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IV. PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE MANO RIVER UNION

The Sub-Regional Dynamics of the Conflict
The current conflict in Liberia is all the more complex because of the web of shifting military and political alliances, based on ethnicity and other factors, that have been established over recent years among the governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea and the various armed opposition groups. As a result, the conflicts in all three countries have been intertwined and have shown a ready potential to overflow and destabilize neighboring countries.

Charles Taylor, both as leader of the NPFL and as president of Liberia since 1997, bears much of the responsibility for instigating the long-standing aggression and violence in the sub-region, both in Liberia and in particular through his support for the RUF in Sierra Leone. During the pre-1997 Liberian civil war, Taylor's NPFL provided significant military and logistical backing to Foday Sankoh's RUF to assist it to wage war against the government of Sierra Leone. The RUF committed widespread atrocities against Sierra Leonean civilians, murdering and mutilating thousands and establishing amputation of the hand as its signature abuse. Taylor continued to give the RUF support even after he became Liberia's president in 1997, in breach of U.N. arms embargos against both Liberia and the RUF. In return, when Taylor's government came under armed attack from Liberian dissidents in 1999, 2000 and 2001, RUF forces assisted in expelling them from Liberia.

Taylor's support for the RUF was countered by Sierra Leone and Guinea. Together with the Nigerian-led West African peacekeeping force ECOMOG, they supported the formation of an anti-Taylor rebel faction, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), during the Liberian civil war. ULIMO forces entered Liberia through Sierra Leone and relied heavily on Sierra Leone for logistic support. In turn, ULIMO fighters helped the Sierra Leone government in its conflict with the RUF.

LURD fighters based in and funded by Guinea have launched repeated hit-and-run attacks against towns in northwest Liberia since June 2000. In retaliation, from September 2000 to April 2001, combined forces of Liberian government troops, RUF fighters, and Guinean dissidents, launched cross-border raids into Guinea, where they attacked towns and refugees camps containing Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees, causing thousands to become further displaced and killing and wounding hundreds of refugees and Guinean civilians.

These Liberian-led incursions into Guinea were opposed by Guinean government forces, backed by members of Sierra Leonean civil defense force militias and Guinea-based LURD fighters. They pushed back the Liberian and RUF forces, and the Guinean army also carried out helicopter, artillery and ground attacks into RUF-held areas of northern Sierra Leone, killing scores of civilians and burning villages.

As the conflict in Sierra Leone has reduced, with the large-scale deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces, demobilization of combatants, and elections scheduled for May 2002, the conflict in Liberia itself has been exacerbated since September 2001 by the arrival of many former fighters from Sierra Leone's civil war crossing over to fight as mercenaries. These include former member of the RUF, the civil defense forces (primarily Kamajors), and the West Side Boys (comprising former soldiers in the Sierra Leone army), who have been signing up to fight either for the Liberian government or for the LURD.

Civilians have borne the brunt of the violence and abuses arising from the conflicts in Liberia and the other countries of the Mano River Union, and it is clear that they will continue to do so if the current conflict is allowed to spread. It is imperative, therefore, that all possible efforts are made by the international community to bring an end to the fighting and to establish the conditions for a sustainable peace and the protection of human rights.

In this context, it should be a priority to maintain and strengthen existing U.N.-mandated controls on the flow of weapons that could destabilize the sub-region, and to establish the institutions and mechanisms necessary to break the cycle of impunity and ensure that those responsible for abusing human rights are held to account. To achieve this, the international community will need to adopt a comprehensive sub-regional approach if there is to be any hope for sustainable peace in Liberia.

