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The Human Rights Context of the Andijan Events

President Karimov has presided over an increasingly restrictive and abusive government.  Authorities tightly control the population and harshly punish dissent.  The government’s campaign to arrest so-called Islamic fundamentalists, which the government considers an important counterterrorism measure, has resulted in wide-spread persecution of religious and secular dissidents.  Cities in the Fergana Valley, including Andijan, have been particularly hard-hit by government repression.  Worsening economic conditions throughout the country have further exacerbated people’s suffering and discontent.

Terrorism and Political Violence in Uzbekistan

The Uzbek government has placed the Andijan events in the framework of terrorism and has argued that its perpetrators were terrorists with an Islamic “fundamentalist” agenda. Human Rights Watch research found no evidence to support the notion that the attackers who seized the prison and government buildings or the protesters on Bobur Square were in any way motivated by an Islamist agenda.

This does not minimize the acts of terrorism and political violence Uzbekistan has endured in recent years. In 1999, bombings of government buildings in Tashkent killed more than a dozen people and wounded many others; the government blamed the bombings on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), independent Muslim leaders, and members of the secular political opposition. The country also faced incursions in 1999 and 2000 by the IMU, an armed group that had been based in Afghanistan (and at times in Tajikistan), that had links with the Taliban, and was routed with it in 2001 by U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan. The IMU has been designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization.  

In late March and early April 2004, a series of explosions directed against police officers in Tashkent and Bukhara, combined with shoot-outs between gunmen and police, resulted in the death of forty-seven people. Four of the dead were innocent bystanders, ten were police officers, and the rest were perpetrators, most of whom were killed either in shoot-outs or in an explosion in a house that the government has said was used to make bombs. The government accused Hizb ut-Tahrir (see below), of orchestrating the violence.

On July 30, 2004, bombs exploded near the U.S. and Israeli embassies and the General Prosecutor’s office in Tashkent, killing four police and security officials, as well as the suicide bombers.

Uzbekistan’s Human Rights Record

Civic freedoms

Uzbekistan has faced growing public criticism over its dismal human rights record that is long-standing and well-documented, with major violations of the rights to freedom of religion, expression, association, and assembly.158 In response to such pressure, the government has made some incremental reforms in legislation, for instance in torture reform, but these have not been implemented in practice or translated into more systemic change. Moreover, they have been undermined by other setbacks to human rights, particularly the deepening of restrictions on civil society the government imposed following public uprisings in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004).

The government of Uzbekistan exercises tight control over most aspects of public life and imposes restrictions on all avenues of peaceful civic participation. It has a long record of formal and informal censorship of the media, intimidating independent civil society activists, severely restricting public demonstrations, and banning political parties that are not loyal to the government. These restrictions violate fundamental rights and stifle peaceful outlets for citizens’ expression and participation, essential to accountable government and the rule of law.

The government has refused to register all genuine opposition political parties and elections are empty exercises. Although five registered political parties participated in Uzbekistan’s December 2004 parliamentary elections, all of them publicly supported the policies of the president and current administration, offering voters no real choice.159 The government formally lifted pre-publication censorship in 2002, but continues to exercise control over media to restrict critical content. No independent media operate in Uzbekistan, and editors and journalists practice self-censorship. The government still restricts undesirable content through intimidation and by bringing arbitrary lawsuits against journalists, editors, and media outlets for criminal libel, or purported violations of tax and registration regulations.160

Following the popular uprising in Georgia, the environment for Uzbekistan’s nascent civil society has grown increasingly hostile, as the government tightened restrictions on local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), harassed and arbitrarily detained human rights defenders, broke up peaceful demonstrations, and tightened restrictions on international NGOs.161

The government for the first time registered an independent local human rights organization in 2002, and registered another in 2003. The authorities have included some human rights defenders in roundtable events with government officials but at the same time steadfastly refuse to allow independent domestic human rights groups to register, restricting their operation and rendering them vulnerable to harassment and abuse, including physical assault, arbitrary detention and house arrest. Uzbek authorities have harassed, detained or held under effective house arrest activists who attempt to stage demonstrations.

