<<previous | index | next>> VII. The Impact of Lack of Transparency and Accountability on Human Rights and DevelopmentA considerable amount of research by the World Bank, IMF, and academic specialists has shown that a country’s reliance on natural resource revenues, particularly oil, can impede economic growth and diversification and facilitate corruption. It is particularly problematic when the government is the direct beneficiary of economic activity and is therefore not reliant on domestic taxation or a diversified economy to function.140 This dynamic is known as the “Resource Curse” or as one academic labeled it, “The Paradox of Plenty.”141 However, little research has focused on the negative human rights impact of a government’s reliance on natural resource revenues. Human Rights Watch believes that a country’s substantial reliance on natural resource revenues can have a negative impact on human rights unless measures are taken to ensure that they are managed and spent transparently. In such an economy, those who rule the state have unique opportunities for self-enrichment and corruption. Because achieving political power often becomes the primary avenue for achieving wealth, the incentive to seize power and hold onto it indefinitely is great. This dynamic has a corrosive effect on governance and ultimately, respect for human rights. In this context, a key indicator of the quality of governance is whether a government is committed to transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and human rights. When a ruler or a governing elite are undemocratic or otherwise unaccountable to their citizens, poor management, poor economic decision-making, corruption, and human rights abuses thrive. Instead of improving the overall situation, the existence of a centrally controlled stream of revenue—such as oil revenue—can serve to reinforce or exacerbate an undemocratic or otherwise unaccountable ruler’s or governing elite’s worst tendencies by providing the financial wherewithal to entrench and enrich itself without any corresponding accountability. These problems are clearly present in Angola. There have been many efforts to reform government practice, but most have not been effective, despite pressure from international institutions, governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and companies. The Angolan government does not make information about its financial dealings available to the public, or even to international institutions. The government’s behavior has had a negative impact on the ability of the public to exercise oversight of the use of public funds and in the absence of true democracy, there are few avenues for public accountability. In this context, the data from the Oil Diagnostic and IMF Staff Reports represent a first window onto how the government uses or misuses public funds. The mismanagement of resources documented here has had an extremely negative effect on the country’s development and the well-being of the population. Insufficient resources have been spent on the needs of the population and the government has tried to force the international community to shoulder much of that burden. Human Rights Watch welcomes the international community’s efforts to provide substantial funding for Angola’s reconstruction and development. However, such funds should complement, not replace, a serious commitment by the Angolan government to attain minimum standards in critical areas such as health and education. To date Angolan government efforts have been grossly inadequate. This section describes how the government’s actions and inaction have led to violations of human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The government’s failure to provide adequate information about its use of public funds violates Angolan’s right to information under article 19 of the ICCPR.142 The government’s failure to allocate adequate financial resources to health and education, at least in part because of mismanagement and corruption, contravenes its obligations under articles 12 and 13 of the ICESCR.143 Moreover, the Angolan government has repeatedly failed in its treaty obligation to report on its compliance with the covenants as required under article 40 of the ICCPR and articles 16 and 17 of the ICESCR. Angola acceded to the ICCPR and ICESCR in October 1992.144 Reports on its compliance with the ICCPR were due in 1997 and 1998. A third report will be due in September 2003. While compliance reports under the ICESCR were due in 1994 and 1999.145 Angola has yet to submit even one of these long-overdue periodic reports. Even in cases where Angola may not have violated its human rights treaty obligations, it has clearly undermined the ability of Angolans to enjoy their rights and to exercise adequate oversight of the government. Two areas where this has occurred are elections and funding of the judiciary. The government’s failure to hold elections since 1992 has prevented Angolans from holding their government accountable and has undermined the government’s commitments under article 25 of the ICCPR. The underfunding of the judiciary has prevented Angolans from having adequate recourse when their rights are violated, impeding another mechanism of government accountability. Freedom of InformationOne major obstacle to public scrutiny of the government’s use of public funds has been the government’s failure to provide relevant data. The government severely restricts information about its activities and refuses to disclose basic information about its revenues and expenditures. Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous allegations of mismanagement of funds, revenue illegally bypassing the central bank, and opaque arms purchases (see sections V and VI above). Because the Angolan public cannot obtain relevant information, however, citizens have little way of evaluating such allegations. This lack of transparency undermines Angolan citizens ability to enjoy their right to information as enshrined under Article 19(2) of the ICCPR that states, “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”146 In Human Rights Watch's view this right should be interpreted as generally entailing a right of access to official information as well as information that is generally available. Although international human rights law does not explicitly provide a right to such official information, the state is required to "ensure" and "give effect to" the right to inform oneself.147 Human Rights Watch believes that except in narrow cases of national security, citizens should have maximum access to information relating to the financial activities of their government. In the case of Angola, the national security exception clearly cannot justify the government’s behavior: it withholds virtually all data about revenues and expenditures and its budgets are widely considered to be unreliable and inaccurate.148
Underfunding of the Judiciary and the Right of Access to JusticeGross mismanagement and misuse of funds also has had a dramatic impact on the welfare of the Angolan population. It impedes social development and economic stability, and undermines economic and political support for institutions necessary to protect human rights, often the same institutions necessary to combat corruption and increase transparency. In Angola, one such underfunded institution is the judiciary. It is difficult to determine exactly how much money is allocated to the judiciary. However, studies of Angola’s judiciary have noted a chronic lack of resources to rebuild or maintain judicial infrastructure or pay salaries of judges. For example, the International Bar Association repeatedly noted these problems in its July 2003 assessment of the Angola’s judiciary149 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the U.N. body charged with interpreting the ICESCR, has noted the importance of the judiciary in protecting all human rights. In its commentary, the committee noted:
The recommendations of the Committee cannot be implemented if courts do not physically exist. As described below, the Angolan government does not provide sufficient resources for its judiciary, effectively curtailing the ability of Angolans to seek redress. There are supposed to be nineteen provincial courts and 168 municipal courts in Angola, according to the assessment by the International Bar Association.151 All of the provincial courts nominally function. However, only twenty-three of the country’s 168 municipal courts were functioning as of July 2003. The government has said that it plans to reopen municipal courts that were closed or destroyed because of the war at the rate of two or three per year. At that rate, it would take at least forty-eight years for all of the courts to reopen. The International Bar Association (IBA) reported that Canada donated U.S.$250,000 to the government to facilitate reopening of the courts, but almost withdrew the money because the government did not use it quickly enough. Even where courts function, it may be at a very low level. The IBA reported that the provincial court in the province of Malanje consists of a storage room, court proceedings must stop when it rains because of flooding, and the prosecutor works from home due to a lack of facilities. In many cases, there is only one judge per province. Some observers estimate that the country needs another 200 judges in order for the courts to adequately function.152 U.N. representatives have repeatedly stressed that chronic underfunding of the judiciary has had a negative impact on human rights. For example, Angolans displaced by the war—many of whom suffered rape, sexual harassment, killings, beatings, or extortion—do not have adequate judicial redress and lack of judicial resources is one important cause.153 Francis Deng, the U.N. Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons noted in 2001 that:
Even after the war with UNITA had ended, abuses and the lack of access to justice have not subsided. The U.N. Secretary-General’s February 2003 mission report on Angola raised similar concerns about ongoing abuses and the lack of access to the judiciary:
The lack of a functioning judiciary also has a serious impact on detainees and defendants. In the absence of functioning municipal courts, cases are transferred to provincial courts. This creates a high backlog of cases. Prolonged pretrial detentions are common and often last two to three years. In one case, a fourteen-year old boy spent seven years in prison without facing trial. He was ultimately released.156 Because of the malfunctioning judiciary, the State Department reported, “in many cases, police beat and then released detainees rather than make any effort to prepare a formal court case.” Given the large amount of public funds that cannot be accounted for by the government, Human Rights Watch believes that there are sufficient resources to significantly reconstitute the judiciary, provided those resources are properly allocated and managed. In this context, the government’s failure to quickly reconstitute the judiciary represents a major failure of political will and not a lack of resources. Inadequate Funding of Health, Education, and Social ServicesHuman Rights Watch does not as a general matter make recommendations on how governments should allocate resources or weigh competing funding priorities. However, when there is clear evidence of gross mismanagement or misuse of public funds that diverts resources away from support for human rights, we believe it proper to document the impact. In the case of Angola, the scale of financial mismanagement is so large and the underfunding of essential social services so glaring that it compels the conclusion that funds needlessly have been diverted away from services and institutions critical to fulfillment of Angolans’ economic and social rights. The U.N. Secretary-General’s April 2001 report to the Security Council on the U.N. mission in Angola noted:
