VI. RESPONSE OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

There's deficiency and impunity in the administration of labor justice.

-- Augusto Salazar, FESTRAS³⁹⁶

The Ministry of Labor has criticized us for taking over their role, but it's not true. We exist because the ministry doesn't function well.

-- Kenneth Kim, COVERCO³⁹⁷

This report describes the statutory and practical sex discrimination that domestic workers and maquila line operators endure on a daily basis. In the case of domestic workers, this is in large part due to discrimination in legal protection. Despite its obligations under international law and specific commitments made in the peace accords, the Guatemalan government has failed to rectify this discrimination. The labor code does, however, guarantee domestic workers some rights, and provides for extensive protections for maquila line operators. Human Rights Watch has identified three critical inadequacies in the Guatemalan response to gender-specific labor rights violations. First, the government has demonstrated a lack of due diligence in monitoring labor rights conditions and enforcing the labor code. Second, sanctions for labor rights infractions were until recently so inadequate as to fail to provide an effective disincentive to would-be violators of the law. Last, the lack of coordination among state institutions obstructs even the most modest attempts to protect worker rights.

Lack of Due Diligence

Ministry of Labor

Article 103 of the Guatemalan Constitution establishes the tutelaridad, or protective nature, of labor law in Guatemala.³⁹⁸ Under the labor code, the Ministry of Labor is charged with enforcing labor legislation following the guiding principle of "protection:" a responsibility to engage in the active protection of worker rights, not simply to serve as an impartial arbiter between the employer and the employee. In its last paragraph, Article 106 provides that in cases of doubt over the interpretation or scope of legal, regulatory, or contractual matters in labor affairs, "the interpretation will be made in the manner most favorable for the workers."

In addition to calling for specific reforms to labor legislation in Guatemala, the Social and Economic Agreement in the peace accords committed the government to take steps to "decentralize and expand labour inspection services, strengthening the capacity to monitor compliance with the labour norms of domestic law and those derived from the international labour agreements ratified by Guatemala, paying particular attention to monitoring compliance with the labour rights of women, migrant and temporary agricultural workers, household workers, minors, the elderly, the disabled and other workers who are in a more vulnerable and unprotected situation."³⁹⁹ Despite these promises, the monitoring and enforcement capacity of the labor ministry remains weak.

Workers who have suffered violations of their rights can go to the Ministry of Labor's Inspectorate for assistance. The Inspectorate comprises of three divisions: Conciliation, Visitations, and Mediation. Workers who have been fired and seek either to be rehired or to obtain their legal severance pay report to Conciliation; workers with on-the-job complaints go to the Visitation division. The Mediation division, according to Roberto de León, the general secretary of the Inspectorate, handles the most complex cases, specifically those involving public sector employees.⁴⁰⁰

The system is not adequately tailored to detect gender-specific labor rights violations. The Inspectorate does conduct predetermined ex oficio investigations on a regular basis. Roberto de León stated that the Inspectorate had conducted 1,700 ex oficio visits between January and June 2000 alone, a significant increase over previous years.⁴⁰¹ However, self-initiated independent investigations by individual inspectors are not common. Indeed, the minister of labor told Human Rights Watch that self-initiated investigations must be approved at the ministerial level.⁴⁰² The ministry makes little or no use of what could be a powerful tool in the protection of workers' rights. The use of pregnancy testing and questions about reproductive status on application forms in the maquila sector are examples. Every official we spoke with was aware of these practices, including the minister of labor, and everyone agreed that these are "totally illegal, without a doubt."⁴⁰³ Labor Magistrate Beatriz de Barreda categorically stated that the labor ministry could open an investigation into these practices if it so chose. ⁴⁰⁴ However, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, Minister of Labor Alfaro dismissed the idea, saying "I don't think we are into that level of detail."⁴⁰⁵

