From
the beginning of Operation Allied Force-NATO's bombing campaign against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-NATO and allied government and military
officials stressed their intent to limit civilian casualties and other
harm to the civilian population. The practical fulfillment of this legal
obligation and political imperative turned upon a range of decisions relating
to targeting, weapons selection, and the means of attack. Despite precautions,
including the use of a higher percentage of precision-guided munitions
than in any other major conflict in history, civilian casualties occurred.
Human Rights Watch conducted a thorough investigation
of civilian deaths as a result of NATO's bombing campaign in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. On the basis of this investigation (detailed in
a February 2000 report, "Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign"), Human
Rights Watch found that there were ninety separate incidents involving
civilian deaths throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the
seventy-eight day bombing campaign. Some 500 Yugoslav civilians are known
to have died in these incidents. Between 278 and 317 of the dead-between
56 and 60 percent of the total number of deaths-were in Kosovo.1
Thirty-two of these incidents with civilian deaths
occurred in Kosovo, the majority involving attacks on mobile targets or
military forces in the field.2 Attacks in Kosovo overall were more deadly
for civilians than those elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-a
third of the incidents (thirty-two out of ninety) account for more than
half of the civilian deaths in the country. Seven incidents of civilian
deaths that were particularly deadly were a result of attacks on convoys
or transportation links. Because pilots' ability to identify these mobile
targets properly was so important in avoiding civilian casualties, these
incidents raise the question whether flying at high altitudes precluded
proper target identification and caused unnecessary loss of life. Insufficient
evidence exists to answer that question conclusively at this point.
Another factor in assessing the higher level of
civilian deaths in Kosovo is the possible government use of ethnic Albanian
civilians as "human shields." There is some evidence that Serbian and Yugoslav
forces used internally displaced civilians as human shields in the village
of Korisa on May 13, and may thus share the blame for the eighty-seven
deaths there. (For further discussion on the use of "human shields" by
government forces, see March-June 1999: An Overview.)
International Humanitarian Law and Accountability
Rules of international
humanitarian law arise from international agreements such as the Geneva
Conventions, or develop as international customary law. States have an
obligation to ensure compliance with all provisions of international humanitarian
law, and to suppress all violations. War crimes constitute some of the
most serious violations of international humanitarian law, known as grave
breaches, and are generally intentional or deliberate acts. These violations
give rise to the specific obligation to search for and punish those responsible,
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the place where the
crime was committed. Examples of war crimes are wilful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment of noncombatants, wilfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health of noncombatants, or launching an indiscriminate
attack in the knowledge that the attack will cause excessive loss of life
or injury to civilians.
Human Rights Watch found no evidence of war crimes
in its investigation of NATO bombing in Kosovo. The investigation did conclude,
however, that NATO violated international humanitarian law. Human Rights
Watch has called on NATO governments to establish an independent and impartial
commission, competent to receive confidential information, that would investigate
violations of international humanitarian law and the extent of these violations,
and would consider the need to alter targeting and bombing doctrine to
ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. Such a commission
should issue its findings publicly. Human Rights Watch also called for
NATO to alter its targeting and bombing doctrine in order to bring it into
compliance with international humanitarian law.
With respect to NATO violations of international
humanitarian law in Kosovo, Human Rights Watch was concerned about a number
of cases in which NATO forces:
· took insufficient precautions identifying
the presence of civilians when attacking convoys and other mobile targets;
and
· caused excessive civilian casualties by
not taking sufficient measures to verify that military targets did not
have concentrations of civilians (such as at Korisa).
The Standards Applied
The conduct
of warfare is restricted by international humanitarian law-the laws of
war. International humanitarian law applies expressly and uniquely to armed
conflict situations, with distinct provisions to regulate international
and non-international (internal) armed conflicts. In evaluating NATO's
use of military force in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the laws of
war provide the most relevant standards.
As explained in the chapter on Legal Standards in
the Kosovo Conflict, beginning February 28, 1998, the conflict in Kosovo
could be characterized as an internal armed conflict, which obliged both
government forces and the KLA to respect basic protections of international
humanitarian law-the rules of war-in particular, Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Protocol II to those conventions, and
the customary rules of war. With the initiation of the NATO bombing on
March 24, 1999, the conflict in Kosovo and all of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, to the extent that it involved NATO and Serbian and Yugoslav
forces, became an international armed conflict to which the full body of
international humanitarian law applied.
Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 provides the basis for the evaluation here of NATO's bombing. This
protocol has been ratified by most NATO members, and the U.S. government,
while not a party, has declared that it accepts all of the relevant standards.
The basic principle of Protocol I, and of the laws of war generally, is
that the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations. This turns
in large part on the requirement that attackers must distinguish between
civilians and combatants and between military objectives and civilian objects.
They must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize harm to civilians,
and to this end may not attack civilians directly, or combatants and civilians
indiscriminately.
Damage to civilian objects and civilian casualties
that are incidental to lawful attacks on military objectives are known
in military terminology as "collateral damage." The legality of an attack
turns upon various factors. First, the attackers must do everything feasible
to verify that they are aiming at something specific-they cannot lash out
blindly. Second, the attackers must establish that the objective to be
attacked is a legitimate military objective. And third, the attackers must
establish whether an attack would endanger civilians and civilian objects,
and must weigh this risk against the military advantage to be gained. Attacks
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of life or injuries to civilians,
or to cause damage to civilian objectives are
indiscriminate if this harm to civilians is
"excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated"
(Protocol I, article 57 (2)). The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the principal authority on the interpretation of international
humanitarian law, has cautioned that the argument of proportionality can
never justify very high civilian casualties and damage, whatever the military
advantage envisioned.
In researching each of the incidents involving civilian
deaths in Kosovo, Human Rights Watch sought to gather the facts that can
enable analysts to assess the legitimacy of the real or perceived military
objectives targeted; the care taken and procedures and criteria employed
to confirm the military nature of the targets; the proportionality of the
civilian deaths and the means employed in the attack in relation to the
military objectives, where these were known; the correlation of civilian
deaths to the location and nature of the targets selected; the timing of
target selection as a factor in its appropriateness and the minimization
of civilian harm; the methods and conditions under which distinct weapons
systems were employed; and, the potentially indiscriminate nature of some
weapons systems in general and under certain conditions.
In assessing specific attacks, with a view to general
observations on the conduct of the air war, the primary issue is whether
due care was taken for the protection of civilians. Was the prospect of
civilian deaths sufficiently taken into account in the targeting, the weaponry
employed, and the means and conditions under which weapons were employed?
This involves a review of the selection of targets, and the procedures
through which these were determined, matters beyond the scope of the present
report. So too is the larger question of whether the military objectives
identified and targeted by NATO forces were wholly within what is permissible
under humanitarian law. The following analysis addresses those aspects
of the air war conducted in Kosovo only through the cost in civilian lives,
as a factor in assessing the larger picture of compliance with international
humanitarian law.
Case Studies of Civilian Deaths _in Kosovo
The incidents
in Kosovo involving civilian deaths provide a part of the picture from
which to consider NATO's conduct of the war.3 At issue is whether NATO
effectively adhered to the humanitarian law imperative that the civilian
population be protected against dangers arising from military operations.
At the core is the principle of civilian immunity from attack and its complementary
principle requiring the parties to a conflict to do everything feasible
to distinguish civilians from combatants at all times. Several incidents,
which accounted for a large proportion of civilian deaths, clearly illustrate
troubling aspects of NATO actions, and are presented below.
The most dramatic losses of civilian life from the
NATO offensive in Kosovo came from attacks on fleeing or traveling refugees
mistaken for military forces. Repeated attacks on refugees over a twelve-mile
stretch of the Djakovica-Decan road in Kosovo took the lives of seventy-three
civilians; attacks near Korisa in Kosovo killed as many as eighty-seven
displaced persons and refugees; and two incidents involving attacks on
civilian buses, at Luzane and Savine Vode, caused additional civilian losses.
An estimated nineteen civilians died in the two attacks on Dubrava prison.
In all of these incidents, the principal concern
is whether every feasible precaution was taken to accurately distinguish
civilians from combatants. At the same time, there are questions as to
whether the decisions to attack might have been made on the basis of incomplete
and/or seriously flawed information. The public statements by NATO concerning
particular attacks, and the changes in the way attacks were characterized,
also bear some analysis, in particular insofar as such statements may show
an intent to justify clearly unlawful attacks in which civilian casualties
were clearly excessive.