Since the May 13 killings in Andijan the authorities have arrested at least five human rights defenders in connection with the Andijan events and have harassed and intimidated others. Saidjahon Zainabitdinov, chair of the group “Appeliatsia,” was arrested on May 21 and has reportedly been charged with inciting the May 13 demonstration through an article he published on the Internet.162 Zainabitdinov had spoken out about the killings on May 13 to the press and was cited by foreign news outlets. On May 23, Sobitkhon Uztabaev was arrested in Namangan, after he announced a hunger strike to protest the May 13 killings. And on May 28, Mukhammadqodir Otakhonov, Dilmurod Muhiddinov, and Musazhon Bobozhonov, all from the Andijan branch of the human rights group Ezgulik, were arrested. The men are being charged under article 244-1 of the criminal code (“preparing or distributing materials that threaten public safety and order”).163

Also, authorities in Tashkent and Jizzakh, in central Uzbekistan, have harassed and intimidated human rights defenders, warning them not to plan or participate in public protests.


Uzbekistan has no independent judiciary and torture is widespread in pre-trial detention and post-conviction facilities. Prison conditions are atrocious. In 2003, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven, called the use of torture “systematic” in Uzbekistan.164 Torture and ill-treatment remain pervasive throughout the Uzbek criminal justice system, and occur with near-total impunity.  Although the government claims to have increased prosecutions of law enforcement officials for using torture and other illegal methods, no information about these convictions has been made available, despite requests, rendering them impossible to verify. Countless reports of torture remain without remedy; legal safeguards against torture that have been introduced are rarely implemented in practice, despite persistent recommendations to that effect by international monitoring bodies. For example, judges routinely admit confessions as evidence even when defendants allege that the confessions were coerced or obtained under torture or mistreatment, despite rules that prohibit the admission of any evidence gained through the use of torture.

Religious Persecution

The arrest and trial of the twenty-three businessmen on charges of “religious fundamentalism,” which set off events off the events of May 13, should be seen in a much broader context. Throughout the past ten years, the Uzbek government has imprisoned as many as 7,000 people on charges of religious “extremism” or “attempt to overthrow the constitutional system.” The government first justified this tight control over religion as necessary in defense of a secular state, and then, in the late 1990’s, as necessary to the fight against terrorism. However, the targets of the campaign are nonviolent believers who preach or study Islam outside official institutions and guidelines. 

The government repression that has attended this campaign against independent Muslims—those who practice their faith independent of government-sanctioned mosques and other government religious institutions—has included illegal arrest and torture, sometimes resulting in death.  The accused have faced unfair trials and lengthy terms in prison under inhumane conditions.  Family members of those targeted have also been detained, tortured, threatened, and stigmatized. 

Arrests of independent Muslims have occurred nationwide, but the overwhelming majority have taken place in Uzbekistan’s capital, Tashkent, and the Fergana Valley cities of Andijan and Namangan.165

Over the years, the scope of the campaign has been expanded from a focus on independent-minded and popular spiritual leaders to anyone in the religious community who expresses dissent with the policies of the Karimov government. 

Religious activity deemed deviant by the state has included studying Arabic in order to read the Koran in its original language, sticking strictly to the observance of the five daily prayers, or appearing in public dressed in a way that suggested piety, i.e. wearing conservative  Islamic dress. Refusal to praise the president and his policies during religious services or expression of a desire for a state governed by Islamic law has been treated as anti-state activity. In fact, the government views as an affront to its power any display of loyalty not directly associated with the state. This includes visits to the homes of local religious teachers, attendance at mosques not registered with the state, and most importantly the placement of loyalty to Islam before loyalty to the country’s political leaders. Imams who have become popular and developed a regular following or who refuse to serve as informants for the state security agents are similarly seen as unacceptably insolent.  The Uzbek government has labeled these independent Muslims “Wahhabis” to denote “Islamic fundamentalism” and as a slur.166

