NON-SIGNATORIES

AFGHANISTAN

Key developments since March 1999: Landmine casualties continued to decline. An estimated five to ten people were injured or killed by mines every day in 1999, compared to an estimated ten to twelve people in 1998 and an estimated twenty to twenty-four people in 1993. In 1999, 110 square kilometers of land were cleared of mines and UXO, which constitutes 24% of the total of 465 square kilometers cleared since 1990. In 1999, 21,871 antipersonnel mines, 1,114 antitank mines, and 254,967 UXO were destroyed. Donors contributed US$22 million to mine action in 1999. A total of 979,640 people received mine awareness education in 1999, and about 6 million since 1990. The opposition Northern Alliance continued to use antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

At least in part because of its unusual international political status and situation, Afghanistan is not a party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, or Taliban authority, now controls over 90% of country, but Afghanistan's seat at the United Nations is still occupied by the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, known as the Islamic State of Afghanistan or Northern Alliance, which was ousted by the Taliban in September 1996. Northern Alliance forces are currently engaged in continued fighting with Taliban forces in the north of Afghanistan.

In October 1998, the supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Muhammed Omer, issued a lengthy, detailed statement from Kandahar proclaiming a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines.⁹⁰ In 1999 and 2000, the Taliban has reaffirmed its support for the ban on landmines on a number of occasions. On 1 March 2000, the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) and member organizations organized an event in Kabul to commemorate the anniversary of the entry into force of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Several high-ranking officials of the Taliban participated as well as UN officials and representatives of international agencies and NGOs.

The head of the Taliban's Office of Disaster Response, which includes a Department of Mine Clearance, Mohammed Yousef, used the occasion to confirm the October 1998 declaration condemning the use, production, trafficking, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines.⁹¹ He said "if someone uses a mine in a Taliban-controlled area they will be punished according to Islamic Shariat" and went on to state that the Taliban had not used landmines since the 1998 policy declaration. The deputy head of the Ministry of Information and Culture, Abdul Rhman Hotak, said that "prevention of the use of this weapon which kills without discrimination is necessary and its use is irrational." He called on all countries of the world to join the ban on landmines. Both officials closed by describing the Taliban's strong support for mine clearance.

For its part, the Rabbani government declared its support for an immediate and comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines in a statement to the UN Human Rights Commission in March 1996. However, the Northern Alliance forces admit to continued use of mines since that time. The Rabbani government was absent from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, just as it had been absent on similar resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Production

There is no evidence of antipersonnel mine production in Afghanistan, past or current, by any government, warring faction or private enterprise.

Transfer

Large numbers of mines from many sources were sent to Afghanistan during the many years of fighting. With regard to recent practice, Taliban authorities have by their 1998 statement denounced import and export of landmines, and Landmine Monitor has no evidence to the contrary. Landmine Monitor Report 1999 reported that the Northern Alliance acknowledged still using and importing antipersonnel mines.⁹² Taliban has often accused Iran of supplying mines to the opposition forces. In a 5 July 2000 letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Taliban's Foreign Minister asked the UN to stop the flow of landmines from "hostile" countries to resistance commander Ahmad Shah Masood.⁹³

Landmine Monitor has received unconfirmed reports of small-scale smuggling of landmines left over from the conflict by private dealers to sources in Pakistan and Sri Lanka but the quantity and value of such trade cannot be estimated.

Stockpiling

It is obvious that both sides to the current conflict have stockpiled landmines but because the conflict continues it is difficult to obtain details on the numbers, types, or country of origin of stockpiled mines. Landmine Monitor is not aware of any systematic destruction of AP mine stockpiles by either party to the conflict.

In September 1999, Taliban authorities asked the United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan for assistance to undertake the clearance of the "most dangerous museum of the unexploded ordnance in the world" in Zendajan, Herat province. Over 465 different UXO including aircraft bombs and other types of ammunition were safely destroyed by a special bomb disposal team of a demining organization in November 1999.⁹⁴

Use

Landmine Monitor has not been able to obtain any firsthand evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines because the areas in which the fighting is taking place are inaccessible and there are no mine action NGOs operating there.

The Taliban and the Northern Alliance continue to accuse each other of on-going use of antipersonnel mines.⁹⁵ The Northern Alliance admits to use,⁹⁶ and in November 1999 the Associated Press reported that "U.N. landmine officials said most of the new mines are being laid by the opposition."⁹⁷ The NGO Save the Children's Northern Regional Office in Taloquen (Takhar Province) reported in August 1999 that landmines had been planted from Kunduz to Takhar provinces, through Imam Sahib and Archi districts. They also reported new mine casualties, noting that health centers in Kunduz and Takhar had cared for many landmine casualties in 1999.⁹⁸ In 1999, the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines sent a letter to the leader of the Northern Alliance urging him to take the necessary action to ensure that his followers refrain from importing and using of landmines in the territories.⁹⁹

Mine Action Funding

The humanitarian mine action program in Afghanistan is funded by various donor countries that channel funds through the UN Coordination Office for Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA). The program is coordinated by the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). MAPA's activities includes surveys of mined areas, mine clearance and mine awareness education, implemented by various national and international NGOs working in Afghanistan. Funding for NGOs engaged in mine action accounts for about 63% of all NGO activity in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁰

Funding for MAPA has totaled U.S. $153 million from 1991 through 1999. The total budget for 1999 was U.S. $21.9 million. This was a significant decrease from the 1998 total of U.S. $27 million, but still represented a higher total than any other year besides 1998. By comparison, funding in 1995 totaled $15.6 million, in 1996 $17.8 million, and in 1997 $20.2 million.

Countries that have contributed to the program since 1991 are shown in Table I. The biggest donors in 1999 were the U.S. ($3.0 million), European Community ($2.6 million), Sweden ($2.5 million) and Germany ($2.5 million). The biggest donors since 1991 are the European Community ($17.1 million), Sweden ($16,9 million), U.S. ($15.9 million), UK ($13.1 million), Japan ($11.6 million), and Norway ($11.2 million).

Funding for MAPA has generally been sufficient in 1999, but several times in the past it has faced severe shortages that affected field operations.

None of the above figures include funding for victim assistance programs; MAPA does not have a victim assistance component in its structure.

Table I. Details of funds received by MAPA from 1991 through 1999 in U.S.$¹⁰¹

Country	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Contributions B/F from last year	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,817,433	3,890,841	8,708,274
Australia	0	658,868	138,279	274,800	306,000	293,600	748,380	335,550	0	2,755,477
Austria	0	180,000	0	315,725	159,982	203,030	16,667	10,000	127,992	1,013,396
Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	273,224	0	273,224
Canada	0	0	562,559	716,874	355,540	737,419	777,940	705,937	659,659	4,515,928
CEC	0	0	0	0	2,785,321	5,077,730	3,624,437	3,027,613	2,634,534	17,149,635
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	10,000	0	0	0	0	10,000
Denmark	0	400,000	0	202,823	900,000	900,000	598,802	729,639	0	3,731,264
Finland	235,294	227,635	175,991	756,559	242,825	423,191	380,952	0	512,540	2,954,987
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	167,000	0	100,000	267,000
Germany	0	0	0	0	374,232	2,388,041	2,000,000	2,373,000	2,500,000	9,635,273
Greece	0	16,365	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16,365
Italy									100,000	100,000
Japan	5,000,000	2,000,00	2,000,000	0	2,000,000	0	1,000,000	300,268	1,300,000	11,602,268
Korea	0	0	75,000	0	0	0	0	50,000	0	125,000
Netherlands	0	586,281	780,457	341,591	789,345	1,363,527	2,530,993	1,482,945	1,454,525	9,329,664
Norway	765,004	1,126,877	1,819,103	631,606	562,375	886,163	1,508,107	2,398,649	1,477,044	11,174,928
Sweden	894,457	872,600	1,148,494	1,894,524	2,218,743	2,535,812	2,500,000	2,278,481	2,510,488	16,853,599
Switzerland	0	0	709,220	0	344,828	344,828	0	135,135	0	1,534,011
UK	904,350	954,350	1,494,000	1,085,840	1,970,728	1,183,088	1,209,678	3,346,000	979,800	13,127,834
U.S.	123,000	1,105,023	1,500,000	3,227,405	2,564,089	1,308,507	2,000,000	1,073,442	3,021,000	15,922,466
Direct/ in -kind	0	2,955,000	6,972,428	7,521,244	0	115,328	1,111,111	3,121,990	315,147	22,112,248
Total	7,922,106	11,082,999	17,375,531	16,967,991	15,584,008	17,760,264	20,174,057	26,984,087	21,931,072	153,830,424

Landmine Problem

A total of about 717 square kilometers of land remains contaminated by mines and UXO. This includes 337 square kilometers of affected land classified as high priority.¹⁰² A major socio-economic impact study conducted by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) under the auspices of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan (MAPA), and published in December 1999, revealed that affected land consisted of 61% grazing land, 26% agricultural land, 7% roads, 4% residential areas, and 1% irrigation systems.¹⁰³ The survey was conducted in eighteen out of Afghanistan's twenty-nine provinces and covered a total number of 3,656 minefields and 20,645 villages. It indicated about 1,600 villages were affected by mines and UXO.

Refugees and internally displaced persons are still reluctant to return home, in part due to fear of mines. A total of 12,216 families were repatriated in 1999, including 72,098 individuals.¹⁰⁴

See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for a list of fifty antipersonnel mines found in Afghanistan and their countries of origin.¹⁰⁵ Two more antipersonnel mines have since been added to the list: the YM-I mine from Iran and the RAP-2 mine from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Mine Clearance

From 1990 to April 2000, a total of 465 square kilometers of contaminated area has been cleared in Afghanistan. That includes 207 square kilometers of mined land and 258 square kilometers of mostly unexploded ordnance (UXO) from battlefields.¹⁰⁶ In the same period, 205,842 antipersonnel mines, 9,199 antitank mines and 1,054,738 UXO were cleared.¹⁰⁷

In 1999, 110 square kilometers of land were cleared, including 34 square kilometers of mined land and 76 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields.¹⁰⁸ In 1999, 21,871 AP mines, 1,114 AT mines and 254,967 UXO were cleared.¹⁰⁹

In February 2000, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) stated that fourteen national and international NGOs employed approximately 5,000 people to implement mine action projects in Afghanistan.¹¹⁰ This is a significant increase over the 3,900 employees reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999. The majority of employees are Afghan, but there are also a number of Pakistanis and a few international workers.

A list of eight organizations directly involved in mine clearance follows. The other six are mine action implementing partners who work in other types of mine action-related assistance: META, AMMA, SCF/US, HI, ARI, BBC.

Organizations directly involved in mine clearance.¹¹¹

Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC). ATC is Afghanistan's oldest Mine/UXO clearance NGO, established in 1989 by its present director Kefayatullah Eblagh. It has 1,299 employees. Its 1999 budget was $4,792,386. In year 2000, in accordance with policy changes of the EU in relation to funding of NGOs, the EU has agreed to the provision of about two million Euro per annum to ATC through UNOCHA. ATC has cleared approximately 40% of overall MAPA Program Operation. In 1999, ATC cleared 6.6 square kilometers of mined land and 24 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields, and destroyed 9,028 mines and 62,712 UXO.

Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA). DAFA has 689 employees. Its 1999 budget was $3,326,497. In 1999 DAFA cleared 2.9 square kilometers of mined land and 0.06 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields, and destroyed 2,807 mines and 44,196 UXO.

Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). MCPA has 297 employees. Its 1999 budget was $2,331,000. In 1999 MCPA cleared 0.3 square kilometers of mined land and 0.2 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefield and destroyed 19 AP mines and 645 UXO.

Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC). MDC has 707 employees. Its 1999 budget was $5,531,000. In 1999 MDC cleared 16.9 square kilometers of mined land, and destroyed 1,171 mines and 2,102 UXO.

Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). OMAR has 431 employees. Its 1999 budget was $2,321,500. In 1999 OMAR cleared 3.5 square kilometers of mined land, and destroyed 2,193 mines and 2,525 UXO.

HALO Trust. HALO has 1,210 employees. It conducts clearance independent of MAPA. Its 1998 budget was $2,000,000, but figures for 1999 were not available (UNOCHA provided $1,375,600). In 1999 HALO cleared 3.6 square kilometers of mined land and 52 square kilometers of mostly UXO from battlefields, and destroyed 7,001 mines and 143,428 UXO.

Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA). AREA has 731 employees, of which 114 are engaged in mine action. Its 1999 budget for landmines was $115,928 (36 percent of AREA's total budget). In 1999, AREA cleared 0.3 square kilometers of mined land, and destroyed 79 AP mines.¹¹²

Danish Demining Group (DDG). This Danish mine clearance NGO established an office in Pakistan to undertake mine clearance activities in Afghanistan. Due to differences with the Governor of Kandahar on recruitment policy, DDG moved out and shifted its main operational office to Kabul. The agency has so far established two mine clearance teams with a staff capacity of 60 persons.

Apart from Kabul-based HALO, all the mine clearance organizations were based in Pakistan, but in the course of 1999 and 2000 they have moved or are moving their base of operations to Kabul while maintaining liaison offices in Pakistan for logistical purposes. The move to Afghanistan should be completed by September 2000 and reflects the better operating environment within the country.

While there is no MAPA "standard" for demining team composition, most of the demining agencies have a similar structure in which each demining team consists of thirty people plus support staff. MAPA has clear criteria for employment in demining. Most importantly, all employees (such as deminers, surveyors, dog handlers) must pass independently conducted courses before they are licensed. A few organizations have a policy of hiring local staff while others recruit staff who work outside of their own province.

Work in the field is monitored and evaluated by the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META), funded and reporting to MAPA. META is based in Jalalabad. META has sixty-six employees who are undertaking monitoring and training of the mine action staff. In 1999 META had a budget of $625,800.¹¹³

From 1990 until April 2000, a total of 40,658 students (employees of mine clearance agencies) were trained through 1,139 courses on mine recognition, revision, team leaders in battle areas and clearance courses.¹¹⁴ In 1999 alone, 4,270 were trained in 186 courses.

Coordination and Planning

The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA). Tasks are given to the mine action agencies by a coordinated plan of action by MAPA who may act in regards to a regular work plan or on ad hoc basis if communities or organizations request it on an emergency basis. In 1999 and 2000 mine action is divided into five regions:

· Central region: Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Bamiyan, Wardak, Logar, and Ghazni provinces

· Northern region: Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan, Faryab, Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces.

· Southern region: Urozgan, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimroz provinces

· Western region: Badghis, Ghor, Herat, Farah provinces

· Eastern region: Nengerhar, Kunar, Laghaman, Paktia, Paktika provinces

MAPA has offices in each region with both expatriate and national regional coordinators looking after the program and reporting to the main office of MAPA in UNOCHA Islamabad. MAPA maintains the MAPA mine action management information system, a database containing a wide range of information and data including records of mined areas, cleared areas and data on landmine incidents and injuries. MAPA prioritizes both the area needing clearance and the area needing marking into high and low priority categories.

Mine Awareness

There is a continued need for mine awareness education programs. Some challenges include the very low literacy rate, the location of the majority of the population in remote and sometimes isolated areas and inadequate education facilities, especially in rural areas.

From 1990 to April 2000, some six million people received mine awareness education, including 979,640 in 1999.¹¹⁵ While these numbers are impressive, MCPA reported that only 0.64% of mine victims it surveyed had received mine awareness education prior to their injury.¹¹⁶

Mine awareness organizations use a curriculum that has been developed over the last ten years. In 1999, MAPA conducted two workshops to review and streamline the curriculum. Mine action organizations undertake mine awareness activities in communities where they work. Demining is done in the mornings while mine awareness is carried out in the afternoons. They use wooden models in real size and shape so the audience can grasp the actual volume and danger of the devices also demonstrated by videos and printed material.

Organizations involved in mine awareness include:¹¹⁷

Afghan Mine Awareness Agency (AMAA). AMAA established mine awareness programs in communities in Herat province in 1998.¹¹⁸ AMAA sends its master trainers to live in a village for one month and train a selected couple. Christian Aid UK and UNOCHA have financially supported AMAA in 1998/99 but the NGO has not been able to secure funding for its activities during the second half of 1999 and year 2000.

Handicap International (HI). In April 1996 HI started a mine awareness program in the Kandahar province to complement its orthotic and prosthetic activities. The guiding principle of was to develop a community-based mine awareness project (CBMAP) aimed at the empowerment of Afghan communities and ensuring sustainability. Most recently the project has expanded to Farah province in May 2000. CBMAP trainers (Nomaindas) are recruited from the community in which they live and in turn it is their responsibility to recruit, train, equip and supervise volunteer trainers from the surrounding communities, to continue training the population. By the end of May 2000, a total of thirty Nomaindas were deployed in thirty districts of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, and Farah provinces and 949 volunteer Mine Committees were operational. Since the inception of the project a total of 833,551 villagers and nomads have been directly and/or indirectly trained by CBMAP.

Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS). The ARCS was again funded by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) for its mine awareness activities in 1999. Training was concentrated in Kabul and Wardak provinces.

Ansar Relief Institute (ARI). In Iran, twenty-three instructors provided mine awareness training to Afghans at refugee centers in the country and at border crossing points. In 1999, the ARI project was carried out in close consultation with the Iranian Bureau of Aliens and Foreign International Affairs (BAFIA), UNHCR and UNDP Tehran. ARI trained 125,000 people, achieving its target for the year. Compulsory mine awareness training was given to returning Afghan refugees through the UNHCR encashment process (returnees hand in their refugee registration booklets in return for money and other items). It was supported by the distribution of materials such as mine awareness silk screens, posters and notebooks.

British Broadcasting Corporation, Afghan Education Projects (BBC/AEP). BBC/AEP receives funding from UNOCHA (US$95,000) for the dissemination of mine awareness messages through its highly successful radio drama series "New Home, New Life" and in the illustrated magazine that accompanies the program. The series, which is made in the Pakistani city, Peshawar, is broadcast on the Pashto and Persian services of the BBC World Service. The primary themes are to disseminate awareness and avoidance messages and improve community relationships with the mine action agencies. There is extensive consultation with MAPA to ensure the message and materials are culturally appropriate and technically correct. BBC/AEP reinforcement programs are broadcast on the Pashto and Persian services of BBC World Services. The reinforcement output is accommodated in two special programs, entitled Village Voice and Refugee File (Sada-e-Abadi and Khpala Khawara). The BBC/AEP also published a monthly cartoon magazine based on "New Home, New Life" to reinforce its soap opera.

Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). OMAR achieved its 1999 target of training 570,000 people with a funding of US$456,500. OMAR distributed mine awareness notebooks, posters, silk-screens, identification books and storybooks. The materials were designed to assist people who have received training to subsequently provide information and education messages to friends and family members. Activities have been carried out in Badakhshan, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Urozgan, Zabul, Nimroz and at UNHCR encashment centers at border crossing points. The community-based mine awareness project developed in 1997/98 by OMAR focused on the establishment of volunteer councils to disseminate messages in their respective communities. The project has established 117 volunteer councils in Kabul, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Badakhshan, Ghazni, Logar and Herat provinces. These have trained 142,000 people. OMAR received funding from UNOCHA, the ICRC, the Netherlands Organisation for International Development and Cooperation (NOVIB), and the German government (all coordinated by the MACA).

Save the Children USA (SCF-US). In early 1996, SCF-US commenced its Landmine Education Project (LEP) in Kabul, following fierce fighting that left Kabul heavily contaminated with both mines and UXO. SCF also works in the surrounding districts of Paghman, Khaki Jabar and Sarobi. SCF-US has 26 facilitators, 236 community volunteers and 73 health promoters who all carry out mine awareness education. The project operation was undertaken in hospitals, clinics, mosques and Kuchi settlements following the political changes in Kabul and a ban on girls attending schools, which had been the original forum for the program.