The fact that the Inspectorate is primarily reactive rather than proactive has a particularly harmful impact on domestic workers. There is, in effect, no monitoring or investigation into the situation of the tens of thousands (if not hundreds of thousands) of domestic workers throughout the country. Few domestic workers ever seek redress in the labor ministry, fewer still do so for on-the-job, continuing violations of their rights. This is due, in part, to lack of awareness of their rights, fear of retaliation, and a basic mistrust of the system. Part of the solution, as the minister of labor noted, is worker rights education.⁴⁰⁶ An equally important part of the solution, however, is full compliance by the ministry with its duty to monitor the situation of domestic workers and investigate on-the-job conditions. The ability of the ministry to perform this duty is seriously impeded by the exemption enjoyed by employers of domestic workers from the obligations of providing a written contract⁴⁰⁷ and depositing the names and details of employees with the Ministry of Labor.⁴⁰⁸

When a worker goes to Conciliation to lodge a complaint about alleged violations such as unjust dismissal or failure to pay severance money, the assigned inspector will summon the employer to seek an administrative solution to the conflict. If the employer fails to appear after three summonses, the inspector concludes his or her participation in the matter with a report. Until recently, and while Human Rights Watch conducted this investigation, the worker was solely responsible for pursuing the case in the labor courts beyond this point. In July 2000, Minister of Labor Alfaro announced the creation of the Workers' Defense Office (Procuraduría de Defensa del Trabajador) within the ministry to provide legal aid to workers with no financial resources who have been fired without just cause.⁴⁰⁹ As a rule, the office only accepts cases in which the severance pay due the worker is calculated at Q5,000 (U.S. $667) or less, but it does accept all cases, regardless of the amount of severance pay, involving pregnant or breastfeeding workers, minors, or senior citizens.⁴¹⁰ As of February 2001, the Workers' Defense Office had received 670 cases; of these, 150 cases had been resolved or dropped, while the remaining 520 cases were still being processed.⁴¹¹

In the Visitation division, workers can lodge complaints about on-going, on-the-job abuses. The receiving inspector is supposed to advise the employer of the report, and give the employer a certain number of days to comply with his or her obligations. The inspector may use his or her discretion in determining the length of time.⁴¹² The inspector may also conduct an unannounced visit to the work site. During this visit, the inspector will call the worker who submitted the complaint to conduct what one inspector called "a direct hearing" between employee and employer.⁴¹³ If the employer fails to comply within the specified amount of time, the case is remanded to the legal section of the Inspectorate, which has the obligation of pursuing the case in court on behalf of the worker.

The practice of calling the worker before her employer in a quasi hearing has some troubling aspects. These hearings reflect the overarching emphasis of the labor ministry on conciliation and extrajudicial mechanisms for resolving labor conflicts. Unfortunately, the practice presupposes that the worker will be free to contest openly her employer as if they were equal parties to a negotiation when, in fact, the at-work power dynamic clearly favors the employer. Furthermore, this practice exposes the worker to employer retaliation, and may, in some cases, ultimately serve as a disincentive to other workers. The message is that any attempt to defend one's rights will only put an individual in a worse situation.

Another troubling practice is the failure to investigate situations beyond an individual complaint, even when there exists the reasonable likelihood of a widespread problem or pattern. In general, the inspectors enjoy wide discretion over whether to initiate an investigation into potential violations, either on the basis of the individual complaint or on the basis of observed wrongdoings during an on-site inspection. An inspector who has worked in the labor ministry for a decade told Human Rights Watch that "we have the authority to conduct ex oficio investigations, but sometimes we are limited [from doing so]...sometimes, the head of inspection will send around a memorandum saying that we should only look at the complaint, and no other problems in the business."⁴¹⁴ As a result, generalized problems may not be detected, and remedies will only be partial and limited.