In addition to so-called Wahhabis, at least half of those arrested on religion-related charges have been members of the group Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). Hizb ut-Tahrir members form a distinct segment of the independent Muslim population by virtue of their affiliation with a separate and defined Islamic group with its own principles, structure, activities, and religious texts. Hizb ut-Tahrir is an unregistered—effectively, banned—organization in Uzbekistan. The group is an international Islamic organization with branches in many parts of the world, including the Middle East and Europe. Hizb ut-Tahrir propagates a particular vision of an Islamic state. Its aims are restoration of the Caliphate, or Islamic rule, in Central Asia and other traditionally Muslim lands, and the practice of Islamic piety, as the group interprets it, (e.g., praying five times daily, shunning alcohol and tobacco, and, for women, wearing clothing that covers the body and sometimes the face). Hizb ut-Tahrir renounces violence as a means to achieve reestablishment of the Caliphate. However, it does not reject the use of violence during armed conflicts already under way and in which the group regards Muslims as struggling against oppressors, such as Palestinian violence against Israeli occupation. Its literature denounces secularism and Western-style democracy. Its anti-Semitic and anti-Israel167 statements have led the government of Germany to ban it.168 The government of Russia has also banned the group, classifying it as a terrorist organization.169


The twenty-three businessmen whose arrests sparked the protests and subsequent killings in Andijan were accused of being followers of “Akramia,” which refers to the religious teachings of Akram Yuldashev, a former mathematics teacher from Andijan. In 1992, Yuldashev wrote a religious pamphlet entitled Yimonga Yul (“Path to Faith”), consisting of twelve lessons on the path to faith which analyze thought and logic in Islam.170

Yuldashev was arrested on drug charges in 1998 and sentenced to two and a half years in prison. He was released under a presidential amnesty in December of the same year but re-arrested the day after the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent. He was sentenced to seventeen years of imprisonment, having been found guilty of being a main organizer of the bombings and of forming an extremist religious organization whose aim was the overthrow of the secular Uzbek government and the establishment of an Islamic state. Around the time of his trial the State Committee on Religious Affairs banned Yuldashev’s pamphlet as “extremist,” and the court that sentenced Yuldashev found his writings to advocate the overthrow of the Uzbek government.171

The government alleges that Akramia is an extremist religious group related to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Yuldashev did join Hizb ut-Tahrir in 1986, but left the group in 1988.

While some claim that Akramia is a group entirely of the government’s invention, a pro-government scholar insists that Akramia is a group intent on establishing an Islamic state and allows the use of alcohol and drugs to entice new members.172 Independent writers who have examined Yuldashev’s text find little in it to support the government’s view, finding Yuldashev’s tract a logical examination of Muslim spiritual values devoid of political content entirely.173

Significance of the Fergana Valley

Due to its history, location and demographics, the Fergana Valley occupies a special place in Uzbek politics.  The valley cuts a path through the three neighboring states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  Areas on the Uzbekistan side are densely populated—Andijan province accounts for about 7 percent of Uzbekistan’s population—and impoverished (see below).174  The area’s residents are perceived as being especially devout Muslims and socially conservative. 

The Fergana Valley handed President Karimov a major political challenge in the first days of Uzbekistan’s independence from the Soviet Union.  In December 1991, residents demanding reforms in the Fergana Valley city of Namangan took over a government building.  Karimov traveled to Namangan to address the large group of protesters, but was met with jeers and derision and was openly challenged by a young and charismatic political opposition leader, Tohir Yuldash.  Karimov was silenced by the crowds’ shouts and consigned to crouching on the stage as Yuldash and others articulated their demands, including for application of Shari’a (Islamic law) as the law of the land.  Karimov left Namangan humiliated, but exacted his revenge, as those involved in the rally were arrested or forced to flee the ensuing government crackdown.

Yuldash fled the country and went on to form the IMU along with another Fergana Valley native, Jumaboi Khajiev (aka Juma Namangani).  Namangani was presumed killed when U.S. bombing operations in Afghanistan destroyed the group’s camps in 2001.  Yuldash is believed to have survived. 

