Juan Luis Alfaro, who worked for six years with a permanent contract as a subcontractor for plantation Colón in Balao, told Human Rights Watch that he was fired for requesting a raise for himself and his work team and then accused by his employer of having union sympathies. He explained:
I spoke with the administrator. I wanted him to recognize the amount of boxes [of bananas we produced] and give us more money. . . . He called the plantation owner on the radio. The owner said that he couldn't do that and that I was a troublemaker and that the administrator should look for another work team. . . . I asked for a raise in the morning. At 5:00 that afternoon, they fired me-me and the whole team. . . . The administrator communicated to me that the owner did not need our services and had another team all ready.213
Alfaro continued, "They [then] sent around papers so that they won't give me work on other plantations. Administrators of other plantations showed me the papers. They [the papers] say that I am a troublemaker and that I want to unionize. . . . They don't give me work. They don't want to." He added, "The following day I went to speak to the owner to ask for [indemnity]. He told me that he is not going to recognize not even a cent."214 At the time of Human Rights Watch's interview with Alfaro, he was working in a bakery, unable to find work on banana plantations in the area.
Freedom of Association under International Law
Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment. . . . Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to . . . (b) [c]ause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities.229
According to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, protection against anti-union discrimination should cover the periods of recruitment and hiring, employment, and dismissal.230 The committee has found, however, that as long as "adequate protection" during these periods is, in fact, provided, the methods adopted to safeguard workers against anti-union discrimination may vary from country to country.231 The ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (ILO Committee of Experts) has clarified, however, that because the remedy for anti-union dismissal should "compensate fully, both in financial and in occupational terms, the prejudice suffered by a worker as a result of an act of anti-union discrimination . . . [t]he best solution is generally the reinstatement of the worker in his post with payment of unpaid wages and maintenance of acquired rights."232 Further:
The Committee considers that legislation which allows the employer in practice to terminate the employment of a worker on condition that he pay the compensation provided for by law in all cases of unjustified dismissal, when the real motive is his trade union membership or activity, is inadequate under the terms of Article 1 of the Convention [ILO Convention concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining], the most appropriate measure being reinstatement. . . . Where reinstatement is impossible, compensation for anti-union dismissal should be higher than that prescribed for other kinds of dismissal. 233
Freedom of Association under Domestic Law
Even though the minimum number of 30 workers would be acceptable in the case of sectoral trade unions, the Committee considers that the minimum number should be reduced in the case of [company committees and company unions] so as not to hinder the establishment of such bodies, particularly when it is taken into account that the country has a very large proportion of small enterprises and that the trade union structure is based on enterprise unions.238
The ILO has twice recommended that Ecuador "take measures to amend the legislation so as to reduce the minimum number of workers required under the Act (presently 30) in order to establish enterprise unions."239
When unionizing began, it began because of ideas of the extreme left. . . . It was so easy to unionize. There was great bitterness among business. The following problem was occurring: . . . to avoid leftist unionization, [companies] did not grow sufficiently. They reached twelve or thirteen [workers] in order not to have unions. The same occurs [now at] twenty-nine.241
He concluded, therefore, that the difference now is that avoidance of unionization can be accomplished concurrently with reasonable business growth.
The Labor Code allows employers to hire temporary workers to satisfy exigent circumstances, such as temporary personnel reductions, or when the demand for regularly provided products or services increases.249 In the former case, the contract must state the reason for hiring, the names of the replaced personnel, and the contract's duration; in the latter case, "the contract cannot have a duration of more than 180 consecutive days."250 The rationale behind this provision is that a worker who provides everyday services to a company on a regular basis, month after month, should be considered a permanent employee and enjoy the corresponding legal protections and benefits.
