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III. The Spread of Abuses to Ingushetia

In June 2003, Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen forces conducted at least seven operations on the territory of Ingushetia. Five of these operations were carried out in settlements of internally displaced—OOO URS, Nasyr-Kort, Nesterovskaia, Tanzilla, and Altievo; the other twoin the Ingush villages of Arshty and Chemulga.

The operations followed the pattern of sweep operations or targeted raids seen in Chechnya: large groups of armed personnel, often arriving on armored personnel carriers and other military vehicles without license plates, surrounded a settlement or an entire village and conducted either sweep or random checks at peoples’ dwellings. The armed personnel, who were in most cases masked, did not identify themselves or provide the residents with any explanation for the operations. During the operations, many civilians were subjected to beatings and other forms of ill-treatment; and some houses were looted. As a result of the seven operations, the armed personnel detained at least eighteen people; ten of those were released several days or weeks after, without ever getting any explanation of the grounds for their detention.

Most of the operations had no obvious purpose, and neither Ingush nor federal authorities provided any explanations of their purpose.45 Only two operationsin the Tanzilla and Altievo settlementsresulted in legal proceedings against the detainees. However, these two operations were also conducted in an abusive manner and involved numerous human rights violations, raising serious concerns regarding the legal validity of subsequent investigations.

Russian military appeared to be responsible also for at least two groundless attacks on Ingush civilians near the village of Galashki, killing one and seriously injuring another person in one incident, and shooting a minor in another.

Ingush and federal authorities failed to adequately respond to the proliferation of abuses: no investigations were launched into violations committed during the special operations, and an investigation into the Galashki attack stalled because of the military procuracy’s refusal to take over the case.

Human Rights Watch recognizes that Russian authorities have a legitimate right to conduct law enforcement and security operations in any part of the Russian Federation in order to identify and arrest suspected criminals. Any such operations should, however, conform to Russian and international law.

The majority of detentions described below must be considered arbitrary, since no grounds for detention were given and no charges brought against the detainees. In addition, none of the detainees who were later released had access to counsel; their relatives were not informed of the detention; and apparently no detention record was kept.46

Other abuses committed by Russian forces during the special operations, including incidents of ill-treatment and looting, also violate Russia’s obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the ICCPR, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).47

Abuses During Special Operations in Settlements for Internally Displaced People

Special operation in OOO URS settlement48

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on June 3, 2003, six armored personnel carriers (APCs), which are used only by Russian forces, and other vehicles, including two Ural trucks, two Gazel vans, and a Volga sedan encircled the OOO URS settlement on the western outskirts of Nazran. With the exception of the vans, the vehicles did not have license plates, or the plates were covered with mud. Dozens of armed personnel in camouflage uniforms, many of them masked, forced their way into peoples’ homes, breaking the doors if the dwellers did not open them fast enough. They forced all men, including teenagers and the elderly, outside and put them on the ground, face down with their hands behind their heads. The uniformed men did not identify themselves or provide any explanation. Most of them spoke Russian, although some spoke Chechen.49

The armed personnel beat several people while taking them out of their homes. For example, fifty-one-year-old Alik A. (not his real name) told Human Rights Watch that he woke up that night as a man in camouflage poked an automatic rifle into his face, forcing him outside. When Alik A. turned around to take his coat, the serviceman hit him with a rifle butt in the shoulder. According to Alik A., two days later his shoulder was still black from bruises.50

Another witness said the armed personnel threw her neighbor, a minor, down the stairs and slammed his head against the wall so that for the next couple of days he suffered from a severe headache and his eyes were swollen.51

Over the next several hours, the armed personnel photographed and checked the identity documents of the displaced Chechens and conducted unsanctioned searches in their shelters. Witnesses reported several cases of looting during the searches. Fatima F. (not her real name) mentioned that the armed personnel took a video camera, video tapes, and several pairs of shoes from her neighbors’ place;52 Alik A. said that the uniformed man who was conducting a body search on him while he was laying on the ground took away his penknife and took 1,200 rubles (U.S.$ 40) out of his pocket, but returned the money after Alik A. started shouting that he was being robbed.53 According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the armed personnel also took away a box of jeans (stored for sale) from a family that was not at home that night; stole boxes with humanitarian aid from the house of the settlement’s commandant; and took away radio-recorders from two cars belonging to displaced persons.54

After the armed personnel left, the settlement dwellers learned that four people had been taken away. Three of them were released the next day but one was held for sixteen days. One of the three, Abubakar A. (not his real name), told Human Rights Watch that he was on the ground along with other men from the settlement when the servicemen lifted him up and put him into the Ural truck, along with three other men, saying they were going to check their identities. The armed personnel drove them away. The drive took about six hours, yet the witness did not know where he was taken, because he was hooded when transferred from the car to the place of his detention. Abubakar A. told Human Rights Watch that he was kept in solitary confinement and interrogated about the rebel fighters’ whereabouts.55 In a petition on file with the Memorial Human Rights Center, Abubakar A. complained that in detention he was handcuffed to a pillar during the day and at night, and that two interrogators severely and repeatedly kicked him, and tortured him with electric shock.56 He told Human Rights Watch that on the second day of detention he was put into a car along with two other detainees from his settlement, all three of them hooded, and taken to a quarry between Grozny and Argun. The servicemen ordered them to remain hooded for ten minutes after the servicemen left and then to go home, which they did.57