Limited training and the lack of clear guidelines compound the shortcomings of the Inspectorate. The ministry has recently implemented some training cycles for new inspectors. However, many older inspectors never received any training, and attention to gender-specific labor rights violations in the trainings is minimal. The Working Women's Unit (Sección de Promoción y Capacitación de la Mujer Trabajadora), a division of the labor ministry created in 1994, conducts only limited internal training for labor inspectors on women's labor rights concerns. ⁴¹⁵ Indeed, the two lawyers in the legal office of the Inspectorate had not received any training in women's labor rights, nor had the secretary general of the Inspectorate, who oversees the work of the inspectors.⁴¹⁶

The Working Women's Unit has limited power to influence the performance of inspectors. The unit does not take complaints directly, but it does have the mandate to provide legal advice to working women with problems, and Inspectorate officials will sometimes send women up to the unit. However, the unit has no mandate to oversee the handling of cases involving gender-specific labor rights violations. The inspectors, according to Berta Hilda de Alcántara, the unit's director, do not openly share the details of their cases: "There's nothing that obligates them to tell us what's happening with their cases."⁴¹⁷

The Inspectorate does not have a procedures manual for its employees. According to one inspector, "everyone interprets [their duties] as they wish." ⁴¹⁸ Similarly, there is no established method for informing inspectors about new laws or regulations. "One finds out through the newspapers," complained one inspector.⁴¹⁹ The consequences of limited training and lack of clear directives can be devastating. Pedro Barán, the lawyer for the women's project at CALDH, remembers that one inspector refused to accept the complaint of a woman who was unable to get her medical certificate from the maquila where she worked in order to have her prenatal check-ups. The inspector wanted proof from her that she was pregnant. "He said he wasn't going to waste his time without being sure that she was actually pregnant," Barán told us.⁴²⁰

The lack of adequate staff and material resources clearly affects the ability of inspectors to carry out their responsibilities effectively. At the time of this investigation, there were twenty-three inspectors in Conciliation (five of whom dealt with cases being considered in Mediation), and thirty-two in Visitations. ⁴²¹ As Misrahí Auyón, the CENTRACAP lawyer, acknowledged, inspectors "attend to many people every day, the treatment isn't very in-depth."⁴²² The Inspectorate relies on only two lawyers to shepherd all cases of on-the-job complaints and noncompliance through the labor courts on behalf of workers. Between the two of them, as of June 2000, they had some three hundred cases to follow in the courts. ⁴²³ At the time of this investigation, the Visitations division had only three vehicles available to inspectors to conduct worksite investigations. These vehicles are difficult to reserve in advance, and rarely available for emergency visits.⁴²⁴

Guatemalan Institute for Social Security

The Guatemalan Institute for Social Security (IGSS) was created in 1946 as an autonomous entity with the purpose of "providing minimum protection to the whole population of the country."⁴²⁵ This social security system functions as a public health care system for contributing employees. IGSS provides services and benefits not only in cases of work-related accidents and illnesses, but also general health care and maternity care, as well as disability care and payments.⁴²⁶ Employers with more than three employees have an obligation to register those workers with IGSS, contribute the employer percentage, and deduct the employee contribution each pay period.⁴²⁷

The IGSS Inspectorate is charged with verifying compliance with employer obligations.⁴²⁸ There are 125 inspectors in the whole country, sixty-five of whom are based in the capital. ⁴²⁹ This Inspectorate can receive complaints of noncompliance from workers, doctors treating a worker, authorities within the IGSS itself, or from a state institution. In acknowledgement of the difficulties workers have in reaching IGSS offices, the Inspectorate established a telephone hotline workers can call with complaints. The IGSS Inspectorate shares many problems with the labor ministry inspectorate: limited staff, inadequate resources, problematic procedures, and weak enforcement capacity.

Upon receiving a complaint, IGSS inspectors are supposed to visit the workplace without advance warning to investigate the allegations. However, like labor inspectors, IGSS personnel do not have the right to enter any workplace, be it a maquila, a private home, or an office, without permission. "One problem with the maquilas is that they don't let us in," a high ranking official of the IGSS Inspectorate told Human Rights Watch.⁴³⁰ If the inspector is allowed to enter, he or she will look at the company's personnel files. If the documents do not corroborate what the worker has alleged, the IGSS simply halts the investigation and closes the case.⁴³¹ If the worker's name does not appear in the personnel files, the inspector will require the worker to show proof that he or she works or worked in that establishment. The difficulties of proving this fact can be substantial. The maquilas, for example, rarely give employees copies of their work contracts, and paychecks rarely come with pay stubs. Where workers do receive pay stubs, these often do not have the name of the business anywhere on them.