They can fire them because they [temporary workers] do not have a right to stability. They are fired if they try to unionize. . . . They all fire them. There is not a company that would not fire them. The temporary worker that gets involved in [unionizing] already knows that he's out. . . . Temporary workers are [hired] so as not to have problems with unions. In the moment that the temporary workers unionize, they are fired.270
Gema Caranza, after working as a "temporary" worker for a year and a half on Recreo #1 and #3 in the canton of Naranjal, was indefinitely "suspended" on May 7, 2001, allegedly for involvement in union activity. She explained that she was told by the boss of the packing plants that "by order of the administrator of all the plantations of Enrique López," she would be suspended. "[The boss said,] `He [the administrator] has found out what you're involved in and [is afraid] that you will want to speak with the people and organize.'"271 According to Caranza, her boss, with whom she had a good working relationship, added, "I told you not to get involved in that-that you'd lose your job." Caranza said that in June 2000, she began to attend union-sponsored events and seminars. In most cases, she said, she invented excuses for her absence, afraid to disclose their true purpose. Before leaving for her first union-sponsored event outside Ecuador, however, she showed her boss the event invitation. She said, "He told me to be careful [and] that others might soon know [what I was doing]." Caranza said, "I knew that if they [the administrator, the plantation owner, or others in management] found out, they would fire me. . . . Because that's the way it is. If they find out, they fire you. This is why most people are scared."272
Temporary workers are precarious. They do not have the same guarantees as permanent workers because they do not have the right to indemnity. . . . They do not have the right to unionize. . . . [Unions] could not count temporary workers to meet the minimum number of workers [required for union formation].273
A representative of the undersecretariat's Legal Department similarly stated, "Temporary workers who work per month do not have the right to organize because they are not stable. . . . If there are temporary workers in the statutes [or] founding papers, they do not count towards the minimum [number required to unionize]."274 And the head of the undersecretariat's Labor Directorate, who oversees the regional labor inspectors and registers unions for the undersecretariat, told Human Rights Watch, "Only stable workers [can unionize]. . . . Temporary workers . . . cannot affiliate. . . . They cannot affiliate after [union formation, either]."275
Approximately half the adults interviewed by Human Rights Watch and almost all the children identified their bosses not as the plantation administrators but as the leaders of small work teams, either in the fields or the packing plants.281 These "team leaders," as the workers call them, are responsible for finding, hiring, and overseeing the workers and paying them directly, either in cash or check, often from money given to them by the plantation administrators. According to a banana producer and long-time member of the banana industry in El Oro province, "Normally, they are subcontractors, but semi-permanent subcontractors-months or years on the same plantation."282 Juan Luis Alfaro, a subcontractor employed for six years by plantation Colón in the canton of Balao, stated that he rotated with his team of sixteen workers among the plantation's three packing plants.
They made me sign a contract to hire personnel to process bananas in the packing plant. . . . They wanted to charge me taxes. . . . They made me do a payroll. I had to make the rolls [and] put [the workers'] names and sign [the] blank [paper]. They put the amount. They gave me money to pay the team. . . . They gave me cash.283
According to the workers who make up these work teams, most of whom work three or four days a week, their team leaders notify them, usually one day prior, when they will be needed on the plantations. A twelve-year-old girl working on the plantation group Las Fincas explained, "They come tell you so you know when they need workers."284 Lisa Moreno, a thirteen-year-old, described being recruited by team leaders, saying, "The boss came looking for me at home because they needed people on Colón. Recently, two weeks ago . . . the [team] boss of Pachina came looking."285 Victor Garza, a sixty-two-year-old worker, explained that he had worked for contractors for approximately forty years. He stated that since 1998, he had worked in Balao on plantations San Vicente, Luz Belén, and San José, owned by Parazul, S.A., for subcontractors hired by the plantations' administrators.286 He told Human Rights Watch, "I am not a permanent worker. . . . No written contract, verbal. They come in trucks to pick us up. They communicate to you so that later, the next day, they pick you up."287