Suleiman S. (not his real name), also detained during the operation in OOO URS settlement, believed he and the other detainees were taken to Grozny. The servicemen did not release him along with the others, and he spent sixteen days in detention. He told Human Rights Watch that he was kept in solitary confinement and was never informed of the grounds for his arrest or of his procedural status. He was interrogated twice as to the identities of his neighbors detained during the operation. Suleiman S. could not explain why he was kept in detention for more than two weeksthe servicemen told him that it was “because of the holidays.”58

One of the settlement dwellers told Human Rights Watch that the first three detainees were in very bad shape when they returned from detention. Their neighbors immediately called an ambulance, and the doctors wanted to hospitalize the men, yet the victims refused. According to the witness, the three men were suffering from pain in their backs, apparently caused by beatings on their kidneys, and their wrists were swollen as if they had been hung by the wrists.59

After the operation, the settlement dwellers filed a joint petition with the local procuracy. However, the procuracy requested additional individual petitions. “But someone said we would be taken away again,” Alik A. told Human Rights Watch. “I asked them [the procuracy], ‘Can you give us any security guarantees if two or three of us file additional petitions?’ They said ‘No.’ Then everybody refused to file additional petitions.”60

The settlement dwellers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, especially those detained during the operation, were visibly scared and dispirited, and were reluctant to talk to human rights investigators. According to one of the witnesses, the detainees were explicitly warned not to talk to anybody about what happened to them.61

Special operation in Nasyr-Kort settlement

On June 7, 2003, at about 5:00 a.m. unidentified armed personnel arrived to the Nasyr-Kort settlement near Nazran on three UAZ jeeps and a PAZ bus, without license plates. The men blockaded the settlement, not letting anybody out. They surrounded one of the buildings of the abandoned dairy farm that serves as shelter for the displaced people, and conducted searches inside the building. Some displaced persons believed that the armed men were representatives of the Chechen law enforcement structures.62

Without any explanation the men took away Umar U. (b.1975) and one other person. Human Rights Watch was unable to meet with the two released detainees: according to other displaced persons, the two men were afraid of talking to anybody after their arrest.63 A brother of one detainee, Abdulla A. (not his real name), told Human Rights Watch that people were scared because they think talking to “journalists” might result in further persecution. As for his brother’s detention, Abdulla A. stated that the armed men put a plastic bag on his brother’s head when detaining him at home. For the next two days the relatives had no information about his whereabouts. The family went to Chechnya to look for him and on the third day after the detention Abdulla A. and other family members found him in a hospital in the Chechen city of Gudermes and took him home. Abdulla A. said that his brother was in bad shape, because he had been beaten and held with a bag on his head for a full day.64

According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, Umar U. was taken to one of the Ministry of Internal Affairs departments in Grozny and then transferred to Gudermes. Law enforcement officials interrogated him, seeking information about an alleged rebel fighter from his native village, Tsotsin-Yurt, and then forced him to sign a confession that he was a rebel fighter himself who voluntarily came to surrender under the amnesty. He was released on condition that within a month he would “find” a submachine gun and “voluntarily” hand it in.65

Special operation in Nesterovskaia settlement

On June 3, 2003, at about 1:00 p.m. four cars arrived at the Nesterovskaia settlement, located at the abandoned dairy farm in Sunzhenskii district of Ingushetia. Masked men jumped out of the cars and immediately started shooting into the air, causing panic among the settlement dwellers.66 Rustam R. (not his real name) arrived at the settlement in his car after the operation had already started. When he approached the farm, the armed men opened fire on his car, but missed. The men ordered Rustam R. and one other young man, Adam A. (not his real name), into their car, and took both away. They also seized Rustam R.’s car.67

Both detainees were taken to an unknown location in the Gudermes area in Chechnya. Rustam R. would not provide Human Rights Watch a detailed account of his detention, saying that they were warned not to talk. He said that the abductors treated him well, but that they did not explain the grounds for his detention. He was released on June 18, 2003, and Adam A. returned to the camp several days later. No charges were brought against either of the men, and no explanation was given as to why they were kept in detention for more than two weeks.68

According to Memorial, Ingush policemen who stopped the car with the detainees when it was leaving Ingushetia said that representatives of Chechen security force carried out the operation.69

Special operation in Tanzilla settlement

At about 7:00 p.m. on June 12, 2003, armed masked men in camouflage uniforms, most of them speaking Russian and some speaking Chechen, arrived at the gates on the Tanzilla settlement in the center of Nazran. Officials claim the servicemen were pursuing two cars that stopped near the camp. According to witnesses, the masked men jumped out of their vehicles and immediately seized all men and teenagers who were near the gates at the moment. Settlement dwellers were not allowed to enter or leave the settlement.70

