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Strike Three; The Tipping Point

On December 16, 2006, Guinea’s President Lansana Conté traveled to Conakry’s central prison with his motorcade and personally secured the release of two close allies charged with embezzlement from Guinea’s Central Bank, reportedly telling his entourage, “I am justice.”24 The first, Mamadou Sylla, is alleged to be Guinea’s richest businessmen and had been arrested at his home earlier that month in connection with his allegedly unlawful removal of millions of dollars from the Central Bank.25 The second, Fodé Soumah, former Central Bank deputy governor, was also arrested for alleged complicity in the affair.

For the unions, who had “suspended” the 2006 strikes pending government economic reforms, the incident was the final straw.26 Several weeks later a new strike notice was issued. Citing executive interference in the affairs of the judiciary and the dire economic situation in the country, the unions called for an unlimited general strike as of January 10, 2007 until such time when there was a “return to the rule of law.”27

Unlike the strikes of 2006, which focused almost exclusively on economic reforms, union demands in January 2007 were more overtly political, and included the nomination of a consensus prime minister with power to form a consensus government; review and renegotiation of certain mining, fishing and forestry agreements; and putting an end to corruption by prosecuting individuals charged with embezzlement of public funds. Union and other civil society leaders explained that they could no longer ignore the fact that the problems behind Guinea’s economic woes were essentially political in nature.28

After the strike began on January 10, 2007, activities in Conakry and major towns across Guinea ground to a halt. The first few days of the strike were relatively peaceful. As schools, shops, and markets were shut, additional police patrols deployed around the streets of the capital Conakry and there were sporadic clashes with rock-throwing “youths.”29 As the strike wore on, however, and the standoff between the unions—who were increasingly clear that their primary and non-negotiable demanded was that President Conté cede many of his powers to a new consensus prime minister—and the government intensified, security forces engaged in a brutal crackdown on unarmed demonstrators.

During the first four weeks of the strike government security forces, including the police, the gendarmerie,30 and the presidential guard, also known as the “Red Berets,” would be responsible for the deaths of approximately 100 demonstrators; the wounding of hundreds more by gunshot; the beating, robbing, and arrest of scores of demonstrators and bystanders; and the harassment, arrest, and abuse of union and other civil society members. Human Rights Watch conducted detailed interviews with 79 victims and witness to the brutality that took place during the first four weeks of the strike, a selection of which are provided below.

Lethal Use of Force

During the first week of the strike most protestors were peaceful. There were no large-scale organized rallies or marches, and most demonstrators chose to observe the strike by staying at home and refusing to work. However in some locations, demonstrators burned tires and cars, and threw rocks, both at security forces as well as taxis and other commercial vehicles attempting to break the strike.31 Reports as to the manner of the police and gendarmes’ intervention indicate that the response was generally appropriate, and their efforts to disperse demonstrators consisted largely of non-lethal means such as tear gas and shots fired into the air. There were no reports of deployment of the presidential guard.32 As the strike continued past its first week, however, the intensity of confrontations between protestors and security forces increased, as described by an 18-year-old shoe shiner from one of Conakry’s outer suburbs,33 who reports being shot by police on January 18, 2007:

The day I was shot, I was going out to try to find some rice to eat. It was   around noon. Once I made it to the main road, I saw a group of youths protesting on the street. Some of them were throwing rocks at a large group of nearby policemen, who immediately started shooting at us. I felt a sharp pain and looked down and saw blood flowing from my leg and I fell down. I couldn’t walk. A group of youths picked me up and started to carry me to the hospital. But a group of police started firing straight at them and they panicked, dropped me on the ground, and ran off. The police came up and I heard one of them say they should kill me. Then one of them kicked me in the face and I felt the blood start to run. The police left me there and a little while later another group of youths took me to the hospital.34

During the same period, one resident of Conakry’s Hamdallaye neighborhood interviewed by Human Rights Watch described being shot by the police in front of his house as he stepped outside to make a telephone call.35 The victim reported that a policeman sitting on top of a passing truck fired directly at him, hitting him three times in the hip and thigh. 36 Another witness in the same neighborhood described seeing a rock-throwing protestor shot in the foot as a group of gendarmes fired at the ground in an attempt to disperse protestors.37

“The Human Tide”

While as many as a dozen deaths were reported in the first 10 days of the strike,38 the death toll would rapidly escalate on Monday, January 22, when union leaders, civil society coalitions, and other community groups mobilized tens of thousands of demonstrators for a march from Conakry’s suburbs into central Conakry in which many dozens of protestors were killed by security forces and many more wounded by gunshot.39 Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch referred to the stream of protestors as a “human tide,” some of them claiming it was the single largest crowd they had ever witnessed in Guinea.40 Protestors interviewed reported that when leaving their houses that morning, they felt that the day would be decisive, one way or another. As one protestor put it, “When we came out on Monday, we were determined to change the system in place. It’s been 48 years since independence, and we have nothing.”41

The goal of most demonstrators was to reach the headquarters of the National Assembly, known as the People’s Palace (Palais du Peuple), a dozen kilometers from Conakry’s suburbs.42 Though there were sporadic instances of rock throwing in the outer suburbs during the early morning hours, as the marchers coalesced into streams flowing down the main arteries towards central Conakry, those interviewed by Human Rights Watch—both protesters and international observers—reported that protestors were unarmed and marching peacefully.43 Marchers reported that they carried signs and banners bearing slogans such as “Down with Conté,” “We want change,” and “Down with the PUP.”44 Many protestors told Human Rights Watch that order among the marchers was kept by informal overseers, one of whom explained his role as follows:

