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Government Use of Force in Detention Facilities

Numerous detainees in various facilities told Human Rights Watch about violence used against them during 2006. In some cases, the government used violent force to suppress disturbances in the prisons, the most prominent of which, the March 27, 2006 disturbance in Tbilisi Prison No. 5, resulted in the deaths of at least seven inmates and injury to at least 17 others as well as injury to at least 10 government agents. The government has sought to justify the use of force as necessary to suppress these disturbances, which it characterizes as riots or attempted riots. But serious questions remain about the proportionality of the response to these disturbances, and the lawfulness of the use of force, in particular regarding the March 27 incident. Human Rights Watch documented several instances of excessive use of force during the March 27 operation. In other instances, illegal acts such as assault, including severe beatings, have been carried out as punishment apparently in an attempt to intimidate certain detainees whom the government perceives as threats, such as the thieves in law. These beatings, particularly when done for the purpose of punishment, clearly violate the prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment, and on some occasions have either been so severe, frequent, or combined with other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment to have amounted to torture.

The March 27 Disturbance in Prison No. 5

Much controversy surrounds the exact nature of the disturbance in Tbilisi Prison No. 5. What is clear is that in the very early morning hours of March 27, government authorities arrived at the Republican P rison Hospital to transfer to Tbilisi Prison No. 7 six alleged crime bosses who, according to the government, were attempting to instigate riots in the prison system. People interviewed by Human Rights Watch and others state that these six individuals were beaten during this operation; the government denies that they were ill-treated. As the authorities removed these men from the prison hospital, other detainees began to make noise and burn sheets and other items. This disturbance quickly spread to the nearby Tbilisi Prison No. 1 and Prison No. 5, where many detainees made noise, set fire to linens, escaped from their cells, and barricaded the doors of the prison. Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior troops conducted a special operation to end the disturbance in Prison No. 5, resulting in at least seven deaths and numerous injuries. According to the Ministry of Justice, at least ten government agents also sustained injuries. The disturbance in Tbilisi Prison No. 1 subsided without an armed intervention.

In explaining the origins of the disturbance in Tbilisi Prison No. 5, the government maintains that one inmate, Malkhaz Zedelashvili, an alleged thief in law, had plotted with others to create a disturbance in the prison system intended to stop the ongoing prison reforms, which, as noted above, were aimed at dismantling the thieves in laws’ authority within the prisons.280  The government claims that Zedelashvili, together with two other suspected criminal authorities, recruited three other crime figures to carry out a plan to inflict injuries on themselves and other collaborators that they would claim had been inflicted by the head of the Penitentiary Department in order to provoke disturbances in the penitentiary system.281 The government says that it obtained information about this plot on March 25 and set up secret audio and video recording in the Republican Prison Hospital, where all six of the alleged plotters were being detained.282

On March 26, the head of the prison hospital informed authorities of the Penitentiary Department that the six plotters “were organizing mass disturbances” and asked that Penitentiary Department officials take necessary measures. The head of the Penitentiary Department and officers from the criminal investigation department then arrived at the prison hospital to transfer the alleged plotters to other penitentiary facilities. According to the government, “In order to prevent further complication of the situation it was decided to carry out the operation at night,” at 12:45 a.m. on March 27.283

Detention of the alleged riot plotters and disturbance in the Republican Prison Hospital

The government claims that the six alleged plotters physically resisted the attempt by Penitentiary Department officials to relocate them and that during their transfer they called out to other detainees in the hospital to “start mass disturbances.”284  As a result, other detainees in the prison hospital “started disobedience and mass disturbance, namely making noise, swearing, shouting, setting things on fire, breaking the windows, etc.”285 

Victims and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch described the actions of the law enforcement agents who entered the Republican Prison Hospital to detain the six alleged plotters riot differently from the government. Human Rights Watch reviewed evidence indicating that at least four of the six detainees may have been beaten severely as they were removed from the prison hospital and transferred to Prison No. 7. One detainee told Human Rights Watch,

On March 27… I was asleep. I was called out of my room by the hospital administration. They took me downstairs and started beating me. This began inside and then continued outside where I lost consciousness.… I was taken from the surgical wing. I don’t know who beat me. It happened in the night. People were in masks. I was taken into the yard and people beat me with metal sticks and truncheons, and kicked me.286

The victim was then taken immediately to Tbilisi Prison No. 7. He suffers long-term medical repercussions as a result of the beatings. Human Rights Watch observed the severity of his condition and a doctor confirmed the urgent need for him to receive sophisticated medical treatment.

The ombudsman and a medical professional visited the three other suspected riot plotters allegedly beaten on March 27 when they were removed from the Republican Prison Hospital. The medical expert confirmed numerous injuries consistent with beatings on each detainee. One detainee stated that he was taken from his room and “beaten with [truncheons] in front the [hospital] Director’s Room.” The medical expert confirmed that the prisoner had been beaten on his abdomen, back, and head, and, as a result, suffered pain in his kidneys, dizziness, and balance problems, as well as nightmares and other psychological problems. The ombudsman and the medical expert confirmed that two of the other alleged riot plotters had injuries consistent with being beaten and suffered serious physical and psychological repercussions. The ombudsman documented the injuries to one of these detainees in photographs which he showed to Human Rights Watch.287 

Several witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch provided further corroboration that several detainees from the prison hospital were beaten in the early morning hours of March 27. One detainee explained:

On March 27, it started on the second floor. The special forces troops came into the surgery wing of the hospital… and took three guys right before our eyes. They beat them on our floor and then took them to the courtyard. They didn’t hide it. They beat them with gun butts and truncheons. People started to cry out. These were three people from separate rooms. One of them has epilepsy. They took them out of the hospital… There were 40, 50, or 60 members of the special forces. There was first one group, then a second. They were in masks and black uniforms.288

Another witness stated, “I saw the special forces troops enter the surgery department. First 20 [people] and then another 20.”289  A third said, “It was 1 a.m. and I was sleeping. I heard an inhuman cry that woke me up. I take sleeping medicines, but even so, I woke up. I heard two cries. I saw people in masks in the courtyard. They were beating two people. They cried out. Then they brought a third person out…. I have never heard such cries in my life.”290

Witnesses who were in the prison hospital at the time stated that hospital detainees started to make noise and protest in reaction to the treatment they saw being inflicted on their fellow detainees. “People started screaming from the hospital windows… They were making a lot of noise. People feared also being beaten. One of the people they were beating has epilepsy. People were shouting “Don’t beat him! He has epilepsy!” one detainee told Human Rights Watch.291  According to another detainee, “People started to cry out…. Some of the prisoners burned sheets and pillows and put them out the window.”292   

The disturbance travels to Prisons No. 5 and No. 1

Witnesses stated that once the disturbance started in the prison hospital, detainees in Prison No. 5 and Prison No. 1, located 50 meters away, also began to react. According to one detainee in the prison hospital, “Prison No. 5 looks out onto our hospital. They can see everything. They started to bang dishes and to make noise. They were yelling out, crying out. They wanted to bring attention there.”293  “From Prison No. 5, inmates started yelling, ‘What’s happening?’ and started making noise, and they became louder than people here. It’s only 50 meters away, and at night when it’s quiet, sound travels really well,” another detainee told Human Rights Watch.294

In Prison No. 5 and Prison No. 1, detainees made noise by shouting and banging dishes and other implements. They also began to set fire to sheets and other objects and throw them out of the windows. Upon seeing the disturbance in the prison hospital spread to Prisons No. 5 and No. 1, the director of Tbilisi Prison No. 5, Giorgi Polodashvili, told Human Rights Watch that he took the decision to remove all personnel from the building for their own safety and to close the building.295  Ultimately, in Prison No. 1, the authorities were able to put an end to the disturbance without conducting a special operation or using force. However, what happened in Prison No. 5 after the prison staff left the building remains unclear, and even government authorities provide conflicting information.

The authorities reported that detainees on the third, fourth, and fifth floors of Prison No. 5 broke out of their cells or exited their cells. The director of Prison No. 5 stated, “The doors were broken by the prisoners. Absolutely all of them were broken. The doors are so old. That’s why they broke. They used the beds in the rooms. All it takes is 10 people to use the bed and ram it against the door.”296  One detainee who had been on the fourth floor of Prison No. 5 on March 27 told Human Rights Watch that, indeed, they had managed to break down their cell door. 297 Other detainees confirmed this. 298 

From the available evidence, it is not clear that detainees broke their doors down en masse. Some detainees said they managed to exit their cells and then opened the doors of other cells.299  Still other detainees reported that their doors had not been broken or opened and that they did not leave their cells.300  The Ministry of Justice reports that “prisoners destroyed all cell doors, and most [of the] inmates were outside the cells. Some prisoners went on the roof and set the prison building on fire.”301  Kakha Morgoshia, head of the Penitentiary Department special task force, also told Human Rights Watch, “The inmates were burning clothes, blankets, and throwing these out the windows. Some of them had climbed onto the roof. They threw things out and off of the roof. No one could come too close to the building.”302  However, when Human Rights Watch asked Prison Director Polodashvili about the inmates on the roof he said, “What? There was no one on the roof.”303

Polodashvili told Human Rights Watch that at about 2 a.m., he called the head of the Penitentiary Department, who came to the facility, and that 15 minutes later special forces troops arrived and surrounded the prison buildings as a show of strength.304  The ombudsman, Sozar Subari, who was also present during the operation, stated that there were approximately 150-300 special forces troops.305  According to witnesses, two armored personnel carriers or some other type of large military vehicle were also brought into the courtyard.

