II. Background: People, the India-Pakistan Dispute, Political History, Recent Developments, and Peace Talks

The people of Jammu and Kashmir

India’s northernmost state, Jammu and Kashmir, lies in the Himalayas and borders Pakistan, Tibet, and China. The state comprises the administrative regions of Jammu, which lies in the plains below the Pir Panjal range, and has a population of approximately 4.39 million; Ladakh, bordering Tibet, with a population of 0.23 million; and the Kashmir valley between the Pir Panjal and Panjri ranges, with a population of 5.44 million.1

Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in India. However, the state is divided roughly along religious lines. Ninety-five percent of the residents of the Kashmir valley are Muslim, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni, while 50 percent of the population of Ladakh is Buddhist and 46 percent is Muslim (most of the Muslims of Ladakh are Shia). Jammu has a very different religious make-up, with 66 percent of the population Hindu and most of the rest Muslim.2 The literacy rate is 54 percent, lower than the national average of 65 percent.3

Before the conflict, Jammu and Kashmir had a large and profitable tourist industry, which provided a major portion of the state revenue. But tourist numbers have dropped from more than seven hundred thousand visitors a year before 1989 to fewer than eight thousand per year in the 1990s. With an improvement in the overall security situation, the number of tourists visiting the state is gradually increasing, though those numbers may decrease after the recent deliberate targeting of tourists by militants in 2006.4

The conflict has also exacted a heavy toll on the state’s infrastructure. Over 1,100 government buildings, 640 educational buildings, eleven hospitals, 337 bridges, and more than ten thousand privates houses and shops have been destroyed in violent incidents since the conflict began.5

The state’s inability to generate sufficient resources has led to an increased dependency on central assistance and borrowings. In an effort to generate employment opportunities and prevent the youth from joining the militancy, the central government has announced several aid packages over the years. The central government spends eight to ten times more on each citizen in Jammu and Kashmir than any other Indian state.6

India-Pakistan dispute

Jammu and Kashmir was the name of the territory that now includes territory under Pakistani and Chinese control. Since 1947, roughly a third has come under Pakistan’s control; this territory is called Azad Kashmir by Islamabad and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir by New Delhi. The remaining two-thirds is called Jammu and Kashmir by New Delhi and includes the Hindu and Buddhist majority regions.7  Islamabad calls this portion Indian-Occupied Kashmir.

The conflict in Kashmir has its origins in the state’s accession to India in 1947. As colonial rule came to an end in South Asia, the British decided to create two separate countries, India and Pakistan. The smaller kingdoms that were part of the British “Raj,” having accepted the suzerainty of Britain, were offered the choice of resuming their independent status or joining with either Hindu-majority India or Muslim-majority Pakistan. Most chose to accede based on geography or religious majority. However, Kashmir was a problem because it was a border Muslim-majority state ruled by a Hindu king. The British left its fate for future negotiations because the Maharaja of Kashmir had failed to decide whether to accede to either India or Pakistan.8

Kashmir immediately became the subject of conflict between the two new countries. Pakistan believed that the division of territories generally between the two countries had been influenced by Lord Mountbatten, the last colonial viceroy, who got on well with Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru but had no great personal affection for Pakistan’s leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.9 Believing that it had already received an unfair division of territory, soon after the end of British rule in the subcontinent, Pakistan backed an invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani tribesmen. Unable to defend his kingdom, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, sought India’s assistance, and on October 26, 1947, signed an Instrument of Accession,10 paving the way for Indian soldiers to come to his aid.11 The first war between India and Pakistan had begun.

The war ended in January 1949 with Indian and Pakistani military representatives defining a ceasefire line, freezing the positions held by the two armies. The contour of this line has changed slightly after later wars, but has remained more or less the de facto border between Pakistan and India in Kashmir and is called the Line of Control. The total area of Jammu and Kashmir is 101,387 sq. km., while Azad Kashmir contains about 78,387 sq. km. 12

In January 1948 India filed a complaint against Pakistan with the U.N. Security Council under the dispute mechanism of the United Nations Charter.13 In retrospect this is ironic, as India now vehemently opposes any U.N. or other third-party involvement in working out a solution to the Kashmir dispute. In a series of resolutions in 1948-49, the Security Council called for a ceasefire; asked Pakistan to withdraw all forces, regular or irregular; and, in a third part that was not binding unless the first two had been implemented, said that the future status of the entire Kashmir state would be determined “through a free and impartial plebiscite.”14  Both countries supported the provision in Security Council Resolution 47, adopted on April 21, 1948, which stated that in a fair plebiscite Kashmiris should only have the choice to accede to either India or Pakistan.15 The resolution did not include an option to vote for independence, an aspiration of many Kashmiris. India has never held the plebiscite described in Security Council Resolution 47. Nor has Pakistan withdrawn its troops from Kashmir as envisaged by this and the other resolutions of 1948-49.16

