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V. International Response to the Crisis

In the immediate aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina, statements by a number of key U.N. agencies signaled the international community’s recognition that the evictions caused a large-scale humanitarian and human rights crisis that must be urgently addressed.

The Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons characterized the situation as a “massive internal displacement,” expressing hope that “with rapid action on the part of the United Nations in conjunction with the Government of Zimbabwe, ongoing violations of human rights on the massive scale… can be quickly brought to an end.”114 A group of ten U.N. experts, including eight Special Rapporteurs, issued a joint statement deploring the evictions and their “grave human rights implications.”115 In the report of her fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe, the U.N. Special Envoy emphasized “an immediate need for the Government of Zimbabwe to recognize the virtual state of emergency that has resulted and to allow unhindered access by the international and humanitarian community to assist those that have been affected.”116

However, these statements have not been translated into an effective response by the U.N. country team and non-U.N. agencies—such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—on the ground.

Human Rights Watch did not attempt to perform a full-scale assessment of the U.N. humanitarian assistance program in Zimbabwe. However, numerous site visits and interviews with the internally displaced, as well as interviews with a broad range of national and international NGOs, local authorities and representatives of U.N. and other international agencies revealed that the U.N.-led program had failed to reach the majority of the internally displaced with basic assistance, or to take decisive action to provide protection to the vulnerable population.

One of the main obstacles preventing the U.N. from fulfilling its obligations is indisputably the government’s refusal to acknowledge the crisis and its deliberate obstruction of aid delivery documented in detail in this report.

Yet Human Rights Watch found serious flaws in the U.N. program itself, which have undermined the fulfillment of its humanitarian objectives. The problems include the U.N. county team’s failure to assess and evaluate the situation on the ground and devise a realistic response strategy that would take existing challenges into account; inattention to protection concerns both in the planning and implementation of programs and the absence of safeguards against human rights violations within the program.

Human Rights Watch acknowledges that the U.N. country team in Zimbabwe works under challenging circumstances and has to carefully choose the means for advancing its goals without endangering the ongoing humanitarian involvement in the country. Members of the country team indicated to Human Rights Watch that they had to resort to quiet negotiations with the government, fearing that any public criticism would put their operations at risk. While accepting that quiet diplomacy can, on occasion, be an effective strategy for promoting human rights, it does seem clear that six months into the crisis precipitated by Operation Murambatsvina, the strategy of quiet diplomacy has produced few tangible benefits for those displaced by the evictions.

While the U.N. cannot be held responsible for the Zimbabwean government’s recalcitrance, it does bear a responsibility to the hundreds of thousands of people whose fundamental rights have been continuously violated as a result of Operation Murambatsvina, and whose very survival is currently at risk. In situations where the governments defy their international obligations to respond to the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced, the international community bears the task of becoming meaningfully involved.117 In relation to the situation in Zimbabwe this obligation was further reiterated by the U.N. Special Envoy who concluded in her report on the impact of Operation Murambatsvina that “the international community has a responsibility to protect those affected.”118

Planning and coordination

Failure to incorporate protection issues in the response plan

Response to the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Operation Murambatsvina was elaborated in two planning documents produced by the U.N. country team— a three-months “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe” (Interim Plan) prepared in mid-July 2005, and the following “Common Response Plan,” finalized in early September.119

Neither plan meaningfully incorporates protection objectives and activities into the program. While the failure to incorporate protection concerns in humanitarian assistance programs is not unique to Zimbabwe, it has been repeatedly addressed and criticized in the U.N. policy documents and extensive research materials on the matter.120

The Interim Plan mentions that “besides the broader protection issues such as health, water, and sanitation” there are also “specific protection issues for the most vulnerable populations.” However, it does not elaborate on the issues any further and does not describe the specific action that needs to be taken to address them. The Common Response Plan declares that “protection… will be mainstreamed into all the sectors,” yet does not explain what this mainstreaming would mean in practical terms. The only groups whose protection needs in both plans have been addressed more specifically are children and, to a lesser extent, women at risk of sexual violence.121

Significantly, despite the U.N. Special Envoy’s conclusion that “hundreds of thousands of people have had their basic rights infringed upon and their dignity violated” as a result of the evictions,122 and the Interim Plan’s supposition that the “evictions and demolition… could prima facie constitute serious human rights violations,”123 the response plans do not even mention the term “human rights” in the protection context, do not address the broad range of protection needs generated by the evictions and their aftermath, and do not list any protection-related objectives among the priorities. This is particularly troubling given the human rights causes of the displacement crisis.

The one provision in the Interim Plan that is apparently supposed to reflect the human rights protection strategy states the need to:

[c]arry out a legal analysis of the ongoing evictions with the view to ascertaining their conformity or otherwise with applicable national, regional and international human rights standards, and to be carefully employed as an advocacy tool by the [Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator] in the policy dialogue with the Government of Zimbabwe and other stakeholders.124

The U.N. Special Envoy’s report indeed contained such detailed legal analysis of the evictions, concluding that they have been carried out with disregard to international and national law and calling for immediate measures to redress the large-scale human rights violations.125 The U.N. country team, however, did not seem to have taken due notice of this conclusion and recommendation in its further programming. The September Common Response Plan does not mention the term “human rights” at all.

The absence of a commitment to protection in the plans is contrary to U.N. policy, which emphasizes the responsibility of humanitarian agencies “to ensure that protection features are integrated in their programmes and operations.” 126 The policy interprets protection as “all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual,” including the rights related to physical security and integrity and to basic necessities of life, as well as other political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights.127 In his recent report, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons again reiterated that “human rights protection goes beyond the mere provision of assistance insofar as it aims at ensuring that violations cease, do not reoccur and that victims of violations are provided with effective remedies including reparation.”128

Lack of coordination and limited involvement of protection-oriented agencies

The failure to meaningfully incorporate human rights concerns and corresponding protection goals in the planning documents is related to a larger problem of coordination and division of labor within the country team and a very limited involvement of agencies with protection mandates.