During the march on January 22, I was one of the stewards. Our role was to keep marchers from throwing rocks and engaging in acts of vandalism. We wanted to improve upon the marches of January 17, where some youths had thrown rocks and wanted to insult the police. And even that morning, near Bambeto,45 there had been a group throwing rocks, so it was important to calm things down. Those playing this role were just organized informally, and were older guys from the neighborhood who the youth respected. We didn’t get orders from on high.46

As the protestors made their way into central Conakry, there were a number of encounters with large groups of police and gendarmes stationed at various strategic crossroads. Though police and gendarmes did in many instances attempt to disperse the advancing protestors using tear gas and shots fired in the air, eyewitnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that in several instances security forces fired directly into the advancing crowd when non-lethal means failed to stop the advance, resulting in deaths in the neighborhoods of Hamdallaye and Dixinne.47

Many protestors interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that, rather than fleeing the gunfire, crowds of demonstrators picked up the bodies of the dead, and continued their march towards security forces while carrying the bodies above their heads.48 The following account is typical:

When we arrived in Hamdallaye, there were lots of police and gendarmes and there was lots of firing in the air and lots of tear gas. But it wasn’t frightening people, so they fired straight into the crowd. There was no stone throwing at Hamdallaye. Nothing. Two died there that I saw. One was hit in the forehead, and the other in the chest. I don’t know if it was a policeman or gendarme who fired those particular shots. We took the bodies and put them on a piece of corrugated tin and carried them on our heads. The security agents backed off as we approached with the bodies and we passed forward towards Bellevue.49

Another witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch, a 38-year-old teacher in a Koranic school, described an encounter in Dar-Es-Salam, one of Conakry’s outlying neighborhoods, between police and demonstrators:

That morning, I went down to the main road to see what was happening. When I arrived, there were people on the street chanting, “Down with Conté,” “Down with the regime,” and “Down with dictatorship.” There were no rocks being thrown. I saw a police mini-bus come up the street. It was loaded with officers, I don’t know how many. There was one sitting in the back. I saw him point his gun at the crowd and fire a single shot. It hit a protestor, a young man in the face and killed him. They did not fire any gas that I saw. At that point, the crowd got really angry and started to move toward the bus, and the policemen in the back fired in the air to scare people, and then they drove off. I saw some of the demonstrators take blood from the dead body and smear it on their faces.50

Ultimately, security forces stationed at many strategic crossroads chose to retreat in the face of the peacefully advancing demonstrators, whose numbers were increasing by the hour.51

The November 8 Bridge

Conakry is situated on a long, narrow peninsula, at points barely wider than 500 meters across. To reach the National Assembly from Conakry’s suburbs, nearly all major road arteries pass near a narrow choke point, known as the “November 8 Bridge.” On January 22, 2007, dozens of security forces, including the police, gendarmes, and members of the presidential guard, were stationed in a line across the bridge, creating a barrier to any advance beyond the bridge to the National Assembly building or anywhere else in the city center.52 

As groups of protestors reached the November 8 Bridge, security forces attempted to disperse them with tear gas and with shots fired in the air.53 When that failed, witnesses told Human Rights Watch that security forces, in particular the Red Berets, fired directly into the crowd.54 Journalists and officials from humanitarian organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch estimate that between 10 and 20 individuals were killed at the bridge, though many more likely subsequently died due to injuries suffered.55 One foreign diplomat who was able to view the scene at the bridge, provided the following account:

From what I saw of the march of the 22, security forces were firing on an absolutely peaceful march. The protestors had no stones or arms of any kind. At first, security forces did use tear gas to try to push people back. But then the first wave of protestors that was advancing toward the bridge got closer and closer. One protestor was carrying a Guinean flag. A group of protestors got down on their knees in a non-threatening position in front of the soldiers. But the soldiers fired at the one in the first row holding the Guinean flag, as he stood there on his knees. They literally fired directly into the crowd. The Red Berets were firing, but so were the police and gendarmes. Several were wounded at the bridge, hit in the stomach, so they couldn’t have been firing in the air. I saw police kick those who were already lying prostrate wounded on the ground, so the security forces were clearly over-excited. Groups of protestors would disperse in all directions only to come back again. I don’t know why the demonstrators kept advancing. Maybe they thought because they weren’t armed, they wouldn’t be hurt.56

As security forces fired into the crowds approaching the November 8 Bridge, many demonstrators attempted to flee. Eyewitnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that security forces stationed at the bridge went so far as to target fleeing unarmed demonstrators who could in no way pose a threat to their safety. One demonstrator described the situation as follows:

As we neared the bridge, we were chanting, “We don’t want Conté anymore.” We also had a Guinean flag. We had no stones, no arms of any kind. Our only weapons were little tree branches that we were waving above our heads. Around 2 p.m., we arrived at the bridge. There were police, gendarmes, and Red Berets there. The police were there in strong numbers. There were fewer Red Berets, but I tried to stay closer to the police because the Red Berets were firing more. I saw the Red Berets firing straight into the crowds and several people fall on the ground. We panicked and tried to flee. As my friend was trying to climb a wall into a nearby cemetery to get away, someone fired and hit him in the shoulder. He fell town and tried to climb again, and they shot him again in the lower back side. I knew if I tried to climb the wall they’d shoot me too, so I ran towards the police because they weren’t firing as much and they captured me. They struck me with their rifle butts on the back and arrested me.57

