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VIII. Recruitment and Use of Children

The Naxalites, Salwa Judum members, and the Chhattisgarh police have recruited and used children in different capacities that expose them to risk of injury and death. Salwa Judum does not have any official policy for recruitment of children, but children have actively participated in Salwa Judum meetings and raids along with government security forces. Many eyewitnesses or victims of Salwa Judum raids said that they saw children, some as young as age 12, among Salwa Judum members who raided their village.371 One woman who was beaten by Salwa Judum members commented that children also mercilessly beat her without showing any respect for her age.372

In their special police officers (SPOs) program that began around June 2005, the Chhattisgarh police began to recruit tribal camp residents, including children, to assist the government security forces in Dantewada and Bijapur districts.373 The objective, it appears, was to use tribal communities’ knowledge of jungle terrain to conduct anti-Naxalite combing operations. SPOs are deployed along with the paramilitary police on such operations and perform roles comparable to those of the paramilitary police.374 Their posts entail significant risks that place children, particularly boys who are SPOs, in the forefront of armed encounters and Naxalite reprisals. An unknown number of underage SPOs have been killed in the conflict.375

The Naxalites do not deny the recruitment and use of children in hostilities—it is part of their policy and practice.

There are no clear estimates of the number of children used by these different parties.

India is party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).376 It is also party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol), which was adopted by the UN in 2000.377 The Optional Protocol raises the standards set in the CRC by establishing 18 as the minimum age for any conscription, forced recruitment, or direct participation in hostilities. It also places obligations upon non-state armed groups—article 4 states that “armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a state should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of eighteen.”

The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles), a set of international guidelines adopted in February 2007, reiterate that states have a duty to respect the humanitarian character of camps, and ensure that displaced children are not recruited for combat. The Paris Principles recommend individual registration and documentation for all displaced children as a preventive measure.378  

The Paris Principles also provide guidance for release, protection, and reintegration of children. Children who have been associated with armed forces or armed groups should not be prosecuted, punished, or threatened with prosecution or punishment solely for their membership of those forces or groups. Prosecution for crimes committed by children when they were members of armed groups should conform to international juvenile justice standards. Further, release and rehabilitation measures should be carried out without any conditions. During release, children should be handed over to “an appropriate, mandated, independent civilian process,” and the majority of children should be returned to their family and community or a family and community environment as soon as possible after their release.379

A. Government recruitment and use of children as special police officers

Chhattisgarh police have not actively recruited new SPOs since March 2006.380 Even though the government claims that all children in its ranks have been removed, Human Rights Watch found that children who were appointed earlier continue to serve as SPOs, perform paramilitary tasks, and risk their lives. Police estimate that as of February 2008 there were around 3,500-3,800 SPOs in Dantewada and Bijapur districts;381 of these, 10 to 20 percent are female.382 The percentage of children among SPOs is not known.

Many civilians who attended Salwa Judum’s public meetings and victims of Salwa Judum raids told Human Rights Watch that they saw underage SPOs in meetings and raids.383 Vasanti Kumar, an 18-year-old former resident of Konta camp stated that she saw SPOs younger than herself:

I have seen SPOs younger than me in the camp. I cannot tell you the exact number because they are on duty in different places at different times but there will easily be at least 10 such SPOs [in the camp].384

In December 2007 a surrendered Naxalite who now works with the police confirmed that underage SPOs continued to work with the police.385 A teacher from Bhairamgarh claimed that he recognized school dropouts from his area who were serving as SPOs even in December 2007:

[I]n Bhairamgarh, about 15 to 20 children dropped out of high school [after class 8 in 2005] to become SPOs—both boys and girls. I live in Bhairamgarh and many of these children also stay there. Now they are all SPOs. Their entire schooling has been ruined—they can never go back to school because they have discontinued education for over two years.386

Children interviewed by Human Rights Watch also claimed that they knew school dropouts who were enlisted as SPOs.387 A student in eighth standard said she had friends who were serving as SPOs even in December 2007: “I know a girl [name withheld] who was studying in seventh standard with me. She stopped studying and became an SPO. She is still an SPO.”388

A villager from Sankanpalli described seeing children among the police that visited his village:

The CRPF [Central Reserve Police Force] come to my village every 10 to 15 days, at least twice a month. The SPOs also accompany the CRPF. Each time, about 200 SPOs and 200 CRPF come to my village … The SPOs are of all age groups. The youngest is about 14 to 15 years and there are people in their 20s and 30s also.389

Chhattisgarh police say that the minimum age for SPOs is 18, but do not deny that children were recruited initially.390 They explained that many recruits from rural areas do not have birth certificates or school certificates (many have not attended schools), and therefore they are forced to rely on oral confirmations of age given by the headmen of the applicants’ villages. 391

Police officials also said they have made a concerted attempt to remove all underage recruits from the ranks but were unable to give us additional details.392 In February 2008 Human Rights Watch interviewed four SPOs from a police station in Konta block of Dantewada district. They looked obviously underage but stated that they were age 18 or 19 even though they did not know their birth years.393 These SPOs said they had been serving for over two years.394 They stated that the police or government officials had neither asked them to bring age-related documents (birth or school certificates) at the time of recruitment nor sought age verification more recently.395

The recruitment process

The national law does not contain any age-related criteria for recruitment of civilians as SPOs.396 The Dantewada police superintendent told Human Rights Watch that the Chhattisgarh police followed three appointment criteria: “Applicants should be above age 18, should volunteer to be an SPO, and should be a victim of Naxal  violence.”397

However, it is obvious that no special care was taken to ensure that all applicants are indeed at least age 18.  SPOs explained that the application procedure was simple and does not involve a stringent verification of age:

To apply to become an SPO, we need to go to the police station and ask for forms and fill out the forms. In the form, they ask for our name, father’s name, age, photo, and village name. The form also asks us whether we were sangam [village-level Naxalite association] members in our village…. The police tell us that anyone who has passed fifth class can become SPOs but we know that even people who have not studied at all can become SPOs. They [police] also tell us that only people who are 18 years can become SPOs but they take people who are younger also—it’s only approximate and based on their assessment. When applying, we need someone [from our village] to introduce us to prove who we are, from where we are. If we are educated, then we can show our certificate. If we have not studied, then we can call people from our village who will vouch for us—like sarpanch [village official] or patel [village headman]. So they take people who have not studied also.398

Even though age documentation is difficult to procure, it was found that in some cases police failed to even inquire whether applicants were at least age 18. A former resident of a camp who was asked to become an SPO said,

Even boys who were 15 years old were becoming SPOs. There are boys and girls who hold rifles and the rifles are bigger than them … Police asked me also to become an SPO but I refused because I did not want to become an SPO and commit heinous crimes. I did not want to shoot and kill people. They did not ask me how old I was when they asked me to become an SPO. They do not ask anyone how old they are. Even 14-year-olds can become SPOs if the police want them to become SPOs.399

In cases where school children become SPOs, age-related documentation or oral verification from teachers is easy to procure, and police have been negligent in not verifying the age of such applicants. 

While there is no evidence of police coercion in SPO recruitment, in some cases Salwa Judum leaders, village headmen, or police have approached camp residents and asked them to become SPOs. As one girl explained,

In the camp they asked me and my sisters to become SPOs. I said I wanted to take care of my sister and would not become an SPO because of that. They keep asking me every time I go to [name withheld] camp. They keep asking my sister also – they tell her “ask your sister to become an SPO.”…They ask everyone who is around [age] 16.400

In some cases, children have chosen to become SPOs because it provides a livelihood.401 For example, Irram Seethamma who claimed she was age 18 at the time she was appointed as SPO explained to Human Rights Watch why she signed up:

I became an SPO last year in March [2006]. I became an SPO even before my brother to earn money for my family. After we moved to the camp we had no income because we did not have any work. So I thought working as an SPO would give us some money. We used to have fields in [village name withheld] near [name withheld]. But now we do not have any fields. A few of my friends and I discussed becoming an SPO and we all applied together. I studied with them in school. We all studied till the eighth standard and then stopped studying after we came to the camp. I wanted to study but could not continue because I have to help with household work … we needed the money badly.402

Lack of vocational training and other activities for youth also appears to be a motivation to sign up for SPO posts. SPO Mandavi Mohan, appointed at age 17, reasoned: “Judum started, what could I do? I couldn’t sit around idly. So I became an SPO.”403

In other cases, SPOs, many of whom were underage when they joined, said that they signed up to avenge Naxalite killings. As one SPO explained,

I became an SPO to take revenge. My brother was an SPO and he was killed by Naxalites. My brother died in February 2006 when he was coming back from Dornapal after a [Salwa Judum] rally.404

At the time of recruitment, most SPOs are given no information regarding the nature of SPOs’ duties or possible hazards:

When we go to give the filled-out forms they tell us to come for training. They don’t tell us anything else—nothing about SPOs’ powers, functions, and duties.405

Everyone who applies for the SPO job is tested for physical fitness. From their own experience, SPOs surmise that applicants who do well in the physical fitness regimen are recruited as SPOs, but are not aware of any official screening procedure.406

Training and duties

SPO training largely includes physical fitness workouts and some basic training in the use of weapons.407 All SPOs are issued a service weapon while on duty—a .303 rifle.408 SPOs explain that, typically, police deploy female SPOs as guards at checkposts, base camps, and police stations: “Women get only morcha duty [guard duty]. Occasionally they take women one or two kilometers away to the jungles to show them how it [combing operation] looks.”409

Male SPOs perform the same guard duties as women but also take part in patrols, Salwa Judum rallies and meetings, and armed fighting.410 One SPO described how his brother, also an SPO, died while returning from one such Salwa Judum rally:

My brother died in February 2006 when he was coming back from Dornapal after a [Salwa Judum] rally. Judum was returning from Dornapal and were on their way to Konta in five trucks. There was an ambush and a landmine. Thirty-five SPOs died and my brother was one of them. My brother actually survived the blast but Naxalites then killed him with bow and arrow.411

Male SPOs accompany government security forces on anti-Naxalite combing operations in interior areas of Dantewada and Bijapur districts. Three SPOs who participated in combing operations in 2007 told Human Rights Watch that these operations resulted in armed exchanges with Naxalites; the SPOs claimed that they were around age 17 or 18 at that time.412

One male SPO who was injured in a Naxalite ambush while on duty stated:

Sometimes we go on combing operations. We were caught in Naxalite firing on October 29, 2007, on Gangalur road, between Bosaguda and Pamaloia. Fifteen SPOs and five regular police had gone to the area. We were on foot and went there for road opening—we stand on either side of the road and only if we say that the road is clear [of Naxalites’ and landmines] will vehicles travel the road; we have to stand guard on either side. As soon as we reached this place, even before we could sit down, [Naxalite] firing started. I got injured in four places. Five SPOs died and three were injured.413

Serving as SPOs places children at great risk, particularly male SPOs who serve on the front lines during armed encounters.  The Dantewada superintendent of police said,

[Naxalites are] inflicting terrible blows to the police. Since January 2007 I lost around 137 of my boys [police including SPOs].414

The police stations where SPOs are deployed are poorly protected and thus easily breached during Naxalite attacks. “We are expected to go out and fight the Maoists, but our police stations are little better than cattle sheds,” one official complained.415 For instance, Naxalites attacked a police outpost in Rani Bodli in March 2007 in which around 55 police including 27 SPOs were killed. One journalist who visited this site told Human Rights Watch that he saw the bodies of many SPOs, and estimated that approximately 10 of them appeared under age 18.416