Even those workers lucky enough to have been hired with permanent employment contracts directly by plantation owners risk dismissal if they attempt to organize. As discussed above, the Labor Code does not require reinstatement when a worker is fired for engaging in union activity, and, instead, in most cases, only requires the payment of a relatively small fine.299 As Undersecretary of Labor Montalvo noted, "If the dismissal is for disharmony, [the fines] will not be an obstacle. . . . It does not function to dissuade. If [the employer] wants to fire [the worker], it will fire [him]."300 Francisco Lazo, a business-side labor lawyer, told Human Rights Watch:
Companies . . . try to avoid unionization because it implies they have to negotiate a collective contract and increase production costs. . . . When the conditions are very bad, they resort to firing. Before, there was [some] minimal stability. The company had to recognize two [years' pay for indemnity]. The visto bueno [mandatory approval for dismissal from the Labor Inspectorate] was more complicated. . . . Now, three months is the indemnity for illegal firing. . . . It's harder for the workers and more favorable for the employer. It's easier to fire workers.301
Minister Insua also explained, "If the possibility of people wanting to unionize is seen, they are all fired. . . . They prefer to bring workers from other areas than to have a union. They fire them and they propose a diminished indemnity, and if they don't accept it, they can go to court. For the field worker, . . . it's too difficult [to go to court]. . . . The judicial avenue is very long-two years at a minimum."302 The attorney Lazo concurred, noting:
I can fire workers if I want. I don't necessarily have to pay. It is the worker who has to complain to the Ministry of Labor. The worker is obligated to file the case. The case can last . . . two years. Companies that tell a man to leave tell him that they will not pay and don't pay. A company can pay much more and [get] good lawyers so [the case] lasts many years. . . . They prefer to pay the lawyer [than the worker].303
Commenting on the anti-union climate in the banana sector, the general manager of Del Monte's Ecuadorian subsidiary noted:
The [Ecuadorian] banana producer is very radical. He has a phobia of unions. . . . They cut at the roots any efforts [to organize]. They fire the people. . . . In meetings of producers, I've heard that they will do anything not to have unions. . . . The producers here see Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Colombia and talk with producers from those countries who are tied by the unions. They don't want . . . that problem.304
Similarly, a labor inspector for the Undersecretariat of Labor for the Coastal and Galápagos Region told Human Rights Watch, "There have been cases in which they [workers] have wanted to form unions or company committees, and they have been fired. In the banana sector, this is an everyday occurrence."305 The director of the undersecretariat's Labor Directorate added, "Employers are afraid of workers' organizations. If they discover them, they [the workers] are fired . . . before notifying here [to register the organization]."306
213 Human Rights Watch interview, Juan Luis Alfaro.
215 Human Rights Watch interview, Julio Gutiérrez, Guayaquil, May 10, 2001.
216 Human Rights Watch interview, Tomás Peña, Balao, May 27, 2001. Peña told Human Rights Watch that the plantation on which he worked, whose name Human Rights Watch has omitted to protect Peña's anonymity, primarily produces for Noboa but that he occasionally saw stickers for Dole placed on the bananas.
217 Human Rights Watch interview, Cecilia Menéndez, Balao, May 27, 2001. According to Francisco Chávez, director of human resources for Noboa, Alamos Rey-Rancho is directly owned by Noboa. Human Rights Watch interview, Francisco Chávez.
218 Human Rights Watch interview, Victor Garza, Balao, May 19, 2001.
219 Human Rights Watch interview, Sara Portillo.
220 Human Rights Watch interview, Franklin Zambrano, secretary general, FENACLE, Naranjal, May 20, 2001; Human Rights Watch interview, Guillermo Touma, president, FENACLE, Quito, May 8, 2001; Human Rights Watch interview Patricio Contreras, Ecuador representative, AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center, Washington, DC, April 24, 2001.
222 Guillermo Touma and Franklin Zambrano provided Human Rights Watch with estimates of the number of affiliates in each of the five workers' organizations. Human Rights Watch interview, Franklin Zambrano; Human Rights Watch interview, Guillermo Touma.
