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Under international law, those who assist, aid, or abet crimes against humanity are individually responsible for the resulting crimes. Both governmental and private organizations have provided financial and logistical support to groups responsible for suicide attacks against civilians. Others have given funds to groups that may have been diverted to fund such activities, or, through the provision of large cash payments to perpetrators' families, have rewarded those who carried out such attacks. This section discusses the varying means by which regional governments and other entities have tangibly supported suicide bombings.

Funding Overview of Perpetrator Groups

Several governments, notably the United States and Israel, have asserted that Hamas receives funding for armed activities and logistical support from governments in the region, including Iran and Syria. Hamas has also received extensive support for its social programs and military activities from individuals and charitable foundations in Saudi Arabia, other countries in the Gulf area, the United States, and elsewhere. One recent press report cites Israeli intelligence experts as saying that Hamas's annual operational income "tops at least $20 million a year."5 Although exact figures are not known, a considerable portion of Hamas's resources are devoted to charitable and social programs. A Western diplomat based in the region and familiar with Palestinian political organizations told Human Rights Watch that the proportion of Hamas finances devoted to armed activities "represents a small portion of their resources." 6 Asked about reports of state funding of Hamas, the group's spokesman, Ismail Abu Shanab, told Human Rights Watch that the organization gets no financial support from "formal sources," and that this was one expression of the group's "independence."7

In contrast to Hamas's complex and varied financial structure, Islamic Jihad is generally thought to derive almost all its funding from state sponsors, particularly Iran. According to the U.S. State Department, Islamic Jihad receives financial assistance from Iran and "limited logistical support assistance" from Syria.8 According to the Israeli government, documents captured by the IDF in PA offices in April 2002 indicate that Islamic Jihad received "massive financial aid" from the group's headquarters in Damascus, but documents supporting this assertion have not been made public.9 One publicly available document, a report from the Palestinian National Security Forces in Jenin to the West Bank head of the PA General Intelligence Services (GIS), Tawfiq Tirawi, states that Islamic Jihad operatives in Jenin received funds via bank transfer from Ramadan Shalah, the Islamic Jihad secretary-general in Damascus, but does not indicate the amount of money thus transferred.10 The transfers included financial assistance for the families of Islamic Jihad members in prison or killed, as well as support for Islamic Jihad military operations.

The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades appear to have benefited from the routine misuse of PA funds. Arafat and other senior PA officials, as well as many rank-and-file Fatah members, have overlapping identities as employees or officials of the PA, on the one hand, and as members of Fatah on the other. This dual identity appears to have facilitated the use of PA resources to fund Fatah activities directly and indirectly, including payments to individual al-Aqsa Brigades activists (discussed in Section VII). Yet the al-Aqsa Brigades appear to have had more limited resources than Hamas or Islamic Jihad, at least in the northern West Bank. Kamal Yusuf Shihab, a mid-level al-Aqsa Brigades militant in Nablus, received no salary or stipend as a militant and continued to work as a mechanic. "He worked his job during the day and was a militant at night," his brother told Human Rights Watch.11 `Ata Abu Rumaila, a Fatah leader in Jenin refugee camp, told Human Rights Watch that militants there received "no support" from the PA and that weapons had been "bought out of our own pockets."12 In one captured document, on the letterhead of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in Jenin governorate and addressed to Fatah secretary-general Marwan Barghouti, the writer complained, "At the same time the Islamic factions receive all the financial aid they require for working and for purchasing arms. They recruit boys with motivation in that they supply them with arms, give them a monthly salary, and solve all their economic problems."13 This situation, at least in the Jenin area, may have led to financial assistance from the local Islamic Jihad group to al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.14 No action or authorization is indicated on the document.