SPOs complain to Human Rights Watch that they are not only at the forefront of armed encounters, but at times are also abandoned by better trained and equipped government security forces who run for safety during armed encounters.417 One SPO said that despite repeated SPO requests to be sent in larger patrol parties, the police sent them on combing operations in smaller groups that were easily overpowered by Naxalites.418

SPOs perform duties that make them vulnerable not only to Naxalite attacks but also to reprisals.419 The Dantewada superintendent of police described SPOs as “the number one target of Naxalites.”420 A Judum leader opined, “If Naxalites say that they will allow people to go back without killing them, then villagers can go back. People who are SPOs and people who are sarpanches or mukhiyas [village headmen] cannot go back.”421

SPOs, including children, have been ordered to participate in a range of human rights violations. Some SPOs admitted that they carried out police orders to kill and beat civilians suspected of being Naxalites, including child recruits. One male SPO who was under age 18 at the time of a 2007 anti-Naxalite combing operation in Maraiguda stated that he was ordered to open fire on a group of children wearing school uniforms.422 Two other SPOs admitted to accompanying Salwa Judum members and government security forces on raids in Uddinguda, Barraimuga, Birla, Gaganpalli, Ikkalguda, Kattanguda, Darbaguda, and Nendra villages between 2006 and 2007.423 At the time of these raids, they were age 17 or 18.

One female SPO admitted to beating two suspected Naxalites in the police station:

Once when I was in the police station the police told me to beat two people who were caught and brought to the police station. The police told me they were Naxalites and so I had to beat them. I was hesitant but because they told me to beat them, I beat both of them.424

Working conditions for SPOs

“[W]e are expected to work harder than the police,” complained an SPO who also pointed out that they were paid less than regular police. 425 The government pays SPOs 1,500 rupees (roughly US$37) each month. People who are rendered jobless after they abandon their homes, fields, and farming, at times turn in desperation to the risk-ridden SPO post for money. One SPO, speaking for a group of SPOs, said,

We are not given any uniforms. We have to buy our own uniforms—khaki shirt and pants. They give us 1,500 rupees and expect us to buy a uniform and also survive within this money. We have to feed our family also with this.426

The government claims it has a group insurance scheme for SPOs but one SPO informed us that the government does not provide adequate assistance to injured SPOs:

Many SPOs are injured. When they are injured, they are given treatment for two days and then they are brought to the house and left —no one to take care of them or ask about them. Sometimes, if they are injured very badly, then they lose their job [otherwise they continue to be employed].… For example, if my right arm is blown, I cannot carry a huge rifle with one hand so they will put me on duty with a small gun. How does that help? That is more dangerous for us. But the government does not care. We have not heard about any group insurance scheme for SPOs.427

Another SPO who was injured in an armed encounter with Naxalites stated that he got some government assistance but had to pay for a lot of his medical treatment out of his own pocket.428

Freedom to resign from SPO posts

The Dantewada superintendent of police maintained that SPOs had the freedom to resign in case they chose to do so.429 Some SPOs felt that they could give a resignation letter and leave.430 They said that four or five SPOs resigned from their police station because they got permanent jobs in government offices.431

However, NGO sources working in Dantewada and Bijapur districts stated that in some cases SPOs who were scared of being caught in the crossfire between Naxalites and police had run away, been forcibly brought back to the camp by other SPOs, and had been forced to continue their service.432 They also felt that it was harder for SPOs who were former sangam members to desert and return to their villages.433

The Chhattisgarh state government response

Government officials maintained that underage SPOs were no longer a part of their SPO force. In fact, Vishwa Ranjan, the state director general of police even denied that underage SPOs were recruited and reasoned that tribal youth appeared younger than they actually were:

There are many reports of underage SPOs but it’s not true. Age is very difficult to assess. Tribal communities have a peculiar way of aging. They look very young even if they are not very young and then after a particular age, they begin to age very fast—so suddenly they look very old when they are actually not that old. We ask people what their age is and verify it with the sarpanch.434

However, the Dantewada Superintendent of Police Sharma conceded that there had been recruitment of underage SPOs and stated that the police department had taken action to identify and remove such SPOs from their posts:

A small percentage of SPOs were underage. It was a bona fide mistake. Now they have all been removed. We got strict instructions from the MHA [Ministry of Home Affairs]. You tell us what we can do—if we ask them [applicants for SPO posts] for their age they say something like “I was born in winter.” We cannot go by their height and looks because the tribal build is different. They are also not educated and so we have reduced their educational qualification to allow them to be SPOs—they should have passed class five. However, we have tried to look at available records and have removed those that appear to be underage from the force.435

The Dantewada superintendent of police claimed that “[o]ver the last four months [September-December 2007], we have removed over 100 SPOs, and in the last six months [July-December 2007], 150 were removed and 50 have left of their own choice,” but was unable to elaborate upon the different grounds for their removal.436 He was not able to give us a breakdown of the 150 dismissals but stated that some of them were also dismissed due to disciplinary reasons.437 Another police official stated that many underage SPOs were removed before his tenure began in 2007 and apologized for not having additonal details.438

The government does not have a scheme for rehabilitation and reintegration of underage SPOs who are released because of their age. The Dantewada superintendent of police clearly stated that people who are dismissed “just go back and live in the camp.”439 A teacher from Bijapur expressed his concern that “[v]illagers have … been removed from their SPO post and no alternative employment is provided to them.”440 The teacher further explained how “[f]ormer SPOs can never go back to their villages because they would get killed [by Naxalites].”441

B. Recruitment and use of children by Naxalites

All former Naxalites interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that they joined different Naxalite wings when they were children. Naxalites organize children between ages six and twelve into balsangams (village-level children’s associations). Depending on their skills and aptitude, children from a balsangamare “promoted” to other Naxalite departments: sangams (village-level associations), CNMs or chaitanya natya manch (street theater troupes), jan militias (armed informers who travel with dalams), anddalams (armed squads). Typically, there is no direct forced recruitment, but Naxalites pressure parents by repeatedly “requesting” that they send their children into Naxalite ranks. 