Moreover, there is a question as to whether NATO's
determined effort to avoid pilot casualties precluded low-flying operations
that might have helped to identify targets more accurately. This was and
continues to be a major issue in the public debate about Operation Allied
Force. For many weeks in the initial stages of the war, NATO airplanes
were not flying below 15,000 feet. If the height at which the NATO pilots
flew had little effect on with identification of and attacks upon targets,
then the issue is irrelevant. But if precision would have been greater
(and civilian casualties lessened) had NATO pilots flown lower, it could
be argued that there may have been a point at which NATO was "obligated"
to have its pilots fly lower.4 In the case of attacks such as those at
Djakovica-Decan, described below, in which flying at a higher altitude
seems to have been a factor in a pilot's failure to properly identify a
target, the conclusion again is that inadequate precautions were taken
to avoid civilian casualties.
The incident at Korisa, described below, also raises
important questions of Yugoslav responsibility for some of the civilian
deaths attributed to NATO bombing. In this case, NATO did not apply adequate
precautions in executing its airstrikes. But Yugoslav military forces may
share the blame for the eighty-seven civilian deaths at Korisa: there is
some evidence that displaced Kosovar civilians were forcibly concentrated
within a military camp there as human shields.
Direct Yugoslav responsibility has been shown for
killings at the Dubrava prison that Yugoslav authorities attributed to
NATO bombing. Human Rights Watch researchers in Kosovo found that some
eighty-six prisoners there were victims of extrajudicial executions-cold-blooded
murder-by Yugoslav forces in the days after NATO bombed the prison. The
NATO attack on May 21 was, however, responsible for nineteen deaths at
the facility prior to the massacre of prisoners; an earlier NATO attack
killed four civilians at the prison.5
Seven of the thirty-two incidents in Kosovo in which
civilians died occurred as a result of attacks on targets in densely populated
urban areas. Three incidents occurred in Djakovica, two in Pristina, and
two in Prizren.The targets in almost all of these attacks were military/police
barracks, headquarters, and other facilities, or factories. In these cases
there was little doubt as to the apparent objective of the attack, or that
these locations constituted lawful military objectives.
A discussion of the major legal and policy issues
raised in selected incidents in Kosovo follows:
Refugees on the Djakovica-Decan Road
On April 14,
during daylight hours, NATO aircraft repeatedly bombed refugees over a
twelve-mile stretch of road between Djakovica and Decan in western Kosovo,
injuring thirty-six and killing seventy-three civilians-deaths Human Rights
Watch was able to document. The attacks began around 1:30 p.m. and persisted
for about two hours, causing civilian deaths in numerous locations on the
convoy route near the villages of Bistrazin, Gradis, Madanaj, and Meja.
NATO and U.S. spokespersons initially claimed the target was an exclusively
military convoy and that Serb forces may have been responsible for the
attacks on civilians. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon said that NATO commander
Gen. Wesley Clark had received reports that "after the convoy was hit,
military people got out and attacked civilians." "The pilots state they
attacked only military vehicles," NATO said, adding that the "reported
incident will be fully investigated once all mission details have been
reviewed." There are also various NATO reports of Serbian deception in
placing dead civilians at the site of the bombing. German Defense Minister
Rudolf Scharping, in particular, put the blame for civilian casualties
on Yugoslav forces.6
On April 15, NATO began to backtrack. It said one
plane had "apparently" dropped a bomb on a civilian vehicle traveling with
a military convoy. The reference to a strictly military convoy was modified:
"Serbian police or army vehicles might have been in or near the convoy."
NATO acknowledged that it had bombed civilian vehicles by mistake: "Following
a preliminary investigation, NATO confirmed that apparently one of its
planes dropped a bomb on a civilian vehicle traveling with a convoy yesterday."
Reporters from U.S. media went to the scene on April
15. They interviewed refugee survivors and observed shattered farm tractors,
burned bodies identified as refugees, bomb craters, shrapnel, and bomb
remnants with U.S. markings. The refugee column had apparently been divided
in two main groups. Over the next few days, NATO wavered from insisting
its forces attacked only military vehicles to an explanation that two convoys
had been targeted, that the refugees had been at the rear of military columns,
and that the civilian death toll was limited. On April 16, NATO spokesman
Jamie Shea and Gen. Giuseppe Marini declared that "in one case and one
only, we have proof of civilian loss of life. Otherwise, we are sure that
we targeted military vehicles."