Like their colleagues in the labor ministry inspectorate, IGSS inspectors normally only investigate upon complaint, and rarely attempt to establish whether other workers under the same employer are faced with the same problems. For example, an IGSS inspector responding to a complaint from a maquila worker that she is unable to secure a medical certificate will only look into the specific complaint, and not investigate whether the problem is widespread in the maquila. Similarly, although a complaint of failure of the company to register a single worker with IGSS could be symptomatic of a widespread problem, inspectors will rarely open independent investigations. Carmen López de Cáceres, the director of the ILO's project on maquilas in Guatemala, complained that the "IGSS is not concerned with verifying the affiliation of workers. It's a general problem."⁴³² A highly-placed official in the IGSS Inspectorate acknowledged that "a high number" of workers are not registered with the Institute.⁴³³

The IGSS can neither impose fines directly nor take any action against employers who fail to comply with IGSS regulations. In cases in which the inspector verifies an infraction, such as the failure of the employer to register workers with the IGSS, the Institute has the obligation to lodge a formal legal complaint. The IGSS official explained that this obligation is rarely pursued. "It takes too much time. We try to reach a conciliation, an extrajudicial resolution." According to the official, the Inspectorate receives an average of ten complaints every month from maquila workers about their inability to get a medical certificate. He claimed most are resolved in favor of the worker. He explained that the last complaint the IGSS Inspectorate lodged in the labor courts was in 1992. "They haven't summoned us yet."⁴³⁴

Ineffective Sanctions

Absurdly low fines, drawn-out court proceedings, and the difficulties of enforcing sanctions when applied have all left the worker little choice but to try to reach a negotiated settlement. Even those charged with taking cases to court, the two labor ministry prosecutors, believe that "conciliation is better for the worker."⁴³⁵ "There's deficiency and impunity in the administration of labor justice," according to Augusto Salazar, a union organizer. "There are no sanctions, no coercive measures. If you exhaust the conciliatory avenue, then you can go to the courts, but there the case will take two years. Impunity reigns in all areas."⁴³⁶

At the time this research was conducted, the Ministry of Labor was not empowered to impose sanctions directly. Only the labor courts, which are part of the Ministry of Justice, could order penalties for labor rights violations.⁴³⁷ But court cases take an extremely long time, and sentences can be difficult to enforce. Pedro Barán, the lawyer for CALDH's women's rights project, explained that it can take months simply to get a court date, then months before the case will actually be heard. A labor magistrate agreed, telling Human Rights Watch that the average case takes two years to work itself through the courts.⁴³⁸ "They don't comply with the principle of prompt justice, so that hunger doesn't arrive before justice," complained Barán.⁴³⁹

According to several lawyers and the labor magistrate, employers use several tactics to delay judicial proceedings indefinitely. Chief among these are claims of inability to attend the hearings due to illness (which can be filed up to three times) and allegations of incompetence of the judge to hear the case. This latter charge is routinely filed, regardless of the case or the appointed judge. Once filed, "the judge must give it due process. This is filed only to delay the process," according to labor magistrate de Barreda. ⁴⁴⁰ Lawyers for employers will file these motions at every step in the process, including appeals, every time causing "another stagnation of months," according to Auyón. ⁴⁴¹

Even when a worker persists and sees the case through the courts, there are no guarantees that she will actually receive redress even in the event of a favorable decision. Labor magistrate de Barreda complained, "the fines are ridiculous, and they [employers] don't even pay them."⁴⁴² In the specific case of domestic workers, Auyón explained that workers often have a difficult time collecting damages. A ruling against the employer means the court can embargo his or her goods to ensure payment to the worker. Often, says Auyón, the accused in a domestic worker case is the woman of the household, who does not have any goods, property, or bank accounts registered in her name. From 1999 through June 2000, Auyón had handled a total of sixteen cases for CENTRACAP, and this had been a problem in the four cases that received favorable sentences. In these cases, the courts had failed to act to seize the male head of household's goods. "So there's a declared right but without effect," commented Auyón. ⁴⁴³