Guinea and the Liberian Conflict
The government of Guinea is currently fueling the Liberian conflict by providing logistic and some financial and military support to the LURD rebels; although LURD fighters complained to Human Rights Watch that what they received from Guinea was inadequate. Evidence indicates that this support is being given with the knowledge and support of high-ranking Guinean officials. The LURD leader Sekou Conneh, a Liberian Mandingo, has access to Guinean President Lansana Conteh, through his wife Ayesha Conneh, who has been the president's spiritual advisor since she foretold a 1996 coup attempt. Human Rights Watch interviewed some fifteen LURD recruits from Sierra Leone, who, after arriving in Conakry by boat, described being picked up at the wharf by men in Guinean military uniform. They then described being housed in "safe houses" which were frequented by men in military uniform. Most described being transported across Guinea to Liberia in military convoys, where they received new uniforms and guns, said, by their commanders, to have come from Guinea. A few recruits described seeing men dressed in Guinean military uniform going in and out of LURD camps around Kolahun and Voinjama. Numerous civilians used by the LURD as porters described to Human Rights Watch how they were forced to walk to the Guinea border where they were ordered to carry arms, ammunition and supplies back to LURD bases in Lofa County. Wounded LURD soldiers and Liberian civilians described being evacuated from towns around Lofa County to hospitals in Conakry for treatment.

In view of the close links between the Guinean government and the LURD rebel forces in Liberia, the participation of Guinean troops in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, should give cause for concern. The Guinean contingent of UNAMSIL is currently deployed in Sierra Leone's Pujehun District, which borders Liberia, raising fears that this area too could become a base of operations for the LURD, enabling them to strike into Liberia from two directions. Already, some problems have been reported. On February 27, 2002, some thirty Guinean UNAMSIL troops, under the command of Captain John Fadika, entered the Jimmi Bagbo Liberian refugee camp in Sierra Leone "on a mission," interrogated the Liberian refugees about the nature of the camp population, and ordered the refugee women to cook for them. The incident, which frightened the Liberian refugees, was a breach of UNAMSIL practice and of international refugee protection standards, which guarantee the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps, and was carried out without prior notification of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which runs the camp. Although immediate steps by UNHCR and UNAMSIL were taken to reprimand the Guinean troops, the incident underscored the ease with the Guinean UNAMSIL contingent could misuse its position to access or intimidate Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone and the Liberian Conflict
Growing numbers of Liberian refugees and combatants are crossing into Sierra Leone. At the same time, LURD fighters are clandestinely recruiting and establishing a supply line along the Sierra Leone/Liberia border, despite the Sierra Leone government's refusal to allow the LURD to operate from its territory. This could compromise the safety and security of the Liberian refugees, and destabilize the fragile peace in Sierra Leone.

As of February 2002, UNHCR had registered some 10,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone in camps, and estimated that another 10,000 were living without international assistance in border towns. UNHCR anticipates that this number will grow significantly, and are planning for the arrival of a further 50,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone in the coming year. Efforts are underway to move refugees away from the border areas in accordance with international refugee protection standards.

    In addition to refugees, both Liberian government troops and LURD rebel soldiers often cross from Liberia into Sierra Leone for the purpose of looting, to sell on looted goods, to buy provisions, to escape fighting, and, in a few cases, to abduct people who are then forced to work as porters for them. In February 2002, for example, AFL soldiers appeared in Batwono and Bobu, on the Sierra Leone side of the border, and forced local residents to buy their looted goods. In March 2002, LURD forces attacked Baladu village in Sierra Leone, killing one civilian and abducting ten as porters. Liberian army deserters are also to be found on the Sierra Leone side of the border, where they could present an additional security threat. There appears to be no consistent policy on the part of either the Sierra Leonean government or UNAMSIL on how to address this problem. In the first quarter of 2002, Sierra Leone police detained at least ten AFL soldiers, including one lieutenant-colonel.

    There is an urgent need for border security to be strengthened, including by screening to ensure that combatants are clearly distinguished and separated from civilians seeking refugee protection in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leonean government needs to establish an adequate police presence along the border areas, establish a status determination body to screen combatants from refugees. Additionally, there is a need for improved policing to ensure that refugees are adequately protected and to guarantee the civilian nature of all refugee camps.

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