Raisa R. (not her real name), who was returning home after the operation started, was not allowed through the cordon into the settlement, and she witnessed the events from outside. She told Human Rights Watch that armed personnel severely beat the men with clubs and rifle butts and threw them face down onto the ground, where they stayed for several hours. Meanwhile, the armed men were searching the cars they were allegedly pursuing and moving guns and ammunition from one car to another, and had a cameraman shooting the scene. The witness was unsure whether there were any weapons already in the cars, yet she said she saw the soldiers putting their own weapons and body armor into the vehicles for the filming. According to the witness, many of those detained were bleeding heavily and could not rise to their feet on their own. The armed men lifted them up and threw them into a bus.71 Several other witnesses (who were watching the scene through the windows of a café located on the territory of the settlement and facing the street) corroborated this account.72

The armed men arrested nine men near the settlement.73 Human Rights Watch does not have the names of all of the detainees, but possesses information and details about three of them. Two of them were residents of the Tanzilla settlement. The first one, Courah C. (not his real name), was sitting near the gates of the settlement reading a newspaper when the operation started. His wife told Human Rights Watch:

That evening I was coming back from the market place and saw my husband sitting near the gates. He was reading a paper or may have been doing a crossword. I did not see any cars or servicemen around. It all happened in a matter of minutes. I had not even taken my shoes off when I heard screams outside and heard women saying that some men were detained near the camp. I immediately thought of my husband, because he was there, near the gates…. I wanted to come out, but they did not let me, and I was watching through the café window. I saw him lying on the ground, he was bleeding, I saw blood on his arms and face. I went to bring his identity papers, but they did not take them.74

Another detainee from the settlement was Kharon Kh. (not his real name), a high school student who also happened to be near the gates at the time of the operation. That evening he went to get some water for dinner, and while waiting for his turn near the water-pump, wandered into the street. His father told Human Rights Watch:

I heard that they had detained people, and ran out, but they did not let anybody out of the gates. He took his last exam at high school that day… . When they left, I did not even know my son was among the detainees. I was waiting for him to come back the whole night, and the next day. Only the next day, in the evening an official came with the list [of detainees]. I knew my son did not have any papers on him and wanted to give them his passport. But he did not take it, just ordered me to come next morning. Next morning I came to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and told them what I saw. In my absence, they conducted a search at our place, but did not take anything. An investigator told me my son was in detention in Ossetia. I went there, but they did not let me see him.75

Both Courah C. and Kharon Kh. spent one and a half months in detention. They were kept in a pretrial detention center in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia and Kharon Kh. was later transferred to Piatigorsk, in Stavropol region. According to Kharon K.’s lawyer, both were charged with possession of arms, but released late July in accordance with article 27.1(1) of the Russian criminal procedure code – “non-involvement of the accused in the perpetration of the crime.” The lawyer is considering suing the authorities who carried out the operation for moral and physical harm inflicted on his client by an unlawful detention.76

During the operation, the servicemen also detained Aslambek A. (not his real name), who was married to a woman from the Tanzilla settlement. A local police official claimed that Aslambek A. was “a supporter of the militant Islamic wahhabi movement” and that he was detained and charged with “terrorism” and other “serious crimes.”77 Human Rights Watch has no information to confirm or deny these allegations, but is concerned about the serious violations that have characterized the investigation of his case.

On July 8, 2003, a group of several dozen armed personnel in camouflage, some of them masked, arrived to Alina tent camp, where Aslambek A.’s parents and eight siblings lived in two adjacent tents. The parents were not at home; that day they had gone to visit Aslambek A. in detention. According to a neighbor, the armed men did not introduce themselves and did not explain the purpose of their visit. They turned everything in the tents upside down and took away some documents, family pictures, and a toy gun belonging to one of the boys.78

The armed personnel also took away two minors – Aslambek’s fourteen-year-old brother Ramzan (not his real name) and his seventeen-year-old sister, Makka (not her real name), along with a woman who was visiting the family. The servicemen took both minors to a local police station, where they stayed for several hours. Makka told Human Rights Watch:

They did not explain anything…. We asked “Why?” but they just said, “Move forward!” They put me in the back of an UAZ jeep, and there were masked men sitting next to me. There [at the police station] they interrogated us separately, in separate rooms, one by one…. All major officials were sitting around. It lasted for two or three hours. They asked about our brothers, and other relatives in the family pictures. They threatened [me]: “We know everything, tell us! We know your house, your gates, everything.” After the interrogation, I signed something.79

Makka M. did not know what exactly she had signed, because she hardly spoke Russian and could neither read nor write it.