Other demonstrators who managed to flee beyond the range of security forces firing from the bridge found themselves trapped as their advance away from the bridge was met by groups of police and gendarmes coming from the other direction.  Pinned down between two sets of security forces, many fleeing demonstrators attempted to hide in neighboring houses, Conakry’s central mosque, and even Camp Boiro.58 One witness described being caught by security forces while trying to hide:

After I fled from the bridge, they had barred most of the roads, so lots of people were trapped. Everywhere I looked, the police and gendarmes were beating and arresting people. I ran as far as the great mosque, and then I fled into a house with a small group of protestors to take refuge. The father of the house where we were staying told us to stay there, but later he came back with about fifteen green berets.59 They started beating the protestors in the house with rifle butts and clubs. They were saying, “Do you want a change or not?” We understood that if we said, “We want change” they would keep beating us, so we said, “No, we don’t want change,” and they let us go.60

“The Day of Hell”; Treating the Wounded in Conakry’s Hospitals

As the body count increased over the course of the strike, scores of dead and wounded flooded into local hospitals. Medical personnel on duty on January 22, 2007, the single heaviest day of deaths and injuries during the entire six-week crisis period, described the difficulties of treating the unexpected influx of wounded:

Monday the 22 was the day of hell. We simply weren’t prepared for it. Early that day we saw smoke near Hamdallaye61 and we knew it would be bad. Between 9:30 and 10 o’clock, we saw the first crowds approaching. There were already two bodies being carried by the protestors. We asked where they had been killed, and they said “at Kerfalla’s house.”62 Ten minutes later all hell broke loose. Injured were flowing in at three to four per minute. There was a crazy terror throughout the hospital. We were seeing lots of head wounds. Not just simple bullet wounds, but entire heads exploded. The wounds we saw were more serious than I ever saw during the rebel attacks in the forest.63 The Red Cross and the youths were sending bodies, especially from the bridge using plastic mats, mostly of wounded young. I saw doctors crying, saying, “Why are they firing on their own people?” We were working on patients laid out on the ground in the hospital. There was literally nowhere else to put people. And there was nothing at the hospital in terms of supplies. Many died before we could even treat them.64 

In what was a blatant instance of excessive use of force against injured persons, several witnesses, including medical personnel trying to attend to the wounded, described seeing the security forces in green uniforms firing a tear gas cartridge directly in front of the emergency room as patients were being treated:

At one point, they launched a tear gas cartridge into the hospital courtyard, right in front of near the emergency room where we were treating people. A group of doctors went out to confront them and said, “Go ahead, kill us too. Kill all of us.” We told them, “You are Guinean like us. Come in and we’ll show you what you have been doing since this morning.” I wanted them to come in to see the wounded but they lowered their weapons and they refused. There were no protestors in the courtyard when they fired the gas, and it wasn’t a stray gas cartridge. Everyone knows that area is the emergency room where protestors were being treated, so I think it was fired on purpose. Later on, a Red Beret did come into the hospital because his brother, a protestor, had been killed. First he was furious, saying that he was going to avenge his brother’s death. But then he started to cry, saying, “We told them not to fire. We told them not to fire.”65

Beating, Arrest, and Robbery of Protestors and Bystanders

Throughout the first four weeks of the strike, as protestors dispersed from major roads into surrounding neighborhoods, police and gendarmes pursued them, at times for up to over a kilometer from the main road where the demonstrations were taking place. Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of eyewitnesses who allege that, as security forces entered the neighborhoods, they rampaged through the homes and businesses of local residents, beating and robbing not only the protesters, but many others including women, children, and elderly men who had not participated in the protests. One man of 47 told Human Rights Watch that the police broke into his house and robbed him, just as he was planning to leave for eye surgery in Dakar, Senegal:

On Friday, January 26, around 10:30 a.m., I was lying down in my one-room house with no lights on. Around five police broke the door down. One of them said, “Kill him.” I replied, “You’re going to kill a sick person?” They pulled an iron bar off the door and hit me with it on my back. Then they searched the house. They stole eight million CFA [West African CFA francs, about US $16,000] that I had in a bag to go get eye surgery in Dakar. Then they grabbed me and tried to take the phone from my pocket. I said, “Please leave me this, you took everything else.” Then they hit me on the left temple with a rifle butt. Before this happened, I had been trying to get to the airport to go to Dakar for treatment, but it wasn’t possible to get there due to all the gunfire. Now I don’t know how I’ll ever get treated.66

In the course of their expeditions into the neighborhoods, security forces arrested many individuals having little to do with the protest. Many of those arrested later interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they were taken to police detention facilities, beaten, held for several days, and freed only after family members bribed police officers to secure their release. A man in Conakry’s outer suburbs who had not taken part in the strikes described his arrest at his home on January 17, 2007:

The day the police arrested me, I was sitting home with my mother, wife, and baby. Around two o’clock that afternoon, my wife screamed, “Get up, soldiers are coming!” Just then, two tear gas cartridges were fired into the courtyard, and about fifteen policemen burst in. I think they were from the CMIS.67 They were all dressed in black. As they burst in, my mother passed out and fell down on the ground from the stress. I heard them saying in Sousou,68 “Let’s go, let’s go, they have money,” and one of them fired four times in the air with his rifle. I stood in the doorway to the house and didn’t want to let them through, but they pushed me and we got into a tussle. One of them hit me from behind with a rifle butt. Another slapped my wife, who fell down holding our one-month-old baby. Then one of them beat me on the ground with his pistol. They hauled me down to the main road and threw me in their truck and took me to the police station in Bellevue. The whole way there they were kicking me and slapping me. At the station, they handcuffed my hands under a bench and struck me thirty times or so with their boots and fists. They left me handcuffed like that for two days. My mother called my cousin who is a Red Beret, who came to Bellevue to free me. They paid 400,000 francs [Guinean Francs, about US$67] to free me. I later learned that after my arrest they stole my cell phone, my camera, 100,000 francs [Guinean francs, about US$17], a radio, along with my wife’s clothing and some food from our house. I don’t know why they chose our house, but it’s not the only one in the neighborhood they hit. Since then, I have decided I might as well strike and march with everyone else, because if they are going to kill you, they are going to kill you, even inside your own house.69

A 58-year-old teacher whose son was killed on January 22, described his arrest during his attempt to find his son’s body:

On Monday the 22, around 10:30 a.m., my son’s friend came to tell me my son had been hit by a bullet and was dead. I wanted to get the body, but when I got to the main road I was told that the protestors had taken it away as part of their march, so I decided to follow the march in the hopes of finding my son’s body. At Donka, I was told that my son’s body had been abandoned near Cameroun.70 By this time, many protestors were fleeing in the opposite direction, but I pressed forward. Near the CMIS police station, there was a group of policemen.71 They swept me up with another guy. Then they threw a couple of young kids into the truck like sacks. One policeman they called “Method” came and rapped me on the head and then ripped off my robe. He searched me and stole 200,000 francs [Guinean francs, about US$33] and my cell phone. I arrived at the police station practically naked. It was the CMIS. They took our names, and then put us in a cell. There were twenty-five people in a cell less than six meters squared. It was full of urine and feces. They didn’t interrogate us, but just wanted our name and neighborhood. Later we were transferred into a larger common room with around ninety-five people in it, all as naked as earthworms. The least noise and the police would come in and hit people with batons. There were many wounded and swollen protestors there. They were interrogating the union members next door.72 I recognized the faces of some of them as we were being transferred. Later we were transferred to a third room where we spent the night. I was freed the next day.73

Harassment, Arrest, and Abuse of Members of Civil Society

Throughout the strike, leadership at the highest levels of government, including the executive branch, together with Guinean security forces engaged in what appeared to be an organized attempt to intimidate and silence union and other civil society leaders.

On January 13, members of a civil society coalition, the National Council of Guinean Civil Society Organizations (Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guinéenne, CNOSCG), were at their headquarters preparing for a march that was scheduled to take place on January 15.74 Youth members assembled there to paint signs and banners for the march with various slogans such as: “We are fed up, we want change,” “We are hungry, we want bread,” and “We have no water, and no electricity.”75 

CNOSCG members interviewed by Human Rights Watch report how that afternoon, a group of seven or eight policemen burst into the courtyard, arrested seven of those preparing the signs, and took them (along with the signs) to the central police station, where they were interrogated and thrown into a cell with routine criminal suspects before being released late that night after the intervention of civil society leaders.76 The following day, January 14, the governor of Conakry issued an edict banning all street demonstrations.77 The march planned for January 15 was canceled, with the head of CNOSCG, Ben Sékou Sylla, stating that he would not “send the population to the slaughterhouse.”78

On January 17, leaders of the CNTG and USTG trade unions attempted to walk from CNTG headquarters to the National Assembly building to deliver a letter containing their demands to the president of the National Assembly.79 Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch describe the march as peaceful, with union members marching in the lead, and youths from downtown Conakry behind them.80 Approximately halfway to the Palais du Peuple, however, police and gendarmes who had been following the marchers fired tear gas and warning shots to break up the march, and arrested union members. One union member described the scene:

Suddenly, police were firing tear gas everywhere, and started hitting people with clubs. Marchers fled in all directions. From what I saw, the young were the biggest targets of the beatings. In total, seven union members and one youth were arrested and taken to the CMIS police station. When those of us who weren’t arrested managed to make it to the National Assembly, Somparé received us and asked us what the matter was.81 We refused to speak until our comrades were released.82

Those taken by the police reported that they were released several hours after their arrest and driven to the Palais du Peuple, allowing the letter to the president of the National Assembly, which was being carried by one of the arrestees, to be delivered.83

Later that day, union leaders report that they were summoned to Camp Samory, an army base in central Conakry, where President Conté threatened to kill them.84 In an interview with Human Rights Watch, one union leader described the encounter between the union leadership and President Conté:

We were taken into the president’s office. Chantale Cole was there, along with Fodé Bangoura and Kerfalla, but only Chantal Cole was close to the president.85 She had a list of our demands in her hand.  There were Red Berets standing all around the perimeter of the room. Then the president said, “You have taken off my shirt. Only my pants are left. You have humiliated me, but I will kill you. If I kill you, I won’t have to answer for it to anyone, and no one will be able to do anything about it. Should I cut your head off, or just make you disappear? I could make you disappear and no one would ever know. If I lift my little finger, my guards will cut you up and eat you in front of me.  Sooner or later, I will kill you. I’m just thinking about how I’m going to do it.”86

