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Clearance and Risk Awareness

Because of the widespread presence of cluster submunitions in south Lebanon and the detrimental humanitarian consequences of duds, rapid clearance is essential. Although clearance groups have moved at a quick pace, clearing the estimated hundreds of thousands and possibly up to one million unexploded submunitions is a time- and labor-intensive endeavor. “There is a lot of work. One company, one army, cannot do it,” a demining official said.249 NGOs, governmental organizations, private demining companies, UNIFIL, and the Lebanese Army are collaborating to clear unexploded submunitions as quickly as possible so that civilians may return to their normal lives. These groups have also worked together to create public awareness (risk education) campaigns about submunitions to try to minimize the ongoing civilian casualties.

Clearance History in Lebanon

Because of the large quantity of landmines and unexploded ordnance from previous conflicts, Lebanon already had an extensive demining program in place before the 2006 war. From the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, Israel extensively used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, cluster munitions, and other weapons in Lebanon, leaving behind abundant explosive remnants of war. A landmine impact survey completed in 2003 estimated that mines and other explosive remnants of war affected 137 square kilometers of land in 22 of 24 districts, with high contamination in the immediate area of the UN-delineated Blue Line along the border with Israel.250

To address the need for clearance, the Lebanese government established the National Demining Office, a part of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in the late 1990s. The UN established the Mine Action Coordination Center, overseen by the UN Mine Action Service, in 2002. While the people of Lebanon have benefited greatly from having an established mine clearance program operating for several years, the 2006 conflict interrupted existing clearance efforts. In addition to the vast amount of new explosive remnants of war, the conflict displaced existing minefields, which will have to be re-surveyed and re-marked before clearance. “We were about to phase out…. Unfortunately now we are starting everything anew,” said Habbouba Aoun, coordinator of the Landmines Resource Center.251 

Clearance in South Lebanon

Clearance began immediately after the ceasefire, with the Lebanese Army taking on a large role in clearing visible submunitions. MACC SL and its contractors also quickly responded to the problem. After just two weeks of operations, MACC SL reported that its contractors had located and destroyed 2,171 submunition duds. This total did not include submunitions cleared by the Lebanese Army, UNIFIL, Hezbollah, or ordinary Lebanese civilians.252 As of January 15, 2008, MACC SL contractors, the Lebanese armed forces, and UNIFIL had cleared and destroyed about 140,000 submunition duds.253

Despite the overwhelming contamination in the country, international support leaves some hope that clearance will be completed in a timely manner.254 From August to October 2006, MACC SL focused on “clearance of essential infrastructure like houses, schools, and roads.” Since then, it has turned its attention to “agriculture and grazing lands, as well as communities where applicable.”255

As of mid-December 2007, MACC SL reported that about 26.6 square kilometers of contaminated area had been cleared. It did not give an estimation for finishing the task, but reported that:

25% of identified contaminated land has been fully cleared down to a depth of 20cm and additional 43% has been cleared of all surface threat and is subject to further evaluation as to whether it will also require clearing down to 20cm.256

MACC SL expects to have 52 clearance teams working by the end of 2008.257

UN Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon

MACC SL coordinates unexploded ordnance clearance in south Lebanon in cooperation with the National Demining Office, now called the Lebanon Mine Action Center. It does not perform the clearance tasks itself. Instead, MACC SL has contracted clearance work to NGOs, commercial firms, and governmental groups. MACC SL also liaises and coordinates clearance efforts with the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL.

MACC SL has demarcated eight demining areas and divided them among the clearance teams. As of January 18, 2008, MACC SL-affiliated teams had cleared 46,082 M42/M46s, 57,2721 M77s, 28,136 BLU-63s, 6,892 M85s, and 1,257 MZD-2s.258

Demining Organizations

Mines Advisory Group was the only NGO engaged in clearance in Lebanon when the conflict began in July 2006, and it renewed operations after the ceasefire. “On day one, August 15, we were the only NGO on the ground,” said Andy Gleeson, program manager for MAG.259 As of December 2007, MAG had 22 teams in