The Security Council also created the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute.17 In January 1949, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan.18 On March 30, 1951, following the termination of UNCIP, the Security Council in Resolution 91 decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir.19

To defend its failure to hold a plebiscite, India points to Pakistan’s failure to withdraw troops from the area under its control and also cites the vote of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, elected in 1952 in polls held by India that, despite an overwhelming Muslim representation, voted in favor of confirming accession to India.20 New Delhi also says that since Kashmiris have voted in successive national elections in India, there is no need for a plebiscite.

India’s argument for the legitimacy of its claim to all of Jammu and Kashmir, including the portion administered by Pakistan, is based on the 1947 Instrument of Accession signed with Maharaja Hari Singh.21 Similar instruments determined the distribution of all princely states in the 1947 partition; questioning the accession of Jammu and Kashmir would imply unraveling the constitutional and legal basis for the creation of India and Pakistan.22 Pakistan, however, has always questioned the legality of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India and pointed out that India agreed to the U.N. resolutions calling for self-determination after the Instrument of Accession had been signed. Pakistan believes that Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir will choose to be part of Pakistan and it will justify, once again, the ideological basis for the 1947 partition.23 India, for that same reason, is unwilling to let go of Jammu and Kashmir, as a Muslim majority state is proof that India is a secular and liberal state.24

India and Pakistan fought another war over Jammu and Kashmir in 1965. Once again, infiltrators from Pakistan entered Jammu and Kashmir state, backed by the Pakistan army in what was called Operation Gibraltar. Initially, Indian troops were deployed only in Kashmir, but in September 1965 Indian forces opened another front in Punjab, advancing towards Lahore. The United States and United Kingdom, the primary suppliers of arms to the two countries, reacted by suspending military aid. After a meeting in Tashkent (in the then-Soviet Union) between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakisani President General Ayub Khan, peace was declared with both armies withdrawing to the 1949 ceasefire line.

In 1971, a third war between the two countries led to the secession of East Pakistan and its independence as Bangladesh. This truncation of Pakistan further exacerbated the distrust between Pakistan and India.25 Since India had helped in dividing Pakistan, it also became a priority for Islamabad to ensure unity in the country that remained through an anti-Indian Islamic ideology.26

After the 1971 war, India and Pakistan signed a pact on July 2, 1972, commonly known as the Simla Agreement, which defined the Line of Control in Kashmir and committed both sides to future bilateral negotiations on all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.27 India then took the position that the mandate of the United Nations mission UNMOGIP had lapsed and said that Resolution 47 no longer applied because of changes in the original territory, with some parts “having been handed over to China by Pakistan and demographic changes having been effected in Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas.”28 UNMOGIP, however, continues to maintain its mandate and functions, but has failed to make any discernable progress in maintaining peace in the region.29 Pakistan still formally insists on a plebiscite, as do some factions among the Kashmiri rebel groups. But recently, President Musharraf and some militant groups have said that they are willing to give up the demand for self-determination if India agrees to be flexible on demands for demilitarization and self-governance in Kashmir.30

The neighbors came to the brink of war several times after the Simla treaty: in 1986 when India conducted Operation Brasstacks, massive military maneuvers near the Pakistani border; in 1990, when India first discovered the extent to which the Kashmir rebellion was being assisted by Pakistan and threatened retaliation; in 1999, when Pakistan seized territory in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kargil sector; and once again in 2002, when both countries deployed troops at the border after the Indian parliament was attacked on December 13, 2001, allegedly by Pakistani militants (the last two episodes are described in more detail below).31 In each case it was international diplomacy—particularly pressure from the United States—that dissuaded the rivals. But the heavy deployment of troops and the exchange of fire each time led to civilian deaths, injuries and displacement.

Political history inside Jammu and Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir is the only state in India with its own constitution.32 It was guaranteed autonomy in all regional affairs apart from foreign policy, defense and communications. However, this autonomy never materialized.

Through the 1950s and 1960s, there was increasing political discontent with the central government’s attempts to manipulate politics in Jammu and Kashmir. Political leaders who demanded genuine autonomy and pro-plebiscite activists were repeatedly jailed. In 1964 the first militant group, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), was formed to fight for an independent state.

