II. POLITICAL INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE

Since Ismail Khan took control of Herat in late 2001, his troops have regularly committed acts of violence and intimidation against persons and groups perceived to oppose his rule. His armed forces and agents have made explicit threats to, arrested, harassed, and beaten members of nascent political, civic, media, professional, and cultural groups. Ismail Khan has also planted devoted subordinates into many groups, whose role appears to be to poison the atmosphere of their work and limit their independence. They also perform the well-understood role of spy, leading to self-censorship even in private meetings.

Violence and intimidation were especially severe during the run-up to the June 2002 loya jirga, when forces under Ismail Khan's command arrested candidates in almost every district of Herat and in several neighboring provinces. A senior UNAMA official familiar with events during the loya jirga confirmed many of the cases documented in this report. According to this official, in almost all districts in Herat province, Amniat, military, or police forces interfered with the loya jirga selection process.³⁵ In addition, the official confirmed that three loya jirga delegates were killed in Ghor province.³⁶ Human Rights Watch received a written message from an eyewitness that at least one of the killings was carried out by the forces of a commander loyal to Ismail Khan.³⁷ Intimidation and arrests have continued after the loya jirga. Persons who have criticized Ismail Khan's government, or who are perceived to be against him, have been threatened or ordered to be arrested.

Setting the Tone: Ismail Khan's Initial Attack on Supporters of the Former King Zahir Shah
During the first weeks of Ismail Khan's rule in November 2001, several supporters of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, were arrested and severely beaten. A few days after the Taliban retreated from Herat, around November 13, 2001, supporters of King Zahir Shah tried to hold a press conference in the Moufaq Hotel in central Herat to announce their support for the Bonn process, democratic rule, and a role for the former king in Afghanistan's next government. Ismail Khan reportedly told the manager of the Moufaq Hotel not to allow Zahir Shah's supporters to use the facility-he would do so "at his own peril."³⁸ The supporters then decided to hold a political rally near Herat's main mosque.³⁹

The rally occurred on Wednesday, November 21, 2001. Several international journalists attended, and television crews filmed the event.⁴⁰ Abu Bakar Barez, a leader of the rally, was arrested by military police as he attempted to give a speech at the event. Other elders from Herat and Karoch districts, supporters of the king, were arrested at the same time.

One witness told Human Rights Watch:

I saw some vehicles drive up, loaded with police, and they surrounded the mosque. And then some of them came and took Barez with five other elders who were with him, and they carried them to the police station.⁴¹

Barez, in his late sixties, reportedly went voluntarily, hoping to avert violence. Hundreds of supporters were around him when he was arrested.⁴² At the police station, the elders were held in a single holding room. There, troops beat Barez and other supporters of the king, kicking them, whipping them with hard thorny sticks, and punching them. Barez had bruises and cuts across his body, and broken ribs. Other elders had injuries as well.⁴³ Ten months later, acquaintances said that Barez still showed scars from the beating on his torso and head.⁴⁴

According to witnesses, when the elders were first gathered at the police station, Ismail Khan arrived with his son, Mir Wais Siddiq.

There were soldiers on either side of him [Ismail Khan], about ten or fifteen of them, pointing their guns at the elders. And Ismail Khan came directly at [Barez], and without saying anything, he just punched [Barez] in the forehead. You can see the scar now....⁴⁵

Ismail Khan's son then grabbed Barez by the throat and started to choke him. The other troops pushed and hit Barez, and he fell down on the floor. At this point, Ismail Khan said: "It cannot be done like this, this is not enough."⁴⁶

The troops then took Barez to another room. They fastened Barez's feet with a rope so he couldn't move. Then they repeatedly hit him with the branches of a pomegranate tree (a sturdy stick with thick sharp thorns) especially on the side of his torso, cutting him severely. Troops also kicked him in the side. At some point during the violence, Barez lost consciousness.⁴⁷