Soon after the disturbance began, several detainees called Elene Tevdoradze, chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Civil Integration, and she immediately went to the prison.306 Tevdoradze told Human Rights Watch, “Inmates told me, ‘We’ve taken over the prison, we’re afraid they will start shooting, please come help immediately.’ I had the impression that they wanted me to negotiate with them.”  She stated that, upon arrival at the prison, “I asked the minister of the interior to allow me inside [the prison] with the ombudsman to convince the prisoners to return to their cells. As soon as they opened the door [to the prison], the minister of the interior changed his mind. I was told it was too dangerous to go in, what if the prisoners took me hostage—they wouldn’t be able to help me. So instead they brought me a megaphone, and I addressed [the prisoners].”  Tevdoradze stated that she was not afraid to enter the prison and believes that direct contact with the detainees might have diffused the situation: “I still think if I’d gone in, they wouldn’t have taken me hostage.”307  

The special operation to quell the disturbance

Tevdoradze, Subari, and other officials spoke to the inmates from the prison courtyard using a loudspeaker and asked them to calm down. The government claims that for an hour it issued warnings that “if the orders were not followed [that] force [would be used]” and only then took a decision that members of the Penitentiary Department and special forces should enter the building. However, according to Sozar Subari, “Some of the detainees had called me on my mobile phone. They wanted some kind of negotiations, although they didn’t have any particular demands. But they wanted negotiations…. The troops gave no warning as they entered. They made no attempts to negotiate. There was just one announcement over the radio [about the operation],”308 which the detainees claim not to have heard given the loud noise they were making themselves.309 

Many discrepancies exist about the initiation of the special operation itself. Polodashvili, who led the first entry into the prison, stated that he, two colleagues from the Penitentiary Department, and a group of special forces were unable to enter through the main door of the prison because it had been barricaded from the inside. Using a side entrance, they made it to the fourth floor where they started to break down a barricaded door. He claims they heard yelling and gunfire. Polodashvili described the events that followed to Human Rights Watch,

The two department employees were shot. As soon as they were shot I took them out of the corridor to a safe place. The special forces troops started to shoot with rubber bullets into the windows and ceiling to scare the prisoners. Then the special forces troops entered the fourth floor. It was dark. The prisoners had broken the lights. We heard other gunfire and the special forces troops started to shoot [with automatic weapons]. This was happening on the fourth floor, but some distance from us.310   

According to the Ministry of Justice, however, the events unfolded differently. While, as noted above, the head of Prison No. 5 states that he and his colleagues were shot at and his two colleagues were wounded as they entered the fourth floor, the ministry claims that the authorities initiated the shooting by firing rubber bullets. Only at that moment did the prisoners initiate fire in the direction of the Penitentiary Department employees. In its report to the UN Committee Against Torture, the Ministry states:

Having cleaned the blocked entrance of the building, the Director of the Prison No. 5 with several Special Task Force officers entered the building and once again called on the prisoners to calm down, this resulted [in] the counter-reaction of the inmates and they began moving towards the administrators; therefore the special task force used the guns with rubber bullets; the prisoners responded with firearms shooting that resulted in injuries [to two Penitentiary Department employees]. After [the] wounding [of] the staff members of the Penitentiary Department, the decision to open the counter fire was made immediately.311

The government now claims that six firearms were found in the prison, together with dozens of knives. 312 However, conflicting information persists about the exact number of firearms. In a press conference immediately following the incident, the minister of justice reported to the media that five weapons had been discovered.313  The ombudsman told Human Rights Watch that when he entered the prison immediately after the special forces concluded the operation, he saw two guns allegedly fired by prisoners during the riot.314  Human Rights Watch could not confirm whether prisoners had firearms and, if they did, how many, and how they were able to obtain them and keep them in the prison.315   When Human Rights Watch asked how the weapons allegedly used by prisoners entered the prison in the first place, Prison Director Polodashvili replied, “I don’t know. Not on my watch.”316

Use of force during the special operation

The government does not provide any detail as to what happened after the special forces entered the prison, stating only that “after the abovementioned, the situation went under control, the prisoners entered their cells and stopped resistance.”317  Both the government and detainees state that no non-violent means or alternative methods of riot control, such as teargas or water cannons, were utilized; the only means used was gunfire with rubber bullets and live ammunition, resulting in the death of seven detainees and injury to at least 17 detainees. The Standard Minimum Rules require that the authorities should not “use force except in self-defence or in cases of attempted escape, or active or passive physical resistance to an order based on law or regulations. Officers who have recourse to force must use no more than is strictly necessary…”318 

With respect to the use of armed force, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials require governments to provide equipment that allows for a differentiated use of force and firearms, with a view to “increasingly restraining the application of means capable of causing death or injury to persons,” as well as self-defense equipment, “in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind.”319  The Basic Principles on the Use of Force further state, “Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.”320  The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly set out the standards that authorities must respect when resorting to the use of force. The protection of the right to life requires that any use of force must be no more than “absolutely necessary” even when it is used for a legitimate purpose: it must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims.321

Human Rights Watch interviewed numerous detainees who described the use of automatic weapon fire by special forces once they entered the prison. Human Rights Watch interviewed seven detainees who had sustained gunshot wounds from automatic weapons. Representatives of the Office of the Ombudsman also documented gunshot wounds on detainees who had been in Prison No. 5 at the time of the disturbance. These experts also found wounds consistent with being hit by rubber bullets on the hips, buttocks, head, chest, ankle, and feet of 11 different individuals.322  Human Rights Watch interviewed two people who had been injured by rubber bullets. One detainee told Human Rights Watch, “I was hit twice with plastic bullets on my right thigh.”323 

Some detainees also reported that authorities had been shooting at the main prison building from the roofs of other buildings and that bullets entered through the windows. At some point in the operation, bullets were fired into their cells from outside the building. As a result, some prisoners felt compelled to leave their rooms for safety reasons. Others reported being injured from this fire. One detainee in a cell on the fourth floor reported, “I was in my room and wounded in my side. They were shooting from the roof [of the administration building] opposite ours and a ricochet bullet hit me.”324  A detainee on the fifth floor stated, “There was shooting in the yard. We were afraid and went out of the cell and stood in the corridor. Our door had been opened from the outside. They opened it by breaking the lock. We were watching on our television what was happening to us. There was shooting from the outside. There was shooting from the roofs at our building. We then went into our room and waited. In the cell next to us we heard shooting. There were people shot. There was one person injured and another one killed.”325  Another detainee, who sustained two bullet wounds and then lost consciousness stated, “We have big windows in those cells. I think bullets may have come through the windows. I had stood up from my bed. I don’t know who shot me. Everyone was terrified.”326  During its visit to Prison No. 5, Human Rights Watch saw holes in the window shutters of numerous cells that appeared consistent with bullet holes. However, a forensic examination is necessary to determine the exact nature of the holes.

Various witnesses confirmed that the authorities fired bullets in the courtyard of the prison during the operation, even in the direction of the prison hospital or the street where dozens of journalists, relatives, human rights activists, and others had gathered. Witnesses reported seeing “lighted bullets,” apparently tracer bullets, which burn brightly during their flight, enabling the shooter to follow the bullets’ trajectories.327

The issue of excessive use of force

As described above, there are discrepancies in various accounts of the special operation to end the disturbance in Tbilisi Prison No. 5, even among different government agencies. Although it is clear that detainees put up an undetermined degree of resistance to the law enforcement agents attempting to regain control of the prison and that special forces troops used lethal force and other violent means to suppress this resistance, the exact nature and proportionality of the force used remains unclear. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude whether the shooting described above was excessive, and a thorough investigation by an independent body is the only means to reaching specific conclusions. However, Human Rights Watch was able to document specific individual incidents of excessive and illegal force. These involved at least two cases of shooting of detainees during the operation and several cases of beating of detainees after the operation.