In 1975, in a move that largely discredited him with pro-independence Kashmiris, Sheikh Abdullah, who had originally led popular dissent against Maharaja Hari Singh and later against political control by Delhi, signed an accord with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that promised greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. 33 Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference party, however, won an overwhelming victory in the 1977 state elections, which were considered to be free and fair.34 Parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami, which openly advocated allegiance to Pakistan, were virtually wiped out politically.35

After Sheikh Abdullah’s death in 1982, his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah took over as chief minister. Once again, New Delhi interfered in Kashmiri politics. The ruling Congress party removed Farooq Abdullah in 1984, and then his successor, G.M. Shah, in March 1986, when for the first time the central government imposed governor’s rule––direct rule by New Delhi––in the state.36 Governor Jagmohan took charge of the state administration until fresh elections could be held.

In 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah signed a new political agreement establishing an electoral alliance. This only added to a sense of betrayal among Kashmirs, who were shocked at Farooq Abdullah’s compromise with the very Congress party that had pushed him out of power two years earlier.37 Many Kashmiris had already turned against Farooq Abdullah because of allegations of widespread corruption and incompetence during his previous rule. After Farooq’s perceived sell-out to the Congress party, there seemed to be increasing support for a new opposition party, the Muslim United Front (MUF), a collection of Islamic and secessionist parties that included the Jamaat-e-Islami.38 Many Kashmiri youth supported this coalition, which contested the March 1987 elections to the state assembly.

The state elections of 1987 were the turning point in the history of Jammu and Kashmir. There were mass arrests of MUF candidates and party workers and widespread and credible allegations of vote-rigging.39 Kashmiris became disillusioned with electoral politics and there was enormous resentment against the victorious National Conference-Congress coalition that claimed victory in the elections. Journalist Tavleen Singh writes in her well-regarded book, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors:

The rigged election was the beginning of the end…. Nearly everyone I met said that most of the youths who had acted as election agents and workers for MUF candidates were now determined to fight for their rights differently. They had no choice but to pick up the gun, was the message I was given.40

Many of those youths were supporters of the pro-independence JKLF.41 Many other MUF workers joined their ranks.

There were several demonstrations with protestors shouting anti-India slogans.42 Militant groups successfully organized a boycott of the 1989 Indian parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, a militant campaign of violence began, with the JKLF claiming responsibility for a series of explosions in Kashmir, damaging government buildings and public transport. The JKLF openly admitted that it received arms and training in Pakistan.43 The law and order situation began to spiral out of control.

On December 8, 1989, the JKLF abducted Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the new home minister in the Indian government, a Kashmiri named Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (later to be chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir—see below).44 She was freed when the government complied with ransom demands and released five detained members of the JKLF. National attention was suddenly focused on Kashmir. In Kashmir the public mood had initially changed: most Kashmiris did not support the kidnapping of a young, unmarried woman. But when the released militants were brought to Srinagar, jubilant crowds celebrated in the streets. Support for the militants soared, with many Kashmiris treating the release of the five as a victory against New Delhi.45 Taken aback, the Indian government dispatched more troops to the state.46 In January 1990, Jagmohan, already unpopular because he was seen as party to New Delhi’s dismissal of an earlier elected government, was once again appointed governor.47 Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah resigned in protest. Governor’s rule was imposed, putting New Delhi into direct confrontation with the Kashmiri rebels.

Jammu and Kashmir by then had fallen into near civil war. There were daily protests as tens of thousands marched on the streets, calling for independence. The militant groups, with arms and training from Pakistan, continued their attacks, murdering and threatening Hindu residents, carrying out kidnappings and assassinations of government officials and suspected informers, and engaging in sabotage and bombings. Hundreds of thousands of Hindu Kashmiris, known as “pandits,” fled the valley. Militant groups that espoused an extremist Islamist ideology issued threats to shopkeepers and others engaged in business that they considered un-Islamic, including liquor dealers and cinema hall owners.48 In a book called My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Jagmohan claims that law and order had collapsed when he took charge in 1990, with the valley “stricken with violence, bloodshed and brutality.”49

Unwilling to acknowledge or appease disenchanted Kashmiris, the Indian government termed the rebellion as Pakistan’s “proxy war” with India.50 Indian security agencies responded with unprecedented brutality to quell the rebellion. 51 Counter-insurgency laws such as the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act and the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act were enacted in 1990, giving security agencies draconian powers of detention and interrogation. Since it was virtually impossible to identify the militants, who had local support, civilians were subjected to terrible abuses by state security forces. The Indian army and other state forces carried out large numbers of summary executions, custodial killings, torture, “disappearances,” and arbitrary detentions.52 Security operations included regular warrantless searches, usually in the middle of the night, and after grenade and sniper attacks by militants upon security posts, security guards would storm the neighborhood nearby, setting fire to buildings, and randomly beating up residents. Writes journalist Humra Quaraishi: “Through those months, journalists, both Indian and foreign, reported on havoc Jagmohan’s policies were wreaking on the lives of ordinary Kashmiris. Going back to those reports, the year 1990 seems to me the year of the written forewarnings that were never heeded.”53

