V. Failure of the U.S. and Coalition Forces to Support Exhumations

Iskandar Jawad Witwit, who was appointed acting mayor of al-Hilla after the collapse of the Iraqi government, informed U.S. Marines based in the area of the existence of the mass grave containing between forty and fifty corpses just south of al-Hilla as early as May 3. U.S. Marine forces briefly secured the site, but then allowed civilians to begin exhuming the remains. On May 5, an assessment team from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) visited the mass grave site, and recommended that U.S. military forces should secure mass grave sites in the future in order to preserve evidence and that mobile forensic teams should be mobilized to assess the grave sites and exhume them in a professional manner.

The U.S. government soon became aware of the possible existence of much larger mass graves in the al-Hilla area. By May 7, intelligence information gathered by the U.S. concluded that mass graves containing perhaps tens of thousands of bodies existed in the greater al-Hilla area. Despite this information, the U.S. and coalition forces as of this writing failed to come up with a strategy to assist with the exhumations of the large mass graves.

When asked about the lack of forensic assistance at the al-Mahawil mass grave site, Lt. Col. Rick Long of the U.S. Marines explained to Human Rights Watch that his orders were to classify mass graves as ones relating to suspected war crimes—a category he defined as crimes committed during international hostilities or involving the executions of prisoners of war—and ones involving suspected crimes against the Iraqi people. If the mass grave was classified as involving suspected war crimes, he explained, his orders were to secure it. If the mass grave involved suspected crimes against the Iraqi people, he was to “assist” the local authorities.⁸

The U.S. Marines at the site—who, it must be noted, do not have any forensic experience—provided water and shelter for the local authorities, and brought in some U.S. Marine counterintelligence officers to interview witnesses and gather testimonial evidence. With their limited resources, the U.S. forces on the ground mobilized military photographers to videotape and photograph the remains. The U.S. forces also brought in mechanical diggers after the exhumations were completed at the large al-Mahawil mass grave site to assist with the reburial efforts for the unidentified remains, and U.S. Marines helped provide security at the site. In all, the U.S. military forces at the location went to significant lengths to provide the assistance that was asked from them by the local authorities, and seemed dedicated to doing whatever they could on site.

However, the assistance provided at the site did not extend to bringing in professional forensic experts to assist with the exhumation. The U.S. military officials explained this failure by pointing out that they were simply respecting the wishes of the local population, who wanted to exhume the mass grave as quickly as possible. Equally likely, the failure to bring forensic experts to the scene of the mass grave was due to the fact that as far as Human Rights Watch has been able to learn as of this writing, the U.S. and coalition forces have yet to define a comprehensive strategy to assist with the exhumation of mass graves in Iraq—in sharp contrast with the international efforts made in the Balkans to assist with the exhumation and identification of remains.