According to the same union leader, after this speech, President Conté insulted them, and then allowed them to go home.87

On January 22—the day tens of thousands of Guineans attempted to march from the suburbs to the Palais du People, and the day of the highest casualties—the headquarters of one of the two principal trade unions leading the strike, the CNTG, was attacked by a combined group of police and Red Berets. According to union leaders and others present in the building, the Red Berets first arrived that morning, led by Ousmane Conté, the son of President Conté.88 Union leaders told Human Rights Watch that the security forces then broke down several doors on the upper level of CNTG headquarters and arrested six youths upstairs, who were taken to camp Koudara, where union members reported that they were each given 40 blows with a club before being released.89 Most union leaders were downstairs at the time of the first invasion, several of them observing Ousmane Conté from a window.90 

Later that afternoon, union members report that Red Berets and police returned to CNTG headquarters in greater numbers, with the police storming the top floor from the front of the building, and the Red Berets storming the lower floor from the back side of the building.91 One union member described the arrival of the police on the upper floor of CNTG headquarters:

I was on the top floor with one of the union leaders when the police came. Around 5 p.m., we heard lots of noise and decided to shut the door to the office we were in, and then hide in the bathroom connected to that office. There were around ten of us in there. Soon after, the police broke open both sets of doors and found us in the bathroom. Three policemen came into the toilet area. One of them looked like he was going to throw a tear gas grenade in and shut the door. But another policeman held his arm. We lifted our hands to surrender and they searched us. They took my money, 225,000 francs [Guinean francs, about US$37], and my cell phone. Then they beat us with clubs, saying, “You want to make a mess of things, we’re going to mess you up. We’re going to kill all of you.” They took the secretary general and took his glasses off and started to beat him all over with clubs. Then suddenly the three of them ran out and left us, so we shut the door to the toilet again. But a few minutes later a second group came. Three of them. We raised our hands and they searched us again, and found my second cell phone. Then they beat us again before arresting us and sending us to the truck outside. One of them said, “We’re going to kill all of you today.”92

Union members told Human Rights Watch that as the combined police and Red Beret forces proceeded to ransack the building, overturning computers and smashing office equipment, a group of them converged in a room downstairs containing senior union leadership. One union leader reported her experience as follows:

Around 4:30 p.m., the Red Berets came back. We heard cries and insults outside the room we were in. Then ten or so burst into the room.  There was one Red Beret and the rest were police. One of them said, “Fofana is here, Raby is here.”93 Then another said, “It’s here that you are planning your coup d’état. We’ll give you change.” They turned over all the computers and equipment. Seven of them seized Fofana and beat him, hitting him hard in the eye. They handcuffed him with difficulty because of his girth. One of them said, “Stick him with a bayonet, open up his head,” and we all screamed, “Oh God!” Then they emptied money from our pockets. They knocked us with their rifle butts as we were exiting. We were hurrying out of the room to avoid the blows. Then they put us in a pickup outside, but the truck was so loaded with union members, it couldn’t go up the small hill to get out of our parking lot. So they threw us all out and divided us into four trucks. We were first taken to the central police station downtown. We thought they were going to shoot us. One policeman pointed to Fofana and said, “Who handcuffed him?” But no one responded. By this point, Fofana could only see from one eye because the other was so swollen and there was blood on his face. Many of us cried from the sight of him.  We told the police, “He’s sick, he has diabetes.” One of them said, “We don’t care. You wanted change, we’ll bring it to you.” They took our names, and then put us back in the truck. There were police sitting on the rack above the pickup bed with their feet hanging down near our heads. If any of us moved, they kicked our head. Then they took us to the CMIS police station.”94

Later that evening, the heads of the CNTG and USTG unions were taken from the CMIS police station to see President Conté at Camp Samory. A union leader interviewed by Human Rights Watch claimed that during this encounter President Conté appeared to have no prior knowledge of the invasion of CNTG headquarters and subsequent arrest of union members, and ordered their release.95 In all, union leaders reported that approximately 70 union members were taken to the CMIS police station where they were held until around midnight, before being escorted to their homes. A subsequent agreement between the unions, the government, and the Employers’ Association (Conseil National du Patronat) signed on January 27, 2007 officially “deplore[d] the invasion, destruction, and ransacking of the Bourse de Travail [CNTG headquarters]…and the arbitrary arrest of union leaders.”

Intimidation of the Media During the First Weeks of the Strike

In late 2006, Guinea became the last country in West Africa to allow private radio broadcasting, ending a 48-year-long state broadcasting monopoly when four private radio stations were granted licenses and began broadcasting.96 Despite this apparent embrace of freedom of expression guaranteed under both Guinea’s constitution as well as international conventions to which it is party, 97 during the first weeks of the strike, a number of actions were taken by agents of the Guinean government to restrict the free transmission of information by private radio stations. For example, journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that FM transmission of Radio France International was disrupted by the government on at least two occasions during the strike.98 On January 15, 2007, in separate visits to the various radio stations, then-serving minister of information, Boubacar Yacine Diallo, reportedly prohibited all private and community radio stations from broadcasting any material relating to the strike.99 An employee for one of Guinea’s four private radio stations that persisted in broadcasting news about the strike told Human Rights Watch that he received a variety of threatening calls from government and anonymous sources during the first weeks of the strike, including from the minister of information himself.100