NATO finally admitted that the pilot of a U.S. F-16
mistakenly fired on what he believed to be military trucks, and expressed
"deep regret." Later, on April 19, NATO modified its account of a single
pilot's error, declaring that about a dozen planes had been involved in
numerous attacks on the two convoys, dropping a total of nine bombs. Convoluted
explanations continued for a number of days after the incident; NATO and
the United States seemed incapable of reconstructing what had occurred.
There were widespread press reports of the use of cluster bombs, which
the United States denied.7
In addition to the press reporting of this incident
and the endless damage control by NATO and U.S. spokespersons, Human Rights
Watch obtained extensive forensic details of the incident from the Yugoslav
government.8 No evidence whatsoever was ever produced to indicate Serb
responsibility for any of the deaths, though Tanjug reported the deaths
of three Serbian "policemen" in the bombings who it said "were securing
the safe passage for the convoy."9 This tends to suggest that military
or police were present among the refugee vehicles, but Human Rights Watch
found no basis to support the claim that the convoys themselves were primarily
composed of military vehicles.10
General Clark stated in September that NATO consistently
observed Yugoslav military vehicles moving on roads "intermixed with civilian
convoys." After the Djakovica-Decan incident, General Clark said, "we got
to be very, very cautious about striking objects moving on the roads.11
Another NATO officer, Col. Ed Boyle, said: "Because we were so concerned
with collateral damage, the CFAC [Combined Forces Air Component Commander]
at the time, General [Michael] Short, put out the guidance that if military
vehicles were intermingled with civilian vehicles, they were not to be
attacked, due to the collateral damage."12 When this directive was actually
issued, and why it may not have served to avoid the subsequent three incidents,
remains an important question. Nevertheless, the reported change in NATO
rules of engagement would indicate that the alliance recognized it had
taken insufficient precautions in mounting this attack, in not identifying
civilians present, and in assuming that the intended targets were legitimate
military objectives.
Displaced Civilians in the Korisa Woods
On May 13,
almost a month after the Djakovica-Decan incidents, as many as eighty-seven
displaced Kosovar civilians were killed and sixty wounded when bombs were
dropped during the night on a refugee camp in a wooded area on the Prizren-Suva
Reka road, near the village of Korisa. There have been various conflicting
reports of the number of dead, from 48 to 87.13 The Yugoslav government
claimed the attackers used cluster bombs, and the White
Book published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
includes photographs of the remains of tactical munitions dispensers (TMDs)
it says are from the site. NATO spokespersons vociferously denied the use
of cluster bombs,14 and Human Rights Watch has been unable independently
to confirm that cluster bombs were indeed used in this attack.
In an official statement on May 15, NATO spokesman
Maj. Gen. Walter Jertz acknowledged the attack, deeply regretting any "accidental
civilian casualties." He insisted, nonetheless, that the attack was against
Yugoslav army forces in the field:
This was a legitimate military target. The Serb
claims of an attack involving cluster bombs against a non-military target
are both false. NATO identified Korisa as a military camp and command post.
Military equipment including an armored personnel carrier and more than
ten pieces of artillery were observed at this location. The aircraft observed
dug-in military positions at the target before executing the attack. NATO
cannot confirm the casualty figures given by the Serbian authorities, nor
the reasons why civilians were at this location at the time of the attack.15
The NATO statement further stressed that military
positions had been positively identified and that the bombs employed included
laser-guided precision guided missles and non-guided gravity bombs:
Immediately prior to the attack at 23:30-11:30 p.m.-local
time Thursday night an airborne forward air controller confirmed the target,
so the identification and attack system of his aircraft, having positively
identified the target as what looked like dug in military reveted positions,
he dropped two laser guided bombs. Following his attack, he cleared his
wingman to also attack the same target using two more laser guided bombs.
Approximately 10 minutes later, the third aircraft engaged the target with
. . . six gravity bombs. A total of 10 bombs were dropped on the target.16
The same day, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said
at a news briefing that the incident would be reviewed, but that major
changes in operations should not be expected:
This accident at Korisa did not shake NATO's resolve
in any way. . . . NATO deeply regrets civilian casualties. . . . We try
very hard to avoid these casualties, but combat is inherently dangerous
and accidents cannot be avoided ._._. this mission, like every other, will
be
reviewed, and the airmen and their commanders will learn what they can
from it and continue. But I don't anticipate that there will be a sweeping
change. We can't cross legitimate military targets off the list, and we
won't.17
On May 16, a Kosovar refugee who witnessed the NATO
strike on Korisa reported to Deutsche Welle that FRY police forced some
600 displaced Kosovars to serve as human shields there before the attack.