Peaceful demonstrations were dispersed by indiscriminate firing by the security forces. In this report, we describe three such incidents, in January 1990 in Srinagar, in October 1990 also in Srinagar, and in 1993 in Beijbehara.

Many former militants say that they joined the armed groups because they were furious at the violations and wanted revenge.54 The basis of the armed conflict gradually changed from a secular demand for independence to a war grounded in Islamic terms. The pro-independence JKLF became weaker and was gradually replaced by the religious extremist Hizb-ul-Mujahedin, which promoted accession to Pakistan. Several JKLF members and supporters were killed, allegedly by militants belonging to the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin.

Jagmohan’s administration came under increasing criticism, and eventually, five months after his re-appointment, Jagmohan was recalled and a new governor appointed.55 Jagmohan has refused to acknowledge that human rights violations took place under his watch, insisting that the “militants and propaganda outfits, and the rumor mill, which had always worked overtime in Kashmir, were soon busy churning out stories of excesses, of atrocities, of hundreds of persons being killed.”56 But he adds, “Sitting in your office, you cannot really say with precision whether the force used was excessive.”57

Meanwhile, after a series of collapsed coalition governments in New Delhi, the Congress party came to power again in 1991, led by P.V. Narasimha Rao. But despite the change in governments, the policy towards Jammu and Kashmir remained the same. While there were some efforts at talks with the separatists, troops continued to act with brutality.

In mid-1992 the government launched a “catch-and-kill’ policy to execute captured militants.58 Human Rights Watch reported in 1993:

In August 1992, Indian government forces launched a new offensive against the militants, called Operation Tiger, a campaign of surprise raids designed to capture and kill suspected militants and terrorize civilian sympathizers. Summary executions of detainees and indiscriminate attacks on civilians escalated during the operation, and during the one that followed, called Operation Shiva. Over the next several months, the security forces also engaged in frequent arson attacks, burning houses, shops and entire neighborhoods.59

India offered to negotiate with militant groups, but often claimed that there were no Kashmiri representatives with whom they could hold talks.

In response, on March 9, 1993, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of over twenty groups, some demanding independence and others accession to Pakistan, was founded to act as the political voice of the movement.60

By the mid-1990s, Indian forces had gained the upper hand in the major towns and villages of the Kashmir valley. But the nature of the conflict had changed. While in the early years of the conflict the militants were usually from the Kashmir valley, by 1996 the Kashmiri component of the battle for secession had largely been subdued. Amnesty offers had encouraged many to surrender. Others had been killed or detained. Many dropped out of combat but stayed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

By the mid-1990s, the battle for Kashmir was taken up largely by foreign fighters drawn from the waning Afghan war.61 The groups they belonged to represented a dangerous development in the conflict as they had no accountability to the local populations. They operated openly out of Pakistan, often with the support of the Pakistan army and intelligence services, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI), Pakistan's powerful military intelligence service.62 Young Pakistanis responded to the appeal for religious war in Kashmir. After a few months of training, they were sent into Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani army helped arrange the infiltration of the militants across the Line of Control.63

These organizations seldom claim responsibility for any attacks, and often change their names, particularly after they have been banned. Some, like the Harkat-ul Ansar,64 Harkat-ul-Mujahedin, Al Badr, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba have, over the years, been blamed for several attacks in which civilians were executed. The Harkat-ul Ansar, for instance, calling itself Al Faran, kidnapped six Western tourists in July 1995. One, a Norwegian, was beheaded. There is still no news of the others, who were British and U.S. citizens.65

The Indian government responded to the influx of foreign fighters into Jammu and Kashmir by expanding the army’s role in the conflict.  By 1993 the government had introduced the Rashtriya Rifles, an elite unit created specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir.