The Strike Outside of Conakry

While the neighborhoods of Conakry were a hotbed of both demonstration and repression throughout the strike, demonstrations were not limited to those in the capital city, or to a particular region or ethnic group. Between January 17 and 23 there were sizable protests in nearly all major towns and regions of Guinea, including Télimélé, Koundara, Dalaba, Pita, Labé, Mamou, Siguiri, Kankan, Kissidougou and N’Zérékoré, and at least a dozen deaths were reported in Labé, Mamou, Kankan, and N’zérékoré.101 Although Human Rights Watch was not able to conduct an investigation in each of these towns due to time constraints, it did conduct interviews in the central Guinean towns of Mamou, Dalaba, and Labé.

The Case of Labé

Security forces in Guinea’s central Fouta Djallon region exercised considerably more restraint during the first weeks of the strike than their counterparts in Conakry, resulting in a significantly lower death toll. In Labé, the regional capital, witnesses report that city-wide marches occurred nearly every day of the strike, with some eyewitnesses and government officials claiming that protestors marched more frequently in Labé than in any other town in Guinea.102 The majority of these marches were peaceful rallies, with no stone throwing, vandalism, or brutality on the part of security forces.103 However, on January 17, 2007, a group of protestors ransacked the official residence of the governor along with the private home of the prefect of Dubréka.104 Demonstrators also attacked the residence of the prefect, where one protestor was shot and killed.105

Despite the frequent marching and destruction of government and private property, Labé only registered a single death and a handful of wounded during the first four weeks of the strike. Protestors and government officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch attribute the relatively low death toll to a number of factors, including organization by the trade unions and youth groups to prevent vandalism, and an apparent determination on the part of the governor of Labé to minimize the loss of human life.106 The governor of Labé provided the following account of the ransacking of his residence:

When my guards called me to tell me that the protestors were in front of my house, one of them was crying saying, “The protestors are going to kill us.” I told them not to fire, and to retreat if they had to. As governor, it is my decision to fire or not to fire. Windows and objects can be replaced, but life can’t. The soldiers at my house were armed. If I hadn’t given the order not to fire, demonstrators probably would have died when attacking my house. But I told them not even to fire in the air, because those bullets can come back down and kill people. If a house like this had been attacked in Conakry, you would have had a lot of deaths.107

Others interviewed by Human Rights Watch attribute the restraint shown by security forces in Labé during the first weeks of the strike, at least in part, to a tract that was circulated by a youth group after a protestor was shot in front of the prefect’s residence, containing a threat to kill three members of military families for every subsequent death of a protestor.108




24 Human Rights Watch interview with the then-serving Guinean Minister of Justice, Alsény Réné Gomez, Conakry, February 8, 2007; Serge Michel, “Mamadou Sylla, le millionnaire contesté, irrite les Guinéens en pleine crise sociale,” Le Monde, January 16, 2007, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3212,36-855908,0.html?xtor=RSS-3210, (accessed March 23, 2007).

25 Mamadou Sylla is also alleged to hold a multi-million dollar "overdraft" at the Central Bank, an institution where individuals are not, in theory, allowed to hold accounts. Human Rights Watch interview with international correspondent, Conakry, February 8, 2007.

26 Human Rights Watch interviews with union and other civil society leaders, February 5 and March 15 and 16, 2007.

27 l’Inter-Central CNTG-USTG, “Avis de Grève,” January 2, 2007.

28 Human Rights Watch interviews with union and other civil society leaders, February 5 and 6 and March 15 and 16, 2007. Throughout the strike, leaders of Guinea’s ruling PUP party attempted to use the political nature of the trade unions’ demands to suggest that the strike was directed from behind the scenes by the political opposition parties in an attempt to wrestle power from them. Human Rights Watch interview with PUP member of the National Assembly, Conakry, March 17, 2007. Though Guinea’s political opposition parties kept a low profile both before and during the strike, on January 8, 2007, leaders of Guinean’s political opposition threw their weight behind the strike by issuing a call “to all citizens to undertake acts of civil disobedience…until there is a return to the rule of law.” Declaration des Parties de l’Opposition, January 8, 2007.

29 The term the youths, or “les jeunes,” which appears in numerous instances throughout the report, is often used by Guineans to refer broadly to the “young generation,” and can refer to individuals well into their thirties. In this report, Human Rights Watch uses this word in its colloquial Guinean sense. 

30 In Guinea, the gendarmerie is a military body charged with police duties among civilian populations. It falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense.

31 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29 and 31 and March 19, 2007. Though most taxi drivers are not formal union members, some demonstrators saw attempts by those few taxi drivers attempting to do business as reflecting a lack of solidarity. Throughout the strike, youth demonstrators attempted to impede their circulation by erecting barricades and throwing rocks.

32 There are two divisions within the Guinean army that have the authority to wear Red Berets—the Autonomous Presidential Security Battalion (Bataillon Autonome de la Sécurité Présidentielle, BASP), or presidential guard, stationed primarily in and around Conakry, and the Autonomous Battalion of Airborne Troupes (Bataillon Autonome des troupes Aéroportées, BATA), an elite group of commandos stationed at Camp Alpha Yaya on the outskirts of Conakry and throughout the interior of the country. Human Rights Watch interview with a former member of the Guinean military, Conakry, July 1, 2006. It is not possible for a civilian to distinguish between a member of the BASP and the BATA based on differences in uniform. Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Mouniè Donzo, commander of the BASP, Conakry, March 16, 2007.