As this report was finalized, the Guatemalan Congress adopted a series of reforms to the labor code. These reforms attempt to redress a situation in which sanctions for infractions of the labor code were so minimal that they provided no disincentive to employers. Until the May 2001 reforms were adopted, the labor code established fines that were so low that it was far easier for employers to violate the law and pay the fine than take the necessary measures to protect workers' rights. For example, the labor code stipulated a fine of Q500-Q2500 (U.S. $67-U.S. $333) for a violation of any article referring to salaries, workdays, rest periods, etc. Health and safety violations gave rise to a Q250-1,250 (U.S. $33-U.S. $167) fine. The May 2001 reforms establish a range of minimum wage amounts per type of infraction, rather than absolute quantities of money. Thus, an infraction of legislation related to salaries, workdays, and rest periods, is subject to a fine between three and twelve monthly minimum wages for non-agricultural activities.⁴⁴⁴ The same reforms give the Ministry of Labor the authority to directly apply and collect fines for infractions of the labor code.⁴⁴⁵ These welcome reforms conform to the government's long-standing commitment acquired in the 1996 peace accords to temalan government undertook to "promote, in the course of 1996, legal and regulatory changes to enforce the labour laws and severely penalize violations, including violations in respect to the minimum wage, non-payment, withholding and delays in wages, occupational hygiene and safety and the work environment."⁴⁴⁶ The reforms came at a time when the United States had threatened to remove Guatemala's benefits under two separate preferential trade agreements-GSP and CBTPA-unless, among other steps, the government did not reform the labor code.

Ineffective Mechanisms

The ineffectiveness of state institutions in responding to labor rights violations is due in part to lack of coordination among them. This is especially true for violations in the maquila sector, where the Ministry of Labor, the IGSS, and the Ministry of Economy have important roles. The Guatemalan state now counts on several bodies charged with defending women's rights and overseeing state policies on gender equity. These entities could also have a role to play in monitoring gender-specific labor rights violations and the overall state response.

The Ministry of Economy has far greater coercive power than the labor ministry in cases involving maquilas. Under Decree 29-89 that regulates the maquila sector, the Department of Industrial Policy in the Ministry of Economy is authorized to cancel benefits in the event of non-compliance with national law. ⁴⁴⁷ Everyone agrees that managers in the maquila sector are far more concerned with the scrutiny of the Department of Industrial Policy than with that of the Ministry of Labor. The department's head, Nora González M., explained that "the labor ministry goes [to a maquila] and doesn't find the information, the economy ministry asks for the information, and gets it." ⁴⁴⁸ Indeed, the secretary general of the labor ministry's Inspectorate acknowledged that "their power of persuasion is greater than ours."⁴⁴⁹ Even though the threat of sanctions is greater, the Ministry of Economy has in fact only cancelled benefits six times since 1990.⁴⁵⁰

The Ministry of Economy cannot initiate its own investigations. Rather, it can only proceed upon receipt of an official report from the labor ministry. Staff from the Department of Industrial Policy will then call or visit a factory to investigate the allegations and apply pressure. The maquila is given a period of time during which it must rectify the situation, under threat of cancellation of benefits under Decree 29-89. The system of information sharing and transferring of cases from the labor ministry is not adequately developed. According to Roberto de León from the labor Inspectorate, the system "sort of worked last year."⁴⁵¹ His counterpart, Nora González, agreed that there had been more cases in 2000, claiming whatever coordination exists "depends on the political will of each government." ⁴⁵² González informed Human Rights Watch that the Ministry of Economy received five reports from the labor ministry regarding noncompliance with national labor laws in maquilas; as a result, benefits were cancelled for four maquilas.⁴⁵³

