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Executive Summary

The March 2004 violence across Kosovo was the most serious setback since 1999 in the international community’s efforts to create a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which both the government and society respect human rights. Widespread riots involving an estimated 51,000 people across Kosovo left nineteen people dead, almost a thousand wounded, more than four thousand people displaced and hundreds of properties destroyed. But the tragedy also offered an opportunity to demonstrate that those responsible would be brought to justice. In the aftermath, the international community repeatedly stated that justice would be done.

The criminal justice response to March 2004 provides a useful yardstick with which to measure progress on accountability efforts in the province generally. After almost seven years of international administration, it can no longer be argued that the international community has had insufficient time to address the shortcomings in the legal framework, the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts.

Human Rights Watch research indicates that despite the rhetoric of the international community and the local leadership that accountability for the March violence would be achieved—that justice would this time be done—the reality is that accountability remains a distant goal in Kosovo.

Assessing progress on accountability for March 2004 is made complicated by the fact that there is no consensus among the international agencies tasked with overseeing the criminal justice system about the total number of prosecutions. Statistics from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) indicate that 426 individuals have been charged for March-related offences, mostly minor offences such as theft, with just over half resulting in final decisions. Figures from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Department of Justice suggest 348 cases have been filed, with a clear-up rate that appears to match the OSCE’s figure, but it is unclear whether “cases” relate to individual or multiple defendants. But whichever figures one relies upon, it is clear that progress has been limited.

Among the fifty-six “serious” cases (the number of defendants is unclear), which are being prosecuted by and before international prosecutors and judges, progress has been equally limited. By March 2006, only thirteen cases—less than one-quarter—had resulted in final decisions, with another twelve dismissed or terminated. A further two appeared likely to reach trial. The remaining twenty-nine cases have not even reached the pre-trial investigation stage.

It is also clear that those prosecutions that have resulted in convictions have often attracted lenient sentences, including in cases in which international judges were involved. In some cases sentencing was so lenient that it fell below minimum sentencing guidelines.

There are complex reasons for the failure to bring to justice many of those responsible for the March 2004 violence. A key factor was the entry into force of a new criminal procedure code just weeks after the riots, which fundamentally restructured the criminal justice system in Kosovo, giving prosecutors, rather than investigative judges, primary responsibility for the conduct of investigations, and creating a new branch of the police to support their efforts. Despite the profound importance of that change, insufficient attention was given to operationalizing the new responsibilities of prosecutors and the police.

Also important was the establishment of a special international police operation to investigate the March violence. The operation failed to achieve its goals and was eventually disbanded due to its ineffectiveness. As the operation was not integrated into the criminal justice system, its failure impacted not only efforts in relation to March 2004, but also undermined the introduction of the reforms to the criminal justice system by disenfranchising national police officers, and by masking the importance of operationalizing the new branch of the police intended to support prosecutors in their investigative role.

The failure of the special operation underscores general shortcomings in policing in Kosovo, among international and national police alike. The police were largely passive in the conduct of their investigations and prosecutions into the March cases, in many cases failing to contact or follow up with victims and witnesses from minority communities. A lack of coordination between international and national police also hampered investigations. And few efforts were made to investigate, and where appropriate, to prosecute allegations of police misconduct during the riots.

Prosecutors contributed to these deficiencies by failing to take on their new responsibilities as investigative prosecutors, preferring instead to blame the police for the poor quality and protracted nature of their investigations. Case management problems and lenient sentencing practices undermined the success of the courts in delivering justice for March, including in cases handled by international judges.

These problems were compounded by a lack of effective oversight by the various institutions in the United Nations administration tasked with developing the rule of law in Kosovo.

Moreover, little or no effort has been made to conduct outreach in order to inform affected communities about the outcome of investigations and prosecutions arising from the March 2004 violence.

The inadequate criminal justice response to violence in March 2004 symbolizes one of the greatest problems faced by Kosovo today—rampant impunity for crime, particularly where it has a political or ethnic dimension. The track record on investigating and prosecuting war and inter-ethnic crimes prior to March 2004 is extremely poor, despite these cases also having been given priority within the criminal justice system.

The failure to deliver justice for March 2004 has reinforced the belief among Serbs and other minority communities that there is no will to create accountability for violence against minorities in Kosovo. While the international community likes to point to progress in reconstructing damaged houses, the failure to ensure accountability undermines efforts to promote return of displaced minorities to their homes and bolsters the belief within minority communities that the violence of March is likely to happen again.

The gap between the promise that those responsible for March would be held to account, and the reality, should be a warning sign to the international community that criminal justice in Kosovo is in crisis. To address that crisis, accountability for crimes, including war crimes and attacks on minorities prior to March, must be put at the heart of the political agenda, including in the status negotiations now underway.

Establishing the rule of law is a fundamental objective of the international administration in Kosovo. That cannot be achieved in a climate of impunity. It is imperative that the international community make good on its obligation to protect those within its jurisdiction and to ensure that the perpetrators of all crimes in Kosovo—including war crimes and crimes against minorities—are indeed brought to justice, as part of its strategy to establish law and order. Urgent and meaningful steps are required to tackle this culture of impunity before status is determined. Otherwise, Kosovo—regardless of its future shape—will inherit a legacy of broken judicial institutions incapable of ensuring fair and transparent justice in the territory.