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Impunity and the Need for Justice

Although their unlawful activities are common knowledge in Côte d’Ivoire, government authorities have only rarely investigated, arrested, and prosecuted those FESCI members responsible.²²³ In many instances, victims of FESCI-perpetrated violence have filed official complaints. However, according to victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch, those complaints almost never result in even so much as a member of FESCI being questioned by the police, let alone charged.²²⁴

Since at least 2000, Côte d’Ivoire has been characterized by a climate of well entrenched impunity, with government security forces, together with pro-government groups and militias seemingly able to kill, rape, assault, harass, and extort perceived supporters of the political opposition (and, after 2002, the rebels) without consequences.²²⁵ In this sense, the abuses perpetrated by members of FESCI detailed above, and the failure of the government to investigate and, where the facts dictate, prosecute those responsible are but one manifestation of a much larger problem.

Direct and Indirect Support by Government

During Human Rights Watch’s investigation into FESCI perpetrated-violence, interviewees ranging from students and professors, to policemen and judges frequently asserted that much of FESCI’s political power and criminal behavior stems from the fact that it is “protected by power” and “supported by the FPI.”²²⁶ Interviewees allege that the FPI’s protection of and support for FESCI comes in both direct and indirect forms and that, given FESCI’s involvement in a litany of serious criminal offenses, government support in any form is particularly inappropriate.

In terms of direct support, though it is often alleged that the National Bureau of FESCI receives financial contributions from either the presidency or high-ranking members of the FPI party, no one interviewed by Human Rights Watch was able to come up with any hard evidence to support this claim.

Beyond the purely financial, however, there are several high-profile examples of direct government support that are described elsewhere in this report, including assistance provided to FESCI and other members of the “patriotic galaxy” by the head of Côte d’Ivoire’s army when they stormed the national television station in January 2006 and logistical support provided to FESCI and other “patriots” during the January 2006 anti-UN riots, among others.²²⁷

A far more pervasive form of encouragement for FESCI’s activities, however, both those that appear politically motivated, as well as those with a more base criminal or pecuniary motive, is the impunity associated with nearly all offenses perpetrated by members of FESCI.²²⁸ Without this impunity, one professor observed, FESCI in its current violent and hegemonic form could not exist.²²⁹ A number of professors and students interviewed maintain that the government’s unwillingness to prosecute FESCI members is, in effect, a form of indirect government support to FESCI.

A State within a State

In interviews with Human Rights Watch, police, officials in a mayor’s office, professors, and students referred to university residences alternatively as a “state within a state,” “a foreign embassy,” and a “no mans land” due to the absolute control exercised by FESCI and the inability or unwillingness of state security forces to intervene in the face of criminal conduct by FESCI members.²³⁰ One policeman interviewed by Human Rights Watch acknowledged that police are unable to set foot in these areas for law enforcement purposes (or on the university campus) without seeking the permission of FESCI’s leader.²³¹

Some police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch expressed great frustration at what they perceive to be their inability to take action against FESCI-perpetrated abuses:

Today, FESCI does what it wants and nothing happens. They benefit from total impunity. Members of FESCI are never punished and they never will be because those in power support them. There have been cases of FESCI members being arrested, but they are freed soon after. In the case of Habib Dodo, we know who did it, but nothing happens.²³² We know those among them who have killed, stolen, and beaten, but we can’t do anything against them in the current system. Nothing happens because people are afraid of them and the people in government who support them. I mean, they even beat up judges in 2004, and nothing happened. Why? Because they are protected from up above.

When people call and say, “FESCI is here causing problems,” a policeman thinks ten times before acting. It’s as if you have an affair with the devil. If something hits the press, then the police are called to do an investigation, but that just means we do a couple of interviews and leave it at that. The head of our precinct will say, “I’m sending you, but don’t get yourself in trouble.” Today, there are even policemen who are former members of FESCI, so you also have to contend with them saying, “Calm down, do nothing.” Our leaders might try to create a little smokescreen to say they are doing something about the problem but we the officers below them know they aren’t doing anything. There are lots of officers who are tired of the system and the impunity but those on the other side have greater numbers and they control the highest positions.²³³

Other police officers and judges interviewed by Human Rights Watch provided similar testimony. One high-ranking police officer noted that, “If they would give us the green light to take care of things we could settle the problem, but we can’t take action because we know they are protected by the party in power.”²³⁴