Human Rights Watch was able to document two cases in which special forces troops appear to have shot detainees, who were not posing an immediate threat or danger to the guards, without issuing any warning or using other means to subdue the detainees. According to one injured detainee, who sustained five bullet wounds:

I was afraid of the gunfire. There was panic in our room…. I was afraid of being killed. We all were. Some people were saying to us, “Take it easy, don’t worry, they won’t kill us.”  The door of our cell was closed. A guy with an automatic weapon and a mask came into the room. He started to swear at us. He was alone standing in the doorway, but there were others behind him. He said to us, “So you want a color television you motherfuckers?” And then he started to shoot. I was close to him and right in front of him and so I took the first bullets. This all happened really fast. He came in, said these words to us, and then started to shoot. He gave no warning that he would shoot. I lost consciousness. The thing is, we had a television in our room, and a few days before this happened, they wanted to take it away. We said no.328

Special forces apparently shot another prisoner because he could not comply fast enough with their order to lie down on the floor. The prisoner, who sustained multiple gunshot wounds, told Human Rights Watch,

The special forces came to our corridor. I heard them shooting in the corridor. The special forces were saying, “Lie down!” at the same moment as they shot. In my room the people who were standing lay down. But for me—some of us were on the top bunk. We couldn’t climb down to lie down because the room was all full of people lying down. One special forces member came into our room and said, “Lay down motherfucker!” I came down from my bunk and saw a place near the bed towards the corner. As I moved there, the special forces guy shot me. When prisoners heard the gunfire, prisoners from other cells came into our cell. I was really afraid. I was just watching the door waiting to see what would happen. 329

Another detainee told Human Rights Watch that after being shot in the leg by a member of the special forces, he fell to the ground. “Then the special forces guy came over and fired two more bullets into my buttocks, right into my back pockets.”330

As part of the operation, apparently once the special forces troops had gained control of the prison, many members of the special forces beat detainees, apparently to punish or subdue them. One detainee told Human Rights Watch that immediately after the operation, “They beat us with truncheons. They also kicked us…. [They beat us] like dogs.”331  According to another detainee, after the operation had begun, “We just sat in our room and didn’t move. If people were in their rooms they weren’t beaten. But if they had gotten out and had gone to another room they were beaten. I heard how people were beaten. They would scream out in pain.”332  A detainee from the fourth floor stated that after the operation, “[The special forces] came and took us into the hall one at a time and beat us practically to death. I lay in bed for a week unable to move.”333 Another told Human Rights Watch, “We were taken from our cells and beaten to teach us a lesson.”334 One stated that he was even beaten while being transferred out of Prison No. 5: “I was beaten on the head with an automatic weapon, once in the room, once in the van coming here [to Rustavi Prison No. 6].”335 Based on interviews with detainees in various penitentiary facilities following the operation, medical experts from the Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture “Empathy” estimated that more than 100 detainees in Prison No. 5 were beaten during the course of the operation or immediately afterward.336

Although it was not possible for Human Rights Watch to rule out the possibility that one or more of the injured detainees interviewed may have been involved to some degree in resistance against the law enforcement agents, the types of force used in the incidents described above and the punishment beatings are clearly serious violations of Georgia’s human rights obligations and are illegal under international law. As indicated above, under international standards to which Georgia is bound, resort to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by a detainees’ individual conduct is in principle an infringement of the prohibition on ill-treatment.337 Georgia is required to investigate each incident so that the perpetrators can be identified, prosecuted, and punished. The victims must be compensated for the violations.

Government explanation for the use of force

The government claims that it undertook the special operation in reaction to “an eminent [sic] threat of escape of approximately 3,500 inmates,” which, “according to operative information,” would have caused mass escapes in “all other penitentiary establishments”338 and “massive destabilization” in the country.339 In a speech given the same day as the riot, President Saakashvili said he believed “4,000 dangerous, desperate criminals could have escaped into the streets last night and this would have meant hundreds of stolen cars, hundreds of raped people, hundreds of robbed houses, hundreds of murder cases and many other disasters and disorders.”340   However, the government also confirms that the inmates had constructed multiple barricades in the prison, including of the main doors and the doors on each floor to make it difficult for prison authorities and others to enter the building.341  It remains unclear how the prisoners intended to escape, having barricaded themselves inside the prison. No detainees were shot in the yard of the prison or in the course of making an attempt to flee the prison.

Other information made public by the ombudsman in June 2006, concerning an alternative plot centered on some of the same thieves in law but involving official complicity, calls into question the government’s version of events.342   The ombudsman also stated that transcripts of the alleged plotters’ conversations do not contain any mention of a planned riot,343 and he casts further doubt on the government’s version of the alleged prison riot plot by noting that because one of the alleged plotters, Platon Mamardashvili, is regarded as an influential thief in law and was isolated from other prisoners, he could not have met with other prisoners, especially other alleged crime bosses, without the direct consent of prison officials.344 

Treatment of the wounded

The medical care provided to the wounded following the operation was wholly inadequate.345 

The detainees who were taken from the Republican Prison Hospital and transferred to Tbilisi Prison No. 7, as described above, reported that they did not receive immediate medical attention for the injuries sustained from the beatings and faced difficulties receiving adequate care. Kakha Kvistiani, a lawyer for Giorgi Avaliani, one of those transferred, stated to the media that his client was refused medical treatment for his injuries on March 27.346   A doctor was allowed to see the detainees on March 28 only after an intervention by the ombudsman.

On April 7 representatives of the Office of the Ombudsman also found that, despite continuing physical and psychological complications associated with the March 27 beatings, the detainees had not received forensic medical examinations, were denied regular contact with doctors, and received no substantive medical treatment. One man reported being afraid to request a visit by the doctor out of fear of additional verbal and physical abuse by the prison authorities. The detainees were not allowed to go outdoors and could not maintain proper hygiene—they could not shave and had limited possibility to wash. There were no medial records related to the detainees in the prison.347 

Those wounded during the special operation in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 also reported receiving inadequate care. Although numerous ambulances had arrived at the prison, not all inmates were treated immediately by skilled medical personnel, and at the time of Human Rights Watch’s visit, many detainees who were in need of surgery still had not received it.

One detainee who received multiple gunshot wounds during the special operation was in critical condition and was driven to the city hospital, only to be turned around and then driven to the Republican Prison Hospital, and then later taken back to the city hospital. He told Human Rights Watch,

I regained consciousness and I was on the ground in the yard in front of the prison. I was lying in a puddle. It was raining and I remember thinking, “Oh, the water feels good.” They put me into a vehicle with other injured people and two dead people. It wasn’t an ambulance, but a vehicle for transporting prisoners. They drove us to the city hospital, but when we got there they didn’t take us out. Somebody called and then they turned around and drove us [to the Republican Prison Hospital]. It turned out I was in really critical condition and so they took me back to the city hospital where I got medicine and had an operation.348

Another detainee with multiple gunshot wounds, who traveled in the same vehicle as the above detainee and was still in need of surgery at the time of Human Rights Watch’s visit, described his medical treatment:

Several of the prisoners took me in blankets and put me on the ground [outside]. I don’t know how many people or how long I lay on the ground. But then I was put into a prisoner car. There were eight or nine people with me… There were two dead bodies in the car with us. We drove to the city hospital, but then we were brought back [to the Republican Prison Hospital]. They gave me pain medicines, and put a cast on me, but they didn’t do any operation. I have a complex fracture and they need to put my leg back together. I am in pain now. I don’t know about my wounds. I don’t know whether they will operate on me or not.349  

Another detainee from Tbilisi Prison No. 5 who had not yet had needed surgery stated, “I was shot in the lower back and I lost consciousness. They took an x-ray [at the city hospital] then I was taken to the prison hospital. I need an operation to remove the bullet, but they say I’m not yet in strong enough health. The hospital gives me some medicine, but my family must provide the more expensive ones.”350  In May 2006, nearly two months after the incident, at least three other detainees told Human Rights Watch that they had not had surgery to remove bullets from their bodies.351 One told Human Rights Watch, “I haven’t had any surgery [on the two bullets in my legs]… I can still feel the pain in my legs.”352

Another victim told Human Rights Watch that he was wounded but not treated in a hospital. “I was wounded in my side. They were shooting from the roof opposite ours and a ricochet bullet hit me. Three special forces then came into our room and didn’t say anything and started to shoot. I was standing maybe three meters from the door when they came in. I immediately lay down. They then started asking, ‘Who’s wounded?’ They took me out and took me here [to Rustavi Prison No. 6]. [The wound] was all bloody and it hurt a lot. They examined me, put on a bandage and it hurt for about one week or 10 days,” he stated.353  Other detainees with wounds from rubber bullets reported being sent to Rustavi Prison No. 6 and not receiving any treatment.354

An expert acting at the request of the Office of the Ombudsman also identified numerous patients in Rustavi Prison No. 6 in need of urgent medical care some weeks after having been injured in the March 27 incident. One detainee had multiple wounds some of which had apparently become infected resulting in fever. The expert determined that other detainees had single bullet wounds that required surgery and other serious treatment. One detainee with a chest injury had not received an x-ray or consultation with a specialist. The expert noted that the prison did not have a registry to record injuries of the incoming detainees and kept no medical documentation regarding sick or injured detainees.355 

Discrepancies in the number of killed and wounded

The Ministry of Justice report states that during the operation two special forces members were wounded and 10 were injured. The report does not specify the types of wounds or injuries, nor does it clarify the difference between wounds and injuries. The report also states that two members of the Penitentiary Department suffered gunshot wounds at the beginning of the operation. 356  It is not clear whether the injuries to the Penitentiary Department employees are counted separately or in the total number for government agents wounded and injured.