Most former Naxalites who served in sangams, jan militias, or dalams said that they had received weapons training when they were children. Children who are recruited into a dalamare given weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and are involved in armed fighting against government forces. Children in bal sangams, sangams,andCNMs do not actively participate in hostilities, but are nevertheless exposed to great risks during government anti-Naxalite combing operations. As noted above, one SPO who participated in these operations described how the police opened fire on a group of children allegedly because they were part of a CNM:

In Maraiguda we found a group of children wearing school uniforms sitting and eating food. We … started firing at the group. We were sure that it was a CNM and therefore did not check. We know because the theater group also wears uniforms. The children started running. They did not fire back. We did not bother to check if anyone was dead … We fired and ran from there.442

Even if the children were members of a CNM, it would have been unlawful to fire at them.

Human Rights Watch does not have any estimates for the number of children recruited and used by Naxalites, but notes that all of the former Naxalites who were interviewed stated that they started working for Naxalites in some capacity when they were children.

Recruitment into balsangams

Naxalites usually enlist children between ages six and twelve into balsangams. Balsangam is the village-level children’s association where children learn Maoist ideology. Most children who are part of balsangams also work as informers and are trained in the use of non-lethal weapons such as sticks.443

There appears to be no fixed method, number, or quota for bal sangam enlistment. When we asked how children were chosen to be in bal sangams, former Naxalite Satyam David said, “They included almost all children’s names in the bal sangam [in his village].”444 For example, the largest bal sangam described to Human Rights Watch had 150 members and the smallest had 10-15 members.445

Subba Atish, a former Naxalite commander, gave us a brief description of the role of bal sangam members:

[Children join a] balsangam from age six or seven. From a balsangam, they go to a sangam or CNM, and from there to different departments depending upon how good they are. One is in a balsangam until around age 12 … We used to sing songs at bal sangam meetings. They [senior Naxalites] used to talk about Marx and Lenin. They used to tell us we must join the fight. We [balsangam members] also worked as informers and told them [dalam members] about police movements and locations…. For example, [bal sangam members] will be playing with jeeps and if they see anyone they will run and tell [dalam members]…. I was in a bal sangam for three years…. Became balsangam adhyaksh [president] when I was in class seven. I continued education up to class nine. We had around 150 children in the balsangam from our village.446

When he was part of the balsangam Satyam David was “on sentry duty and used to collect rice from families for Naxalites.”447

Subba Atish described the training he received in his balsangam:

We [balsangam members] also got to watch all trainings about planting bombs, even though we weren’t given training for these things when we were in the balsangam. Balsangam members are trained to fight with sticks…. I was also trained with sticks—how to fight with them, to attack, to take positions and so on.448

Two former dalam members Tarrem Kosa and Sushovan Banu also stated that they trained balsangam children in the use of non-lethal weapons.449  Coincidentally, Human Rights Watch spoke to Sushovan Banu when he was with Bhushan Corin, one of his former balsangam pupils from a non-lethal weapons training class,450 and Sushovan Banu joked that Bhushan Corin was not good at these trainings and therefore had not been inducted into a dalam.451 

Recruitment into other Naxalite wings, including armed units 

Typically, after age 12, balsangam members are sent to other Naxalite wings depending upon their skills. Children are also recruited into sangams, CNMs, jan militias, and dalams. Human Rights Watch spoke to four former Naxalites who were sent to these Naxalite wings from balsangams;452 one of them eventually became a Naxalite dalam commander and was part of many armed encounters with the police.453 Another former dalam member, Tarrem Kosa, said that there were around seven or eight underage members in his 45-member dalam. 

Some children are inducted directly into other Naxalite wings without being trained in balsangams. Human Rights Watch spoke to six former Naxalites who were directly inducted into other Naxalite wings when they were children—three became sangam members, one joined a jan militia, and two joined a dalam. Subba Atish said that villagers who were being inducted into dalams had to take an oath: “To join a dalam, one has to take a public oath in front of all the villagers—‘I have no family any more. You [dalam] are my family.’”454 Naxalites also recruited school-going children to teach in Naxalite-run schools.455

In some cases, Naxalites approach parents and pressure them to send their children to join the “people’s war.” In other cases, Naxalites visit schools and ask children to join them. Subba Atish, a former Naxalite commander, said, “They go to school and ask children to join a dalam. This has happened in the Jagargonda area. They don’t force children but ask them.”456 Typically, recruitment involves repeated visits to homes to convince parents to send their children.

Given Naxalites’ brutal punishment of dissent or non-conformist behavior as described above, a mere recruitment request to families creates tremendous pressure on them. In some cases Naxalites simply note down children’s names during meetings and ask them to join.457

In two cases, two former dalam members told Human Rights Watch that Naxalites abducted and inducted them into dalamswhen they were children.458 Vikas Modhey recounted how he joined a dalam:

I joined when I was 15 years old. I was working in the fields in the evening, and they took me away. I was in Konta when a dalam came and took me. I was alone. They said they wanted to train me. They knew me from before because they had come to my village. They didn’t say anything, but I thought they would beat me if I didn’t go.459

Similarly, Tarrem Kosa was taken from his school with the assurance that he would be sent back in 15 days:

I joined the military dalam when I was 13 or 14 years old. I was studying in an ashram school [government-run residential school]—eighth standard—when Naxalites came to my hostel…. They took four [students] from my school, but after 10-12 kilometers, the other three were sent away, and only I was kept. Two of them were in the eighth and one was in the seventh. I don’t know why the others were sent back.… After two or three days, I told them I wanted to go back to school. The dalam leader said, “Don’t worry, we will send you to school till the 10th.” 460

Tarrem Kosa said that there were others from his dalam who had experiences similar to his:

In the group of 90, there were about 30 or 40 my age—14 or 15. I don’t know if the others left school to join our dalam. They may not have studied. Some were abducted. I wasn’t told the truth about what would happen to me after 15 days. Most of the others were also like that.461