SCF's activities were suspended at the beginning of 1999, due to negotiation with the Ministry of Planning to allow SCF to resume its activities. Official permission was given in February 1999 to SCF to resume activities in sub-districts of Paghman, Khaki Jabar and Sarobi. In 1999, SCF reached 64,000 people, mainly children, with its landmine awareness sessions. Sessions were run through a combination of direct implementation and indirect by training community. The LEP teams continue to use the child-focused material and methodology. This includes activity cards, board games, a memory game, landmine/UXO pictures and LEP passports. SCF also trained 398 community volunteers (239 male and 159 female) bringing the total number of committees trained by SCF to 680.

SCF continued throughout 1999 to document the landmine and UXO accidents in Kabul city. Staff were tasked to visit hospitals, clinics and other places to gather accident information. SCF also encouraged local community leaders to report mine/UXO incidents through the local government to higher authorities. This information is collated by RMAC and the MACA and used for planning purposes. As part of its ongoing activities SCF constructed four new safe playgrounds throughout Kabul city in 1999. This part of SCF's project aims to provide children with an alternative to playing in areas contaminated with mines and UXO. The total UNOCHA funding for the SCF/US LEP in 1999 was US$247,584.

Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program (CDAP). CDAP plans to train its field workers in mine awareness in the year 2000, through class lectures. UNDP, Norway, Sweden, Holland and Canada provide about US$2.2 million to CDAP. ¹¹⁹

Mine Awareness by Other NGOs. In addition to activities undertaken by the specialist mine awareness agencies, other NGOs included mine awareness training in their operations as they carried out mine-related programs such as demining and survey. The Monitoring, Training and Evaluation Agency (META) of the MAPA also gave some awareness instruction.

Although all Afghan mine action organizations are members of the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL), advocacy in support of the ban is sometimes not fully included in mine awareness education to some communities.¹²⁰ The principle arguments that underline the demand for a ban on landmines find strong support in local culture and religion; once activated, this understanding can increase the legitimacy of demining operations, and decrease the legitimacy of future landmine use in the country.¹²¹ In 1999, the ACBL published bi-monthly newsletters and booklets in local languages that it distributed for free to member organizations and NGOs working in Afghanistan to pass them on to people in their contact and reach. A booklet entitled "Stories of Mine Victims in Afghanistan" was published in November 1999.¹²²

Landmine Casualties

The number of landmine casualties in Afghanistan continues to decline. It is estimated that in 1999, five to ten people were injured or killed by mines every day.¹²³ In 1998, there were an estimated ten to twelve casualties each day;¹²⁴ in 1993 an estimated twenty to twenty-four casualties each day.¹²⁵

Data on mine casualties is not systematic but joint plans are underway for comprehensive collection by the World Health Organization, ICRC, and MAPA. Some problems with data collection include the ongoing fighting and the isolated and remote areas where some incidents occur. Almost 50% of landmine victims are still believed to die due to lack of medical facilities at an early stage of the injury.¹²⁶

MAPA recorded 1,771 landmine casualties (including injuries and deaths) in the thirteen months from January 1999 through January 2000.¹²⁷ The Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted a sixteen-month survey of landmine victims from January 1999 through April 2000. It recorded 2,004 mine casualties (1,831 wounded and 173 deaths). Thus, similar results were found: MAPA data gives an average of 136 mine casualties per month , while the ACBL survey gives an average of 125 mine casualties per month, both in the 4 to 5 per day range. However, these figures would not represent total casualties in the nation, since some go unreported.

The ACBL survey was an intentionally simple sampling survey with two types of questionnaires. It was sent to six provinces (Badakhshan, Balkh, Heart, Kabul, Kandahar, Kundaz). Of the 173 deaths recorded: 110 were males aged between 15-60 years, 38 were males under 15 years, 22 were females aged between 15-60 years and 3 were females under 15 years. Of the 1,831 wounded: 1,349 were males aged between 15-60 years, 295 were males under 15 years, 105 were females under 15 years, 82 were females aged between 15-60 years. The survey showed that 694 people lost one leg, 85 lost both legs, 187 lost one hand, 76 lost both hands, and 87 were blinded.

Since 1991, more than 400,000 people have been killed or maimed by landmines in Afghanistan.¹²⁸ According to the Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Programme (CDAP), as many as 800,000 people, or 4% of Afghanistan's population, are disabled, including some 210,000 landmine-disabled.¹²⁹

In December 1999, MCPA estimated that 12% of mine victims are above the age of 40 years, 50% are between the ages of 18 and 40 years and 36% are children under age of 18 years.¹³⁰ The same survey estimated that 96% of casualties were male and 4% female.

In the month of December 1999, four deminers died and twenty-one were injured due to mines. In January 2000, there was one recorded death of a deminer due to mines.¹³¹ According to a news account, since 1990, 30 deminers have been killed and 534 have been injured.¹³²

Survivor Assistance

About thirty organizations and NGOs provide services and assistance to landmine survivors in Afghanistan, including medical care, surgical operations, orthopedic care, physical rehabilitation, technical training and employment opportunities.

The main organizations providing services and assistance are:

Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program (CDAP) operates a community based rehabilitation program for Afghan disabled, including landmine victims, in sixty-six districts of Afghanistan. 113 physiotherapists and 400 staff members serve a community of 30,000 disabled (one-third of whom are female beneficiaries served by female staff). Local Taliban commanders have cooperated with the program and have encouraged CDAP to employ female physiotherapists and other field staff. Over the past four years, CDAP has serviced an estimated 92,000 disabled but it claims that this is "just a fraction of the total number of people' requiring assistance."¹³³ CDAP offers micro-credit of up to $120 to disabled people to start small businesses and also provides physiotherapy to the victims. CDAP's implementing partners include Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) in Ghazni, Wardak and Logar provinces in south and in Badakhshan, Takhar and Balkh provinces in the north; Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) in Herat and Farah provinces; and Guardians in Kandahar province. Other organizations supported by or working in collaboration with CDAP include: Afghan Association for Blind (AAB), HIFA, SERVE, IAM and Rädda Barnen as well as the Afghan Ministry of the Disabled. In April 2000, CDAP called on the international community to contribute another U.S. $1 million to the program, which has an annual budget of US$1.6 million.¹³⁴

International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC provides assistance directly and through the Afghan Red Crescent (ARC) in districts and villages. ICRC also has medical and physical rehabilitation centers. In 1999, 86% of the prostheses produced by ICRC in Afghanistan were for mine victims (3,929 out of 4,565).¹³⁵

Afghan Amputees Bicyclists for Rehabilitation (AABRAR). Based in Ningerhar, a city in the eastern of the country, AABRAR provides social rehabilitation and assistance to landmine survivors. It teaches amputees to ride bicycles and to encourage them to hold cycle races and volleyball tournaments.

Guardians. Guardians works with the disabled, including mine victims, in Kandahar and the south west of the country, with funding and Japan and assistance from CDAP and Handicap International. It provides orthopedic and physiotherapy services to disabled, including mine survivors.

Other organizations involved in assistance to mine victims include the World Health Organization, Afghan Disabled Society, Handicap International, Save the Children Fund (U.S.), Sandy Gall Afghanistan and Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA).

In terms of availability of services to mine victims, the ACBL Survey found that between 1999 and April 2000, 1,950 mine survivors received assistance in a variety of facilities in the provinces surveyed.

Note to Readers: A much longer, more detailed country report on Afghanistan is available on request. Also, please contact MAPA or MCPA direct for the report: Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan, Study and Report by MCPA, December 1999.

BHUTAN

Bhutan has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty or Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It did not participate in the Ottawa Process. It did not attend any of the major diplomatic meetings on landmines in 1999 or 2000. It has, however, voted in favor of all pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1996, including the December 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Bhutan also sent a representative to the International Committee of the Red Cross' South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.

Bhutan does not use, produce, trade, or stockpile antipersonnel mines. Its territory is mine-free.

BURMA (MYANMAR)¹³⁶

Key developments since March 1999: Government forces and at least ten ethnic armed groups continue to lay antipersonnel landmines in significant numbers. Landmine Monitor estimates there were approximately 1,500 new mine victims in 1999. The Committee Representing the People's Parliament endorsed the Mine Ban Treaty in January 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The military government of Myanmar is known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty and did not participate in the Ottawa Process. It abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. The representative of the SPDC explained by stating, "A sweeping ban on landmines is unnecessary and unjustified. The problem is the indiscriminate use of mines, as well as the transfer of them."¹³⁷

The SPDC has stated that it supports a ban on transfer of antipersonnel landmines, and believes that the Conference on Disarmament (of which it is a member) is the appropriate forum to negotiate this issue.¹³⁸ Myanmar is not a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but in December 1999 it sent observers to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in Geneva. Myanmar has not participated in any other mine ban fora in 1999 or 2000.

Shortly after the release of the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, the SPDC criticized the report for being based on sources residing mostly outside of the country. It denied that Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) have laid mines inside Thailand, that Tatmadaw mine use has been directed against the civilian population, and that civilians have been used as "human mine sweepers."¹³⁹

In January 2000 the Committee Representing the People's Parliament endorsed the Mine Ban Treaty. It stated that it would "recommend to the People's Parliament, when it is convened, as a matter of immediate national concern, accession to the Convention."¹⁴⁰

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling--Government

Myanmar is a producer of antipersonnel mines. The Myanmar Defense Products Industries (Kahpasa) produce at least two mines, designated as MM1 and MM2. These mines are modeled after the Chinese Type 59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine and the Chinese Type 58 blast mine.¹⁴¹ Ethnic militia members have told Landmine Monitor researchers that the government produces three other types of antipersonnel mines, designated MM3, MM4, and MM5, but no conclusive evidence is available.¹⁴²

Although the SPDC has declared its support for a ban on AP mine transfers, it has yet to institute a formal moratorium or ban. There is no evidence that the government has exported antipersonnel mines to other countries, but there have been allegations that Tatmadaw units have provided mines to ethnic combatants.¹⁴³

Several types of antipersonnel mines from other countries continue to be found in the field indicating past, if not current, importation. These include Chinese, Israeli, Italian, Russian, U.S., and other unidentified AP mines.¹⁴⁴

Neither the SPDC, nor the Ministry of Defense, will release any statistics regarding the size and type of mines in stockpile.

Use-Government

Mine warfare has continued since the release of Landmine Monitor Report 1999. While the government does not deny that it uses antipersonnel mines, it insists it does not do so in an indiscriminate fashion.¹⁴⁵

The rebel Shan State Army (SSA) alleges that sections of the border with Thailand, southern Shan State and the banks of the Salween River have been mined by the SPDC.¹⁴⁶ They also allege that Lahu mercenaries hired by the SPDC have mined paths used by the SSA. Landmine Monitor researchers have seen mines of Burmese manufacture removed by the SSA.

In Dweh Loh township of Karen State, it was alleged in April 2000 that SPDC units torched villages from which the inhabitants had fled, and then laid mines in the remains and on paths and in fields adjacent to the villages.¹⁴⁷ In the area northeast of the capital, SPDC troops are said to have laid mines in retaliation to mine laying by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). It is alleged that the SPDC lays mines on KNLA supply lines, escape routes to the Thai border used by refugees, and around villages and fields that Karen people have fled or been forcibly relocated.¹⁴⁸

In the Tenasserim Division, beginning late November 1999, the Tatmadaw has used landmines to consolidate its control of areas on the border with Thailand from Amalakee southward.¹⁴⁹ This operation has placed a mixture of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines between military posts along the border where persons, including those seeking to flee Burma as refugees, could conceivably cross: along stream beds, on paths and roads, and at passes.

There continue to be reports of Tatmadaw units deliberately laying mines in Thailand, including reports from Thai military based on the border.¹⁵⁰ Thai authorities provided Landmine Monitor with what appear to be Tatmadaw documents related to mine laying inside Thailand.¹⁵¹ Thai military border officers have been killed and wounded by Burmese-made mines apparently placed during 1999 and early 2000 while on patrol along the border.¹⁵² They have cleared mines in several locations.

The Tatmadaw uses two methods of laying mines: "registered" and "lost." Registered mines are laid as a defensive perimeter around military camps, or along supply lines, at certain times. The locations of these mines are recorded, and when the operation is finished these mines are removed. Lost mines are never recovered. Neither registered nor lost mines are fenced or marked in any way. The general location, numbers and types of lost mines are usually recorded on Tatmadaw maps or records (e.g. five AP mines on hill 270). This allows Tatmadaw units to know if an area was previously mined, but it does not give the exact locations of the mines.¹⁵³

In addition, it is believed SPDC military engineers actively maintain minefields along the border with Bangladesh, replacing old or exploded mines with new mines.¹⁵⁴ Originally laid in 1993, the minefields, which run nearly the entire length of the border, now serve to prevent cross-border economic activities like woodcutting and smuggling,¹⁵⁵ to deter further flight by refugees from the interior of Burma,¹⁵⁶ and to interdict cross-border movement by armed ethnic militias.¹⁵⁷ Some mines have been placed on the Bangladesh side due to poor demarcation and thick vegetation. Victims of AP mine incidents include both Burmese and Bangladeshi citizens.¹⁵⁸ The government of Bangladesh has repeatedly requested Myanmar remove these mines.¹⁵⁹

Regular Tatmadaw officers have told Landmine Monitor researchers that they received no formal instruction in mine laying. Usually, mines are laid by specialized "BE" military engineering units. Other soldiers only lay mines when the engineers are "not available," and do so under the direction and instruction of their commanding officer.¹⁶⁰

Ethnic Armed Groups

Thirty armed organizations, most associated with an ethnicity within the country, have been involved in armed struggle against the SPDC (see chart below). In 1999, about a dozen armed groups were actively engaged in some level of military activity (often quite limited) against the Tatmadaw in Arakan, Chin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen States, as well as in the Bago and Tennaserim Divisions.¹⁶¹

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling-Armed Ethnic Groups

All of the armed groups are believed to be capable of building blast mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Some groups can also manufacture Claymore-type mines.¹⁶² Materials for mine production are readily available. Many of the mines require batteries for operation, limiting the mine's life to that of the battery, usually said to be one year. A new mine design by the Karen National Liberation Army does not require a battery and has a longer field life.¹⁶³

The armed ethnic groups do not receive mines from foreign governments. However, the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia have left ample quantities of landmines on the regional black market. In 1999 the black market price for a U.S.- or Vietnamese-made M14 antipersonnel mine was about US$5, and a Claymore mine was about US$11.¹⁶⁴ Other types of AP mines are available, including the Chinese-made Type 72. As mentioned above, there have also been allegations that Tatmadaw units have provided mines to ethnic combatants.¹⁶⁵

One knowledgeable source has said that two stockpiles of landmines in the hands of ethnic military forces are estimated to number in the thousands, mostly of indigenous construction.¹⁶⁶

Use-Ethnic Armed Groups

At least ten of the ethnic militias are mine users. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is likely to be the largest mine user, followed by the Karenni Army (KA). The All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Peoples Defense Forces (PDF), Myiek-Dawei United Front (MDUF), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Shan State Army (SSA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, God's Army, and the Chin National Army (CNA) are also believed to use mines.¹⁶⁷

Like government-laid mines, mines laid by the KNLA, KA and others also produce civilian casualties. Ethnic militias involved in mine warfare acknowledge use of AP mines and/or Claymore mines for perimeter defense of their mobile camps at night, but claim they remove all mines during daylight. Command-detonated Claymore mines (usually U.S.-made M-18s) are also used during offensive operations, such as ambush.¹⁶⁸

Mines have been used predominantly in conflicts between government troops and ethnic armed groups, but have also been used in conflicts between various armed ethnic organizations as well, both in competition for "business interests" as well as over territorial disputes.

Active mine laying is occurring in Karen and Karenni states where the Karen National Liberation Army and the Karenni Army are attempting to maintain control or harass Tatmadaw troops, especially in the area to the northeast of Hpa-an, where mine laying by both the KNLA and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army is considered heavy.¹⁶⁹

A former military advisor stated that the KNLA lay mines near SPDC camps, on the flanks of key passes for the KNLA, along KNLA supply routes and refugee escape routes. The KNLA lays a combination of their own mines and purchased ones.¹⁷⁰

God's Army has planted mines in their area of operation along the Thai-Burma border opposite Ye according to a communiqué they released in late January 2000.¹⁷¹

At least one militia is suggesting that it might cease antipersonnel mine warfare. In March 2000 the SSA issued a statement claiming it was "against the producing, stockpiling or using of these mines."¹⁷² Earlier, at a press briefing in December 1999, the SSA said that they have a military policy of "no offensive mine use," stating that it is "dangerous for [Shan] villagers."¹⁷³

The KA is rumored to be cutting back on its mine use. The Rohingya Army of the RSO and the Chin National Army allege that they lay no "lost" mines. They also admit use of command-detonated mines.¹⁷⁴ The People's Defense Force (PDF), made up of former Tatmadaw soldiers and officers and operating in lower Karen State, admits to AP mine use for night perimeter defense of mobile camps.¹⁷⁵

Notes:

Cease-fire: Has negotiated cease-fire agreement with SLORC or SPDC.

AP Mine User: Is currently practicing mine warfare, either defensively or offensively.

Producer: Manufacture IEDs that have the characteristic of an antipersonnel landmine, or alter other munitions to serve as antipersonnel landmines.

Stockpile: Maintain a store of mines, or components, for use in warfare.

Mines in Territory: Mines now in the ground in their province or division of activity. Could be laid by themselves, allies or adversaries.

There are a variety of small self-proclaimed armed groups that are dysfunctional or not currently active that are not included.

Revolutionary political organizations, which do not maintain an armed wing, are not included.

Some of the armed ethnic organizations are primarily involved in the narcotics trade for self-perpetuation rather than any real political activity. (10, 13, 15) Several armed groups are quite small, and work only in alliance with other groups. (22,23)

Landmine Problem

Ten out of fourteen states and divisions in Burma are mine-affected, with a heavy concentration in eastern Burma. Mines are found widely in Karen, and Karenni states and the Tenasserim Division. The northwest frontier in Arakan State and a few areas of the western edge of Chin State and southern portions of Shan State are mined. There are also reports of landmines in Mon and Kachin States and the Bago Division.

There are landmines planted along the majority of Burma's border with Thailand and there is in essence a massive boundary minefield that runs virtually the entire length of Burma's border with Bangladesh, beginning a few miles from the termination of the water border along the Naf river, up to the Tri-Border junction with India. One officer interviewed specified that landmines can be found beginning at border post 31 running right up to the border with India.¹⁷⁶ The mines were laid in 1993 after a massive departure by a quarter of a million Rohingya people in 1991 and 1992.¹⁷⁷ There are also mines in a few scattered and remote areas along the borders with China and India.

There are no reliable estimates of the number of mines planted in Burma, or the amount of land affected.

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations in Burma. Some ethnic armed groups have lifted mines in their areas.

The Myanmar Red Cross has stated that it is not considering mobilizing a landmine awareness program, or surveying mine victim needs. The Myanmar Red Cross believes "the problem is going away" since "the government has signed peace agreements with all but one armed group," and therefore they should not waste scarce resources on this issue.¹⁷⁸

Atrocity Demining

In a particularly ugly practice, Tatmadaw units operating in theaters of conflict near Myanmar's border with Thailand have repeatedly been accused of forcing the local population to walk in front of Tatmadaw soldiers in areas suspected of mine contamination.¹⁷⁹ There have been new reports of this "human minesweeping" in late 1999 and early 2000: in Karen State in the Dooplaya District,¹⁸⁰ south of the Karen State capital Hpa-an,¹⁸¹ during military assaults on Shan State Army positions near Tachilek in Shan State,¹⁸² and during the operations against God's Army camps in the Tenasserim Division.¹⁸³ Danish doctors interviewing Burmese refugees in Thailand in 1998 and 1999 received numerous reports of human mine-sweeping.¹⁸⁴

Landmine Casualties

Landmine Monitor estimates that conflict in Burma produced approximately 1,500 mine victims in 1999 alone. This estimate is based on a compilation of statistics from the Karen State from 1998 suggesting that this single state produces nearly one civilian landmine amputee per day,¹⁸⁵ as well as statistics given by the government's National Rehabilitation Center in Rangoon and by Handicap International on the Burma-Thai border, and the number of prosthetic components given to the military by the ICRC (until recently). It assumes there are two military casualties for every one civilian victim, since mines are used mostly in theaters of conflict where the civilian population has either been forcibly removed or has fled, and that 30 percent of the victims die prior to any medical care.