The total number of inmates killed and wounded in the operation remains unclear. According to official information provided to Human Rights Watch by the Penitentiary Department, seven inmates were killed. However, initial reports indicated that there may have been more casualties than officially recorded and that in at least one case a death attributed to other causes was in fact a result of the operation. The family of Mamuka Gviniashvili, an inmate from Prison No. 5, stated that upon receiving the body of their son, they found a gunshot wound to his head and wounds consistent with beating. However, the government stated that the official cause of death was liver complications and that Gviniashvili died in the Republican Prison Hospital. Gviniashvili’s mother denies this, saying she visited her son in Prison No. 5, not the Republican Prison Hospital, the day before the disturbance, and he did not complain about any health problems.357

The number of wounded is in even greater dispute. The government itself provides conflicting information. In statistics provided to Human Rights Watch in May 2006, the Penitentiary Department gives the names of 17 wounded inmates. In contrast, the Ministry of Justice states in its May 2006 report to CAT, “After bilateral fire seven prisoners died and 22 inmates received injuries of different gravity.”358   Representatives of the Office of the Ombudsman, including one physician, visited detainees in Rustavi Prison No. 6 who had been transferred from Tbilisi Prison No. 5 following the March 27 operation. Initially, the staff of Rustavi Prison No. 6 told the ombudsman’s representatives that eight of the prisoners transferred had been wounded during the March 27 operation. However, the representatives found 15 patients with wounds, including gunshot wounds, sustained during the March 27 operation. They stated, “For lack of time we could not survey all the cells, so we can assume that the number of [wounded] prisoners is even higher.”359 

Additionally, Human Rights Watch interviewed 14 other individuals who sustained injuries during the March 27 operation. These included seven individuals who suffered gunshot wounds and two detainees wounded by rubber bullets, as well as five detainees who were injured as a result of beatings. Taken together, the information collected by Human Rights Watch and the Office of the Ombudsman suggest that the actual number of wounded may be higher than reported by the government.

Planning the operation

Very little information is available about what kinds of plans, required by law, were in place for addressing the kind of disturbance that erupted in Prison No. 5 and how those plans were executed.360  It is also unclear whether such plans addressed the requirements for the use of force set out by the European Prison Rules361 and article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights,362 as explained by the European Court of Human Rights.363  

According to the Ministry of Justice, the special operation “was carried out fully in accordance with the Georgian legislation and prison rules,” but does not elaborate on the operation’s compatibility with international obligations or provide any evidence of the planning that went into the operation.364  Information collected by Human Rights Watch raises questions as to the actual plan in place for the operation. Prison Director Polodashvili told Human Rights Watch, “Of course there is a rule, and we know how to deal with different situations. Plus, you just decide how to act as the events unfold.”365  Deputy Director Stepan Ozashvili immediately added, “It’s like when you have to go to the toilet—you just figure out how to do it and act.”366  Although it is clear that special forces of the Ministry of Justice as well as special forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted the operation, most people interviewed by Human Rights Watch could not state who was in charge of the operation. Even Prison Director Polodashvili, who himself participated in the operation, stated, “I don’t know who was in charge of the operation; I don’t know who controlled the special forces. The special forces all have the same uniforms and masks. I can’t say from where they come.”367 

With respect to planning, Elene Tevdoradze told Human Rights Watch, “The minister of the interior promised me they’d use only rubber bullets. They showed me the special weapon that fires these bullets. They said they would do everything to ensure there were no casualties. But the special forces started [the operation], and they were already shooting real ammunition

Investigation into the March 27 incident in Tbilisi Prison No. 5

According to information provided to Human Rights Watch by the General Prosecutor’s Office, on March 25, 2006, the Investigative Department of the Ministry of Justice opened an investigation into the alleged plotting of a riot in the penitentiary system and pursued this investigation following the disturbance on March 27. 369  After March 27 the scope of the investigation expanded to include charges of membership in a criminal society,370 but did not include any articles of the Criminal Code related to the death of seven inmates or the conduct of law enforcement agents during the operation. The authorities claimed that in evaluating the March 27 events, the investigation would nevertheless examine the actions of law enforcement agents.

On April 13 charges were brought against Platon Mamardashvili for being a thief in law and for impeding or disrupting the activities of the Penitentiary Department.371 Charges related to the alleged organization of a riot were brought against Malkhaz Zedelashvili, Nikoloz Makharadze, Giorgi Avaliani, Zurab Vibliani, and Levan Tsindeliani.372 On May 19, on the basis of a decision by the deputy prosecutor general, the criminal case was transferred to the General Prosecutor’s Office, in accordance with the law, and “with the view of [ensuring] an objective and impartial investigation.”373

Four days after the March 27 incident, OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel de Gucht called upon the Georgian authorities to open an independent investigation, noting that “a lack of clarity exists” following the March 27 incident and that “it would be appropriate to set up an independent and public enquiry to investigate the events, including allegations of a disproportionate use of force by government troops which resulted in a large number of victims.”374  The government refused to do so, saying that the investigation into the causes of the riot that was already underway made an independent investigation unnecessary. Yet, at that time, even members of the ruling National Movement Party were unclear as to the exact nature of the investigation, claiming that the General Prosecutor’s Office had opened the investigation into the possibility that excessive force had been used, when in fact the investigation had been opened by the Ministry of Justice and only into the facts regarding the organization of the alleged riot, as described above by the General Prosecutor’s Office itself.375

Publicly, the government has stated unequivocally that law enforcement agents acted lawfully. Saakashvili hailed the Justice Ministry staff and the Georgian police whom he claimed “acted extremely professionally.”376  Nino Burjanadze, the speaker of parliament, was quoted as having praised the police saying they used “adequate force” to prevent a jailbreak.377

The deputy prosecutor general, when asked why an investigation into the death of seven detainees and whether the force used was absolutely necessary was not opened immediately, told Human Rights Watch that these facts would be examined under the investigation into the planning of the riot opened on March 25.378  The deputy prosecutor general further stated that evidence suggesting that detainees had damaged the prison was sufficient to explain the need for the use of firearms. She stated, “The assumption from the beginning is that the use of force was justified because all evidence showed there was clear resistance. The whole prison was destroyed. It was more than clear because everything was destroyed, everything was burned. No single door was left.”379

Almost three months after the incidents in the Republican P rison Hospital and Prison No. 5 the authorities finally undertook a specific investigation into the actions of law enforcement agents. According to the General Prosecutor’s Office, on June 21, 2006, criminal case N74068237 was separated from the existing case, and the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated a preliminary investigation under article 333(1) of the Criminal Code of Georgia (exceeding authority) into whether law enforcement agents used force in accordance with the law during the operation in Prison No. 5 on March 27.380 

Notwithstanding the alleged level of resistance by inmates, the Georgian authorities are obligated to promptly and effectively investigate every death and serious injury in custody. This obligation is based on the requirement to protect the right to life and the right to bodily integrity, particularly as it relates to persons in custody. For example, article 2 (the right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) imposes a positive obligation on governments to ensure that the law adequately protects the right to life and imposes strict requirements in relation to the investigation of fatal incidents, especially when considered together with article 13, the right to an effective remedy. The European Court has held that the same applies in article 3 (prohibition on ill-treatment) cases, where a detainee has “an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State.”381  

Georgia’s obligations under the ECHR also require it to carry out an effective official investigation when an individual has been killed as a result of the use of force or other fatal incident,382 and, “in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility.”383 As the European Court explains, article 2 secures “the accountability of agents of the State for their use of lethal force by subjecting their actions to some form of independent and public scrutiny capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in a particular set of circumstances.”384  Furthermore, where a death has occurred during custody, the burden of proof is on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation for the events leading to a detainee’s death.385

With respect to investigations into potentially unlawful killing by state agents, for the investigation to be effective the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation must be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence.386  The initial investigation undertaken by the Ministry of Justice regarding the actions of its own employees or the employees of the Ministry of Interior fails to meet this standard for independence.

Moreover, in order for an investigation to satisfy the requirements of articles 2, 3, or 13 of the ECHR, it must be capable of leading to a determination of liability for the killings or injuries and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. The authorities investigating must have the independence, impartiality, and mandate to establish the key issues of responsibility and liability. Any deficiency, such as a predisposition to discount wrong-doing on the part of the security agents, undermines its ability to reach a determination on these issues and falls foul of the required standard. The initial investigation opened by the Ministry of Justice on March 25, which did not examine the planning of the special operation or the use of lethal force or physical force that resulted in injuries to detainees, does not meet this standard. Moreover, the assumption on the part of the General Prosecutor’s Office that the use of force was legal, in and of itself undermines the effectiveness of both the initial and subsequent investigations and suggests that the investigation is incapable of being impartial and effective.387

The European Court of Human Rights also requires that an investigation be reasonably prompt, finding that “a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.”388  The investigation opened by the General Prosecutor’s Office regarding the use of force by law enforcement agents nearly three months after the incident and the death of seven inmates does not meet the requirement for promptness.

Finally, the court has found that an effective investigation must involve a sufficient element of public scrutiny and involve the next of kin to the greatest extent possible.389  Public scrutiny of the investigation or its results is necessary to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the authorities’ adherence to the rule of law, and prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.390 It is unclear whether either investigation has met this requirement.

