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Impact on the Return of Displaced Persons

The riots and attacks on minorities in March 2004 left some 4,100 minority community members displaced in Kosovo. More than one-and-a-half years later approximately 1,300 of these persons are still officially displaced.209 Human Rights Watch research in the field suggests that very few of those displaced by March events have actually returned to reconstructed houses in their original communities, choosing instead to live in temporary collective shelters on the outskirts of their old communities, in mono-ethnic enclaves elsewhere in the province, or outside of Kosovo altogether.210

There is a widespread belief on the part of the Serb community in particular that the failure to achieve accountability for March crimes is the result of a “lack of will” on the part of the international presence in Kosovo. The views expressed below—by people displaced by March riots, often by neighbors whom they recognized—reflect widely-shared sentiments among minority communities:

The intelligence that was working in Kosovo, they have photos but they will never give them to you.211

The police and others know who did this, but they keep those photos of who was burning the houses for themselves.212

No police even are looking for them. So many murders took place around Kosovo and no one was convicted.213

Nobody came to apologize. Nothing happened. They were showing us some pictures and telling us like they were involved in March events (and they knew they were involved), but they did nothing. If the Serbians did something like this, they would have caught them a long time ago. There is no justice from KFOR, UNMIK, or others, and I cannot ask for anything of the Albanians.214

The promise after March 2004 was that it would be “fixed”: perpetrators would be brought to justice and the houses would be rebuilt. Return of the displaced is contingent on both of these elements; there must be safety enabling return as well as a viable place to return to.215

Whatever progress has been made in reconstructing houses, the fact that there has been little or no visible accountability for March crimes—for ordinary perpetrators and law enforcement personnel alike—reinforces the fear within minority communities that events like in March 2004 are likely to happen again. This view is echoed in the conclusion of the recent OSCE analysis of the criminal justice response to March, which states that the “relatively weak response of the courts… may also be considered inadequate to prevent similar acts of public disorder in the future.”216 

Many of the people Human Rights Watch interviewed told of their deep attachment to their land and their wish to return, but asked how they could return given the lack of security. In the words of one man, who was crying as he spoke:  “I would return, but how can I by myself. Who doesn’t want to live in his own house?  I live in a container and my house is near.”217

One woman summed up her situation as follows:

The people who committed those crimes are walking freely. . . . Nobody has said anything. No one from [city name] has come here to talk to us, not the President or the Serbian community representative or the municipality. They had one meeting in [city name] about six months ago and said if you want you can come back, but we cannot guarantee your safety.218

Human Rights Watch found that a number of displaced persons, particularly the elderly or those with children, preferred to live in collective temporary shelters—often in poor conditions or in metal containers only six by two meters in size—rather than risking return. No one we interviewed still living in displacement had plans to return to their rebuilt homes.219

The lack of visible prosecutions and accountability for offenders also appears to have sent a message that harassment and intimidation of minorities is permissible. In one municipality visited by Human Rights Watch, several elderly displaced persons said that their neighbors had threatened them with “worse next time” if they seriously contemplated return.220 Other minorities described how children cursed them, spit at them, and even threw stones, when they returned to their former villages or towns to visit their rebuilt houses.221

For minorities, especially the displaced, the end result is confirmation for them that accountability in the broadest sense has not been achieved. The international community and the local administration have failed in their promise to bring to justice those responsible for the violence and devastation wreaked on their communities. They proved themselves yet again incapable of delivering on their promise to rebuild an important part of what they had lost—trust and a sense of security or protection. Local leaders and municipal representatives also did not rise to the occasion, failing to actively promote and support returns of those displaced from their communities in March 2004.

Against this backdrop it will be difficult for any future leadership in Kosovo to achieve real progress in the area of increased (and sustainable) returns of minorities and multi-ethnicity, unless the perception of impunity can be dramatically altered.




[209] Human Rights Watch interview with UNMIK Office of Returns and Communities, Pristina, September 16, 2005; Human Rights Watch interview with UNHCR, Pristina, September 26, 2005. See also U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,”  S/2006/45.

[210] Human Rights Watch bases its analysis on field research with displaced persons from six different municipalities. Human Rights Watch interviews, Kosovo, September 16-17, 2005. In subsequent discussions with NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies it is clear that the numbers of returnees from March 2004 is very low. One municipality representative in the North Mitrovica region suggested that if “1 percent has returned that is generous.” Human Rights Watch interview with UNMIK municipal representative, North Mitrovica region, September 21, 2005. It is also notable that the October 2005 Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo by Ambassador Kai Eide (“the Eide report”) concluded bluntly “the overall return process has virtually come to a halt.”

[211] Human Rights Watch interview with sixty-five-year-old man, September 19, 2005.

[212] Human Rights Watch interview with thirty-nine-year-old man, September 19, 2005.

[213] Human Rights Watch interview with fifty-two-year-old man, September 19, 2005.

[214] Human Rights Watch interview, September 21, 2005.

[215] The issues related to the second necessary precondition for return (houses and the reconstruction effort) fall outside the scope of this report. It should be noted, however, that in the December 2005 report on the status of developments in Kosovo of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to the U.N. Secretary-General, the SRSG concludes that “[t]hese failures [relating to the reconstruction and compensation scheme led by the PISG] undermine returns and the prospect for returns and undercut the government’s message in the immediate aftermath that the violence was unacceptable and would not be repeated.” See U.N. Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” S/2006/45, p. 17, para. 69 of Annex I “Technical assessment of progress in implementation of the standards for Kosovo,” prepared by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo, 20 December 2005.

[216] OSCE LSMS, “The Response of the Justice System to the March 2004 Riots.”

[217] Human Rights Watch interview with fifty-one-year-old displaced man, Kosovo, September 20, 2005. A seventy-four-year-old displaced man expressed similar sentiments: “I do not want to go from prison to prison. If some other Serb neighbors would go back, I would definitely return. . . . [But] to go back there now to have someone kill me in the night…?” Human Rights Watch interview, Kosovo, September 18, 2005.

[218] Human Rights Watch interview with sixty-six-year-old displaced woman, Kosovo, September 20, 2005.

[219] It should be noted that there is a long-standing debate in Kosovo about the advisability of returns to homes of origin versus alternative resettlement options. UNHCR has adopted the position that despite the guiding principles on return, which give displaced persons a choice in the manner and location of return, in the Kosovo context return can only mean to “homes of origin.” Resolution 1244 implies that return can only be to homes of origin and in reality there is little informed or real choice for alternative resettlement options because the areas outside mono-ethnic enclaves are not considered safe and therefore not an option, thus severely limiting the “choice.” In October 2005, Special Envoy Kai Eide suggested that returns to places other than homes of origin should be contemplated. See “A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo,” report of Special Envoy Kai Eide as submitted by the Secretary General of the United Nations to the President of the Security Council for review on October 7, 2005, p. 7. It will be critical that this issue be taken on directly in broader discussions about sustainable returns to Kosovo.

[220] Human Rights Watch interview with displaced couple, Kosovo, September 19, 2005.

[221] Human Rights Watch interview with displaced woman, Kosovo, September 18, 2005.


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