An engine from a US-made M26 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rocket landed in Tebnine and is shown here on August 16, 2006. Israel fired hundreds of these rockets, which carry 644 DPICM submunitions each, into Lebanon during the war. © 2006 Marc Garlasco/Human Rights Watch

operation.260 Norwegian People’s Aid began work in Lebanon shortly after the conflict ended and works on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Demining Office. The NGOs DanChurch Aid, Handicap International, and Swiss Foundation for Mine Action have also joined the clearance team. BACTEC and Armor Group are British-based commercial companies clearing cluster munitions, mines, and other unexploded ordnance in Lebanon. Governmental groups working with MACC SL include the New Zealand Defence Forces and the Swedish Rescue Service Agency.261 Together these groups destroyed 37,055 submunitions by June 20, 2007.262 More recent breakdowns by clearance group were not available.

UNIFIL

UNIFIL’s clearance operations in the past focused on “tactical demining” to clear areas where UNIFIL operates. As UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer Ryszard Morczynksi said, however, “the recent war changed this.”263 The unprecedented contamination in the country forced UNIFIL to participate in humanitarian clearance, focusing on areas where civilians are directly impacted by duds. As of June 20, 2007, UNIFIL had disposed of 23,590 duds.264

UNIFIL has more than 20 clearance teams, which include Belgian, Chinese, French, Ghanan, Indian, Indonesian, Italian, South Korean, Spanish, and Turkish battalions. The number of team members per battalion ranges from five to 15.265

Lebanese Army

The Lebanese Army has primarily deployed emergency response teams to remove and destroy unexploded submunitions in and around towns and villages, focusing on removal of visible submunitions in heavily populated areas. “The problem is so huge that we aren’t able to clean everything like people in the South would like,” said a National Demining Office official. “It’s beyond our capabilities.”266 MACC SL teams return to areas cleared by the Lebanese Army to do full clearance.267

Immediately following the ceasefire, the Lebanese Army undertook the most widespread clearance activities, clearing people’s homes, main streets, and visible duds around villages.268 With the increase in other demining teams, however, the Army began phasing out major operations in late October 2006.269 Nevertheless, the Army will continue to remove submunitions still being found in populated areas. The mukhtar of Zawtar al-Sharkiyeh said that when you find duds, “you call them [the Army], and they come and get the bombs.”270 In late October 2006, when Human Rights Watch researchers arrived to Halta a few hours after a child was killed by a dud, the Lebanese Army was already there responding to the community’s call for clearance. The researchers observed the destruction of approximately 15 submunitions during the hour they were in Halta. As of June 20, 2007, the Lebanese armed forces had cleared 60,030 submunitions.271

Hezbollah

In the days after the ceasefire, there were reports of Hezbollah doing clearance of submunition duds and other explosive remnants of war in certain areas. This appears to have been limited to emergency operations in civilian areas. On August 22, 2006, a UN demining official told a reporter, “Hezbollah have picked up a large number of these [submunitions] and put them into boxes and got them away from the children. It’s not the approved method, but the risk is such that if something is not done, people will die.”272 MACC SL told Human Rights Watch in early September 2006 that Hezbollah had stopped doing clearance. Nevertheless, municipal officials told Human Rights Watch in October 2006 that Hezbollah members still cleared submunitions when requested, much in the same way that the Lebanese Army responded to clearance calls.273
Community Clearance

Out of perceived economic necessity, a desire to protect children and others, or lack of awareness, many ordinary Lebanese civilians have been clearing and/or collecting unexploded submunitions despite warnings from the Lebanese government, the UN, and NGOs engaged in risk education projects. Human Rights Watch researchers spoke to community members who either personally performed clearance or knew people who had done so in Halta, Sawane, Tebnine, Yohmor, Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, and Zawtar al-Sharkiyeh.274 In Deir Qanoun, near Tyre, BACTEC deminers found about 1,000 submunitions that villagers had picked up and packed into wooden boxes.275 Clearance by ordinary individuals ranged from collecting a few submunitions to hundreds. One man killed doing self-clearance in Yohmor allegedly collected 400 clusters on his own.276