Other Incidents Involving the Use of Force in the Penitentiary System

In addition to the incident on March 27, there have been several other serious incidents involving the use of force by government authorities in the Georgian penitentiary system since December 2005. As described in detail below, these incidents have resulted in numerous injuries and in one case the death of an inmate. Some beatings occurred during the transfer of prisoners to different facilities, or immediately following their transfer, apparently as a means of demonstrating government authority over prisoners. Special forces agents also used beatings in order to suppress alleged disturbances or to punish inmates for allegedly participating in disturbances. In Tbilisi Prison No. 7, for several months in 2006, special forces members serving as guards in that facility reportedly routinely subjected detainees to beatings and strip searches. In some instances, the treatment of detainees in Prison No. 7 has risen to the level of torture. Under the Convention against Torture a state party must prevent torture as well as other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and must undertake a prompt and impartial investigation wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture or other act of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has been committed.391  As indicated previously, article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture, also obligates states to undertake an effective investigation into any allegations of serious ill-treatment that is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible.392

Use of force against detainees in Kutaisi, Batumi, and Rustavi          

A disturbance erupted on December 21, 2005 in the new Kutaisi Prison No. 2 after 100 detainees were transferred there from the old Kutaisi Prison No. 1. Prisoners burned sheets, banged on the doors and walls, and in some cells attempted to break down the doors.393  Some sources allege that the inmates were protesting about the lack of water, electricity, and heat that had not yet been turned on in the new facility.394  Other sources suggest that supporters of thieves in law initiated the disturbance and that other inmates acted in solidarity with them.395  Special forces from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice undertook a special operation to end the disturbance that resulted in injuries to at least 29 detainees and three law enforcement agents396 and the death of one prisoner in the Kutaisi clinical hospital as a result of blunt force trauma to the head.397  According to the Office of the Ombudsman, special forces troops beat all inmates in the area of the prison from where the noise emanated, irrespective of whether detainees had participated in the disturbance.398

During and after the transfer of additional prisoners to the new Kutaisi Prison No. 2 in the following days, special forces again used force against prisoners. 399  As a result, “a large number of detainees had indications of wounds of varying seriousness.”400 Special forces from the Department of Constitutional Defense of the Ministry of Interior had been called in specifically to assist with the transfer of detainees.401 According to Deputy Prison Director Shmagi Panzevadze, “Special forces moved people from other prisons to this one. This is not typical, but given the number of prisoners being moved, we had to ask for their help.”402  Detainees also reported to Human Rights Watch that they were beaten during special operations that took place on January 26 and February 6, 2006, and subsequently; newly arrived detainees were particular targets of abuse. One detainee stated,

When we came in [to Kutaisi Prison No. 2 in December] it was very cold here. We didn’t want to be here. Some prisoners started to make noise. The special forces came in and beat us. I don’t know how many of them there were. They took us all out into the corridor and beat us. I was beaten with a truncheon. They hit me on the head, in the kidneys, and on the legs…. This happened regularly after that for about one and a half months or so. The special forces would beat us. For the last three months it has been more or less normal. No one from my cell has been beaten.403

Another detainee described being beaten sometime in April 2006:

They take you into the hall. Line you up in the corridor and beat you as long as you can take it. They have special clubs that give electric shocks. They don’t just wear masks, some wear helmets. They come into the cell with something in writing, as if they have some information, that someone is trying to escape or something. They do it systematically, one cell at a time, all in a row, without conversation. They take you out of the cell, work you over, and return you to the cell. And then take the next guy. Without clothes. Yes, we were naked.404

Another told Human Rights Watch,

When they come for a surprise check, a raid, they come with clubs and masks at night and they make you undress. Everyone is beaten the first night they arrive. I still have a bruise from [several] months ago. When they come, they open the door and tell us to undress and take us into the hall. They ask questions and if they don’t like the answer, they beat you. They ask you what you are in for. I’m in for heroin. For that, they beat me. I have a tattoo on my arm. They beat me for that, too. If you don’t take off your pants, they beat you for that. It’s normal, that’s their style. They do it so they won’t have problems from us.405

For over a week following the December incidents, lawyers were not allowed to meet with their clients in Kutaisi Prison No. 2. Prisoners could not receive packages, apparently as punishment for the disturbance. 406  Following the Kutaisi incidents, thousands of detainees throughout the penitentiary system undertook a hunger strike for approximately nine days. Some reports described this action as a protest against ill-treatment and poor conditions of detention.407 Some detainees reported to the Office of the Ombudsman that they were pressured to go on hunger strikes by thieves in law and their supporters.408   The Ministry of Justice conducted an investigation into the planning of the riot and charged several inmates. The case is currently pending in court. However, neither the Ministry of Justice nor the General Prosecutor’s Office opened a separate investigation into the use of force by law enforcement agents or into the death of Malkhaz Sirginava.409 

During this period there were also violent incidents in the Batumi and Rustavi prisons. On January 24, 2006, in the Batumi prison, the authorities conducted a search of the prison and forced inmates to stand outside in very cold weather and snow for many hours, without allowing them to dress properly for the weather, and also used force and offensive remarks against the detainees. On January 29 special forces and detainees clashed in Rustavi Prison No. 2, resulting in injuries to one detainee and one member of the special forces.410 

Use of force against detainees in Tbilisi Prison No. 7

The government has designated Tbilisi Prison No. 7 as the facility where it will detain alleged thieves in law, including both those who were previously detained in other facilities as well as those recently arrested. Some prisoners involved in political cases are also detained in this facility.411  Detainees in Prison No. 7 reported that since December, they have been subject to frequent beatings and other degrading treatment that usually takes place during daily cell searches. During the searches, detainees are taken out into the prison corridor, made to stand with their faces against the wall, and forced to dress and undress repeatedly allegedly in order to check for contraband. Prisoners report beatings also happening at this time. Human Rights Watch considers that, given the frequency and the severity of the beatings and the accompanying humiliation, together with the appalling conditions of detention and widespread rights restrictions in the prison described above, the treatment of detainees in Prison No. 7 has, at times, amounted to torture.

Detainees explained the process of inspections and the accompanying treatment to Human Rights Watch. “When they do inspections they [make us] have our faces against the wall and our hands against the wall. They often beat [us]. They don’t beat me every day, but they beat someone every day,” said one detainee.412  Another stated, “If there is a problem with the checking, then they beat me. They make us take our clothes off, then dress again, then take our clothes off, then dress again. This can even happen five, ten times per day.”413  Yet another stated, with resignation, “Me, personally, the last time I was beaten seriously, not just hit a few times, was 20 days ago. [The guards] say, ‘Take off your clothes, crouch down. Okay get up, get dressed.’ Then again, ‘Take off your clothes, crouch down,’ etc. over and over. Finally [one time] I said, ‘Okay, if you want to beat me just do it.’  They just want to humiliate us and provoke us. They beat us whenever they want to so it makes no difference if we’re talking to you. It doesn’t matter anymore.”414

Detainees reported that they had experienced particularly harsh treatment several months earlier. One stated, “For three months here they beat me every day. They beat me with truncheons. For the last two months there was no beating. They would beat all of us, two or three times per day.”415  Another told Human Rights Watch, “It was worse before. The last month has been OK. Every day there were beatings. I almost died. I could also hear the beatings in the cell next to me. Every morning.”416  He continued, “Two months ago they took me from this cell and beat me terribly…. They were in masks. I don’t know why. They say nothing, they just hit. There were 10 of them. They took me upstairs to the doctor’s office. By the end I was unconscious.”417  One lawyer told Human Rights Watch that his client faced repeated beatings and told him, “In Prison No. 7, I was beaten in the night. In my cell sometimes. In February they beat me every day for two weeks.”418

Others stated that basic requests will result in repercussions from the prison staff. “If you cry out for medicine, for a lawyer, then they’ll beat you for sure,” one detainee told Human Rights Watch.419 One lawyer similarly reported that, according to her clients’ statements, “The beatings happen very frequently. Every day or every other day during certain periods. Anything can trigger it. Someone is sick and asked for a doctor, or someone asked for medicine—this would trigger beatings.”420  Another lawyer told Human Rights Watch that, according to one of his clients, “Prisoners ask for a doctor, for water, or for medicine. And the guards say, ‘I’m your doctor, I’m your medicine,’ and beat them.’”421

Lawyers reported seeing evidence of these beatings when meeting with their clients in Prison No. 7. “On [one of my clients] I saw a serious wound near his ear that was like a dark yellow circle. I believe it was a bruise.”422  Another lawyer confirmed, “I have examined my clients. I saw large bruises on one person’s body.”423  She also reported seeing her client beaten as he was brought to meet with her. She described the incident to Human Rights Watch, saying,

They beat him in front of me in Prison No. 7. I came into the building and heard screams. This was on January 15. They were going to bring the prisoner to me. He was in the corridor. Four employees with masks beat him. The thing is, when a person is brought to a lawyer, he is searched and forced to take off all of his clothes. He is completely naked. This is humiliating. After the meeting he is forced to take off all of his clothes again. [My client] protested taking off his clothes. They punched him with their fists.424

Impunity for Abuses Perpetrated by Prison Staff and Special Forces

There are numerous obstacles to effective investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of abuse against detainees, including direct interference by prison authorities and the lack of identifying insignia among prison staff and special forces. Lawyers have tried legal remedies to assist their clients in Prison No. 7 who have been victims of ill-treatment. One told Human Rights Watch, “I filed a suit and asked for an investigation. There was some kind of check, but afterwards my clients told me that [a prison administration official] had warned them: ‘If you tell anyone then it will get worse for you.’  The suit I filed on behalf of my clients- this was not confirmed. I got an answer saying ‘We checked and there are no claims against the prison administration.’  Other prisoners demanded forensic examinations. [One forensic expert] was not allowed into the prison. Not a single lawyer could get a forensic examination when they asked for it.”425   Another confirmed, “I demanded a forensic examination, but experts are not allowed in.”426 