In their response to the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Operation Murambatsvina, U.N. and non-U.N. agencies in Zimbabwe are working within the framework of the “collaborative approach,”129 which suggests that a “broad range of U.N. and non-U.N., governmental and non-governmental actors (including humanitarian, human rights and development actors) work together in a transparent and cooperative manner,” with a Humanitarian or Resident Coordinator being responsible for the strategic coordination of protection and assistance as well as for “negotiating unimpeded humanitarian access.”130

However, specific roles assigned by the planning documents to various agencies raise serious concerns. For example, IOM is designated as the lead agency for provision of food (supplied by the World Food Program) and non-food items (including shelter) to the internally displaced, with more than 50 percent of the Common Response Plan budget directed to this agency.

Based on its previous research of IOM’s field operations across the world, Human Rights Watch has identified serious problems in the organization’s response to humanitarian crises. The problems include a lack of expertise in providing emergency assistance, such as delivery of food and shelter; absence of a formal mandate to monitor human rights abuses and to protect the rights of beneficiaries; unwillingness to engage with experienced humanitarian and human rights actors to ensure that operations reflect sensitivity to the human rights dimension; failure to meaningfully engage with nongovernmental organizations and other civil society actors; and the lack of effective accountability mechanisms to answer criticism with respect to field practice’s impact on human rights.131 Many of these problems appear to have affected IOM’s humanitarian operations in Zimbabwe, as illustrated below in this report.

The limitations of the IOM’s leading role are exacerbated by the very limited involvement of agencies with specific protection mandates—primarily the UNICEF and UNHCR—in the humanitarian response to the internal displacement crisis in Zimbabwe. 

In their public statements following Operation Murambatsvina, UNICEF representatives spoke about the enormous humanitarian crisis precipitated by the evictions and repeatedly called on donor countries to provide additional resources to support UNICEF’s emergency programs in the country.132 The statements, however, did not acknowledge that the main reason for UNICEF’s inability to reach the majority of its intended beneficiaries was the government obstruction of humanitarian assistance and did not advocate for the need to provide human rights protection to the displaced.

For its part, UNHCR has strictly limited its role to assisting refugees in the Tongogara camp and, as indicated to Human Rights Watch by other members of the U.N. country team, the agency has not been involved in any aspects of the assistance program related to IDPs.133

Devising a realistic strategy for addressing the needs of the internally displaced

While the Zimbabwean government has persistently obstructed humanitarian operations and demonstrated no willingness to cooperate with international agencies, the U.N.’s plans proceeded from a false assumption of the government’s collaboration and thus could not devise a realistic strategy that would take the existing challenges into account and enable the agencies to adjust their operations accordingly.

The government’s non-cooperation was evident at the time the Interim Response Plan was devised and was noted both in the plan itself and in the U.N. Special Envoy’s report.134 The Interim Plan spoke about the need to improve cooperation with the government and to build “a shared understanding on the priorities for delivery of assistance to the populations affected.”135

By September, very little had been achieved with respect to the improved cooperation with the government, and the government obstruction of humanitarian assistance had not only intensified but also effectively prevented the country team from fulfilling most of the objectives set out in the Interim Plan.

Nonetheless, the Common Response Plan ignored this reality, citing instead the government’s welcoming of the “assistance of the United Nations and other partners to address the humanitarian effects of the operation,” and adding that “access to those affected by the operation has increased, allowing the U.N. and its partners to expand ongoing assistance.”136

These assertions, however, did not reflect the situation on the ground. All U.N. staff interviewed by Human Rights Watch in September and October consistently cited the government’s continuous obstruction of operations as the main reason for the international agencies’ inability to implement their programs. Moreover, Zimbabwean government officials continued to deny the existence of the crisis and the need for international assistance.137 

U.N. officials acknowledged to Human Rights Watch that in the absence of the government’s cooperation, which the Common Response Plan was heavily relying on, the chances of the Plan being implemented are now very slim.138

Assessment and monitoring

Another important factor which significantly complicated the implementation of humanitarian programs in the aftermath of the evictions was the U.N. country team’s failure to carry out a comprehensive needs assessment, to establish a procedure for registering the internally displaced, and to engage in monitoring of the situation, either directly or through implementing partners.

In the absence of government cooperation, and given the government’s deliberate actions aimed at restricting the access of the international actors to the internally displaced described above in this report, these tasks were certainly not easy to accomplish. Yet, Human Rights Watch found that in these challenging circumstances the U.N. country team and other international agencies involved in humanitarian response appeared not to have undertaken even the steps that were well within their capacity. For example, they did not visit many locations throughout the country in order to assess and monitor the situation of the IDPs and register the displaced, although access to most of these areas is not restricted. Neither did the agencies make use of data, possibilities for access and extensive networks of local and international NGOs active on the ground in Zimbabwe.

Absence of comprehensive data

In July, the U.N. Special Envoy noted in her report that “nearly two months into the crisis, the United Nations has been unable to survey humanitarian needs in coordination with the authorities” and that the “lack of information on the number of people affected, their profile, and their whereabouts” made “programming, coordination and resource mobilization extremely difficult and onerous.”139

Six months into the crisis, the U.N. country team has yet been unable to produce any comprehensive data on the overall numbers of people in need of humanitarian assistance, let alone any disaggregated data on the internally displaced and their specific needs.

In interviews with Human Rights Watch, U.N. staff explained the absence of data by their lack of access to the displaced population and the government’s unwillingness to cooperate in the process.140 While acknowledging the enormous difficulties inherent in working in Zimbabwe, Human Rights Watch is concerned that the documents produced by the U.N. country team contain often wildly inconsistent figures and make no effort to explain the discrepancies.