An overall sense of the impact that lack of transparency and mismanagement have had on the well-being of the country’s population can be derived from a comparison of the total amount of unaccounted for funds and the total amount of social spending. As noted earlier, Angola is one of the poorest countries in the world. Approximately 70 percent of Angolans live in poverty and the country ranked 164th out of 175 countries in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2003 Human Development Index.158 What is particularly troubling is that Angola’s 2003 HDI ranking was its lowest in several years, even though oil production and revenues had increased and its war had ended. In 2002, the country was ranked 161st out of 173 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI).159 In 2001, Angola’s HDI ranking was 146th out of 162 countries.160 And it ranked 160th out of 174 countries in both 1999 and 2000.161 Overall, Angola’s social spending is far below its regional neighbors. Between 1997 and 2002, the average spending on social programs (including health) for Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa was about 6.7 percent of total government spending annually. Angola, however, only spent about 3.45 percent of its budget on social programs annually.162 This relatively low level of funding stands in stark contrast to the Angolan population’s desperate need for more services. Healthcare is a case in point. The average life expectancy in Angola is only 36.1 years, and this in part reflects the failure of the government to make basic healthcare services available.163 Olara Otunnu, the U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict noted after his visit to Angola:
60 percent of hospitals and clinics were destroyed during the war, taking a devastating toll on the health care system. Even the effects of war, however, do not adequately explain the state of the health system in areas firmly under government control.165 Francis Deng, the U.N. Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons made similarly bleak observations about the state of the health system in government-controlled areas after his visit to Angola in 2000:
Education spending is similarly low. The average for Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa was about 12.7 percent of government expenditure from 1997 to 2002. In Angola, it was only 4.9 percent of government expenditure during the same period.167 The need, however, is great. About 60 percent of school-age children do not have access to education and about 5,000 schools were destroyed during the war.168 According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), only 4 percent of Angolan children who attend primary schools reach the fifth grade.169 In addition to the government, the U.N. and NGOs in Angola provide essential assistance to millions of Angolans. In 2003, the U.N.’s Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, the combined request from the U.N. and NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance in Angola, requested U.S.$313,843,200 to fund all of its humanitarian activities, including food aid, health, education, landmine clearance, resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and human rights protection for IDPs. The appeal stated that 1 million Angolans were dependent on “external aid to survive” and a total of 3.7 million required various forms of humanitarian assistance—about 36 percent of the total population.170 From 1997 to 2002, requests under the Consolidated Appeal ranged between U.S.$80.9 million and U.S.$289.1 million, but donors only funded between 43.9 percent and 81 percent of these requests.171 An important reason for such low levels of government funding is the unexplained diversion of funds, as detailed in the IMF reports. It is revealing to compare the amount of money the U.N. needed for humanitarian needs; the amount of money the government spent on education, health, and other social services (social security, welfare, and housing); and the disappeared funds. The contrasts are striking as the following table shows. Table 11: Comparison of Angolan Government social expenditures, United Nations Humanitarian Assistance, and Government Discrepancy (U.S.$ millions)172