Little is known about funding of the PFLP. Like Islamic Jihad and Hamas, it has a headquarters in Damascus. According to the U.S. State Department, the PFLP receives logistical and safe haven assistance from Syria, and has training facilities in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. One U.S. government analyst told Human Rights Watch that the high-profile killing of the Israeli minister of tourism in September 2001 had enabled the PFLP to attract new external sources of support, but provided no details.15

State Support for Suicide Attacks Against Civilians


Perhaps the most frequently cited example of state support for suicide attacks against civilians are the money and training that Iran provides to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The U.S. government has attributed Iran's support for armed activities to two institutions: the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Both institutions are accountable only to Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Iranian officials have routinely denied such allegations of support.16

Few details are available publicly about this assistance, and accounts vary widely. Islamic Jihad's relationship with Iran is anchored in the organization's ideological affinity with the pan-Islamic revolutionary program of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Israeli analyst Meir Hatina dates the organization's "material dependence on Iran" to Israel's expulsion of Islamic Jihad founders Fathi `Abd al-`Aziz al-Shikaki and Suliman `Awda to Lebanon in 1988.17 In 1995, al-Shikaki said Iranian support was "very limited." "The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the Palestinians politically and morally," he told correspondent Robert Fisk. "Our organization gets some support for the families of martyrs."18 In 1996, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, then the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism in the U.S. State Department, said that Iran's assistance to Islamic Jihad was at that time some two million dollars per year.19

Reports regarding Iranian funding of Hamas vary widely. An IDF report from January 1993 stated that "Hamas receives financial support from unofficial bodies in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and recently also from Iran."20 A recent report by the Congressional Research Service of the U.S. Library of Congress, citing the State Department, estimated that total Iranian funding for Hamas represented approximately 10 percent of the organization's budget but did not provide an estimate of the dollar size of Hamas's budget or the amount of Iran's contribution.21 As noted above, Israeli intelligence experts have estimated the annual operational budget of Hamas as being at least $20 million.

Iran has also reportedly provided training and other forms of support to Hamas. In a recently published interview, Hassan Salameh, a Hamas member from Gaza serving forty-six consecutive life sentences in Israel for his role in the 1996 suicide bombings, said that after he fled to Sudan via Jordan in 1993, "the organization arranged a training camp for us and flew us to Syria and then to Iran."22 In June 2002, the regional press reported high-level meetings of Iranian, Hamas and Islamic Jihad officials in Iran, and noted that Iranian authorities had decided to increase the financial aid given to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. According to one report, the Iranians were also considering a "special budget for backing some Palestinian figures whose organizations lost their financial sources after the collapse of the Soviet Union," possibly referring to the PFLP.23 Islamic Jihad leaders were reportedly promised a 70 percent increase in funding and told that it would pass to them directly, rather than via Hizbollah in Lebanon.24

The U.S. government contends that the Iranian government has been encouraging greater coordination of Islamic Jihad and Hamas with Hizbollah.25 Israeli intelligence reports state that Hamas receives training and access to explosives from Hizbollah, and funding from Iran via the Hamas office in Damascus, which is headed by Musa Abu Marzuq and Khalid Mish`al.26 Asked in June 2001 about allegations of Hamas collaboration with Hizbollah, Shaikh Yassin responded, "It is our right to cooperation with any side that serves our cause, whether Hizbollah or others."27


Syria provides safe haven as well as logistical support, and serves as a conduit for funds, to several groups that perpetrate suicide attacks against civilians. Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP all have headquarters or a high-level presence in Damascus. Islamic Jihad and Hamas also have "basing privileges" for training and other activities in the Beka'a Valley, an area of Lebanon under effective Syrian control.28 Both Islamic Jihad and the PFLP are said to have received financial support from Syria in 1998, although there is little public evidence of Syrian financial contributions to armed activities since then.29 In late September 2002, Syria reportedly rejected U.S. efforts to include specific mention of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in a draft U.N. Security Council resolution. Each had claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Israel the week before, which were to be mentioned in the draft.30