Why Little is Done to Hold FESCI Members Accountable

Judges and police interviewed by Human Rights Watch explained that authorities typically fail to take action against crimes by FESCI members for a mixture of reasons. Some expressed fear for their career, others fear for personal or family safety, and others simply the unpredictability of taking action against those they believe to have enormous political cover.²³⁵ One investigating magistrate explained as follows:

If I started questioning FESCI members, I’d be putting my career at risk. Someone at the ministry [of justice] would likely intervene that that would be it for you. It’s not that judges get specific instructions not to touch militia members like FESCI, but each thinks of his own security and his own career. As little judges we know if we go after them, they’ll come get us in the night if we dig too deep or perturb them. And no investigation will be carried out to find out who did it to you.²³⁶

In partial contrast to others interviewed, the then-serving National Director of Police (Directeur Général de la Police Nationale, DGPN), Yapo Kouassi, acknowledged that there have been problems with members of FESCI, but denied the charge that FESCI benefits from impunity:

We have to admit that it is difficult for authorities to control them. But I want to emphasize that the authorities have never officially sanctioned acts of destruction by FESCI and I’ve ordered them to be dispersed when it was necessary. For example, in 2003, I was director of public security. FESCI wanted the head of RTI removed, and we dispersed them using tear gas. This stunned people because it was said that they were close to power. Everyone expected me to be fired. But instead I was elevated to become National Director of Police soon after. So the highest authorities are bothered by actions taken by FESCI. It exposes them to the international community and doesn’t present a good image of the country. FESCI gives the impression of being a second power, but they don’t have a free hand in the country, even if they did help save republican institutions after the crisis.²³⁷

As alluded to in the account above, there is belief held by members of FESCI and others interviewed that by mobilizing street demonstrations at key junctures since the crisis erupted in 2002, FESCI and other members of the “patriotic galaxy” have “saved the institutions of the republic” in general, and the Gbagbo government in particular. The National Director of Police explained that:

It is true FESCI has the power to interfere in the functioning of some state institutions. But they have also used their power to support the government. For example, following the crisis of Sept 19, 2002 there were lots of mass mobilizations by patriotic movements. In those days, FESCI acted as a spearhead to support the institutions of the republic.²³⁸

Of course, few if any members of FESCI literally took up arms to stop an impending rebel advance. However, there seems to be a general feeling among former members of FESCI interviewed that mass protests and mobilizations have nevertheless landed blows in a moral and public relations battle against the rebellion. In addition, as described in this report, FESCI and other members of the patriotic galaxy have mobilized to stymie the peace process at key junctures, often in ways that helped the FPI gain traction at politically precarious moments.

For this reason, many of those interviewed, from policemen to students, maintain that the government is reluctant to take legal action against members of FESCI both as a sort of recompense for actions taken on behalf of the government in the past, as well as the fact that FESCI’s capacity to mobilize youth may be needed again in the future. As one judge put it:

The most important thing is to put an end to the impunity. As long as there are no consequences for their actions, nothing will change. This is largely a question of political will. But the FPI thinks it needs youth for “patriotic resistance.” And FESCI and other patriots have organized impressive demonstrations. So somewhere, the regime owes its survival to them. We have to acknowledge that groups like FESCI have enormous political weight. They have a capacity to mobilize youth that the political parties themselves don’t have.²³⁹

Other political observers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including professors and diplomats, stated that the FPI is unlikely to bring members of FESCI to justice now because they may need to call upon FESCI’s mobilization capacity and muscle during upcoming elections, currently scheduled in late November.²⁴⁰ Several interviewed felt that it was important to understand the sense of mutual loyalty born out of FESCI and the FPI’s common struggle for multiparty democracy in the 1990s and the persecution both groups faced.²⁴¹ For example, a former high-ranking official in the ministry of security told Human Rights Watch, “The reason that FESCI is not judged and punished is because the FPI created it when they were in the opposition and they can’t turn against their own creation now.”²⁴² One human rights defender expressed a similar idea: “Until the war is over, it would be hard for the government to arrest FESCI members. FESCI would see this as treason since they brought the FPI to power.”²⁴³

FESCI Crimes are Well-Known to Both the Government and the Public

The kinds of crimes documented by Human Rights Watch in this report will not be news to those living in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, many of FESCI’s activities have been publicized in local media and were known to judicial and police authorities interviewed by Human Rights Watch.²⁴⁴ Knowledge of FESCI perpetrated-crimes reaches the highest levels of government. In an August 2006 editorial published in the local press, then-serving Minister of Security Dja Blé denounced a general “culture of violence sustained by a quasi-impunity” in Côte d’Ivoire and cited as an example “the numerous acts of vandalism and physical attacks going as far as murder committed by FESCI members which still remain unpunished.”²⁴⁵