As the table shows, unexplained expenditures in every year from 1997-2002 were far greater than both the total amount that the U.N. requested and what it received for humanitarian programs, except in 1998. In aggregate, the unexplained expenditures were some U.S.$3.1 billion more than the amount requested under the Inter-Agency Appeal and U.S.$3.6 billion more than the appeal actually received. That sum is staggering: more than six times the amount of money received under the Inter-Agency Appeal has disappeared at a time when international assistance was providing for the critical needs of about 30 percent of Angolans. Overall, expenditures under the Inter-Agency Appeal plus the Angolan government’s social spending were only about U.S.$55 million more than unexplained expenditures from 1997 to 2002. Total humanitarian and social spending was approximately U.S.$4.27 billion while unexplained expenditures were about U.S.$4.22 billion. In effect, the Angolan government misspent an amount roughly equal to the total amount spent on the humanitarian, social, health, and education needs of a population in severe distress. Based on those figures, it is apparent that the Angolan government could have allocated far more for social expenditures had it chosen to do so. Social Bonus Payments from CompaniesPayments made by oil companies to Sonangol for social projects were not scrutinized in the Staff Report. However, KPMG did examine these payments as part of the Inception Report. Social bonus payments were made as part of the contracts with oil companies that were exploring and producing in Angola. Technically, this is social spending, but it falls outside of formal government spending since Sonangol designates the use of the funds. To our knowledge, there has been no audit or other detailed accounting of the use or effectiveness of such funds. These bonus payments were either payable in a single lump sum either in the year the contract was signed or when exploration began. They can also be paid annually; beginning with the year the contract is signed.173 KPMG compiled these sums from the Production Sharing Agreements themselves and according Inception Report this is the known amount paid in social bonus funds: Table 12: Exploration Bonuses (U.S.$ Millions)
In addition to the exploration bonuses that KPMG reported, the IMF determined that approximately U.S.$100 million had been paid for Block Thirty Four. Thus, since 1997, Sonangol has received at least U.S. $165 million from oil companies for social projects, but the government has not provided an accounting of those funds. Human Rights Watch spoke to an oil company representative in Luanda who has visited some of the projects. He confirmed that some projects were underway, such as water projects, but could not verify whether the scope and scale of those projects matched the amount of funds that Sonangol had received.181 Human Rights Watch believes that a mechanism to coordinate all forms of social spending should be developed in order to adequately coordinate the use of resources. This is especially important given the sizable amount of corporate bonus payments directed to social projects. The Angolan Government’s Obligation to Fulfill Economic, Social and Cultural RightsThe ICESCR acknowledges that different countries have different levels of resources available to them and does not unrealistically require countries to immediately devote more resources than they have to fulfill their obligations. Rather, the covenant calls upon governments to progressively implement those rights commensurate with the amount of resources available. Gross misallocation of resources to the detriment of the enjoyment of economic and socials rights can constitute a human rights violation. The diversion of funds from health services and facilities is a case in point. Article 12 of the ICESCR requires that states “recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” This includes “provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality…prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;” and “creation of the conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.”182 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the authoritative interpretive body for the ICESCR, has said in General Comment 14 that a “violation of the obligation to fulfill” requirements under article 12 can occur when there is “insufficient expenditure or misallocation of public resources which results in the non-enjoyment of the right to health by individuals or groups.”183 Similarly, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights state that a violation “through the acts of commission” of the ICESCR can occur if a government engages in the “reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure, when such reduction or diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by adequate measures to ensure the minimum subsistence rights for everyone.”184 The Maastricht Guidelines were an effort by a group of more than thirty experts on international law to elaborate obligations, violations, and remedies under the ICESCR. Governments, multilateral organizations, and NGOs use the guidelines as guidance for interpreting the ICESCR. In the case of Angola, billions of dollars of funds have been mismanaged and misspent. Those funds have not been spent on health, education, or other social services. In effect, that mismanagement of funds has come at the expense of enjoyment of economic and social rights. Indeed, as noted above, the amount of money that has disappeared from 1997 to 2002 is roughly equal to the total social and humanitarian spending by the government and U.N. combined over that same period. Had the government properly accounted for and managed the disappeared funds it is likely that more funds would have been allocated towards the fulfillment of economic, social, or cultural rights, such as increased spending on education, health, and other social services. The government of Angola has not complied with its obligations under international human rights law because it has misallocated resources at the expense of the enjoyment of rights. The disappearance of funds has been a major impediment to human rights improvements. During the last years of the war, the humanitarian and human rights situation continued to be poor even in areas under government control. For example, the 2001report of the U.N. Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, citing a prior study, reported:
Like the IMF, the U.N. has repeatedly noted the need for the government to allocate more resources for social expenditures. Olara Otunnu, the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict noted in 2002:
Even when the government does devote resources for humanitarian purposes, it exaggerates the amount of funding and usually allocates much less than what is needed. Moreover, it also expects the international community to pay for the bulk of assistance. For example, Francis Deng, the U.N. Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, commented on this problem in 2001:
The government’s apparent callousness towards humanitarian assistance has had a chilling effect on donors and U.N. Inter-Agency Appeals have never been fully funded (see Table 11 above). Deng noted:
The government’s claim that oil-related debt would prohibit increasing humanitarian assistance is not credible because of the massive discrepancies. And the government’s pattern of overstating its social expenditures while demanding the international community should pay more has continued into 2003. For example, the government announced that it would spend U.S.$800 million on education from 2004 until 2015. The government would spend U.S.$400 million while the remainder would come from the Brazilian government and other sources. According to these numbers, the government’s burden would only be about U.S.$37 million per year, much less than the government already spends.189 Similarly, a World Bank official told Human Rights Watch that the government claimed it had spent approximately U.S.$120 million of an approximately U.S.$180 million emergency demobilization and resettlement program to assist former UNITA soldiers, their families, and war-affected civilians in 2002. The World Bank official added that the government said that it had spent enough on the program and more than it had originally intended. As a result, the government claimed that it was not its responsibility to pay for any more assistance. Instead, the government said that it would be up to the international community to pay for the balance of the program and any additional assistance. Moreover, the World Bank could not confirm that the government had actually spent $120 million and believed its true spending was actually U.S.$50 to U.S.$60 million.190 The failure to adequately fund the demobilization program has a direct impact on human rights. The program includes components to provide human rights education to demobilized soldiers, their families, and the communities that where they settle, assistance to women, and child soldiers. Human Rights Watch has found, however, that government demobilization programs effectively excluded assistance to child soldiers. Thus, children’s’ suffering as combatants is only increased when the government provided no specific assistance for them once the war with UNITA ended.191 Increased government expenditures alone would not fully resolve the dire humanitarian situation in Angola. But, the availability of additional funds could facilitate major improvements. Human Rights Watch recognizes the magnitude of Angola’s humanitarian and social needs and welcomes international assistance in order to fully fund the U.N. Inter-Agency Appeal. However, we also believe that the Angolan government has been negligent by mismanaging public funds and failing to meet the acute needs of its citizenry. Emerging Issues: HIV/AIDSThe low level of government spending for health also has serious implications for Angola’s emerging public health crises. According to UNAIDS, HIV prevalence increased to 8.6 percent of the population in 2002, but Angola has little data on HIV. It is likely that HIV prevalence is much higher in Angola because the government only conducted a limited survey in the provinces of Luanda and Huila. No other surveys have been conducted since 1996. Even the earlier surveys suggested that the infection rate might be much higher than 8.6 percent. For example, a 1996 survey in the province of Cabinda found that infection rates were rapidly increasing. In 1992 the rate was 6.8 percent and had increased to 8.5 percent by 1996.192 In the case of epidemics and public health emergencies, such as HIV/AIDS, General Comment 14 by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights specifies the “right to prevention, treatment and control of diseases” and states that this includes “the creation of a system of urgent medical care in cases of accidents, epidemics, and similar health hazards.”193 In acceding to the ICESCR, Angola undertook to establish systems that would provide health care to all in epidemics, including HIV/AIDS. However, under General Comment 14, unjustifiably low allocations for HIV/AIDS could lead to a violation of Article 12 of the ICESCR.194 The government did develop a national AIDS strategy, scheduled to run from 1999 to 2002. UNAIDS reported that the government expenditure was primarily for the National AIDS plan and that “provincial programmes have a very low budget allocation, and limited staff and infrastructure.”195 However, even the resources for the program were nominal: only about U.S.$7.1 million.196 By comparison, Tanzania had an HIV prevalence rate of 7.8 percent in 2002 and had allocated U.S.$19 million for HIV programs for that year.197 The government said that it would apply for approximately U.S.$75 million in funding for HIV/AIDS and other diseases from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in May 2003.198 Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch believes that greater resources should be devoted to Angola’s HIV/AIDS crisis. A failure to do so could undermine Angola’s commitments under Article 2 of the ICESCR.