The U.S. State Department estimated 1,500 victims per year in Burma in a 1994 report.¹⁸⁶ This could mean that the number of mine victims in Burma has been holding steady, at a very high level, for many years.

A recent report by a group of Danish doctors who interviewed 120 refugees from Burma at refugee camps in Thailand in both 1998 and 1999 found that 30% of the subjects they interviewed knew of a person who had suffered a landmine incident. In 40% of these cases, the interviewee's relationship to the person was family member. Victims reported through this study were between 8-55 years of age, and 90% were male. 30% of the time the victim is reported to have died from the injuries. Survivors lost a limb in 87% of the cases. In about half the cases, the activity that the victims were involved in was field work; the other half were reported to occur during service as a military porter or as forced labor to detonate mines by walking in front of troops (human mine-sweeping).¹⁸⁷

Despite the fact that military mine victims can be seen in border areas of the country, the Ministry of Defense maintains that there are no military victims of landmines.¹⁸⁸ There is no centralized agency collecting statistics on landmine survivors within Burma.

One news article looking at mine incidents on the Burma-Bangladesh border states that in the past six years there have been 170 victims, of which 50 have died. Victims included both Burmese and Bangladeshi citizens.¹⁸⁹ A list assembled by the Bangladesh Rifles indicates one hundred deaths were attributable to mines up to 1999.

There are other victims of mines: more than twenty elephants have died due to mines along the Bangladesh border, with still more on the Thai border. In Bangladesh the elephants have now changed their migration routes causing them to become a problem in nearby Bangladeshi agricultural areas that they had previously avoided.¹⁹⁰ One event that brought mine laying along the Thai/Burma border into the headlines this year was when an elephant triggered a mine. She survived and received a prosthetic leg.¹⁹¹ There is a major black market in cattle in the region, and many cattle are killed by mines as traders cross the border with them. Also, villagers living near the border region have lost many cattle to mines.¹⁹²

Survivor Assistance

Several medical practitioners believe that 50% of all people wounded by landmines die before receiving medical treatment, and at least one close observer of the situation in Karen State believes that figure is conservative.¹⁹³ Access to first aid and surgical care is dependent on the victim's physical distance from health care facilities and the prevailing security situation in the area at the time of the accident. Mine victims have reported travelling hours or even days in order to receive care. Medical care received prior to surgery is primitive and depends on whether a medic is on hand.¹⁹⁴

The medical system in Myanmar has been devastated by neglect. Medical practitioners in public hospitals receive a monthly salary of US$5.¹⁹⁵ Unless a victim can pay for care at public or private health facilities, no care is available. In two cases told to Landmine Monitor researchers, victims of Tatmadaw-laid mines were intercepted by soldiers before they could reach a hospital and turned back with the warning that they should not reveal the cause of their injury.¹⁹⁶

The Myanmar Ministry of Health provides prosthetic devices through the National Rehabilitation Centre (NRC). The NRC receives no funding from the government for outreach to the nation. All patients must reach the Centre on their own. There has been no systematic distribution of information through Myanmar's health care system about the NRC, and the Director concedes many health practitioners in the country may not even be aware of the Centre's existence. The NRC has two branches, one in Rangoon, and a second in Mandalay, each with a maximum capacity of about thirty in-patients per month. The two NRC facilities, and the Ministry of Defense hospital in Mingaladon near Rangoon, are the only facilities in the country currently providing artificial legs. An additional ICRC constructed facility in the Maymyo military hospital is currently not functional. The majority of the Centre's patients arrive under a joint ICRC-NRC program from Shan, Karen and Karenni States and the Bago Division.

The NRC provides limited statistics on its patients. Between 1990-1998 it fitted almost 1,400 patients with artificial limbs, of which more than 70% were victims of landmines.¹⁹⁷ Between April-September 1999, the NRC provided services for 157 landmine victims.¹⁹⁸

No information is available from the government on victim assistance through hospitals under the management of the Ministry of Defense, but ICRC statistics indicate military hospitals may be providing more than twice as many prosthetics as the civilian system.¹⁹⁹

There is one vocational rehabilitation center in Rangoon run by the Ministry of Health. A second facility for the vocational rehabilitation of amputees is being constructed in Rangoon by an international NGO.

An independent, ethnic-based, mobile medical organization named the Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT) operates in ethnic resistance areas of Mon, Karen, Karenni and Shan States. These medics offer a variety of primary and emergency services. They have received training in amputation from a U.S.-based medical organization, and held a special workshop in Thailand in mid-July 1999 on Trauma & Landmines. All medics have been trained in emergency amputation surgery. Surgeries are performed on sterilized plastic sheets on the floor of huts in the nearest village. Landmine Monitor researchers were asked for bone saws, as the backpack medics complained their saws were now dull.²⁰⁰

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Key Developments since March 1999: China completed clearance of its border with Vietnam in September 1999. For the first time, China announced that it had destroyed 1.7 million older antipersonnel mines in recent years. China is apparently converting its non-detectable antipersonnel mines by adding metal. Though China again abstained on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution in December 1999, it attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It has been one of the governments most insistent on the military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel mines. China has criticized the treaty as being based solely on humanitarian concerns while neglecting security requirements.²⁰¹ China was one of only ten governments that abstained on UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on pro-ban treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999.

In response to the Landmine Monitor request, China sent a letter describing its landmine policy:

China has always attached great importance to accidental injury to civilians caused by landmines. It supports proper and rational restrictions placed on the use and transfer of landmines. At the same time, the Chinese government holds that, in addressing the problem of landmines, especially that of anti-personnel landmines (APLs), due regard should be given to both humanitarian concerns and legitimate self-defense needs of sovereign countries. All countries are entitled to safeguard the security of their nation, territory, and people by legitimate military means, including the use of APLs, according to the purposes and principles of the UN charter. As a developing country with long land borders, China has to reserve the right to use APLs for self-defense on its own territory pending an alternative to replace APLs and the presence of security and defense capability.²⁰²

Yet China has also stated its support for "the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition" of antipersonnel mines.²⁰³ At the First Annual Conference for Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in December 1999, China stated that Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty "have made their respective contributions to reducing the civilian casualties" and "are not mutually exclusive, but rather reinforcing and complementary to each other."²⁰⁴

China was one of very few governments that did not participate in any of the Ottawa Process diplomatic conferences, though China sent observers to the ban treaty signing conference in December 1997 in Ottawa.²⁰⁵ China was also one of just twelve non-signatory states to send an observer delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held from 3-6 May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique.²⁰⁶ China has not participated in any of the treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. It is notable that the government responded to the request for information from Landmine Monitor, and provided comment on last year's report.²⁰⁷

On 4 November 1998, China ratified Amended Protocol II, and indicated it would exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with key restrictions.²⁰⁸ At the First Annual Conference for Amended Protocol II, China stated, "Amended Protocol II has provided the most appropriate ways and means to address the landmine issue." China also regretted the lack of universality of Protocol II and said it is imperative to promote universality.²⁰⁹ The Chinese delegation was headed by Mr. Sha Zukang, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicating the importance China attaches to landmines and Protocol II.

In October 1999, China submitted the report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, detailing steps China has taken to implement the protocol. Information is provided, often in more detail than ever before, on dissemination of information about the protocol to civilians and the armed forces (including a special manual for the military), mine clearance efforts, post-clearance rehabilitation measures, stockpile destruction and modification, other mine-related legislation, and international assistance to mine action.²¹⁰

China is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and has supported the CD as an appropriate forum to deal with the landmine issue. It has indicated its willingness to negotiate a transfer ban in the CD.²¹¹

Production

China is known as one of the world's largest producers of AP mines. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Chinese State Arsenals have been producing about twenty-two types of AP mines, six of which are based on Soviet designs and the rest of Chinese origin. (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for additional details).

It is unknown if China plans to begin production of new antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II, such as scatterable mines that have self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms meeting the new technical requirements of the Protocol. China should no longer be producing its most common mine, the Type 72, to be compliant with Amended Protocol II, unless it adds enough metallic content to meet the new standards (eight grams of metallic content).²¹² Also under the terms of the protocol, China can no longer export the mine, and will have to stop using it after 2007, unless metal is added.

Transfer

In the past China was one of the world's largest exporters of AP mines. The Type 72 may be the most frequently encountered mine in the world. On 22 April 1996, the Chinese government announced a moratorium on the export of mines not in conformity with the Amended Protocol II, and stated it would exercise the utmost restraint and strict control on the export of all AP mines.²¹³ Indeed, Chinese officials have said that China has not exported any antipersonnel mines since 1995,²¹⁴ and there is no concrete evidence to the contrary. Still, Chinese officials have stressed that China's moratorium applies only to non-detectable mines and remotely-delivered mines not in accordance with Protocol II.²¹⁵

China has supported discussions on a mine transfer ban in the Conference on Disarmament.²¹⁶

Stockpiling

China is believed to have the largest antipersonnel landmine stockpile in the world. While the Chinese government will not provide any information on stockpiles, several experts contacted by Landmine Monitor have concluded that a plausible estimate of the Chinese AP mine stockpile is some 110 million, including perhaps 100 million Type 72 alone.²¹⁷ In response to this figure in the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, a Chinese official stated that it was "exaggerated."²¹⁸

Under Amended Protocol II, China will be prohibited from using the non-detectable Type 72 in its present form after 2007. The Chinese government will have to either destroy them or add eight grams of metal to them so that they will be protocol compliant. A U.S. official told an ICBL delegation in December 1999 that China would be converting its non-detectable mines by adding metal.²¹⁹ China's report required under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, submitted in October 1999, states that "the competent departments of China began to work out programs...so as to transform and dispose of all the APLs that are not in conformity with the Protocol."²²⁰ China's Article 13 report also reveals for the first time, "In recent years, China has destroyed over 1.7 million old-type APLs of GLD110, GLD120, GLD130 and GLD150, etc...(sic)." ²²¹

Use

China has used antipersonnel landmines along its borders with Russia, India, and especially Vietnam, planting an estimated 10 million mines along those borders over the years.²²²

Landmine Problem

The government states that "China is not a country seriously affected by mines" and that the Sino-Vietnamese border "is the only area affected by mines over the years."²²³ Moreover, after major clearance operations from 1992-1999, China maintains that now, "The mine threat on the Chinese side along the Sino-Vietnamese border has been basically removed."²²⁴

Before the clearance operations, landmines posed a threat to civilians in the border areas with Vietnam, where there existed over 560 minefields with a total area of over 300 square kilometers.²²⁵

There are also mines laid along China's borders India and Russia, but the danger to civilians is reportedly relatively minimal due to the sparsely populated, mountainous terrain.²²⁶

Mine Action Funding/Training

China began support for international humanitarian mine clearance efforts in 1998. In November 1998, China donated $100,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, earmarked for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also in 1998, China contributed to the Trust Fund some equipment for mine detection and clearance, earmarked for mine clearance operations by 2001 in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Namibia.²²⁷

China is sponsoring two international mine clearance training courses in China. The first training course was held in Nanjing from 11-30 October 1999, with trainees from Cambodia, Namibia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second course will be held from 16 May to 4 June 2000, with trainees from Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda. During the courses, Chinese army experts provide technical training, using mine clearance equipment to be donated by China.²²⁸

The course was to be co-sponsored by the UN Mine Action Service, but UN officials asked to be disassociated from the training. UN sources have told Landmine Monitor that the training was inconsistent with UN mine action policy and the UN International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations. They noted that the course provided training in military post-conflict landmine recovery operations, as a component of mine warfare operations, and concluded that this type of operation should not be compared to and was not relevant to humanitarian demining operations, though appropriate and extremely effective for China's needs.²²⁹

Mine Clearance

Mine clearance in China has been systematically conducted by the People's Liberation Army as a military activity. According to the Ministry of National Defense, China completed its clearance of the Sino-Vietnamese border in September 1999. Operations were carried out in two phases: from January 1992-July 1994 to clear important trade ports and passes, and from July 1997-September 1999 to clear all remaining minefields except those in disputed sections.²³⁰

The mine clearance was carried out by more than two thousand officers and soldiers. They cleared 1.88 million landmines, 32,000 UXO, and destroyed more than 700 tons of discarded ammunition and explosive devices. More than twenty types of mines from different countries were found. A total area of some 300 square kilometers was cleared, and more than 290 border trade passes and ports were reopened. About 60,000 hectares of farmland, pasture, and mountain forests were restored.²³¹

For some minefields, totaling some 20-30 square kilometers, China decided to mark and "seal" the areas instead of clearing. It said that these minefields were located near water sources or in primeval forests, and these steps were taken in order to protect the natural resources and prevent civilian injuries.²³²

The Army has said that three deminers were killed and more than twenty injured and disabled during these mine clearance operations.²³³

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In response to a Landmine Monitor request for information on victim assistance, China stated: "China attached importance to assistance to mine victims and has made tremendous efforts in this area. However, we have been engaged only in actual assistance work so far instead of making them known to other countries. We are yet to conduct a comprehensive compiling of the statistics in this regard. The departments concerned in the Chinese government are trying to gather relevant information. Once available, the information will be publicized in due time."²³⁴

A document dated 20 December 1999 from the Disabled Association of Guangxi Fang Cheng Gang City in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region provides information on mine victims:

Fang Cheng Gang City, situated in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of our country, is a local city in the border area adjoining Vietnam in land and ocean. Its population is 750,000, among which about 40,000 are disabled persons, representing 5% of the entire population of the city.... Especially in 1978, before and after the self-defense and counterattack battle occurred in the Chinese-Vietnamese border, many civilians of our city stepped on mines and became disabled. Most of the victims are farmers in the countryside suffering from poverty. In addition, due to the dull development of the local economy, it is extremely difficult for the local government to help them obtain prosthesis. Therefore, most of the victims still do not have any means to get prosthesis and live difficult lives.²³⁵

The document gives information regarding 149 mine-injured disabled persons, 42 in Fang Cheng District, 15 in Shangsi county, 77 in Gang Kous district, and 15 in Dog Xing city, including information such as name, address, gender, age, nationality, educational background, year of injury, occupation, cause of disability, type of injury and prosthesis. It appears 80% were male, more than three-quarters listed "farmer" as occupation, and nearly half the accidents occurred from 1978-1985. Of the 149, only thirteen had a prosthesis, of which five were broken.

Disability Laws and Policy

The "law of the People's Republic of China on the protection of disabled persons" was promulgated on December 28, 1990. This legislation protects the rights of equality and participation of people with disabilities. It clearly stipulates government responsibilities and legal guidelines for rehabilitation, education, and employment. ²³⁶

The China Disabled Persons' Federation is a government-approved organization which represents the interests of people with various categories of disability. It protects their rights and provides services for them from a national level to a township level (through its local branches.²³⁷

The Regulations on the Education of Persons with Disabilities were approved for implementation in 1994. The Regulations define the responsibilities of the government, institutions, society, schools, and families in education of disabled persons.

In 1993, the State Council Coordination Committee on Disability was established. It is headed by a state leader and composed of leaders of 34 government agencies, institutions and representatives of disabled persons organizations. The coordination committees on disability were also established at local levels. The major responsibilities of the coordination committee are: coordinating the formulation and implementation of the guidelines, policies, laws and regulations, programs and plans on disability; solving problems related to the work of disabled persons and organizing the UN activities in China concerning disability issues.²³⁸

Health System and Social Welfare

The health expenditure per capita was estimated to be US$ 20 (PPP) in 1997.²³⁹ In December 1997, there were 315,033 health establishments, including 67,911 hospitals.²⁴⁰ In the years 1994-98, there were 290 hospital beds per 100,000 inhabitants ²⁴¹ There were 157 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants in 1994.²⁴²

Beside the state, large enterprises also provided social services for their employees. However a program of comprehensive social security reforms was being devised, in recognition of the increasing level of expenditure required to provide for an aging population and the rising rate of unemployment. A medical insurance system was to cover all urban employees by the year 2000. Western and traditional medical care, for which a fee is charged, is available in the cities and, to a lesser extent, in rural areas.

There is no special care for disabled persons in the Chinese medical system and they do not receive pensions. Disabled ex-servicemen are guaranteed preferential treatment and pension by law, depending on their degree of disability.²⁴³

In 1993 there was a total of 7,154 community based rehabilitation services, including day-care centers for children with disabilities. In addition, the State has set up in Beijing the China Rehabilitation Research Center which combines medical treatment with research and training, and rehabilitation departments in hospitals.²⁴⁴

Tibet

Tibet can claim the dubious distinction of being home to the world's highest minefields. The landmine problem dates from China's military intervention in 1959, and from the attacks on India by China launched from Tibet in 1962. Mines remain near the lines established by China during its military push into the present areas of India in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.²⁴⁵ These are extremely remote, almost uninhabited, high mountain regions; some are on permanent glaciers. Maintenance by China of minefields bordering Arunachel Pradesh has been reported, but no new mine laying.²⁴⁶

Casualties among the local Indian population in Arunachal Pradesh have been reported to the Landmine Monitor, but none among Tibetan refugees.²⁴⁷ Possibilities for immediate and continuing medical care for victims are unknown. Most of this border is extremely rugged mountains with few roads. Landmines in these remote border areas have been reported to claim the lives of Tibetan gazelle, Tibetan wild ass, blue sheep, alpine musk deer and the snow leopard.²⁴⁸

INDIA

Key developments since March 1999: India ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 2 September 1999, exercising the nine-year deferral period. India is making its stockpile of M14 antipersonnel mines detectable. India states it has cleared 8,000 mines planted by intruders during the 1999 conflict in the Kargil area of Kashmir. Officials report 835 civilian casualties to mines and IEDs in the state of Jammu and Kashmir alone in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

India has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While expressing support for the eventual elimination of antipersonnel mines, India has been critical of the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty itself.

While India voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines, it has been among the small number of states to abstain on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999. India did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 and has not participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts process, even though a large number of non-signatories have done so.

India's position on a ban has changed little in recent years. Ambassador Savitri Kunadi articulated the Indian government's approach to AP mine elimination in December 1999:

India remains committed to the objective of a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines through a phased process that addresses the legitimate defence requirements of States, while at the same time ameliorating the humanitarian crises that have resulted from an irresponsible transfer and indiscriminate use of landmines.... The process of complete elimination of APLs will be facilitated by the availability of appropriate non-lethal alternative technologies.... We had proposed and remain prepared for a complete prohibition of the use of landmines...in non-international armed conflicts, i.e. internal conflicts.... In fact, we believe that use of anti-personnel landmines should only be permitted for the long-term defense of borders, perimeters and peripheries of States.... We...favor an outright ban on transfers rather than attempts to restrict transfers.... [W]e could in fact start by addressing a ban on transfers in the Conference on Disarmament.... India has always observed a unilateral moratorium on export of landmines. India calls upon all States to do so.²⁴⁹

Ambassador Kunadi also stated, "We believe that increased transparency and regular exchange of information would be useful in enhancing confidence."²⁵⁰ But India has refused to provide even basic details to Landmine Monitor on its production or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines.

India ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 2 September 1999. In doing so, it decided to exercise the option to defer implementation of key provisions of the protocol for nine years. India views Protocol II as the best international instrument to address the global mine problem.

Production

India has produced two types of antipersonnel landmines, both copies of U.S. mines: the M16A1 bounding fragmentation mine, and the APNM M14 pressure initiated blast mine. The M14 has less metallic content than required by Amended Protocol II. Thus, to be in compliance with the protocol, India must cease production of this mine, and continued use is conditional upon making it detectable. In its report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, India said that "production agencies have been instructed to cease production of landmines incompatible with the Amended Protocol II."²⁵¹

It appears India will be producing new mines that meet Protocol II standards. The Article 13 report states, "India is taking the necessary steps to render existing stocks as well as new designs [emphasis added] fully compliant with the relevant provisions of Amended Protocol II.... Further, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has designed devices equipped with self-destruction and self-deactivation features. Devices that have fulfilled the required design parameters are undergoing user trials."²⁵²

Various armed groups in India have manufactured improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Transfer

According to the government, "India has never exported landmines and has formally announced [a] moratorium, of unlimited duration, prohibiting the export of landmines." ²⁵³ The comprehensive moratorium was announced on 3 May 1996. India has called for a global ban on transfers, and suggested the Conference on Disarmament as the best forum.²⁵⁴ There is no evidence of Indian exports of AP mines. Information is not available on any Indian import of mines.