In 1999, militants and Pakistani troops infiltrated into Indian territory, occupying areas in the Himalayas in the Kargil and Drass sectors of Jammu and Kashmir. India responded with force. The U.S. administration of President Bill Clinton, fearing an all-out war between the now nuclear-armed neighbors, stepped in to defuse the situation, getting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw the intruders.66 Soon after, Nawaz Sharif was deposed by his army chief, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in a bloodless coup. India-Pakistan relations fell to an all-time low as violence peaked in Jammu and Kashmir.67 In December 1999, militants hijacked an Indian plane to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and secured the release of three Pakistani militant leaders as ransom.68 In December 2001, an attempted attack on the Indian parliament was foiled by security forces; six policemen and a gardener were killed in the exchange of fire, as were the five militants. Over twenty others, including some journalists, were injured.69 India accused Islamabad of organizing the attack.70 India began to deploy troops to the border, as did Pakistan. As both sides began to threaten nuclear conflict, the international community stepped in once again to pull both sides back from the brink.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan was successfully pressured by its main international supporter, the United States, to withdraw overt support to groups that were active in Afghanistan and Kashmir to demonstrate its commitment to the “war on terror.” Militant infiltration decreased noticeably. According to Indian government reports, while 3,500 militants are believed to have crossed into Jammu and Kashmir in 2001, the number dipped to 237 in 2005.71 A slowing down of the peace process in 2006, however, has coincided with a gradual increase in attacks by militants, which the army blamed on increased infiltration.72

According to the Indian army, which does not necessarily provide reliable statistics, the proportion of foreigners among those killed had steadily increased until 2003—when it was reportedly as high as 70 percent—reflecting that the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir was being run primarily by Pakistan-based groups, but then began to drop.73 The army said that in 2004 only 374 of the 976 militants killed, or 38 percent, were foreigners.74 In 2005, the number of militants killed had dropped to 178; fifty-nine of them were reportedly foreigners.75 While these numbers have been disputed because the armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir have frequently killed civilians and later claimed they were foreign militants, they still likely reflect the trend of decreasing infiltration by non-Kashmiri fighters, as India has little incentive to under-report infiltration from Pakistan.

Recent developments

In 2002, India surprised most observers by holding the most credible elections in Jammu and Kashmir in many years, which militants tried to disrupt by threatening and killing several voters and candidates. Kashmiri nationalists and separatist groups, however, refused to participate, since the elections were held under Indian supervision. Their lack of participation, they argue, means that the election cannot be considered to be representative of the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

A coalition government led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) replaced the Farooq Abdullah government of the National Conference. While in opposition, the PDP had campaigned vigorously against rampant state human rights violations, and the new state government under Sayeed took initial steps to respond to charges of human rights violations. In March 2003, it opened investigations into alleged “disappearances” and deaths in custody reported after it took office.76 It also set up a cabinet committee to examine charges of tampering with evidence in an earlier case. In November 2005, according to the coalition agreement, Ghulam Nabi Azad of the Congress party replaced Sayeed as chief minister. A day after his appointment, the new chief minister once again called for an end to human rights violations and said that custodial killings (summary executions of detainees) would not be tolerated.77

In November 2003, India and Pakistan announced a ceasefire at the Line of Control, ending almost a decade of relentless exchange of fire.78 India’s then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee began peace talks with Pakistani president Musharraf of Pakistan. General elections in India in 2004 saw a change in government, with a Congress-led coalition coming to power. The new prime minister, Manmohan Singh, has held several meetings with General Musharraf. Both say they are committed to the peace process. The process has led to dialogue between Kashmiri separatist political representatives and the Indian government. Kashmiri leaders have also traveled to Pakistan for dialogue with Pakistan.

However, it is still a fragile process that is easily stalled because of deep distrust accompanied by intransigence by both parties. India insists that Pakistan should close down militant training camps and put an end to militants’ infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan says that the camps have been shut down. However, it allowed militant groups to openly undertake relief work after the October 2005 earthquake, leading to fears of further militancy in the future.

After the earthquake, centered in Pakistan-administered Kashmir but also causing substantial damage in Jammu and Kashmir, India and Pakistan opened up five points on the Line of Control to deliver relief materials to the worst-affected Pakistan-held areas. Opened several weeks after the earthquake, and only under considerable Kashmiri and international pressure, the efficacy of these relief points remains unclear. However, the delay is explained by the concerns of Indian security officials about the revival of the militant groups who took over relief operations in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and fears that donations for relief might be used instead to recruit and train more militants.79 In Azad Kashmir, militant groups were the first on the scene dispensing relief goods and aid. These groups won much local appreciation for their rescue and relief efforts. This could not have been possible without logistical support from sections of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. Seen in this context, the post-earthquake role of militant organizations actually underlines the continuity of the Pakistani military-militant relationship rather than an unexpected revival of militant fortunes in the aftermath of natural disaster. Very possibly, the Pakistani military sees the earthquake as an opportunity to craft a new role for the militant groups rather than attempting to disband them.