Lack of DemocracyA critical way for the public to hold officials accountable is through voting. Elections allow voters to choose how they should be governed and, indirectly at least, provides an opportunity for public input on government use of public funds. In Angola, however, this has not been the case. Angola does not comply with article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity…without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors….”199 On paper, Angola is a republic that allows elections of members of the National Assembly (parliament) and the president. In practice, however, Angolans do not have the ability to change their government. Power is concentrated in the hands of the president and the National Assembly has largely served as a “rubber stamp” body for the president and council of ministers.200 The last elections were held in September 1992 and reported to have been generally free and fair. However, UNITA refused to recognize the need for runoff elections and rejected the results. By October, UNITA resumed the war with the government.201 Since that time, there have not been elections in the country. As a result of UNITA’s rejection of the 1992 elections, President José Eduardo dos Santos has been in power since 1979.202 Prior to the end of the war in April 2002, the government did state that it wanted to hold elections.203 However, it has never firmly committed to do so. In May 2002, a month after the war had ended, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) jointly published a “pre-election assessment report” detailing the steps needed for free and fair elections.204 That report concluded that meaningful elections would not be possible until four major steps were taken. The first was a major commitment to restore basic rights, including respect for freedom of association, expression, assembly, and movement. Second, the report recommended constitutional reforms and the introduction of legislation to enable those reforms. Third, revising key electoral laws so that opposition parties could fairly compete with the ruling Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA) party. Finally, the report recommended setting a firm date for elections in order to have a meaningful deadline in order to implement reforms.205 At this writing, however, the government has not set a date for elections, nor has it comprehensively undertaken needed reforms.206 It is unlikely that elections could take place before 2005 and without reforms would not be free or fair and could further entrench the MPLA in power. In the absence of a firm date for elections and the political will to implement reforms, the Angolan people are unable to exercise their rights under article 25 of the ICCPR. This also allows the government to maintain its control over the political and economic resources of the country, without any electoral accountability. Another factor delaying elections is the government’s mismanagement of the economy. According to one senior diplomat based in Angola, the government’s mismanagement has led to a lack of funds for the reforms required to conduct free and fair elections.207 The government has repeatedly said it would like to hold elections by 2004 or 2005 and has estimated that U.S.$350 million would be required to pay for those reforms. But it has not specified whether it had allocated those funds.208 Mismanagement of funds may have also created a political disincentive to hold free and fair elections. According to the same foreign diplomat, the government is reluctant to hold elections because it cannot show that it has provided for the population and fears that it would lose an election as a result.209 140Alan Gelb and associates, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (New York: The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1988); Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources Corruption, and Economic Growth," International Monetary Fund Working Paper, July 1999; and Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 141 The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States. 142 Article 19 of the ICCPR states: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. 143 Article 12 of the ICESCR states: 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness. Article 13 of the ICESCR states: 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; (b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; (d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; (e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph I of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State. 144 United Nations, Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Angola,” treaty bodies ratification database; and United Nations, Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights: Angola,” treaty bodies ratification database. 145 United Nations, Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Angola: Reporting Status for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, treaty bodies database: reporting status; and United Nations, Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Angola: Reporting Status for the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, treaty bodies database: reporting status. 146 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19(2). 147 Human Rights Watch, Chile: Progress Stalled-Setbacks in Freedom of Expression Reform, a Human Rights Watch short report, March 2001. 148 For example, see the IMF’s comments on the Angolan budget in “Angola: Staff Report for the 2002 Article IV Consultation,” p. 16. 149 International Bar Association, Angola: Promoting Justice Post-Conflict (London: International Bar Association, 2003). 150 United Nations, “Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,”General Comment 9 by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, May 12, 2003, p. 54. 151 Angola: Promoting Justice Post-Conflict p.19. 152 Ibid., pp.30-33. 