Strike Three; The Tipping PointOn December 16, 2006, Guineas President Lansana Conté traveled to Conakrys central prison with his motorcade and personally secured the release of two close allies charged with embezzlement from Guineas Central Bank, reportedly telling his entourage, I am justice.24 The first, Mamadou Sylla, is alleged to be Guineas richest businessmen and had been arrested at his home earlier that month in connection with his allegedly unlawful removal of millions of dollars from the Central Bank.25 The second, Fodé Soumah, former Central Bank deputy governor, was also arrested for alleged complicity in the affair. For the unions, who had suspended the 2006 strikes pending government economic reforms, the incident was the final straw.26 Several weeks later a new strike notice was issued. Citing executive interference in the affairs of the judiciary and the dire economic situation in the country, the unions called for an unlimited general strike as of January 10, 2007 until such time when there was a return to the rule of law.27 Unlike the strikes of 2006, which focused almost exclusively on economic reforms, union demands in January 2007 were more overtly political, and included the nomination of a consensus prime minister with power to form a consensus government; review and renegotiation of certain mining, fishing and forestry agreements; and putting an end to corruption by prosecuting individuals charged with embezzlement of public funds. Union and other civil society leaders explained that they could no longer ignore the fact that the problems behind Guineas economic woes were essentially political in nature.28 After the strike began on January 10, 2007, activities in Conakry and major towns across Guinea ground to a halt. The first few days of the strike were relatively peaceful. As schools, shops, and markets were shut, additional police patrols deployed around the streets of the capital Conakry and there were sporadic clashes with rock-throwing youths.29 As the strike wore on, however, and the standoff between the unionswho were increasingly clear that their primary and non-negotiable demanded was that President Conté cede many of his powers to a new consensus prime ministerand the government intensified, security forces engaged in a brutal crackdown on unarmed demonstrators. During the first four weeks of the strike government security forces, including the police, the gendarmerie,30 and the presidential guard, also known as the Red Berets, would be responsible for the deaths of approximately 100 demonstrators; the wounding of hundreds more by gunshot; the beating, robbing, and arrest of scores of demonstrators and bystanders; and the harassment, arrest, and abuse of union and other civil society members. Human Rights Watch conducted detailed interviews with 79 victims and witness to the brutality that took place during the first four weeks of the strike, a selection of which are provided below. Lethal Use of ForceDuring the first week of the strike most protestors were peaceful. There were no large-scale organized rallies or marches, and most demonstrators chose to observe the strike by staying at home and refusing to work. However in some locations, demonstrators burned tires and cars, and threw rocks, both at security forces as well as taxis and other commercial vehicles attempting to break the strike.31 Reports as to the manner of the police and gendarmes intervention indicate that the response was generally appropriate, and their efforts to disperse demonstrators consisted largely of non-lethal means such as tear gas and shots fired into the air. There were no reports of deployment of the presidential guard.32 As the strike continued past its first week, however, the intensity of confrontations between protestors and security forces increased, as described by an 18-year-old shoe shiner from one of Conakrys outer suburbs,33 who reports being shot by police on January 18, 2007:
During the same period, one resident of Conakrys Hamdallaye neighborhood interviewed by Human Rights Watch described being shot by the police in front of his house as he stepped outside to make a telephone call.35 The victim reported that a policeman sitting on top of a passing truck fired directly at him, hitting him three times in the hip and thigh. 36 Another witness in the same neighborhood described seeing a rock-throwing protestor shot in the foot as a group of gendarmes fired at the ground in an attempt to disperse protestors.37 The Human TideWhile as many as a dozen deaths were reported in the first 10 days of the strike,38 the death toll would rapidly escalate on Monday, January 22, when union leaders, civil society coalitions, and other community groups mobilized tens of thousands of demonstrators for a march from Conakrys suburbs into central Conakry in which many dozens of protestors were killed by security forces and many more wounded by gunshot.39 Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch referred to the stream of protestors as a human tide, some of them claiming it was the single largest crowd they had ever witnessed in Guinea.40 Protestors interviewed reported that when leaving their houses that morning, they felt that the day would be decisive, one way or another. As one protestor put it, When we came out on Monday, we were