A memorandum from the PA Preventive Security office in Bethlehem to the PSS Central Operations directorate, dated May 1, 2000 and made public by the IDF, forwards second-hand information from a PSS informant asserting that Islamic Jihad funding in the Bethlehem area comes from Damascus through Amman to the Cairo-Amman Bank in Palestine, and that a second stream comes from Saudi Arabia through Cairo to the same bank. This memo reports that funds are transferred monthly but to individuals whose identities change "according to conditions."31

Syria has consistently refused to take steps to limits its assistance to armed Palestinian groups that perpetrate suicide attacks. It claims that such groups are engaged in legitimate resistance against occupation but makes no effort to disassociate itself from attacks on civilians, in clear violation of international humanitarian law.32


The government of Iraq has expressly endorsed and encouraged suicide bombing attacks against civilians. Iraq, in its provision of funds to families of "martyrs" and others, has established a differential in which families of suicide bombing operatives are said to receive a considerably larger sum of $25,000, while other families that have suffered a death receive $10,000.33 In promoting suicide attacks, Iraqi leaders have made no distinction between attacks against civilians and attacks against military targets.

Iraq provides these monies through the local Ba'th Party-affiliated Arab Liberation Front (ALF). The ALF is a constituent member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a representative sits on the PLO executive committee, but it is not considered to have a significant number of adherents and is not credited with playing any role in the current clashes other than as a conduit for Iraqi government funds and propaganda. The ALF has told reporters that Iraq has provided $20 million in aid to Palestinians since clashes began in September 2000, but it is not known what portion of that amount has been provided to families of suicide bombers.34 One Gaza-based ALF official, Ibrahim al-Za'anin, told Reuters, "President Saddam made clear that [suicide] attacks must be considered the utmost act of martyrdom."35

There are several accounts of public events where such payments have been made. Reporter Paul McGeough described a meeting of some 200 members of forty-seven families who gathered in the Tulkarem chamber of commerce in March 2002 to collect checks.36 Two were families of suicide bombers. ALF secretary-general Rakad Salem told McGeough in Ramallah that as of late March 2002 more than eight hundred families of Palestinians killed in the unrest had received $10,000 "martyr" payments, and that the funds had been "transferred by the banks-from the Iraqi banks to the banks in Palestine."37 The Tulkarem ALF officials told McGeough that the additional $15,000 payment was to encourage more volunteers for suicide missions.38 A member of the Palestine Legislative Council was reportedly among those presiding at the Tulkarem event.

Another report described an ALF gathering on May 20 in the Gaza Strip at which forty-six families of "martyrs" received $10,000 apiece and the families of two suicide bombers received $25,000 apiece.39 In a Sky TV broadcast of a similar event staged by the ALF in Gaza on July 17, 2002, members of families of "martyrs" killed in the violence received certificates and $10,000 checks, while families of suicide bombers received $25,000.40 The report did not indicate the numbers of families in either category.

Other Forms of Funding or Support

In addition to funding from governments, Hamas receives funding from individual benefactors and charities, some in the Persian Gulf region and others in the Palestinian and Arab diaspora in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. In Saudi Arabia, some of the charities that solicit funds for Palestinian charities allegedly associated with Hamas do so under royal patronage. The U.S.-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, which the U.S. government forcibly closed in December 2001 on the grounds that it was a Hamas front organization, reportedly listed revenues of $13 million on its tax returns for the year 2000, and allegedly channeled funds to Hamas through local charity committees in the West Bank and Gaza.41 One Bahamas-based financial institution, al-Taqwa Bank, is alleged to have been the repository of some $60 million in Hamas-related funding for the year 1997 alone.42