153 See: Human Rights Watch, “Struggling Through Peace: Return and Resettlement in Angola,” a Human Rights Watch short report, August 2003; Human Rights Watch, “The War is Over: The Crisis of Angola’s Internally Displaced Continues,” a Human Rights Watch briefing paper, July 2002; and United Nations, “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, Addendum 5, Profiles in Displacement: Angola,” E/CN.4/2001/5/Add. 5. 154 “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, Addendum 5, E/CN.4/2001/5/Add. 5, p. 24. 155 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Angola,” S/2003/158, February 7, 2003, p. 6. 156 Angola: Promoting Justice Post-Conflict, pp.37-39. 157 “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola,” S/2001/351, p. 5. 158 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Annex III: Human Development Indicators. 159 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2002 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Annex I: Human Development Indicators. 160 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Human Development Indicators. 161 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), Human Development Indicators; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Human Development Indicators. 162 International Monetary Fund, “Angola: Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV Consultation,” July 14, 2003, p. 36. 163 World Health Organization, “Angola: Selected Indicators,” available at www.who.int. 164 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, “Report on the Mission by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara A. Otunnu to Angola, May 11-17, 2002, May 2002, p. 5. 165 Ibid. 166 “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, Addendum 5: Angola,” E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.5, pp. 7-8. 167 “Angola: Staff Report for the 2003 Article IV Consultation,” p. 36. 168 “Report on the Mission by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara A. Otunnu to Angola, May 11-17, 2002,” p. 4. 169 UNICEF, Angola: Statistics,” August 2003. 170 United Nations, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2003 (New York: United Nations, November 2002), p.1. 171 See: United Nations, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals from 1997-2003. These statistics and reports are available at www.reliefweb.int/appeals/index.html in the Angola section. 172 Sources: “Angola: Staff Report for the 2002 Article IV Consultation,” p. 33; “Angola: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,” p.109; and United Nations, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals from 1997-2003. These statistics and reports are available at www.reliefweb.int/appeals/index.html in the Angola section. Angolan government expenditures were classified as education, health, social security, welfare, and housing. 173 KPMG, Inception Report, p.125. 174 To be used in community and social projects. 175 To be used in community and social development projects to be defined by Sonangol 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid. 181 Human Rights Watch interview, Luanda, November 30, 2002. 182 ICESCR, Art. 12. 183 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” General Comment No. 14 (2000), E/C.12/2000/4, November 8, 2000, paragraph 52. 184 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, paragraph 14(g). 185 “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, Addendum 5: Angola,” E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.5, p. 11. 186 “Report on the Mission by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara A. Otunnu to Angola, May 11-17, 2002,” p. 8. 187 “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, Addendum 5: Angola,” E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.5, p. 18. 188 Ibid., p. 18. 189 “U.S.$ 800 million Needed for Education Reform,” ANGOP, July 30, 2003. 190 Human Rights Watch interview with World Bank official, Washington, D.C., June 19, 2003. 191 Human Rights Watch, “Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola,” a Human Rights Watch short report, vol.15, no.10 (A), April 2003. 192 UNAIDS, UNICEF, and WHO, “Angola: Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections,” 2002 Update, p. 2. 193 CESCR General Comment No. 14, “The right to the highest attainable standard of health,” paragraph 16. 194 U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” General Comment No. 14 (2000), E/C.12/2000/4, November 8, 2000, paragraph 52. 195 UNAIDS, “Angola: National Response Brief,” 2002. This document is available at: www.unaids.org/nationalresponse/r. 196 Government of Angola, Ministry of Health, National Office of Public Health, “Strategic Plan for the National Program in the Fight Against AIDS: 1999-2002,” July 15, 1999, p. 49. 197 UNAIDS, “Tanzania: National Response Brief,” 2002. This document is available at: www.unaids.org/nationalresponse. 198 “Country to Get USD 74 Million from Global Fund,” ANGOP, May 30, 2003. 199 ICCPR, Art. 25. 200 United States Government, Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002: Angola (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2003). 201 Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p.15. 202 Government of Angola, “Profile of President José Eduardo dos Santos.” This biography is available at the Angolan Embassy in the U.S. website (www.angola.org/politics/p_bios.htm). 203 Government of Angola, “Angola’s President Reaffirms Commitment to Democracy; Calls on Savimbi to Take the Path to Peace,” press statement, May 11, 2001. 204 The International Foundation for Election Systems, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, “Angola: Pre-election Assessment Report,” May 2002. 205 Ibid., p. ii. 206 “Government Prepares Next Elections in the Country,” ANGOP, July 25, 2003. 207 Human Rights Watch interview, London, June 18, 2003. 208 “Government Prepares Reliable General Elections—Minister,” ANGOP, August 8, 2003. 209 Human Rights Watch interview, London, June 18, 2003.
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