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V. Lessons from Ceasefires in Kachin and Mon States

In 1994 and 1995 Kachin and Mon armed groups signed ceasefires with the government. Research conducted bythe TBBC in eastern Burma in 2004 and field work conducted by Human Rights Watch in eastern and northern Burma between 2002-2005 demonstrates that living conditions for IDPs in these ceasefire and adjacent government-controlled areas are generally better than in conflict zones or relocation sites. There are, however, ongoing problems with displacement and human rights violations. An analysis of how residents of the affected areas have fared offers an idea of the kinds of issues that need to be addressed so that IDPs benefit as much as possible from any ceasefire that may take place between the KNU and SPDC. Examining the consequences of the 1994 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and 1995 New Mon State Party (NMSP) ceasefire agreements may also inform potential domestic and international assistance programs.

Kachin state

Following a ceasefire agreed with the government in 1994, the KIO organized the return of ten thousand refugees from China and helped to resettle about sixty thousand IDPs within Kachin State. Although the KIO and local Kachin NGO resettlement and reconstruction activities generally exhibited poor strategic and site planning due to limited human and financial resources, an impressive range of infrastructure and community development projects was nevertheless implemented.

There has been a limited peace dividend in Kachin State. Most encouraging is the post-ceasefire re-emergence of civil-society networks, although the KIO remains ambivalent regarding the role of civil society groups. Today in Kachin areas there are many more CBOs and local NGOs than before the ceasefire. Such local associations grew out of a war-ravaged population and have provided services to resettled IDPs and others, while slowly building local capacity.

However, the post-ceasefire situation in Kachin State presents a mixed picture. The government’s attitude towards the Kachin and other ceasefire areas has been one of neglect––or active obstruction. Kachin leaders claim that the SPDC wants to keep their area underdeveloped and attempts to undermine the KIO’s standing within Kachin communities. International donors could have done more to directly support the local population following the ceasefire.

Several other negative developments present worrying precedents. The main cause of post-ceasefire displacement in Kachin State is land rights. Although counter-insurgency motivated forced relocations have stopped, communities continue to still lose their land, due to:

• Post-ceasefire militarization, and farmland confiscated by the Tatmadaw. Before the ceasefire, there were four battalions in Bhamo District, southern Kachin State; by 2004, there were eleven, each of which had reportedly confiscated three hundred-four hundred acres of land.
• Up to four thousand people have been displaced by large-scale jade mining around Hpakhant in western Kachin State. Increased post-ceasefire logging and gold mining activities have also brought environmental damage to several areas, as well as charges of corruption against officials of different ceasefire groups.
• Large-scale agriculture projects have also often involved unlawful land confiscation, as has development-induced displacement, such as road, bridge, and airport construction in the state capital of Myitkyina, all of which have been carried out without regard for international standards on forced eviction.

All of these factors have been causes of continued forced displacement since the ceasefire––people are still being displaced, although the reasons have changed. In many cases, the abuses outlined above––particularly land loss, plus the prevalence of forced labor––have undermined villagers’ livelihoods so severely that they have had little choice but to migrate either within Burma, or to a neighboring country. Indeed, food insecurity, loss of livelihood, and lack of access to basic services (such as education and health) are probably the most widespread and chronic causes of forced displacement in Burma.

Mon state

The Mon situation illustrates similar themes. Between 1993-96––and especially after the 1995 New Mon State Party (NMSP) ceasefire––about ten thousand Mon refugees were forced up to and across the border by the Thai authorities. The Mon refugees were repatriated to NMSP-controlled ceasefire zones, with help from international NGOs.

Some refugees returned home, but most remained in limbo, in camp-like conditions just over the border, with only limited access to agricultural land. Although now largely invisible to Thailand and the international community, most of the Mon returnees have still not returned home and continue to face chronic livelihood and food security problems. Most remain partially dependant on decreasing amounts of humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, as a consequence of ongoing human rights abuses and renewed outbreaks of insurgency in Mon State, newly displaced villagers continue to seek refuge in the Mon ceasefire zones.

As in Kachin State, the most serious post-ceasefire problems in Mon State relate to land rights. Since 1998, more than eleven thousand acres of farmland have been confiscated without compensation by the Tatmadaw, mostly in order to build new garrisons. Adding insult to injury, farmers have sometimes been forced to work on the confiscated land, building barracks and farming on behalf of the army. Examples of development-induced displacement include the government’s practice of building roads and bridges on confiscated land, using forced labor.

Nevertheless, there have also been some positive developments in Mon State over the past decade. An end to the armed conflict has generally improved basic protection of the civilian population, at least in the ceasefire zones.¹²⁰ As in Kachin State, the ceasefires have brought new opportunities to develop agriculture and opportunities for travel and local trade, which is particularly important to villagers. In many villages, livelihoods have improved considerably over the past decade.

Since the ceasefire, the Mon Women’s Organization (MWO) has extended its community development and adult literacy activities beyond the NMSP-controlled zones to Mon communities across lower Burma. Also, despite some serious setbacks, in 2004-05 the NMSP Education Department and Mon CBOs provided Mon language teaching to over one hundred thousand students, approximately 70 percent of whom live in government-controlled areas, an achievement which would have been impossible before the ceasefire.

Lessons learned

There is a lack of impartial, comparative accounts of post-ceasefire developments in Burma. Given the possibility of a KNU-SPDC ceasefire, it is important that all interested parties—the SPDC, ethnic nationality groups, affected populations, CBOs, and international aid and lobbying organizations—have access to accurate information about such relevant past experience. This can help pave the way for sound judgments regarding possible solutions to problems in Karen (and Karreni and Shan) areas, particularly for IDPs.

Recent research conducted in eastern Burma by the TBBC and its local partner groups is encouraging, as indicators show that conditions for IDPs and presumably others are significantly better in ceasefire areas than in government-controlled or war zones.¹²¹ Civilians in ceasefire zones also have better access to education services.¹²² Educational opportunities should continue to be expanded. The involvement of CBOs has been a positive step.

Maintaining the peace while creating sustainable livelihood opportunities will go a long way towards improving the situation of residents. Greater attention should be paid to the limited peace dividends in Kachin and Mon ceasefire areas and the often important role of local groups in successful resettlement and reconstruction. Today in Kachin State, and even more so in Mon State, there are many more CBOs and local NGOs than before the ceasefires. As noted above, such local associations have been able to provide services and capacity-building assistance to many resettled IDPs and other residents.

However, there have also been significant post-ceasefire disappointments which must be avoided or ameliorated considerably, if any of the limited gains are to be consolidated. These include limited assistance to IDPs, ongoing fighting and post-ceasefire militarization, environmentally damaging natural resource extraction and development projects, forced labor, and land confiscation.

Human rights abuses, including land confiscation, must stop and be appropriately prosecuted. All parties to ceasefires need to commit to ensuring that the fundamental rights of the population are respected, including the right of access to humanitarian assistance. The Burmese government needs to address the abuses inevitably associated with the Tatmadaw’s self-support policy. Those affected by the confiscation of land and other property have a right to a remedy, and should be offered restitution, and/or other forms of compensation. Finally, given the long-term nature of this conflict and the legitimacy conferred on ethnic nationality groups by their people, international organizations should reconsider providing aid only to “state actors.”

The past decade has been one of mostly missed opportunities to move from an environment of “peace making” to “peace building” in ceasefire areas. If these mistakes can be avoided, if Karen (and Karenni and Shan)and SPDC representatives can agree on mechanisms to address ceasefire violations, and if donors can be persuaded to support rehabilitation efforts in partnership with appropriate local civil society groups, then the rights and well-being of affected individuals will be better protected.