Several people saw Barez soon after the beating and verified the extent of his injuries.⁴⁸ While he was in custody, his friends and supporters contacted the former king's representatives and other Afghan leaders to secure his release. They were concerned for his health, because of his age and the fact that he received no medical attention after the beating.⁴⁹

Barez was released ten days after he was arrested. A representative of Ismail Khan demanded as a condition of his release that he not discuss his case with international journalists or other foreigners.⁵⁰ Barez traveled to Kabul for medical treatment, but later returned to Karoch and ran for election in the loya jirga. He withdrew from the election, however, after the commander of his district, a close ally of Ismail Khan, threatened him with death.⁵¹

A senior U.N. official who spoke with several Zahir Shah supporters confirmed the arrest and beating of Barez, as well as the beatings of other supporters of the king during the same period.⁵²

Barez's arrest and beating in November 2001 was one of Ismail Khan's first acts of political violence, occurring mere days after his return to power. The message was received by Heratis interested in politics: no political rallies or organized political events have occurred in Herat since this event, except for those organized by Ismail Khan and his followers.

Attacks During the Loya Jirga (May and June 2002)
The selection process for the loya jirga, which took place in May and June 2002, was conducted in two stages. During the first stage, candidates were elected in their home districts by traditional local shuras; during the second stage, these candidates attended a regional election where they chose a smaller number of delegates from among themselves to attend the loya jirga in Kabul.⁵³

Human Rights Watch's investigations document a pattern of violence and intimidation throughout the loya jirga elections and at the meeting in Kabul in mid-June.⁵⁴ In Herat, these acts were conducted by agents of Ismail Khan and directed at political opponents, Pashtuns, supporters of Zahir Shah, certain female candidates, and Afghan election workers and monitors.⁵⁵ In addition, Amniat agents threatened an independent Afghan monitor of the loya jirga before the second round election in Herat,⁵⁶ and, as detailed in other sections of this report, intimidated several Afghan journalists, arresting one of them.⁵⁷

Agents of Ismail Khan, including members of Amniat, arrested and beat loya jirga candidates in almost every district of Herat province: Ghorian, Gozra, Kushk, Karoch, Pashtun Zarghan, and Herat city itself, as well as in several other provinces in the west under Ismail Khan's control, including Ghor.⁵⁸ Many nominated delegates withdrew from the elections because of the arrests and violence, and many delegates who attended the meeting in Kabul were afraid to challenge Ismail Khan's agenda.⁵⁹

The process for selecting delegates for the loya jirga was opaque at best, but was supposed to result in an approximate representation of Afghan society. But Human Rights Watch's findings in Herat raise fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the already flawed process of choosing delegates. Ismail Khan controlled this process from beginning to end, scaring and intimidating potential delegates out of the process and installing his own people in their place. The following cases, while in no way exhaustive, indicate some of the problems with the process in western Afghanistan:

Ghorian District: A resident of Ghorian district in Herat province told Human Rights Watch that scores of Pashtuns in Ghorian were arrested and beaten in late April 2002, before the loya jirga elections began. Victims included representatives who wanted to nominate themselves.

It was after ten o'clock in the morning. My kids came running in, and they were screaming, "Grandfather has been arrested by the police!" They had seen it with their own eyes. But I could do nothing, I was afraid to go out for fear that they would arrest me. So for that day we stayed inside....

[Later] they made a business out of it: they ransomed people back to their families. If you were able to pay them something, they would release the prisoners. And so we paid to have him released.⁶⁰

Once the grandfather had been released, he told his son what had happened, and urged him to flee to Kandahar and tell the story to U.N. officials there.