223 Although information and data regarding worker organization rates vary, often widely, depending on the source, Human Rights Watch estimates that organization rates in the top five banana-exporting countries in Latin America are: Ecuador at approximately 1 percent; Costa Rica, with the next lowest rate, at between roughly 6 and 7 percent; Colombia and Panama at approximately 90 percent; and Guatemala at roughly 40 percent, with the rate varying significantly depending on the region. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Efrén Sandovál, Office of the Legal Commission, Sindicato de Trabajadores de Bananeros de Izabal [Union of Banana Workers of Izabal] (SITRABI), Guatemala, June 25, 2001; Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Manuel Marqués, secretary of education, Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Agropecuaria [Union of Workers of the Agriculture and Livestock Industry] (SINTRAINAGRO), Colombia, June 25, 2001; Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Germán Zepeda, director, Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Bananeros [Coordinator of Latin American Banana Unions] (COLSIBA), Honduras, June 25, 2001; Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Gilberth Bermúdez, director, Sindicato de Trabajadores de Plantaciones Agrícolas [Union of Workers of Agriculture Plantations] (SITRAP), Costa Rica, June 25, 2001; U.S./Labor Education in the Americas Project, Issue #2, August 2000, p. 5.
224 ICCPR, Article 22(1).
225 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 171, December 16, 1966, Article 8(1). Ecuador ratified the ICESCR on March 6, 1969.
226 International Labour Conference, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session, Geneva, June 18, 1998. According to ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, "all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those Conventions." Therefore, even countries that have not ratified the ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and the ILO Convention concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining are bound by this obligation.
227 ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (ILO No. 87), 68 U.N.T.S. 17, July 4, 1950, Article 2. ILO Convention No. 87 was ratified by Ecuador on May 29, 1967.
228 ILO, Complaint against the government of the Philippines presented by the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers (IFBWW), Report No. 292, Case No. 1615, Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 1, para. 332(a).
229 ILO Convention concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (ILO No. 98), 96 U.N.T.S. 257, July 18, 1951, Article 1. ILO Convention No. 98 was ratified by Ecuador on May 28, 1959.
230 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, General (Protection against anti-union discrimination), Digest of Decisions, Doc. 1201, 1996, para. 695. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association examines complaints from workers' and employers' organizations against ILO member states alleging violation of the right to freedom of association, makes determinations based on the facts and applicable legal standards, and recommends measures to resolve the disputes.
231 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Need for rapid and effective protection (Protection against anti-union discrimination), Digest of Decisions, Doc. 1204, 1996, para. 737.
232 International Labour Conference, 1994, Freedom of association and collective bargaining: Protection against acts of anti-union discrimination, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 81st Session, Geneva, 1994, Report III (Part 4B), para. 219. The ILO Committee of Experts is composed of a group of independent experts that reviews reports submitted by ILO member states on their ratification of and compliance with ILO conventions and recommendations. Once a year the committee produces one report on its general observations concerning certain countries and another on a particular theme covered by ILO conventions and recommendations.
233 Ibid., paras. 220, 221.
234 Labor Code, Articles 450, 459.
235 Ibid., Article 459.
236 Ibid., Article 226.
237 International Labour Conference, 1994, Freedom of association and collective bargaining: Right of workers and employers to establish and join organizations, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 81st Session, Geneva, 1994, Report III (Part 4B), para. 81.
238 ILO, Complaints against the Government of Ecuador presented by the Confederation of Workers of Ecuador (CTE), the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organisations (CEOSL) and the Latin American Central of Workers (CLAT), Report No. 284, Case No. 1617, Vol. LXXV, 1992, Series B, No.3, para. 1006, citing International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 79th Session, Geneva, 1992, Report III (Part 4A), pp. 212, 213, 268.
239 ILO, Complaint against the Government of Ecuador presented by the Ecuadorian Federation of Agricultural, Agro-Industrial and Food Workers (FETAL), Report No. 294, Case No. 1746, Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 2; ILO, Complaints against the Government of Ecuador presented by CTE, CEOSL and CLAT . . . , para. 1006
240 ILO, Complaints against the Government of Ecuador presented by CTE, CEOSL and CLAT . . . , para. 1001.
241 Human Rights Watch interview, Alberto Montalvo, undersecretary of labor for the coastal and Galápagos region, Ministry of Labor, Guayaquil, May 16, 2001.
242 Constitution, Article 35(9).
243 Labor Code, Articles 447, 467; see Convention concerning the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, Article 2.
244 Labor Code, Articles 42(10), 44(j).
245 Ibid., Article 626. The IMF has also noted that in Ecuador, "the punishment for noncompliance with labor legislation is relatively low." IMF, "Ecuador: Selected Issues and Statistical Annex" . . . , p. 57.