determined to change the system in place. Its been 48 years since independence, and we have nothing.41 The goal of most demonstrators was to reach the headquarters of the National Assembly, known as the Peoples Palace (Palais du Peuple), a dozen kilometers from Conakrys suburbs.42 Though there were sporadic instances of rock throwing in the outer suburbs during the early morning hours, as the marchers coalesced into streams flowing down the main arteries towards central Conakry, those interviewed by Human Rights Watchboth protesters and international observersreported that protestors were unarmed and marching peacefully.43 Marchers reported that they carried signs and banners bearing slogans such as Down with Conté, We want change, and Down with the PUP.44 Many protestors told Human Rights Watch that order among the marchers was kept by informal overseers, one of whom explained his role as follows:
As the protestors made their way into central Conakry, there were a number of encounters with large groups of police and gendarmes stationed at various strategic crossroads. Though police and gendarmes did in many instances attempt to disperse the advancing protestors using tear gas and shots fired in the air, eyewitnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that in several instances security forces fired directly into the advancing crowd when non-lethal means failed to stop the advance, resulting in deaths in the neighborhoods of Hamdallaye and Dixinne.47 Many protestors interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that, rather than fleeing the gunfire, crowds of demonstrators picked up the bodies of the dead, and continued their march towards security forces while carrying the bodies above their heads.48 The following account is typical:
Another witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch, a 38-year-old teacher in a Koranic school, described an encounter in Dar-Es-Salam, one of Conakrys outlying neighborhoods, between police and demonstrators:
Ultimately, security forces stationed at many strategic crossroads chose to retreat in the face of the peacefully advancing demonstrators, whose numbers were increasing by the hour.51 The November 8 BridgeConakry is situated on a long, narrow peninsula, at points barely wider than 500 meters across. To reach the National Assembly from Conakrys suburbs, nearly all major road arteries pass near a narrow choke point, known as the November 8 Bridge. On January 22, 2007, dozens of security forces, including the police, gendarmes, and members of the presidential guard, were stationed in a line across the bridge, creating a barrier to any advance beyond the bridge to the National Assembly building or anywhere else in the city center.52 As groups of protestors reached the November 8 Bridge, security forces attempted to disperse them with tear gas and with shots fired in the air.53 When that failed, witnesses told Human Rights Watch that security forces, in particular the Red Berets, fired directly into the crowd.54 Journalists and officials from humanitarian organizations interviewed by Human Rights Watch estimate that between 10 and 20 individuals were killed at the bridge, though many more likely subsequently died due to injuries suffered.55 One foreign diplomat who was able to view the scene at the bridge, provided the following account:
As security forces fired into the crowds approaching the November 8 Bridge, many demonstrators attempted to flee. Eyewitnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that security forces stationed at the bridge went so far as to target fleeing unarmed demonstrators who could in no way pose a threat to their safety. One demonstrator described the situation as follows:
Other demonstrators who managed to flee beyond the range of security forces firing from the bridge found themselves trapped as their advance away from the bridge was met by groups of police and gendarmes coming from the other direction. Pinned down between two sets of security forces, many fleeing demonstrators attempted to hide in neighboring houses, Conakrys central mosque, and even Camp Boiro.58 One witness described being caught by security forces while trying to hide:
The Day of Hell; Treating the Wounded in Conakrys HospitalsAs the body count increased over the course of the strike, scores of dead and wounded flooded into local hospitals. Medical personnel on duty on January 22, 2007, the single heaviest day of deaths and injuries during the entire six-week crisis period, described the difficulties of treating the unexpected influx of wounded:
In what was a blatant instance of excessive use of force against injured persons, several witnesses, including medical personnel trying to attend to the wounded, described seeing the security forces in green uniforms firing a tear gas cartridge directly in front of the emergency room as patients were being treated:
Beating, Arrest, and Robbery of Protestors and BystandersThroughout the first four weeks of the strike, as protestors dispersed from major roads into surrounding neighborhoods, police and gendarmes pursued them, at times for up to over a kilometer from the main road where the demonstrations were taking place. Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of eyewitnesses who allege that, as security forces entered the neighborhoods, they rampaged through the homes and businesses of local residents, beating and robbing not only the protesters, but many others including women, children, and elderly men who had not participated in the protests. One man of 47 told Human Rights Watch that the police broke into his house and robbed him, just as he was planning to leave for eye surgery in Dakar, Senegal:
In the course of their expeditions into the neighborhoods, security forces arrested many individuals having little to do with the protest. Many of those arrested later interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they were taken to police detention facilities, beaten, held for several days, and freed only after family members bribed police officers to secure their release. A man in Conakrys outer suburbs who had not taken part in the strikes described his arrest at his home on January 17, 2007:
A 58-year-old teacher whose son was killed on January 22, described his arrest during his attempt to find his sons body:
Harassment, Arrest, and Abuse of Members of Civil SocietyThroughout the strike, leadership at the highest levels of government, including the executive branch, together with Guinean security forces engaged in what appeared to be an organized attempt to intimidate and silence union and other civil society leaders. On January 13, members of a civil society coalition, the National Council of Guinean Civil Society Organizations (Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guinéenne, CNOSCG), were at their headquarters preparing for a march that was scheduled to take place on January 15.74 Youth members assembled there to paint signs and banners for the march with various slogans such as: We are fed up, we want change, We are hungry, we want bread, and We have no water, and no electricity.75 CNOSCG members interviewed by Human Rights Watch report how that afternoon, a group of seven or eight policemen burst into the courtyard, arrested seven of those preparing the signs, and took them (along with the signs) to the central police station, where they were interrogated and thrown into a cell with routine criminal suspects before being released late that night after the intervention of civil society leaders.76 The following day, January 14, the governor of Conakry issued an edict banning all street demonstrations.77 The march planned for January 15 was canceled, with the head of CNOSCG, Ben Sékou Sylla, stating that he would not send the population to the slaughterhouse.78 On January 17, leaders of the CNTG and USTG trade unions attempted to walk from CNTG headquarters to the National Assembly building to deliver a letter containing their demands to the president of the National Assembly.79 Witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch describe the march as peaceful, with union members marching in the lead, and youths from downtown Conakry behind them.80 Approximately halfway to the Palais du Peuple, however, police and gendarmes who had been following the marchers fired tear gas and warning shots to break up the march, and arrested union members. One union member described the scene:
Those taken by the police reported that they were released several hours after their arrest and driven to the Palais du Peuple, allowing the letter to the president of the National Assembly, which was being carried by one of the arrestees, to be delivered.83 Later that day, union leaders report that they were summoned to Camp Samory, an army base in central Conakry, where President Conté threatened to kill them.84 In an interview with Human Rights Watch, one union leader described the encounter between the union leadership and President Conté:
According to the same union leader, after this speech, President Conté insulted them, and then allowed them to go home.87 On January 22the day tens of thousands of Guineans attempted to march from the suburbs to the Palais du People, and the day of the highest casualtiesthe headquarters of one of the two principal trade unions leading the strike, the CNTG, was attacked by a combined group of police and Red Berets. According to union leaders and others present in the building, the Red Berets first arrived that morning, led by Ousmane Conté, the son of President Conté.88 Union leaders told Human Rights Watch that the security forces then broke down several doors on the upper level of CNTG headquarters and arrested six youths upstairs, who were taken to camp Koudara, where union members reported that they were each given 40 blows with a club before being released.89 Most union leaders were downstairs at the time of the first invasion, several of them observing Ousmane Conté from a window.90 Later that afternoon, union members report that Red Berets and police returned to CNTG headquarters in greater numbers, with the police storming the top floor from the front of the building, and the Red Berets storming the lower floor from the back side of the building.91 One union member described the arrival of the police on the upper floor of CNTG headquarters:
Union members told Human Rights Watch that as the combined police and Red Beret forces proceeded to ransack the building, overturning computers and smashing office equipment, a group of them converged in a room downstairs containing senior union leadership. One union leader reported her experience as follows:
Later that evening, the heads of the CNTG and USTG unions were taken from the CMIS police station to see President Conté at Camp Samory. A union leader interviewed by Human Rights Watch claimed that during this encounter President Conté appeared to have no prior knowledge of the invasion of CNTG headquarters and subsequent arrest of union members, and ordered their release.95 In all, union leaders reported that approximately 70 union members were taken to the CMIS police station where they were held until around midnight, before being escorted to their homes. A subsequent agreement between the unions, the government, and the Employers Association (Conseil National du Patronat) signed on January 27, 2007 officially deplore[d] the invasion, destruction, and ransacking of the Bourse de Travail [CNTG headquarters] and the arbitrary arrest of union leaders. Intimidation of the Media During the First Weeks of the StrikeIn late 2006, Guinea became the last country in West Africa to allow private radio broadcasting, ending a 48-year-long state broadcasting monopoly when four private radio stations were granted licenses and began broadcasting.96 Despite this apparent embrace of freedom of expression guaranteed under both Guineas constitution as well as international conventions to which it is party, 97 during the first weeks of the strike, a number of actions were taken by agents of the Guinean government to restrict the free transmission of information by private radio stations. For example, journalists interviewed by Human Rights Watch report that FM transmission of Radio France International was disrupted by the government on at least two occasions during the strike.98 On January 15, 2007, in separate visits to the various radio stations, then-serving minister of information, Boubacar Yacine Diallo, reportedly prohibited all private and community radio stations from broadcasting any material relating to the strike.99 An employee for one of Guineas four private radio stations that persisted in broadcasting news about the strike told Human Rights Watch that he received a variety of threatening calls from government and anonymous sources during the first weeks of the strike, including from the minister of information himself.100 The Strike Outside of ConakryWhile the neighborhoods of Conakry were a hotbed of both demonstration and repression throughout the strike, demonstrations were not limited to those in the capital city, or to a particular region or ethnic group. Between January 17 and 23 there were sizable protests in nearly all major towns and regions of Guinea, including Télimélé, Koundara, Dalaba, Pita, Labé, Mamou, Siguiri, Kankan, Kissidougou and NZérékoré, and at least a dozen deaths were reported in Labé, Mamou, Kankan, and Nzérékoré.101 Although Human Rights Watch was not able to conduct an investigation in each of these towns due to time constraints, it did conduct interviews in the central Guinean towns of Mamou, Dalaba, and Labé. The Case of LabéSecurity forces in Guineas central Fouta Djallon region exercised considerably more restraint during the first weeks of the strike than their counterparts in Conakry, resulting in a significantly lower death toll. In Labé, the regional capital, witnesses report that city-wide marches occurred nearly every day of the strike, with some eyewitnesses and government officials claiming that protestors marched more frequently in Labé than in any other town in Guinea.102 The majority of these marches were peaceful rallies, with no stone throwing, vandalism, or brutality on the part of security forces.103 However, on January 17, 2007, a group of protestors ransacked the official residence of the governor along with the private home of the prefect of Dubréka.104 Demonstrators also attacked the residence of the prefect, where one protestor was shot and killed.105 Despite the frequent marching and destruction of government and private property, Labé only registered a single death and a handful of wounded during the first four weeks of the strike. Protestors and government officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch attribute the relatively low death toll to a number of factors, including organization by the trade unions and youth groups to prevent vandalism, and an apparent determination on the part of the governor of Labé to minimize the loss of human life.106 The governor of Labé provided the following account of the ransacking of his residence:
Others interviewed by Human Rights Watch attribute the restraint shown by security forces in Labé during the first weeks of the strike, at least in part, to a tract that was circulated by a youth group after a protestor was shot in front of the prefects residence, containing a threat to kill three members of military families for every subsequent death of a protestor.108 24 Human Rights Watch interview with the then-serving Guinean Minister of Justice, Alsény Réné Gomez, Conakry, February 8, 2007; Serge Michel, Mamadou Sylla, le millionnaire contesté, irrite les Guinéens en pleine crise sociale, Le Monde, January 16, 2007, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3212,36-855908,0.html?xtor=RSS-3210, (accessed March 23, 2007). 