33 Central and downtown Conakry are located on a long, narrow peninsula. They are home to Conakry’s business district, and the majority of residents come from the Sousou ethnic group, the dominant ethnic group in Guinea’s lower coastal regions. As that peninsula widens at its base, it gives way to Conakry’s suburbs, or banlieue, where neighborhoods are dominated by Guinea’s other major ethnic groups: Peul and Malinké. There are pockets of wealth and large areas of poverty throughout Conakry.

34 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 31, 2007. Human Rights Watch interviewed this witness as he lay prostrate on the floor of his home, his badly wounded leg braced with shoddy cardboard splints. The witness told Human Rights Watch that the bullet passed through his thigh and shattered his femur.

35 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007.

36 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007.

37 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007.

38 See, for example, “Guinea Unions Up Ante, Government Calls Strike 'Insurrection',” Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2007.

39 Human Rights Watch interviews with heath services professionals, Conakry, February 7. Two heath services professionals interviewed by Human Rights Watch maintained that there were over 70 individuals killed on January 22 in Conakry, and at least 150 wounded.  

40 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007.

41 Human Rights Watch interview with demonstrator, Conakry, January 29, 2007.

42 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007.

43 Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomats, journalists, and demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007.

44 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007. The Party for Unity and Progress (Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès, PUP) is the ruling party to which President Conté belongs.

45 A neighborhood in Conakry’s outlying suburbs.

46 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 6, 2007.

47 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Conakry, January 29 and February 6, 2007.

48 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Conakry, January 29 and 30 and February 6, 2007.

49 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 6, 2007. Bellevue is a neighborhood in central Conakry.

50 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 30, 2007.

51 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29 and 30 and February 6, 2007. During its time in Guinea, Human Rights Watch watched several videos taken by demonstrators on January 22, 2007 that show large groups of police choosing to retreat in the face of peacefully advancing protestors.

52 Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomats and eyewitnesses, January 29 and 30 and February 5 and 6, 2007.

53 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Conakry, January and February 2007.

54 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29 and 30 and February 5 and 6, 2007. There are persistent reports that some of the soldiers participating in the crackdown, and particularly at the November 8 bridge on January 22, were, in fact, not Guinean, but a combination of troops sent from neighboring Guinea-Bissau, and Liberian mercenaries recruited by the Conté regime. “Fighters Cross Border,” IRIN, January 22, 2007. The governments implicated have denied these allegations. Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Mouniè Donzo, leader of the BASP, Conakry, March 16, 2007. “Bissau Army Denies Sending Troops to Conakry,” IRIN, January 23, 2007. Human Rights Watch was unable to verify these reports. However, a number of witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they had heard soldiers speaking in Portuguese and English on January 22 and saw soldiers wearing uniforms that they had never seen before. Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses and journalists, Conakry, January 29 and February 1 and 8, 2007.

55 Human Rights Watch interview with journalists, humanitarian organizations, and medical personnel, Conakry, February 1, 7, and 8 and March 16, 2007.

56 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 5, 2007.

57 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 6, 2007.

58 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29, 30 and February 6, 2007. Camp Boiro is a former notorious gulag-style prison camp where Sékou Touré imprisoned thousands of political dissidents. Today, it is no longer used as a prison facility, but to house members of the Guinean military and other security forces.

59 Both the gendarmes and regular Guinean military wear green berets. When asked, the victim was not sure to which group his assailants belonged, though it is likely that the Green Berets in question were gendarmes as regular Guinean military were confined to their barracks during the first weeks of the strike. Human Rights Watch interview with diplomat, Conakry, January 30, 2007.

60 Human Rights Watch interview with victim, Conakry, January 30, 2007. The victim had large scabs all over his arms and buttocks, which he said resulted from the beating.

61 A neighborhood in Conakry’s outlying suburbs.

62 General Kerfalla Camara is chief of staff for Guinea’s army. He has a house in central Conakry. Human Rights Watch interviewed several witnesses who report that on January 22, members of the presidential guard, or Red Berets, fired on demonstrators near General Kerfalla’s house, resulting in as many as five killed. Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 30, 2007.

63 In late 2000 and early 2001, the Liberian government, assisted by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean dissidents, launched a series of cross-border attacks into Guinea, accusing Guinea of hosting and providing support to a Liberian rebel group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).

64 Human Rights Watch interview with a health services professional, Conakry, February 1, 2007.

65 Human Rights Watch interview with a health services professional, Conakry, February 1, 2007.

66 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 31, 2007. Human Rights Watch observed bruises on the victim’s back and head, as well as the victim’s medical file demonstrating a history of treatment for eye problems. The victim’s door showed clear signs of forced entry and the interior of his house had been ransacked.

67 Within the police, there is a dedicated rapid-intervention unit known as the Mobile Intervention and Security Company (Compagnie Mobile d’Intervention et de Sécurité, CMIS), specially trained in crowd control and equipped with riot control equipment. Human Rights Watch interview with then-serving Minister of Security Fodé Shapo Touré, Conakry, February 7, 2007.