For example, the Interim Response Plan concluded in July, based on an “informal assessment in selected areas,” that approximately 74,000 households (370,000 individuals) have been “affected” by the evictions, noting that the figure was likely to increase, since the evictions were still ongoing. While referring also to the figures cited by the U.N. Special Envoy, which—based on the information received from the government—put the number of the “affected” households at a figure almost two times higher (133,000), the Plan, with no real explanation, designated only 40,000 households as the population targeted for humanitarian assistance.141

In September, the Common Response Plan, in turn, identified the population in need of “emergency assistance” to be “in the region of 300,000” explaining neither how this figure corresponded to the one in the previous plan nor giving a basis for this estimate.142  IOM representatives provided Human Rights Watch with yet another document, also compiled in September, which gives a figure of 462,745 as an estimated number of the individuals “affected” by Operation Murambatsvina.143 

An independent countrywide survey carried out by ActionAid in six urban areas of Zimbabwe in August 2005 concludes that in Harare alone out of 850,000 individuals “affected” by the evictions, 71 percent—or approximately 600,000 people—lost their homes.144 One of the UNICEF statements also mentioned in late July that 585,000 were made homeless by the evictions.145 The six-fold discrepancy between the ActionAid’s and UNICEF’s figures and the Common Response Plan estimates raises serious concern regarding the accuracy of the needs assessments being carried out by humanitarian agencies.

The figures contained in the U.N. planning documents are of questionable accuracy, considering that the country team has also not yet undertaken a countrywide registration process of persons displaced by the evictions. The vast majority of the internally displaced interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that no agency had ever taken down their names and other details, although a few individuals mentioned that church representatives wrote down their names during the food distribution.

The importance of comprehensive data collection cannot be overestimated. The absence of data on the numbers and needs of the displaced population prevents the agencies involved in humanitarian response from setting realistic objectives and makes their fulfillment virtually impossible. Moreover, in the absence of an accurate assessment, it is impossible to evaluate the impact of the humanitarian operation and ensure that the programs reach out to the vulnerable populations and meet their needs, as well as to engage in meaningful advocacy with the authorities.146

Monitoring the situation

During their stay in Zimbabwe, Human Rights Watch researchers were able to visit numerous locations in four of the country’s provinces where large numbers of people displaced by the evictions were staying. In each location, local NGOs, community- and faith-based organizations, and, in three of the provinces, local authorities all assisted the researchers with locating the internally displaced, and also willingly shared their information on the numbers and needs of the IDPs. In most locations, Human Rights Watch researchers were able to conduct extensive interviews with the displaced as well as take photographs without any interference from the authorities.

At the same time, the vast majority of the internally displaced interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had never been visited by any representatives of the U.N or other international agencies. Members of nongovernmental organizations and local authorities corroborated this testimony, saying that U.N. representatives have never contacted them for information or assistance with access to the internally displaced.

For example, a representative of a Harare-based NGO, which has been closely monitoring the situation of the internally displaced in the city and its surroundings since the beginning of Operation Murambatsvina, told Human Rights Watch:

[The U.N.] could have come just like you, and we would have taken them around to see all these places where people are sleeping in the open without any help, and to talk to people about their needs. But they never asked. You are the first internationals who approached us for assistance.147 

One of the U.N. officials in Zimbabwe interviewed by Human Rights Watch claimed that his agency has in fact sent monitors to various areas, and specifically mentioned Victoria Falls as an area where the agency made several trips and “identified 600 people who were still living in the open and required assistance.”148 These figures indicate that the U.N. monitoring managed to reach and identify only a small fraction of the displaced, while the majority remains undetected and unassisted. Human Rights Watch visited several different areas in Victoria Falls and its surroundings and was informed that they had never been visited by a representative of any international organization.149 Moreover, as mentioned above, local authorities in Victoria Falls indicated that Operation Murambatsvina resulted in the destruction of 6,000 structures in the city, while about 10,000 people have been directly “affected.”150 According to the ActionAid survey, over 17,000 people in Victoria Falls were “affected” by the evictions.151

The U.N. staffer also confirmed that up to now, they have been unable to perform any monitoring of families relocating to the rural areas. As the official described it, “with those who moved to the rural areas, it’s a bit of a black hole,” explaining that the agency has not yet attempted to track down the relocating families.152 In practical terms this “black hole” means that the internally displaced moving to the rural areas throughout Zimbabwe have been deprived of any and all forms of assistance and protection on the part of the international community.153

A more active involvement by the U.N. country team in field monitoring would not only have enabled it to adequately assess humanitarian needs, but would also have served an important protection function. The very presence of international humanitarian staff often helps to prevent abuses against the internally displaced and to promote accountability.154

Human Rights Watch interviews with U.N. staff also revealed that the restrictions on them have not prompted them to explore a variety of methods for monitoring and assessing the situation on the ground. For example, when Human Rights Watch suggested the possibility of using group leaders in the informal IDP settlements for collecting information about the group and preliminary registration, the U.N. staff met the suggestion with overt skepticism.155 Meanwhile, Humanitarian Charter as well as several studies on the subject mention this approach as one of the main methods for collecting information in situations with limited access to the displaced population.156

Lack of coordination with local and international NGOs

The failure to utilize the resources of local NGOs and civil society groups to enhance its knowledge of the situation on the ground is indicative of the U.N. country team’s overall insufficient cooperation with local groups and international NGOs in response to the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Operation Murambatsvina.

Although the U.N. Interim Response Plan emphasized the importance of “developing strategic partnerships, capacity, and a productive dialogue” among all relevant humanitarian actors, “including… International and National NGOs,” this intention has remained unfulfilled. In reality, U.N. agencies and IOM most often used churches and a few local NGOs as implementing partners for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, while a broader cooperation or even communication with local and international NGOs has been virtually non-existent.

