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II. Introduction

If questioned, a Chinese government official would not say that Tenzin Delek Rinpoche5 lived in Tibet. For Chinese authorities and most ethnicChinese speakers in China, the term Tibet is reserved for the Tibet Autonomous Region, the part of the Tibetan plateau over which the Dalai Lama ruled at the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Tibetans, on the other hand, often use the term to refer to a larger, Tibetan area which includes the TAR and Tibetan areas in four neighboring provinces, the northeastern part of which they refer to as Amdo and the eastern and southeastern part as Kham. China recognizes most of the Tibetan-inhabited areas as Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures or Tibetan Autonomous Counties, but by no means regards them as part of Tibet.Most of the Tibetan areas in Sichuan are parts of what Tibetans call Kham. Inhabitants of the area, such as Tenzin Delek, are known as Khampas.

More than 50 percent of ethnic Tibetans live outside the TAR in so-called autonomous prefectures and counties created by the Chinese government after 1949 and assigned to the jurisdiction of one of four provinces: Qinghai, Yunnan, Gansu, and Sichuan. This dispersal of Tibetan population clusters over four provinces is related less to geography and more to history and to a deliberate government attempt to make it administratively harder for Tibetans to organize or act as a single community.

Prior to 1949, warlords and officials loosely associated with the Republic of China (familiarly referred to as the Guomindang or the nationalists) ruled the eastern areas, parts of which had been severed up to 300 years earlier from the Dalai Lama’s jurisdiction.6 Almost immediately after securing control of China in 1949, PRC leaders sent troops into eastern Tibet. A year later, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces entered central Tibet, the area the Chinese government renamed the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1965. Tibetans call the incursion an “invasion”; the Chinese refer to it as the “peaceful liberation” of Tibet.

After PLA forces entered Tibetan areas in the eastern part of the Tibetan plateau in 1949, the new PRC government implemented a series of policy changes that led to massive Tibetan resistance and a ten-year period of instability and intermittent warfare in all Tibetan areas. Lithang, Tenzin Delek’s home base, was the early epicenter. Open revolt against Chinese policies began there in the mid-1950s and, by all accounts, was brutally suppressed by Chinese forces intent on radically changing Tibetan social and economic structures and on enlisting local leaders’ cooperation in furthering so-called reforms.7 In 1959, in Lhasa, the seat of the Dalai Lama’s government, Chinese forces quashed the most serious in a string of uprisings. The Dalai Lama and some 100,000 Tibetans fled to India. Tibet and Tibetan areas were then sealed off to outsiders and radical social reforms, including vigorous restrictions on religion, were implemented throughout the area.8

In Kardze as in other Tibetan areas, stories about psychological humiliation, loss of livelihood, decimation of religious institutions, inhumane prison conditions, wholesale slaughter, starvation, and execution of family members in the 1950s, and then again during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60)9 and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), fueled resentment directed at Chinese officials and China’s Tibet policies.

By 1979, it had become clear that the new policies were not working, and that the harsh retaliatory measures meted out to those who refused to comply had backfired. Rather than creating divisions among Tibetan social classes, as had been expected, government tactics amplified Tibetan identification.

During a visit by then premier Hu Yaobang to the TAR in May 1980 with a Working Group of the (Chinese Communist) Party Central Committee, the government partially reversed course. It agreed to consult and cooperate with regional authorities, apologized for earlier errors, and ordered a large number of Chinese cadres to be removed so that local Tibetans could take over their positions. In a speech at the end of the stay, Hu recommended permitting Tibetans the same “system of private economy” already in place in many other areas.10 In addition, he implied eventual exercise of full autonomy for Tibetans and the development of Tibetan education, culture, and science.

In theory, a 1984 national law, the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Autonomy of Minority Nationality Regions,” furthered the new policy.11 It promised so-called autonomous minority regions, such as the TAR, prefectures such as Kardze, and certain counties, a degree of control over their economic, social, and cultural development. However, in the almost twenty years since the law took effect, the Chinese leadership has ensured that autonomy in these areas has remained extremely limited. At the same time, China has taken steps to diminish the influence of traditional religion and culture among Tibetans. In addition, it has moved aggressively to “sinicize” Tibetan areas. Tenzin Delek’s prestige and the growth of the monastic community he led, as detailed below, appear to have been viewed as obstacles to this process and as unacceptable displays of distinctive cultural identity.