They [the jailers] had beaten the prisoners, very hard, with cables. About fifty were beaten, the rest were threatened. My father told me that they would come into the prison in the night, and they would take one man out, and beat him, and then bring him back, and take another, and then beat him, and so on. And they also made all of them labor during the day, making bricks and digging with pickaxes. And they told all the prisoners, when they were together, and also when they were beating them: "Do not try to be in the loya jirga. You are Pashtun, you do not belong in the west. You are Pashtun, you are not from our people."⁶¹

U.N. officials confirm that Ismail Khan's forces again arrested loya jirga delegates in Ghorian in late May.⁶² Ismail Khan's forces came into Ghorian village just before the elections and again picked out Pashtuns elders, taking them to jail. Most were later released but did not run for the loya jirga elections.⁶³

Gozra and Kushk Districts: Persons familiar with the loya jirga elections in Gozra and Kushk districts-including loya jirga commission members, UNAMA staff, and a local NGO official-described to Human Rights Watch several cases of intimidation of loya jirga candidates. According to two witnesses, Sharif Yilani, a commander from a military base in Herat, verbally gave a death threat to one delegate who was nominated in the first round and tore up his election certificate (a document affirming the delegate was elected in the first round).⁶⁴ International monitors witnessed the intimidation and his certification was reissued.⁶⁵ One witness told Human Rights Watch that this delegate, along with another who had been elected in the first round in Kushk, went to the UNAMA office in Herat immediately before the second round election to complain about the situation. According to the witness, UNAMA officials tried to encourage the delegates and offer support but said they could provide no guarantees for their security. Days before the election, agents of Ismail Khan visited both delegates, threatened them again with death, and told them to withdraw. Both dropped out of the election before it took place.⁶⁶

The same witness told Human Rights Watch that police loyal to Ismail Khan arrested supporters of one Kushk candidate elected in the first round, and held them in prison just before the second round elections in early June.⁶⁷ The delegate, who was also threatened with death by agents of Ismail Khan, withdrew from the election.⁶⁸ When an observer from Kushk came to the election to lend him support, he found he was alone. "Where is everybody?" he asked, to which an unnamed man said, "They've all been arrested."⁶⁹

Ghulran District: An observer familiar with the elections around Herat told Human Rights Watch that agents of Amniat threatened several delegates in Ghulran district.⁷⁰ As with other cases, UNAMA officials confirmed these incidents.⁷¹ The observer described one case in particular: "Amniat agents came to this one man and told him to drop out of the election. They said that if he did not withdraw, they would kill him. They said, `We will open for you an account in heaven or hell.'"⁷²

Karoch District: Residents of Karoch district told Human Rights Watch that the commander of their district, Naim Haqjo, told all supporters of Zahir Shah that they could not run in the loya jirga elections, and later threatened them with death.⁷³

Just before the first elections, I went into the city, and when I returned, my son told me that someone had come from the district governor's office, and said that I shouldn't show up at the elections.... Another Pashtun delegate was also intimidated. [He] came to me and he said, "The governor [district administrator] himself has come and told me not to go to the election. He said, `Dear brother, as a favor, I tell you not to nominate yourself. You will be killed. And give this message to [name withheld] too, that he should not nominate himself or he will be killed.'" So I did not nominate myself.⁷⁴

Some residents complained to the United Nations, to the Afghan loya jirga commission, and to Ismail Khan. According to one account, Ismail Khan told the Karoch residents that he had not given any order to Naim Haqjo, and that he would rebuke him for intimidating them. He also invited the residents to a public meeting at the Qol-e Urdu military base, along with UNAMA representatives and the district governor. One resident described the meeting with Ismail Khan to Human Rights Watch:

So the next day, we went to the base in Herat, Qol-e Urdu. Ismail Khan was there, and [a representative from UNAMA], and the district governor [Haqjo]. And Ismail Khan did not rebuke Haqjo for intimidating us [as he had promised], but instead embraced him and kissed his cheeks and told him, "You are closer to me than my son."⁷⁵

Then, during the meeting, Ismail Khan reportedly said that "only mujahid" can run in the elections, and no one else-"no Khalq, Parcham, or Shoala" (in other words, no one who had worked in the communist regime).⁷⁶ At the meeting, U.N. representatives reportedly pleaded for Ismail Khan to be more open and not make political proclamations about who could work in government. Residents described what he said next:

Ismail Khan stood again and said, "No! We will not allow these people to run for the loya jirga. They have killed two million of our people. Even if they are elected, we will cut off their feet so that they cannot even get on the airplane to go to Kabul for the loya jirga."⁷⁷

After the meeting one of the representatives elected in the first round was intimidated:

Naim Haqjo came to me and told me not to run in the second election. He said: "My brother, I am under the authority of Ismail Khan, and when an order is given I have to follow it and implement it. So I am telling you, please don't run for the election in the second round. It is not me who is stopping you; it is Ismail Khan himself.... If you do run for election in the second round, you will have to face the consequences. And if I am given the order, I will come to your house. I will pull you out of your house in the night, and when that happens, don't complain to me." And in the end, I did not run.⁷⁸

As in other instances, UNAMA officials pressured Ismail Khan about the cases in Karoch, but the delegates still felt unsafe. The latter delegate was particularly upset, and told UNAMA representatives that they had let him down: "We contacted [UNAMA] after the meeting with Ismail Khan, and we said, `We put our trust in you, and you did not help us.' But they told us, `We have given you all the help we can, but we cannot do anything more, and in the end we cannot protect you.'"⁷⁹

According to a UNAMA official the events detailed above were "a typical case."⁸⁰

Pashtun Zarghan District: One loya jirga candidate told Human Rights Watch that Pashtuns-mostly supporters of the former king-were also intimidated in Pashtun Zarghan district.⁸¹ According to several sources, this intimidation was aimed at the former king's supporters throughout Herat province.⁸² "They said that if we participated, they would kill us," said one supporter.⁸³

Other arrests in Herat Province: According to the U.N. spokesman in Kabul, during the loya jirga elections Ismail Khan's agents arrested Abdul Latif, a representative from Adraskan district, during the last week of May, and, around the same time, Ghulam Farook, from Shindand district.⁸⁴ Both were arrested in Herat city.⁸⁵

Ghor Province: Human Rights Watch also received reports from Ghor province, located to the east of Herat province and at the time entirely under Ismail Khan's control, that loya jirga candidates in Chaghcharan city, the provincial capital, were arrested in late May and that three were killed.⁸⁶ UNAMA staff publicly confirmed the three killings.⁸⁷ A commander allied with Ismail Khan, named Ahmad Murghabi, was reportedly connected to one of the killings. Witnesses from Ghor told Human Rights Watch that early on the morning of June 3, four soldiers (one reportedly known as Sharab Khan), all under the command of Ahmad Murghabi, arrested Qazi Abdul Jabbar, a local attorney and candidate for the loya jirga, and took him to a military base in the city. (The witnesses said that shopkeepers also saw him being taken into the base.) A few hours later his body was found with gunshot wounds and a head injury, dumped near the city's bazaar.⁸⁸

Some of the delegates from Herat province went into hiding after the elections. According to one:

Ismail Khan's people were trying to find us, to punish us. So we disappeared. And because they could not find us, they could not punish us. After the second round election, I hid myself. I had no courage to go back to my village. It was only six days ago that I finally went back for a visit, after three months. The other five men also hid for a long time.⁸⁹

One Herat resident, familiar with events during the loya jirga elections, told Human Rights Watch that the only reason that more people were not arrested, beaten, or physically intimidated during the loya jirga elections was that people were too afraid of Ismail Khan to challenge him. After the beating of Abu Bakar Barez, the Mohammad Rafiq Shahir case reinforced this fear.

The Case of Rafiq Shahir
One of the best known and significant cases of political violence around the time of the loya jirga came after the second round elections, when agents of Ismail Khan arrested and beat the head of Herat's Professional Shura, a civic group of intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, and teachers.⁹⁰ Accounts of this event were widely reported in the press at the time, and are known to many in and outside of Herat.