According to Makka M., among the documents the armed personnel seized from their place were their older brothers’ death certificates and an appeal prepared by Aslambek A.’s lawyer, in which he described the torture his client was subjected to in order to force him into confession.80

The police official told Human Rights Watch that they did not “detain the kids, but just invited them, along with their aunt” to give some “explanations.” Explaining the way the two minors were apprehended in the camp, the official complained that “all the bandit groups are hiding in the camps,” and that the tent dwellers “attack” the authorities when they conduct checks. “Had we conducted the questioning there, we would have had problems, including smashed car windows,” he added. “And this way we just invited them over and were done in half an hour.”81

Special operation in Altievo settlement

At about 3:00 p.m. on June 22 armed masked men arrived in two cars at the Altievo settlement on the territory of an abandoned dairy farm. A Ministry of Internal Affairs official informed Human Rights Watch that the operation was carried out by forces of the Oktiabrskii ROVD from Grozny.82 According to witnesses, the police forces were looking for one of the settlement dwellers, Minkail M. (not his real name), who started fleeing when he realized that the armed personnel were after him. The servicemen chased Minkail M. and eventually seized him when he randomly ran into one of the houses in the settlement, belonging to Suleiman S. (not his real name). They beat Minkail M. with rifle butts, put him in one of the cars, and drove away.83 His wife told Human Rights Watch that her husband used to be a fighter during the first war and is now charged with murder and burglary.84

The alleged legal grounds for this arrest does not, however, justify the police conduct during the operation. According to numerous witnesses’ accounts, they were responsible for looting and deliberately endangering the safety of other settlement dwellers. In the house of Suleiman S. (where they apprehended Minkail M.) the servicemen stole a camera and 5,600 rubles (approximately US $190).85 When the settlement dwellers, mostly women, including Minkail M.’s wife, approached the servicemen trying to see what was going on, the servicemen started shooting at the women’s feet to disperse the crowd.86 According to Satsita S., one of the servicemen then dropped to his knee and fired a shot at a boy who was running away. The shot missed and the boy escaped unharmed. [87]

The settlement dwellers did not file any complaints about the operation, explaining that they were scared that the servicemen might return.88

Abuses during Special Operations in Ingush villages

Special operation in Arshty

On the morning of June 6, 2003, federal forces on six APCs and other military vehicles surrounded the village of Arshty in southern Ingushetia and blocked all ways in and out. The operation lasted for two days, during which the servicemen conducted unsanctioned searches in peoples’ homes, looted and damaged civilian property, and ill-treated several people, one of whom was hospitalized.

On the first day of the sweep an FSB official from Sunzhenskii district who entered the village, along with the head of the local administration and a local policeman, accompanied the servicemen during the checks in peoples’ houses. According to Murad Firzauli, head of the local administration, this helped to prevent looting. However, the next day, June 7, no authorities were allowed into the village, including the vice prime minister of Ingushetia, the deputy chief prosecutor of Ingushetia, and the Sunzhenskii district prosecutor, all of whom tried unsuccessfully to enter the village.89 In order to keep the servicemen under control, Firzauli suggested they should form two groups — one accompanied by himself, and one by the local policeman. Yet, according to Firzauli:

[On the 7th,] they formed four groups instead – we went along, checking [with the first two groups], and right after us the other groups came, stealing everything. From some people they stole gold and necklaces, from some – money, from others – a tape-recorder. They managed to carry away a big tape-recorder! Where people were not at home, they broke doors. They were smashing doors, although I told them not to do it here… The second day they were checking the same houses, and that’s when all this stealing and looting began.90

On the first day, federal forces ill-treated some villagers, before the head of the local administration managed to impose some order. At about 8:00 a.m. on June 6, four APCs drove into the yard of Timur T. (not his real name.) Federal forces threw three smoke grenades into the yard and started shooting into the air. Timur T. described the event to Human Rights Watch:

I heard explosions and shooting, and saw the flashes. In the yard I saw one of the kids, terrified, and lifted him to my arms. But they immediately swooped down on me, and tossed the child away – I did not see where they took him – and threw me onto the ground. They did not ask any questions, but were filming everything. They turned everybody face-up and filmed, and then put us back facedown onto the ground. Three of my brothers and my nephew were also on the ground, and they [the servicemen] - beat them with rifle butts. Then they checked our last names and said that was a mistake. Our father is a vice prime minister’s cousin. After everything they did they said it was a mistake! The worst thing is all these insults we have to swallow. They keep humiliating us and there is nothing we can do, not even say a word.91

On June 7, the servicemen broke into the house of eighty-year-old Atarik A. (not her real name). Murad Firzauli, who was present during the search, informed them that the elderly woman was the only one living there, and that she was not at home. Not listening to him, the servicemen started turning everything in the house upside down. They broke a safe, a chest, and a trunk; they stole some clothes and 8,000 rubles (approximately U.S. $250) that were hidden under a mattress on Atarik’s bed.92 “These were savings from my pension,” Atarik A. told Human Rights Watch. “When I returned home, everything was on the floor; they trampled and dirtied everything with their boots.”93

The servicemen also drove three APCs into the yard of Khumid Albakov, a member of the Ingush parliament. The family was not at home at the time of the operation. One of the APCs broke the gates of the house. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the servicemen occupied the house for the time of the operation, damaged the family’s property, and took away some furniture, linens, and other things.94 Albakov’s nephew, who lives nearby and was present during the operation, told Human Rights Watch that the servicemen reversed APC into the yard and started loading it with loot, such as cushions and pillows.95