Civilians have employed various methods to clear duds, including poking them with sticks, throwing rocks at them, burning them, running over them with bulldozers, and burying them. A 65-year-old man in Sawane proudly told Human Rights Watch about collecting duds by hand and boxing them to give to the Lebanese Army.277 Muhammad `Ali Yaghi of Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh also collected submunitions by hand but disposed of them by tossing them into an open field.278 Farmers sometimes burned their fields to destroy submunitions, a dangerous activity. The submunitions may blow up unexpectedly during and after the fire. The fire also burns the ribbons on the top of some submunitions, making it difficult to see them on the ground.279

Various reasons exist as to why community clearance has been so pervasive. In some ways, the sheer volume of duds has necessitated self-clearance. MACC SL’s Chris Clark pointed out, “There’s too much out there to deal with. Locals have to take matters into their own hands.”280 This was particularly true directly after the ceasefire when people returned to homes and communities inundated by submunitions, and the Army and NGOs were unable to perform clearance.

Economic necessity has also been a major factor in self-clearance. Many people have returned to their fields to remove clusters so that they could harvest their crops. It is the poor that are most in need of income from crops and thus most likely to clear duds on their own. As Habbouba Aoun noted, “Those being killed are the disadvantaged people.”281

Shadi Sa`id `Aoun, the 26-year-old farmer from Tair Debbe, who suffered injuries when he decided to clear his field himself, told Human Rights Watch:

The priority is the houses, but I could not wait for the Army to come and remove the ones from the field. It would ruin me. The orchard is my only source of income. That’s why I had to start clearing them myself. My brother and father are still working on collecting the clusters. We know it is dangerous. But we need to clear the field before the rain comes because if the rain comes, it will cover the clusters. That’s also why we can’t irrigate before removing them.282

Poverty has also compelled some individuals to remove submunitions as a source of income. Human Rights Watch researchers heard reports of people being paid anywhere between $1 and $4 per dud by locals who needed their property cleared.283 A UNIFIL civil affairs officer had heard that Palestinian refugees, a marginalized and economically vulnerable population in Lebanon, have also cleared submunitions, receiving pay for the boxful.284 Farmers desperate to try and save the last of the harvest have often turned to these self-clearers.

Newspaper articles glorifying individuals who have done self-clearance have only exacerbated the problem.285 The trumpeting of these demining efforts is particularly damaging considering the ongoing education efforts trying to dissuade children from engaging in the precise behavior that community clearers demonstrate.

Community clearance has generated many challenges for clearance groups. According to den Haan of BACTEC, “Self-clearance makes our job difficult. We don’t know anything about footprint, direction, and strike patterns when they are removed.”286 Furthermore, civilian clearance presents danger to deminers, especially when deminers are given boxes of live duds collected by civilians. “The methods [used by civilians] of disposing of them will no doubt cause problems in the future,” said an official with the Mine Victims Assistance and Mine Risk Awareness section of the National Demining Office.287 Moving unexploded submunitions to another area merely shifts the location of the danger.

Demining groups indicated in the fall of 2006 that civilians were clearing at a lower rate then than they were immediately after the war. “People are realizing self-clearance is stupid and that we provide a better response,” said Chris Clark.288 Nevertheless, even in summer 2007, MACC SL reported that community clearance was still a problem, endangering civilians and deminers and complicating clearance efforts.289 However, by January 2008 MACC SL was able to report that community clearance was rare.290

Lack of Israeli Assistance

Perhaps the biggest challenge to clearance groups has been Israel’s refusal to provide information about its cluster munition strikes. According to a MACC SL official, “The main obstacle for the clearance operations is that we lack good reference information from the Israeli government on the locations they hit with clusters and the quantities.”291 According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Immediately after the cease-fire the IDF gave UNIFIL maps indicating the likely locations of unexploded ordnance, to aid the international attempt to clear these areas and avoid injury to the population.”292 An IDF lawyer told Human Rights Watch, “The IDF gave the best information it could subject to operational and military restrictions,” and said she knew of no complaints from MACC SL.293 Nonetheless, MACC SL has publicly declared the maps provided by Israel to be “absolutely useless” in clearance operations and has repeatedly requested more specific information, such as precise strike coordinates and numbers and types of weapons used.294 An MACC SL official explained:

As each Israeli unit withdraws, it gives maps to the UN with circles on it where they indicate whether there may be a concentration of UXO [unexploded ordinance]. That’s it. There is no distinction between cluster and other bombs. Basically, these are maps that local commanders draw for briefing their own troops. They are not helpful. What we want is strike data with exact date of strike, what was fired and where—not maps.295 

That information would allow deminers to pinpoint their clearance efforts to specific strike locations, ensure that all locations are dealt with, and know what kind of submunitions to expect. MACC SL said in June 2007 that “only upon receipt of detailed strike data by the IDF will we be able to ensure that we have identified all cluster munition strike locations.”296

An IDF reserve officer told a reporter, “We have this information in our computers. I fail to understand why we do not transfer it to them [the UN] and put an end to all this. We are talking about one huge email. Period.”297 An Israeli MLRS platoon commander told Human Rights Watch that before attacks, the MLRS unit received 16-digit target coordinates, and these firing coordinates were recorded in the MLRS launchers’ computer system as well as a handwritten log maintained by each crew. He said that after the end of hostilities, IDF military intelligence collected all of the firing data as the reserve MLRS unit was demobilized.298

As a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Israel helped negotiate Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, which entered into force on November 12, 2006. Israel has not yet ratified the protocol but has expressed support for it. Article 3 of the protocol states that users responsible for unexploded ordnance outside their territory must provide assistance to facilitate clearance.299 To fulfill its humanitarian obligations, Israel should meet the requirements of the protocol.

Risk Education Programs

The high level of unexploded cluster duds in populated areas has made risk education programs critical. NGOs, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Lebanese Army, and community members have collaborated to raise awareness about the dangers of submunitions. These groups have employed a range of tactics. Directly after the ceasefire, the Lebanese Army distributed 100,000 flyers created by UNICEF identifying cluster submunitions and bomblets to community members at checkpoints. Similarly, UNIFIL has distributed UNICEF water bottles with pictures of cluster munitions and submunitions.300 When Human Rights Watch researchers asked witnesses to describe the weapons they had seen, they often pointed to the pictures on the water bottles. Human Rights Watch researchers saw UNICEF posters in several areas in south Lebanon warning civilians of the dangers of cluster submunitions. One such poster stated, “Your peace is our goal,” and displayed pictures identifying the various types of submunitions.

Risk education programs have particularly targeted children. Schools have implemented programs to help children recognize submunitions, while various organizations have distributed videos, CDs, brochures, songs, and storybooks in communities to educate children about the danger of duds.301 The book “Mazen and Leila in Discovery Camp” tells the story of two children who find cluster submunitions while playing in a field. Games have also been popular methods of educating children.

The Lebanese government designated November 4, 2006, May 26, 2007, and November 5, 2007 as National Days against Cluster Bombs, holding events in downtown Beirut to raise awareness about cluster submunitions. Various groups, including UNICEF, the Lebanese Army, Handicap International, and Norwegian People’s Aid, participated in the events, where there were photo exhibits revealing the effects of submunitions, puppet shows teaching children about the perils of duds, and a re-creation of a contaminated zone with displays of different unexploded ordnance.302

The effectiveness of such risk awareness programs has been mixed. Some community leaders told Human Rights Watch researchers of the success of the programs.303 Nevertheless, as apparent by the large number of casualties, many people were still uneducated about the dangers of cluster duds even in late October 2006. UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer Ryszard Morczynski stated, “The level of awareness is increasing, but it is insufficient. So many people in the villages have no clue.”304




249 Human Rights Watch interview with Johan den Haan, BACTEC, Tyre, October 25, 2006.

250 See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2006 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2006), pp. 988-989.

