Smoke and Mirrors
Colombia’s demobilization of paramilitary groups

I. Summary and Recommendations

The Government’s Record to Date

Implementation of Demobilizations

The OAS Mission in Colombia

Future of the Demobilization Process

Recommendations

To the Colombian Government

To the Member States of the OAS

To International Donors to Colombia and the OAS Mission

To the United States Government

II. Background: Paramilitary Violence, Wealth, and Power

Profits from Drugs and Crime

Political Control and Corruption

High Pay for the Troops

Paramilitary Atrocities

Military-Paramilitary Links

III. Demobilization Negotiations

IV. Recent Paramilitary Demobilizations

Steps in a Collective Demobilization

Failures in Implementation of Collective Demobilizations

Failure to Request Aliases

Failure to Maintain a Record of Arms Possession

Failure to Include Prosecutors from the Human Rights Unit in the Team of Prosecutors Questioning Demobilized Paramilitaries

Failure to Ask Questions About Past Crimes or the Groups’ Operations and Assets

Superficial Checks of Demobilized Paramilitaries’ Backgrounds

Inadequate Monitoring of Demobilized Paramilitaries

Failure to Share Information with Local Authorities

Inadequate Policies to Prevent Recruitment

V. The Government’s Record to Date

Accountability

Truth and Reparation

Lasting Peace and Dismantling of Paramilitary Structures

Cease-fire

Continued Paramilitary Control

Partial Demobilizations

Wealth and New Recruitment

VI. The Role of the OAS Mission

VII. Future Demobilizations

Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes and Abuses is Greatly Restricted

A Single Reduced Sentence as low as Two or Three Years Applies to All “Accepted” Charges

Political Status

Opportunity to Avoid Extradition

Full and Truthful Confession is not a Condition to Get Sentence Reductions

No Incentives to Ensure Turnover of All Illegal Assets and Disclosure of Information about the Group’s Structure and Finances

Commanders Can Receive Sentence Reductions without Ensuring their Forces’ Cessation of Abuses

VIII. Colombia’s Obligations under International Law

IX. Conclusion

X. Acknowledgements

August 2005   Vol. 17, No. 3(B)