A series of large-scale political protests in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region, in 1987-89,12 followed in 1993 by populist economic protests there and the spread of political protest to the countryside,13 played a role in another reversal of course. In 1994, at a meeting called the Third National Forum on Work in Tibet (Third Forum), central Chinese leaders agreed on a program of accelerated economic development and approved a policy that curtailed civil and political rights. There were to be new restrictions on religious activities and monastic independence, efforts to curtail the Dalai Lama’s political and religious influence took on a new intensity, and a patriotic (Chinese) education campaign in schools and monasteries began. Taken together, the new policies aimed to eradicate the burgeoning Tibetan independence movement and to encourage migration of ethnic Han Chinese to Tibetan areas.14

Tenzin Delek

Tenzin Delek was born in 1950 in Kham, the eastern portion of the Tibetan plateau. His name at birth was A-ngag Tashi. In spite of the chaos surrounding the Chinese incursion into Tibetan areas in the 1950s and the ban on all religious expression during the Cultural Revolution, he managed to study Buddhism. During the 1970s, as conditions permitted, he worked to protect and reestablish Tibetan Buddhism in his home region.

From 1982 to 1987 Tenzin Delek was in India, where the Dalai Lama recognized him as a tulku (reincarnated lama). His time in India may have alarmed Chinese officials, partly because the title greatly enhanced his prestige and even his power within the local community. According to supporters, he left home without official permission or travel documents in 1982, in part to further his own education and, in part, because he feared arrest even then.15

Tenzin Delek’s return in 1987 marked the beginning of a period during which he reportedly was able to bring to fruition many of his proposals for new monasteries, small schools, medical clinics, an orphanage, and old-age homes. It is unclear whether Tenzin Delek received official permission to establish or run these facilities,16 another possible cause for alarm among local officials.

One of his major projects, begun within two years of his return, was the construction of a permanent monastic structure at the summer site of Geden Tashi Dargyeling monastery, an important religious site in Orthok [see Map 3, “Southeastern Section of Kardze/Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture”].17 Named Kham Nalendra Thegchen Jangchub Choeling, but usually referred to simply as Orthok monastery, it was the largest single institution that Tenzin Delek founded and served as the core of his growing network of monks, activists, and branch monasteries.

In 1998, Tenzin Delek established a school in a place known as Geshe Lungpa in Nyagchu county [see map] for some 350 orphans and children from poor families.18 Another school, established in the early 1990s on the site of Orthok monastery, served some 160 students, including orphans and impoverished youngsters. By providing food and shelter as well as an education, Tenzin Delek was able to obtain the agreement of parents, who might otherwise have been reluctant or too poor to send their children to school. Schools such as these, connected to monasteries, often emphasized religious and traditional learning at the expense of a state-mandated curriculum. It is not clear if either school had been licensed to operate.

Tenzin Delek also helped to bring medical facilities to underserved areas. A clinic in Orthok monastery specializing in Tibetan medicine served the local community. Another in Nyagchukha, provided a similar service. A Chinese official has acknowledged Tenzin Delek’s beneficial medical work in his local area.19 However, a planned settlement to shelter nomads during winter, for which Tenzin Delek had allocated funds and purchased materials, was never built after local officials objected. The investment could not be recouped.

Over the years, as Tenzin Delek’s activities in the Nyagchukha area led to his rise to prominence, local government officials took increased notice of his activities and views. Many were not in line with local government policies and thus could have been seen as challenges to the authority and influence of local officials. Tenzin Delek was an advocate for the social, cultural, economic, and religious rights of local residents. For example, he challenged officials who indiscriminately backed deforestation projects at the expense of local communities. He was willing to confront officials who put what he considered their own interests before those of their constituents. He took a public position on harmful environmental practices in the area and expressed views that had been outlawed by the central government and that local officials had been ordered to eliminate, such as loyalty to the Dalai Lama and other forbidden religious ideas.