Insurgent groups have obtained mines mostly through the global clandestine arms trade. However, it appears the militants in Kashmir have obtained and used mines manufactured by the Pakistan Ordnance Factory. During interviews with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, a Landmine Monitor researcher was shown, and took photographs of, recovered mines, both antipersonnel and antitank, that had the seal of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory on them.²⁵⁵

Stockpiling

India's antipersonnel mine stockpile may number as many as four to five million, according to some non-Indian governmental sources, although confirmed details are not available.⁰ The great majority of mines in the stockpile are believed to be the Indian APNM M14 mines. India's Article 13 report states that India will make the M14 mines detectable and therefore compliant with Amended Protocol II: "This includes a simple and cost-effective technique to render mines detectable by strapping a 8mg metal strip on M14 mines in accordance with the provisions of the Amended Protocol. The Director General of Quality Assurance in the Ministry of Defence has been tasked with ensuring the detectability of existing stocks. The entire stock of antipersonnel landmines would be rendered detectable within the stipulated time period."¹ India will have nine years to complete the process.

Use

India has charged that "during the intrusions in India's Kargil areas [in June-July 1999] large scale and indiscriminate laying of anti-personnel landmines, including both metallic and plastic APLs and special snow type devices, was resorted to by the retreating intruders."² The Indian government indicated that a total of 8,804 mines had been recovered, and that fifty-two Army personnel were injured due to landmines (See Pakistan report for additional details).³

There were some allegations of use of mines by Indian forces, but these were denied by India and no evidence has been found.⁴ One news story that focused on use of mines by "Pakistani-backed intruders" ended with the following: "But India uses landmines, too. `We also use anti-infiltration mines,' said an Indian army official, who asked not to be identified."⁵

India has called for a complete prohibition of the use of landmines except in international armed conflicts, and has also said that use of antipersonnel landmines should only be permitted for the long-term defense of borders. In December 1999 Ambassador Kunadi said, "For its part, India has never used and remains committed not to use landmines in armed conflicts not of an international character, " and that "the restraint characterizing the use of landmines by Indian forces has been widely acknowledged."⁶

India states, "There is no peacetime deployment of landmines by the armed forces."⁷ According to the Army, no mines are laid for border protection or to prevent armed infiltration, such as in Jammu and Kashmir. The minefields are to be laid only when hostilities are imminent, and are to be used only by the Army. The police and paramilitary forces are not authorized to hold mines.⁸

Armed groups in India have used a wide variety and type of both regular mines as well as improvised explosive devices, and such attacks continue to this day.⁹

The following chart shows the number of mines and IEDs recovered in Kashmir from militant forces by Indian security forces, according to the Jammu & Kashmir Police. It appears to show that the use of antipersonnel mines by militants has been on the decline, while the use of IEDs has been on the rise.

Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices Recovered in Kashmir, 1990-1999

(Source: Jammu & Kashmir Police)

The People's War Group in Central India (Andhra Pradesh state) has also been using mines and IEDs. On 7 March 2000 Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Minister Madhav Reddy was killed in a landmine blast.¹⁰ According to the state government of Andhra Pradesh, from 1987 to 1999 there were 113 landmine and IED incidents, resulting in 63 civilians killed and 65 injured, as well as 178 policemen killed and 224 injured.¹¹

Landmine Problem

The Indian Government states that there is no problem with uncleared mines in India: "India is not a mine afflicted country."¹² Still, there have for years been reports indicating that there are uncleared mines along the India/Pakistan border in Kashmir and along the India/China border. It appears that there are still mines in Kashmir laid in the 1965 and 1971 conflicts, still claiming victims. Retired Lt. Colonel Man Singh of the Indian Army, who fought in both wars, stated that "antipersonnel mines planted in 1965 in Poonch, Nawgoan, Uri, and Kyan Bol in forward areas are still not taken away. When snow melts, due to shifting of the antipersonnel mines, there are still antipersonnel mine casualties."¹³

There also appear to be landmines remaining from the India-China conflict in 1962, including in Ladakh and Arunahal Pradesh. The mines are in extremely remote, almost uninhabited, high mountain regions, but some mine casualties among the local population in Arunachal Pradesh have been reported.¹⁴

Mine Action Funding

While not making financial contributions, India has provided significant assistance internationally in the fields of mine clearance and victim assistance (see below).

Mine Clearance

The Indian armed forces have very extensive mine clearance capabilities. Its large engineering corps would be able to field hundreds of mine clearance teams. Following the fighting in Kargil in the summer of 1999, India reports that the "Corps of Engineers of the Army have taken steps to clear the area of all mines," and that members of the Indian forces suffered injuries during the clearance operations.¹⁵

Beginning with the Congo mission in 1963, India has been extensively involved in the UN mine clearance and rehabilitation programs, in places including Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. Currently they are involved in the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Their services have included "establishing mine clearance and mine survey teams, actual mine clearance tasks, developing of databases on landmines, area fencing duties, sensitizing local populations to the threat of landmines, setting up specialized clinics providing prosthetic aids as well as conducting workshops on prosthetic devices."¹⁶

Mine Awareness

The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines (IIPDEP) believes that there is a need for mine awareness programs in India. As a public education and awareness campaign, it has arranged three National Conferences and eighteen Regional Seminars and Photo Exhibitions in state capitals and major cities.

Landmine Casualties

There are regular press accounts of landmine incidents and casualties in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere due to insurgent activities. The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines has appointed twelve field workers, who are visiting border villages in the Jammu region and collecting information about mine victims.

Following are some statistics provided by Indian government sources on mine casualties in certain regions. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, from 1990-1999 a total of 889 civilians were killed and 7,798 injured by mines and IEDs. From 1994-1999, there were 1,461 mine and IED casualties in Kashmir valley, and 561 in Andhra Pradesh from 1989-1999.

Civilian Casualties due to Mines and IEDs in State of Jammu and Kashmir

(Source: Jammu and Kashmir Police)

Mine & IED Incidents and Casualties in Kashmir Valley¹⁷

(Source: State Government of Jammu and Kashmir)

Mine & IED Incidents and Casualties in Andhra Pradesh

(Source: State Government of Andhra Pradesh)

Survivor Assistance

The government reports, "The Army's Artificial Limb Centre at Pune plays an important role in the rehabilitation of victims of landmines in the broader framework of policies for the reintegration of such victims, which includes assistance for self-employment.... Indian medical agencies have developed prosthetics for mine victims. The most commonly used device is an artificial limb popularly known as the `Jaipur foot.' India's assistance to mine victims under international programmes has also included assisting mine victims with the Jaipur foot. New advances in this field are being constantly examined, including development of artificial limbs using new materials derived from polypropylene technologies. The Indian corporate sector has also assisted in this process."¹⁹

The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that in its field work, it appeared that landmine victims were given proper medical treatment and that every victim encountered was fitted with a prosthetic by the government or the military.

KIRIBATI

Kiribati has not yet acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Kiribati is now a member of the United Nations having been formally accepted on 14 September 1999, but it was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

A representative of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted that Kiribati is "sympathetic to the Ottawa Treaty and its objectives" and "possesses no anti-personnel mines." Kiribati "wishes to evaluate the requirements that membership would have on scarce personnel resources and the effect of any financial obligations before acceding."²⁰

At two recent regional meetings of parliamentarians in Fiji, members of parliament from Kiribati promised to work for Kiribati's accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.²¹ In October 2000, Kiribati will host the next meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

It is believed that Kiribati has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines, nor has it contributed to any humanitarian mine action programs.

Kiribati was the scene of heavy fighting in the Pacific during World War II and considerable quantities of military wreckage and unexploded ordnance affect Tarawa and other islands. Landmines are not believed to be among the unexploded ordnance. Much of Tarawa's unexploded ordnance has been removed to make way for a new port development.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Although the North Korean government has been largely silent on the landmine issue, it is clear that the government has no intention of acceding to the treaty at this time, believing that antipersonnel mines are needed for their national defense. The DPRK was one of just ten nations to abstain on the 1996 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It has been absent for the votes on the UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999 in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. The DPRK did not participate in any of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, or the treaty negotiations.

In one of the few public statements on the ban, Mr. Kim Sam Jong told the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 1998 that his government fully supported the "humanitarian purposes and the nature of that Convention," but could not accede to it "for security reasons" under the present circumstances on the Korean peninsula. He also said that if antipersonnel landmines are to be banned in Korea a "durable peace and stability should be ensured by replacing the present armistice system with a new peace mechanism."²²

North Korea has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine Protocol. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has said that it does not take any position on the negotiations of a ban on mine transfers in the CD.²³

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The DPRK produces a Model 15 antipersonnel mine (a copy of the Soviet POMZ-2 fragmentation stake mine), and perhaps a copy of the Soviet wooden PMD-6. It appears that North Korea's mine production is neither extensive nor sophisticated.²⁴

The DPRK is not known to have exported AP mines to other countries; its mines have not been found in other countries.²⁵ It is assumed that North Korea has imported antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Eastern European countries in the past. No current information is available on the size or composition of North Korea's stockpile.

A DPRK representative has said that "we use landmines in the area along the military demarcation line, solely for defensive purposes."²⁶ While it is not certain how many antipersonnel mines have been planted in the northern sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), separating the North from the South, American analysts estimate the number "to be in the hundreds of thousands."²⁷

Landmine Problem and Casualties

A North Korean official has said that, apart from the border area with South Korea, there are no minefields in the DPRK, either left over from the Korean War or otherwise, and that there are no mine problems on the borders with China or Russia.²⁸ Although difficult to confirm, that appears to be a reasonable claim, based on testimony of refugees.²⁹

Occasional injuries - to both soldiers and civilians -- due to mines in or near the DMZ are likely, just as they are happening in the South. The DPRK has claimed that "there are no instances of civilian casualties caused by those mines" in the area.³⁰ In a rare landmine incident, a U.S. military patrol somehow crossed into the northern sector of the DMZ on 7 December 1979, and stepped on North Korean mines, killing one and wounding four soldiers.³¹

Mine Action

There is no information about any mine clearance, mine awareness, or victim assistance programs in the North. The DPRK has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for mine clearance. However, DPRK has shown some interest in mine clearance by sending a representative to the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance meeting, held in Geneva, 27-29 March 2000.³²

A request for information for Landmine Monitor was submitted through the DPRK Mission to the UN in New York in November 1999. There had been no response as of June 2000.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Key developments since March 1999: In April 1999 the ROK began a multi-year program to remove mines from around some military bases. The ROK reports that it has made all of its non-self-destructing mines detectable. The ROK produced 1,363 new antipersonnel mines in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While acknowledging the humanitarian consequences of antipersonnel mines, the ROK is one of the governments that has been most vocal in insisting on the legitimacy and military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel landmines. South Korea was one of just ten governments to abstain on UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. ROK has also been among the few to abstain on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998 and 1999.

The South Korean government told Landmine Monitor in March 2000 that it "could consider joining the Ottawa Convention if the security situation on the Korean Peninsula improved substantially, or if suitable alternatives to antipersonnel landmines became available.... The ROK government agrees, in principle and from the humanitarian point of view, with the movement to ban completely the use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). However, the ROK cannot fully subscribe to the total ban on APLs.... [I]n a country under a constant threat of war like Korea, the landmine issue is not a matter of humanitarianism, but that of survival. Therefore, we cannot regard APLs issue the same way as other countries do."³³ Asked if it would join the treaty if North Korea did so, the ROK replied, "We will consider this issue positively."³⁴ South Korea has sent representatives to many of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program Standing Committee of Experts meetings.

South Korea did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. It has attended the treaty's intersessional meetings on mine clearance, technologies, victim assistance, and stockpile destruction.

While not yet a party to the CCW and amended Protocol II, South Korea has expressed its intent to accede in 2000.³⁵ The government states that it "is preparing national legislation necessary for the implementation of the Protocol," and that it "has made necessary steps to meet the requirements concerning the use of mines set out in the Protocol, including making dumb mines detectable."³⁶ The ROK participated in the first Annual Conference for Protocol II States Parties in December 1999.³⁷ South Korea is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, and has expressed a willingness to join efforts to negotiate an AP mine transfer ban in the CD.³⁸

Production

South Korea has produced at least two antipersonnel mines, which are copies or variations of the U.S. M18A1 Claymore mine. The Korean designations are KM18A1 and K440. Both are directional fragmentation mines, the K440 slightly larger. They are usually used in a command detonated mode, but can also be used with tripwires.³⁹ According to the ROK Ministry of National Defense, a total of 10,721 KM18A1s were produced from 1995-1997 and 1,363 in 1999, but "during the last three or four years, the K440 was not produced."⁴⁰

According to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 1999-2000, South Korea also produces a licensed copy of the U.S. M16A2 bounding antipersonnel mine. The source lists the mine as "in production" and the manufacturer is listed as the Korea Explosives Company Ltd.

Transfer

There is no evidence that the ROK government exported antipersonnel mines in the past. On 28 September 1995, the government announced a formal one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, which was extended in 1996. In 1997, the government decided to extend the moratorium for an indefinite period.⁴¹

The ROK government states that it did not import any AP mines in 1999.⁴² It imported 40,324 AP mines from the United States from 1969 to 1992, including 31,572 ADAM mines which are fired from artillery, 1,035 non-detectable M14 mines, and more than 7,000 Claymore mines.⁴³

Stockpiling

The number and types of antipersonnel landmines in the South Korean stockpile are military secrets. However, in a meeting with the ICBL in February 1998, Vice Minister of Defense Lee Jung-Rin said that South Korea has twice the amount of landmines in stock that it has already deployed in the ground.⁴⁴ This would imply that South Korea probably holds at least two million antipersonnel mines in stock. The ROK states that it has already made its dumb (non-self-destructing) mines detectable, as required under Amended Protocol II.⁴⁵

In addition, the U.S. is stockpiling in South Korea approximately 1.2 million M14 and M16 dumb mines and some 50,000 Gator, Volcano, and MOPMS "smart" (self-destructing) mines, all to be used in any future resumption of war in Korea.⁴⁶

Use

Landmines were used extensively by all combatant armies during the Korean War, and the U.S. and ROK have laid large numbers of mines since then. A Defense Ministry report to the National Assembly in September 1999 reportedly said that over 1.12 million mines were laid across the country: 1.05 million antipersonnel and antitank mines "around the civilian control line and the demilitarized zone," and another 75,000 antipersonnel mines in "rear areas."⁴⁷ When asked by Landmine Monitor, "How many landmines are buried in the ground in your country," the South Korean government responded that "an estimated one million mines are buried in the DMZ."⁴⁸ This figure of one million mines planted in the DMZ by U.S. and ROK forces has been cited by others over the years. However, a report by a retired U.S. general states that in addition to the DMZ, "about one million dumb AP mines already are emplaced in the six-mile-deep military control zone immediately south of the two-and-a-half-mile band of the DMZ."⁴⁹

The ROK and U.S. military have also planted significant numbers of antipersonnel mines around important military facilities in the South, some of which have created problems in recent years (see below).⁵⁰

If there is war on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. is planning to lay more than one million additional "dumb" mines in South Korea -- not in the existing DMZ, but throughout the twenty mile area between the DMZ and Seoul. In addition, numerous self-destructing mines would be scattered by aircraft and artillery.⁵¹

Landmine Problem

As noted in a U.S. State Department report, "The Republic of Korea still has a problem with landmines from World War II and from the Korean Conflict." The report says that uncleared mines are located "along the inter-Korean border and in areas in which Korean War battles occurred."⁵² According to the ROK government, there were forty-seven mine accidents from 1992-1999.⁵³

The 151-mile Demilitarized Zone may be the most heavily mined area in the world. One South Korean legislator, a former army general, Mr. Im Bok-Jin warned that the DMZ will likely remain a "belt of death" even after Korea is reunified because of the huge number of difficult-to-detect buried mines. He also stated that the mines were not adequately mapped.⁵⁴

In recent years, South Koreans have experienced problems due to flooding or landslides from heavy rains that wash landmines out of minefields or storage sites into areas frequented by civilians. In April 1999, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly said that only fifty-nine out of 321 landmines washed away by rainstorms in 1998 had been recovered.⁵⁵ According to Rep. Seo Chung-Won, since the 1980s a total of 1,430 mines have been washed away from fifteen military bases and only ten percent have been recovered.⁵⁶ In August 1999, military authorities warned visitors to the North Han River region to be on the lookout for mines spread around by recent rains and flooding; at least three M-14 antipersonnel mines were retrieved in a civilian area in Yonchon.⁵⁷

Two other legislators of the National Assembly revealed in 1999 another aspect of the landmine problem in South Korea. According to Rep. Kim Sang-Hyun and Rep. Ahn Dong-Sung, only 570 of the 3,400 landmines buried to protect five Army bases were removed when the units were relocated. The locations are Uijongbu, Kachang, Kwangchun, Ahuhung, and Hadong.⁵⁸

The Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) has identified the following landmine problem areas: Cholwon-kun, Eunhyun-myon, Koyang-city, Paengnyong-do, Paju-city, Pyongtaek-city, Sangnam-city, Tongduchun-city, Uijungbu-city, Yanggu-kun, and Yonchun-kun.⁵⁹

Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness, Mine Action Funding

In April 1999, the ROK Air Force started removing thousands of landmines laid in and around four of the Air Force's air defense sites in the outskirts of Seoul. Officials indicated the clearance was being undertaken for fear that mines might be washed away in heavy monsoon rains and endanger civilians. This was reported to be the first phase of a clearance effort lasting several years that will remove landmines from ten air defense sites -- seven in the Seoul area and one each in Pusan, Kangwon and North Cholla province.⁶⁰

In September 1999, the Defense Ministry said it will clear mines every year through 2003 in the five rear areas of Mount Sumo (south Kyongsang province), Mount Homyong (Kyonggi province), Kachang (Taegu), and Kwangchong and Anhung (both in south Chungchong province).⁶¹

The South Korean government has participated in the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings on mine clearance and victim assistance.⁶²

There are no government-sponsored mine awareness programs. Since its formation in 1997, the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines has produced a brochure and a picture book, and has conducted workshops and a media campaign to increase the general public's understanding of the issue.⁶³

The ROK government has contributed $430,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, including $55,000 in 1999 for mine action programs in Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.⁶⁴

Landmine Casualties

The Korean War probably resulted in many thousands of landmine casualties (soldiers and civilians), but the South Korean government states that data is not available for the period of 1950-1991.⁶⁵ Though rarely discussed, there continue to be new mine casualties. According to the official records of the South Korean government, there were ninety-one mine victims between 1992 and 1999, including thirty-four civilians.⁶⁶ The government says that there was one incident in 1999, when a civilian was maimed by an AP mine in Chungyang-kun, Choongchungnam-do.⁶⁷ The government states that there are only sixty-two landmine victims alive in South Korea.⁶⁸

The actual victim figure is likely higher since the official number apparently includes only those who lodged claims with the South Korean government. As a result of lawsuits, the government had to make compensations totaling $213,000 to five landmine victims from 1992 to 1997.⁶⁹ The Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines has talked to many mine survivors who did not make legal claims because they were reluctant to create trouble with military authorities. Recognizing the shortage of reliable data, the KCBL estimates that, dating back to the end of the war, there have been more than 1,000 civilian mine victims, and 2,000-3,000 military mine victims in South Korea.⁷⁰

Survivor Assistance

The government states that it "makes reparations to the surviving victims of landmines through the State Compensation Act. The victims are categorized into seven scales according to the severity of their wound. The Act stipulates various kinds of preferential policy treatment for the victims, such as tax cuts, employment advantages for their children and assistance in purchasing homes. For soldiers wounded while on duty, medical services are provided by the Veteran's Hospital."⁷¹ The Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines indicates that as of October 1999, the national health insurance system covers victims' expenses in fitting artificial legs.

