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III. BACKGROUND

Tanzania was formed in 1964 as a union of mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar-the islands of Unguja (also known as Zanzibar) and Pemba.1 Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous part of the United Republic of Tanzania. The United Republic of Tanzania is a unitary state with a union government, but some powers in Zanzibar are devolved to the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government.2 Within the United Republic of Tanzania, Zanzibar formally retained considerable local autonomy and its own president, legislature (known as the Zanzibar House of Representatives), and judiciary, but ceded control over security and foreign affairs to the newly formed Tanzanian government. Over the years, however, the powers of the Zanzibar government became steadily less autonomous, and eventually, the ruling Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar formally merged with the ruling Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) party on the mainland to form the Chama cha Mapinduzi [The Revolutionary Party] (CCM).

Historically, certain human rights have been systematically disregarded in Zanzibar by the Tanzanian government as well as by Zanzibar's own government. The institution of multi-party politics in 1992, replacing one party rule, opened the door for legitimate opposition. The Civic United Front (CUF) subsequently emerged to become one of the largest opposition parties in the country, and the most supported party on the islands, garnering greater support in Zanzibar than the ruling party.

In 1995, Tanzania's first multi-party elections in thirty-one years were marred by allegations of vote-rigging in favor of the ruling party.3 There were complaints of voter registration irregularities, delays in the delivery of voting materials, and police and army interference in vote counting. Salmin Amour, the CCM incumbent, was declared the president of Zanzibar by a margin of less than 1 percent.

In protest, CUF opposition members boycotted the CCM-dominated Zanzibar government for the next three years. CUF presidential candidate and party secretary general Seif Shariff Hamad refused to recognize Salmin Amour as the legitimate president of Zanzibar. During the boycott, the government orchestrated reprisals against CUF members: Eighteen CUF officials were detained and charged with conspiracy, later changed to treason. Despite wide international criticism, they were held until after the next national elections in October 2000.4 Between 1995 and 1998, Pembans and CUF supporters who worked for the government in Zanzibar were fired en masse from the civil service. Hundreds of Pemban-owned homes and businesses were razed in the Mtoni neighborhood and other parts of Zanzibar Island.

Several attempts at mediation eventually culminated in a Commonwealth-brokered agreement of June 1999. The agreement between CUF and CCM committed the CUF to return its elected members to the Zanzibar House of Representatives and the CCM to reform the Zanzibar Electoral Commission and to enact mechanisms to ensure impartiality in the 2000 elections. An Inter-Party Committee was to compile a credible voter register, ensure equitable access to the media, reform the judiciary, and guarantee political freedom. The agreement was celebrated across the Zanzibar islands, although a year later, little or no progress had been made, except for the ending of the CUF boycott.5

The next time Tanzanians went to the polls was for the October 2000 national elections. Once again, the elections were flawed, with the ruling CCM being accused of serious abuses. Following the election, international observers condemned the electoral abuses: "We wish to record our sadness and deep disappointment," noted the chairperson of the Commonwealth observer mission, "at the way in which so many voters were treated by the ZEC [Zanzibar Electoral Commission] ... in many places this election is a shambles. The cause is either massive incompetence or a deliberate attempt to wreck at least part of this election. Either way the outcome represents a colossal contempt for ordinary Zanzibar people and their aspirations for democracy."6 No international observers were allowed to witness voter registration or election campaigning. Many legitimate residents were prevented from registering to vote. In particular, the local authorities responsible for determining eligibility used a rule that requires five years' residence in one constituency on Zanzibar to bar Zanzibaris from registering to vote.7 Police looted Pemban and CUF-owned businesses in Zanzibar town, and the CUF was denied permission to hold political rallies. In September 2000, police shot live ammunition into a peaceful meeting at Kilimahewa on Zanzibar Island, severely injuring six people.