Jammu and Kashmir state remains a heavily militarized and armed area: according to the International Center for Peace Initiatives, there are about five hundred thousand army and paramilitary personnel deployed in Jammu and Kashmir and some seventy-nine thousand police.80

1 The Planning Commission of India, Jammu and Kashmir Development Report, District-wise Population of Jammu and Kashmir, Chapter II, September 2003 [online] (retrieved April 4, 2006).

2 BBC News, India/Pakistan government census, [online] (retrieved January 9, 2006). (The portion of Kashmir administered by Pakistan is 99 percent Sunni.)


4 “Valley’s Tourist Graph on High,” The Indian Express, January 9, 2006, [online] (retrieved February 5, 2006). Shujaat Bukhari, “Protest Against Attacks on Tourists,” The Hindu, July 15, 2006, [online] (retrieved July 29, 2006).

5 International Center for Peace Initiatives, “Costs of Conflict Between India and Pakistan, Costs for Jammu and Kashmir”, July 2004, p. 73.

6Ibid. p. 75.

7 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Country Studies, India, 2003-2005, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005).

8 M.J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003), pp. 94-102.

9 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 (UK: Roxford Books, 1991), p. 117.

10 Instrument of Accession, 1947, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005).

11 The Maharajah, however, insisted on a special deal under which Kashmir would have its own constitution. Under Clause 7 of the Instrument of Accession, Kashmir retained a measure of autonomy. It stated that, “Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India.” As a result of Kashmir’s conditional accession, Article 370 was incorporated into the Indian Constitution which provided inter alia: “Only Article 1 of the Constitution of India, which defines the territories of India, and Article 370 itself apply to Kashmir ipso facto. All other articles …may be extended to Kashmir… only in ‘consultation’ with the state government if it pertains to matters regarding legislative power of Parliament, and with the ‘concurrence’ of the state government if it pertains to other matters.” Text of Article 370, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005).

12 Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Country Studies, India, 2003-2005, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005). China controls another 42,685 sq. km.  In 1963 Pakistan handed over around 5,000 sq km. area in the Shaksgam Valley to China. Although the transfer was subject to a settlement on the Kashmir issue between the two claimants, China has already built a military highway on this territory and is unlikely to vacate it.  Rahul Bedi, "After failing to talk through their differences, India and Pakistan resume the shelling in Kashmir,", July 23, 2001, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005).

13 Text of India’s complaint to the Security Council, January 1, 1948, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005).  Article 35 of the U.N. Charter states in part: “Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 [situations ‘likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’], to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.”

14 India and Pakistan, United Nations Documents, Security Council Resolution 47 (1948), S/726, April 21, 1948, [online] (retrieved December 20, 2005).

15 Security Council Resolution 47 says that:  “The Security Council, … Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite… Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India and Pakistan.”  [online] (retrieved January 9, 2006).

16 Sumit Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Frank Cass & Co, 2003), pp. 2-3.

17 United Nations Peacekeeping, “India-Pakistan Background,” [online] (retrieved January 9, 2006).

18  United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, [online] (retrieved June 1, 2004).

19 Security Council Resolution 91, S/2017, India Pakistan Question, March 30, 1951, [online]

20 In Security Council Resolution 122, January 24, 1957, the United Nations Security Council rejected this argument. The various Security Council resolutions on Kashmir are available online at (retrieved July 20, 2005).

21 It is worth noting that when the Muslim rulers of the Hindu-majority Gujrati states of Junagadh and Manavadar signed instruments of accession to Pakistan, they were overruled by the Indian government, which seized the states on the grounds of geographical contiguousness and religious majority. In Hyderabad, which had a Muslim ruler and a Hindu majority, India argued that the right of self-determination was paramount when the Nizam of Hyderabad sought to declare independence for his state. Hyderabad was forced into the Indian Union through “police action” in 1948.

22 J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak Relations, 1970-1994 (Delhi: Konarak Publishers, 1995), p. 200.

23 Apart from religion, Pakistani scholars also explain that Jammu and Kashmir is vital to the country’s economy because it is the source of most rivers flowing into Pakistan. Among the various disputes related to Kashmir between India and Pakistan is the construction of dams in Jammu and Kashmir, which will allow India control over Pakistan’s irrigation and water sources.

24Wajahat Habibullah, “The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict: Opportunities for Economic Peacebuilding and for U.S. Policy,” Special Report 121, United States Institute of Peace, June 2004, [online] (retrieved August 18, 2004).

