The numbers documented by the DAA Project reveal a general failure of accountability in detainee abuse cases, particularly with respect to commanders. Reasons include an apparent disinclination by commanding officers and civilian authorities to pursue meaningful punishment of serious offenses, and a series of general investigative failures, described in more detail below.
Even though approximately 600 U.S. personnel are implicated in the cases of detainee abuse documented by the DAA Project, as of April 10, 2006, only seventy-nine military personnel are known to have been recommended for court-martial, and only sixty-four appear to have actually been court-martialed. (This number includes eleven summary courts-martial, in which the maximum sentence is thirty days of confinement, and thirteen special courts-martial, in which the maximum sentence is one year).12 Ten courts-martial are still pending, and charges were dropped in the five other cases.
With respect to the sixty-four concluded courts-martial, the DAA Project found that:
While those cases actually brought to court-martial produced a relatively high rate of conviction, punishments that included prison time were not consistent. Substantial prison sentences were given in a few high profile cases covered by the media, but a number of other equally serious cases resulted in punishments far less severe. Examples of people sentenced to significant prison time include Charles Graner and Ivan Frederick, both convicted for assaults and other misconduct in the notorious photographed abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in late 2003, who were sentenced to ten and eight years respectively. Two other soldiers have received heavy sentences: Sgt. Michael P. Williams and Spec. Brent May were convicted of murder for the killings of two men they detained near Baghdad in August 2004. Williams was sentenced to life in prison; May was given five years.
However, other serious cases resulted in light punishments. Examples include:
The vast majority of the courts-martial cases detailed here (95 percent) involved enlisted personnel, not officers.
Under the doctrine of command responsibility, a long-recognized principle of U.S. domestic and international law, commanders can be held criminally liable as principals for the criminal acts of their subordinates, if they knew or should have known about criminal activity, but did not take steps to prevent it or to punish the perpetrators. For example, if prosecutors demonstrate that commanders knew their troops were committing abuses, but failed to stop them, the commanders can be charged as though they committed the crimes themselves.15
Not a single U.S. military officer serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Guantánamo Bay has been criminally charged under the doctrine of command responsibility for detainee abuses committed by his or her subordinates. The DAA Project found no evidence that the military has even sought to prosecute officers under the doctrine of command responsibility.
As of April 10, 2006, only five officers had been criminally charged in connection with the cases of abuse detailed in this report, and none under the doctrine of command responsibility. Christopher Beiring, an Army captain, was charged for dereliction of duty in a case involving the death of two detainees in Afghanistan in December 2002; he was acquitted.16 Andrew Ledford, a Navy lieutenant, was charged with assault and dereliction of duty, among other counts, for his involvement in the November 2003 interrogation at Abu Ghraib of Manadel al-Jamadi, an Iraqi detainee who died in custody; Ledford too was acquitted.17 Three other officersa lieutenant, a captain, and a majorwere convicted at court-martial for their involvement in detainee abuse; in all three cases the officers were charged for direct participation in the criminal acts, and had taken part in abuses themselves or had ordered troops to commit abuses.18 One was sentenced to only two months in prison, another to forty-five days, and the third was discharged and received no prison sentence.19
The following are some of the stories behind the numbers:
Criminal Investigators concluded that the specialist had committed aggravated assault, assault/battery, and negligent discharge of a firearm, and found probable cause to bring charges. Commanders instead ordered a non-judicial hearing, and the specialist received a punishment of two months of extra duty, restriction to base, reduction of rank, and a fine.30
First, the group took her out of her cell and escorted her down the cellblock to an empty cell. [Unnamed Soldier] stayed outside the cell while another held her hands behind her back, and the other forcibly kissed her. She was escorted downstairs to another cell where she was shown a naked male detainee and told the same would happen to her if she did not cooperate. She was then taken back to her cell and forced to kneel and raise her arms while one of the soldiers removed her shirt. She began to cry, and her shirt was given back as the soldier cursed at her and said they would be back.
During the Armys criminal investigation, the victim identified the three soldiers from a photograph lineup provided by military investigators. Two months later, the criminal investigation was closed. Instead of a court-martial, commanders chose to punish the soldiers involved in this case non-judicially. The three soldiers each received one month of confinement and one of the soldiers was fined $500, while the other two were fined $750.
Both the U.S. military and the Justice Department have the necessary resources and procedures to investigate abuse allegations, document the facts, and determine whether prosecutions are warranted. Yet the DAA Project found numerous cases in which authorities failed to initiate investigations, delayed in initiating investigations (often adversely affecting their outcome), or failed to follow basic investigative techniques, including interviewing victims and witnesses and gathering physical evidence.
