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I. Summary

The continuing failure of the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the New Forces rebels to address human rights concerns raises the prospect of massive rights violations should the shaky peace between the government and rebels fall apart.  The government has provided support for some ten thousand ill-disciplined militia fighters, which often are supplanting the official security forces. These militias have committed serious crimes with impunity, particularly against northerners, Muslims and West African immigrants and others perceived to be supporting the rebels.  The government’s past willingness to use hate speech in the media to incite violence against perceived opponents remains a cause of future concern should armed hostilities return.  As well, the northern-based New Forces rebels continue to engage in serious human rights abuses such as extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detentions and confiscation of property.

The 1999-2000 military junta and the 2002-2003 armed conflict between the government and northern-based rebels, in addition to the political unrest and impasse that has followed, have been punctuated by egregious atrocities by both government and rebel forces including political killings, massacres, “disappearances” and numerous incidents of torture. The steady crescendo of impunity by armed groups from all sides, but especially government militias, has resulted in ever-increasing incidents of violence against civilians. The political and social climate has become increasingly polarized and characterized by intolerance, xenophobia, and suspicion, bringing fears of what could happen should there be an all-out resumption of hostilities.

Two military incidents since November 2004, discussed in this report, demonstrate the precarious nature of the situation, and how further incidents could set off a spiral of human rights violations that could prove difficult to control. The two incidents – the November 2004 government offensive against the rebel-held north and the February 28, 2005 militia attack on the rebel-held town of Logouale – not only sparked an alarming spate of ethnically motivated attacks between indigenous groups and immigrant farm workers over land rights, but also highlighted the desperate need for stronger measures to protect vulnerable groups of civilians.

In the first several months of 2005, diplomats, U.N. sources, international aid workers and Liberian fighters said they believed, despite official denials, government forces were training and equipping militias, including hundreds of Liberian mercenaries, to renew the war against the New Forces rebels.¹ The attacks would likely start from the far west where long-simmering tensions between indigenous groups and immigrant farm workers over land rights are easily manipulated for political gain. The deployment of ill-trained and ill-disciplined militias would greatly increase the likelihood of abuse against the civilian population and suspected rebels.  Human rights abuses by New Forces rebels, which have a history of torture and summary execution against perceived government opponents, are also a grave source of concern,² especially given that rebel commanders sometimes appear to be unable to exert effective command and control over armed bands, ostensibly allied to them.³

Concerned by the explosive state of affairs in Côte d’Ivoire, the U.N. Security Council has taken important steps to provide some protection for the civilian population.   However, more needs to be done. Additional troop reinforcements for the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire – some 1,200 peacekeepers have been requested by Secretary General Kofi Annan – should be approved and deployed without delay. United Nations economic and travel sanctions against individuals “determined as responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire” or who “incite publicly hatred and violence” should be implemented immediately.⁴ The sanctions were authorized in November 2004 under U.N. Security Council resolution 1572 but have effectively been put on hold by African Union negotiators.  Regional bodies, concerned governments, as well as the International Criminal Court, must follow through with efforts to hold key players in the Ivorian conflict accountable for human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Lastly,  U.N. Security Council members should make preparations to pass a resolution, in the event that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire deteriorates, to block radio [or electronic] transmissions of xenophobic hate speech intended to incite violence against civilian populations.

The renewed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire also threatens to draw in more roving combatants from neighboring countries and jeopardize the precarious stability within the region. Governments in the region, the Economic Community of West African States and the United Nations must proactively investigate the cross border movement of arms and combatants by both the Ivorian government and New Forces rebels. Those involved in the recruitment and use of child combatants, a war crime, must be held fully accountable.  This includes the Ivorian government which has since at least October 2004 recruited scores of recently demobilized Liberian child combatants for use in a militia in western Côte d’Ivoire.

A United Nations force of some 6,000 peacekeeping troops and a French force of 4,000 more heavily armed soldiers under separate command currently stands between the rebels and government forces. The U.N. says this is too small a force to ensure peacekeeping and civilian protection.  It has asked for, and genuinely needs, 1,200 additional troops which would better enable them to protect civilians. However, that demand is running into United States opposition in the Security Council on ostensibly budgetary grounds.⁵  Japan is also less than enthusiastic about the call for more troops, diplomats say.⁶

The division of the international force into U.N. and French contingents is a constraint on the U.N.’s ability to protect civilians across the country.  As was evident during the November 2004 events in Abidjan, French priorities in Côte d’Ivoire are not always the same as those of the U.N.  Reinforcements to the U.N. contingent would help the U.N. achieve a peacekeeping profile independent of France, the former colonial power, which is viewed with mistrust by many Ivorians in the south and west, and allow the U.N. to respond serious emergencies as it best sees fit.

To the surprise of many Western diplomats and UN officials, mediation efforts by South African President Thabo Mbeki led to the signing of an agreement by all sides on April 6, 2005, which effectively committed all forces to disarm and work towards elections in October 2005. Progress in the mediation, which was sponsored by the African Union, had been slow until the meeting in Pretoria April 3-6, 2005, which was billed as a last ditch attempt to save Côte d’Ivoire from sliding back into full-scale war.  A decision on the eligibility of candidates for the presidential election was left to mediator Mbeki, who on April 13, 2005 asked President Gbagbo to use his special presidential powers according to Article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution to circumvent the constitution and allow all political parties that are signatories of the Pretoria agreement to run.

Political observers remain skeptical about the prospects for implementation of the Pretoria agreement, however, given that two previous peace accords – Linas-Marcoussis in January 2003 and Accra III in July 2004 – never got off the ground,⁷ and because the government has on at least two occasions broken the ceasefire, and attacked rebel-held positions. Gbagbo’s willingness to abide by Mbeki’s proposal to open up the field of candidates, and thereby include his key political rival, remains the most central issue standing between the prospects for an end to the war and a resumption of hostilities.

One casualty of the African Union-led mediation process and indeed preceding efforts to achieve peace has been the international community’s reluctance to either restrain military and political leaders in the Ivorian conflict alleged to have committed abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law (the laws of war) through the imposition of economic and financial sanctions, or encourage criminal prosecution against them.

The U.N. Security Council in November 2004 did approve economic and financial sanctions against individuals accused of such violations. Yet these sanctions, which could curb ongoing human rights abuses, have yet to be implemented for fear of undermining efforts to achieve an end to the political and military stalemate. 

The international community has appeared equally reluctant to take concrete steps to hold accountable leaders and commanders from all sides accused of war crimes. Putting justice on hold for an elusive final settlement denies victims and Ivorian society the right to see those responsible for serious human rights crimes held accountable, undermines the ever- deteriorating rule of law and is a dangerous strategy given the precarious state of human rights and civilian protection in Côte d’Ivoire today. Not only does this strategy not seem to be working, but it also appears to be emboldening perpetrators.

This report examines the military, social and economic context of the current political stalemate, the potentially devastating human rights costs of the proliferation of militias, and the government’s use of hate speech that incites violence.  It is based on interviews in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere from February-April, 2005 with diplomats, United Nations officials, military and intelligence analysts, civil society leaders and aid workers. The report makes several urgent recommendations that addresses these concerns and might reduce the terrible human cost should hostilities resume.