25 Not only did Pakistan end up losing half of its territory, but its military was routed, leaving some ninety thousand prisoners of war—a reason, many Indians believe, why the Pakistani military is strongly opposed to India. See “India Pakistan Troubled Relations, 1971 War,” BBC News, [online] (retrieved April 12, 2006).

26 Hussan Haqqani, “Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir,” in Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question, pp. 43-45.

27 Under the agreement, both countries agreed to resolve their differences over Jammu and Kashmir bilaterally and “by peaceful means.” The full text of the Simla Agreement is available online at (retrieved June 1, 2005).

28 Embassy of India, Washington D.C., “A Comprehensive Note on Jammu & Kashmir,” [online] (retrieved July 20, 2005). India believes that a number of non-Kashmiris have moved into the region, which will make a fair plebiscite impossible.

29 Before the Simla Agreement had been signed, Pakistan had repeatedly raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations. By the 1960s, however, India had developed close ties with the Soviet Union, which vetoed any Security Council resolutions reminding India of its commitments to the United Nations on Kashmir.

30 “Pak Militant Groups Say UN Resolutions on Kashmir Not Viable,” Press Trust of India, January 14, 2006, [online] (retrieved February 7, 2006).

31 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crisis in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (University of Washington Press, 2005), [online excerpts] (retrieved July 21, 2005).

32 Legislation adopted by the Indian parliament does not apply to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which must adopt those laws through its own legislature. The state has many separate laws, such its penal code, called the Ranbir Penal Code.

33 Often called the “Lion of Kashmir,” Sheikh Abdullah had been a prominent leader of India’s independence movement in Kashmir. In 1931, he founded the Muslim Conference, later renamed the National Conference. In May 1946, Maharaja Hari Singh jailed Sheikh Abdullah for dissent. Sheikh Abdullah was released after the Instrument of Accession was signed, and was made prime minister of the state’s interim government. Sheikh Abdullah’s insistence on autonomy soon led to disagreements with New Delhi and he was put under detention on August 9, 1953. The National Conference remains one of the largest political parties in Jammu and Kashmir and has won several elections. In recent years, National Conference party workers and leaders have come under increasing attacks by militants.

34Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question, p. 4.

35Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 192.

36 President’s rule, or in the case of Jammu and Kashmir state, governor’s rule, is provided for under Article 356 of the constitution. Under this article, the central government is empowered to dismiss a state legislature if the governor, a federal appointee, advises that “governance of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.” Under the Jammu and Kashmir constitution, governor’s rule may be imposed for six months, after which president’s rule, which permits New Delhi to suspend state government and rule directly, may be enacted for six-month periods. Constitution of India, [online] (retrieved April 16, 2006).

37 Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, p. 213.

38 Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), p. 101.

39 Balraj Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited,1993), p. 53.

40 Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 103.

41 Formed in 1964, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front was the first Kashmiri militant group formed to fight for independence. Initially known as the Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Front, it was renamed in 1971. The group opened offices in several countries including Pakistan, the United States and United Kingdom. In February 1984, the group was accused of kidnapping and murdering an Indian diplomat in the U.K. Its leader, Amanullah Khan, was deported to Pakistan in 1986. A unit of the JKLF was set up in Jammu and Kashmir in 1988.

42 Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 110.

43 Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia) and Physicians for Human Rights, A Pattern of Impunity (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 21. Zulfiqar Ali, ‘’Pakistan Trained Us’, Rebel Says,” BBC News, June 16, 2005, [online] (retrieved July 29, 2006).

44 Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir in November 2002.

45 Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, p. 120.

46 “Excess Will Continue As Long As Militancy Exists,”, December 16, 1999, [online] (retrieved August 21, 2005).

47 Although initially with the Congress party, Jagmohan eventually became a member of the Bharatiya Janata Party and was a cabinet minister from 1998 to 2004 in the BJP-led coalition government. Jagmohan’s appointment as governor in 1990 by the V.P. Singh government which was supported by the BJP was opposed by the Congress Party, the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other opposition political groups.

48 Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), Kashmir Under Siege (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), p. 129.

49 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1991), p. 342.

50 The Indian government has consistently blamed Pakistan for planning, training and arming the insurgency in Kashmir. Militants, both Kashmiris and Pakistani citizens fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, have never denied that they receive arms and training from Pakistan. When the violence first began, Indian officials chose only to focus on the Pakistani influence. Governor Jagmohan, in his book My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, describes at length Pakistan’s Operation Topac, which was conceived by then president, General Zia-ul-Haq. The basic objective of Operation Topac was to make Kashmir part of Pakistan. The first phase of this operation, Jagmohan quotes General Zia-ul Haq as saying, would be: “A low level insurgency against the regime…. We whip up anti-Indian feelings amongst the students and peasants, preferably on some religious issues…. Organize and train subversive elements and armed groups with capabilities, initially to deal with paramilitary forces located in the Valley.”