A significant barrier to proper investigation into the alleged abuses described above is special forces’ complete lack of visible insignia, making it impossible to identify perpetrators. As of December 2005, special forces troops serve as the main guards in Tbilisi Prison No. 7. As a rule, all special forces members wear masks and do not wear name tags or identifying numbers. The identity of special forces troops remains so opaque that even other government officials note their complete anonymity. The director of Prison No. 5, who participated in the special operation of March 27, told Human Rights Watch, “There were… special forces from different organs. Everyone was in masks. It’s hard to say where they were from.”427 His deputy, who was also present during the operation stated, “The special forces all have the same uniforms and masks. I can’t say from where they come.”428  There are no laws requiring that special forces or even regular prison guards wear identification.429 

Difficulties in obtaining investigations and prosecutions into abuse in prisons are part of a broader problem of impunity for alleged crimes committed by law enforcement officers, in particular police, documented by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other organizations.430 The Georgian government has often refused to acknowledge these criticisms, and President Saakashvili has gone so far as to claim incorrectly that Human Rights Watch no longer considers torture or impunity to be problems in Georgia. In a speech delivered in November 2005, he stated, “A stereotype that people are tortured in Georgia persisted, but the reports made by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch maintain that there is not a single fact of a person being tortured.”431 During its review of Georgia in May 2006, the UN Committee Against Torture made several statements regarding the ongoing problem of impunity. It stated, “The Committee remains concerned that despite extensive legislative reforms, impunity and intimidation still persist in the State party, in particular in relation to the use of excessive force, including torture and other forms of ill-treatment by law enforcement officials, especially prior to and during arrest, during prison riots and in the fight against organized crime.”432  The committee also noted its concern “about the relatively low number of convictions and disciplinary measures imposed on law enforcement officials in light of numerous allegations of torture and other acts of cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as the lack of public information about such cases,”433 and pointed to the specific problem of the lack of identification of special forces troops.434  

In mid-2005 the government undertook specific legislative reforms, apparently as an attempt to respond to international criticism and take measures to address torture and impunity. These included a monitoring system for police stations under the framework of the Office of the Ombudsman, the requirement that police officers wear identification, and the requirement that, before approving a plea bargain, a court must ascertain that the agreement is reached voluntarily, without violence or coercion and that torture, inhuman or degrading treatment have not been used by police or other law enforcement officials against the defendant. However, lawyers and NGOs reported that the quality of investigations remain mixed. According to Levan Ramishvili of the Liberty Institute, “In terms of investigation and punishment of law enforcement agents, sometimes people are convicted, but more often the prosecutors say that the investigation is ongoing and the investigation will remain open indefinitely.”435   The lack of investigations into the deaths, injuries, and other ill-treatment and possible torture inflicted by law enforcement agents acting in the Georgian penitentiary facilities in early 2006, also suggests that the government is not fully committed to guaranteeing justice for victims and eliminating the climate of impunity.




280 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital,” document submitted by Georgia to the UN Committee Against Torture, during the committee’s review of Georgia May 1-19, 2006, supplied to Human Rights Watch by Natia Siradze, assistant to Deputy Minister of Justice Givi Mikanadze, via email on May 25, 2006.

281 According to the government, in addition to Zedelashvili, the other five alleged riot plotters are Platon Mamardashvili, Nikoloz Makharadze, Giorgi Avaliani, Zurab Vibliani, and Levan Tsindliani. “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

282 “Public Defender Unveils New Details of Tbilisi Prison Incident,” Civil Georgia, June 6, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/print.php?id=12753 (accessed June 7, 2006). The government also claims to have telephone conversation recordings revealing that a Georgian thief in law living in Ukraine helped organize the riot and instigated prisoners to riot. He was extradited from Ukraine on May 24, 2006. “Ukraine Extradites Suspected Georgian ‘crime boss,’” excerpt from report by Georgian Imedi TV, Tbilisi, May 24, 2006, English translation by BBC Monitoring, May 24, 2006.

283 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

284 Ibid.

285 Ibid.

286 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name and details withheld).

287 The prison authorities also randomly cut the hair of one detainee, Mamardashvili, apparently to humiliate him. “Report on Medical Monitoring Conducted in Prison no. 7 of Penitentiary System of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, Conducted on April 7, 2006”; “Ombudsman of Georgia visited Tbilisi Jail no. 7,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release, March 28, 2006; “Information Regarding the Events of March 27,” June 6, 2006, as distributed by the Ombudsman of Georgia Press Center; and Human Rights Watch interview with Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, Tbilisi, May 10, 2006.

288 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

289 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

290 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

291 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

292 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

293 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

294 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

295 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

296 Ibid.

297 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

298 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

299 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

300 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006, and Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

301 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

302 Human Rights Watch interview with Kakha Morgoshia, head of the Penitentiary Department special task force, May 16, 2006.

303 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

304 Ibid.

305 Human Rights Watch interview with Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, Tbilisi, May 10, 2006.

306 Although not technically allowed by Penitentiary Department regulations, many prisoners possessed mobile phones, especially prior to the reforms begun in December 2005.

307 Human Rights Watch interview with Elene Tevdoradze, chairperson, Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Civil Integration, Tbilisi, May 22, 2006.

308 Human Rights Watch interview with Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, Tbilisi, May 10, 2006.

309 “I didn’t hear any warning. Everything was too noisy. We couldn’t hear anything.”  Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld). “The building was literally shaking from the noise.” Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

310 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

311 As written in the original translation provided to Human Rights Watch, with parenthetical additions to provide clarity. “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.” Those allegedly injured were Head of the Penitentiary Department Special Task Force Kakha Morgoshia and Head of the Penitentiary Department Special Security Service Mamuka Shabanadze.

312 Ibid.

313 “Escaping Danger at the Expense of Victims,” 24 Hours, March 28, 2006 (in Georgian), on file with Human Rights Watch.

314 Human Rights Watch interview with Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, Tbilisi, May 10, 2006.

315 Human Rights Watch interviewed one of the Penitentiary Department employees allegedly shot by detainees. Human Rights Watch could not determine whether the small wound on his arm, which he claimed was a result of the shooting, was actually caused by gunfire. Human Rights Watch interview with Kakha Morgoshia, head of the Penitentiary Department special task force, Tbilisi, May 16, 2006.

316 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

317 As written in the original translation provided to Human Rights Watch. “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

318 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, art. 54. Similarly, the CPT notes, “Prison staff will on occasion have to use force to control violent prisoners… these are clearly high risk situations insofar as the possible ill-treatment of prisoners is concerned, and as such call for specific safeguards.” CPT, “The CPT Standards, Substantive Sections of the CPT’s General Reports,” p. 19, para. 53.

319  The Basic Principles also require, “Governments and law enforcement agencies [to] develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms. These should include the development of non-lethal incapacitating weapons for use in appropriate situations, with a view to increasingly restraining the application of means capable of causing death or injury to persons. For the same purpose, it should also be possible for law enforcement officials to be equipped with self-defensive equipment such as shields, helmets, bullet-proof vests and bullet-proof means of transportation, in order to decrease the need to use weapons of any kind.” Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27 to September 7, 1990.

320 Ibid.

321 See, for example, Akkum and Others v. Turkey, no. 21894/93, judgment of March 24, 2005; Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, judgment February 26, 2004; McShane v. United Kingdom, no. 43290/98, judgment of May 28, 2002; Gulec v. Turkey, judgment of July 27, 1998, Reports 1998-IV; Andonicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, judgment of October 9, 1997, Reports 1997-VI.

322 Levan Labauri, MD, “Letter to Sozar Subari, Ombudsman of Georgia, Reporting on the Monitoring of Rustavi Prison no. 6 on April 6, 2006 to Investigate the State of Health and Possible Injuries of Prisoners and Adequacy of Treatment Provided to Them and Inspection of the Nutrition Unit and Establishment of its Agreement with Applicable Medical Standards.”

323 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

324 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

325 Another detainee told Human Rights Watch “Then the gunfire started. It came from outside and inside. Bullets came in to the room through the window. But no one in our room was shot from the outside. We heard noise in the next room and I heard someone say ‘I was shot!’” Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

326 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

327 Human Rights Watch interview with Nana Kakabadze, director, Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, Tbilisi, May 10, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Ana Dolidze, chair, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Tbilisi, May 19, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with Elene Tevdoradze, chairperson, Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Civil Integration, Tbilisi, May 22, 2006; Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

328 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

329 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

330 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

331 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name and details withheld).

332 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

333 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

334 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

335 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Rustavi Prison No. 6, May 17, 2006.

336 Human Rights Watch interview with Mariam Jishkariani, executive director, Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture “Empathy,” May 12, 2006.

337 See for example, European Court of Human Rights judgments Tekin v. Turkey, judgment of June 9 1998, Reports 1998-IV; and Assenov and others v. Bulgaria, judgment of October 28, 1998, Reports 1998-VIII.

338  “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

339 Nino Burjanadze, parliamentary speaker, as quoted in, “Destabilization Plot Feared Behind Prison Riot,” Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, March 27, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12186 (accessed June 7, 2006).

340 “Saakashvili Speaks about Prison Riot, Hails Police,” Civil Georgia, March 27, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12191 (accessed June 7, 2006).

341 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital”; and Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006. Although these sources provide slightly contradictory accounts, it is clear that there were substantial barricades within the prison.