Coordination between the labor ministry and IGSS has also been difficult. "There's a certain atomization, certain jealousy between the Ministry of Labor and IGSS. There should be more collaboration between them, but there isn't. Those who come out losing are the workers," according to Pedro Barán, legal advisor to the women's project at CALDH.⁴⁵⁴ Apparently, an agreement existed years ago to facilitate coordination of efforts between the two institutions, but now "there is no information sharing, in other words, there's no coordination," said an official in the IGSS Inspectorate.⁴⁵⁵

CALDH proved the catalyst for initiating a dialogue among these institutions. In February 1999, the NGO organized the "Coordinating Body" (Instancia Coordinadora), an informal mechanism for promoting coordination not only among state institutions, but also with NGOs. The Instancia includes the Ministry of Labor (Inspectorate, Health and Safety, and the Working Woman's Unit), IGSS (Inspectorate, Health and Safety), Ministry of Economy (Department of Industrial Policy), Immigration Department, Human Rights Ombudsman's Office (Education Department), GRUFEPROMEFAM, AMES, CEADEL and COVERCO. The ILO and MINUGUA participate as observers. While all members applaud the effort, few concrete measures have resulted. For example, the Instancia has proposed a system in which the Ministry of Economy would send information about newly established maquilas to the IGSS Inspectorate every month. This would facilitate the ability of IGSS to ensure compliance with registration of workers and contributions. There is, however, no formal agreement yet, and therefore no information is currently being shared.⁴⁵⁶

The vast majority of the women workers we spoke with had not even considered seeking redress through the labor ministry, much less through adjudication in the labor courts. The few who had gone to the labor ministry had for the most part done so after losing their job in order to force their ex-employer to give them their severance pay. Far fewer workers with on-the-job complaints sought help from the state. The reasons for this reluctance are many-fold. The majority of workers are unaware of their rights, or do not know how to exercise them. Others are afraid of retaliation from their employer. Still others are convinced they will receive poor treatment and decide the effort is not worth it. Overall, there is a lack of confidence that the system can help them. Human Rights Watch found that this overall reluctance is well-founded and the practices and failings of state institutions reinforce working women's fears and serve to further dissuade them from demanding their rights.

³⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Augusto Salazar, national coordinator, FESTRAS, Guatemala City, June 9, 2000.

³⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Kenneth Kim, project coordinator, COVERCO, Guatemala City, June 1, 2000.

³⁹⁸ Constitution of the Republic, Article 103: "The laws that regulate relations between employer and work [sic] are conciliatory, protective of the workers and will attend to all the pertinent economic and social factors."

³⁹⁹ Social and Economic Agreement, Article 26(d).

⁴⁰⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Roberto de León, secretary general, Labor Inspectorate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid. According to de León, the Inspectorate conducted 431 ex oficio investigations in 1999 and 516 in 1998.

⁴⁰² Human Rights Watch interview, Juan Francisco Alfaro Mijangos, minister of labor, Guatemala City, June 23, 2000.

⁴⁰³ Human Rights Watch interview, Berta Hilda de Alcántara, director, Working Women's Unit, Guatemala City, June 21, 2000.

⁴⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Beatriz de León de Barreda, labor magistrate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Juan Francisco Alfaro Mijangos, minister of labor, Guatemala City, June 23, 2000.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Labor code, Article 27.

⁴⁰⁸ Labor code, Article 61(a).

⁴⁰⁹ "Ministerio de Trabajo inaugura procuraduría de defensa del trabajador" ("Ministry of Labor inaugurates a workers' defense office"), Siglo Veintiuno, July 14, 2000.

⁴¹⁰ Communication (fax) from Carmen Yolanda Monges Galván, Asistente General del Ministro (General Assistant to the Minister), Ministry of Labor, dated February 23, 2001, Of. 134-2001 CYN/slo.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Labor Code, Article 281(l).

⁴¹³ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous labor inspector, Guatemala City, June 13, 2000.

⁴¹⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous labor inspector, Guatemala City, June 13, 2000.

⁴¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Berta Hilda de Alcántara, director, Working Women's Unit, Guatemala City, June 21, 2000.