For their part, members of FESCI appear to revel in the impunity they enjoy. A frequent taunt FESCI members use, as repeated by dozens of students, teachers, and others interviewed by Human Rights Watch is, “We can beat you, and nothing will happen. We can kill you, and nothing will happen.”²⁴⁶ One student bragged that a simple phone call suffices in many instances to free a member of FESCI in trouble with the police:

If someone gets arrested, say for beating a taxi driver, we go en masse to the police station and announce that we are FESCI and free the person. The 8^th precinct usually cooperates, so most of the time the secretary general can just call them. One example is a time I was sent by the secretary general to the 8th. A student wasn’t going to pay for his taxi so the driver took him to the police station. But basically, as soon as I confirmed his identity as a member of FESCI, they freed him.²⁴⁷

It should be noted that in at least two instances in 2007, then FESCI secretary general Serge Koffi voluntarily turned FESCI members accused of crimes over to the police. One such instance involved the June 2007 killing of an accused thief on campus, and the second the October 2007 beating of two Abidjan city (SOTRA) bus drivers. However, while these are welcome developments, such actions remain the exception rather than the rule.

Relations with the Police

Since the 2002 crisis erupted, FESCI has had an at times contradictory relationship with the police, with authorities in limited circumstances seeking to curb FESCI’s more nefarious activities, but more often turning a blind eye to them. On still other occasions, frictions between members of the police and FESCI have degenerated into attacks and skirmishes. These dynamics were well illustrated by events in August 2006 and August 2007.

In August 2007, FESCI members attacked and ransacked an Abidjan police station, smashing windows of cars and buildings in the vicinity, in order to free two fellow members who had just been arrested for failure to stop their car for a police inspection. A policeman at the station that night told Human Rights Watch that just hours after the two FESCI members were brought to the station, hundreds of FESCI members stormed the station accompanied by a ruling party deputy from the National Assembly, William Attéby:

It all started when a checkpoint manned by the UIR [Rapid Intervention and Research Unit, Unité d’Intervention et de Recherche] whistled a car to a stop. The car refused to stop and the police gave chase all the way to the Cité Rouge. The police were able to arrest two of them and took them to the 8^th precinct. When they arrived, the students were sat down on a bench and asked to explain the situation. Meanwhile, they had placed calls to FESCI. Around 2:30 in the morning, at least three hundred FESCI members and Depute Attéby himself came to the station. They forced their way in and broke the door. One of them took a Kalash [an AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle] from the station. Attéby was wearing shorts and a t-shirt. He said, “Free these kids immediately. If you don’t, you’ll have to deal with what follows.” We said, “We can’t just free them like that.” Then he said, “You security forces ‘didn’t win the war.’ The president himself said it.²⁴⁸ It’s these kids outside who put the government in place.”

We got on the police radio and said that we were being attacked by FESCI and that some of them were even armed. Our chief got on the radio and said, “Don’t touch a single hair on the head of a student. Let them go.” That really upset me. As people were leaving, one student told us, “You’ll see. You are nothing. We are the government. We break stuff, and nothing will happen.”²⁴⁹

No one has been questioned or arrested in connection with the attack. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, the then National Director of Police, Yapo Kouassi, said that he gave the order to free the students because “there are extremists in FESCI who could unleash violence all over Abidjan, which would jeopardize our fragile peace.”²⁵⁰ In an interview with a local paper, then FESCI Secretary General Serge Koffi denied responsibility for the attack: “I am surprised that I’ve been accused of initiating the violence. If I had really wanted to do that, things would have been a lot worse.”²⁵¹

On other occasions, frictions between FESCI and the police have degenerated into bloody battles. In late August 2006, members of FESCI beat a police cadet at a bus stop after he reportedly tried to jump the queue.²⁵² In reprisal, a group of police cadets, whose training academy borders the university, stormed the Cocody university campus shooting dead at least one student and severely injuring as many as 20.²⁵³ Some policemen claim that there was an exchange of gunfire between FESCI and the police.²⁵⁴ In a meeting with President Gbagbo after the incidents, as reported in a pro-FPI newspaper, FESCI’s Serge Koffi allegedly demanded the firing of several high-ranking police officials, as well as the minister of security, whom he accused of having a grudge against FESCI, because he had publicly denounced the impunity from which FESCI benefits.²⁵⁵ Soon after, the director of the police academy was suspended and seven policemen were reportedly charged with assault and rape.²⁵⁶