342 On June 6, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman released information from Platon Mamardashvili, a thief in law and one of the alleged plotters of the prison riot, stating that he had cooperated with prison officials to organize an incident designed to restore the credibility of the head of the Penitentiary Department, Bacho Akhalaia, who had been accused publicly of ill-treating detainees in recent months. Mamardashvili stated that he had renounced his standing as a thief in law and cooperated with the authorities in exchange for early release from prison. According to Mamardashvili, the plan required that he and several other crime bosses would deliberately injure themselves and each other and then blame the injuries on the head of the Penitentiary Department. The government would record these conversations. After an investigation that would reveal the audio recordings of the crime bosses planning this incident, the government would be able to show that the thieves in law had been organizing a campaign to discredit the head of the Penitentiary Department and, as a result, to prove that the accusations of ill-treatment against Akhalaia were not credible. Mamardashvili claims that he went to the ombudsman with the information about this plan after the plan fell through and the March 27 events unfolded. After March 27 Mamardashvili faced additional charges of planning the disturbances in the prison. “To the Ombudsman of Georgia Sozar Subari, Explanatory Transcript of Medical Facility Detainee Platon Mamardashvili (Regarding the Incidents of 27 March),” June 5, 2006, as distributed by the Ombudsman of Georgia Press Center; and “Information Regarding the Events of March 27.”

343 “Public Defender Unveils New Details of Tbilisi Prison Incident,” and “Liberty Institute Criticizes Ombudsman Again,” Civil Georgia, June 7, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12760 (accessed June 7, 2006); “To the Ombudsman of Georgia Sozar Subari, Explanatory Transcript of Medical Facility Detainee Platon Mamardashvili (Regarding the Incidents of 27 March)”; and “Information Regarding the Events of March 27.”

344 “Public Defender Unveils New Details of Tbilisi Prison Incident.”

345 A prisoner against whom any means of force have been used should have the right to be immediately examined, and, if necessary, treated by a medical doctor. CPT, “The CPT Standards, Substantive Sections of the CPT’s General Reports,” p. 19, para. 53.

346 Liz Fuller, “Tbilisi Prison Unrest,” RFE/RL, March 29, 2006 http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/9c5f4d3d-ab4a-4aed-95f2-1eea60a24919.html (accessed June 13, 2006).

347 “Report on Medical Monitoring Conducted in Prison no. 7 of Penitentiary System of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, Conducted on April 7, 2006.”

348 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

349 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

350 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

351 Human Rights Watch interview with three detainees injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (names and details withheld).

352 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

353 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (name and details withheld).

354 Human Rights Watch interviews with two detainees injured in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27 (names and details withheld).

355 Levan Labauri, MD, “Letter to Sozar Subari, Ombudsman of Georgia, Reporting on the Monitoring of Rustavi Prison no. 6 on April 6, 2006.”  See also “Jail #6,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release, April 10, 2006.

356 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

357 “TV Report Questions Official Prison Riot Death Toll,” Civil Georgia, March 30, 2006 http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12222 (accessed June 7, 2006) and “Georgian Justice Ministry Denies Prison Death Cover-up,” Prime-News Agency, Tbilisi, March 30, 2006 (via distribution list).

358 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.” See also “Georgian Justice Minister Informed Foreign Diplomats about Monday Riot,” Prime-News Agency, March 28, 2006. The director of the Republican Prison Hospital told Human Rights Watch that there were 22 injured patients brought to the hospital following the incident. Human Rights Watch interview with David Ossetian, chief doctor, Republican Prison Hospital, May 15, 2006.

359 Levan Labauri, MD, “Letter to Sozar Subari, Ombudsman of Georgia, reporting on the monitoring of Rustavi prison no.6 on April 6, 2006.”  See also “Jail #6,” Ombudsman of Georgia Press Release, April 10, 2006.

360 According to the Law of Georgia on Imprisonment, “In time of mass disorder in the institution of execution of punishments or in case of announcement of extraordinary or military situation in order to avoid attack, escape or other violations of law, the [Penitentiary] Department works out the plan of additional security measures approved by the Minister of Justice upon the agreement with the Ministry of Interior and State Department of State Border Defense.” Law of Georgia on Imprisonment, as amended June 1, 2005, art. 96.

361 The European Prison Rules expect that there shall be detailed procedures about the use of force including stipulations about: a. the various types of force that may be used; b. the circumstances in which each type of force may be used; c. the members of staff who are entitled to use different types of force; d. the level of authority required before any force is used; and e. the reports that must be completed once force has been used. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2006) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, para. 65.

362 Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that “(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. …. And (2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”  

363 The European Court of Human Rights has determined that the use of force must be strictly proportionate to the relevant Article 2(2) aim and that the planning and control of a police operation must minimize the reliance on lethal force and the risk to the lives of those involved “to the greatest extent possible.” Mc Cann v. UK, no. 18984/91, judgment of September 27, 1995, para. 161.

364 “General Information on Event of March 27, 2006 in Tbilisi Prison no. 1, no. 5 and Prison Hospital.”

365 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

366 Human Rights Watch interview with Stepan Ozashvili, deputy director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

367 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

369 The investigation was opened under art. 378 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, “Impeding the Activities of Detention or Penitentiary Institutions or Disorganization of Such Activities,” in connection with art. 19 of the Criminal Code, “Attempted Crime.”

370 Article 2231 of the Criminal Code, “Membership of a criminal society: being a thief in law.”

371 Article 2231, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code of Georgia, “Being a thief in law.” The crime is punishable by deprivation of liberty from five to ten years, with or without fine. Criminal Code of Georgia, art. 378, para. 1, “Non-compliance with the legal request of the employee of the detention or penitentiary institutions or otherwise impeding or disorganizing the activity of this institution shall be punishable by imprisonment of up to one year; para. 3, Attack on the administration of the detention of penitentiary institution or creation of a criminal gang for this purpose or an active participation in such gang shall be punishable by imprisonment of four to ten years; and para. 4, The action referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, perpetrated by the person convicted of a grave or an especially grave offence- shall be punishable by prison sentence ranging from eight to fifteen years in length.”

372 Criminal Code of Georgia, art. 378, paras. 1 and 3.

373 “Information on Questions Regarding the Criminal Case Concerning the Attempt of Disorganization at Penitentiary Establishments,” information provided at the request of Human Rights Watch by Tamar Tomashvili, human rights department, General Prosecutor’s Office, via email, July 11, 2006. According to this document, “Sub-paragraph I of art. 56 of Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia provides for the authorization of a prosecutor to take over from the investigator on any criminal case and forward it to another, in accordance with the investigative subordination. The Prosecutor General is authorized to take any criminal case notwithstanding investigative subordination and transfer it to an investigator from the Prosecutor’s Office or another investigative unit.”

374 “OSCE Chairman-in-Office Concerned about Violent Incidents in Georgian Prison,” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe press release, March 31, 2006, http://www.osce.org/cio/item_1_18578.html (accessed July 18, 2006). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with a statement saying, “The Georgian law enforcement agencies acted in full compliance with the law and the whole process of delivering information regarding the incident was transparent.”  The Ministry attributed De Gucht’s statement to the fact that members of the OSCE Mission to Georgia did not attend a Ministry of Justice briefing on March 28, 2006 regarding the incident. “Comment of the Department of the Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the Statement Made by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Karel De Gucht regarding the Incident in Tbilisi Prison No. 5 on March 27,” http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=35&info_id=1314 (accessed July 18, 2006).

375 Nika Gvaramia, member of parliament, member of the Parliamentary Committee for Legal Issues, stated, “I do not know why an independent probe is necessary, when the General Prosecutor’s Office is investigating whether excessive force was used or not during the prison riot.” As reported in, “’Lack of Clarity’ in Prison Incident,” Civil Georgia, April 2, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12244 (accessed June 5, 2006); see also “Parliament Rejects Probe into Prison Riot,” Civil Georgia, March 28, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12196 (accessed June 7, 2006).

376 “Saakashvili Speaks about Prison Riot, Hails Police,” Civil Georgia.

377 “Destabilization Plot Feared Behind Prison Riot,” Civil Georgia.

378 Human Rights Watch interview with Nona Tsotsoria, deputy prosecutor general, Tbilisi, May 23, 2006. However, the deputy minister of justice, Givi Mikanadze, told Human Rights Watch, “There is no investigation into the actions of the authorities.” Human Rights Watch interview with Givi Mikanadze, deputy minister of justice, Tbilisi, May 18, 2006.

379 Human Rights Watch interview with Nona Tsotsoria, deputy prosecutor general, Tbilisi, May 23, 2006.

380 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Tamar Tomashvili, human rights department, General Prosecutor’s Office, July 11, 2006.

381 For European Court findings specifically related to effective investigation into alleged violations of article 3, see Assenov and others v. Bulgaria, no. 24760/94, judgment of October 28, 1998, para. 102; and Sakik and others v. Turkey, no. 31866/96, judgment of October 10, 2000, para. 62.

382 Mc Cann v. UK, no. 18984/91, judgment of September 27, 1995, para. 161.

383 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, para. 117; see also İlhan v. Turkey, no. 22277/93, ECHR 2000‑VII; and Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, ECHR 2002‑IV.

384 Kaya v. Turkey, no. 158/1996/777/978, judgment of February 2, 1998, para. 87.

385 Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488/98, judgment of May 18, 2000, para 70; Salman v. Turkey, no. 21986/93, judgment of June 27, 2000, paras. 99 and 100; Tanli v. Turkey, no. 26129/95, judgment of April 10, 2001, para. 141; and Orak v. Turkey, no. 31889/96, judgment of February 14, 2002.