The U.S. and Israeli governments allege, and Hamas denies, that these funds "leak" to the organization's armed wing.43 Examples of Hamas-controlled societies that allegedly received funds from the Holy Land Foundation were the Islamic Charitable Society of Hebron, the Jenin Zakat Committee, and the Ramallah Zakat Committee, each of which had among its officials persons who had allegedly admitted to armed activities with Hamas, including attacks against civilians.44 U.S. authorities have also cited Israel's interrogation of Muhammad Anati, former head the Foundation's Jerusalem Office, in which Anati reportedly confessed that funds intended for charitable use were diverted to Hamas's military activities.45

Hamas enjoys a reputation for financial probity, in contrast to the reputed corruption of the PA, and its network of welfare activities, associated with local Muslim charity organizations, is in many areas reportedly more extensive than those of the PA. IDF analysts, commenting on documents captured from Palestinian offices, wrote, "it can be assumed that some of funds that were transferred to the Hamas or entities linked to it also trickled to the Hamas operational-military apparatus," but the IDF made no information public to support this assertion.46 The U.S. government has also argued that Hamas's charitable activities provide a benign cover through which funds can be transferred from abroad into Hamas-controlled institutions.47

However, Ziad Abu `Amr, a Gaza-based independent member of the Palestine Legislative Council, told Human Rights Watch that he has examined the books of large Hamas-affiliated charities in Gaza in his capacity as chair of the PLC Political Committee. "One of the Hamas groups that Arafat closed in December [2001] was the Islah [reform] Society, which is big money," he said. "We examined their books carefully. There was nothing amiss. I went to Arafat and said, on what basis are you shutting them down?" Abu `Amr said that funding for Hamas's military activities may well come from outside states such as Iran but that he is convinced that social and charitable funds are kept separate. "They will not jeopardize their social institutions," he said. "That is their strength, their existence."48

Whether or not funds intended for charitable purposes are diverted to the Hamas military wing, Hamas spokespersons openly acknowledge that the group sees its sizeable social programs as a means of building and maintaining popular support for its overall political goals and programs, including its militant and armed activities. "The political level is the face of Hamas, but without the other divisions Hamas would not be as strong as it is now," spokesperson Ismail Abu Shanab told a reporter. "So it needs the three parts to survive. If nobody supports these needy families, maybe nobody would think of martyrdom and the resistance of occupation."49 Another Hamas leader, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, in an interview in a Hamas-affiliated magazine, characterized Hamas's objective as "the liberation of all Palestine from the tyrannical Israeli occupation" "This is the main part of its concern," he said. "Social work is carried out in support of this aim."50

Payments to Family Members of Those Who Carry Out Attacks Against Civilians.

Many of the organizations that donate to Hamas-related or other charitable groups provide compensation support to families of "martyrs"-generally defined as individuals who have been killed, disabled or imprisoned during the current clashes. A significant portion of the funding to the charities and other organizations that provide these programs appears to come through non-governmental channels from Saudi Arabia and other countries, with government approval. In the case of Iraq, funding comes directly from the government (see above). Human Rights Watch is not aware of any effort by the PA to restrict payments from reaching families of suicide bombers who have attacked civilians.

Israeli authorities have publicized a figure of some $33,000, made up of payments from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the PA, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates that it says goes to families of suicide bombers.51 Human Rights Watch could not confirm that payments of such scale with any regularity. Palestinians interviewed by Human Rights Watch agreed that families of "martyrs" generally received financial assistance, but said that, except in the case of Iraqi payments, such funds were provided to families of all persons whose death was related to confrontations with Israeli forces, not only to those who carry out suicide attacks.52

Among the PA documents captured by the IDF in April-May 2002 are records relating to payments from the Saudi Arabian Committee for Support of the Intifada al-Quds, headed by the Saudi Arabian Interior Minister, to the Tulkarem Charity Committee.53 Under the arrangement, all payments or distributions were made on the basis of information supplied by "Palestinian elements," and were arranged through some fourteen local charity committees, many of which had links to Hamas.54 Each charity committee made payments or distributed food to the needy, and also gave both lump-sum and ongoing payments to families of individuals killed, injured, or imprisoned in the intifada, including the families of individuals from Hamas or other armed groups who had carried out suicide attacks against civilians.55 The PA strenuously objected on the grounds that it was designed to undercut its authority, but not because the payments were rewarding attacks on civilians.