251 Human Rights Watch interview with Habbouba Aoun, coordinator, Landmine Resource Center,Beirut, October 20, 2006.

252 It consisted of 820 M77 MLRS submunitions, 715 M42 artillery submunitions, 631 M85 artillery submunitions, and five BLU-63 aerial bomblets. As of September 13, the total had increased to 5,045 submunitions, including 2,121 M77 MLRS submunitions, 2,066 M42 artillery submunitions, 691 M85 artillery submunitions, and 167 BLU-63 aerial bomblets. In addition, Lebanese Armed Forces had cleared 8,626 submunitions and UNIFIL had cleared 3,269, for a combined total of 16,940.

253 Email communication from Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, January 16, 2008.

254 Human Rights Watch interview with Allan Poston, chief technical advisory, National Demining Office, UNDP, Beirut, October 20, 2006.

255 Email communication from Julia Goehsing, program officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, May 14, 2007.

256 MACC SL, “November–December 2007 Report of the Mine Action Co-ordination Centre, South Lebanon,” December 17, 2007, http://www.maccsl.org/reports/Monthly%20Reports/Monthly%202007/Monthly%20Report%20Nov%20-%20Dec%2007.pdf (accessed January 15, 2008), pp. 1, 6.

257 Ibid.

258 Email communication from Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2008.

259 Human Rights Watch interview with Andy Gleeson, program manager and technical operations manager, Mines Advisory Group, Kfar Joz, October 25, 2006.

260 MACC SL, “November-December 2007 Report of the Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon,” December 17, 2007, http://www.maccsl.org/reports/Monthly%20Reports/Monthly%202007/Monthly%20Report%20Nov%20-%20Dec%2007.pdf  (accessed January 31, 2008).

261 Ibid.

262 Email communication from Julia Goehsing, program officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2007.

263 Human Rights Watch interview with Ryszard Morczynski, civil affairs officer, UNIFIL, al-Naqoura, October 27, 2006.

264 Email communication from Julia Goehsing, program officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2007.

265 MACC SL, “November-December 2007 Report of the Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon.”

266 Human Rights Watch interview with officer (name withheld), Mine Victims Assistance and Mine Risk Education section, National Demining Office, Beirut, October 20, 2006.

267 Human Rights Watch interview with Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer, MACC SL, Tyre, October 21, 2006.

268 Ibid.

269 Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, program manager, MACC SL, Tyre, October 21, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer, MACC SL, Tyre October 21, 2006.

270 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed `Ali Mahdi Suleiman, mukhtar, Zawtar al-Sharkiyeh, October 23, 2006.

271 Email communication from Julia Goehsing, program officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2007.

272 Lyon, “Israel Cluster-Bombed 170 Sites in Lebanon—UN,” Reuters (quoting Tekimiti Gilbert, operations chief for MACC SL).

273 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Qhanfer, municipal leader, `Ainata, October 27, 2006.

274 Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad `Ali Yaghi, Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, October 23, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Kasim M. `Aleik, head of Yohmor municipality, Yohmor, October 26, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Mouzamer, vice head of Sawane municipality, Sawane, October 26, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Yousif Fawwaz, mukhtar, Tebnine, October 24, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Ghattas Lel Gharib, head of Rashaya al Foukhar municipality, Rashaya al Foukhar, October 22, 2006.

275 Serene Assir, “A Million Killers in Waiting,” Al Ahram, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/815/re8.htm (accessed October 9, 2006).

276 Human Rights Watch interview with Kassin `Aqil, Sawane, October 26, 2006.

277 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Mouzamer, vice head of Sawane municipality, Sawane October 26, 2006.

278 Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad `Ali Yaghi, Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, October 23, 2006.

279 Human Rights Watch interview with Andy Gleeson, program manager and technical operations manager, Mines Advisory Group, October 25, 2006.

280 Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, program manager, MACC SL, Tyre, October 23, 2006.