"We were told something bad would happen to us if we left the place," said
the eyewitness, interviewed by the station's Albanian service. He said
Serbian police hinted at what was about to happen. "Now you'll see what
a NATO attack looks like," the refugee quoted one policeman as saying.
The refugee said he finally went to sleep underneath a tractor only to
be woken up by explosions and the cries of children and adults. He said
he and others managed to scale a two-meter wall surrounding the plot and
fled in the direction of the village as Serbian paramilitaries fired bullets
around them.18 On the basis of available evidence it is not possible to
determine positively that Serbian police or Yugoslav army troops deliberately
forced civilians to group near them, nor to establish the motive for such
action.
The laws of war expressly forbid shielding. Article
28 of the Geneva Convention IV stipulates that "The presence of a protected
person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations." Protocol I, article 51(7), elaborates:
The presence or movements of the civilian population
or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military
objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations.
The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian
population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.
The protocol stresses, however, in art. 51(8), that
such violations of the laws of war do not in any way release an adversary
from obligations to respect civilian immunity. An authoritative new commentary
on humanitarian law states: "If one party to a conflict breaks this rule,
this does not exempt the other side from the regulations applicable in
military attacks. . . . The military commander must therefore take into
account the column of refugees used by the adversary as a shield."19
For NATO, then, the question is whether its target
designation was made with the knowledge that hundreds of displaced civilians
were present in this wooded area-there is no evidence to this effect-and
secondly, whether sufficient measures were taken to verify that the target
had no such concentrations of civilians. On this score, the excessive civilian
death toll in what NATO has itself described as a lamentable accident suggests
that verification was inadequate.
Bombing of Dubrava Prison
Another case
of Yugoslav deception involves civilian deaths and NATO bombing that damaged
the large Dubrava prison complex near Istok. According to NATO and former
Dubrava prisoners interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Yugoslav Army and
Serbian police forces were based adjacent to the penitentiary, which was
fully operational well into the NATO air campaign, housing common criminal
offenders and political detainees serving out their terms.
The Penitentiary Institute Istok, as it was officially
called, was hit twice by NATO, causing civilian deaths among both prisoners
and guards. In the first attack, at 1:15 p.m. on May 19, three prisoners
and a guard were reported killed. The second attack occurred on May 21,
in which at least nineteen prisoners were killed. An investigation undertaken
by Human Rights Watch, based on eyewitness testimony, found that prisoners
were lined up and fired upon by Serb police and prison guards inside the
penitentiary walls after the May 21 attack, and some eighty or so prisoners
were killed. (For detailed documentation of the killings, see the section
on Dubrava prison in Istok Municipality).
The Yugoslav government initially reported that
nineteen people were killed in the Dubrava Penitentiary as a result of
the May 21 attack.20 However, four days later, the Yugoslav press reported
from the official Tanjug agency that "in days-long bombardment of the Penitentiary
Institute Istok, some 100 prisoners died, and some 200 were wounded." On
May 27, Tanjug quoted Vladan Bojic, a judge in Pec's District Court, saying
that ninety-six corpses had been pulled from the ruins. On May 29, the
Yugoslav government stated that "The number of casualties in the Correctional
Institution in Istok is increasing."21 On May 30, Tanjug reported a total
of ninety-three killed.22 In July, the Yugoslav government claimed that
NATO bombs killed ninety-five inmates and injured 196.23
While NATO readily acknowledged the air strikes
at Istok and justified the attacks on the grounds that it had targeted
military objectives "in the vicinity of a prison,"24 Human Rights Watch
has determined that Yugoslav forces were likely responsible for the majority
of the deaths which occurred after the bombing. On May 22, according to
eyewitnesses, prison officials ordered approximately 1,000 prisoners to
line up in the prison yard. After a few minutes, they were fired upon,
and grenades were thrown at them from the prison walls and guard towers,
killing at least seventy people. Over the next twenty-four hours, prison
guards, special police, and possibly paramilitaries attacked prisoners
who were hiding in the prison's buildings, basements, and sewers, killing
at least another twelve people.