Vakha V. (not his real name), a resident of Arshty, was away when the operation started. On June 7, he rushed back home worried about his nineteen-year-old son who had stayed in the village. As his car approached the village, two military vehicles blocked the way. Then, according to Vakha V.:

Soldiers jumped out, stopped us, and started throwing stuff from the car all over the road, swearing at us. I asked what was the matter, but they immediately hit me in the face with a rifle butt, and continued to beat me up. They broke several of my ribs and I had to go to a hospital right away. I have a medical certificate about the injuries.96

When interviewed by Human Rights Watch on July 5, 2003, Vakha V. had a visible, fresh scar on his face. He told Human Rights Watch that a local policeman from the neighboring village of Chemulga who witnessed the beating did not dare to intervene, but ran to notify a military unit permanently located near the village. The military also refused to take any measures to stop the abuse, however, saying their intervention could only make things worse. Vakha V. did not file a complaint with the procuracy, thinking it would be in vain.97

The Memorial Human Rights Center documented several other cases of ill-treatment and looting during the operation in Arshty.98

According to the head of the local administration, the villagers complained orally about the servicemen’s behavior during the operation, and specifically about looting, yet were afraid to file written complaints with the procuracy. Local procuracy officials along with the deputy chief prosecutor of Ingushetia visited Arshty after the operation, yet they did not question either witnesses or victims, and just ordered the head of the administration to collect and hand to the procuracy the villagers’ written complaints – if there were any.99

From a knowledgeable official Human Rights Watch learned that the operation was carried out by Moscow OMON (special-purpose police unit) troops, temporarily seconded at the Khankala military base in Chechnya.100

Special operation in Chemulga

On June 17-18, federal forces conducted another operation in the village of Chemulga, located in southern Ingushetia not far from Arshty. The village was surrounded by military vehicles, including APCs, and the servicemen checked identities of persons and searched cars entering and leaving the village.101 According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the head of the local administration and a local policeman were present during the operation, and the servicemen did not commit serious abuses. However, they beat up a local resident, who was trying to enter his house through a window, because his brother had left with the keys.102

Attacks on Ingush Civilians

Killing of Umar Zabiev, Wounding of Tamara Zabieva

On June 10, 2003, three Ingush civilians—sixty-five-year-old Tamara Zabieva and two of her sons, Ali and Umar Zabiev—were weeding their potato field near the village of Galashki. At approximately 6:00 p.m. they heard a column of military vehicles passing by and saw helicopters, apparently providing air cover for the column. About an hour later they drove back home in their truck when the car suddenly came under heavy machine gun fire.103

More than fifty bullets were shot at the car.104 Umar Zabiev, who was driving, lost control over the vehicle; the car ran into a tree on the roadside and caught fire. According to Ali Zabiev, the shooting was coming from a nearby forest; there was no prior warning or shooting into the air; and no effort to stop the car. Zabiev told Human Rights Watch that during the shooting his mother was injured in the back, neck, and head. When the brothers took her out of the car, she was unconscious. Ali and Umar did not sustain serious injuries during the shooting. Umar stayed with his mother and sent Ali to the village for help.105

About forty minutes later, villagers from Galashki, local police, and Zabiev’s family members arrived at the site of the shooting. Musa Zabiev, the oldest brother and a major in the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, told Human Rights Watch that they found Tamara Zabieva unconscious and sent her to the local hospital, but were unable to find Umar that evening.106

The search for Umar went on into the night, and at about 10:00 p.m. two local residents, who were combing the forest, were stopped by a group of armed military men, speaking unaccented Russian. The military men interrogated them about the purpose of their search and the villagers’ reaction to the shooting. Three hours later, having received some commands through a radio transmitter, the military men released the two villagers.107

Next morning, Umar Zabiev’s body, bearing clear marks of torture and gunshot wounds, was discovered twenty meters away from the spot where the two villagers were detained the night before. The body was hidden in the forest, 1,700 meters away from the road. Musa Zabiev told Human Rights Watch:

We would have never found the body if it weren’t for the two men who had been detained at night. They suggested we should go and check around the place where they had been stopped. And there we saw blood and traces of dragging, which we followed…. Umar had multiple fractures — his jaw and right arm were broken, and the teeth on the right side were knocked out. There was a stab-wound in the kidney area. His eyes were bruised and swollen, and on the leg there were traces from beating with a rifle butt…. It was clear that they were finishing him off. They took a final shot [to his head].108

Musa Zabiev believes that the servicemen who had fired at the car later found Umar and his mother; they took Umar away, but left Tamara Zabieva, thinking she was dead.109

In the proximity of the burial place local police found more than one hundred used cartridges and a machine gun cartridge belt, used band-aids, cigarette stubs, and insoles. They also found numerous empty water bottles and food packages, including tinned pork meat cans and tea and sugar packages with the Russian Ministry of Defense marking on them. Food items were hidden in small pits covered with soil.110