In addition to being a site of political crackdown, the Fergana Valley has been a focal point of the Karimov government’s multi-year campaign against independent Islam.   Along with Namangan and the capital, Tashkent, Andijan has been particularly hard-hit by government repression.  The “disappearance” of Andijan’s most famous imam in 1995 was in fact the first major indication of the government’s increasing hostility toward independent Islam.175 Sheikh Abduvali Mirzoev, head of the Jo’mi (Friday) mosque in Andijan, was extremely popular in Andijan province and with the independent-minded Muslim community throughout Uzbekistan.  In the years that followed his “disappearance,” government antagonism for independent Islam deepened and the list of “suspects” grew.  Andijan, home to numerous Muslims who practice their faith outside state controls, saw estimated hundreds and possibly thousands of its residents caught in the crackdown. 

Economic Background

Uzbekistan’s underdeveloped economy remains heavily agricultural176 and also relies on the export of primary commodities, including cotton and gold.177 The growth rate lags behind nearly all of the countries of the former Soviet Union.178 Limited industrialization has produced no significant positive impact on the economy, owing to low production capacity of most industries.179 The incomes, living standards, and health status of the population have improved little since the early 1990s.180    

Although the official unemployment rate is recorded as less than 1 percent, hidden and informal unemployment and underemployment are serious problems.181  Unemployment and underemployment are particularly significant in rural areas, where more than 60 percent of the population lives. 182  Furthermore, even full employment does not protect from poverty, due to low wages and wage arrears.183 Some 28 percent of the population is poor and approximately 1/3 of all poor households can be considered extremely.184  People living in rural areas suffer disproportionately: the poverty rate in rural areas is estimated at 30.5 percent compared to 22.5 percent in urban areas.185  Poverty in the Fergana Valley economic area is recorded at 30.3 percent—the second highest rate among all economic regions in Uzbekistan.186  In the densely-populated Andijan province, which accounts for 8.9 percent of the total population of Uzbekistan, the incidence of poverty is 31.8 percent and the incidence of extreme poverty 9.1 percent.187 

As a result of the limited economic opportunities and real problem of poverty, many Uzbeks have turned to shuttle trading and work in local bazaars as some of the only options for generating income. However, since June 2002, the government has imposed numerous restrictive regulations on traders’ activities, including high tariffs on imported goods, restrictions on border crossings, and requirements for traders to obtain licenses, register with various government agencies, and deposit all revenue in bank accounts why?.188  Tax inspectors and police often have enforced these regulations aggressively.  Countless traders have been forced out of business.  Government policies in the agricultural sector have been similarly damaging to individual livelihoods, as authorities pay below market rates for crops or impose quotas and confiscate land for failure to meet expected production levels.189 

In recent years, both farmers and traders in many regions of Uzbekistan have organized small protests over economic conditions and restrictive government policies.  In Andijan province, traders participated in several protests in the months prior to the May 13 uprising.  In early September 2004, traders of imported goods at the Kholis market and in the vicinity of the city's Central Department Store were forced to stop selling as a result of new government resolutions requiring individual registration. On September 7, a group of nearly 500 women halted traffic on a major street in protest.  A few days later, the government began demolishing trading booths, leading to more demonstrations that continued for several days.190  In January 2005, a group of traders gathered near a district administration building in Andijan province to protest interference by the tax authorities.191

Risks of Future Violence and Instability

According to foreign journalists and local activists in Tashkent, the official version of events in Andijan offered by the Karimov government has been met with extreme skepticism by the general population. This, on top of years of government repression, corruption, and a deteriorating standard of living, has the potential to create further popular discontent and unrest. There are no indications that the government would respond to future protests or other dissident activities with greater restraint than practiced in Andijan. The risk of additional violence, including use of excessive force by law enforcement agencies, is therefore acute. The possibility that such unrest would result in mass refugee flows to neighboring states and regional instability also remains of concern. As noted above, a government crackdown on human rights defenders and other perceived critics is already underway and there is a real threat that further restrictions will be placed on the population as a whole.

