publications

International Response to Sexual Violence

African Union Mission in Sudan

During its lifespan from 2004 through 2007, the African Union’s peacekeeping mission experienced a variety of obstacles to deploying and exercising its mandate.93 Nevertheless, the mission did make some efforts to prevent the occurrence of sexual violence around IDP camps. In 2005, AMIS started “firewood patrols” to accompany IDP women and girls when they leave their camp or settlement to collect grass and firewood. These patrols did sometimes help reduce the risk of violence.94 However, NGOs on the ground were concerned that all too often commanders refused to conduct the patrols, planners did not choose routes well and failed to engage IDP communities or humanitarian organizations in the planning, and patrols were often ineffective in reducing violence against women and girls.95

The mandate of AMIS Civilian Police (CivPol) was initially to build public confidence, maintain contacts with government police and community members, and monitor the “service delivery” of government police.96 The terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement expanded the list of mandated tasks, calling for more proactive monitoring and establishment of special units staffed by women to handle cases of crimes against women.97  In late 2006 AMIS CivPol created “Women’s Desks.”98 Like many CivPol staff, the police women often lacked the appropriate background in policing standards and protocols for handling cases of sexual violence. On a number of occasions, AMIS staff reported the details of the cases—including the names of victims of sexual violence—in public meetings.99One of their biggest challenges was the lack of female language assistants.

In 2007, the mission still lacked the resources it needed to carry out its mandate and it had lost a great deal of credibility, particularly among IDPs who opposed the DPA. The mission came increasingly under attack, most dramatically in October 2007 when 10 peacekeepers were killed in a raid by rebel forces on an AMIS camp near Haskanita.100  To mitigate risks, AMIS adopted stricter security guidelines; civilian police could no longer conduct their confidence-building activities without heavily armed protection forces accompanying them, compromising their interactions with civilians in camps and villages. AMIS also reduced all its activities.101 By late 2007, most AMIS staff were confined to their bases and often expressed frustration about their predicament. 

United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur

Noting “with strong concern of on-going attacks on the civilian population and humanitarian workers and continued and widespread sexual violence,” the UN Security Council in July 2007 authorized UNAMID to take “necessary action” to protect civilians, albeit “without prejudice to the Government of Sudan.”102 The 26,000 personnel will include military observers, infantry, civilian police, Formed Police Units,103 and civilian staff. In addition, UNAMID has absorbed the so-called “substantive”, functions of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), such as the Human Rights Unit, Civil Affairs, and Gender Affairs.

The mandate prioritizes protection of civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence,” qualified by “within its capability and the areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan.”104 Its rules of engagement authorize use of lethal force in certain circumstances, but the extent to which UNAMID will exercise its powers depends largely on its resources and leadership.

So far, the Sudanese government’s obstructive tactics and failure of member states to provide necessary military equipment, such as attack helicopters, has significantly delayed deployment of the peacekeepers,105 contributing to the perception that UNAMID is merely a “re-hatting” exercise. Despite these obstacles, UNAMID has recommenced patrols in IDP camps and started night patrols, inspiring a renewed sense of security among some populations.106

The police component mandate is similar to that of AMIS following the signing of the DPA. It does not provide powers of arrest and detention and instead focuses on implementing the DPA, policing in IDP camps, and capacity-building for government and “movement” police through monitoring, training, and mentoring. It is still unclear whether UNAMID police will monitor government police more proactively than did AMIS. It plans to maintain the Women’s Desks, or “victim friendly” facilities, staffed by female police officers, inside the major IDP camps. As of February 2008 more than 200 female UNAMID police were deployed to Darfur. The UN Police Commissioner has advocated for more female police to be deployed, but the mission still faces challenges in finding qualified female officers, particularly from higher ranks, from the contributing countries.107

A continuing concern, voiced by humanitarian actors on the ground, is that in an attempt to fulfill its mandate, UNAMID police officers may too aggressively seek and interview victims of sexual violence. NGOs have complained of unwanted visits by AMIS staff to women’s health clinics in the past. Another concern is that UNAMID Police officers, in their efforts to build the capacity of government police, might take victims of sexual violence to government authorities against their will or share information in breach of confidentiality principles.

These concerns underscore the need for exceptional coordination between UNAMID police and humanitarian actors in cases of sexual violence. UNAMID police, government police, healthcare providers, humanitarian agencies, UN human rights officers, and child protection officers all have mandates to handle individual cases of sexual violence. A working group established to coordinate humanitarian agencies’ responses to sexual violence in each Darfur state has developed a referral pathway to clarify which agencies should be involved at which stages, making clear that at all stages, those who come into contact with the victim must allow her to decide the next steps.  This should be strictly adhered to.




93 See, e.g. Imperatives for Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan, Vol. 18 No 1A (A) January 2006 pp. 20-30; Commander S. Appiah-Mensah, “Monitoring fragile ceasefires: the challenges and dilemmas of the role of AMIS,” July, 2006.

94 Refugees International, “Ending Sexual Violence in Darfur: An Advocacy Agenda,” November 2007, p. 16.  The AU has reported that violence occurs more frequently in areas it could not patrol. African Union, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur,” Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(CXII), para.34.

95 Refugees International, “Ending Sexual Violence in Darfur: an Advocacy Agenda,” p. 19.

96 Civilian Police mandate, AMIS, http://www.amis-sudan.org/PoliceComponent.html (accessed February 27, 2008).

97 Ibid. The DPA specifies that CivPol shall be given “unimpeded access to information on police investigations,” and calls for establishment of special units for reporting crimes committed against women, staffed by women police personnel. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), May 5, 2006, paras. 277-278, http://www.unmis.org/english/2006Docs/DPA_ABUJA-5-05-06-withSignatures.pdf (accessed March 21, 2008).

98 United Nations Development Program document, “Capacity Building of the AU/AMIS Civilian Police,” July & August 2007, also available at Sudan Vision Daily website, http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25595 (accessed February 27, 2008).

99 A UNDP training project has attempted to strengthen the women’s desks since late 2006.

100African Union, “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur,” Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/2(CXII), paras. 27-28; “Peacekeeper crimes are war crimes,” Human Rights Watch press release, October 10, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/01/darfur16994.htm.

101 Ibid., para. 28.

102 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007), S/RES/1769 (2007), para. 15 (ii), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement (accessed February 27, 2008).

103 “Formed Police Units” are contingents of police from one country that are deployed as a single unit, and are lightly armed and equipped to perform crowd control and public order functions.

104 The mandate is drawn from paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur, S/2007/307/Rev.1, 5 June 2007, para. 54 (b), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/369/68/PDF/N0736968.pdf?OpenElement (accessed February 27, 2008).

105 Human Rights Watch joint NGO report, UNAMID Deployment on the Brink: the road to security in Darfur blocked by government obstructions, December 2007, http://hrw.org/pub/2007/africa/unamid1207web.pdf.

106 See “Peacekeeping in Darfur Hits More Obstacles,” The New York Times, March 24, 2008; “’Hybrids’ take back night in dangerous Darfur camps,” Reuters, February 18, 2008; “New UN Force Seeks to Protect Darfur Women from Rape,” AP, February 19, 2008; UNAMID Press Release No/04/2008, “Protection of Civilians Top UN Police Priorities As Force Launches its Operation in Darfur IDP Camps“ January 14, 2008, http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=36&ctl=Details&mid=376&ItemID=52 (accessed February 26, 2008).

107 Human Rights Watch telephone conversation with UNAMID Police Commissioner, March 3, 2008.