Military officials immediately started denying any involvement of federal servicemen in the incident. The day after the shooting, the deputy commander of the United Group of Forces, General Istrenko, a representative of the military intelligence unit, and a representative of the military procuracy from Khankala, Chechnya, visited the site of the incident. However, none of them has demonstrated any willingness to investigate the involvement of servicemen in the shooting. Musa Zabiev described his discussion with General Istrenko:

The general denied everything, the very possibility of the military’s involvement, and the shooting. I got an impression that the general arrived in order to somehow find my relatives’ connections to rebel fighters; in order to somehow lump the blame [for the incident] on rebels. When someone is really interested in solving the case, his behavior, his attitude is very different.111

The Sunzhenskii district civilian procuracy has been thoroughly and aggressively investigating the case. After discovering ample evidence of federal servicemen’s involvement, an investigator tried to transfer the case to the military procuracy, but the latter refused to take it over. Due to procedural limitations, the civilian procuracy cannot take further measures to identify individual perpetrators or a unit involved, and without the military procuracy’s involvement, the case will most likely remain unsolved.112

Wounding of Imran Guliev

On June 4, 2003, sixteen-year-old Imran Guliev was on a riverbank near Galashki with three friends, gathering stones for construction purposes. At approximately 4:00 p.m. the teenagers saw a column of APCs driving by.

One of the APCs slowed down, and a soldier sitting on top of the vehicle took aim and shot at the boys, wounding Imran in the leg. Imran told Human Rights Watch that right after the shot the soldier pushed two of his subordinates off the vehicle and they picked up the bullet case. The soldiers clearly heard the screams and saw Imran falling, but did not bother to stop.113 Imran’s friend ran for help and the boy was taken to a local hospital, where he spent the next twenty days.

Imran’s friends and three other bystanders witnessed the incident. They remembered the APC’s number – “825,” and they could clearly describe the soldier who shot at the boys. According to one of the youngsters, the soldier’s skin was darkish; he had a scar on one of his cheeks; and he was wearing a T-shirt, camouflage pants, and a bandana covering his head.114

Imran’s father, Sultan Guliev, addressed the authorities almost immediately after the incident. He rushed to the village administration, local police, local procuracry, and FSB, urging the authorities to stop the column. His efforts proved futile — the APCs drove through the village and left unhindered.115

The military procuracy has to date refused to open an investigation into the incident. According to Sultan Guliev, the procuracy believed that the case was not worth pursuing, since the serviceman would be in any case acquitted under the recent amnesty.116

Response of the Authorities

One of the most alarming developments witnessed by Human Rights Watch in Ingushetia was the authorities’ unwillingness to acknowledge that the abuses even took place, let alone to investigate them and punish the perpetrators.

Federal forces participating in the Ingushetia operations enjoy complete impunity, which has long been a characteristic feature of the Chechnya conflict. As mentioned above, no investigations have been launched into the raids on settlements for displaced persons and Ingush villages, and the victims are actively discouraged from pursuing their cases with the authorities. The investigation launched by the Ingush civilian procuracy into the brutal attack on Umar Zabiev and Tamara Zabieva came to a standstill because of the military procuracy’s refusal to take over the case or assist the investigators in any way.

Overall, the reaction of Ingush authorities to the escalation of abuses on their territory has been mixed. For example, an Ingush procuracy official bitterly complained to Human Rights Watch about the impudence and arbitrariness of Russian forces, and the impunity they enjoy.117 At the same time, a high-ranking Ingush Ministry of Internal Affairs official fervently denied any allegations that the situation in Ingushetia is worsening.118 He insisted that the operations conducted on Ingush territory conform to the law and are targeted against criminals hiding in the republic. According to the official, no abuses or violations have occurred during the raids, and the brutality of the servicemen was merely the fruit of the displaced persons’ imagination.119

The Ministry of Internal Affairs official’s account of the special operations in Arshty, Nesterovskaia, Tanzilla, OOO URS, and Altievo was inconsistent and contradicted facts documented by Human Rights Watch. For example, the official claimed that all nine people apprehended near the Tanzilla settlement were legally detained and charged with “very serious criminal offenses;” that in southern Ingushetia operations were conducted only in the forests, and “not a single shot was fired in an inhabited area;” and that in all circumstances the servicemen identified themselves. Regarding the Galashki incident, the official insisted, “nothing has been proved there yet, including the military’s involvement.”120

According to same official, Ingush authorities were informed about the general plans of the Russian or pro-Moscow Chechen forces to conduct operations in Ingushetia, but not about specific locations, “in order to prevent a leak.” He insisted that these operations were nothing out of the ordinary. He told Human Rights Watch:

Nothing extraordinary is going on here. Ordinary measures. Of course, some people are interested in presenting all this in a different light, but all these are lawful measures, lawful detentions…. Only lawfulness and harshness, nothing else…. We never touch the innocent, and people always know who conducted the operation and why. But they just try to present it in such a light, to lump their problems on someone else so that someone else would solve them. They often play foul like that.121