25 Mamadou Sylla is also alleged to hold a multi-million dollar "overdraft" at the Central Bank, an institution where individuals are not, in theory, allowed to hold accounts. Human Rights Watch interview with international correspondent, Conakry, February 8, 2007. 26 Human Rights Watch interviews with union and other civil society leaders, February 5 and March 15 and 16, 2007. 27 lInter-Central CNTG-USTG, Avis de Grève, January 2, 2007. 28 Human Rights Watch interviews with union and other civil society leaders, February 5 and 6 and March 15 and 16, 2007. Throughout the strike, leaders of Guineas ruling PUP party attempted to use the political nature of the trade unions demands to suggest that the strike was directed from behind the scenes by the political opposition parties in an attempt to wrestle power from them. Human Rights Watch interview with PUP member of the National Assembly, Conakry, March 17, 2007. Though Guineas political opposition parties kept a low profile both before and during the strike, on January 8, 2007, leaders of Guineans political opposition threw their weight behind the strike by issuing a call to all citizens to undertake acts of civil disobedience until there is a return to the rule of law. Declaration des Parties de lOpposition, January 8, 2007. 29 The term the youths, or les jeunes, which appears in numerous instances throughout the report, is often used by Guineans to refer broadly to the young generation, and can refer to individuals well into their thirties. In this report, Human Rights Watch uses this word in its colloquial Guinean sense. 30 In Guinea, the gendarmerie is a military body charged with police duties among civilian populations. It falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. 31 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29 and 31 and March 19, 2007. Though most taxi drivers are not formal union members, some demonstrators saw attempts by those few taxi drivers attempting to do business as reflecting a lack of solidarity. Throughout the strike, youth demonstrators attempted to impede their circulation by erecting barricades and throwing rocks. 32 There are two divisions within the Guinean army that have the authority to wear Red Beretsthe Autonomous Presidential Security Battalion (Bataillon Autonome de la Sécurité Présidentielle, BASP), or presidential guard, stationed primarily in and around Conakry, and the Autonomous Battalion of Airborne Troupes (Bataillon Autonome des troupes Aéroportées, BATA), an elite group of commandos stationed at Camp Alpha Yaya on the outskirts of Conakry and throughout the interior of the country. Human Rights Watch interview with a former member of the Guinean military, Conakry, July 1, 2006. It is not possible for a civilian to distinguish between a member of the BASP and the BATA based on differences in uniform. Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Mouniè Donzo, commander of the BASP, Conakry, March 16, 2007. 33 Central and downtown Conakry are located on a long, narrow peninsula. They are home to Conakrys business district, and the majority of residents come from the Sousou ethnic group, the dominant ethnic group in Guineas lower coastal regions. As that peninsula widens at its base, it gives way to Conakrys suburbs, or banlieue, where neighborhoods are dominated by Guineas other major ethnic groups: Peul and Malinké. There are pockets of wealth and large areas of poverty throughout Conakry. 34 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 31, 2007. Human Rights Watch interviewed this witness as he lay prostrate on the floor of his home, his badly wounded leg braced with shoddy cardboard splints. The witness told Human Rights Watch that the bullet passed through his thigh and shattered his femur. 35 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007. 36 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007. 37 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007. 38 See, for example, Guinea Unions Up Ante, Government Calls Strike 'Insurrection', Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2007. 39 Human Rights Watch interviews with heath services professionals, Conakry, February 7. Two heath services professionals interviewed by Human Rights Watch maintained that there were over 70 individuals killed on January 22 in Conakry, and at least 150 wounded. 40 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007. 41 Human Rights Watch interview with demonstrator, Conakry, January 29, 2007. 42 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007. 43 Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomats, journalists, and demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007. 44 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple demonstrators, Conakry, January-February 2007. The Party for Unity and Progress (Parti de lUnité et du Progrès, PUP) is the ruling party to which President Conté belongs. 45 A neighborhood in Conakrys outlying suburbs. 46 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 6, 2007. 47 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Conakry, January 29 and February 6, 2007. 48 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Conakry, January 29 and 30 and February 6, 2007. 49 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 6, 2007. Bellevue is a neighborhood in central Conakry. 50 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 30, 2007. 