A number of local organizations actively involved in addressing the needs of people who lost their shelter, livelihood, or were otherwise affected by the evictions, told Human Rights Watch that the U.N. country team never made use of their information and networks, and ignored both their offers of assistance and their appeals for help. For example, the head of a Harare-based NGO, which has been working with over 5,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in Greater Harare, told Human Rights Watch that although the organization shared the data on their clients who lost housing, livelihood or medical care as a result of the evictions with the U.N. country team, they received no response. The head of the organization said:

During the U.N. Envoy’s visit the U.N. country team asked us for all the data—what we needed, who needed it, etc. We spent three days with the U.N. Envoy. We also gave information—numbers of our clients, numbers of those affected by the evictions and their names—to the IOM, WFP, ActionAid and HIVOS. We told them about what we regarded as the implications and what input was required. But we had no reply or feedback. There was simply no response and no communication.157

When Human Rights Watch asked the U.N. country team about the information received from the group, the team claimed to have heard nothing from or about the organization.158

The staff of another organization, which works with over 500,000 widows and orphans countrywide also expressed to Human Rights Watch their disappointment over the country team’s failure to use their resources and extensive network for reaching out to the displaced. The head of the organization said:

In June, UNICEF inquired about our needs – we gave them the lists of families in need of assistance: widows, orphans, HIV-positive. They promised assistance, and brought non-food items once, but then we never heard back from them. IOM and WFP delivered food once, but then… everything stopped. Widows keep coming to us asking for assistance but we cannot help them at the moment. We see more than 500 women come weekly--we could have been easily distributing assistance here.’159

Several international NGOs and humanitarian organizations have also seen little support from the U.N. country team. A staff member of an international NGO also emphasized that the lack of support from the U.N. made the work of NGOs increasingly difficult, as civil society groups trying to access the displaced despite government’s obstruction are being seen “as mavericks.” The person said, “The U.N. could have been innovative and dispersed their resources through other organizations. International agencies are at the point where they don’t feel they have the protection from the U.N.”160 The representative also said that the extensive data on the impact of Operation Murambatsvina gathered by his organization and specifically the information about the numbers of HIV/AIDS patients who lost medical assistance as the result of the evictions, “has not been warmly received by the U.N.”161

Implementation of humanitarian programs

Lack of protection

The absence of human rights concerns and corresponding protection activities in the U.N.’s humanitarian response plans inevitably has led to a failure on the part of the country team to address the protection needs of the internally displaced. The situation was exacerbated by the apparent reluctance of the U.N. country team to confront the government over its blatant disregard of the human rights of the displaced–or indeed of Zimbabweans generally. Until such time, as human rights protection is placed at the center of the U.N.’s engagement with the Zimbabwean government, it is difficult to imagine how improvements can be achieved.

While the majority of the internally displaced continued to face a wide range of human rights violations documented earlier in this report, including continued evictions, police harassment, and involuntary relocation, no agency within the U.N. country team has been involved in monitoring, documenting and reporting on the ongoing human rights violations of the internally displaced.

Notably, the summary of activities compiled by the U.N. agencies in October 2005 (a so-called “Humanitarian who-where-what matrix”) did not report on any protection activities aside from those related to children and gender-based violence.162

Prevention of further evictions was one of the very few protection-related objectives mentioned in U.N. country team response plans. In October, representatives of the U.N. agencies and IOM acknowledged in interviews with Human Rights Watch that the evictions were still going on.163 However, it was not at all clear, what, if anything, U.N. agencies were doing in response.

Specifically, the U.N. country team failed to adequately respond to the above-described incident of forcible relocation of 252 displaced persons from Mbare. Although the U.N. country team requested information on the incident from the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, it did not take any action to advocate for the protection of the displaced or support the ZLHR’s. Since early October, when the ZLHR informed the country team of threat of the IDPs’ forcible relocation, the U.N. had a month-and-a-half to intervene on behalf of the displaced; however, a statement of protest came from the country team only after the government followed through with its threat and forcibly removed the displaced from the site.164

Testimonies of representatives of the U.N. and non-U.N. agencies indicated that they were well aware of the government’s persistent efforts to compel the relocation of the displaced to the rural areas, as well as the government’s strategy to ensure that assistance is only available to those who agree to move, and not to those who stay in the urban areas. However, in the six months after the evictions, the question of the government’s manipulation of international aid to facilitate involuntary relocation has not been raised by the U.N. country team as a protection issue. If any “quiet diplomacy” on the issue has occurred between U.N. representatives of the country team and government officials, it has clearly not yielded tangible results.

On the contrary, U.N. agencies, including the WFP, have continued to provide food packages to areas where assistance has been used as a means for involuntary relocation, as assistance to the IDPs who choose to stay in urban areas has not been permitted. Provision of one-time food supplies for families who agreed to relocate did not provide a long-term solution for their food needs, as no process was in place to track down their movement and ensure that they continue to receive food aid after the relocation. At the same time, it allowed the government to send a strong message to the IDPs that their refusal to move to rural areas would prevent them from receiving any food assistance whatsoever.

The numerous cases of police harassment of the internally displaced also triggered no reaction on the part of the U.N. country team, even when the country team members were directly informed of the incidents. For example, the earlier described case of several families from Mutare, whom local police had been forcing to leave their makeshift shelters by burning their possessions, remained overlooked by the U.N. country team. Although at its October 3, 2005, debriefing with the U.N. country team, Human Rights Watch drew the attention of the U.N. agencies to this particular incident. Nonetheless, by the time of this writing no representative from the country team has visited the area or arranged for any measures to be taken to protect the families.165

Problems with delivery of assistance

The deficiencies of planning and coordination within the U.N. country team combined with the lack of clarity regarding the scale of the displacement and specific needs of the IDPs made the implementation of the assistance program highly problematic.

In early July, during and immediately after the Special Envoy’s visit, international agencies distributed initial emergency assistance, such as food packages and blankets, to the internally displaced in some areas. Since then, however, the entire operation has been characterized by major disruptions, failures to secure access to the displaced population and a resultant inability to deliver vital assistance to the majority of the IDPs.

The failure of the assistance program was evident in all of the sites visited by Human Rights Watch and was further confirmed by numerous testimonies by the internally displaced persons, local authorities, NGOs and representatives of the U.N. agencies themselves.

In addition, the analysis of the October Humanitarian matrix against the objectives set out in the three-month Interim Response Plan also sheds light on the lack of progress of the humanitarian assistance operation.