Journalists who visited the Dubrava prison on May
21, just after the morning bombing, reported seeing between ten and twenty
bodies.25 Serb authorities again opened the prison for journalists on May
24. Reporting for the BBC, Jacky Rowland said it was unclear how the victims
in the prison had died, but that three days after the first journalists'
tour, the dead numbered forty-four. The condition of the prisoners' bodies
viewed there did not conform with the government's claim that they had
died in the bombing. Post-war visits to the prison by journalists confirmed
that prisoners had been killed execution-style after the bombing.26
Given the degree of civilian casualties in the two
attacks on the Dubrava prison, it appears that NATO did not apply adequate
precautions in executing its airstrikes on nearby military objectives,
and therefore must be held accountable for the civilian deaths that occurred
as a direct result of those attacks. But Yugoslav forces must be held fully
responsible for approximately eighty-six of the ninety-five deaths Yugoslav
authorities acknowledged at Dubrava, as these were prisoners who were executed
extrajudicially well after the NATO strikes.
NATO's Use of Cluster Bombs
One of the issues of most intense public interest
that has emerged from Operation Allied Force is NATO's use of cluster bombs.
There are seven confirmed and five likely incidents involving civilian
deaths from cluster bomb use by the United States and Britain. Altogether,
some ninety to 150 civilians throughout Yugoslavia died from NATO cluster
bombs.
The most serious incident involving civilian deaths
and the use of cluster bombs occurred on May 7 in Nis, Serbia. The mid-day
attack on Nis airfield, which is located inside the urban zone, killed
fourteen civilians and injured twenty-eight. NATO confirmed the attack
on Nis airfield,27 and on May 8, NATO Secretary General Solana confirmed
NATO responsibility for the attack, stating that "NATO has confirmed that
the damage to the market and clinic was caused by a NATO weapon which missed
its target."28 According to U.S. Air Force sources, the CBU-87 cluster
bomb container failed to open over the airfield but opened right after
release from the attacking airplane, projecting submunitions at a great
distance into the city.29
AFTER THE INCIDENT IN NIS, THE WHITE
HOUSE QUIETLY ISSUED A DIRECTIVE TO THE PENTAGON TO RESTRICT CLUSTER BOMB
USE (AT LEAST BY U.S. FORCES).30 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CONSIDERS THIS TO HAVE
BEEN THE RIGHT MOVE, BUT IS CONCERNED, GIVEN THESE RISKS, THAT CLUSTER
BOMBS WERE BEING USED IN ATTACKS ON URBAN TARGETS IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE
MID-MAY PROHIBITION AGAINST THE FURTHER USE OF CLUSTER BOMBS CLEARLY HAD
AN IMPACT ON THE LEVEL OF CIVILIAN DEATHS AS THE WAR CONTINUED, PARTICULARLY
AS BOMBING WITH UNGUIDED WEAPONS (WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE INCLUDE CLUSTER
BOMBS) SIGNIFICANTLY INTENSIFIED TOWARDS THE END OF THE MONTH. NEVERTHELESS,
THE BRITISH AIR FORCE CONTINUED TO DROP CLUSTER BOMBS (OFFICIAL CHRONOLOGIES
SHOW USE AT LEAST ON MAY 17, MAY 31, JUNE 3, AND JUNE 4),31 INDICATING
THE NEED FOR UNIVERSAL, NOT NATIONAL, NORMS REGARDING CLUSTER BOMB USE.
1 Discussion of bombing outside Kosovo
is beyond the scope of this report. For further information on bombing
elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see: Human Rights Watch,
"Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign," February 2000.
2 Each of the thirty-two incidents
in Kosovo is set out, together with supporting references, in Annex A of
"Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign," pp. 29-64.
3 For an early account of the use
of cluster bombs by NATO in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Human
Rights Watch's position, see "Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster
Munitions in Yugoslavia," A Human Rights
Watch Short Report, vol. 11, no. 6(D), May 1999;
and Human Rights Watch, "Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Delegates,"
December 16, 1999.
4 The question as to what extent
the military is obligated to expose its own forces to danger in order to
limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects is examined in
William J. Fenrick, "Attacking The Enemy Civilian As A Punishable Offense,"
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law,
1997, p. 546, located at http://_www.law.duke.edu/journals/djcil/articles/djcil7p539.htm
(March 27, 2001).
5 The eighty-seven deaths in Korisa
are counted in the Human Rights Watch total of 500 [cited in the report,
"Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign"]; the seventy-six at Dubrava
prison are not.
6 NATO, SHAPE News Morning Update,
April 15, 1999; Reuters, 150059 GMT, April 15, 1999.