The following are examples of cases in which authorities either failed to investigate credible allegations of abuse, or failed to conduct adequate or timely investigations of such allegations:
Immediately after their release, the four men told their employers that they had been tortured and otherwise physically abused during their three days of detention. Ureibi and Ahmad al-Badrani alleged that they were repeatedly kicked and hit (with enough force to be knocked over) between and during interrogation sessions, subjected to sleep deprivation, and forced to perform difficult and humiliating physical motions or hold painful stress positions for hours at a time (including kneeling with their arms in the air, forced standing overnight, and standing up-and-down repeatedly). Both say they were forced to drink large quantities of water until they felt sick. Sattar al-Badrani and Ahmed al-Badrani also alleged acts of degradation and humiliation: Ahmad was forced to put his middle finger in his anus and then lick it, while Sattar was forced to put a finger in his anus and then smell it. Ureibi, who says he was separated from the others, also alleged that he was forced to crawl around on the floor with his head between another detainees legs. He reported that an object (possibly a shoe) was put in his mouth and that soldiers said they would rape him and his wife. Ali, who gave an account to NBC officials, also said that he was beaten and kicked, and that he was subjected to sleep deprivation, stress positions, and forced exercises.
An unclassified executive summary of the Army investigation into the case, dated January 29, 2004, reviewed statements obtained from soldiers involved in the detention and stated that the detainees were purposefully and carefully put under stress, to include sleep deprivation, in order to facilitate interrogation; they were not tortured. The summary then dismissed the allegations of abuse by the four detainees as not credible. In a February 3, 2004, letter to Pentagon officials, Reuters called the Army investigation woefully inadequate, noting that investigators had only taken statements from soldiers and not from the alleged victims of the abuse. Reuters requested that investigators speak with the journalists themselves, but investigators never did so. In a March 2004 letter to Reuters, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez (then commander of U.S. operations in Iraq) stated that the military would not reopen the case, and wrote that the conclusions and findings of the Investigating Officers are sound. Even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in late April 2004, the military refused to reopen the investigation. In August 2004, the military again confirmed to Reuters that the investigation was closed.
 As noted above, another fifty-seven individuals faced non-judicial punishments.
 See United States Marine Corps, USMC Alleged Detainee Abuse Cases Since 11 Sep 01, August 5, 2004, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/navy3740.3749.pdf.
 See ibid.
 For a discussion of the concept of command responsibility in U.S. law, see In Re Yamashita, 327, U.S. 1, 16 (1946) and decisions under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. § 1350) applying the doctrine of command responsibility: Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103. F. 3d 767, 777-78 (9th Cir.1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 171-172 (D. Mass. 1995). In a recent decision, Ford v. Garcia, 289 F. 3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002), family members of victims of atrocities committed by members of the Salvadoran National Guard filed a case in a Florida federal court against a general and the former minister of defense. The judge directed that the two generals could be held responsible for the crimes of their subordinates if the defendants were in effective command and if they knew or should have known that persons under their effective command were committing such crimes.
 Tim Golden, Years After 2 Afghans Died, Abuse Case Falters, New York Times, February 13, 2006.
 Marty Graham, U.S. Navy commando cleared in Abu Ghraib case, Reuters, May 27 2005.
 One case involved Lieutenant Jack Saville, who ordered troops to throw two Iraqi detainees into the Tigris River (one drowned); Saville was sentenced to 2 months of prison time. See U.S. soldier gets 45 days for Iraqi assaults, Reuters, March 15 2005. The second case involved Capt. Shawn Martin, who was convicted of three counts of assault against detainees, including two assaults he carried out himself and a case in which he ordered a detainee to dig his own grave and then fired shots next to the detainees head in a mock execution. Martin was sentenced to 45 days prison time and a fine of $1,000 per month for twelve months. See Erin Emery, Officer sentenced to prison Convicted Army captain gets 45 days, cut in salary, Denver Post, March 18, 2005. The third case involved Maj. Clarke Paulus, who was convicted of ordering troops to drag a detainee out of his cell by his neck, strip him naked and leave him outside; Paulus was not sentenced to prison time but simply discharged from the military. See Seth Hettena, Marine is sentenced in abuse of Iraqi prisoner, Associated Press, November 12, 2004.
 See preceding note.
 For details on regulations governing criminal and administrative investigations, see Army Regulation 15-6, Procedure for Investigating Officers and Board of Officers, September 30, 1996, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.usma.edu/EO/regspubs/r15_6.pdf; Department of the Army, Administrative Publications, 195 Series Collection, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/195_Series_Collection_1.html. For additional information, see Human Rights First, Commands Responsibility, p. 30 and fns. 429-441. A criminal investigation is required after the death of any detainee in U.S. custody.
 As noted in Commands Responsibility, p. 30, administrative investigations, unlike criminal investigations, can only be used to investigate an incident or individual within the appointing commanders chain of command. In other words, investigators cannot investigate wrongdoing at the level of, or higher than, the commander who initiated the investigation.
 See RCM 306.
 See ibid. If a commander orders a general court-martial, a pre-trial hearing must be held (known as an article 32 hearing, roughly similar to a civilian grand jury).
 UCMJ art. 15.