Shelter

Six months into the crisis, international agencies have been unable to overcome the resistance of the government and provide temporary shelter to any of the people displaced by the evictions, leaving hundreds of thousands of the internally displaced in appalling conditions amidst the rainy season. U.N. officials suggested in interviews with Human Rights Watch that the major reasons for the Zimbabwean government emphatic opposition was related to the government’s fear that extensive tent camps throughout the country would reveal the true scale of the humanitarian crisis and that the availability of temporary shelter would allow the displaced to stay in cities instead of moving to the rural areas in accordance with the government’s plan. 

None of the shelter-related objectives set forth in July by the Interim Response Plan have been met by the U.N. country team or by the IOM, leading the U.N. team to conclude in September that of people displaced by the evictions, “the majority are still homeless in either a relative or absolute sense of the word.”166

On July 30, 2005, U.N. Habitat, UNDP, and IOM launched a “pilot project” in Headlands, Manicaland, providing “shelter packages,” including tents and food “to some 123 families.”167 UNICEF spokesman James Elder described the project as “a case of U.N. best practice, with all U.N. agencies and IOM pushing in the same direction under difficult circumstances to help the people of Zimbabwe.”168

The pilot project, however, did not last long—on September 28, 2005, an IOM representative told Human Rights Watch that the tents in Headlands “had been put down by the police,” and that the government “said ‘no’ to any tents or plastic sheeting.”169 The IOM representative interviewed by Human Rights Watch did not provide any details of the incident when asked about the project, but mentioned that the IOM “wrote a protest letter through the U.N. country team,” to which the government never responded.170

A new plan proposed by IOM to government suggested providing temporary shelter in the form of wooden cabins to the people who had been allocated stands by the government through Operation Garikai; 2,500 cabins were supposed to be built during the first phase of the program.171 Although the plan was devised to fully accommodate the requests of the Zimbabwean government rather than to effectively address the needs of the displaced population, it was not until mid-November that the government reportedly finally accepted the U.N. offer to build 2,500 “units” for people made homeless by the evictions campaign.172

However, given the realities of Operation Garikai described earlier in this report, the vast majority of the displaced are not likely to benefit from the plan. Moreover, formally, the proposed wooden cabins will be no more legal than houses destroyed during Operation Murambatsvina, as they would hardly conform with the existing housing regulations, and the beneficiaries may thus be still vulnerable to further evictions.173 Some U.N. officials also admitted to Human Rights Watch that “this will not be a comprehensive program at all.”174 Indeed, the 2,500 shelter units would at best accommodate a little over 10 percent of the “approximately 100,000 most vulnerable individuals” in need of shelter mentioned in the September Common Response Plan.

Food

In the vast majority of places visited by Human Rights Watch, internally displaced persons said that they had either received no food assistance whatsoever, or had received assistance once in July, and have received nothing since. Only in one of the townships in Harare, a local official told Human Rights Watch that Catholic Relief Services (CRS) had distributed food on a monthly basis from July to September. Yet, according to the official, when she asked CRS about further distributions in late September, she was informed that there was no food left and that from then on food packages would be provided only to families relocating to rural areas.175

A number of organizations involved in distributions as implementing partners to the U.N. agencies and IOM also confirmed the major disruptions in food distribution after July 2005.176 An IOM representative clarified that “two months ago [in August 2005] the Minister of Social Welfare requested that food distributions stop,” and the agency followed the order. According to the IOM representative, there was no further communication with the government on the issue of the suspension of food distribution.177 

A representative of another U.N. agency expressed hope that its general program of addressing food insecurity in Zimbabwe would also reach at least some of the people displaced by Operation Murambatsvina, yet admitted that the program does not specifically address the internally displaced as the government explicitly banned the agency from distributing food to the victims of evictions in urban areas. The agency’s plan conformed with the government’s preference and indeed did not contain any reference to the food needs of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the evictions.178

The U.N.’s own figures provide little clarity regarding the number of people who have thus far been reached with food assistance. The September Common Response Plan repeats word for word the goal set in the Interim Response Plan “to provide pulses and vegetable oil to some 27,000 households considered most food insecure as a result of the displacements,” providing no clarification as to whether the same item remained on the agenda because the designated beneficiaries had not been reached yet, or because the same number required continued assistance. The September Plan, however, accepts the government’s requirement that no food should be distributed specifically to the displaced, noting that “the targeting of the affected population will be within the wider context of national food insecurity.”179

The IOM, which has been the lead agency responsible for food distribution, provided Human Rights Watch with a datasheet which suggests that from June to September 2005, the food distribution program has reached 45,280 household, or 49 percent of households in need of assistance according to IOM’s estimates. The accuracy of the statistics is, however, questionable, as the monthly breakdown of figures does not make clear whether or not the same families receiving assistance on a monthly basis may have been counted several times in the calculation of the total, and the total number would thus refer to the number of packages distributed rather than families assisted.180

The October humanitarian response matrix does not add clarity to the matter, citing the above-mentioned IOM statistics. In addition, it mentions food assistance programs carried out by WFP, UNICEF and other organizations, but does not specify whether any of these programs have been reaching the population displaced by the evictions, and does not show whether the goals set by the Interim Response Plan have been met.

Health and sanitation

As described in the previous chapter, in areas visited by Human Rights Watch, no health facilities or arrangements for the provision of medical care were in place. Most of the IDPs interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported having health problems, resulting from their stay in the open as well as chronic life-threatening diseases. Not a single person in places visited by Human Rights Watch has received any medical assistance from any international organization. In all of the areas visited by Human Rights Watch, potable water has not been distributed to the internally displaced, and they had no access to sanitation facilities.

In most locations, the spread of diseases has been unavoidable, given the congestion of the population and the absence of sanitation, sewage systems, waste disposal facilities, and access to water or water purification equipment.