[158] See for example, Human Rights Watch, “Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Uzbekistan,” Human Rights Watch briefing paper May 1, 2003. Available at: “Uzbekistan and the EBRD: Progress Report on the Human Rights Benchmarks”, Human Rights Watch briefing paper March 23, 2004. Available at “Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 46, February 18, 2003. Available at: “Uzbekistan 2004 Report,” Amnesty International, January 2004. Available at:  “The Worst of the Worst: the World’s Most Repressive Societies 2005,” Freedom House, Special Report to the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva. Available at:

[159] Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), “Republic of Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Report.” Available at:

[160] For example, on April 13, 2005, authorities in Tashkent arrested Sobirjon Yaqubov, a journalist for the newspaper Hurriyat; he is being charged with attempting to overthrow the constitutional system of Uzbekistan (article 159 of the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan), on what appear to be politically motivated grounds. On April 23, Ulugbek Haidarov,a  journalist for IWPR was beaten by unknown assailants while waiting at a bus stop in Jizzakh, suffering a broken arm. According to Haidarov, the assailants yelled “we’ll teach you how to write,” suggesting that he was targeted for his articles critical of the local government.

[161] Human Rights Watch, World Report: Events of 2004. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005), p.446-451.

[162] The internet article was a rebuttal of an article in another outlet calling Akramists terrorists. A copy of the article is on file with Human Rights Watch.

[163] “Aresty Pravozashitnikov v Andizhane Prodolzhaiutsia” (Arrests of human rights activists in Andijan are going on”), Ezgulik report, May 29, 2005 [online], (retrieved May 31, 2005).

[164] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2002/38, Mission to Uzbekistan, February 3, 2003. E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2. Available from:$FILE/G0310766.pdf.  

[165] The overwhelming majority of cases documented by Human Rights Watch and the Russian rights group Memorial involved the arrest of people from these regions. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Zokirjon Almatov, head of the agency responsible for carrying out many of the arrests, acknowledged this regional targeting. Speaking of “criminals” acting under the influence of “extremist religious groups” the minister said, “Investigations have shown that those who have committed crimes are mainly citizens who live in Tashkent, Andijan, and Namangan regions.” Uzbek Radio first programme, January 27, 2000, English translation in BBC Monitoring, January 27, 2000.

[166] The “Wahhabi” label has also been used in other parts of the former Soviet Union as short-hand for militant. According to Central Asia scholar Mehrdad Haghayeghi, the term was first used by the Soviets to refer to “fundamentalist” Muslims in general during the 1980s. Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, p. 227, note 55. In the Tajik civil war, fighters seeking to overthrow the government were nicknamed “vofchiki,” a diminutive form of “Vahabit,” or “Wahhabi.”

[167] Hizb ut-Tahrir materials often denounce Israeli occupation of Palestine and Israeli conduct in the conflict there.

[168] The German Ministry of the Interior issued a statement on January 15, 2003 announcing that Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in the country. The ministry statement cited as grounds for the decision, paragraphs 3, 14, 15, and 18 of the German Vereinsgesetz (congregation laws). German Minister of the Interior Otto Schilly said that, “Hizb ut-Tahrir abuses the democratic system to propagate violence and disseminate anti-Semitic hate-speeches. The organization wants to sow hatred and violence.” He also stated that, “The organization supports violence as a means to realize political goals. Hizb ut-Tahrir denies Israel’s right to exist and calls for its destruction. The organization further spreads massively anti-Semitic propaganda and calls for killing Jews.” See also, Peter Finn, “Germany Bans Islamic Group; Recruitment of Youths Worried Officials,” The Washington Post, January 16, 2003. That article states that German officials accused Hizb ut-Tahrir of spreading “violent anti-Semitism” and establishing contacts with neo-Nazis. In April, German police searched the homes of more than eighty people suspected of supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir. No arrests were made. See, Associated Press, “Germany stages new raids against banned Islamic organization,” April 11, 2003.

