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I. SUMMARY

Addressing the nation on October 17, 1999, five days after he deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and proclaimed himself chief executive, General Pervez Musharraf offered a damning indictment of the state of Pakistan's economy and civic institutions. Outlining a seven-point recovery plan, Musharraf said that the army planned to stay in charge only so long as was "absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in the country." Increasing authoritarianism and militarization of state institutions during Sharif's second term had in fact undermined democratic governance, although observers in and outside Pakistan expressed skepticism that a military government would be likely to reverse those trends.

The Musharraf administration has since begun to address a few longstanding justice issues-notably, through the adoption of Pakistan's first federal juvenile justice law and the establishment of a commission on the status of women. But in other respects, human rights conditions have deteriorated since the coup. Political opponents and suspected wrongdoers have been subjected to prolonged detention without charge, custodial ill treatment, and even torture. The administration has also greatly augmented executive powers, curtailed the independence of the judiciary, and neutralized political parties. It has done so through the promulgation of executive orders that infringe on judicial independence and fundamental rights; the application of broadly defined laws governing terrorism, sedition, and public order; and the establishment of extra-constitutional accountability and monitoring mechanisms.

Immediately after the coup, the government stripped the judiciary of much of its power by promulgating the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), which suspended the constitution and legislative bodies and prohibited the superior courts from making any decision against the chief executive "or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority." On January 26, Musharraf issued an order requiring all Supreme and High Court judges to take an oath that would bind them to uphold his proclamation of emergency and the PCO, effectively dispensing with any pretension to judicial independence and immunizing officials of the military government from prosecution. Fifteen judges, including the chief justice of the Supreme Court, were removed for failure to take the oath. Four months later, a reconstituted, quiescent Supreme Court validated the coup on the ground of state necessity and set a three-year time frame for the restoration of democratic rule. The court also gave the Musharraf administration authority to amend the constitution unilaterally -a power that the administration says it intends to utilize.

General Musharraf has also acted to remove real and potential sources of political opposition. Senior Sharif administration officials were detained on the day of the coup, including two, Information Minister Mushahid Hussain and Petroleum Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, who continue to be held without charge. Sharif himself was tried and convicted under the Anti-Terrorism Act and sentenced to life imprisonment on April 6, 2000, following a trial that was marred by the retroactive revision of the act to facilitate his prosecution and by the murder of one of his defense counsel.

The government's principal vehicle for detaining former officials and party leaders, however, has been the National Accountability Ordinance, a law created in November 1999 ostensibly to bring corrupt officials to account. Although Human Rights Watch does not question the need for accountability mechanisms, the terms of the ordinance invite politically motivated application. It confers sweeping powers of arrest, investigation, and prosecution in a single institution, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), permits detainees to be held for up to ninety days without charge, and at trial places the burden of proof on the defendant. There have been persistent reports of ill treatment of detainees in NAB custody, particularly those who were held at Attock Fort, an army-occupied sixteenth century fortress west of Islamabad where a number of high-profile accountability trials have been conducted. Persons convicted under the ordinance are automatically prohibited from holding public office for a period of twenty-one years. A recent amendment to the Political Parties Act also bars anyone with a court conviction from holding party office. The combined effect of these acts, as they have been applied, is to eliminate the existing leadership of the major political parties.

While political parties themselves have not been banned, they have been prohibited from fielding candidates for the local government elections that the Musharraf administration plans to hold in December 2000. The administration has also suppressed political activity by conducting raids on party offices, preventing political rallies from being held, and lodging criminal cases against rally organizers under laws governing sedition and public order. Rana Sanaullah Khan, a member of the suspended Punjab provincial assembly from Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML), was arrested in Faisalabad on November 28, 1999. The arrest came after he criticized the army at a meeting of former legislators and urged his colleagues to launch a protest movement against the military government. He was tortured while in custody, and criminal charges were registered against him.

In March 2000, the government formally curtailed the fundamental rights of free association and assembly with an order banning public rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. At least 165 PML leaders and activists were arrested when the order was enforced against a procession that Nawaz Sharif's wife, Kulsoom Nawaz, had planned to lead from Lahore to Peshawar. Other police and army operations have targeted the two leading ethnically based parties in Sindh, the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). One consequence of the government's curbs on political activity is that the relative space open to religious parties-whose authorities and institutions General Musharraf has thus far largely refrained from challenging-is likely to grow. The influence that the latter already wield is apparent from the government's abrupt withdrawal of plans to restrict administratively the application of the blasphemy law and to repeal electoral law provisions that many members of religious minorities have criticized as contributing to their communities' political marginalization.

This report examines human rights abuses by the Musharraf administration in its consolidation of military rule and suppression of political party activism and leadership. The press has not been as frequent a target of the present government as political parties, and this report does not specifically address press freedom issues. However, local human rights activists report that self-censorship on political issues is increasingly common in the vernacular press, while recent developments suggest that the English-language press is coming under official pressure as well. On September 27, an army monitoring team conducted an unannounced, four-hour inspection of the headquarters of Karachi's respected English-language daily Dawn. Although the ostensible purpose of the inspection was to check metering equipment for electricity billing fraud, the team demanded access to all floors of the publishing house, including the offices of the publishers, editors, and journalists. According to Dawn, the inspection was preceded by legal notices to the newspaper from the Ministry of Information to restrict its coverage of a draft Freedom of Information Act, and by complaints from government officials about an article in Dawn stating that the administration was preparing new curbs on press freedom.

Ironically, many of the steps taken by the new government-the militarization of state institutions and the use of accountability courts and anti-terrorism legislation-rest on a foundation that was established by Sharif and which helped give his government its autocratic cast. Together with the military administration's curbs on judicial independence and on freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, they speak against Musharraf's justification for the coup and are undermining respect for human rights and the future of democratic development in Pakistan.

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