Late on October 29, 2000, election day, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission suddenly announced that elections in sixteen urban constituencies on Zanzibar Island were being cancelled. Soldiers and police seized ballot boxes by force on both Zanzibar and Pemba islands. Opposition party polling agents were harassed, beaten, and arrested. Ballot boxes were kept out of view of both local and international election observers and party agents. When the Zanzibar government announced there would be a re-run of the elections in the sixteen cancelled constituencies, international election observers left the country in protest.

In the days following the election, armed bands of CCM supporters accompanied by police conducted house-to-house searches on both islands and beat members of the opposition. Journalists and television crews recorded assaults on CUF supporters and passers-by by the security forces. Army and police reinforcements were brought from the mainland.

After October 2000, the CUF was denied permission to hold public rallies by the Tanzanian government, and CUF supporters were subjected to arbitrary arrests and harassment. In December, CUF leaders called for a nationwide, peaceful demonstration to protest political repression in Zanzibar, call for new elections, and demand constitutional reform. Tensions were exacerbated when four small bombs were detonated in Zanzibar, injuring one person and causing minor property damage. The government attributed the blasts to the CUF, and quickly arrested dozens of opposition supporters; for their part, CUF officials strongly denied any involvement. Some thirty opposition members in Pemba were held for several months without bail or trial before being released and charges against them dropped.

Political tensions between the mainland and Zanzibar are exacerbated by religious differences. Muslims are a marked minority in public office, army, police, and the civil service on the mainland. Zanzibar's population is overwhelmingly Muslim. It is also markedly diverse and tolerant. The CUF has consistently asserted that it is not a party based on religion; while its leaders are mostly but not exclusively Muslims, it claims significant support on the largely Christian mainland. However, the CCM-led governments of Tanzania and Zanzibar have, at times, tried to paint CUF as a Muslim party with terrorist aims. On several occasions, they have implied that all Muslims (whether they belong to the CUF or not) are Islamic fundamentalists, thus justifying repression of any political opposition in which Muslims figure.8

The announcement of an agreement between the government and CUF on October 10, 2001, finally broke the impasse. The agreement promised to address one of the major stumbling blocks to genuine multiparty democratization: the separation of the government and ruling party infrastructures. The agreement, if fully implemented, would change the Zanzibar constitution, the electoral commission, and the judiciary. In order to address electoral inequalities and irregularities, the electoral laws are to be amended, a permanent voter register is to be set up, and the state-owned Zanzibar media are to give equitable coverage to all parties. Under the terms of the accord, the government also agreed to create an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the violence that occurred in Zanzibar in January 2001. Other appendices include a list of constitutional amendments to take effect from February 1, 2002, and a statement on the need for the joint commission to continue functioning after its mandate expires, with a view to establishing a government of national unity in the future.

The October 2001 pact represented an important step toward ending the long-standing hostility between the Tanzanian government and the political opposition. If enacted, it should bring to an end many of the contentious issues between the government and ruling party and the opposition. The signing ceremony was attended by President Mkapa, the Zanzibar president, Amani Karume, and opposition CUF leaders Ibrahim Lipumba and Seif Sheriff Hamad.

The first significant step in this process was to be the establishment of a Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission, staffed by five representatives each from the CCM and the CUF, to monitor the implementation of the agreement. However, only one month after the signing of the pact, complaints were already being lodged by CUF in December 2001 when the Zanzibar attorney general Iddi Pandu Hassan sought to unilaterally alter the text of the accord by introducing amendments to the bill to set up the Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission in the Zanzibar House of Representatives. Instead, he submitted a watered down version, including changes to the nomination process, mandate, and duration of the commission. The changes were unacceptable to CUF: they pointed out that the commission was central to the implementation of the entire agreement, and unless it was vested with the requisite powers to supervise and enforce the process, it was possible for the government to manipulate the entire process.

Optimism was renewed on January 3, 2002, after CCM and CUF signed a new agreement re-pledging their commitment to the original document, and confirmed that there would be no changes without agreement by both parties. The new agreement resolved the differences over the Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission, and bound the government to consult with the CUF before deviating from any of the terms of the October agreement.