Palestinians for the most part support the provision of assistance to families that have lost loved ones, and do not believe that families of perpetrators of attacks against civilians should be denied such assistance. "I myself am deeply opposed to suicide bombings, yet I too support the families," the prominent Gaza-based psychiatrist and human rights activist Eyad Sarraj said in a recent interview. "As a Palestinian, as an Arab, as a Muslim, and as a human being ...I cannot leave their children in poverty-I have to do what I can to leave them some hope and dignity. This is why we support the families-certainly not to encourage suicide bombing."56

However, as discussed in Section III, individuals who die in the course of committing a crime against humanity should not be equated with individuals who are victims of attacks or who die in ordinary combat. In the case of Iraq's payment of a sizeable "premium" to families of suicide bombers, the intent is expressly to encourage the commission of crimes against humanity. Such payments should be stopped.57 In the view of Human Rights Watch, the family of a person responsible for carrying out suicide attacks against civilians should be eligible for financial assistance only as part of a general welfare program based on demonstrated financial need. The provision of funding to the families of individuals who perpetrate suicide attacks against civilians in any other circumstances is wrong. Even payments that do not privilege the families of suicide bombers should not be made to such families in any manner that confers social honor, such as a status of "martyr" or war victim, on the persons responsible for carrying out crimes against humanity.

The PA Ministry of Social Affairs says that it provides a small monthly sum to the family of any person killed or injured in confrontations with Israeli forces or settlers. Yusuf Abu Laban, head of the Bethlehem office of the ministry's Committee to Care for Martyrs' Families, told Human Rights Watch that the amount depends on whether the victim was a primary breadwinner, and the family's economic circumstances. Laban also indicated that the committee plays a role in coordinating the distribution of some funds contributed from elsewhere. Outside contributions, he said, also come to the locally based Islamic Development Bank, "which has a list of eligible martyr families." In other cases, he said, such as funds from Iraq, the sums go directly to the families. Laban insisted that the PA ministry gives no preference or special treatment whatsoever to the families of suicide bombers. "We are first of all a social assistance agency, and we provide only if the family needs it."58 However, the PA makes no apparent effort to limit special payments by others to the families of suicide bombers who attack civilians.

Local charitable societies also provide financial assistance. Shaikh Ahmad al-Kurd, the Hamas-affiliated Islah (reform) Society in Gaza, of which he is the president, was quoted in the Saudi press as saying that the society provided $5,300 to families of persons killed or disabled in the conflict, $1,300 to injured persons, $2,650 to families whose homes have been destroyed or badly damaged, and $2,600 to families of prisoners.59 Shaikh Ahmad gave no indication that people who attacked civilians were excluded from this policy. Some news reports indicate that Hamas has provided additional "compensation" to the families of suicide bombers.60

Media reports as well as reports of government intelligence agencies indicate that compensation provided to Palestinian families who have had a member wounded, imprisoned, or killed during the current clashes has to a considerable extent been funded from foreign sources. One example is the Saudi Committee for Support of Intifada al-Quds, mentioned above. Of some 102 names listed in the committee's tenth cycle of payments to the Tulkarem Charity Committee, at least ten were individuals responsible for ordering or condoning attacks against civilians during the current clashes. One example is the payment made to the family of `Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Said Hmaid, who was allegedly involved in the suicide attack on the Dolphinarium discotheque on June 1, 2001.61 Payments were also made to the families of perpetrators of suicide attacks against civilians in 1995-96. According to an IDF analysis (originals were of too low a quality to permit independent examination), information on each victim included the cause of death, with those who had carried out suicide attacks clearly marked. The committee should cease payments to the families of individuals who have committed crimes against humanity.