Veera Etishan used to study in a residential school. Naxalites sometimes came to his school for food. They often asked him and other students from his school to join them. When he was around age 15, they told him that he had to join the sangam in his village. Veera said that he tried to refuse but was given no choice: “They said, ‘We have already added your name.’”462 He continued to study but participated in sangam activities. When he was in class six, Naxalites recruited him as a teacher for a school run by them.463

Satyam David felt that “Naxalites used to stop us [children] from studying, particularly when we went to ashram schools outside the village.”464 On January 25, 2007, when he was in class nine (roughly age 14 or 15) he was forcibly taken out of school and brought to a Naxalite camp in the jungle. They called a people’s court and accused him of being a police informer and said that he should be killed. His family begged some sangam members to intercede, and he was spared. However, he was told to stay in the village and not return to school—“People used to follow me all the time. I was forced to attend [sangam] meetings.”465 Eventually, Satyam David was recruited as a jan militia member.

Lingu Gopal was around age 14 or 15 when Naxalites came to his village in 2000 or 2001 and announced his name among those of several other boys and girls who had been selected to join a jan militia group. Before that he had already been deployed as an informer: “We used to be on sentry duty to check on police movements. We used special whistles and drum beats to inform the sangam members.”466 He claimed that he initially told Naxalites that he did not want to be part of a jan militiabut had no choice: “They [Naxalites] said, ‘Why will you not join? Do you want to join the police?’ I was scared and so I went.”467

When Veka Idma was about age 12 or 13, he joined a jan militia group. When he was in class five, a Naxalite range committee member inducted him into the group.468 He was told he could continue schooling. His training began with physical exercise to build stamina. Then he was taught to fight with sticks and eventually he learned how to use and clean rifles. He also learned how to make bombs. When he went with the jan militia group he had “tiffin bombs [bombs packed in tiffin boxes] and wire bombs.” He also learned how to use AK-47 and Insas rifles. Veka Idma said, “There were 25 people in my jan militia—seven others were about my age and younger.”469      

Naxalites asked Vattam Fanu to quit school and join a dalam. He refused saying that he wanted to study. This upset Naxalite commanders who visited his family every day and asked him to sign up. Eventually, at age 16, frightened that he would not be able to escape Naxalites, he ran away to a town nearby:470

They [Naxalites] came to the village and asked all young men and women, as well as teenage boys and girls to join them. They first told us to attend a meeting. They sang songs and made speeches. Then they started writing down names of boys and girls and told them to come to the jungle to learn to fight. I went as well. They were training people in the use of sharp, pointed sticks. They told me I must join a dalam.  I refused and told them that I wanted to study. They were angry. They started coming to our house every few days. This went on for three or four years. Then they started becoming much more insistent, saying that I had studied enough. Finally, I was forced to run away. For a long time I lived in the forest, sleeping in trees to be safe. My mother would come in the middle of the night to feed me.”471

When Himmatlal Korbe was in class six (around age 16 or 17), Naxalites went to his house and asked his parents to send him with them. His parents told them that they wanted him to study. Himmatlal Korbe was not at home when Naxalites visited his house. When he returned, his parents explained what had happened and sent him away to a hostel in another village. He stayed in the hostel and studied there to avoid Naxalite recruitment. Naxalites came to his house again when he was studying in class eight and demanded that his parents send him. When he found out that Naxalites were looking for him he ran away from the hostel and settled near a village close to a police station. He was forced to discontinue his schooling and has been living in this village since the day he ran away from the hostel. In February 2008, three or four years after he first ran away, Himmatlal Korbe still had not returned to his native village to visit his parents. His parents visited him occasionally.472

Himesh Karan is the eldest of three brothers. As a child he was raised by his maternal grandfather and only returned to his native village after finishing class five. Soon after he came to his native village Naxalites attempted to recruit him:

Naxalites came to our village and asked for a meeting with all those who were educated. The villagers told them that I knew how to read and write. So they came to me and asked me to join them. I refused and they were very angry. They said that it was the duty of educated boys like me to help them. Frightened, I went away from the village once again to stay with my uncle.473 

Training

All former Naxalites who served in sangams, CNMs, jan militias, or dalams said that they had received weapons training when they were children. Dalam members used to run training camps in the village for them. Sushovan Banu who became a sangam member when he was around age 12 or 13 said,

Whenever the dalam [in charge of that area] came, they would organize a training camp for sangam members—about Mao, Lenin, weapons training, training in landmines, and bombs. I knew how to plant landmines and bombs when I was in [my village] sangam, and later on when I became a dalam member I trained other sangam members.474

Kripash Hari who also became a sangam member when he was a child said,

As a sangam member, I assembled people for meetings, cooked for dalam members when they came to the village, and worked as an informer. I had bows and arrows and was trained to use tiffin bombs [bombs packed in tiffin boxes] and other types of wire-bombs. I was also given training to use guns and rifles but was not given a rifle. I was only a sangam member—sangam members do not get rifles. 475

Similarly, children who served as informers in jan militias received weapons training. They each also had their own bag with different bombs which they had to carry when they were accompanying dalam members. Veka Idma, who became a balsangam member in class four and a jan militia member when he was studying in class five, said,

After I went with the jan militia people I had my own bag with tiffin bombs [bombs packed in tiffin boxes] and wire bombs … I also underwent training with AK-47 and Insas.476

Two other youth, Tarrem Kosa and Vikas Modhey, told Human Rights Watch they had been armed, received weapons training, and were part of armed encounters with the police, all while still children.477

Tarrem Kosa’s life as a dalam member

A dalam interrupted Tarrem Kosa’s school days when he was in class eight. They came to his school one day, watched him playing sports, and saw that he was agile and strong. That sealed his fate and decided his career. Dalam members approached him and asked him to go with them. He said he wanted to study, but they promised to let him go after 15 days. Unfortunately, they did not keep their promise.