Furthermore, it appears that a significant portion of local residents trusted Tenzin Delek, rather than district cadres, to solve communal problems fairly and efficaciously, in part because of his willingness to approach provincial and central government officials when local efforts failed. The use of locally respected lamas as mediators in conflicts is a traditional practice in Tibetan communities and in many places continues to be encouraged by Chinese officials, with the implicit or explicit understanding that such lamas not oppose local or national policies.

At some point, however, Tenzin Delek must have crossed the line. According to local sources, the major turning point in Tenzin Delek’s relationships with local officials came in 1993, when he worked—successfully——to help roll back an attempt to extend clear-cutting to forest land that residents saw as “belonging” to them. According to community members, those officials never forgave Tenzin Delek for their loss of face over the issue.

Residents argued it was this insult that inspired plans to detain Tenzin Delek in 1997-98 and in 2000. Pressure from Beijing on local authorities to curb what Beijing saw as his politically unacceptable activities most likely also played a role. He was finally arrested in 2002. Knowledgeable informants maintain that local authorities were irritated at Tenzin Delek’s personal influence and at monastic rather than lay influence in general.20 They apparently resented his contention that some officials and some lamas neglected the social and economic needs of the populace to seek out higher salaries and increased privileges for themselves.21

Lobsang Dondrup

Lobsang Dondrup and Tenzin Delek were distantly related and their family connection may be responsible for the claim of conspiracy against the two. In 1998 or 1999, when Lobsang Dondrup was twenty-four years old and newly separated from his wife, he expressed a desire to become a monk. Tenzin Delek agreed to a trial period. However, one source told Human Rights Watch that after little more than a year, during which Lobsang Dondrup helped with minor chores at one of Tenzin Delek’s monasteries, it became obvious that other pressures prevented him from committing himself fully or devoting the time necessary to advance his studies. His mother and son needed his financial help. And he was handicapped by a combination of illiteracy, the absence of any previous formal education, and the relatively advanced age at which he was attempting to begin monastic study.

According to one account, in 2000, Tenzin Delek, aware that the plan was not working out, advised Lobsang Dondrup to pursue his interest in small business ventures. Another account suggests that Tenzin Delek insisted Lobsang Dondrup leave the monastery for flouting its rules.22

Local informants have said that Lobsang Dondrup presented a suitable target for officials looking for a relatively unknown and thus unprotected person connected to Tenzin Delek whom they could scare into pointing an accusatory finger at Delek.” As one informant explained after Lobsang Dondrup was detained:

What kind of support would he have? He came from a very poor family. They were uneducated. He lived in a very remote place. There was no road. Electricity——there was none. It was like people lived before 1959. And he was a distant relative of the Rinpoche.23

Bombs

On April 3, 2002, a bomb, described as a “simple fuse device,”24 exploded in Tianfu Square in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province in China’s southwest. It was this bomb that led to the arrests of Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dondrup. There was a Xinhua report on January 26, 2003, the day of Lobsang Dondrup’s execution, that one person was seriously injured and many others hurt at the time of the blast.25 Property damage was reported to have exceeded 800,000 renminbi (U.S.$96,400).26

Other accounts vary as to the identity of the Tianfu Square bomber, how and when he was apprehended, and the nature of his alleged confession. They also include contradictory information regarding the presence or absence of pro-independence leaflets at the blast sites. Without access to official court documents, particularly the procuratorate indictments and the court verdicts, the discrepancies cannot be resolved.

According to conflicting Chinese government accounts, the detonation was the culminating event in either a series of six bombings beginning in 1998 or a series of four beginning in 2001.27 Quasi-official reports that Lobsang Dondrup and Tenzin Delek “confessed” to direct responsibility for five attacks28 cannot be reconciled with the lower figure.29 Other reports put the number of bombings at seven and are inconsistent in reporting where and when they occurred.