246 Labor Code, Article 188.
247 Ibid., Articles 459, 462. The indemnity for dismissing a union organizer is only greater if the dismissed worker is a member of a union's elected leadership or if the workers at her workplace have just organized and notified the Labor Inspector but not yet selected union leadership. In such cases, the worker enjoys special union protection, fuero sindical, and the fine due is one year's salary, averaging roughly U.S. $1,300 for banana workers. However, reinstatement is still not required. Ibid., Article 187.
248 ICCPR, Article 2.
249 Labor Code, Article 17. The Labor Code also permits the use of temporary contracts, not to exceed thirty days, for workers hired to attend to emergencies or extraordinary business needs that, unlike the everyday processing or field activities of banana workers, are not linked to the normal activity of the employers. Seasonal contracts may also be used to hire workers for cyclical labor and are understood to create the right for such workers to be hired back the following cycle or season. As banana production in Ecuador is not cyclical and, instead, involves the performance of all phases of production activity year-round, seasonal contracts are generally not used in the sector. Ibid.
251 Human Rights Watch interview, Minister of Labor Martín Insua.
252 Human Rights Watch interview, Undersecretary of Labor Alberto Montalvo.
253 Labor Code, Articles 14, 16.
254 The Labor Code requires that temporary contracts and project contracts for ordinary business activities, with a mandatory minimum duration of one year, be executed in writing. Ibid., Article 19.
255 Human Rights Watch interview, Marco García.
256 Gema Caranza told Human Rights Watch that Recreo #1 and #3 primarily produce for Noboa. According to Caranza, Arturo Quirola's plantations are owned by Quirola, a smaller Ecuadorian banana company. Human Rights Watch interview, Gema Caranza, Guayaquil, May 10, 2001.
258 According to many workers, Italia primarily produces for Dole. Nonetheless, one child, Ricardo Leiva, and two adults, Carla Villa and Antonio Romero, reported occasionally seeing Del Monte stickers on the bananas produced by Italia; one child, Violeta Chamorro, and Villa and Romero stated that they also saw stickers with Noboa's brand name, Bonita, on the plantation's bananas; Romero claimed also to have seen Favorita stickers on the bananas; and Villa asserted that she occasionally saw Chiquita stickers on the fruit. Human Rights Watch interview, Ricardo Leiva, May 19, 2001; Human Rights Watch interview, Violeta Chamorro; Human Rights Watch interview, Carla Chamorro; Human Rights Watch interview, Carla Villa, Naranjal, May 20, 2001; Human Rights Watch interview, Antonio Romero; Human Rights Watch interview, Julio Gutiérrez, Naranjal, May 26, 2001. Chiquita, however, denied that it purchased bananas from Italia from 1995 through the end of June 2001, years that encompass the period during which these workers labored on plantation Italia. Letter from Jeffrey Zalla to Human Rights Watch, August 28, 2001.
259 Human Rights Watch interview, Antonio Romero.
260 Human Rights Watch interview, Carla Villa; Human Rights Watch interview, Julia Villanueva, Naranjal, May 20, 2001.
261 Human Rights Watch interview, Julio Gutiérrez, Guayaquil, May, 10, 2001.
262 The Labor Code grants each worker the right to fifteen uninterrupted paid vacation days annually, including weekends and, after working for over five years for the same employer, one additional vacation day for each year worked, not to exceed fifteen. Labor Code, Article 69. The Labor Code also provides that Saturdays and Sundays are obligatory days of rest, unless circumstances dictate that work cannot be interrupted on those days, in which case, two other days will be designated as days of rest. Ibid., Articles 51-53. Without a stable contract and continuous employment with the same employer, however, these benefits are inaccessible to workers.
263 Ibid., Article 42(31).
264 Human Rights Watch interview, Julio Gutiérrez, Guayaquil, May 10, 2001.
265 Human Rights Watch interview, Julia Villanueva. As previously stated, all workers' names have been changed to protect them from potential reprisals.