Amniat agents arrested Mohammad Rafiq Shahir on or about May 27, 2002. They took him to the Amniat compound in Herat city, where he was held for two days.⁹¹ According to sources familiar with the case, Shahir was tied up, whipped, and beaten by Amniat agents during his detention. During one of the nights, Amniat agents took Shahir from the compound, put him in a car, and drove him to a nearby graveyard. There they put a gun to his head and told him, "We could leave you right here."⁹² When he was released, he showed bruises and cuts on his torso and back to a journalist in Herat city.⁹³ The bruises and cuts on his back were also seen weeks later by observers in Kabul during the loya jirga.⁹⁴ Before his arrest Shahir had received messages directly from Ismail Khan's office threatening him not to take part in the loya jirga elections.⁹⁵

While this incident appeared to be directly linked to Shahir's candidacy for the loya jirga, some observers told Human Rights Watch that it was also related to Shahir's role in organizing the professional shura and its publication.⁹⁶ As detailed in section III, Ismail Khan throughout 2002 has harassed and intimidated the shura's members and attempted to break up its meetings.⁹⁷

Shahir's arrest and beating turned out to be one of the most significant acts of political violence committed by Ismail Khan in 2002. According to many Heratis, the event had far-reaching effects on the public consciousness in Herat. A Herat resident told Human Rights Watch: "After Shahir was imprisoned, people went quiet and no one is daring to say anything against him [Ismail Khan] ... I am afraid to speak because Shahir did and he faced lots of problems."⁹⁸ Other Heratis had similar fears.

Control of Female Loya Jirga Delegates and Candidates
In every province a certain number of loya jirga positions was reserved for women. In Herat city, where five spots were reserved, Ismail Khan used proxies and subordinates to control the selection process and then tried to control their behavior at the meeting in Kabul. One witness to the selection process said that the deputy of the loya jirga commission, Rashad Saljoqi-who was closely linked to Ismail Khan-"invited some selected teachers and women in Herat and right at that moment [of the meeting] held an election and selected five women."⁹⁹

A lot objected and went and complained to [a UNAMA official, but the official] told them: we are only a monitoring group, we are not an executive power-we just listen to complaints and report. We have no right to interfere directly, and we can't cancel the election. There was no order from Kabul on this.¹⁰⁰

Another witness described the proceedings as follows:

We were struggling against the government, and [at the meeting in the mosque] most of the women gave their ideas. We wanted to choose who was to go to Kabul for the loya jirga, but we couldn't stand against the government. The government told us to choose the best one to send to Kabul. Most of the women were selected by the government.... Lots of women wanted to go but were not selected.¹⁰¹

Once the delegates were selected, Ismail Khan personally pressured them to follow his orders at the loya jirga in Kabul. According to one delegate:

Before we went to the loya jirga, Ismail Khan collected all of us and advised us to say positive things about him and nothing against him. He told us to follow his orders there and to say his position.... When we went to the meeting, we had to select an assistant ... Ismail Khan chose two assistants for us but I said, "Why are you choosing?" He said, "You have to obey, and if you want to complain about me you are free to do so." But if we did, the assistants would report to him.¹⁰²

At the loya jirga in Kabul, Ismail Khan's agents kept the delegates in line.

I was under the pressure of the Herat government, and I couldn't say anything about the situation in Herat. I couldn't say anything because the other women, who were close to Ismail Khan, intimidated me when I did.... When two people wanted to talk about something, the others listened, to report back, so it was not comfortable. We couldn't give our ideas freely. We were not relaxed. It was very difficult and hard for all of the women.... For example, if we wanted to say anything, we had to say it secretly. We had to say our ideas secretly to friends, not freely, because we would be punished by the women delegates chosen by Ismail Khan. We went there to say our ideas, but we couldn't say anything because I knew that we would come back to Herat and that it would create many problems if I said anything. I was free in Kabul, but it was very bad when I came back.¹⁰³

Violence and Intimidation after the Loya Jirga
On June 26, 2002, immediately after the loya jirga, Ismail Khan held a meeting to which he invited several loya jirga delegates and members of the Herat Professional Shura (see section III, below, for information on this group and about this meeting). During the meeting, a participant named Abdul Qadir criticized the Herat government. After the meeting, Ismail Khan ordered him arrested. Qadir escaped from Herat without being arrested, but one of his sons was detained that night and held for several days before being released.¹⁰⁴ This son, and another, were arrested again later in July, and released a few days later.¹⁰⁵