First he was trained to use bows and arrows. Because he was good, the dalam leader promoted him and gave him a rifle. They also trained him to plant bombs. Looking back at his years as a dalam member and the separation from his family, Tarrem said,

I used to think of home a lot. I worried I would never be able to contact my parents. I used to read magazines to kill time … Sometimes I would sit and cry. I never had the opportunity to contact my parents. I thought of home a lot, but never had a way to get back.

During his three years with a dalam, he participated in several armed encounters with government security forces. Despite his young age there was no place for fear during such encounters: “You can’t be scared, you just have to run.” Dalam members did not get paid. They depended on villages and schools for food.

His decision to leave his dalam brought deep personal tragedy. After he deserted, the Naxalites killed both his younger brothers. They beat his mother and broke her arm, took all their belongings, and burned their house.

After his surrender to the police when he was under age 18, Tarrem began to work for the police as an informer, and was then promoted to the post of SPO. The Chhattisgarh police gave him additional weapons training, and he now accompanies government security forces on anti-Naxalite combing operations. As part of these operations, Tarrem is often involved in many armed encounters with Naxalites. He is now a top Naxalite target and says he has seen posters with his photograph stating that he should be killed.

Naxalites’ policy regarding recruitment and use of children

Naxalites do not deny the recruitment and use of children in armed hostilities. In late 2006, Ganapathi, general secretary of the CPI (Maoist) party (a prominent Naxalite political party), openly admitted to using children in dalams: 

As regards training minors under 18 years in the use of arms, we wish to make it clear that our policy and the PLGA [People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army] constitution stipulate that no one should be taken into the army without attaining 16 years of age. And this age limit is strictly followed while recruiting. In the specific conditions prevailing in the war zone [Dantewada and Bijapur districts of Chhattisgarh] children attain mental and political maturity by the time they complete 16 because they are directly or indirectly involved in the revolutionary activity from their very childhood. They receive basic education and political training early in their lives and have organisational experience as members of balala sangam (children’s associations)…. When the enemy [Salwa Judum and police] is erasing every norm of international law, the oppressed people have the full right to arm themselves and fight. Making a fuss over age makes no meaning in a situation where the enemies of the people are targeting children too without any mercy. If the boys and girls do not do resist with arms they will be eliminated completely. The intellectuals of the civil society should understand this most inhumane and cruel situation created by the enemy and take the side of the people instead of pushing them more into defensive by raising all sorts of idealistic objections.478

Government failure to provide rehabilitation and reintegration assistance 

The Indian central and Chhattisgarh state governments have no scheme for the identification, rescue, demobilization, and rehabilitation of child Naxalites. In some cases police officials say they have arrested child Naxalites, but in other cases officers claim they view child Naxalites as “victims” more than offenders and therefore prefer not to arrest them.479

The police in Jagdalpur described one case from an armed encounter. They found two young girls, ages 13 and 15, who were recruited by dalam members. The girls were frightened when the shooting started and hid in a small ditch. When the police team found them, they were carrying weapons. The girls were brought to the police station. According to the police, the two girls looked visibly frightened and started crying and pleaded for mercy. They explained to the police that Naxalites had forcibly inducted them into a dalam. Since they were children, the police decided to make them complainants and asked them to lodge a complaint against the Naxalite commander who recruited them. The police said, however, that they could not assist the girls because the government had no scheme to rehabilitate and protect such children. They traced the girls’ parents and sent the girls home even though the parents begged that their children should not be sent back—they feared they would be re-recruited or killed.480

In some cases, police use “surrendered Naxalites” (former Naxalites who police claim deserted Naxalite forces and sought police protection) as SPOs or Gopni Force (informers), irrespective of whether they are underage. These former Naxalites receive weapons training from government forces. Human Rights Watch spoke to four surrendered child Naxalites who are being used by the police as informers or SPOs. The informers and SPOs participate in armed combing operations conducted by the police and also fear Naxalite reprisals.




371 Human Rights Watch interviews with Kosambi Mukesh (pseudonym), IDP from Durma, village W6, Warangal district, November 30, 2007; Vachcham Ragu (pseudonym), IDP from Sankanpalli, village W4, Warangal district, November 30, 2007; Madkam Vaishali (pseudonym), IDP from Lingagiri, village K1, Khammam district, December 1, 2007.   

372 Human Rights Watch interview with IDP-4 from Lingagiri (who chose to remain anonymous), village K2, Khammam district, December 2, 2007.

373 Asian Centre for Human Rights, “The Adivasis of Chhattisgarh, Victims of the Naxalite Movement and Salwa Judum Campaign,” 2006, http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/Chattis0106.pdf (accessed June 7, 2006), p. 40; Independent Citizen’s Initiative, “War in the Heart of India, An Enquiry into the Ground Situation in Dantewada District, Chhattisgarh,” 2006, http://rightsandresources.org/blog/WarintheHeartofIndia.pdf (accessed July 16, 2007), p. 22.; Staci Martin, “Turning a Blind Eye, Child Soldiers at War in the Maoist Conflict in India,” November 2006.

374 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms), SPOs, other details withheld. Suresh and Patel described how on several occasions they were abandoned by the paramilitary police and left to combat Naxalites during armed encounters.

375 Human Rights Watch interview with local journalist (name withheld), Chinturu, December 6, 2007.

376 India became a party to the CRC on December 11, 1992.

377 India ratified the Optional Protocol on November 30, 2005, and made the following declaration: "Pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the Government of the Republic of India declare [sic] that:

(i) The minimum age for recruitment of prospective recruits into Armed Forces of India (Army, Air Force and Navy) is 16 years. After enrollment and requisite training period, the attested Armed Forces personnel is sent to the operational area only after he attains 18 years of age;

(ii) The recruitment into the Armed Forces of India is purely voluntary and conducted through open rally system/open competitive examinations. There is no forced or coerced recruitment into the Armed Forces.