51 Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 4.

52 Human Rights Watch has regularly reported the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir. See Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege; Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity; Human Rights Watch, “India’s Secret Army in Kashmir: New Patterns of Abuse Emerge in the Conflict,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 8, No. 4 (C), May 1996, [online]; and “Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue,” A Human Rights Watch Report, July 1999, [online]

53Humra Quraishi, Kashmir: The Untold Story (Penguin Books India, 2004), p. 56.

54 Ibid. pp. 56-59. Quraishi also cites newspaper editorials written at that time. For instance, The Hindustan Times on April 28, 1990, said that “the ‘tough’ policies adopted by Jammu and Kashmir governor Jagmohan has not only proved counterproductive but has further alienated the people of Kashmir… [who] have been virtually driven to the terrorists’ fold due to hatred generated by the repressive measures of the state administration.”

55 See The Origins of Impunity: Failure of Accountability in Jammu and Kashmir Since the Start of the Conflict, Death of Maulvi Farooq, p. 46.

56 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, p. 18


58 “India’s Secret Army in Kashmir,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol. 8, No. 4(C), Chapter III, [online] (retrieved April 2, 2003).

59  Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 2.

60 Global, All-Parties Hurriyat Conference [online] (retrieved January 9, 2006). The All-Parties Hurriyat Conference has since split. While some leaders have broken away, others have formed a separate faction of the APHC. However, the faction led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq is still regarded as the most powerful of the Kashmiri separatist political voices.

61 Praveen Swami, “Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice,” in Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question, p. 55.

62 In The Lost Rebellion, author Manoj Joshi writes: “Over the years, Indian intelligence has identified some five brigadiers and eleven colonels working out of the ISI headquarters in operations connected to India. In addition, there are have been nine officers involved in training militants, and another twenty field officers in Muzaffarabad and other points of infiltration. In the field, the ISI also maintains an extensive presence of camp instructors, launch specialists and counter-intelligence agents.” Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 20-21.

63Ghulam Hasnain, “Inside Jihad,” Time Magazine, February 5, 2001, Vol. 157 No. 5, [online] (retrieved July 20, 2005).

64 The Harkat-ul Ansar was listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in October 1997. The group changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and continued to operate out of Pakistan. Later the group split into Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. A number of groups were listed as terrorist organizations by Washington and Islamabad after Sep. 11, 2001, but continue operations under new names. See the 2006 Human Rights Watch report on abuses in Pakistan-administered Kashmir for details: “’With Friends Like These…‘: Human Rights Violations in Azad Kashmir,” A Human Rights Watch Report, publication pending.

65 K. Santhanam et al, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 29.

66 Devin T. Hagerty, “US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for Resolution,” in Ganguly, ed., The Kashmir Question.

67 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Nuclear Flashpoint: Quest for Safety,” South Asian Journal, August-September 2003, [online] (retrieved July 21, 2005).

68“Indian Hijack Drama Over,” BBC News, December 31, 1999, [online] (retrieved August 20, 2005).

69“Indian Parliament Attack Kills 12,” BBC News, December 13, 2001, [online] (retrieved April 4, 2006).

70 “India Recalls Parliament Attack,” BBC News, December 13, 2002, [online] (retrieved April 4, 2006).

71 Rajnish Sharma, “Tourists Throng J&K As Terror Dips,” The Hindustan Times, March 16, 2006, p. 8.

72 “Increase in Infiltration Across LOC: Army,” Press Trust of India, July 27, 2006 [online],0006.htm (retrieved July 29, 2006).

73 “Terrorists Killed in J&K Up To August 17, 2005,” [online] (retrieved August 17, 2005).

74 Ibid.

75 “Army in Kashmir, Terrorists killed in J&K up to July 12, 2005,” [online] (retrieved July 20, 2005).

76 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India, 2004 [online] (retrieved July 20, 2005).

77 “Abjure Human Rights Violations, Azad Tells Forces,” Press Trust of India, November 4, 2005, [online] (retrieved February 7, 2005).

78 Khursheed Wani, “Shell Shocked Kashmir Welcomes India-Pakistan Ceasefire,” OneWorld South Asia, November 26, 2003, (retrieved October 8, 2005).

79 Ibid.

80 International Center for Peace Initiatives, “Cost of Conflict Between India and Pakistan,” p. 74.