51 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29 and 30 and February 6, 2007. During its time in Guinea, Human Rights Watch watched several videos taken by demonstrators on January 22, 2007 that show large groups of police choosing to retreat in the face of peacefully advancing protestors. 52 Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomats and eyewitnesses, January 29 and 30 and February 5 and 6, 2007. 53 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Conakry, January and February 2007. 54 Human Rights Watch interviews with multiple eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29 and 30 and February 5 and 6, 2007. There are persistent reports that some of the soldiers participating in the crackdown, and particularly at the November 8 bridge on January 22, were, in fact, not Guinean, but a combination of troops sent from neighboring Guinea-Bissau, and Liberian mercenaries recruited by the Conté regime. Fighters Cross Border, IRIN, January 22, 2007. The governments implicated have denied these allegations. Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Mouniè Donzo, leader of the BASP, Conakry, March 16, 2007. Bissau Army Denies Sending Troops to Conakry, IRIN, January 23, 2007. Human Rights Watch was unable to verify these reports. However, a number of witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they had heard soldiers speaking in Portuguese and English on January 22 and saw soldiers wearing uniforms that they had never seen before. Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses and journalists, Conakry, January 29 and February 1 and 8, 2007. 55 Human Rights Watch interview with journalists, humanitarian organizations, and medical personnel, Conakry, February 1, 7, and 8 and March 16, 2007. 56 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 5, 2007. 57 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, February 6, 2007. 58 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 29, 30 and February 6, 2007. Camp Boiro is a former notorious gulag-style prison camp where Sékou Touré imprisoned thousands of political dissidents. Today, it is no longer used as a prison facility, but to house members of the Guinean military and other security forces. 59 Both the gendarmes and regular Guinean military wear green berets. When asked, the victim was not sure to which group his assailants belonged, though it is likely that the Green Berets in question were gendarmes as regular Guinean military were confined to their barracks during the first weeks of the strike. Human Rights Watch interview with diplomat, Conakry, January 30, 2007. 60 Human Rights Watch interview with victim, Conakry, January 30, 2007. The victim had large scabs all over his arms and buttocks, which he said resulted from the beating. 61 A neighborhood in Conakrys outlying suburbs. 62 General Kerfalla Camara is chief of staff for Guineas army. He has a house in central Conakry. Human Rights Watch interviewed several witnesses who report that on January 22, members of the presidential guard, or Red Berets, fired on demonstrators near General Kerfallas house, resulting in as many as five killed. Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses, Conakry, January 30, 2007. 63 In late 2000 and early 2001, the Liberian government, assisted by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean dissidents, launched a series of cross-border attacks into Guinea, accusing Guinea of hosting and providing support to a Liberian rebel group, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). 64 Human Rights Watch interview with a health services professional, Conakry, February 1, 2007. 65 Human Rights Watch interview with a health services professional, Conakry, February 1, 2007. 66 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 31, 2007. Human Rights Watch observed bruises on the victims back and head, as well as the victims medical file demonstrating a history of treatment for eye problems. The victims door showed clear signs of forced entry and the interior of his house had been ransacked. 67 Within the police, there is a dedicated rapid-intervention unit known as the Mobile Intervention and Security Company (Compagnie Mobile dIntervention et de Sécurité, CMIS), specially trained in crowd control and equipped with riot control equipment. Human Rights Watch interview with then-serving Minister of Security Fodé Shapo Touré, Conakry, February 7, 2007. 68 The Sousou are one of Guineas major ethnic groups, representing approximately 20% of the population, and are most numerous in the lower coastal regions of Guinea. It is the ethnic group of President Conté and many key members of both the government and the military. 69 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007. During Human Rights Watchs visit, the victims door showed clear signs of forced entry and the interior of his house had been ransacked. 70 Donka is the name of one of Conakys main hospitals, located in central Conakry. Cameroun refers to both a neighborhood and cemetery near both the Donka hospital and the November 8 Bridge. 71 CMIS headquarters is not far from both Donka hospital and Cameroun. 72 For details on the arrests of union members, see below, Harassment, Arrest, and Abuse of Members of Civil Society. 