378 The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (“The Paris Principles”), January 30, 2007, http://www.unicef.org/protection/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf (accessed March 25, 2008), para. 6.14.

379 The Paris Principles, paras. 3.11, 7.21, 7.45, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9.

380  Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, superintendent of police of Dantewada disrtict, Dantewada, December 10, 2007 (first interview). Sharma said, “We have not had any recent recruitment. We are currently consolidating existing SPOs.” Human Rights Watch group interview GR8 with volunteers working in camps (name and details withheld). These volunteers confirmed that there was no recent recruitment of SPOs.

381 Human Rights Watch interviews with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007 and second interview, February 1, 2008; Vishwa Ranjan, director general of police of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, December 17, 2007. SP Sharma claimed that there were 3,500 SPOs in Dantewada and Bijapur districts while DGP Ranjan claimed that there were 3,800 SPOs in the same area.

382 Human Rights Watch interviews with Rahul Sharma, first and second interviews, December 10, 2007 and February 1, 2008 respectively.

383 Human Rights Watch interviews with Prateek (pseudonym), IDP from Sankanpalli, village W4, Warangal district, November 30, 2007; IDP-1 from Lingagiri (who chose to remain anonymous), village K1, Khammam district, December 1, 2007; teenage boy (who chose to remain anonymous), IDP from Basaguda, village K2, Khammam district, December 2, 2007; Kaskul Naiyya (pseudonym), IDP from Nayapara, village K3, Khammam district, December 2, 2007; Tati Dhiren (pseudonym), IDP from Pidmel, village K8, Khammam district, December 6, 2007; Vasanti Kumar (pseudonym), IDP from Pandiguda, location withheld, December 6, 2007.

384 Human Rights Watch interviews with Poosam Kanya (pseudonym), former resident of Errabore camp, December 5, 2007; Vasanti Kumar (pseudonym), IDP from Pandiguda, location withheld, December 6, 2007.

385 Human Rights Watch interview with Tarrem Kosa (pseudonym), former Naxalite, others details withheld.

386 Human Rights Watch interview with T-1 (who chose to remain anonymous), government teacher in Bijapur, location withheld, December 14, 2007.

387 Human Rights Watch interviews with teenage boy (who chose to remain anonymous), IDP from Basaguda, village K2, Khammam district, December 2, 2007; Vasanti Kumar (pseudonym), IDP from Pandiguda, location withheld, December 6, 2007; V6 (who chose to remain anonymous), camp resident, Jayanagar (Nayapara) camp, December 13, 2007.

388 Human Rights Watch interview with V6 (who chose to remain anonymous), December 13, 2007; Kaskul Naiyya (pseudonym), IDP from Nayapara, village K3, Khammam district, December 2, 2007.

389 Human Rights Watch interview with Prateek (pseudonym), IDP from Sankanpalli, village W4, Warangal district, November 30, 2007. The Central Reserve Police Force is a paramilitary police force deployed by the Indian central government in the region.

390 Human Rights Watch interviews with Rahul Sharma, first and second interviews, December 10, 2007 and February 1, 2008 respectively; Vishwa Ranjan, December 17, 2007. SP Sharma said that Chhattisgarh police had accidentally recruited children as SPOs.

391 Human Rights Watch interviews with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007; Vishwa Ranjan, December 17, 2007.

392 See below, The Chhattisgarh state government response.

393 Human Rights Watch interviews with SPO Mandavi Mohan (pseudonym) and three other SPOs (names and details withheld).

394 Ibid.

395 Ibid.

396 Police Act, 1861. Chhattisgarh state now has a new law, Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007. SP Sharma stated that no new SPOs were recruited since March 2006 and therefore at the time SPOs were recruited, the only law that was applicable is the Police Act, 1861.

397 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007.

398 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms), SPOs, other details withheld.

399 Human Rights Watch interview with Poosam Kanya (pseudonym), former resident of Errabore camp, location withheld, December 5, 2007.

400 Human Rights Watch interview with Vasanti Kumar (pseudonym), IDP from Pandiguda, location withheld, December 6, 2007; Madkam Dhairya (pseudonym), camp resident, Jailbada camp, December 13, 2007; Korsa Vishwas (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld.         

401 Human Rights Watch group interview GR8 with volunteers working in camps (name and details withheld).

402 Human Rights Watch interview with Irram Seethamma (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld.

403 Human Rights Watch interview with Mandavi Mohan (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld.

404 Human Rights Watch interviews with Telam Suresh (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld; teenage boy (who chose to remain anonymous), IDP from Basaguda, village K2, Khammam district, December 2, 2007; Dasru Mangesh (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld.

405 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms), SPOs, other details withheld; SPO Mandavi Mohan (pseudonym) and three other SPOs (names and details withheld); Vasanti Kumar (pseudonym), IDP from Pandiguda, location withheld, December 6, 2007.

406 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms).

407 Ibid. Human Rights Watch interview with SPO5 (who chose to remain anonymous), other details withheld.

408 Ibid.

409 Ibid. 

410 Ibid. Human Rights Watch interviews with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007 and Vishwa Ranjan, December 17, 2007.

411 Human Rights Watch interview with Telam Suresh (pseudonym).

412 Human Rights Watch interviews with SPO Mandavi Mohan (pseudonym) and three other SPOs (names and dates withheld).

413 Human Rights Watch interview with SPO5 (who chose to remain anonymous), other details withheld.

414 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007.

415 Human Rights Watch interview with a senior law enforcement official in Chhattisgarh (who chose to remain anonymous), other details withheld.  

416 Human Rights Watch interview with local journalist (name withheld), Chinturu, December 6, 2007.

417 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms).

418 Human Rights Watch interview with SPO5 (who chose to remain anonymous), details withheld.

419 See above, section VII C, Reprisals against Salwa Judum camp residents.

420 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007.