Under international law, governments and private organizations incur criminal liability for assisting groups or individuals to carry out suicide bombings against civilians. No support should go to any organization that continues to commit such crimes against humanity. If a group is engaged in parallel legitimate activities, such as charitable welfare, no funds should be provided until a verifiable scheme is established to ensure that no funds are diverted for criminal purposes. In no case should individuals or their families be privileged in any payment because of participation in attacks that target civilians. Governments have an obligation to investigate and prosecute any individual or entity within their jurisdiction that violates these standards.

5 Larry Kaplow, "Backgrounder: Israel's Adversaries: Hamas: Back-seat driver to Arafat group; Palestinian-run movement opposes the peace process," Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 24, 2002.

6 Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, Jerusalem, June 6, 2002.

7 Human Rights Watch interview with Ismail Abu Shanab, Gaza City, May 15, 2002.

8 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, Appendix B, May 15, 2002, p. 103.

9 See IDF report, "Jenin: The Capital of Suicide Terrorists," circa April 19, 2002 at (accessed September 3, 2002).

10 "Cooperation between Fatah and the PA Security Apparatuses with Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the Jenin Area", IDF, April 9, 2002 at (accessed September 3, 2002).

11 Human Rights Watch interview with Lu'ay Shihab, Nablus, June 8, 2002.

12 Human Rights Watch interview with `Ata Abu Rumaila, Jenin refugee camp, June 11, 2002.

13 See Document A, the letter dated September 25, 2001 in IDF report, "Jenin: The Capital of the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists," p.16.

14 On the lack of funding, see IDF Document 8, "The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Fatah Organization are One and the Same.... [F]ragment of a letter allegedly from the Fatah movement in Jenin Refugee Camp to Marwan Barghouti," September 25, 2001; IDF Document 9, "Report on letterhead of the al-Aqsa Brigades of Jenin governorate to Marwan Barghouti," 8 May 2001; "Letter from Khaled `Abd-al Azia Muhammad Sif to Marwan Barghouti," (undated); and IDF Document 3, "Additional Captured Documents Reveal Again the System of Money Transfers to Terrorist Squads, Personally Authorized by Yasser Arafat, with the Deep Involvement of Marwan Barghouti," IDF, June 24, 2002, TR6-498-02. For the allegation that Islamic Jihad gave financial support to the al-Aqsa Brigades, see "February 4, 2002 report to the head of Palestinian General Intelligence from Abu Aziz " in "The Cooperation Between Fatah and the PA Security Apparatuses with PIJ and Hamas in the Jenin Area," IDF, April 9, 2002 TR3-268-02, p. 15.

15 Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, Washington, DC, June 12, 2002.

16 The charge has also come from PA officials. Haidar Irshaid, the acting governor of Jenin, when asked about sources of support for Islamic Jihad in his district, told Human Rights Watch that he was "not authorized to say" but that he had "heard" that the group received support from Iran and Syria. Human Rights Watch interview with Haidar Irshaid, Jenin city, June 10, 2002. In 1999, Police Chief Gazi al-Jabali claimed that the PA had evidence showing Iranian transfers of million of dollars to Hamas for the purpose of influencing the Israeli elections, a charge Iranian officials contested. Ibrahim Barzak, "Police chief: Hamas plans attacks to help Netanyahu win election," Associated Press, February 4, 1999. More recently, but without naming funders or organizations, President Arafat said, "[T]he orders to carry out these actions come from extremist organizations outside Palestine. They are also financed from outside Palestine," BBC Monitoring Middle East cited Palestinian Television, "Arafat says extremist organizations receive orders, financing from abroad," June 30, 2002.

17 Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine, pp. 41, 108. Hatina writes that Iranian financial and logistical aid was "disbursed through the Iranian Embassy in Beirut and through Hizballah," p. 108.