However, the official further complained about the difficulties of conducting operations in settlements, saying that his policemen “die during every operation,” and that the camps’ dwellers “shoot down the servicemen.” Moreover, talking about the Galashki incident, he repeatedly mentioned that “military actions are in place there, with daily shootouts and attacks.” [122]

He underscored the Ministry’s preoccupation with return and dismissed the security risks returnees might face in Chechnya:

We would like them to leave and settle in their houses, which are absolutely intact, safe and sound. [By staying here] they just cause further harm to their houses and gardens. Take a car, go to Chechnya. Absolutely intact houses, the whole villages abandoned. What is the need for staying here, in these farms, in these horrible, unsanitary conditions, while everything is marvelous there? There is nothing scary out there [in Chechnya]. People live freely. But they don’t think it’s worth returning because the freedom of movement is limited there. They may get their documents checked. And many of these people have problems with the law.

Human Rights Watch’s efforts to obtain commentary on the developments in Ingushetia from the Ingush President’s administration, the Ingush government, and the local FSB proved futile.

The failure of Russian authorities to investigate the abuses, prosecute the perpetrators, and provide redress for victims violates Russia’s obligations under international law. The ICCPR requires in article 2 that states “ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” Persons shall have their right to a remedy determined by “competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities,” or other competent state authority. The state must ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.123 The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in its draft General Comment on article 2, notes that “States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.”124

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights recognized in an April 2002 resolution on impunity that “accountability of perpetrators, including their accomplices, for grave human rights violations is one of the central elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations and a key factor in ensuring, … ultimately, reconciliation and stability within a State.”125



45 For example, even when ITAR-TASS news agency briefly reported on the operation in Arshty and Chemulga, the piece mentioned that the “reasons for the operation” were “not reported.” See Ruslam Maisigov, “Military block Ingush settlements of Arshty, Chemulga,” ITAR-TASS World Service, June 7, 2003.

46 Arbitrary detentions are prohibited under Article 9 of the ICCPR. Only arrests conducted in accordance with state legislation specifying the grounds on which individuals may be deprived of their liberty and the procedures to be used in enforcing such deprivations are considered lawful. Moreover, the prohibition on arbitrariness means that the deprivation of liberty, even if provided for by law, must still be proportional to the reason for arrest, as well as predictable. Article 9 also specifically requires that detainees be immediately informed of the reasons for their arrest and promptly told of any charges against them, and that they be brought promptly before a judge empowered to rule upon the lawfulness of the detention. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) contains a similar provision. The Cakici v. Turkey Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (July 8, 1999, para. 105) requires that a detention record (including information on the date, time, and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention, and the name of the person effecting the detention) must be kept regarding every detainee. Principle 17(1) of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, which applies to all people who are detained, states that a detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of legal counsel, be informed of his right by the competent authority promptly after arrest, and provided with reasonable facilities for exercising it.

47 The ICCPR and the ECHR declare the rights to liberty and security of person, to privacy, home, family and correspondence, and to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Both the ICCPR and the ECHR allow interference with these rights only under strictly defined conditions, none of which seem to be met in the cases described below.

48 OOO URS is the name of an abandoned factory where the settlement is located.

49 Human Rights Watch interviews with settlement dwellers: Sultan S., Alik A., Lisa L., Fatima F., Larisa L. and Aminat A. (not their real names), OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

50 Human Rights Watch interview with Alik A. (not his real name), OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

51 Human Rights Watch interview with Fatima F. (not her real name), OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

52 Ibid.

53 Human Rights Watch interview with Alik A., OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

54 Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’” June 26, 2003, available at http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm (retrieved July 31, 2003).

55 Human Rights Watch interview with Abubakar A. (not his real name), OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

56 Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of “Stability and Security?’” The witness did not relate these details when interviewed by Human Rights Watch. He was generally reluctant to talk and looked scared.

57 Human Rights Watch interview with Abubakar A., OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

58 Human Rights Watch interview with Suleiman S. (not his real name), OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003. June 12 is Russia’s independence day, usually celebrated as part of a long weekend.

59 Human Rights Watch interview with Fatima F., OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

60 Human Rights Watch interview with Alik A., OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

61 Human Rights Watch interview with Sultan S.(not his real name), OOO URS, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 4, 2003.

62 Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulla A.(not his real name), Nasyr-Kort, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

63 Human Rights Watch interviews with displaced persons in Nasyr-Kort, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003. Umar U. is also a pseudonym.

64 Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulla A., Nasyr-Kort, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

65 Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’”

66 Human Rights Watch interview with Lema L. (not his real name), Nesterovskaia, Ingushetia, July 6, 2003.

67 Human Rights Watch interview with Rustam R. (not his real name), Nesterovskaia, July 6, 2003.

68 Ibid.

69 Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’”

70 Human Rights Watch interviews with Raisa R., Khadizhat Kh., Taus T. (not their real names) and other witnesses, Tanzilla settlement, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7 and 8, 2003.