73 Human Rights Watch interview with eyewitness, Conakry, January 29, 2007. 74 A handbill produced for the march of January 15 by the CNOSCG advertised the event as a gathering of citizens for peaceful public prayer for all religious confessions, to be held before the National Assembly. 75 Human Rights Watch interview with members of CNOSCG, February 1 and 5, 2007. 76 Human Rights Watch interviews with eyewitnesses and civil society leaders, Conakry, February 1 and 5, 2007. 77 Human Rights Watch interviews with civil society leaders, Conakry, February 5, 2007. See also, Guinea police break up demo, arrest union leaders behind strike, Agence France-Presse, January 17, 2007. 78 Human Rights Watch interview with civil society leader, Conakry, February 5, 2007. 79 Located in downtown Conakry, CNTG headquarters, known as La Bourse de Travail, is home to one of Guineas biggest trade unions, the CNTG, as well as several smaller unions. 80 Human Rights Watch interview with union members and other eyewitnesses, February 5 and 6, 2007. 81 Aboubacar Somparé is the president of Guineas National Assembly. 82 Human Rights Watch interviews with union leaders, Conakry, February 5, 2007. 83 Human Rights Watch interviewers with union members, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007. 84 lInter-Central CNTG-USTG, Info 31, January 18, 2007. 85 Chantale Cole is an adviser to President Conté. Fodé Bangoura was minister for presidential affairs, though he would be sacked soon after this encounter. Kerfalla Camara is the Chief of Staff for Guineas army. 86 Human Rights Watch interviews with union leader, Conakry, February 5, 2007. 87 Human Rights Watch interviews with union leader, Conakry, February 5, 2007. 88 In radio interviews and media reports, Ousmane Conté has denied any involvement in the incident, claiming that he was not in Conakry at the time. 89 Camp Koundara is a military base a short distance from CNTG headquarters, and is the headquarters of the BASP, sometimes known as the presidential guard, or Red Berets. Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007. 90 Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007. 91 Those interviewed by Human Rights watch did not observe the presence of Ousmane Conté during the second assault. 92 Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 6, 2007. 93 Ibrahima Fofana, leader of the USTG, and Rabiatou Diallo, leader of the CNTG, are the two primary union leaders who directed the strike. 94 Human Rights Watch interviews with union members, Conakry, February 5, 2007. 95 Human Rights Watch interview with union member, Conakry, February 5 and 6, 2007. 96 In 2004, the European Union suspended development assistance to Guinea due to human rights concerns. One condition imposed for the resumption of funding was the licensing for the first time in Guineas history of privately owned radio stations. Four licenses were granted in 2006 and in late 2006 private radio stations began broadcasting for the first time. 97 Constitution of the Republic of Guinea (la Loi Fondamentale), Title II, Article 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976; ratified by Guinea in 1978), Article 19. 98 Human Rights Watch interviews with journalists, Conakry, February 1 and 8, and March, 15, 2007. 99 Minister Censors All Private Radio Stations, Media Foundation for West Africa Press Release, January 24, 2007. 100 Human Rights Watch interview with journalist, February 1, 2006. 101 See, Guinea: The Killings Must Stop Immediately, Amnesty International Press Release, AFR 29/001/2007, January 26, 2007, http://www.amnestyusa.org/regions/africa/document.do?id=ENGAFR290012007 (accessed April 4, 2007); "Guinea: Strike violence spreads nationwide," IRIN, January 17, 2007; Alexandre Grosbois, "Guinea unions up ante, govt calls strike 'insurrection'," Agence France-Presse, January 21, 2007; "Two dead in southern Guinea as violence spreads," Reuters, January 20, 2007. 102 Human Rights Watch interviews with Abou Chéri Camara, the governor of Labé, civil society leaders, and demonstrators, Labé, February 3, 2007. 103 Human Rights Watch interviews with the governor of Labé, Abou Chéri Camara, civil society leaders, and demonstrators, Labé, February 3, 2007. 104 Dubréka is a prefecture in lower Guinea near Conakry. The prefect of Dubréka is originally from Labé and had built a large house there. Demonstrators report that they ransacked the home of the prefect of Dubréka because of pro-Conté statements he had made during the first week of the strike. Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Labé, February 2, 2007. 105 Human Rights Watch interviews with demonstrators, Labé, February 2, 2007. 106 Human Rights Watch interviews with the governor of Labé, Abou Chéri Camara, civil society leaders, and demonstrators, Labé, February 3, 2007. 107 Human Rights Watch interview with the governor of Labé, Abou Chéri Camara, Labé, February 3, 2007. 108 In an interview with Human Rights Watch, leaders of the youth group referred to this as a psychological tactic. Leaders of the movement told Human Rights Watch that they subsequently received a message from an officer with the military in Labé indicating that the military had taken a firm decision that no further protestors would be killed. Human Rights Watch interviews with youth movement leaders, Labé, February 3, 2007. |