The U.N. country team documents designate World Health Organization (WHO) as the lead agency for delivery of health services, and UNICEF as responsible for water and sanitation. However, based on the documents, it is hard to determine whether any progress has been made inperceibve   [ ?] per the delivery of health services and sanitation to the displaced population. The Interim Response Plan contained no quantitative assessment of the health needs, listing instead only the intended activities, including “a rapid assessment to determine the health needs of the affected population” and stating that “an immediate response (6-8 weeks) will be arranged for.” Ironically, the September Common Response Plan once again repeated the same set of objectives, and again promises the “immediate (6-8 weeks) response,” containing no clarification as to what happened to the immediate response planned back in July.

The October humanitarian response matrix mentions one mobile clinic established by WHO “to benefit 1,000 in Hopley farm;” “mobile health services” provided by MFS-Holland in Chitungwiza, Epworth and Hatcliffe Extension (the number of beneficiaries is not specified); and 467 female beneficiaries who received reproductive health kits/sanitary wear provided by United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Human Right Watch observation regarding the lack of potable water are corroborated by the October humanitarian response matrix, which reports UNICEF delivering water and sanitation facilities only to Hopley farm and Hatcliffe Extension, thus making it clear that as of yet the provision of water and sanitation has been limited to these government-recognized IDP settlements, while vast majority of IDPs are being deprived of these services.

Advocating for the rights of the displaced

Five months into the crisis, despite the Zimbabwean government’s deliberate obstruction of humanitarian assistance, which effectively stalled U.N. activities and deprived the internally displaced of their basic rights, there has been very little public criticism by U.N. officials, in country or at headquarters, of  the government’s treatment of and violations of the rights of the displaced population.

The U.N. agencies involved in humanitarian response in Zimbabwe chose to avoid any public denunciation of the government’s overall detrimental role and specific abuses, claiming that quiet representations are more effective for achieving its operational goals.

As a result, the U.N. has not assumed the responsibility of being “an advocate for assistance and protection” and of impressing “upon authorities their primary responsibility for the protection of and assistance to” the internally displaced in conformity with international human rights and humanitarian law, as elaborated in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.”181

Though U.N. officials have legitimate concerns at the likely response of the government to public criticism, the U.N.’s unwillingness to publicly raise concerns about the government’s obstruction of its programs and to take a firm stand on protection issues also significantly undermined its credibility in the eyes of local NGOs and donors—two forces which could have become its main partners. Local NGOs, some of which were openly and actively criticizing the government, expressed feeling betrayed in their hopes to secure international support for their cause. For their part, donors started raising growing concerns regarding the U.N.’s ongoing negotiations with the government which “are driven predominantly by what was deemed to be acceptable to the government,” with the U.N. “failing to recognize the risks of this approach.”182

A comprehensive survey on the U.N. response to IDP crises in nine countries across the world undertaken several years ago by the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Brookings Institution-Johns Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement in fact concluded that situations “where access is denied and the displacement problem ignored or minimized… require exposure to public scrutiny and a more assertive response from U.N. agencies on the ground and from U.N. headquarters and the Security Council.”183

At the same time, the decision to keep quiet out of fear that access might be denied “is a trade-off which… serves only to favor the government concerned, enabling it to continue to evade public scrutiny and U.N. pressure or influence.”184 The survey also questioned the validity of concerns regarding possible expulsion of a U.N. team from the country in retaliation for its principled position, concluding that there have not been many examples in history where the U.N. teams were actually threatened with expulsion, let alone expelled, and that in fact some U.N. missions “may have exaggerated this risk to avoid raising the hard issues.”185

The conclusions seems to be particularly relevant for the situation in Zimbabwe, as the access of the country team to the population in need has already been limited to such an extent that the vast majority of the internally displaced are not being reached with basic forms of assistance, and under the present circumstances the country team seems to have little to loose.

As this report was being prepared for publication, a number of statements from senior U.N. officials and donor governments signaled the renewed attention of the international community to the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. Thus, on October 31, 2005, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his deep concern about the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe and the government’s refusal to cooperate with the U.N. agencies. Secretary-General Annan made  a “strong appeal to the government of Zimbabwe to ensure that those who are out in the open, without shelter and without means of sustaining their livelihoods, are provided with humanitarian assistance in collaboration with the United Nations and other aid agencies.”186 The Secretary-General’s appeal was supported by thirteen donor nations and the European Union.187

Zimbabwe state media responded indignantly to the appeal, accusing the U.N. Secretary-General of being a puppet in the hands of Western governments, and publishing an opprobrious cartoon to illustrate this point.188



[114] U.N. Press Release, “U.N. Representative Calls Zimbabwe Crisis Massive Internal Displacement,” July 29, 2005.

[115] U.N. Press Release, “U.N. Experts Deplore Zimbabwe's Campaign of Forced Eviction,” June 24, 2005.

[116] U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, “Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe”, p. 8.

[117] This responsibility was repeatedly emphasized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons and the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons. See e.g., “Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations,” Report of the Secretary-General to the 60th session of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/87–E/2005/78, June 23, 2005;  U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 60th session, provisional agenda item 14(c), Specific Groups and Individuals:  Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/77 (2004); U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 61st  session, provisional agenda item 14(c), Specific Groups and Individuals:  Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2004/55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/84 (2005). The Report by Francis Deng states, inter alia:

[W]here the needs of sizeable populations over whom sovereignty is exercised are unmet and large numbers of people suffer extreme deprivation and are threatened with death, the international community, itself obligated by humanitarian and human rights principles, cannot be expected to stand by and watch passively.

The responsibility is also reaffirmed by the Humanitarian Charter and SPHERE standards to which the U.N. country team in Zimbabwe itself repeatedly refers in its program documents, including in the Interim United Nations Multi Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe, July 15, 2005, Harare. See Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Geneva: The Sphere Project, 2004), Common Standard 3. The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response have been developed by humanitarian NGOs and Red Cross and Red Crescent movement as an operational framework for accountability in disaster assistance efforts. Humanitarian Charter is based on the principles and provisions of international humanitarian law, international human rights law, refugee law and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.

[118] U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, “Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe”, p. 67.