7 Joie Chen and Jamie McIntyre, "As
Serb Force Grows, Limits of Air Attacks Become Apparent," CNN, The
World Today, April 19, 1999; Sarah Chayes, "General
Daniel Leaf Explains the Refugee Bombings," National Public Radio, All
Things Considered, April 19, 1999.
8 FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
NATO
Crimes in Yugoslavia, vol. 1, pp. 1, 21-26,
32-37; FRY Ministry of Housing, "Photo Documentation of Civilians Who Were
Killed By NATO Attacks, from 24.03 until 20.05.1999."
9 Tanjug, Pristina, April 15, 1999.
10 Two eyewitnesses told Human Rights
Watch that within the convoy were military vehicles interspersed. Interviews
with Kole Hasanaj, Meja, July 25, 1999, and with Safet Shalaj, Djakovica,
July 25, 1999.
11 Special U.S. Department of Defense
Press Briefing with Gen. Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
Topic: Kosovo Strike Assessment; Also Participating: Airmen and Analysts
from Operation Allied Force and Post-Strike Assessment Work, Brussels,
Belgium, September 16, 1999.
12 Ibid.
13 FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
NATO
Crimes in Yugoslavia, vol. II, pp. 1-17. Though
the White Book
states that there were "only" forty-eight victims in Korisa, Yugoslav and
Western press, as well as the U.S. State Department and the U.N. report
figures of eighty to eighty-seven victims. Based upon Human Rights Watch
investigations and discussions with Western journalists who attempted to
reconstruct the incident, it appears certain that more that forty-eight
people died in the Korisa attack. The range of deaths reported is thus
used.
14 Transcript of Backgrounder given
by Peter Daniel and Major General Walter Jertz, in Brussels, May 15, 1999.
15 NATO, Subject: Press Release (99)
079, Statement by the NATO Spokesman on the Korisa Incident, May 15, 1999.
16 Transcript of Backgrounder, May
15, 1999.
17 Transcript, U.S. Department of
Defense News Briefing, May 15, 1999.
18 Reuters 152249 GMT, May 15, 1999;
Kosovo Chronology, Timeline of events 1989-1999 relating to the crisis
in Kosovo, released by the Department of State, Washington, D.C., June
18, 1999.
19 Hans-Peter Gasser, "Protection
of the Civilian Population," in Dieter Fleck (ed.), The
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 505, para. 506. Hans-Peter
Gasser is a senior legal adviser of the ICRC.
20 Information provided by Yugoslav
civil defense authorities; FRY MFA, NATO raids on manufacturing and civilian
facilities on May 21st and on the night between May 21st and 22nd 1999.
21 FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
NATO Raids on Manufacturing and Civilian Facilities on May 29th and in
the Night Between May 29th and 30th 1999.
22 Yugoslav press reports; "Identifikovano
86 mrtvih," DAN,
May 27, 1999, p. 2; "Jos sedam leseva," DAN,
May 30, 1999.
23 FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
NATO
Crimes in Yugoslavia, vol. II, p. 319.
24 NATO, Operation Allied Force Update,
May 22, 1999, 0930 CET. See also Transcript of Press Conference given by
Mr. Jamie Shea and Col. Konrad Freytag in Brussels on Saturday, May 22,
1999.
25 Jacky Rowland, "Bombs, Blood and
Dark Despair," Scotland on Sunday,
May 23, 1999; Paul Watson, "NATO Bombs Ignite Prison Chaos-KLA Officers
Reported to be Among Inmates," Toronto
Star, May 22, 1999; Associated Press, "NATO
Hits Kosovo Jail Again Friday Night," May 21, 1999.
26 Carlotta Gall, "Stench of Horror
Lingers in a Prison in Kosovo," New York
Times, November 9, 1999.
27 NATO (SHAPE), ACE News Release-Press
Release 99-05-02, May 8, 1999.
28 Transcript of Press Conference
given by the NATO Secretary General, Mr. Javier Solana, in Brussels, on
Saturday, May 8, 1999 (including Maj. Gen. Jertz).
29 Human Rights Watch correspondence
with a U.S. Air Force officer, Novermber 1999.
30 Human Rights Watch discussions
with U.S. Air Force and Joiint Chiefs of Staff officers, October 1999.
31 U.K. Ministry of Defense, Royal
Air Force, Operation Allied Force News and Downloadable Images (http://www.mod.raf.uk/news/kosovonews.html).
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