Details about the other explosions are sketchy and vary as to the sites where the bombings took place and the extent of injuries and property damage. What appears probable is that two explosions occurred in 1998 at Lithang Gonchen monastery, some 300 kilometers west of Chengdu.30 They took place near the living quarters of one or possibly two high-ranking lamas, one of whom was a prominent Sichuan provincial official. One of the two made offerings to Dorje Shugden, a deity whose worship the Dalai Lama strongly advised be stopped. Tenzin Delek had actively campaigned in the area to promote the Dalai Lama’s view. (See “Opposition to Worship of Dorje Shugden,” page 44 for details about the Dorje Shugden controversy). After official accounts alleged that handwritten leaflets were found at that site, security officers detained a number of Tibetans, including local monks, in order to check their handwriting.31

Some accounts report a third explosion in 1999 near the Lithang County government office. At least two people suspected of involvement were detained but never tried.32 Another two or three bombs went off in Dartsedo (Kangding in Chinese), the Kardze prefectural capital, in 2001. According to an official account, the most serious occurred on October 3, 2001 at an office building of the traffic police. One person, a “watchman” died and monetary damages amounted to 290,000 renminbi (U.S.$35,000). Tenzin Delek reportedly was not charged with responsibility for that incident. Lobsang Dondrup was.33 If this last account is accurate, it suggests that Lobsang Dondrup might have been charged in connection with six incidents. Another account implies that Tenzin Delek was charged in connection with only four bombings and Lobsang Dondrup with five.34

Accounts are consistent in reporting that a bomb went off at a bridge in Dartsedo in January 2001. The third 2001 bomb is variously reported as having occurred at Party headquarters, government offices, or an official guesthouse. According to an account that located the incident at the prefectural offices in Dartsedo, it resulted in two injuries, one of which was “serious,” and extensive damage to the building and to vehicles parked in the compound.35 The probable date is August 2001. An account that located the explosion at the main gate of Party headquarters said that for several weeks the area immediately surrounding the gate was covered with tarpaulins, that traffic had to be diverted, and that the explosion blew out the windows of buildings opposite the site. Both Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dondrup were charged in connection with that incident.

After the Chengdu bombing, the count stood minimally at seven and possibly as many as ten bombings. There is no known evidence other than Lobsang Dondrup’s alleged confession to connect the incidents.



5 Rinpoche is an honorific title meaning “precious jewel.” A tulku is also an honorific title and is a general term for recognized reincarnations of lamas or of earlier tulkus. A tulku is usually discovered in childhood and brought up to carry on the lineage and to preside over the monastic estate of his predecessor. A lama is a monk who has gone from being a “common” monk to one who has studied assiduously, received advanced degrees, and teaches others. A tulku or a lama is often, but not necessarily, called rinpoche.

6 For a brief review of the historical differences between eastern and central Tibet, see Elliot Sperling, “Exile and Dissent: The Historical and Cultural Context,” in Tibet Since 1950: Silence, Prison, or Exile (New York: Aperture Foundation, Inc. and Human Rights Watch, 2000), pp. 30-37.

7 For further information about economic policies and political repression in the eastern areas during the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), see Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) pp. 136-144, 165-170.

8 Selected visitors willing to write glowing reports of the changes in Tibetan society were permitted to visit.

9 Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine (New York: The Free Press, 1996), pp. 168-179.

10 Wang Yao, “Hu Yaobang’s Visit to Tibet, May 22-31, 1980: An Important Development in the Chinese Government’s Tibet Policy,” in Robert Barnett and Shirin Akiner, eds., Resistance and Reform in Tibet (London: Hurst & Company, 1994), pp. 285-89.

11 The “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Autonomy of Minority Nationality Regions” came into effect on October 1, 1984. It was revised on February 28, 2001 to lend support to new economic policy initiatives for developing China’s western regions

12 For further information see, Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), Human Rights in Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1988), pp. 57-64; Asia Watch, Evading Scrutiny: Violations of Human Rights after the Closing of Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1988); Asia Watch, Merciless Repression: Human Rights in Tibet (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990).