[119] “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe,” Harare, July 15, 2005; United Nations Country Team Zimbabwe, “Common Response Plan for the Needs of Vulnerable Persons Affected by “Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order: September to December 2005,” Harare, September 5, 2005. The plans mention the following agencies as participants in the response program: International Organization on Migration (IOM), World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Health Organization (WHO), International Labor Organization (ILO) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

[120] See, e.g., “Protect or Neglect? Toward a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and the U.N. office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division, November 23, 2004.

[121] The Interim Plan emphasizes the need for “assessing” cases of abuse and for continuing a “dialogue with the government on protection issues, to ensure better access to affected children and for the immediate release of children who have been detained during this operation.” The section of the Common Response Plan entitled “Protection needs of the displaced population” also addresses the protection of women and children from violence, yet does not mention any other groups or protection issues. A table of activities and responsible agencies attached to the Common Response Plan also designates Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator as an authority responsible for “protection of vulnerable men, women and children” as well as “protection advocacy,” and specifies the amount of funds required for these activities, yet the substance of these activities is not described anywhere in the plan. See “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe;” United Nations Country Team Zimbabwe, “Common Response Plan for the Needs of Vulnerable Persons Affected by ‘Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order.’”

[122] U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, “Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe”.

[123] “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe,” Harare, July 15, 2005; United Nations Country Team Zimbabwe.

[124] “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe,” Harare, July 15, 2005; United Nations Country Team Zimbabwe.

[125] U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, “Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe”.

[126] Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, (New York: December 1999). The IASC policy paper contains detailed guidelines for building “protective environment” and integrating “protection features into operational response and remedial action.” It underlines the importance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as a basis for conceptualizing and implementing an effective protection strategy.

[127] Ibid. The paper adopts the definition used in 1999 Workshop of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Protection, see International Committee of Red Cross, “Third Workshop on Protection”, Background paper, January 7, 1999.

[128] U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 61st  sess., provisional agenda item 14(c), Specific Groups and Individuals:  Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2004/55, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/84 (2005).

[129] The collaborative approach was initially outlined in 1999 and further reaffirmed by the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). See Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, (New York: December 1999); Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “Supplementary Guidance to Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators on their Responsibilities in Relation to IDPs,” April 5, 2000; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations Of Internal Displacement: Guidance for United Nations Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams (Geneva: 2004). The Inter-Agency Standing Committee was established in June 1992 in response to General Assembly Resolution 46/182 that called for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance. The primary role of the IASC is to formulate humanitarian policy to ensure coordinated and effective humanitarian response to both complex emergency and to natural disasters.

[130] Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations Of Internal Displacement: Guidance for United Nations Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams (Geneva: 2004), p. 7-8.

[131] For a detailed discussion of Human Rights Watch concerns regarding IOM’s field operations see: “The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Human Rights Protection in the Field: Current Concerns,” Human Rights Watch submission to the IOM Governing Council Meeting, 86th Session, November 18-21, 2003, Geneva.

[132] See e.g., “UNICEF Calls for Donor Support to Assist Thousands Displaced by Forced Evictions,” UNICEF press release, July 1, 2005, [online] at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_27559.html (retrieved November 10, 2005); “In Wake of Zimbabwe Demolitions, UNICEF Calls for Global Support to Alleviate Crisis Facing Children,” UNICEF press-release, July 26, 2005, [online] at http://www.unicef.org/media/media_27773.html (retrieved November 10, 2005).

[133] Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives of the U.N. country team, September 28, 2005, Harare; October 3, 2005, Harare; phone interview October 23, 2005.

[134] The Special Envoy reported that “the Government has, on several occasions, prevented humanitarian actors from providing shelter and basic services to the displaced population, particularly near the demolition sites, even though many of the affected persons remain without any form of shelter or ready means of sustenance. It has also impeded data collection.” See United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT), Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka

[135] “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe.”

[136] United Nations Country Team Zimbabwe, “Common Response Plan for the Needs of Vulnerable Persons Affected by “Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order: September to December 2005.”

[137] See, for example, statements by Deputy Information and Publicity Minister Bright Matonga and by Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, cited in: “Zimbabwe: Government Refuses to Endorse Emergency Appeal,” IRINnews, August 29, 2005, [online] at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48804&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ZIMBABWE (retrieved November 22, 2005).

[138] Human Rights Watch phone interview with a U.N. official, October 23, 2005.

[139] U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, “Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe“, p.51-53.

[140] Human Rights Watch interviews with members of the U.N. country team in Zimbabwe, September 29-October 3, 2005, Harare.

[141] “Interim United Nations Multi-Sectoral Response Plan to the Recent Evictions in Zimbabwe.”

[142] United Nations Country Team Zimbabwe, “Common Response Plan for the Needs of Vulnerable Persons Affected by Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order: September to December 2005.”

[143] IOM shared with Human Rights Watch a print out of the figures related to the organization’s assistance program; the cited figure is listed under the section “Households Affected by “Operation Restore Order” in Zimbabwe, Summarized by Province.” The document is on file with Human Rights Watch.

[144] ActionAid International Southern Africa Partnership Program, “The Impact of ‘Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order’ in Zimbabwe,” August 2005.

[145] “In Wake of Zimbabwe Demolitions, UNICEF Calls for Global Support to Alleviate Crisis Facing Children,” UNICEF press-release, July 26, 2005, [online] at http://www.unicef.org/media/media_27773.html (retrieved November 10, 2005).

[146] In relation to IDPs, UNDP has repeatedly emphasized the importance of developing better information systems for assessment and registration of IDP number and needs which form “the foundation for coherently shaping comprehensive programs from the activities of different agencies.” See "Further Elaboration on Follow-up to Economic and Social Council Resolution 1995/56: Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance," U.N. Doc. DP/1997/CRP.10, February 28, 1997, para. 18.

[147] Human Rights Watch interview with representatives of a local NGO, September 30, 2005, Harare.

[148] Human Rights Watch interview, September 28, 2005, Harare.

[149] Human Rights Watch interviews with the internally displaced persons in several townships in Victoria Falls, September 26-27, 2005.

[150] Human Rights Watch interview with local authorities, September 26, 2005, Victoria Falls.