The KCBL states that it contributed $20,000 for survivor assistance in 1999, including artificial legs and the medical expenses of an eight-year-old girl. According to KCBL, Church Women United of Korea will give 100,000 won ($90) per month to nineteen victims from April to October 2000.⁷²

LAOS

Key developments since March 1999: A total of 622 hectares of land were cleared in 1999, with an additional 255 hectares January-March 2000. Almost 90,000 UXO and mines were destroyed in 1999, with about 25,000 more January-March 2000. There were 102 new UXO/mine victims in 1999, and 68 in the first five months of 2000. Almost 180,000 people received UXO/mine awareness education in 1999.

Mine Ban Policy

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos) has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Laos did not participate in the Ottawa Process. Laos has been absent from every vote on pro-ban resolutions in the UN General Assembly since 1996, including the December 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Laos is not known to have made any public statements regarding a mine ban in 1999 or 2000. Laos did, however, attend the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance meetings in September 1999 and March 2000 in Geneva. Laos acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 3 January 1983, but has not ratified the Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Laos is not thought to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Laos is believed to maintain a stockpile of mines, but no details are available. There are no allegations of recent use of antipersonnel mines by Laotian armed forces.

Landmine/UXO Problem

The primary threat to civilians in Laos is unexploded ordnance (UXO), not antipersonnel mines, though both are present. To the civilian population, there is little or no difference between the two. The massive problem with unexploded ordnance is the result of extensive U.S. bombing during the Indochina War, especially during the period from 1964 to 1973. Bomblets (or "bombies as they are known to the Lao people) from U.S. cluster bomb units became de facto antipersonnel mines when they did not explode on impact as designed. It is often said that there are millions of unexploded bombies, and in 1996 the UN estimated that 500,000 tons of UXO were still present in Laos.⁷³ However, UXO Lao, the national coordinating body, has expressed concern that the real number of UXO in Laos remains unknown and that the very rough hypotheses put forth cannot be substantiated.⁷⁴

Handicap International (HI), which in 1997 released the results of an extensive national survey of villages, found that over 3,800 villages, with a population of 1.3 million people, had been affected by UXO and mines. HI stated, "More than 1,000 villages reported the presence of landmines in the past with 214 villages currently reporting landmine contamination."⁷⁵ For extensive additional details from the HI study, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999. The UXO problem continues to be so serious in Laos that it remains a daunting obstacle to development by adding hazards, time and expenses to virtually any new economic activity.⁷⁶

UXO Lao notes that in Laos casualty rates are not the predominant issue, nor the best way to assess the problem: "The Lao government, UNDP and the NGOs working in the programme increasingly understand that land denial and barrier to development are more pressing.... The effects UXO has on food production, infrastructure development, water and sanitation, school and hospital extensions, etc. are profound."⁷⁷

Mine/UXO Coordination

In February 1996 the government established a national office, simply called UXO Lao, with the following tasks: (1) create a national capacity for UXO activities; (2) implement a national UXO strategy and demining projects; and (3) coordinate UXO clearance, awareness and survey projects throughout the country.⁷⁸ With a staff of more than 1,000 people, UXO Lao is one of the country's largest employers.⁷⁹ The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is the executing agency responsible for the implementation of the Lao national UXO program.

UXO and mine clearance has been carried out with both technical and financial assistance from international agencies that are implementing partners (IPs) in the development of the UXO Lao program. UXO Lao has assigned particular provinces to these IPs who work alongside the Lao staff in the field and local offices. In every province with clearance activities, UXO Lao has a Provincial HQ that employs all the field staff, and is managed by Lao staff, with the IP's assistance.

Mine/UXO Clearance

See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for a description of mine/UXO clearance programs from 1996 to early 1999.

UXO Lao reports that in 1999, 89,093 UXO and mines were removed from the ground and destroyed. A total of 622 hectares of land were cleared. More than 951,000 people benefited from the clearance operations.⁸⁰ UXO Lao also reports that from January-March 2000, a total of 255 hectares of land were cleared, benefiting 51,140 persons. A total of 25,163 mines and UXO were destroyed.⁸¹

Those IPs conducting mine/UXO clearance activities in Laos in 1999 and 2000 include:

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a UK based NGO, has been working in Xieng Khouang province since 1994 and in Saravane province since 1997. MAG's operations were initially encouraged, supported, and facilitated by the Mennonite Central Committee. MAG has trained and employed well over 200 Lao nationals, men and women, to address the massive problem of UXO contamination. Following a phased approach, MAG is now in the process of handing over employment responsibility for the staff to UXO LAO. At the end of 1999, MAG's staff in Saravane were transferred to the national body. In May 2000, staff working in Xieng Khouang were transferred. Other assets will be transferred through December 2000. In the one-year period between September 98 and August 99, over 19,000 items of UXO were found, unearthed and destroyed in Saravane. In Xieng Khouang, MAG destroyed over 21,000 items through the period November 1998 to October 1999.⁸²

MAG continues to provide management training for national staff, and is concentrating this year on further technical training, quality assurance and support. MAG now directly employs 28 national staff, in addition to the supervisory role it currently carries out with regard to the UXO LAO technical staff that have recently been transferred. In coordination with UXO LAO - with funds provided by the Danish Government - MAG is to continue clearance & awareness in six of Xieng Khouang's seven districts during 2000.⁸³

Handicap International, an NGO based in France, is providing technical assistance to UXO Lao clearance operations in Savannakhet Province, particularly in the four most affected districts on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Its main objective is to provide capacity building for the establishment, coordination and management of a provincial UXO clearance program. During 1999, five technical advisors provided training to ninety Lao deminers and supervised the clearance operations. The teams cleared a total of 128 hectares, including schools and agricultural land. Mobile roving teams visited 292 villages to destroy a total of 12,000 UXOs, among them 6,000 bombies.⁸⁴ The European Union funds HI.⁸⁵

Norwegian People's Aid, an NGO, has been operating in Sekong province since late 1997 and in Attapeu since 1998 providing on-the-job training to the UXO Lao staff. Its aim is to further develop the capacity of the provincial Lao staff so they can manage and implement all facets of the program. NPA has supported UXO Lao with a financial management position since 1998 and is currently focusing on developing a mid-management training program for national EOD staff. It receives financial assistance from the Norwegian government.⁸⁶

World Vision Australia, an NGO, started operating in Khammouane province in 1999 with the support of the Australian Aid agency (AusAID) providing technical advice and capacity-building to manage the programs at provincial levels.

Gerbera, a German commercial company (supported by the German government through a bilateral agreement with Laos) has been working in the provinces of Houaphan since 1996 and Luang Phrabang since 1998 providing clearance and awareness.

The government of Belgium has provided in-kind contributions of qualified Explosive Ordnance Demolition military staff to support UXO Lao's provincial staff in Champassak province since 1998.⁸⁷

In addition to UXO Lao and its implementing partners, the following agencies also conduct UXO/mine related activities:

Milsearch, a commercial company, is undertaking surveys and clearance for private companies in eight provinces. Interests are in oil exploration, mining, hydraulic construction sites, village relocation and road and bridge building.⁸⁸

The exploration company Hunt Oil has also carried out surveys in four provinces with assistance from the British firm CGG-Exploration Logistics.⁸⁹

Lao Armed Forces also undertake clearance operations.⁹⁰

(See Table below of Expected Clearance Projects and Donor Mechanisms for 2000-2002).

Some foreign UXO clearance personnel in Laos have complained that the United States has been reluctant to share its "render safe procedures."⁹¹ However, UXO Lao reports, "All requested safe procedures have been provided by the U.S. government during 2000 and distributed to the field staff and NGO technical advisors."⁹²

Training Lao Nationals

UXO Lao trains Lao staff at a training center in Ban Ylai. Until January 1999, the center was in Nam Souang. Financial and technical assistance has been provided by the United Nations, U.S. military personnel, other governments and NGOs.⁹³ All candidates for training are selected from the provinces and districts that they will return to work in. Criteria for selection includes basic education but also the knowledge of a local minority language. Around 1,000 Lao nationals have graduated from the center with skills in UXO clearance, community awareness, paramedical techniques and team leadership.⁹⁴

Mine/UXO Awareness

UXO Lao has a Community Awareness (CA) section to provide UXO risk awareness education. UXO Lao reports that in 1999 a total of 178,846 persons were provided UXO awareness information, from a total of 746 villages.⁹⁵ Between 1996 and 1998, 953 villages were visited and more than 233,000 people educated. UXO Lao also reports that from January-March 2000, UXO awareness was provided to a total of 41,650 people.⁹⁶ UXO Lao currently has 18 CA teams operating with a total of 108 staff.⁹⁷

Besides clearance, MAG is also carrying out UXO awareness programs through a community awareness team travelling from village to village conducting workshops, demonstrations and puppet shows to help inhabitants develop safer UXO skills. Gerbera is also carrying out awareness as well as clearance programs. A U.S. NGO, Consortium, has developed and piloted a draft UXO in-school curriculum and teacher training package in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, USAID and UNICEF. In addition, Consortium has also used child-to-child approaches in creative arts workshops and children performed puppet shows. UNICEF is implementing a mass media campaign targeting the nine most affected provinces using national radio and television, in addition to traditional media. The Mennonite Central Committee is also involved in UXO awareness activities include.

UXO Lao's Action Plan for Year 2000

UXO Lao has set a summary of targets for 2000, in addition to those of routine programs and capacity building tasks:

· Community awareness teams to visit 759 villages, briefing more than 190,000 people.

· Land clearance teams to clear 1,005 hectares of high priority agricultural and development land.

· Roving clearance teams to carry out 857 village visits, destroying more than 100,000 UXO.

· Training and equipping an additional 158 deminers, 17 medics, 20 surveyors and additional provincial support staff.

· Expansion by four new district-structured organizations. (Achieved).

· Complete the transfer of all national field staff from implementing partner to UXO Lao contracts. (Achieved).

· Put into place mechanisms ready to take over the responsibility for running costs, equipment, and support functions from the implementing partners MAG and Gerbera.

· Introduce advanced EOD courses at the national training center (delayed from 1999).

· Conduct a study into "Reimbursable" demining.⁹⁸

Mine Action Funding

In 1995 the Lao government established a Trust Fund to finance a nationwide program of UXO/mine clearance and awareness. UXO Lao reports that the following governments have contributed either to the Trust Fund or bilaterally:⁹⁹ Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States, as well as the European Union. The UN Development Program, UNICEF, and UNV have also contributed to the program.¹⁰⁰

The United States has been the largest donor. From 1994-1999, the U.S. provided $13.95 million in assistance for UXO/mine clearance, (28% of total contributions). The total in 1999 was $3.3 million, including funds provided by the Defense Department, State Department, and Agency for International Development. U.S. funds are also used in victim assistance programs in Laos.¹⁰¹ UXO Lao has stated that while the U.S. government has been one of the most consistent donors to UXO Lao, "There are some Lao sensitivities about accepting some U.S. aid. There have been some components of U.S. assistance that the Lao government has chosen not to accept."¹⁰²

In 2000, UXO Lao has budgeted $12.2 million for UXO clearance and awareness activities for the national program (nine provinces, Training Centre and National Office) -- $6.3 million Trust Fund and Bilateral; $5.9 million Implementing Partner.¹⁰³

UXO Lao provides the following table of projects and expected funds for 2000-2002:¹⁰⁴

Mine/UXO Casualties

For 1999, UXO Lao reported 63 UXO/mine accidents resulting in 102 victims (26 deaths and 76 injuries). Among the victims, 60 were children and 84 were male.¹⁰⁵ For the first five months of 2000, there were 39 reported accidents causing 68 victims (26 deaths and 42 injuries). The victims included 25 children and 56 males.¹⁰⁶ It should be noted that it is not possible to know with certainty the exact number of casualties, as many villages do not report them.

Handicap International's survey concluded that from 1973-1996, there were 1,171 people who suffered landmine accidents, and another 9,473 who suffered UXO accidents (a total of 10,644 victims).¹⁰⁷ A report released in early 2000 had similar findings, stating that since 1973 UXO have killed or maimed 11,928 Lao people.¹⁰⁸

The HI report also noted that one-third of all recorded UXO accidents occurred in the first four years following the war (1973-1976), with an average of three accidents per day. In the following ten years (1977 to 1986), the annual casualty rate declined to an average of one accident per day. From 1987 to 1996, the annual casualty rate remained constant, averaging about 240 accidents per year.¹⁰⁹

Survivor Assistance

Prostheses, orthoses, wheelchairs, and other assistive devices are provided by the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) which is a partnership between the Ministry of Public Health, POWER, the International Limb Project, World Vision, the Cambodian School for Prosthetics and Orthotics and the Association (CSPO) for Aid and Relief (AAR). COPE grew out of the work of POWER, which established in Laos in 1995, conducted a complete survey of amputees and other disabled, and of facilities available to serve them. In early 1996 it drew together the other partners in COPE which started operation at the beginning of 1998. The work of COPE is governed by a National Plan of Action, prepared by all of the partners. The plan has recently been extensively revised (NPA-FR) given the achievement of most of the early objectives.

As a result of the COPE Program, five orthoprosthetic centers have been, or are being, completely renovated and upgraded (Vientiane, Luang Phrabang, Phonsavane, Savannakhet and Pakse) and new equipment has been installed throughout. Existing staff have undergone training and twelve students have been sent for training to CSPO. In addition, significant awareness-raising work has been undertaken throughout the country. Whilst refurbishment and training has been in progress, production has been lowered, and only about 400 prosthetic devices were fitted in 1999.

The NPA-FR contains a wide-ranging program for all mobility disabled in the Lao PDR, including UXO victims. The program includes upgrade training for orthopædic surgeons, training for physiotherapists and occupational therapists, vocational training for disabled people, quality control mechanisms for each center, a sports development element, and strengthening of the Lao Disabled People's Association. ¹¹⁰ The Lao Disabled Peoples Association is an adjunct of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. It's constitution has yet to be approved by the Ministry, but it is active and has recruited 300 members in Vientiane Municipality, Vientiane Province, and Bolikhamxay Province. The National Committee for Disabled Persons (NCDP) was established in 1995.

There is no standard follow-up for amputees receiving prostheses from the six centers functioning in Laos.¹¹¹ On the other hand, the COPE program serves a wide range of areas, provides upper-limb prostheses and has regular, six-monthly follow-up evaluations.

HI is training eleven local physiotherapists in Vientiane Hospital.¹¹² The Ministry of Health does not officially recognize physiotherapy, nor do individual doctors or the population at large. Such recognition would be a big step for NGOs wishing to help victims as it would enable them to approach more easily victims and the whole of the population affected by mines.¹¹³

The World Rehabilitation Fund works to establish an integrated approach to physical and psycological rehabilitation, and to provide alternative livlihoods for for mine victims. Civilian victims of mines and UXO do not receive socio-economic assistance from the government, although military victims receive some assistance. The COPE program refunds all travel and accommodation costs for all persons attending any of its five centers, and all devices are provided free of any charge.

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

While the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) would appear to have made no progress towards accession to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, parliamentarians have at least agreed to find out the government's current position.¹¹⁴ In addition, a New Zealand government official commented to Landmine Monitor that the "FSM supports the Ottawa Convention in principle and would like to sign. The FSM regards its special compact with the U.S. as requiring it to act in concert with the U.S. on the issue."¹¹⁵

The Federation was one of 20 countries that abstained from voting on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. The FSM also abstained on earlier resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. One possible reason could be that the Federation is linked through its Compact of Free Association with the U.S., which gives full authority and responsibility to the U.S. government for the Federation's security and defense matters.

The Federation did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo nor did it attend any intersessional meetings of the treaty.

In Landmine Monitor Report 1999, a representative of the Federation indicated that "The FSM does not use, produce or stockpile anti-personnel mines. The FSM National Police has informed me that it is unaware of the existence of landmines in the FSM."¹¹⁶ The FSM is not thought to have contributed to any humanitarian mine action programs.

MONGOLIA

Key developments since March 1999: Officials have acknowledged that Mongolia maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Officials have also stated that no antipersonnel mines have been deployed by Mongolian forces.

Background

Mongolia is a landlocked country located between Russia and China, traditionally aligned with and dependent on the former Soviet Union. The USSR withdrew it troops stationed in Mongolia, as well as its technical and financial assistance, between 1989 and 1992. Since then, the foreign and defense policy of Mongolia has profoundly changed: "Maintaining friendly relations with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China shall be a priority of Mongolia's foreign policy activity. It shall not adopt the line of either country but shall maintain in principle a balanced relationship with both of them and shall promote all-round good neighborly co-operation."¹¹⁷

Mine Ban Policy

Mongolia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In his statement to the UN General Assembly on 5 November 1999, Prime Minister Rinchnnyamyn Amarjargal stated that the government of Mongolia "fully shares the aspirations to ban anti-personnel landmines and welcomes the entry into force of the Ottawa Convention."¹¹⁸ The Ministry of External Relations has said that Mongolia "remains committed to the ultimate goal of banning anti-personnel landmines as a most injurious and indiscriminate type of weapons. However, due to national security considerations Mongolia, at this stage, is not in a position to sign the Landmine Ban Convention and accede to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW [Convention on Conventional Weapons]. The length of Mongolia's border (8,158 km), the size of its population (2.3 million) and the financial constraints it is now facing made it choose a phased approach towards the landmine ban."¹¹⁹

In a letter to Landmine Monitor researchers dated 21 April 2000, Minister of External Relations Ms. Nyamosor Tuya said, "Mongolia stands for the prohibition of anti-personnel mines - a most indiscriminate and inhumane type of weapon - and supports the international community's efforts and initiatives being undertaken in this respect.... At this stage Mongolia, however, has adopted a phased approach towards the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines. As we have a vast territory, long borders and scarce population, joining the 1997 Ottawa Convention on banning anti-personnel landmines at present without obtaining other means of protection, would directly affect our national security interests. Nevertheless, being supportive of the noble objective of banning landmines, we are seeking ways and means to accede as early as possible to the above convention."¹²⁰

Mongolia was one of just eighteen countries that abstained in the vote on the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, but voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1998 and December 1999.¹²¹

Mongolia did not send a representative as an observer to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. Mongolia has not participated in any of the ban treaty Intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings in Geneva, though many non-signatories have done so.

In meetings with Landmine Monitor researchers, representatives of the Ministry of External Relations stated that they had reviewed the Mongolia country report in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, and believed that the commitment of Mongolia to an eventual total ban on landmines was not sufficiently emphasized.¹²²

Mongolia is a state party to the original Protocol II on landmines of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW); however, it has not yet ratified the 1996 Amended Protocol II. Mongolia participated as an observer in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999. The Mongolian representative at that conference told the ICBL that Mongolia was actively looking at ratification of the amended protocol.¹²³ However, an official in the Ministry of External Relations subsequently said that no major change regarding accession to Amended Protocol II should be expected, at least in the very short term.¹²⁴

Mongolia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but its position on negotiating a ban on antipersonnel mine transfers in that forum is not known.