13 See “Accounts of Lhasa Demonstration, May 1993,” in “Reports from Tibet,” October 1992-1993, TIN News Review, October 1993; see also “Rural Protests in Meldrogungkar, Tibet,” TIN News Update, July 11, 1993.

14 Tibet Information Network and Human Rights Watch, Cutting Off the Serpent’s Head: Tightening Control in Tibet, 1994-1995 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), pp. 20-45.

15 According to Chinese regulations, the journey was illegal. Those regulations violated international law on freedom of movement. (See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 12.2, opened for signature December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), entered into force March 23, 1976, signed by China in October 1998, not yet ratified.) According to one Chinese account, at some point, Tenzin Delek was expelled from Lithang Gonchen, the monastery to which he was affiliated, for alleged unacceptable behaviors such as rowdiness, stealing, and drinking. Although the exact dates are uncertain, one possibility is that the expulsion occasioned his move to India. It is also possible that the expulsion might have been formalized and “explained” ex post facto once Chinese monastic authorities learned of his whereabouts. See Radio Free Asia (RFA) Interview with Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture court judge, December 6, 2002. Transcript made available by Radio Free Asia (see Appendix II, “Interview with a Kardze Court Judge” for the full transcript).

16 According to a tape Tenzin Delek made in 2000 at a time when he feared arrest, local authorities approved of at least one project, the school at Geshe Lungpa. Tape and transcript on file at Human Rights Watch. See Appendix I, “Statement of Tenzin Delek Rinpoche.”

17 Orthok is not a Chinese administrative division. It is the traditional name of an area that today encompasses the townships of Horlong, Khola, Detsa, Golog, and Mara.

18 Project costs for the land and materials for repair totaled 38,000 renminbi (approximately U.S.$4,750).

19 Interview in February 2003 with a Chinese official who wishes to remain anonymous, describing a conversation with an official in Chengdu.

20 Emily T. Yeh, “Tibetan Range Wars: Spatial Politics and Authority on the Grasslands of Amdo,” Development and Change, 34(3): 499-523 (2003).

21 Human Rights Watch interview with EJ, June 27, 2003.

22 Human Rights Watch interview with KR, December 19, 2002.

23 Human Rights Watch interview with FP, July 29, 2003.

24 “Bomb Blast in Chengdu,” TIN News Updates, April 24, 2004.

25 “Tibetans sentenced to death for sabotaging China’s unity,” BBC Monitoring of Xinhua, January 26, 2003. The Xinhua article is datelined Chengdu, January 26, 2003.

26 Ibid.

27Zhizao Tianfu Guangcheng Baozha Anjian Deng Anjian Liang Xianfan Bei Ji Shen Xuanpan” (“A verdict has been handed down for two suspects in the case of an explosion in Tianfu Square and other such cases”), Sichuan Daily (Sichuan Ribao), December 5, 2002.

28 “China Court Rejects Tibetan Death Sentence Appeal,” Reuters, January 26, 2003; See Appendix II, “Interview with Kardze Court Judge.”

29 As the primary evidence against Tenzin Delek and Lobsang Dondrup appears to have come from confessions, this discrepancy suggests that the authorities accept that at least one of the six bombings, if indeed there were six, must have been carried out by someone other than Tenzin Delek or Lobsang Dondrup.

30 Interview with DQ, April 3, 2003; see Appendix II, “Interview with Kardze Court Judge.” Lithang is on the main road leading west from Chengdu toward central Tibet. The road runs from Chengdu through Dartsedo (Kangding), on to Nyagchukha, and then to Lithang before reaching the upper Yangze and the border of the Tibet Autonomous Region. There is constant traffic moving between the towns. The road is one of the two major routes linking central Tibet to Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, and the rest of China.

31 Human Rights Watch interview with DQ, April 3, 2003.

32 Ibid.

33 “Tibetans sentenced to death…,” BBC Monitoring of Xinhua.

34 See Appendix V, "Announcement of Appeal Court Decision."

35 See Appendix II, “Interview with Kardze Court Judge.”


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February 2004