[151] ActionAid International Southern Africa Partnership Program, “The Impact of ‘Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order’ in Zimbabwe,” August 2005.

[152] Human Rights Watch interview with a U.N. official, September 28, 2005, Harare.

[153] In some areas, such as Victoria Falls, international organizations through their implementing partners have provided a one-time food package to families who agreed to relocate to the rural areas, however they did not collect any information that would allow to track down and assist these families after relocation.

[154] The IASC policy paper reaffirms this important function served by field presence and monitoring. See “Protection of Internally Displaced Persons”, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper.

[155] Human Rights Watch meeting with the U.N. country team members, October 3, 2005.

[156] Humanitarian Charter contains a comprehensive list of suggested primary and secondary sources that can be used in the process of assessment of humanitarian needs. A comprehensive guidance on the matter is also provided in: J. Telford, Good Practice Review 5: Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives, (London: Relief and Rehabilitation Network/Overseas Development Institute, 1997)

[157] Human Rights Watch interview, September 29, 2005, Harare.

[158] Human Rights Watch interview with members of the U.N. country team, October 6, 2005, Harare.

[159] Human Rights Watch interview, September 30, 2005, Harare.

[160] Human Rights Watch interview with a representative of an international NGO, October 6, 2005, Harare.

[161] Human Rights Watch interview with a representative of an international NGO, October 6, 2005, Harare.

[162] It is unclear to what extent the protection activities mentioned in the October matrix have indeed been implemented. For example, the matrix mentions that UNICEF is “reaching to 334 children with disabilities and their caregivers.” At the same time, Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives of the group corroborated by a testimony from a U.N official suggest that in fact UNICEF referred the group of families with disabled children to another organization, Christian Care, and so far no assistance has been provided to the families.

[163] Human Rights Watch interview with an IOM representative, Harare, September 28, 2005.

[164] According to media reports on November 16, the top U.N. official in Zimbabwe, Agostinho Zacarias, sent a protest note to the Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry expressing his “deep concern” over the new evictions, which he said "make it hard for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the affected populations." See Stella Mapenzauswa and MacDonald Dzirutwe, “Update 2-Rights Groups Petition Africa over Zimbabwe,” Reuters, November 16, 2005.

[165] A local official contacted Human Rights Watch to report that the situation on the ground has not changed and nobody visited the families.

[166] “Common Response Plan for the Needs of Vulnerable Persons Affected by Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order: September to December 2005,” Harare, September 5, 2005.

[167] IOM Harare newsletter, No 2, September, 2005; “Zimbabwe: Pilot project provides shelter to cleanup victims,” IRINnews, August 17, 2005, [online] at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48627 (retrieved October 23, 2005).

[168] Cited in: “Zimbabwe: Pilot project provides shelter to cleanup victims,” IRINnews, August 17, 2005, [online] at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48627 (retrieved October 23, 2005).

[169] Human Rights Watch interview with an IOM representative, September 28, 2005, Harare. The IOM September newsletter, which described the pilot project at length, also contained a tiny footnote saying that “reports from the field indicate that the Headlands pilot project has been suspended.” See IOM Harare newsletter, No 2, September, 2005.

[170] Human Rights Watch interview with an IOM representative, September 28, 2005, Harare.

[171] Human Rights Watch interview with an IOM representative, September 28, 2005, Harare.

[172] “Zimbabwe Agrees to U.N. Aid for Demolition Victims,” Mail and Guardian, November 16, 2005.

[173] The U.N. Special Envoy, who witnessed the launch of Operation Garikai, also questioned in her report the “sustainability of this intervention in terms of security of tenure,” and repeatedly emphasized that any assistance with shelter on the plots allocated through Operation Garikai would be meaningful only if the program also addresses the security of tenure and is combined with “a relaxation of the provisions of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act to enable affected households to gradually rebuild their homes.” See U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe, “Report of the Fact-Finding Missions to Zimbabwe”.

[174] Human Rights Watch interview with a representative of a U.N. agency involved in humanitarian response in Zimbabwe, September 28, 2005.

[175] Human Rights Watch interview, September 30, 2005, Harare.

[176] Human Rights Watch interview, September 26, 2005, Victoria Falls.

[177] Remarks by an IOM representative at the Human Rights Watch meeting with international agencies involved in humanitarian response in Zimbabwe, October 3, 2005, Harare.

[178] Human Rights Watch interview with a U.N. official, September 28, 2005.

[179] “Common Response Plan for the Needs of Vulnerable Persons Affected by “Operation Murambatsvina/ Restore Order: September to December 2005,” Harare, September 5, 2005.

[180] One of the IOM representatives admitted to Human Rights Watch that this flaw in the IOM datasheet “is possible.” Another representative, in a separate interview, denied that this might be the case, claiming that each household had only been counted once in the collection of the data. If this is true, however, it is impossible to tell from the IOM statistics whether any of the families who had received assistance in June or July continued to receive it in the following months. Human Rights Watch interviews with representatives of the IOM, Harare, September 28 and October 6, 2005.

[181] See “Protection of Internally Displaced Persons”, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, (New York: December 1999); Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “Supplementary Guidance to Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators on their Responsibilities in Relation to IDPs,” April 5, 2000.

[182] Human Rights Watch interview, September 28, 205, Harare. 

[183] “Protect or Neglect? Toward a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and the U.N. office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division, November 23, 2004.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Ibid.

[186] “Annan ‘Concerned’ with Government Refusal of Aid,” IRINnews, November 1, 2005, [online] at http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49892&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ZIMBABWE (retrieved November 11, 2005).

[187] “13 Donor Nations Appeal to Government ‘To Ensure That Those Who Are Out in the Open, without Shelter, Are Provided with Humanitarian Assistance,’” VOA news, November 4, 2005.

[188] The cartoon portrayed Annan as a puppet being asked by Prime Minister Tony Blair to repeat after him, “We are deeply concerned with the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe." See “Zimbabwe Media Says Prince Charles Lobbied U.N.” Reuters, November 4, 2005.


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