386 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, para. 118; see also Güleç v. Turkey, judgment of July 27, 1998, Reports 1998‑IV; Öğur v. Turkey, no. 21954/93, ECHR 1999‑III; Ergı v. Turkey, judgment of July 28, 1998, Reports 1998‑IV; and Hugh Jordan v. UK, no. 24746/94, judgment of May 4, 2001, para. 106.

387 See Kilic v. Turkey, judgment of March 20, 2000, Reports and Decisions 2000-III; Finucane v. the United Kingdom, no. 29178/95, judgment of July 1, 2003; and Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, judgment of May 4, 2001.

388 Yaşa v. Turkey, no. 63/1997/847/1054,judgment of September 2, 1998, paras. 102-104; Cakıcı v. Turkey, no. 23657/94, paras. 80, 87 and 106; and Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535/93, paras. 106-107.

389 See, inter alia, Hugh Jordan v. UK, no. 24746/94, judgment of May 4, 2001, paras. 106-109.

390 Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, para. 119; see also McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, ECHR 2001-III.

391 CAT, arts. 1, 12, and 16.

392 The requirements for an investigation to be deemed effective are the same as under article 2 of the ECHR (see above, “Investigation into the March 27 incident in Prison No. 5”). For European Court findings specifically related to effective investigation into alleged violations of article 3, see footnote 381 above.

393 Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department,” Speech to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, May 19, 2006. See also, “Prison Riot Reported in Kutaisi,” Civil Georgia, December 21, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11384 (accessed March 25, 2006).

394 “Inmates Die in Tbilisi Prison Riot,” Civil Georgia, March 27, 2006. The heat and water were apparently restored after one day.

395 The closure of Kutaisi Prison No. 1 and the transfer of detainees to Kutaisi Prison No. 2 and other establishments was apparently part of the plan to reduce the authority of the thieves in law by placing them in a new facility fully under control of the prison administration, and where detainees would be denied contraband and would be limited in their contact with one another. During a visit by the ombudsman to Kutaisi Prison No. 2 on December 25, 2005, some detainees allegedly reported that they were “pleased with the fact that they had been released from the influence of [the] criminal authorities.” “Ombudsman of Georgia considers establishment of order within the penitentiary system is obligation of the government,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release, December 26, 2005.

396 Ibid., and “Regional representatives of Ombudsman monitor jails,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release, January 11, 2006.

397 Malkhaz Sirginava, born 1978, died on December 24, 2005. “Letter from Gocha Megrlishvili, Director, Kutaisi Strict Regime Facility and Isolator no. 2, to Irakli Berdzuli, Head of the Special Division of the Penitentiary Department,” as per Human Rights Watch’s request for information concerning deaths in custody, on file with Human Rights Watch.

398 Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department,” Speech to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, May 19, 2006.

399 “Regional Representatives of Ombudsman Monitor Jails,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release.

400 Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department,” Speech to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, May 19, 2006. In contrast to the Ministry of Justice special forces troops, who are trained for conducting operations in prisons, the special forces from the Department of Constitutional Defense of the Ministry of Interior “are responsible for neutralizing criminals, the fight against terrorism, etc.” and not trained for operations within prisons. Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department.”

401 Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department,” Speech to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, May 19, 2006.

402 Human Rights Watch interview with Shmagi Panzevadze, deputy director, Kutaisi Prison No. 2, May 20, 2006.

403 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Kutaisi Prison No. 2, May 20, 2006.

404 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Kutaisi Prison No. 2, May 20, 2006.

405 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Kutaisi Prison No. 2, May 20, 2006.

406 “Ombudsman of Georgia Continues Monitoring of Jails,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release, January 3, 2006; and Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department,” Speech to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, May 19, 2006.

407 For example, Shorena Kotsotsashvili, “The Lives of Seven Thousand Prisoners in Danger,” Akhali Taoba, no. 2, April 1, 2006.

408 Sozar Subari, public defender (ombudsman) of Georgia, “Ongoing Problems and Results of Monitoring in the Penitentiary Department,” Speech to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, May 19, 2006; and “Ombudsman of Georgia Met with Relatives of Prisoners,” Ombudsman of Georgia press release, January 4, 2006.

409 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with Tea Jaliashvili, Information and Policy Department, Office of the Ombudsman, July 21, 2006. For information regarding the requirement under the European Convention of Human Rights to investigate any death in which lethal force is used, and the particular obligations on the government to provide an adequate explanation regarding any death in custody, see above “Investigation into the March 27 incident in Prison No. 5.”  See also footnote 381 regarding the requirement under article 3 for an effective investigation.

410 “Inmate, Policeman injured in prison riot,” Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, January 30, 2006, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11655 (accessed February 1, 2006).

411 For example, Vladimir Arutunian, who was sentenced to life in prison for attempting to assassinate U.S. President George W. Bush during his visit to Georgia in May 2005 is held in a solitary cell in Prison No. 7. The policemen accused of killing Sandro Girgvliani, head of the international relations department for United Georgian Bank, in February 2006, in a highly controversial case were also held in Tbilisi Prison No. 7, pending trial. For information on the case see, Paul Rimple, “Georgia: Murder Case Verdict Stirs Controversy,” EurasiaNet, July 7, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav070706.shtml (accessed July 18, 2006).

412 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

413 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

414 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

415 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

416 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

417 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

418 Human Rights Watch interview with Gela Nikolaishvili, Tbilisi, May 23, 2006.

419 Human Rights Watch interview with detainee (name withheld), Tbilisi Prison No. 7, May 19, 2006.

420 Human Rights Watch interview with Eka Beselia, Tbilisi, May 16, 2006.

421 Human Rights Watch interview with Gela Nikolaishvili, Tbilisi, May 23, 2006.

422 Human Rights Watch interview with Eka Beselia, Tbilisi, May 16, 2006.

423 Human Rights Watch interview with Lali Aptsiauri, Tbilisi, May 17, 2006.

424 Ibid.

425 Human Rights Watch interview with Eka Beselia, Tbilisi, May 16, 2006.

426 Human Rights Watch interview with Lali Aptsiauri, Tbilisi, May 17, 2006.

427 Human Rights Watch interview with Giorgi Polodashvili, head of Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

428 Human Rights Watch interview with Stepan Ozashvili, deputy director, Tbilisi Prison No. 5, May 16, 2006.

429 With respect to the uniforms of prison guards, “While exercising his/her employment duties, an employee wears a uniform; The President of Georgia approves attributes of the work form of the employee.” Law of Georgia on Imprisonment, as amended June 1, 2006, art. 14, paras. 1 and 2.

430 See Human Rights Watch, “Georgia: Uncertain Torture Reform,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, April 12, 2005, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/georgia0405/; “Agenda for Reform: Human Rights Priorities after the Georgian Revolution,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, February 24, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/24/georgi7650.htm; and Amnesty International, “Torture and ill-treatment. Still a concern after the ‘Rose Revolution,’” AI index: 56/001/2005, November 23, 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur560012005. According to information provided to Human Rights Watch by the General Prosecutor’s Office in May 2006, for 2004 and 2005, the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated 156 investigations into suspected torture or ill-treatment by law enforcement officers. Court decisions have been handed down in just 23 cases. The first prison sentences for law enforcement officers for torture-related crimes came in November 2005. Currently, 14 law enforcement officers are serving prison sentences for torture-related crimes. Three law enforcement officers charged with torture-related crimes were released following a plea bargain. Office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia, “Report with Respect to Human Rights in Georgia; Torture and Ill-treatment, Freedom of Religion and Trafficking.”

431 “Remarks by President Saakashvili at the Opening of an International Forum ‘Europe’s New Wave of Liberation: Democracy and Transformation,’” November 22, 2005, http://www.president.gov.ge/?l=E&m=0&sm=3&id=1037 (accessed March 6, 2006).

432 The committee recommends, “The State party should give higher priority to efforts to promote a culture of human rights by ensuring that a policy of zero tolerance is developed and implemented at all levels of the police force hierarchy as well as for all staff in the penitentiary establishments. Such a policy should identify and address the problems, and elaborate a code of conduct for all officials, including those involved in the fight against organized crime, as well as introduce regular monitoring by an independent oversight body.” United Nations Committee Against Torture, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Republic of Georgia,” para. 9.

433 The committee recommends, “The State party should strengthen its investigative capacity, including that of the Prosecutor-General’s office, in order to promptly and thoroughly examine all allegations of torture and ill-treatment and that statistics on convictions and disciplinary measures be regularly published and made available to the public.” United Nations Committee Against Torture, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Republic of Georgia,” para. 12.

434 “The Committee is concerned about the high number of complaints received from inmates as well as about reports that law enforcement officers wear masks during raids and carry no identification badges which makes it impossible to identify them should a complaint of torture or ill-treatment be made by an inmate. The State party should ensure that all penitentiary personnel, as well as special forces, be equipped with visible identification badges at all times to ensure the protection of inmates from acts in violation of the Convention.” United Nations Committee Against Torture, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States parties under Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Republic of Georgia,” para. 16.

435 Human Rights Watch interview with Levan Ramishvili, executive director, Liberty Institute, Tbilisi, May 11, 2005.