71 Human Rights Watch interview with Raisa R. (not her real name), Tanzilla settlement, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

72 Human Rights Watch interviews with Khadizhat Kh., Taus T. and Zargan Z. (not their real names), Tanzilla settlement, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7 and 8, 2003.

73 Ibid.

74 Human Rights Watch interview with Zargan C. (not her real name), Tanzilla settlement, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

75 Human Rights Watch interview with Khamzat Kh. (not his real name), Tanzilla settlement, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

76 Human Rights Watch interview with Kharon Kh.’s lawyer, Nazran, Ingushetia, September 9, 2003.

77 Human Rights Watch interview with the head of criminal investigations department at Sunzhenskii district department of Internal Affairs (ROVD), Sleptsovskaia, Ingushetia, July 8, 2003.

78 Human Rights Watch interview with Malika M. (not her real name), Alina tent camp, Ingushetia, July 8, 2003.

79 Human Rights Watch interview with Makka M. (not her real name), Alina tent camp, Ingushetia, July 8, 2003.

80 Ibid.

81 Human Rights Watch interview with the head of criminal investigations department at Sunzhenskii District Department of Internal Affairs (ROVD), Sleptsovskaia, Ingushetia, July 8, 2003.

82 Human Rights Watch interview with a high-ranking Ministry of Internal Affairs official, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003. The interviewee requested anonymity.

83 Human Rights Watch interviews with Aslan A., Satsita S. (not their real names) and other displaced persons in MTF Altievo settlement, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

84 Human Rights Watch interviews with Satsita S., MTF Altievo settlement, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

85 Human Rights Watch interviews with Aslan A., Satsita S. and other displaced persons in MTF Altievo settlement, July 7, 2003. See also: Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’”

86 Human Rights Watch interviews with Aslan A., Satsita S. and other displaced persons in MTF Altievo settlement, July 7, 2003.

87 Human Rights Watch interview with Satsita S., MTF Altievo settlement, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003.

88 Human Rights Watch interviews with Aslan A., Satsita S. and other displaced persons in MTF Altievo settlement, July 7, 2003.

89 Human Rights Watch interview with Murad Firzauli, Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

90 Ibid.

91 Human Rights Watch interview with Timur T. (not his real name), Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

92 Human Rights Watch interview with Murad Firzauli, Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

93 Human Rights Watch interview with Atarik A. (not her real name), Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

94 Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’”

95 Human Rights Watch interview with Akhmed A. (not his real name), Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

96 Human Rights Watch interview with Vakha V. (not his real name), Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

97 Ibid.

98 See: Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’”

99 Human Rights Watch interview with Murad Firzauli, Arshty, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

100 Human Rights Watch interview with a military official, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003 (the interviewee requested anonymity).

101 Human Rights Watch interview with Bislan B. (not his real name), Chemulga, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

102 Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and security?’”; Human Rights Watch interview with Bislan B., Chemulga, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003

103 Human Rights Watch interview with Ali Zabiev, Galashki, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

104 Human Rights Watch researchers counted more than fifty bullet holes when they inspected the vehicle on July 5, 2003.

105 Ibid.

106 Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Zabiev, Galashki, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

107 Ibid. See also: Memorial Human Rights Center, “Ingushetia – the Zone of ‘Stability and Security?’”

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Site of occurrence inspection report, Sunzhenskii district procuracy, June 11, 2003. On file with Human Rights Watch.

111 Human Rights Watch interview with Musa Zabiev, Galashki, Ingushetia, July 5, 2003.

112 Human Rights Watch interview with an official at Sunzhenskii district procuracy, Sleptsovskaia, Ingushetia, July 8, 2003 (the interviewee requested anonymity).

113 Human Rights Watch interview with Imran Guliev, Galashki, Ingushetia, July 6, 2003.

114 Human Rights Watch interview with Khusein Kh. (not his real name), Galashki, Ingushetia, July 6, 2003.

115 Human Rights Watch interview with Sultan Guliev, Galashki, Ingushetia, July 6, 2003.

116 Ibid.

117 Human Rights Watch interview with an official at Sunzhenskii district procuracy, Sleptsovskaia, Ingushetia, July 8, 2003 (the interviewee requested anonymity).

118 Human Rights Watch interview with a high-ranking official at the Ingush Ministry of Internal Affairs, Nazran, Ingushetia, July 7, 2003 (interviewee requested anonymity).

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 The Soviet Union ratified the ICCPR on October 16, 1973. Russia, as the Soviet Union's successor state, is a state party to the convention. The European Convention on Human Rights contains a similar provision in article 13. Russia ratified the European Convention on May 5, 1998. The European Court of Human Rights has established that the state’s obligation to respect the right to life includes a duty to diligently investigate murders and other cases of deprivation of human life. See Kaya v. Turkey, Judgment of February 19, 1998, para. 107.

124 U.N. Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment on Article 2, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant Unedited Version, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.3 (2003), paragraph 15.

125 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/79, April 25, 2002, preamble.


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September 2003