266 Human Rights Watch interview, Manuel Vega and Cristina Gallo, Naranjal, May 26, 2001.
267 Labor Code, Articles 169, 172, 180.
268 Ibid., Article 181.
269 Human Rights Watch interview, Julia Villanueva.
270 Human Rights Watch interview, Minister of Labor Martín Insua.
271 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Gema Caranza, Naranjal, June 8, 2001.
272 Ibid.; Human Rights Watch interview, Gema Caranza, Guayaquil, May 10, 2001.
273 Human Rights Watch interview, Undersecretary of Labor Alberto Montalvo.
274 Human Rights Watch interview, Mauro Vargas, Department of Legal Assistance, Undersecretary of Labor for the Coastal and Galápagos Region, Guayaquil, May 16, 2001.
275 Human Rights Watch interview, Efraín Duque.
276 Human Rights Watch interview, Minister of Labor Martín Insua.
277 Resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice, March 8, 1990, cited in Labor Code, Article 224.
278 Human Rights Watch interview, Patricio Contreras, Quito, May 22, 2001. The AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center promotes labor rights and labor organizing around the world.
279 Human Rights Watch interview, Carla Villa.
280 Human Rights Watch interview, Julia Villanueva.
281 The workers did not distinguish between team leaders who were permanent employees of the company and team leaders who were contracted by the company to hire subcontracted work teams. Therefore, Human Rights Watch is unable to determine with certainty how many of these workers were, in fact, subcontracted.
282 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, Arturo Buchelli, general manager, Movilizadora de Banano, S.A. (MOBANSA), Machala, July 7, 2001.
283 Human Rights Watch interview, Juan Luis Alfaro.
284 Human Rights Watch interview, Fabiola Cardozo.
285 Human Rights Watch interview, Lisa Moreno.
286 Victor Garza stated that both Luz Belén and San Vicente primarily produce for Dole. Garza added, however, that, on occasion, he had seen boxes produced on Luz Belén for Noboa. Another banana worker working on Luz Belén, Arturo Zedillo, also stated that the plantation produces primarily for Dole. Human Rights Watch interview, Victor Garza; Human Rights Watch interview, Arturo Zedillo, Balao, May 27, 2001.
287 Human Rights Watch interview, Victor Garza.
288 Human Rights Watch interview, Francisco Lazo, attorney, Quito, May 8, 2001.
289 Human Rights Watch interview, Vicente Wong.
290 Human Rights Watch interview, Francisco Chávez. Human Rights Watch interviewed four adult workers who worked or had worked on Alamos-Rey Rancho, a plantation directly owned by Noboa, and they all stated that they were direct company employees and that subcontractors were rarely used.
291 Human Rights Watch interview, Cecilia Menéndez.
292 Constitution, Article 35(11). Similarly, according to the Labor Code, an employer and that employer's intermediary hired to contract personnel to perform everyday company tasks share "joint responsibility" for the violation of "obligations to the worker." Labor Code, Article 41.
293 Human Rights Watch interview, Joaquín Vásquez.
294 Human Rights Watch interview, Vicente Wong.
295 Human Rights Watch interview, Undersecretary of Labor Alberto Montalvo.
296 Human Rights Watch interview, Ricardo Campozano, regional labor inspector for the coastal and Galápagos region, Ministry of Labor, Guayaquil, May 16, 2001.
297 Human Rights Watch interview, Minister of Labor Martín Insua.
298 "Ministro Insua denunció abuso subcontratción" ["Minister Insua denounces the abuse of subcontracting"], El Universo, June 20, 2001.
299 Labor Code, Article 188.
300 Human Rights Watch interview, Undersecretary of Labor Alberto Montalvo.
301 Human Rights Watch interview, Francisco Lazo.
302 Human Rights Watch interview, Minister of Labor Martín Insua.
303 Human Rights Watch interview, Francisco Lazo.
304 Human Rights Watch interview, Marco García. Nevertheless, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) notes that more trade unionists-135-were killed in Colombia in 2000 than in any other country. ICFTU, Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2001 (Brussels, Belgium: ICFTU, 2000), pp. 5, 44, 53.
305 Human Rights Watch interview, Ricardo Campozano.
306 Human Rights Watch interview, Efraín Duque.