68 The Sousou are one of Guinea’s major ethnic groups, representing approximately 20% of the population, and are most numerous in the lower coastal regions of Guinea. It is the ethnic group of President Conté and many key members of both the government and the military.

69 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007. During Human Rights Watch’s visit, the victim’s door showed clear signs of forced entry and the interior of his house had been ransacked.

70 Donka is the name of one of Conaky’s main hospitals, located in central Conakry. Cameroun refers to both a neighborhood and cemetery near both the Donka hospital and the November 8 Bridge.

71 CMIS headquarters is not far from both Donka hospital and Cameroun.

72 For details on the arrests of union members, see below, Harassment, Arrest, and Abuse of Members of Civil Society.

73 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007.

74 A handbill produced for the march of January 15 by the CNOSCG advertised the event as a “gathering of citizens for peaceful public prayer for all religious confessions,” to be held before the National Assembly. 

75 Human Rights Watch interview with members of CNOSCG, February 1 and 5, 2007.

76 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses and civil society leaders, Conakry, February 1 and 5, 2007.

77 Human Rights Watch interviews with civil society leaders, Conakry, February 5, 2007. See also, “Guinea police break up demo, arrest union leaders behind strike,” Agence France-Presse, January 17, 2007.

78 Human Rights Watch interview with civil society leader, Conakry, February 5, 2007.

79 Located in downtown Conakry, CNTG headquarters, known as La Bourse de Travail, is home to one of Guinea’s biggest trade unions, the CNTG, as well as several smaller unions.

80 Human Rights Watch interview with union members and other eyewitnesses, February 5 and 6, 2007.

81 Aboubacar Somparé is the president of Guinea’s National Assembly.

82 Human Rights Watch interviews with union leaders, Conakry, February 5, 2007.

83 Human Rights Watch interviewers with union members, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007.

84 l’Inter-Central CNTG-USTG, Info 31, January 18, 2007.

85 Chantale Cole is an adviser to President Conté. Fodé Bangoura was minister for presidential affairs, though he would be sacked soon after this encounter. Kerfalla Camara is the Chief of Staff for Guinea’s army.

86 Human Rights Watch interviews with union leader, Conakry, February 5, 2007.

87 Human Rights Watch interviews with union leader, Conakry, February 5, 2007.

88 In radio interviews and media reports, Ousmane Conté has denied any involvement in the incident, claiming that he was not in Conakry at the time.

89 Camp Koundara is a military base a short distance from CNTG headquarters, and is the headquarters of the BASP, sometimes known as the presidential guard, or Red Berets. Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007.

90 Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007.

91 Those interviewed by Human Rights watch did not observe the presence of Ousmane Conté during the second assault.

92 Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 6, 2007.

93 Ibrahima Fofana, leader of the USTG, and Rabiatou Diallo, leader of the CNTG, are the two primary union leaders who directed the strike.

94 Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 5, 2007.

95 Human Rights Watch interview with union member, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007.

96 In 2004, the European Union suspended development assistance to Guinea due to human rights concerns. One condition imposed for the resumption of funding was the licensing for the first time in Guinea’s history of privately owned radio stations. Four licenses were granted in 2006 and in late 2006 private radio stations began broadcasting for the first time.

97 Constitution of the Republic of Guinea (la Loi Fondamentale), Title II, Article 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976; ratified by Guinea in 1978), Article 19.

98 Human Rights Watch interviews with journalists, Conakry, February 1 and 8, and March, 15, 2007.

99 “Minister Censors All Private Radio Stations,” Media Foundation for West Africa Press Release, January 24, 2007.

100 Human Rights Watch interview with journalist, February 1, 2006.

101 See, “Guinea: The Killings Must Stop Immediately,” Amnesty International Press Release, AFR 29/001/2007, January 26, 2007, http://www.amnestyusa.org/regions/africa/document.do?id=ENGAFR290012007 (accessed April 4, 2007); "Guinea: Strike violence spreads nationwide," IRIN, January 17, 2007; Alexandre Grosbois, "Guinea unions up ante, govt calls strike 'insurrection'," Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2007; "Two dead in southern Guinea as violence spreads," Reuters, January 20, 2007.

102 Human Rights Watch interviews with Abou Chéri Camara, the governor of Labé, civil society leaders, and demonstrators, Labé, February 3, 2007.

103 Human Rights Watch interviews with the governor of Labé, Abou Chéri Camara, civil society leaders, and demonstrators, Labé, February 3, 2007.

104 Dubréka is a prefecture in lower Guinea near Conakry. The prefect of Dubréka is originally from Labé and had built a large house there. Demonstrators report that they ransacked the home of the prefect of Dubréka because of pro-Conté statements he had made during the first week of the strike. Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Labé, February 2, 2007.

105 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Labé, February 2, 2007.

106 Human Rights Watch interviews with the governor of Labé, Abou Chéri Camara, civil society leaders, and demonstrators, Labé, February 3, 2007.

107 Human Rights Watch interview with the governor of Labé, Abou Chéri Camara, Labé, February 3, 2007.

108 In an interview with Human Rights Watch, leaders of the youth group referred to this as a “psychological tactic.” Leaders of the movement told Human Rights Watch that they subsequently received a message from an officer with the military in Labé indicating that the military had taken a firm decision that no further protestors would be killed. Human Rights Watch interviews with youth movement leaders, Labé, February 3, 2007.