281 Human Rights Watch interview with Habbouba Aoun, coordinator, Landmines Resource Center, Beirut, October 20, 2006.

282 Human Rights Watch interview with Shadi Sa`id `Aoun, farmer, Hammoud Hospital, Saida, September 22, 2006.

283 Human Rights Watch interview with Habbouba Aoun, coordinator, Landmines Resource Center, Beirut, October 20, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed Ismael Kadre, farmer, Kfar Shufa, October 22, 2006; Anthony Shadid, “In Lebanon, a War's Lethal Harvest; Threat of Unexploded Bombs Paralyzes the South,” Washington Post, September 26, 2006.

284 Human Rights Watch interview with Ryszard Morczynksi, civil affairs officer, UNIFIL, al-Naqoura, October 27, 2006.

285 Human Rights Watch interview with Habbouba Aoun, coordinator, Landmine Resource Center, Beirut, October 20, 2006.

286 Human Rights Watch interview with Johan den Haan, BACTEC, Tyre, October 25, 2006.

287 Human Rights Watch interview with officer (name withheld), Mine Victims Assistance and Mine Risk Education section, National Demining Office, Beirut, October 20, 2006.

288 Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, program manager, MACC SL, Tyre, October 23, 2006.

289 Email communication from Julia Goehsing, program officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2007.

290 According to MACC SL, “Due to Rapid Response plan that was implemented directly after the cease-fire, followed by systematic clearance based on humanitarian needs of the local community, it is not a ‘problem’ anymore. Of course there could be some activities going on that we are not aware of but that would be very rare and rather an exception.” Email communication from Dalya Farran, media and post-clearance officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, January 15, 2008.

291 Government of Lebanon, “Higher Relief Commission Daily Situation Report No. 78,” October 19, 2006 (quoting Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer, MACC SL). 

292 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the Headlines: Legal and Operational Aspects of the Use of Cluster Bombs,” September 5, 2006.

293 Human Rights Watch interview with Maj. Dorit Tuval, head of strategic section, International Law Department, IDF, Tel Aviv, July 2, 2007.

294 “UN Calls Israel’s Use of Cluster Bombs in Lebanon ‘Outrageous,’” Ha’aretz, September 19, 2006.

295 Human Rights Watch interview with Dalya Farran, media and post clearance officer, MACC SL, Tyre, August 19, 2006.

296 Email communication from Julia Goehsing, program officer, MACC SL, to Human Rights Watch, July 20, 2007.

297 Rapoport, “A Barrage of Accusations,” Ha’aretz.

298 Human Rights Watch interviews with IDF reservists (names withheld), Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Israel, October 2006.

299 “In cases where a user of explosive ordnance which has become explosive remnants of war does not exercise control of the territory, the user shall, after the cessation of active hostilities, provide where feasible, inter-alia, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance, bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including inter-alia, through the United Nations system or other relevant organizations, to facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or destruction of such explosive remnants of war.” Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V), U.N. Doc. CCW/MSP/2003/2 (Nov. 27, 2003), entered into force November 12, 2006, art. 3.

300 Human Rights Watch interview with officer (name withheld) Mine Victims Assistance and Mine Risk Education section, National Demining Office, Beirut, October 20, 2006.

301 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed `Ali Mahdi Suleiman, mukhtar, Zawtar al-Sharkiyeh, October 23, 2006.

302 “Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs,” Cluster Munition Coalition press release, November 5, 2007, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.asp?id=98 (accessed January 15, 2008); “Dozens of Lebanese Protest Custer Bombs with Sit-in in Beirut,” International Herald Tribune, November 5, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/05/africa/ME-GEN-Lebanon-Mines-Protest.php (accessed January 15, 2008); Cluster Munition Coalition, “July Campaign Bulletin,” http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/news.asp?id=78 (accessed December 29, 2007); “Saturday, November 4, 2006: A National Day Against Cluster Munitions,” Caritas Liban, November 2, 2006, http://caritaslebanon.blogspot.com/2006/11/saturday-november-4th-2006-national.html (accessed December 29, 2007).

303 Human Rights Watch interview with Ahmed `Ali Mahdi Suleiman, mukhtar, Zawtar al-Sharkiyeh, October 23, 2006.

304 Human Rights Watch interview with Ryszard Morczynski, civil affairs officer, UNIFIL, al-Naqoura, October 27, 2006.