Production and Transfer

Officials from both government and military institutions state that Mongolia has never produced or exported landmines.¹²⁵ One Mongolian diplomat has said that Mongolia imported most of its antipersonnel mines in the 1960s and 1970s from the USSR; he asserted that Mongolia has not imported any antipersonnel mines in at least ten years.¹²⁶

Stockpiling

The Landmine Monitor Report 1999 stated that it was unknown if Mongolia had a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.¹²⁷ Mongolian military and diplomatic officials have now confirmed the existence of an antipersonnel mine stockpile, though the government has not revealed the number or types of mines.¹²⁸ Indeed, there seem to be contradictory indications regarding the size and purpose of the AP mine stockpile. Several officials have said that Mongolia possesses antipersonnel mines only for training purposes.¹²⁹ This would appear to be at odds with the Mongolian position as expressed in various official statements stressing the need for antipersonnel mines for national security considerations and border defense.¹³⁰

The retention of mines for training only would imply a very small stockpile, while an operational stockpile for protection of borders would imply a very large stockpile for Mongolia. Possession of stockpiles of mines for training has sometimes been incorrectly understood by Mongolian officials as an impediment to the accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹³¹

It is also known that Soviet troops stockpiled landmines at their Army bases on Mongolian territory.¹³²

Use

Mongolian officials maintain that Mongolian armed forces have not used antipersonnel mines in the past. They state that all mines have been and are kept in stockpiles, and that none have been deployed on the border areas.¹³³ One official noted that with more than 80% of the land used for pasture by nomads, Mongolia has considered the risk of casualties too great.¹³⁴

Landmine/UXO Problem

Both civil and military institutions insist that there is not a landmine problem in the country. The Ministry of Defense said that it has no data on damage or casualties caused by landmines.¹³⁵ Independent officials, including NGO and UN agency representatives, were unable to recall any reports that would have indicated an antipersonnel mine-related problem.¹³⁶

There have been some reports of problems arising from alleged Japanese use of mines in Mongolia during World War II, and alleged Soviet use in the early 1970s to deter Chinese invasion, but these have not been confirmed.¹³⁷

Officials acknowledge that there is a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) left in and around former Soviet military bases.¹³⁸ A 1996 study and documentary prepared by the Ministries of Defense and Environment concluded that there are no confirmed minefields in Mongolia, including along its borders, but there are unexploded ordnance and landmines at abandoned Soviet bases.¹³⁹ The documentary, intended to assess damage caused to the environment in areas around former Soviet Army bases, clearly shows the presence of unexploded ordnance and other debris lying everywhere on the sites. It also shows rows of landmines that were abandoned, especially TM 57 antitank mines.¹⁴⁰

Landmine/UXO Survey, Clearance, Awareness, Casualties

A Mongolian defense official told Landmine Monitor that in the early 1990s a Soviet team carried out a mission to ensure that all former Soviet military sites had been adequately cleared.¹⁴¹ He also said that in the winter of 1998 NATO representatives visited some sites and concluded that there was not a landmine problem in Mongolia.¹⁴² However, the U.S. Embassy told Landmine Monitor that it was unaware of any such NATO mission.¹⁴³

In May 1999 a team of experts from the United States traveled to Mongolia to conclude an agreement to undertake a survey of areas suspected to be contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance left by Soviets troops. The team left Mongolia, however, just days after arriving, apparently as the result of a misunderstanding between Mongolian civil and military authorities. It appears that the U.S. team arrived without a specific mandate to conclude an agreement on clearing unexploded devices in the absence of an acknowledged landmine problem. Thus, no agreement was concluded and no survey was carried out. There is no documentation filed in the U.S. Embassy on the results of this mission nor is a particular follow-up envisaged.¹⁴⁴

There are no ongoing efforts to clear the areas affected by UXO. There are no programs, governmental or non-governmental, to enhance awareness of the UXO problem.

Unexploded ordnance has caused injuries, including three civilians in 1998.¹⁴⁵ There is no procedure for reporting casualties caused by UXO. An official stated that casualties are not systematically reported and registered by the engineering department of the Ministry of Defense.¹⁴⁶

NAURU

Nauru has not yet signed the Mine Ban Treaty but there appears strong intention to do so. In a letter to Landmine Monitor, the Assistant Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs wrote that Nauru is currently in the process of acceding to the treaty with the intention of ratification in the "near future."¹⁴⁷

Nauru is now a member of the United Nations, having been formally accepted on 14 September 1999, but it was absent from the vote on UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the ban treaty in December 1999. Nauru did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo nor did it attend any intersessional meetings of the treaty.

It is believed that Nauru has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used AP mines and it does not contribute to humanitarian mine action assistance programs.

NEPAL

Key developments since March 1999: There has been a significant increase in the use of homemade mines by Maoist rebels, and some reports of their use of factory-made mines. The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that people in ten districts consider themselves mine-affected. It remains unclear if the government maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty, though the government appears to support a ban. The Foreign Ministry is currently conducting a study on the desirability and implications of joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Nepal has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including the resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Nepal participated in all the Ottawa Process meetings, the negotiations, and the treaty signing ceremony, though only as an observer. Nepal was one of twelve observer states at the First Meeting of States Parties to the ban treaty in Mozambique in May 1999. Nepal participated in the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Victim Assistance meeting in September 1999 and the SCE on Stockpile Destruction in December 1999, both in Geneva. Nepal also sent representatives to the International Committee of the Red Cross' South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.

It would appear that Nepal's failure to join the treaty thus far is related to regional political concerns. A foreign ministry official has said, "Regarding the signing of the convention...Nepal is observing the developments of our SAARC region in this regard."¹⁴⁸ Nepal may also be reluctant to join due to increased hostilities by the Maoist insurgency.

In January 2000, Nepal's Prime Minister (who also serves as Defense Minister) told Landmine Monitor that he believed the use of antipersonnel mines "should be prohibited. Nepal is steadfast on it." He also said, "I have directed the Foreign Ministry to accelerate the study regarding the signing of the treaty."¹⁴⁹

The Home Minister has said, "There should be a complete ban on landmines," but added, "Deep study should be made prior to signing the ban treaty and ratifying it."¹⁵⁰

Nepal has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Use

In the past year Maoist rebels have significantly increased their violent activity, and there have been increasingly numerous reports of use of homemade mines, also known as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).¹⁵¹ For example, a January 2000 press account stated that "mines planted by the Maoist insurgents killed six police personnel," and noted that "an inspection team of Royal Nepalese Army visiting the districts has guessed that those mines were planted during the rainy season."¹⁵²

According to some media reports and to Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) interviews with local communities, the Maoists are also now using factory-made mines. The NCBL notes that 31 of 56 people interviewed (including one Army Lieutenant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, one Police Inspector, and five police personnel) said that mines planted in Rolpa and Salyan districts were factory-made.¹⁵³

There have also been some reports, including from one parliamentarian, of use of mines by Nepalese police for protection around police posts, but these reports could not be confirmed.¹⁵⁴

One news report indicated possible use by the Royal Nepalese Army: "Six people, five of them minors, were killed while two others were injured in Dhading when a mine possibly left behind by the Royal Army went off."¹⁵⁵

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Nepal has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is unclear if Nepal has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. In the past, the government has said that it does not possess antipersonnel mines. But, in 1998 a parliamentarian "asked the government to remove the mines stockpiled at the Swoyambhu area."¹⁵⁶ More recently, a Canadian official in Nepal said that the Royal Nepalese Army has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.¹⁵⁷ An Army officer told Landmine Monitor that when the police confiscate factory-made mines from the rebels, they hand the mines over to the army.¹⁵⁸ A former parliamentarian also said that the police turn mines over to the army, because the police don't know how to deactivate them.¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, Nepal sent a representative to the ban treaty Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meeting in December 1999. The government has not responded to requests for clarification of the issue.

Landmine Problem, Casualties, Survivor Assistance

Increased use of homemade mines by the Maoist insurgency has led to increased risk to civilians. The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines believes that the country should now be considered mine-affected. The NCBL reports that residents in ten districts have described themselves as mine-affected. The NCBL has a list of 172 potentially affected villages in those ten districts.¹⁶⁰

Both police personnel and civilians have been injured and killed by rebel mines and IEDs in the past year. There are no official government statistics on such casualties. A hospital official told Landmine Monitor that information about police or army casualties could not be provided without government permission.¹⁶¹

Nepalese soldiers have fallen victim to landmines while participating in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, and peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavian territories.¹⁶² Other Nepalese soldiers have apparently been maimed and killed by landmines while serving in foreign armies, such as India and UK.¹⁶³

Generally, civilians injured by mines or IEDs are treated in Bheri Zonal Hospital, Bir Hospital and Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital. Police personnel are treated in Birendra Police Hospital. When a civilian is injured, the police inform the Chief District Officer, who relays the message to the Home Ministry, and the Home Ministry in turn informs the Health Ministry. The wounded get treatment at the hospitals only at the recommendation of the Health Ministry. Sometimes part of the cost of treatment is borne by Home Ministry and Health Ministry.¹⁶⁴

PAKISTAN

Key developments since March 1999:

Pakistan-backed militants, and allegedly Pakistan Army troops, made extensive use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict in the Kargil area of Kashmir in mid-1999. It appears the militants in Kashmir obtained and used antipersonnel mines manufactured by the state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). POF also offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a journalist posing as a representative of a private company in Sudan.

Pakistan ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 March 1999, exercising the nine-year deferral period. Landmine Monitor now estimates Pakistan's stockpile of AP mines to be at least 6 million, much larger than previously reported. Pakistan has begun the process of making all of its AP mines detectable. Pakistan is producing new mines in compliance with Amended Protocol II. The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted a survey in the Bajaur area, identifying 405 mine victims. The PCBL believes there may be thousands of mine victims in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Mine Ban Policy

Pakistan has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Pakistan has been one of the stronger defenders internationally of the continued possession and use of antipersonnel landmines, indicating that it recognizes the humanitarian concerns, but believes that security concerns are paramount. Still, Pakistan has expressed its support for "the objective of the complete elimination of APLs [antipersonnel landmines] everywhere."¹⁶⁵ The government has said, "While Pakistan remains fully committed to the cause of eventual elimination of APLs, defence requirements do not allow it to join the Ottawa Treaty at present."¹⁶⁶ A ban is not possible "till such time as an alternative becomes available to meet its security requirements, which like all other sovereign states, Pakistan alone will determine."¹⁶⁷

The Pakistan Armed Forces believes that antipersonnel mines are needed both for potential future conflict with India and for the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan was one of only ten nations to abstain on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 (10 December 1996) urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolutions in 1997, 1998, and 1999.

Pakistan did not attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique. It has participated in one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on mine clearance, held in Geneva in March 2000. Pakistan also sent representatives to the International Committee of the Red Cross' South Asia Regional Seminar on Landmines, held in Sri Lanka 18-20 August 1999.

Pakistan favors a consensus-driven approach and considers Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the desirable processes.

Pakistan ratified Amended Protocol II of the CCW on 9 March 1999. In ratifying, it indicated it would exercise the option to defer implementation of key provisions for a nine-year period. At the First Annual Conference of states parties to the amended protocol, held in Geneva in December 1999, Pakistan said the protocol's "membership represents a global partnership of those who have been able to assume obligations to completely prohibit anti-personnel landmines and others who seek to balance their military and security compulsions with critical humanitarian considerations."¹⁶⁸ It also said that the protocol represented "an evolving process which if fully supported, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, will indeed facilitate the objective of a universally accepted ban on APLs."¹⁶⁹

At the same meeting, Pakistan called on nations to "[e]xplore in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva further measures which would advance the goal of the ultimate prohibition of APLs. Pakistan was the first country to propose the appointment of a Special Co-ordinator for this purpose. We can continue to support negotiations in the CD for a universal instrument banning transfers."¹⁷⁰

Production

Pakistan is a producer of antipersonnel mines. State-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), founded in 1951, has produced six types of AP mines. (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for details).

Pakistan has said that it imposed a moratorium on production during the time Amended Protocol II was under negotiation, "so that production goals could be harmonized with an new provisions emerging from the negotiation. Since then limited production has occurred only in response to a real and finite demand from the armed forces."¹⁷¹ Pakistan also noted that it "had to eliminate an entire indigenous programme of self-neutralising mines" because such mines were permissible under the old protocol but not the new.¹⁷²

In its first annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, Pakistan states that it has taken "[c]omprehensive measures at the production level to make detectable APLs in future," that "[m]arking features have been incorporated in future productions of APLs," and that "[s]pecifications for RDMs [remotely delivered mines] have since been implemented."¹⁷³

In December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that all AP mines produced since 1 January 1997 were detectable. He also said new production was required because of the deteriorating condition of many mines in the stockpile. He indicated that new production would include both hand-laid mines (with sufficient metal content for Protocol II) and remotely-delivered mines with self-destruct and self-deactivation features.¹⁷⁴

Transfer

Pakistan made significant exports of antipersonnel mines in the past, with Pakistani mines being found in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Sri Lanka and other locations.

Pakistan announced on 13 March 1997 that it would observe a comprehensive moratorium of unlimited duration on the export of antipersonnel landmines. Subsequently, Pakistan strengthened this with a regulation: "As part of its export control policy, the Government has issued an SRO (Statutory Regulatory Order) on 25 February 1999, totally banning the export of land mines."¹⁷⁵ Pakistan claims that it has not exported any antipersonnel mines since 1991.¹⁷⁶

In early November 1999, Azeem Zaki, an attaché at Pakistan's High Commission in London offered antipersonnel mines for sale to a British television journalist posing as a representative of a private company operating in Sudan.¹⁷⁷ The offer was filmed and aired on the UK Channel Four Dispatches program on 9 December 1999. The state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories also offered the mines for sale in a faxed quotation dated 11 November 1999. It lists prices of $2,450 for 100 P-7 MK2 bounding antipersonnel mines and $9,300 for 150 P5A3 Claymore-type mines.¹⁷⁸

As described in one press account:

"The [Dispatches] programme makers secretly filmed the Pakistani diplomat agreeing to sell landmines to the reporter, posing as a British arms dealer, during a meeting at an hotel in Knightsbridge, Central London.... Representing a fictitious company, Charles Stevens Associates, the Dispatches reporter was told that, despite the ban on exporting anti-personnel landmines, Pakistan Ordnance Factories, a state-owned business, was still producing them `for their own need' and arrangements could be made to export them. At one point, it is alleged that Mr. Zaki was ready to arrange the export of anti-personnel landmines to Sudan.... To back up the conversations at the hotel, Pakistan Ordnance Factories sent a list of weapons that could be made available, including a P7 mark 2 anti-personnel mine, described as a `jumping/bounding type' that created a `better fragmentation effect'."¹⁷⁹

The ICBL stated, "Such a sale would appear to violate the Landmine Protocol, Pakistan's domestic law banning mine transfers, and the UK's domestic law prohibiting sale, or even the offer of a sale, of mines in the UK."¹⁸⁰ The government of Canada expressed its concerns noting that if true, this would be "in direct violation of their [Pakistan's] obligations under the Amended Protocol II to the CCW.... Canada would welcome clarification of these issues from Pakistani authorities."¹⁸¹

In reaction, Pakistani officials stated, "Under existing procedures it is not possible to effect any international transfer without the express authority of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs."¹⁸² While noting that an investigation was underway, a diplomat insisted that no sale was offered, just discussed, and that the munitions in question were command-detonated devices, not antipersonnel mines, thus eligible to be exported.¹⁸³ Another Pakistani diplomat told the ICBL that "quite a few heads will roll" as a result of the incident, not only Zaki but also POF personnel. He said that the attaché was a low-level functionary and stressed that the sale would never have been successfully completed. He also said that while the jumping mine could be command-detonated, that feature could easily be changed, so that the mine was a "dangerous thing to be exported" and would be removed from the export list. He stated that the mine had not been exported in the past.¹⁸⁴

It also appears the militants in Kashmir have obtained and used mines manufactured by the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. During interviews with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, a Landmine Monitor researcher was shown and took photographs of recovered mines, both antipersonnel and antitank, that had the seal of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory on them.¹⁸⁵ This too would appear to be a violation of Article 8 of Amended Protocol II, which prohibits transfers to any recipient other than a state or state agency authorized to receive such transfers.

There are some allegations that antipersonnel mines, including PMN and PMN-2 mines, are shipped illegally by arms dealers from Afghanistan into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and possibly to Kashmir militants as well.¹⁸⁶

Stockpiling

In response to the requirement in Amended Protocol II, Pakistan said it "accepted to convert our entire stock of APLs to detectable mines. This process is well underway."¹⁸⁷ Non-detectable mines in Pakistani stocks include the P2 Mk2 and P4 Mk1 mines. Pakistan has said the conversion will be completed within the nine-year deferral period (up to the year 2007).

In Landmine Monitor Report 1999, lacking any official information, it was guessed that there are hundreds of thousands of landmines stockpiled in Pakistan.¹⁸⁸ However, in a meeting with ICBL representatives in December 1999, a Pakistani diplomat stated that Pakistan had since 1997 already converted 2.5 million antipersonnel mines to detectable status. He further indicated that at one point in time this represented about one-third of the total Pakistani stockpile, but now constituted more than one-third. He noted that the stockpile number is secret, but is also fluid and could increase in the future. These comments lead to a Landmine Monitor estimate of at least six million antipersonnel mines in Pakistan's stockpile.¹⁸⁹

Various irregular armed groups, non-state actors, and tribesmen have traditionally possessed a wide variety of arms and explosives in the country. Many such groups are likely to have independent stocks of mines and high quality modern explosives capable of being made into Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).¹⁹⁰

Use

The Pakistani Army used landmines during its three wars with India in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan has also laid antipersonnel mines in front of its defended localities in Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁹¹ It has plans to lay mines on the border with India in times of war.¹⁹²

Armed insurgent groups (often called militants) supported by Pakistan, and possibly regular Pakistan Army personnel, used antipersonnel mines in the conflict from May-July 1999 in the Kargil region of Kashmir.¹⁹³ India has charged that "during the intrusions in India's Kargil areas large scale and indiscriminate laying of anti-personnel landmines, including both metallic and plastic APLs and special snow type devices, was resorted to by the retreating intruders."¹⁹⁴ Two types of plastic mines were used: P2Mk2 in areas not covered by snow and P4Mk2 in areas covered by snow. A total of 8,804 mines had been recovered as of August 1999.¹⁹⁵

India has said that the forces were mainly regular Pakistani army troops, backed by rebels, but Pakistan has insisted that it is only providing moral and diplomatic support to the militants.¹⁹⁶

Asked by Landmine Monitor to confirm or deny allegations of use by Pakistani troops in 1999 in Kashmir, the government in a letter did not reply specifically to the allegation, but instead responded that "Pakistan's record with respect to the regulated use of landmines is second to none." It also noted that it fully abides by the provisions of Amended Protocol II.¹⁹⁷

Since the end of the mid-1999 conflict, there continue to be frequent reports of use of landmines by Pakistan-supported militants in Kashmir. The Indian government claimed to have seized 200 mines from militants in Kashmir in the first four months of 2000.¹⁹⁸

Tribesmen continue to use landmines and IEDs, mostly in personal and inter-tribal disputes, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Kurram Agency, and District Dir.

Landmine Problem

According to its 1999 Annual Report to the CCW, "there is no problem of uncleared mines in the areas under the jurisdiction of the government of Pakistan. However, in certain areas adjoining Afghanistan, there have been instances of the presence of uncleared mines which were deployed during the period of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its spill over to our borders."¹⁹⁹

While the government reports no problem with uncleared landmines, Pakistan is mine-affected in the tribal belt. No assessment or detailed survey has been made of the extent of the problem of landmines. However, the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL) has carried out a study in the Mamoond Tehsil (sub-district) of the Bajaur Agency, believed to be one of the most mine-affected areas in the country.²⁰⁰ The PCBL reports the presence of mines in agricultural lands, roads, pathways, near schools and other places posing threats to the communities. Of the 405 mine incidents recorded by PCBL, nearly half (196) took place in agricultural fields.

Mine Action Funding

Pakistan's contribution to mine action has been in-kind services; it has played a very active role in UN and peacekeeping mine clearance operations internationally. In 1989, through `Operation Salam', demining training camps for Afghans were established at Risalpur and Quetta in Pakistan under UN auspices. From 1989-1995 a total of 17,055 mine clearance personnel were trained at these camps. Part of Operation Salam's agenda was also to impart mine awareness to Afghan refugees to identify mines and undertake due precautions.²⁰¹

Pakistani soldiers were also part of the UN demining operations in Cambodia in 1992-93, in Kuwait in 1991, in Angola from 1995-1998, in eastern Slovenia and Western Sahara.²⁰²

In December 1999, Pakistan stated, "We will continue to offer in-kind contributions to global demining efforts,"²⁰³ but it is not known if any operations are currently underway.

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

While actively involved internationally, the Army is not carrying out mine clearance or training operations in Pakistan. Pakistan's Protocol II Article 13 report details the methods of clearance and the types of detectors employed by the Pakistani Army.²⁰⁴

According to the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, some of the local people have purchased mine detectors to try to protect themselves from mines. Local "clearance" methods often mean throwing stones or firing bullets at mines.