This announcement was swiftly followed by the formal inauguration of the Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission, and the independent commission of inquiry into the January 2001 Zanzibar killings. On January 16, 2002, President Mkapa announced the formation of the independent commission of inquiry to investigate the January 2001 violence in Zanzibar. Retired Brigadier General Hashim Mbita, former executive secretary of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee, was named chair of the eight-person team that is to present its report and make recommendations to the government by July 31, 2002.9 It is to be hoped that the commission of inquiry will undertake a full and independent investigation, and will have the necessary powers and resources to enable it to do so. It should identify those responsible for human rights abuses and the government should commit now to prosecuting and bringing to justice such perpetrators.

1 Zanzibar is made up of the two islands of Unguja (also known as Zanzibar) and Pemba. For the purposes of this report, any reference to Zanzibar refers to both Unguja Island and Pemba Island. To distinguish, the island often known as Zanzibar is referred to as Unguja Island.

2 The president of the union government is chief of state and head of government, who appoints the prime minister. The legislative branch is a unicameral national assembly or Bunge that enacts laws that apply to the entire United Republic of Tanzania as well as laws that apply only to the mainland. For an enacted law to apply to Zanzibar, it must contain wording specifying this. The Bunge contains 274 seats-the majority are elected by popular vote, but some seats are reserved for women (allocated by party on a proportional basis) and for members of the Zanzibar House of Representatives. Zanzibar has its own parallel local government that is responsible for matters internal to Zanzibar. Zanzibaris elect their own president to head the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government as well as representatives to their own House of Representatives that makes laws especially for Zanzibar. The Zanzibar House of Representatives has fifty seats-most of its members are voted into office by the Zanzibari electorate, ten members are nominated by the Zanzibar president, and several seats are reserved for women.

3 Zanzibar has a long history of colonization starting with the Portuguese, the Omanis, and then the British. On gaining independence, Zanzibaris held their first multi-party elections in 1961, which were hotly contested and violent. Independence, and new elections, were postponed until 1963, when a coalition government was elected. Because two of the coalition partners won the majority of seats but not the popular vote, political life on Zanzibar remained unstable. On January 12, 1964, the political opposition led by Abeid Karume seized control of Zanzibar Town, the center of government. Between 4,000 and 10,000 people, principally those of Arab origin, were massacred in a bloody revolution. Up to 20,000 were detained, and hundreds "disappeared." In May 1964 a hastily formed union with the mainland Tanganyika was announced, creating the newly formed Tanzanian government. Zanzibar's first revolutionary government, under the leadership of Karume, subsequently undertook a retaliatory campaign of terror on the isles, particularly on Pemba, to suppress any further dissent and to punish those who had not supported the revolution. From 1964 to 1972, many islanders were indiscriminately punished, tortured, or "disappeared," particularly Pembans. See Lofchie, Michael, Zanzibar: Background to the Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, (1965); Martin, Esmond Bradley, Zanzibar: Tradition and Revolution (Hamish Hamilton, London: 1978); Clayton, Anthony, The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1981).

4 See Article 19, Zanzibar: Democracy On Shaky Foundations, (London: April 2000).

5 Ibid, p. 11.

6 See http://www.thecommonwealth.org/pr_info/pr_rel.html.

7 See, International Federation for Human Rights and Legal and Human Rights Centre, "Zanzibar: Wave of Violence," June 1, 2001, available at http://www.fidh.org/afriq/rapport/2001/zanzi0501.pdf.

8 Ibid, pp.17, 29, and Human Rights Watch interview with Bernard Mchomvu, permanent secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, January 30, 2002 (See section on Government Response for more detail). Most recently, in February 2002, as worshippers gathered to commemorate the police shootings of 1998 at Mwembe Chai mosque, police opened fire, beat, and arrested dozens resulting in two deaths; a civilian and a police officer. Official statements later characterized the peaceful meeting as "a gathering of terrorists."

9 Other members of the team include Masauni Yusuf Masauni, Ali Abdullah Suleiman, Salama Kombo Ahmed, Hassa Mlawa, Bruno Mpangala and Kassim Ali and Phillip Mcamanga (secretary).

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