⁴¹⁶ Human Rights Watch interviews, José Antonio Recinos and César Augusto Prera, prosecutors, Labor Inspectorate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000, and Roberto de León, secretary general, Labor Inspectorate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴¹⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Berta Hilda de Alcántara, director, Working Women's Unit, Guatemala City, June 21, 2000.

⁴¹⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous labor inspector, Guatemala City, June 13, 2000.

⁴¹⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous labor inspector, Guatemala City, June 13, 2000.

⁴²⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Pedro Barán, lawyer, CALDH, Guatemala City, June 20, 2000.

⁴²¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Roberto de León, secretary general, Labor Inspectorate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴²² Human Rights Watch interview, Misrahí Iram Aben Auyón B., lawyer, CENTRACAP, Guatemala City, June 7, 2000.

⁴²³ Human Rights Watch interview, José Antonio Recinos and César Augusto Prera, prosecutors, Ministry of Labor, Guatemala City, June 20, 2000.

⁴²⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous labor inspector, Guatemala City, June 13, 2000.

⁴²⁵ Organic Law of the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security, Decree No. 295, October 30, 1946, preamble.

⁴²⁶ Organic Law, Chapter IV, Article 28. Children of employees are covered up to five years of age. Unlike their male counterparts, female employees affiliated with IGSS cannot extend the coverage to their spouses.

⁴²⁷ Labor Code, Article 102. This article actually stipulates only that employers with three or more employees must maintain records in keeping with IGSS regulations. However, it is cited as the source for the rule that only these employers must register their employees with IGSS.

⁴²⁸ Organic Law, Chapter VII, Article 50.

⁴²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous IGSS official, Guatemala City, June 23, 2000.

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Human Rights Watch interview, Carmen López de Cáceres, director, ILO Project for Women Working in the Maquila Sector, Guatemala City, June 2, 2000.

⁴³³ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous IGSS official, Guatemala City, June 23, 2000.

⁴³⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous IGSS official, Guatemala City, June 23, 2000.

⁴³⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, José Antonio Recinos and César Augusto Prera, prosecutors, Ministry of Labor, Guatemala City, June 20, 2000.

⁴³⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Augusto Salazar, national coordinator, FESTRAS, Guatemala City, June 9, 2000.

⁴³⁷ Labor Code, Articles 269-272, 281 (l).

⁴³⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Beatriz de León de Barreda, labor magistrate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴³⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Pedro Barán, CALDH lawyer, Guatemala City, May 29, 2000.

⁴⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Beatriz de León de Barreda, labor magistrate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴⁴¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Misrahí Iram Aben Auyón B., lawyer for CENTRACAP, Guatemala City, June 7, 2000.

⁴⁴² Human Rights Watch interview, Beatriz de León de Barreda, labor magistrate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴⁴³ Of the other cases, two were resolved without going to court, one was resolved in court through arbitration by the judge, and nine were outstanding.

⁴⁴⁴ Decree Number 18-2001, Reforms to the Labor Code Decree Number 1441, adopted May 14, 2001, Article 17.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., Article 15.

⁴⁴⁶ Social and Economic Agreement, Article 26(c).

⁴⁴⁷ Decree 29-89, Article 43 (f).

⁴⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Nora González M., director, Department of Industrial Policy, Ministry of Economy, Guatemala City, June 21, 2000.

⁴⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Roberto de León, secretary general, Labor Inspectorate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴⁵⁰ Communication (email) from Nora González M., director, Department of Industrial Policy, Ministry of Economy, dated March 1, 2001.

⁴⁵¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Roberto de León, secretary general, Labor Inspectorate, Guatemala City, June 22, 2000.

⁴⁵² Human Rights Watch interview, Nora González M., director, Department of Industrial Policy, Ministry of Economy, Guatemala City, June 21, 2000.

⁴⁵³ Communication (email) from Nora González M., director, Department of Industrial Policy, Ministry of Economy, dated March 1, 2001.

⁴⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Pedro Barán, lawyer, CALDH, Guatemala City, June 20, 2000.

⁴⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, anonymous IGSS official, Guatemala City, June 23, 2000.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.