18 Robert Fisk, "The Doctor who Finds Death a Laughing Matter," The Independent (London), January 30, 1995.

19 Wilcox's statement, made to Stephen Flatow and his lawyer in July 1996, was cited in the findings of a U.S. court judgment in a suit for monetary damages that Flatow brought against Iranian officials as a result of the death his daughter, Alicia Flatow, in a suicide bombing in April 1995. See Flatow v. Iran: Order, filed on March 11, 1998 at (accessed August 16, 2002).

20 IDF Spokesman, "HAMAS - The Islamic Resistance Movement," January 1993, p. 10 at (accessed August 16, 2002). The document also estimates that the funds reaching Hamas "operatives" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip annually amount to around $1 million.

21 See Kenneth Katzman, "Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002," p. 7, CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, February 13, 2002 at (accessed September 3, 2002). The report says that Hamas funding comes "from businesses it runs in Palestinian controlled areas, from Iran (about 10% of its budget), from wealthy private benefactors in the Persian Gulf monarchies, and Palestinian expatriates." It does not provide any estimate of the size of Hamas' budget.

22 Post and Sprinzak, "Terror's Aftermath," Los Angeles Times, July 7, 2002.

23 Ali Nurizadeh, "Iran Increases budget to Islamic Jihad and special assistance to resistance leaders," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 8, 2002 (in Arabic).

24 Ibid.

25 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, April 30, 2001 at (accessed September 3, 2002).

26 For an account of a Tehran meeting of Hamas and Hizbollah leaders, see Matt Rees, "The Terror Twins," Time, April 30, 2001.

27 Interview, al-Mujalla, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Near East and South Asia, June 17, 2001.

28 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000.

29 See Katzmann, "Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1999", p. 17. On funding via Syria, see "Perpetrator of hotel attack in Netanya was disguised as a Woman," Yediot Ahronot (in Arabic) May 16, 2002. Translated by Human Rights Watch. The article reflects the purported admissions under Israeli interrogation of Abbas al-Sayid, a Hamas leader from Tulkarem, arrested on or about May 6, 2002. According to the article, "Al-Sayid testified that he was used to contacting Hamas leadership in Syria when he needed money, and he used to receive $10,000 - $13,000 each month. These monies were deposited in his personal account and the account of his wife. He said that he was aware the source of the money was Europe and the U.S. as it was clear from the bank statements."

30 Julia Preston, "Israel resists new U.N. measure to end siege," New York Times, September 25, 2002. Syria is currently a member of the Security Council.

31 "Analysis of the Captured Documents: The Saudi Committee for the Support of Intifada al Quds," Appendix D, from (accessed July 2, 2002). The informant's source reports that she does not know the names of recipients. Reports or allegations of Saudi support for Islamic Jihad are uncommon.

32 See Syria's report to the U.N. Security Council on measures taken to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373. U.N. Document S/2001/1204, December 14, 2001.

33 Iraq increased its payment of $10,000 to "martyrs'" families to $25,000 in the case of suicide bombers in March 2002.

34 Sky TV broadcast of July 17, 2002, shotlist and storyline provided to Human Rights Watch by Associated Press Television News, August 7, 2002.

35 Nidal al-Mughrabi, "Iraqi, Saudi aid money wins Palestinian hearts," Reuters, June 2, 2002.

36 Paul McGeough, "A sea of blood...a sip of coffee," Sydney Morning Herald, March 26, 2002. Some details of the meeting are from McGeough's letter of April 6, 2002, posted on the website of the Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq, (accessed August 7, 2002).

37 Paul McGeough, "Saddam Stokes War With Suicide Bomber Cash," Sydney Morning Herald, March 26, 2002. Israelli forces reportedly arrested Salem in early October 2002. "Israel says arrests pro-Iraq leader in W. Bank," Reuters, October 2, 2002.