421 Human Rights Watch interview with Soyam Muka, Salwa Judum leader of Errabore camp, date withheld.

422 Human Rights Watch interview with Mandavi Mohan (pseudonym).

423 Ibid. Human Rights Watch interview with Korsa Vishwas (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld.

424 Human Rights Watch interview with female SPO6 (who chose to remain anonymous), other details withheld.

425 Human Rights Watch interview with SPO7 (who chose to remain anonymous), other details withheld.

426 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms).

427 Ibid.  

428 Human Rights Watch interview with SPO5 (who chose to remain anonymous), other details withheld.

429 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, second interview, February 1, 2008.

430 Human Rights Watch group interview with Irram Seethamma, Telam Suresh, and Mohin Patel (pseudonyms).

431 Ibid.

432 Human Rights Watch group interview GR8 with volunteers working in camps (name and details withheld).

433 Ibid.

434 Human Rights Watch interview with Vishwa Ranjan, December 17, 2007. Nandini Sundar and others v. State of Chhattisgarh, Counter Affidavit on Behalf of Respondent, January 22, 2008, p. 311, para. 5(e); p. 315, para. 6.

435 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, second interview, February 1, 2008. See also, National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), “Visit to Dantewada (Chhattisgarh) and Khammam (Andhra Pradesh) to Investigate Status of Health and Education of Children affected by Civil Unrest, December 17-19, 2007” report, March 2008, p. 11. The NCPCR report states: “With regard to violation of children’s rights the Committee [NCPCR] would like to specifically note that in reference to the practice of the recruitment of children under 18 years of age as SPOs, the government and police agreed that this had occurred in the past due to lack of strong protocols on age validation but assured us that these have now been strictly enforced.”

436 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007.

437 Ibid.

438 Human Rights Watch interview with police officer-1 (who requested anonymity), other details withheld.

439 Human Rights Watch interview with Rahul Sharma, second interview, February 1, 2008. 

440 Human Rights Watch interview with T-1 (who chose to remain anonymous), government teacher in Bijapur, location withheld, December 14, 2007.

441 Ibid.

442 Human Rights Watch interview with Mandavi Mohan (pseudonym).

443 Human Rights Watch interviews with Tarrem Kosa and Vikas Modhey (pseudonyms), former Naxalites, other details withheld.

444 Human Rights Watch interview with Satyam David (pseudonym), former Naxalite, other details withheld.

445 Human Rights Watch interviews with Sushovan Banu, Subba Atish, and Veera Etishan (pseudonyms), former Naxalites, other details withheld. Sushovan Banu stated that there were around 35 children in the balsangam in his village; there were 10-15 children in Veera Etishan’s village and around 150 children in Subba Atish’s village. 

446 Human Rights Watch interview with Subba Atish (pseudonym).

447 Human Rights Watch interview with Satyam David (pseudonym).

448 Human Rights Watch interview with Subba Atish (pseudonym).

449 Human Rights Watch interviews with Tarrem Kosa and Sushovan Banu (pseudonyms).

450 Human Rights Watch interviews with Bhushan Corin (pseudonyms), former Naxalite, other details withheld; Sushovan Banu (pseudonym).

451 Ibid.

452 Human Rights Watch interviews with Subba Atish and Satyam David (pseudonyms); Veka Idma and Bhushan Corin (pseudonyms), former Naxalites, other details withheld.

453 Human Rights Watch interview with Subba Atish (pseudonym).

454 Ibid.

455 Human Rights Watch interview with Veera Etishan (pseudonym).

456 Human Rights Watch interview with Subba Atish (pseudonym). 

457 Human Rights Watch interviews with Veera Etishan and Sushovan Banu (pseudonyms). Veera Etishan stated that Naxalites noted down his name along with three other boys’ names, asking all of them to go for sangam meetings. Similarly, Sushovan Banu stated that Naxalites called him for a meeting, noted down his name, and told him he was a sangam member.

458 Human Rights Watch interviews with Tarrem Kosa and Vikas Modhey (pseudonyms). 

459 Ibid.

460 Human Rights Watch interview with Tarrem Kosa (pseudonym).

461 Ibid. The group of 90 also included cooks and guards. All 90 members seldom regrouped together. They were split into smaller groups called local guerilla squads to conduct their operations.

462 Human Rights Watch interview with Veera Etishan (pseudonym).

463 Ibid.

464 Human Rights Watch interview with Satyam David (pseudonym).

465 Ibid.

466 Human Rights Watch interview with Lingu Gopal (pseudonym), former Naxalite, other details withheld.

467 Ibid.

468 Naxalite committees follow the following hierarchy—National or central, state or zonal, division, range, and village committees. 

469 Human Rights Watch interview with Veka Idma (pseudonym). 

470 Human Rights Watch interview with Vattam Fanu (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld. 

471 Ibid.

472 Human Rights Watch interview with Himmatlal Korbe (pseudonym), SPO, other details withheld.

473 Human Rights Watch interview with Himesh Karan (pseudonym), other details withheld.

474 Human Rights Watch interview with Sushovan Banu (pseudonym).

475 Human Rights Watch interview with Kripash Hari (pseudonym), former Naxalite, other details withheld.

476 Human Rights Watch interview with Veka Idma (pseudonym).

477 Human Rights Watch interviews with Tarrem Kosa and Vikas Modhey (pseudonyms).

478 Letter from Ganapathi, secretary general, CPI (Maoist), to the Independent Citizen’s Initiative, October 10, 2006, http://www.cgnet.in/N1/maoistreplytoici/view?searchterm=reply (accessed February 20, 2008), para. 5.

479 Letter from superintendent of police, Bijapur district, to Aruna Kashyap, March 6, 2008, No. G-265; Human Rights Watch interviews with Rahul Sharma, first interview, December 10, 2007; G. P. Singh, superintendent of police of Bastar district, Jagdalpur, January 26, 2008. 

480 Human Rights Watch interviews with G. P. Singh, January 26, 2008; station house officer of a police station in Bastar district (name and location withheld), January 27, 2008.