[169] On February 14, 2003, Russia’s Supreme Court, acting on a recommendation from the Office of the Prosecutor General, designated Hizb ut-Tahrir a terrorist organization. According to a press statement released by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 9, 2003, “The main criteria for the inclusion of organizations in the list of terrorist outfits were: the carrying out of activities aimed at a forcible change of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation; ties with illegal armed bands, as well as with radical Islamic structures operating on the territory of the North Caucasus region, and ties with or membership of organizations deemed by the international community terrorist organizations.” “On the Detention of Members of the Terrorist Organization ‘Islamic Liberation Party’ (‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami’),” Publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, June 9, 2003, from the Daily News Bulletin, posted June 11, 2003.

[170] “Uzbekistan: Islamic Charitable Work “Criminal” and “Extremist?,” Igor Rotar, Forum 18 News Service, February 14, 2005. Available from .

[171] Ibid and “Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising,” p. 2. International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 38, May 25, 2005. Available from; and  “Akramia: Mif i destvitel’nost’,” (Akramia: Myth and Reality), Saidjahon Zainabitdinov, August 25, 2004. Available from:

[172] Ibid.

[173] “Akramia: Mif i destvitel’nost’,” (Akramia: Myth and Reality), Saidjahon Zainabitdinov, August 25, 2004. Available from:

[174] The population is 1,899,000. Information provided by the Andijan Hokimiat, at (accessed May 29, 2005)

[175] Human Rights Watch, Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan, March 2004, p. 23.

175 (retrieved May 24, 2005).

[177] Cotton accounts for approximately 41.5 percent of exports, gold 9.6 percent and energy products 9.6 percent. United States Central Intelligence Agency Factbook [online] (retrieved May 25, 2005).

[178] Only Moldova ranked lower. Furthermore, growth has not generated sufficient employment opportunities or generated substantially improved incomes of the population. World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, May 2003, pp. 3-5. 

[179] In fact, UNDP notes that “the direct overall effect of industrialization may have been a negative one as far as living standards were concerned” due to resource extraction from the agricultural sector and protectionist government policies. UNDP, Common Country Assessment 2003, p. 15.

[180] World Bank, Republic of Uzbekistan Country Economic Memorandum, April 30, 2003, p. 4.  UNDP notes that immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, health status declined dramatically, but has recovered to 1990 levels.  Pressing health problems include currently high-rates of infectious and non-infectious diseases and poor nutrition, particularly among children and women. UNDP, Common Country Assessment 2003, p. 25.

[181] The official unemployment rate is .4 percent.  The World Bank estimates that this number is extremely low owing to poor incentives to register as unemployed. World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, p. 25. Using International Labor Organization standards, the IMF estimated unemployment for 2003 to be 3.6 percent.

[182] World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, p. 64.

[183] Fifty percent of the poor are families in which the head of household is employed. IMF, Republic of Uzbekistan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 5.  Wage inequality between agricultural workers and all other workers has increased, despite the fact that agricultural productivity growth has been higher than that in industry. And, wage arrears are common, in particular in the agricultural sector. World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, p. 31.

[184] World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, p. 10.

[185] IMF, Republic of Uzbekistan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 5.  According to the World Bank, rural populations are 35 percent more likely to be poor and 58 percent more likely to be extremely poor. Approximately 4.5 million people, or 70 percent of Uzbekistan’s poor, live in rural areas.  World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, p. 11.

[186] IMF, Republic of Uzbekistan: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, p. 4.

[187] World Bank, Living Standards Assessment, p. 12.

[188] Galima Bukharbaeva, “Uzbek Authorities Mount Witchhunt after Unrest,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 9, 2004 [online] (Retrieved May 24, 2005).  See also, inter alia, Decree 387 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, August 12, 2004 and Decree 413 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, September 2, 2004.

[189] Yevgeny Zavyalov and Galima Bukharbaeva, “Angry Uzbek Farmers Force Official Climbdown,” Institute of War and Peace Reporting, April 5, 2005 [online] (retrieved May 24, 2005).

[190] Daniel Kimmage, “Analysis: Taking to the Streets in Uzbekistan,” RFE/RL, September 28, 2004 [online] (retrieved May 24, 2005).

[191] International Crisis Group, “Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising,” Crisis Group Asia Briefing No 38, May 25, 2005, p. 11.

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