There are no mine awareness programs in place. The PCBL found tampering with mines, especially by children, to be common. The PCBL is developing a mine awareness and risk avoidance education program in the Bajaur Agency.

Landmine Casualties

The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines' survey in the Bajaur area identified 405 landmine victims. Of that total 261 (64%) were the breadwinners of their families, 144 (36 %) were females, and 109 (27%) were age eighteen or younger. A staggering 41% of the victims died from their injuries, largely due to lack of or inadequate first aid and medical facilities. Most of the incidents (260 or 64%) occurred from 1995-1998, with 33 recorded in 1999 and 14 thus far in 2000. The most common activity when mine incidents occurred was working in a field (26%); the second most common was walking to work (25%).

PCBL believes that there may be thousands of landmine victims in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Since the landmine-affected areas are far away from the major cities of Pakistan, even first aid facilities are not available for landmine victims, let alone advanced facilities. Generally victims are rushed to hospitals in the big cities. There are no psychological, social and rehabilitation facilities provided by the government or any national or international organization. Prosthetic and assistance device facilities are available in Pakistan but it is beyond the ability of most victims to afford them.

The PCBL study in the Bajaur area noted inadequate and inefficient medical infrastructure, lack of first aid facilities, complete absence of emergency medical care, lack of emergency evacuation capability, severe transportation constraints, and the inability of victims to pay for treatment or medicines. There is no government or NGO program for longer-term rehabilitation in the area.

PALAU

Legislation to accede to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty has been introduced in Palau's House of Representatives. At a recent regional meeting of parliamentarians in Fiji, a member of parliament from Palau promised to work in support of Palau's accession to the treaty and also indicated she would raise the landmines issue at a meeting in Palau of Pacific legislators in July 2000.²⁰⁵

Palau was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the ban treaty in December 1999 as it was on all previous landmines resolutions. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, and has not participated in any intersessional meetings. One possible reason for this abstention and for the lack of accession could be the close economic, political and military dependence between the Marshall Islands and non-signatory, the United States, as defined by the Compact of Free Association.

It is believed that Palau has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel landmines. It is not believed to provide any assistance to humanitarian mine action.

While the islands of Palau were the scene of fighting in the latter stages of World War II, Palau is not believed to be mine-affected.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Papua New Guinea (PNG) has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty despite some indications of support. The Director of the Multilateral, Legal and Treaties Branch in the Department of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that, "Papua New Guinea supports the aim of this treaty, thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs is already in the process of formalising documents for Papua New Guinea accession to the signing and ratification of this treaty."²⁰⁶

After listening to a presentation by ICBL Ambassador Tun Channereth and Sok Eng of the Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines at a regional meeting of parliamentarians, Papua New Guinea's Chief Justice, Sir Richard Amet, said that he would advocate in support of the ban on AP mines in his country, and that he would write to the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister to get their support.²⁰⁷

Papua New Guinea sent a representative to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. It voted for UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in the past. It is believed that Papua New Guinea does not use, produce, transfer or stockpile AP mines. A small number of command-detonated Claymore mines purchased from Australia twenty-one years ago are believed to be used for training only.

Papua New Guinea is not known to have contributed to humanitarian mine action programs. It has a slight problem with UXO dating from World War II. While it is possible that the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) may have manufactured and used improvised explosive devices during the armed insurgency of the past decade, the island of Bougainville is not believed to be mine or UXO-affected.

SINGAPORE

Key developments since March 1999: Singapore was one of 12 non-signatories to attend the First Meeting of States Parties, and one of 17 non-signatories to vote in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

Singapore has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Permanent Secretary for the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor in May 2000, "There has been no change to Singapore's position on the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).... Singapore will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines."²⁰⁸ Singapore described its ban position in November 1999 at the UN:

"Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right of self-defence of any state cannot be disregarded. Therefore, a blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might be counter-productive since some countries need to use anti-personnel landmines for their defence and security."²⁰⁹

Singapore was one of 12 non-signatories that participated as observers in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, but its representative from the Ministry of Defense did not make a statement. Singapore has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Singapore was one of 17 non-signatories that voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the treaty in December 1999. It also voted in favor of similar pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Apart from a Radio Singapore International program in April 1999 and an article in the March 2000 magazine BIG-O entitled "Where Singapore Stands on Landmines," there has been little coverage of the landmine issue domestically.²¹⁰ The magazine article repeated major sections of the Singapore country report of Landmine Monitor Report 1999 without comment. A proposal to hold a public workshop on landmines in Singapore in 1999 did not proceed as the academic institutions and NGOs approached were unwilling to host such a forum.

Singapore is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Singapore was identified last year by Landmine Monitor as one of 16 countries in the world still producing antipersonnel mines. In May 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "Chartered Industries of Singapore (now reorganised as part of ST Kinetic) is the only company in Singapore that produces APLs, for our own defense purposes only."²¹¹ The Ministry also noted that Singapore is not pursuing alternatives to landmines.

The government will not reveal the types or quantities of mines being produced by Chartered Industries of Singapore. The military trade press notes that Singapore has produced copies of several Italian antipersonnel mines.²¹²

In May 1996, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines without self-neutralizing or self-destructing mechanisms. The moratorium was extended for an "indefinite" period and expanded to cover all antipersonnel mines in February 1998.²¹³

Information regarding the size or content of Singapore's stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not available. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, "For security reasons, we can not discuss the details concerning the stockpiling or destruction of landmines."²¹⁴

There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by Singapore's Armed Forces.²¹⁵

Mine Action

It appears that proposals for contributing to international humanitarian mine action programs have not been implemented and are still under consideration.²¹⁶ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states it is "not aware of any Singapore government organisation that has contributed to humanitarian mine action programmes," but it is "considering the most useful way in which a small country like ours can make an effective contribution to such efforts."²¹⁷ Singapore Army Engineers have not been employed in humanitarian demining activities outside Singapore.²¹⁸ According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "We are looking into R&D on sensor technology to improve the reliability and efficiency of mine detection."²¹⁹

The Singapore Volunteers Overseas Program is investigating the possibility of sending a number of volunteers to Cambodia for one year to work with landmine survivors.²²⁰

SRI LANKA

Key developments since March 1999: Both sides are using antipersonnel mines in the escalated fighting. The UN Mine Action Project began in July 1999 and was expanded in early 2000, but had to be suspended in April 2000 due to the conflict. A total of 214,541 square meters of land had been cleared. It appears there were at least several hundred civilian mine casualties in 1999.

Background

The Sri Lankan government has been engaged in an armed conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since 1983. The LTTE and the government have used antipersonnel landmines extensively over the years, and the northern and eastern provinces are heavily contaminated with landmines. In April 2000, the fighting escalated greatly as the LTTE made significant inroads into areas that were under governmental control. At the time of this writing, heavy fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces continues in the Jaffna peninsula.

Mine Ban Policy

Sri Lanka has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, citing security considerations due to the ongoing conflict with the LTTE. Sri Lanka was one of twelve non-signatories that participated as an observer in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. Its official statement said, "Sri Lanka is not yet a signatory to the Ottawa Convention on antipersonnel mines. However, Sri Lanka shares the views of the other member countries on this issue.... If not for the current security situation...Sri Lanka would have been among the first group of member countries who have ratified the convention.... Sri Lanka, in principle, welcomes a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines on humanitarian grounds. However, such a ban should encompass the use of antipersonnel mines both by the security forces as well as by the terrorist groups." Sri Lanka also called on other nations to help "to bring LTTE atrocities to an end so that Sri Lanka will be able to participate in future meetings on the convention not as an observer but as an active signatory."²²¹

On 1 March 2000, the Deputy Foreign Minister told Parliament that Sri Lanka could not accede to the Mine Ban Treaty because of: (1) the indiscriminate and unfettered use of mines by the LTTE; (2) the need to deploy antipersonnel landmines for defensive purposes; and (3) the need to find alternatives before giving up the use of antipersonnel landmines.²²²

Sri Lanka has voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolutions supporting a comprehensive ban since 1996, including the pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution in December 1999, indicating it voted in favor because of the humanitarian objectives.²²³

Sri Lanka has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in December 1999. Although a member of the Conference on Disarmament, its position on negotiating a ban on mine transfers at that forum is unclear.

The LTTE has not made any statements regarding a ban on antipersonnel mines. An effort made in 1998 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to obtain a commitment from the LTTE to refrain from using antipersonnel landmines was not successful.²²⁴

Non-governmental organizations--local, national, and international--are engaged in advocating for a ban. The Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines has been urging the Sri Lankan government as well as the LTTE to discontinue the use of antipersonnel landmines, and has also been appealing to the government to become a party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In August 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross organized in Sri Lanka a South Asian Regional Seminar on Landmines to which the governments of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka sent representatives.

The Australian Campaign to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines in Sri Lanka²²⁵ launched a photo exhibition and petition campaign on 3 March 2000 urging a ban on the use of antipersonnel landmines in Sri Lanka.²²⁶

Use

It is clear that both sides are continuing to use antipersonnel mines in the current round of conflict that has escalated greatly since April 2000.²²⁷

The Sri Lanka government's position is that it uses antipersonnel landmines purely as a defensive weapon.²²⁸ The government maintains that "we have taken all possible action to minimize the threat of antipersonnel mines to civilian life. Land mines are not used by the security forces as an offensive weapon. In the context of the current situation the security forces have been compelled to use land mines to defend security establishments."²²⁹

The UN, which has a mine action project in the Jaffna peninsula (presently suspended), has indicated that it has found three main types of antipersonnel mines likely used by the government forces: Chinese Type 72a, Pakistani P4, and Italian VS-50. Evidence of command-detonated Claymore directional fragmentation mines has also surfaced.²³⁰

According to the UN, the Sri Lankan security forces have laid barrier minefields to prevent the LTTE from reoccupying Jaffna; these are large mined areas laid to a specific pattern and usually marked. Security forces have also laid minefields to defend specific points; again laid to a pattern and normally marked.²³¹

The LTTE regard antipersonnel landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as an essential and effective part of their arsenal. The LTTE are considered among the most skilled in the world in the use of improvised explosives. The IEDs have devastating effect; a common one is a buried explosives-laden petrol can with a tripwire.

The most frequently used mine is the "Jony" mine locally produced by the LTTE. The UN reports that LTTE defensive minefields have been laid with a rudimentary pattern and not marked. The LTTE have also laid nuisance minefields to prevent access to facilities, shelter, wells, and food. These mines have been laid in small numbers and have never been marked. All nuisance mines discovered have been laid by the LTTE and it is this type of landmine use that has created the greatest threat to returning displaced people.²³²

The UN Development Program reported in February 1999 that both sides to the conflict agreed not to lay mines in land cleared by the Mine Action project in the Jaffna peninsula.²³³ It is uncertain at best that this has occurred.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Sri Lanka is not known to have produced antipersonnel mines. It is believed that Sri Lankan security forces have imported all of their antipersonnel landmines. As noted above, most mines appear to be of Pakistani, Chinese, and Italian origin or design. The fact that virtually no country today is exporting antipersonnel mines could lead to the commencement of domestic production by Sri Lanka, but there is no evidence that this is happening at present. Sri Lanka will not reveal any details about the number or types of antipersonnel mines it has stockpiled.

In addition to making IEDs, the LTTE produce in significant numbers the Jony mine, a small wooden box with 3-400 grams of TNT or C4 that explodes from pressure. The LTTE also make a Claymore-type mine.²³⁴

Landmine Problem

Antipersonnel landmines are largely confined to the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka, which are seriously affected. The UN Mine Action Project in Jaffna states that there is an extremely high level of contamination both in urban and rural areas of the Jaffna peninsula.²³⁵ The UN Development Program has also said, "The greater proportion of mines in Jaffna are the antipersonnel type and they can be found virtually anywhere from marked minefields, to agricultural land, to houses and gardens.... It is estimated that there are around 50 to 75 square kilometres of suspect or contaminated land."²³⁶ Accurate figures will be available only upon the conclusion of the community (Level 1) survey being conducted by the UN Mine Action Project, which is presently suspended. Affected areas include urban areas, roads, water sources and fertile agricultural land.

Numbers of mines are difficult to calculate due to the continual use of mines in the ongoing conflict. The U.S. State Department estimated in 1998 that about 25,000 landmines were deployed,²³⁷ and the Sri Lankan government cited an estimate of 20,000 to 25,000 in May 1999.²³⁸ But the figure could be higher today due to the escalation of the conflict since the latter part of 1999.

Mine Clearance

The UN Mine Action Project which began in July 1999 in the areas controlled by the Sri Lankan security forces in the Jaffna peninsula was expanded at the beginning of 2000. However, due to the escalation of the conflict in the Jaffna peninsula, this project was suspended and the staff started to leave the area on 28 April 2000.²³⁹

The expanded project consisted of a mine awareness program, Level 1 survey (identifying suspected areas), Level 2 survey (marking areas), emergency clearance of priority areas, explosive ordnance disposal, and compilation of a mine action database. The project was developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Funding was provided by UNDP and the governments of Australia and the Netherlands. The project was expected to cost around $3.5 million over two years.²⁴⁰ Funding up to the time the project was suspended totaled about $1.8 million.²⁴¹

The Level 1 survey was approximately 35-40 percent complete; over 300 individual minefields had been identified.²⁴² Total area identified as suspect at the end of April 2000 was 20,242,485 square meters.²⁴³ Eleven surveyors recruited from the local community were involved in the Level 1 survey. The Level 2 survey and the mine clearing operation were contracted to the Zimbabwean company Minetech. Twenty-six Minetech personnel were involved, including three survey/clearance teams. There were also four mine detection dogs.²⁴⁴

By the end of April 2000, they had cleared 214,541 square meters of land and destroyed over 1,023 antipersonnel landmines.²⁴⁵ A manual deminer could clear up to 200 square meters per day depending on vegetation and soil conditions.²⁴⁶

In addition to mine clearance, unexploded munitions were also destroyed when they were perceived as a danger to the public. A special team had been created to deal with this situation. It was estimated that 5-10% of all fired munitions had failed to explode. The end of 1999 had destroyed at least forty-two UXO items.

At the time of suspension of the Mine Action Project, one deminer had been involved in an accident, which resulted in minor injuries. A medical support team provided emergency medical cover to mine clearance, UXO disposal, and Level 2 survey teams.

Mine Awareness

UNICEF had begun a mine awareness program in Jaffna in 1998. When the UN project became operational in July 1999, UNICEF handed over its mine awareness activities in Jaffna. This program has also been suspended. UNICEF now supports awareness programs outside Jaffna including locations under the control of the LTTE.²⁴⁷

The UN Mine Action Program used existing structures in sectors such as health, education, and agricultural to make presentations tailored to specific audiences taking into account the local cultural attitudes. School children were a major focus group. Ninety-three schools across the peninsula participated in a training program for teachers through which 27,770 school children were reached. Further, twenty-three schools from six divisions participated in a drama competition.²⁴⁸

In the health sector, public health inspectors and midwives in certain areas provided information about mines and UXOs. In the agricultural sector, thirty persons working in agricultural instruction and at Agricultural Productive Centers were trained to educate farming communities about the dangers of mines.²⁴⁹

Making use of the media, a mine awareness page appeared monthly in a local newspaper, The Sanjeewa. In addition, 60-second radio spots giving preventive steps were broadcast over the local Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation station beginning in December 1999.²⁵⁰ These too will be affected by the suspension of the mine awareness program.

Community-focused programs included "market mornings" where dancers who are mine victims themselves, and a "talking mine," provided an animated forum through which information was conveyed. Other educational material included the distribution of 1,500 wall-size calendars and 5,000 pocket calendars in the year 2000.²⁵¹

Staff attached to CARE International, Action Contre la Faim, UNHCR and Save the Children Fund UK, received support from the awareness program.²⁵²

The Sri Lankan government has stated that it is implementing awareness programs in affected regions, and that in areas outside the Jaffna Peninsula, service personnel and police conduct these programs.²⁵³

Landmine Casualties

The Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates a total civilian casualty figure of at least 2,000, based on hospital records and information provided by the Jaipur Foot Program, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The UN Mine Action Project gave the total number of landmine and UXO victims in Jaffna in 1999 as thirty-four.²⁵⁴ However, the Sri Lanka Jaipur Foot Program, with headquarters in Colombo and branches in other parts of the country including Jaffna, provided the following information regarding landmine victims for the year 1999: 163 civilians in Jaffna (Northern Province); 48 civilians in Batticaloa (Eastern Province); and, 386 war-related in Colombo, the majority of which are mine victims, both civilian and military.²⁵⁵

The government stated in June 1999 that approximately 4,000 members of the armed forces had suffered mine injuries.⁰ The government also said in May 1999 that over the last two years a monthly average of thirty security personnel and fifteen civilians were killed or injured by antipersonnel mines, and "almost all of these are by mines laid by the LTTE."¹ That totals 540 mine casualties per year for the last two years.

The LTTE provide no information on landmine casualties. Humanitarian workers have indicated that over 1,500 landmine victims are presently awaiting prostheses in the areas outside government control, and a substantial number of these could well be LTTE cadres.

Survivor Assistance

The UNDP notes that hospitals are poorly equipped and unable to acquire basic drugs such as anesthetics. Because of the conflict, there is no reliable road or air link between Jaffna and the main city of Colombo. There is the possibility of air evacuations by military aircraft, but it cannot be counted on. "The alternative is to enhance local capacity by importing expertise and providing dedicated drug supplies to enable casualties to be treated in Jaffna. The professional competence of local medics is reasonably high, but there are serious shortcomings in management practices."²

Medical assistance to victims is primarily provided by the government through the University Hospital Centers and other hospitals. Foreign organizations also help in the medical and rehabilitation process. Medecins Sans Frontieres (France) is involved with the University Hospital center in Jaffna, and three other government hospitals in the northern and eastern regions. Medecins Sans Frontieres (Holland) helps a government hospital in an area controlled by the LTTE.

The Jaipur Foot Centre, which is the best known organization providing prostheses, states that all victims who come to them are provided with prostheses. It is reported that an NGO that is operating in the areas controlled by the LTTE is involved in producing prostheses for landmine victims, and that it is encountering problems sourcing material.

There are no social and economic integration programs specifically targeted at antipersonnel mine victims. There are, however, various general rehabilitation projects underway in the country, including in Jaffna, implemented by a variety of organizations both local and foreign. The Jaipur Foot Center states that it provides interest-free loans of up to SLR5000 (about U.S.$70) to victims of antipersonnel mines (though not confined to this category) who are able to show a feasible self-employment project. They state that they are able to fund only two to three applications per month due to financial constraints.³ The now suspended UNDP Jaffna Rehabilitation and Resettlement Program was involved in self-employment and skills development projects, and implemented a micro-credit project.

The government has a general program for the disabled, which provides a small monthly allowance. There are no specific disability laws available to landmine victims. However, disabled persons of the government forces including landmine victims receive special assistance and pension benefits.

TONGA

The Kingdom of Tonga did not participate in the Ottawa Process and has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. While it is now a member of the United Nations having been formally accepted on 14 September 1999, Tonga was absent from the vote on UNGA resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.

It is believed that Tonga has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines and does not contribute to humanitarian mine action programs.

TUVALU

Tuvalu, formerly known as the Ellice Islands, has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a recent letter to the ICBL Coordinator, Tuvalu's Attorney General noted that the government has heard and read about the Mine Ban Treaty but:

In the absence of any anti-personnel mines in Tuvalu, we have not taken an active role and interest in the convention. However we have traditionally been supportive of any global efforts to prohibit and eliminate any inhumane practices. Accordingly we would have no difficulty in subscribing to the objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty and would appreciate your assistance in furnishing us with all relevant information on the Treaty, in particular with a copy of the text of the Treaty. The only consideration that may hinder our immediate accession to the Treaty may be if there are substantial financial obligations that will be imposed on us as a result of becoming a party to the convention.⁴

The ICBL Coordinator responded by sending a copy of the Mine Ban Treaty as well as the ICRC's "Ratification Packet" and forwarded the letter to Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs who provided Tuvalu with information on the financial obligations required under the ban treaty.⁵

A member of Tuvalu's parliament promised to look into the ratification during a regional meeting of parliamentarians in March 2000.⁶

Tuvalu is not a member of the United Nations and therefore has not participated in any of the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.