38 Paul McGeough, letter of April 6, 2002, was posted on the website of the Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq,

39 Nidal al-Mughrabi, "Iraqi, Saudi aid money wins Palestinian hearts," Reuters, June 2, 2002.

40 Shotlist, soundbite and storyline provided to Human Rights Watch by Associate Press Television News.

41 Matthew A. Levitt, "Charitable and humanitarian Organizations in the Network of International Terrorist Financing," testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, August 1, 2002, p. 4. Officials of the Holy Land Foundation have denied providing support for military activities.

42 Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Violent Crime, US Department of the Treasury, House Financial Subcommittee, Oversight and Investigations, February 12 2002, PO-1009 at (accessed September 3, 2002).

43 The EU has held the position that separation between Hamas military and charitable activities is possible, and has banned fundraising on behalf of the Hamas military wing, the `Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. See "Decision Adopted by Written Procedure, Fight Against Terrorism - Updated List," Brussels 3 May 2002, 8549/02 (Presse 121) at (accessed September 3, 2002).

44 "Summary of Information Provided by the FBI to the Department of Treasury in Support of the Designation of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development," no date, provided to Human Rights Watch by the U.S. Department of Justice, August 2002.

45 United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. John Ashcroft in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Civil Action no. 02-442 (GK), Memorandum Opinion & Order filed August 8, 2002 by Judge Gladys Kessler, p. 29.

46 See IDF captured documents, "Saudi Arabia Finances Terror Activities; Strengthening the Hamas' attack apparatus," (accessed October 4, 2002).

47 U.S. Department of Justice brief, Holy Land Foundation v. John Ashcroft, p. 4 section I (A).

48 Human Rights Watch interview, Washington, June 28, 2002.

49 Megan Goldin, "Hamas feeds struggle against Israel with charity," Reuters, January 4, 2001.

50 The interview in Filastin al-Muslimah (no date cited) is translated and excerpted in "Summary of Information Provided by the FBI to the Department of Treasury in Support of the Designation of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development," no date, provided to Human Rights Watch by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 2002.

51 IDF Captured Document "Saudi Arabia Finances Terror Activities", Appendix F at (accessed September 3, 2002).

52 Only one out of the seven families of perpetrators visited by Human Rights Watch in the preparation of this report acknowledged receiving any financial assistance from any outside quarter-in that case, a check for seventy dollars from the United Arab Emirates.

53 IDF captured documents, "Saudi Arabia Finances Terror Activities" at (accessed September 3, 2002).

54 "Many of the zakat committees may not be controlled by Hamas, but they are under the influence of the Muslim Brothers more broadly," one well-informed Palestinian journalist told Human Rights Watch, referring to the Islamist political group from which Hamas emerged. "Individuals and religious societies in Saudi Arabia will get names and account numbers from an organization like the Hebron Charitable Society." Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, Nablus, June 7, 2002.

55 IDF captured documents, "Saudi Arabia Finances Terror Activities" at (accessed September 3, 2002).

56 Interview with Eyad Sarraj, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope," Journal of Palestine Studies XXXI, no. 4 (Summer 2002), p. 75.

57 For example, life insurance policies typically preclude payment when the deceased has taken his or her own life, so as not to provide any incentive to committing suicide. The rationale behind the above exclusion is all the stronger if the suicide is committed in the course of perpetrating a crime against humanity.

58 Human Rights Watch interview with Yusuf Abu Laban, Bethlehem, June 13, 2002.

59 Fahem al-Hamid and `Abdul Qadir Faris, "Saudi society distributes relief aid to Palestinians in Gaza," Saudi Gazette, May 2, 2002. The Shaikh said that in Gaza there were 518 martyrs' families and 4,027 injured persons.

60 Amanda Ripley, "Why Suicide Bombing....Is Now All The Rage," Time, April 15, 2002. Ripley reported that "[a]t wakes for Hamas bombers, it has become routine for an activist to approach the father with an envelope containing $10,000."

61 The scanned Arabic originals released by the IDF were of too poor a quality to allow analysis.

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