Ongoing military activities between Ismail Khan and isolated Pashtun commanders in the western region, who at times had challenged Ismail Khan's rule, also contributed to the sense of insecurity around Herat. In August 2002, Ismail Khan's troops killed civilians and arrested others in an attack on a local commander in Ghorian district. The commander, Karim Karmez, was reportedly involved in drug smuggling and violence, and was a political and military rival of Ismail Khan.¹⁰⁶ According to several observers, Ismail Khan struck some sort of deal with Karmez after the loya jirga to avoid further confrontations with him, but later broke it by attacking Karmez's checkpoints and positions in Ghorian in August.¹⁰⁷ During the attack, Karmez was reportedly killed.¹⁰⁸ Witnesses in Ghorian told Human Rights Watch that during the operation, Ismail Khan's forces arrested not only Karmez's armed troops, but also a number of Karmez's relatives, civilians whose only connection to the commander was as family, along with Pashtun elders, whom the troops associated with Karmez, presumably because of their common ethnicity. The troops also fired grenades into Karmez's house, killing his wife and children.¹⁰⁹

One witness told Human Rights Watch that he saw troops looting Pashtun homes in Ghorian and said that other families told him that women were raped in their homes.¹¹⁰ (Ismail Khan's troops had already looted homes in Ghorian province earlier in the year.¹¹¹) Some of the fighters captured by Ismail Khan's forces were imprisoned in Ghorian through September 2002, and others in Herat city.¹¹² Some released prisoners complained to U.N. officials that Ismail Khan's troops tortured them.¹¹³

Although the incidence of political arrests or beatings in Herat appears to have declined since the loya jirga, several sources and observers familiar with the political situation told Human Rights Watch that this is because virtually no one is challenging Ismail Khan's government.¹¹⁴

[P]eople fear that if they do something the authorities will punish them.... They have created an environment where no one dares to do anything.... It's not the kind of environment in which people talk and say something and the government suppresses them. No one is saying anything, so there is nothing to be suppressed.¹¹⁵

³⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with a senior UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Letter from eyewitnesses who could not travel to Herat or Kabul to Human Rights Watch, October 2002 (on file with Human Rights Watch).

³⁸ Human Rights Watch interviews with H.S., Herat, September 11 and 12, 2002.

³⁹ Human Rights Watch interviews with H.S., W.A., and K.M., Herat, September 11 and 12, 2002.

⁴⁰ "Afghans test new freedom in rally for deposed king," Los Angeles Times, November 22, 2001; "Former Afghan king's supporters demonstrate in Herat," Agence France-Presse, November 21, 2001.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002.

⁴² Human Rights Watch interview with K.M. and W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002

⁴³ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002.

⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with Z.H., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with K.M. and W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with Z.H., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with Z.H., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Human Rights Watch interview with a senior UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁵³ For more information on the process of the loya jirga, see Human Rights Watch, "Q & A on Afghanistan's Loya Jirga Process," April 17, 2002 (http://hrw.org/press/2002/04/qna-loyagirga.htm).

⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch researchers attended the loya jirga meeting in Kabul during June 2002. See Human Rights Watch, "Loya Jirga Off to a Shaky Start," press release, June 13, 2002; Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan: Analysis of New Cabinet," press release, June 20, 2002; see also, Saman Zia-Zarifi, "The Warlords Are Plotting a Comeback," Commentary, International Herald Tribune, June 10, 2002.

⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with a senior UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁵⁷ See section below, "Violations of Freedom of Expression."

⁵⁸ The information in this section is based on witness testimony recorded in Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar, in May, June, and September 2002, as detailed in footnotes below. These findings were also verified by UNAMA officials familiar with the elections in Herat. Human Rights Watch interview with a UNAMA official, Herat, September 17, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with a UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Herat loya jirga delegate, Kabul, June 18, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with loya jirga commission observer, Kabul, June 16, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with Kabul loya jirga delegate, Kabul, June 16, 2002.

⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with L.L., Kandahar, May 28, 2002.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² BBC Persian Service broadcast, May 26, 2002.

⁶³ Human Rights Watch interview with a UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with a UNAMA observer, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with K.J.J., Herat, September 13, 2002.

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch interview with a UNAMA observer, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁷² Human Rights Watch interview with K.J.J., Herat, September 13, 2002.

⁷³ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002. This incident took place a few days after a Radio Liberty report was broadcast in Dari about Karoch district. The report featured interviews with several supporters of Zahir Shah who said that they supported the Bonn Process, the loya jirga, and wanted Zahir Shah to be involved in the post-loya jirga government.

⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002.

⁷⁶ Ismail Khan apparently believed that King Zahir Shah's supporters had some connection with former communist officials. Some Zahir Shah supporters were formerly members of the communist government of Afghanistan. Most, however, were not associated with that government.

⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with a senior UNAMA official, Herat, September 24, 2002.

⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁸² Human Rights Watch interview with L.H., Herat, September 13, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with a senior UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with H.S., Herat, September 12, 2002.

⁸⁴ Press briefing by Manoel de Almeida e Silva, spokesman for the special representative of the secretary-general, May 28, 2002.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with a senior UNAMA official, Kabul, September 24, 2002.

⁸⁷ Press briefing by Manoel de Almeida e Silva, spokesman for the special representative of the secretary-general, May 28, 2002.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with F.A.H. and G.A.S., Kabul, October 9, 2002.

⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with W.A., Herat, September 11, 2002.

⁹⁰ This incident was widely reported in domestic and international media. See e.g., Ted Anthony, "Afghan meeting marred by detentions," Associated Press, May 28, 2002. Human Rights Watch also spoke with several sources familiar with the case and verified this account.

⁹¹ Human Rights Watch interview with A.L., September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with UNAMA officials, September 8 and 24, 2002; UNAMA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Update, May 1- 31, 2002 (available at www.reliefweb.int).

⁹² Human Rights Watch interview with A.L., Kabul, June 11, 2002.

⁹³ Human Rights Watch interview with I.S.K., local Afghan journalist, Kabul, September 25, 2002.

⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with A.L., Kabul, June 11, 2002.

⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with A.G.A., journalist, August 22, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with A.L., Herat, September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with UNAMA officials, September 8 and 24, 2002.

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with L.H., Herat, September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with A.G.A., journalist, August 11, 2002.

⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with A.L., Kabul, September 11, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with S.Q., Herat, September 14, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with F.J., Herat, September 17, 2002.

⁹⁸ Human Rights Watch interview with M.B., Herat, September 17, 2002.

⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with K.J.J., Herat, September 13, 2002.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch interview with N.J., Herat, September 12, 2002.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch interview with H.D., Herat, September 11, 2002.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with a UNAMA official, Kabul, September 8, 2002.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with H.H.G., Herat, September 16, 2002.

¹⁰⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with L.H., Herat, September 13, 2002.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002.

¹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with H.H.G., Herat, September 12, 2002.

¹¹¹ Human Rights Watch interview with L.L., Kandahar, May 28, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with UNAMA official, Herat, September 24, 2002.

¹¹² Human Rights Watch interview with U.N. official, Herat, September 19, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with senior NGO official familiar with the detention sites in Ghorian, Kabul, September 28, 2002.

¹¹³ Human Rights Watch interview with U.N. official, Herat, September 19, 2002.

¹¹⁴ Human Rights Watch interview with A.A., Herat, September 12, 2002; Human Rights Watch interview with A.L., Herat, September 11, 2002, Human Rights Watch interview with L.H., Herat, September 13, 2002, Human Rights Watch interview with N.N., Kabul, September 22, 2002.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with K.J.J., Herat, September 13, 2002.