 See UCMJ arts. 18-20.
 See RCM 201(f)(2) and RCM 1301(d)(1).
 See UCMJ, art. 15.
 See ibid. See also Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) [hereinafter RCM], 306(c)(3), contained in the U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States (2005 ed.) [hereinafter MCM]; and MCM pt. V, ¶ 5(b).
 The DAA Project identified 57 cases in which non-judicial article 15 hearings were used, and at least twenty other cases in which other administrative disciplinary measures were imposed. Military public affairs officials told DAA Project researchers in April 2006 that the military has used non-judicial punishments against ninety-three personnel, but it is unclear which of these cases overlap with the cases recorded by Project researchers, because military officials have refused to identify the cases individually. See box on page 16,What the Government Says.
 See Department of the Army, CID, CID Report of Investigation, January 30, 2004, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/28TF.pdf.
 See Fay-Jones Report, case No. 2, p. 71. See also Department of the Army, Commanders Report of Discplinary or Adminstrative Action and Army Investigation (documents), retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/22TFa.pdf (commander's report) and http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/22TFb.pdf (investigation notes). See also, Elise Ackerman, Abu Ghraib Interrogators Involved in Afghan Case, Knight-Ridder, August 22, 2004.
 This figure was provided by Army Public Affairs officials in e-mails to Project researchers in April 2006.
 See letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Richard Durbin, January 17, 2006, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file606_23910.pdf.
 The description of this case is based on multiple sources, including: interviews with Salem Ureibi, Ahmad Mohammad Hussein al-Badrani, and Sattar Jabar al-Badrani, by Reuters correspondent Andrew Marshall, Baghdad, January 8, 2004; Human Rights Watch interview with Salem Ureibi, Baghdad, March 22, 2006; U.S. Army, Reuters/NBC Employee Detention (Unclassified Executive Summary), January 29, 2004; Letter from David Schlesinger (Reuters Global Managing Editor) to Lawrence Di Rita (special assistant to the secretary of defense), February 3, 2004; letter from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez to David Schlesinger, March 5, 2004.
 Tracy Wilkinson, A Double Ordeal for Female Detainees, Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2004, p. A1.
 Army Criminal Investigative Command investigation notes and memorandum on the Los Angeles Times case, April-August 2004, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/1209_1247.pdf.
 See ibid. The investigators efforts, with few exceptions, appear to have been focused on recording these few investigatory efforts made and then recommending the case be closed. A June 23, 2004 investigation report noted that the female attorney mentioned in the Los Angeles Times article visited Abu Ghraib in March 2004, interviewed five detainees, and reviewed the files for those five detainees. (It is unclear why agents assumed this visit, in March 2004, would have bearing on the allegations, which were reportedly raised by detainees in May 2004.) The investigation report concluded: This office coordinated with the originating Case Agent, who advised to close this RFA. A month later, a notation dated July 20, 2004, reads: Pending one coordination w/[ith] Mr.  to locate Ms. . If he is unable to locate her, then close this down. All females except for two, who we already titled for False Swearing in 0106-04-[illegible], have been released. According to their custom, the females are forbidden to discuss these allegations. On August 3, 2004, another entry cited the failure to locate the victims and the allegation that two other women had, according to investigators, been found to have made false allegations, and concluded: close this. The files discuss the fact that another investigation identified a separate sexual abuse claim, but no further efforts to investigate the case appear to have been made. The notes contain additional notations about how the limited steps already taken should be better documented, and then on August 26, 2004, the case is closed.
 Department of the Army, CID, CID Report of Investigation Final (C)/SSI-0123-04-CID259-80248 (Aug. 26, 2004), retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/1209_1247.pdf.
 For details about this case, see the Taguba Report, annex 26; and records of Army criminal investigators released under FOIA litigation, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.4311.pdf and http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/294_334.pdf. See also, Joel Brinkley, 9/11 Set Army Contractor on Path to Abu Ghraib, New York Times, May 19, 2004, p. A13; Joel Brinkley, Translator Questioned by Army in Iraq Abuse, New York Times, May 23, 2004, p. A12; Osha Gray Davidson, Contract to Torture, Salon.com, August 9, 2004 [online], retrieved April 17, 2006, at: http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/08/09/abu_ghraib/index.html.
 See Second Amended Complaint, Saleh v. Titan Corp, No. 04 CV 1143 (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, filed July 30, 2005), retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/Saleh%20v%20Titan%20Corp%20Second%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf.
 Email message from FBI official Chris Swecker to FBI Director Robert Mueller, retrieved April 17, 2006, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4882_4885.pdf.
 Human Rights First, Commands Responsibility.
 Information here is derived from the Fay-Jones Report, cases No. 15, 24 and 25; and from un-redacted documents from the Fay-Jones investigation with the names of implicated personnel, on file with Human Rights Watch.
 For details about the case discussed here, see Dana Priest, CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment, Washington Post, March 3, 2005.