Tuvalu has no defense force and it is believed that it has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used AP mines. It is not known to provide any assistance to humanitarian mine action programs.

The islands of Tuvalu are affected by UXO dating from heavy fighting during World War II.

VIETNAM

Key developments since March 1999: Five internationally funded landmine/UXO programs are underway, with several new projects started in 1999 and 2000. Vietnamese officials have confirmed continuing production of antipersonnel mines, but have also said Vietnam "will never export" mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Vietnam has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and appears to have no intention of doing so in the near future. However, the past several years have seen an apparent thawing in Vietnam's policy and attitudes towards landmines, to the point where one official could tell an international forum in early 1999 that Vietnam's acceptance of the treaty is "a matter of time, not of principle."⁷

Queen Noor of Jordan visited Vietnam in October 1999 and spoke to high-ranking government officials in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸ Chuck Searcy of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), who coordinated the queen's visit, said, "Three years ago, this level of discussion in the government would have been unthinkable.... This is a window of opportunity for more cooperation. I hope the door will soon be open much wider."⁹

Until recently, the People's Army of Vietnam exercised complete control over mine policy. That position is now in flux, as various government ministries are involved in different aspects of landmine use, clearance, and survivor assistance. Improved relations with neighboring countries have weakened the greatest military justifications for Vietnamese mine use. Efforts are underway to create a government steering committee on landmines or a national mine action center that would carry out a cohesive national policy.¹⁰

An internal Ministry of Foreign Affairs document provided to Landmine Monitor states that Vietnam did not sign the Mine Ban Treaty for reasons including the policies of other countries and because "mines are a type of defensive weapon that we still need."¹¹ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs views the Ottawa process as "an important effort aimed at preventing the use of mines. But it is still not a comprehensive way to deal with all angles of this multifaceted problem." The government "supports working to restrict the use of antipersonnel mines and condemns the indiscriminate use of mines to massacre civilians." However, the ban treaty "does not yet adequately consider the various defensive security needs of different countries." At present, Vietnam prefers to let other non-signatories take the lead in "reducing the pressure" to sign the treaty, while "simultaneously making use of technical assistance and funding for clearing mines and assisting mine victims."¹² Although Vietnam has not acceded to the treaty, it continues to examine and consider it closely.¹³

Vietnam did not participate as an observer in the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999. It has attended at least one of the ban treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva - on mine clearance in September 1999. Vietnam was one of 20 nations to abstain on the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Vietnam signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981, although it has never ratified. Vietnam did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II (Landmines) in Geneva in December 1999. Vietnam is a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Given the sensitivity of the issue, the NGOs who make up the Landmines Working Group in Hanoi have chosen to focus largely on demining, mine education, and victim assistance, rather than mine ban advocacy.¹⁴

Production

A Ministry of Defense official confirmed in March 2000 that Vietnam continues to produce mines, a policy that comes under the purview of the ministry's Institute for the Study of Weapons Production. No further details were available.¹⁵ The only mine confirmed by external sources to have been produced in the 1990s is the "apple mine," actually a recycled version of the BLU-24 bomblet dropped by the U.S. during the Vietnam War.¹⁶ Vietnam produced many types of antipersonnel mines in the past, mostly copies of U.S., Chinese, and Soviet mines.¹⁷

Transfer

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Vietnam never has exported and never will export mines."¹⁸ This statement may be technically correct if "export" excludes Vietnam's extensive and well documented mine use in Cambodia during its 1979-1990 occupation. There is no evidence that Vietnam has transferred mines to Cambodia since the early 1990s at the latest.¹⁹ The MOFA statement that it "never will export mines" is the most explicit policy statement on this subject of which Landmine Monitor is aware.

Ministry of Trade guidelines formally prohibit the import or export of all types of "weapons, ammunition, explosives, [and] military technical equipment."²⁰ Despite these prohibitions, there is an active illegal trade in war-era explosives, with smuggling to China, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Ethnic groups in Burma report finding Vietnamese-made copies of U.S. M-14 mines on the Thai-Burma border. These mines are trafficked by private Thai middlemen to the border from Cambodia or from Vietnam itself.²¹ There are also unconfirmed reports of Vietnamese-made mines found in Angola.²²

Stockpiling and Destruction

The size and content of Vietnam's stockpile of antipersonnel is not known. The Ministry of Defense Mine Technology Center is in charge of destroying stocks of "tens of thousands" of pre-1975 U.S. and Vietnamese mines that are no longer safe to keep. In 2000, the army plans to destroy 2,000 tons alone.²³ Usable mines and other explosives are presumably kept or "recycled."

Use

There is no evidence of any new use of mines in Vietnam. The army last laid mines in significant numbers during border conflicts with Cambodia and China in the late 1970s and during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1990.

Vietnam reserves the right to use mines "for defensive purposes" due to the "specific circumstances" of national security. "Mines continue to be a low-cost and effective defensive weapon...that must not be lacking to carry out the right of legitimate self-defense."²⁴ Vietnam's current improved relations with its neighbors would appear to make renewed use improbable for the foreseeable future.

The Landmine/UXO Problem

Vietnam remains heavily contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). According to the Ministry of Defense, antipersonnel mines account for only 2-3% of the debris, and only in limited areas. UXO makes up 97-98% of the total, scattered throughout "all 61 provinces and major cities."²⁵ For this reason, the figure of 3.5 million mines (as distinct from UXO) remaining in Vietnam, cited by the U.S. State Department and United Nations, vastly understates the true extent of the problem.²⁶ Among the UXO, U.S. 40mm M-79 grenades and BLU 26/36 cluster bombs or "bombies" are held to be the most deadly and are responsible for a significant number, if not the majority, of recent casualties.²⁷ The Vietnamese term for landmines, bom-min, specifically includes these types of UXO as well.

Vietnamese government sources claim that "at least 5%" of Vietnamese territory has been affected by mines and UXO, or a total of 16,478 km² (5,932 square miles).²⁸ Bui Minh Tam, director of the Mine Technology Center in Hanoi, estimates that 350,000 tons of bom-min remain hidden in Vietnam, more than 2% of the wartime total.²⁹

Quang Tri province, which surrounds the former DMZ, is often assumed to be the most affected region in the country.³⁰ This is not necessarily the case, as no comprehensive survey has yet been carried out. Quang Tri is certainly badly affected, but other provinces are as well, particularly in border areas.

Large numbers of mines remain in northern and southern provinces from the border conflicts with China and Cambodia in the late 1970s and 1980s. The Vietnamese army is believed to possess reasonably complete records of the location of known minefields, but this information is not publicly available. Many U.S. Army records also remain classified or difficult to access as well. None of these records include UXO and remote-delivered mines, which according to American veterans were used heavily around the former Khe Sanh combat base and DMZ.³¹ Certain areas that were heavily bombed, for example Cu Chi district outside Ho Chi Minh City or the road between Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, contain much higher concentrations of UXO than elsewhere. But bombs and shells can turn up anywhere.

UXO contamination is particularly high around military bases, near the former DMZ, and along roads that suffered heavy U.S. bombardment. The most heavily affected provinces in the south are reportedly Bien Hoa, Dong Nai and Binh Phuoc, all lying north or east of Ho Chi Minh City.³² During construction of a bridge in north-central Quang Binh province in March 2000, army engineers uncovered 700 small fragmentation bombs and "thousands" of other UXO in a single site near the start of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The captain of the army demining unit at the site told reporters that the area has "the largest density of UXO in Vietnam."³³

Surveys and Assessment

No nationwide survey has been conducted. Vietnamese officials are aware of the necessity of clearer information before larger-scale clearance can take place. Quang Tri province's proposal for a new "Mines Awareness Program," actually a comprehensive pilot mine action strategy, calls for a Level I survey to be conducted in at least one district.³⁴ The Ministry of Defense Mine Technology Center has expressed interest in conducting a national survey, but it has no budget to carry it out and is unable as a military institute to receive foreign funding.³⁵

Mine Action Funding

Nationally, the Ministry of Defense estimates that complete clearance would take at least ten years, at a cost ranging anywhere from $4-15 billion.³⁶ The Vietnamese Government claims to have spent "hundreds of billions of dong each year" (approximately $10-50 million) on military demining since the end of the war.³⁷ At present, there is no line-item allocation in the national budget for mine and UXO clearance, although certain government officials are working to change this. Ministry of Defense officials claim to be limited by a lack of funding.³⁸

A central government policy governing use of mine action funds is still in the process of formation; at present, funds are available for "socio-economic development" only.³⁹ When mines or UXO are discovered during construction projects, the construction company covers the cost of clearance. In order to open new economic zones along the Chinese border, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) has a "small" budget for demining in six northern provinces.⁴⁰ Vietnam's fledgling local NGO (or semi-GO) sector has not yet been active in landmine work. Nor has Vietnam provided funds for mine action in Cambodia, despite its extensive past involvement in mine laying there.

Since 1997, and in a few cases earlier, international NGOs and bilateral donors working in Vietnam have provided assistance to demining efforts and mine/UXO victims. Official policy "encourages making use of all sources of foreign funding in order to help in [mine clearance].... Naturally, because of economic conditions, the budget for this work is still limited."⁴¹ Vu Xuan Hong, director of the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO), says, "Vietnam is able to receive certain [types of] assistance like equipment, funding to demine ourselves, technical training, and assistance to victims."⁴² However, mine and UXO action must be carried out "according to our internal strengths."⁴³

VUFO and its sub-department, the People's Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM), are the contact agencies in the government for NGOs interested in landmine and UXO work. Bilateral aid is handled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense,⁴⁴ with the frequent involvement of MPI. All NGO and bilateral donor projects must be approved by the central government, in what can be a time-consuming and difficult process.

Four internationally funded mine/UXO programs are currently underway in central Vietnam's Quang Tri province, as well as one in neighboring Thua Thien-Hue. In all cases, projects are carried out in cooperation with the provincial government, or People's Committee, with the support of national-level authorities. Quang Tri's in-kind contributions, while not officially listed in project budgets, have been substantial. The first assistance to Quang Tri, including metal detectors and other technical equipment, was provided from 1994-98 by members of the Landmine Working Group in Hanoi. Working group members have also published books and pamphlets for public education.

The Berlin-based NGO, SODI (Solidaritaetsdienst), has carried out demining and resettlement projects in Quang Tri since 1996, predominantly funded by the German Foreign Ministry. SODI works in cooperation with a professional clearance company from the former East Germany, GERBERA, on a nonprofit basis. Total funding from 1996-99 has been $850,000; an expansion is planned.⁴⁵

PeaceTrees Vietnam, a project of the US-based Earthstewards Network that "plants trees where mines used to be," also began work in Quang Tri in 1996. A Landmines Education Center outside the provincial capital of Dong Ha opened in September 1998. Total funding has been $595,000 through the end of 1999. PeaceTrees's UXO clearance is carried out in cooperation with UXB International, an American clearance company. In December 1999, PeaceTrees Vietnam received a $1.5 million grant from the Freeman Foundation over a three-year period to clear an area of thirteen hectares around the education center.⁴⁶

The British NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Quang Tri Province in December 1998 and has been operational since January 1999, with funding of $1million provided by the Danish Government (Danida). These funds covered a period of January 1999 - July 2000. MAG, in cooperation with the Provincial Peoples' Committee, is preparing a 3 year proposal for expansion of an estimated $4 million. There has been confirmed funding of $1.5 million from the Freeman Foundation.⁴⁷ MAG's program includes demining as well as environmental rehabilitation activities.

A small German NGO, Potsdam Kommunikation e.V., received its first funding of $77,000 in 1999 for surveying and UXO removal in Thua Thien-Hue province. As with SODI, the project operates in partnership with GERBERA. In 2000, the German Foreign Ministry granted an additional DM 450,000 ($225,000) to the project.⁴⁸

The Humanitarian Demining Information Center at James Madison University (Harrisonburg, VA, U.S.) operated a Mines Awareness Program (JMU-MAP) for children in Quang Tri from February 1999 through March 2000. JMU-MAP originally worked in partnership with PeaceTrees, then continued to operate separately, with a U.S. government-funded budget of $485,000 granted in May 1999.⁴⁹ At present, extension of the program has not been funded.

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen offered to provide clearance equipment to Vietnam during his March 2000 visit, a suggestion that seems to have been well received by Hanoi.⁵⁰ However, the details of the arrangement have yet to be finalized. The U.S. State Department's follow-up offer of approximately $750,000 in deep-detection equipment and training still requires the approval of Vietnamese authorities.⁵¹ The State Department's Humanitarian Demining Program has expressed interest in working in Vietnam on several occasions. A spring 1999 assessment mission to discuss possible types of assistance was inconclusive.⁵²

Mine/UXO Clearance

The People's Army of Vietnam conducts almost all organized mine and UXO clearance. From 1975-1985, clearance focused on heavily populated areas and agricultural land. A senior Quang Tri official says, "We paid a lot of attention to bom-min in the one and a half years or so right after reunification.... There were forty clearance teams and 2000 participants."⁵³ Postwar clearance was, however, fairly superficial, dealing only with explosive material at a depth of less than one foot (30 cm).⁵⁴ Clearance campaigns started up again from 1991 to 1998, according to government sources. Some 15-20% of explosives left by the war have been cleared, accounting for 7-8% of the country's total land area.⁵⁵

Recent military clearance has been undertaken along the Chinese border and to make way for new infrastructure projects as necessary. In the northeastern border province of Lang Son, one army battalion reports clearance of 400 hectares of minefields since 1991, preparing for the resettlement of over 2,000 people.⁵⁶

The rapid expansion of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City has led to new construction in previously affected areas. Army sapper units are contracted on a per-job basis to remove the explosives. On occasion, foreign investors and NGOs have also paid the army to clear land. During the 1999 construction of a motorcycle factory in Hai Duong, the Ford Motor Corporation reportedly paid $60,000 for clearance of six hectares-a much cheaper rate than afforded by international demining organizations.⁵⁷ Oxfam Hong Kong paid local militia $14,000 to clear a four-hectare reservoir site during an environmental rehabilitation project in Quang Tri in 1998-9. The operation was completely manual, with safety procedures minimal to nonexistent.⁵⁸

At present, civilians who discover a mine or bomb are expected to inform the local military, who then come to remove or clear the site. However, the response time is often unacceptably slow. Newspapers have reported numerous accounts of residents of various provinces finding explosives, waiting as long as seven months for a clearance team, then attempting to dispose of the materials themselves.⁵⁹

Alternatively, residents call on the numerous scrap collectors and do-it-yourself deminers in the central provinces. Hoang Anh Quyet of Quang Tri's Department of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs claims there have been up to 4,000 people in his province alone engaging in their own clearance activities since the 1980s.⁶⁰ Civilian "wildcat deminers" form a virtual second army in the most affected areas.

The clearance being undertaken in Quang Tri and Thua Thien-Hue is mostly around former US/South Vietnamese military sites. MAG has been working in Gio Linh District, Quang-Tri Province since January 1999. 40 local civilian deminers have been trained, beginning clearance operations in July 1999. MAG's operations are closely linked in support of the provincial development plan; MAG works closely with the Provincial People's Committee, the local authority in charge of administration and development. MAG cooperates with a number of other NGOs which are working on and with the land cleared by MAG: Plan International - a housing construction program; Peace Trees Vietnam- mine awareness and replanting; and Oxfam Hong Kong- agricultural development. To date, MAG has cleared over 60 housing and garden plots handing them back to the families that own the land. This equates to approximately 40 hectares of safe land. Eighty-seven mines and 2,714 items of UXO have been destroyed.⁶¹

GERBERA, under contracts with SODI and Potsdam Kommunikation, works in Cam Lo district and at Ai Tu in Trieu Phong district. It has cleared seventy-seven hectares of land and plans to clear forty-eight hectares in 2000. UXB, under contracts for PeaceTrees, is clearing around the former U.S. Marine logistics base in Dong Ha. It has cleared ten hectares of land and plans to clear thirteen hectares in 2000.⁶²

In each case, the provincial People's Committee suggested the site, or offered several sites out of which one was clearly the most in need of clearance. Recently, provincial officials have taken representatives of each of the international groups to proposed new sites, including Vinh Linh district in the former DMZ and around Khe Sanh.⁶³ The provincial government has submitted proposals to several other international NGOs for additional demining work, but no agreements have yet been reached.⁶⁴

Both MAG and UXB have proposed establishment of mobile detection (EOD) and clearance teams in Quang Tri. The concept has also received the endorsement of provincial authorities. The teams would respond to UXO incidents and suspected minefields anywhere in the province, reported through the provincial Mines Awareness Program.⁶⁵

Coordination of Mine/UXO Action

There is no body responsible for coordinating mine action operations, although there is substantial interest in forming one. The central government has appointed VUFO to form a master plan,⁶⁶ but there is no progress reported as yet. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official says he would welcome NGO support for the establishment of a Mine Action Center.⁶⁷ Any decision to set up a "VMAC" will have to come directly from the Prime Minister.⁶⁸ In a sign of significant movement on the issue, PACCOM agreed in March to Oxfam Hong Kong's proposal for a study tour to mine action centers in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Nine representatives of PACCOM, the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Committee on NGO Affairs, and the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Public Security took part in the two-week trip. Officials are particularly interested in raising and sharing funds, rehabilitation and resettlement activities, and improving relations among international donors and local partners.⁶⁹

Plans to hold a high-level meeting on landmines and UXO have been underway for at least three years, but have not yet been approved by the central government. According to Nguyen Van Kien of PACCOM, "This seminar will provide an opportunity for discussion among Vietnamese agencies and NGOs to find suitable partners for working in the areas of landmines and UXO."⁷⁰

International mine action organizations in Quang Tri hope that their project steering committees, which include local, provincial and army officials, would continue to operate after the conclusion of existing projects, possibly combining into a provincial mine action committee. The province's proposed Mines Awareness Program contains a structure that officials hope can become a nationwide model: "If we work well, the [central] government will allow others to develop regional centers, not just in our province."⁷¹ Vietnam's bureaucratic system, however, restricts the province's freedom to move ahead of central government policy.

Planning of Mine/UXO Action

A national mine and UXO clearance plan, similarly, is currently under discussion in the Vietnamese government. Vu Xuan Hong of VUFO claims that "Vietnam has a plan for demining south of the 17^th Parallel,"⁷² that is in the former South. It is unclear what implications this has for the north of the country. The difficulty of coordinating activities across many ministries and in some cases competing bureaucracies appears to be the major obstacle to faster action.

Quang Tri province is reportedly in the process of developing its own clearance plan.⁷³ A de facto plan appears to exist already, as witnessed by the way that the province has distributed international clearance projects around the province. The memorandum of understanding signed between the Quang Tri People's Committee, James Madison University, and PeaceTrees contains the goal of "developing a Mine Action Master Plan to determine priorities of Landmine/UXO assessment and clearance activity for the province and to focus Mine Awareness Education as a primary goal...."⁷⁴ Other provinces would like to follow suit, but are waiting for central government direction and observing the progress in Quang Tri.⁷⁵

Reconstruction & Development of Cleared Areas

According to the Land Law, agricultural land allocation in rural Vietnam is carried out by the commune or village on the basis of family size and need. Land that is cleared by the military is turned over to local authorities, who then decide how best to use it. Hong Xuan Khang, chair of one Quang Tri commune, says that his community has 170 hectares of arable land, or 15% of the district total, that are currently unusable because of mines and UXO.⁷⁶ If local farmers can enjoy full use of the land, a significant obstacle to poverty would be overcome.⁷⁷

In existing clearance programs in Quang Tri, the province and districts have identified intended beneficiaries for resettlement once clearance is complete. SODI has resettled fifty-four families since 1998 on a cleared military base site in Cam Lo, many of them the children or relatives of families who lived there prior to the war.⁷⁸ An additional hundred families whose villages were destroyed by a landslide will be resettled in 2000 on SODI's Ai Tu site.⁷⁹

MAG works in coordination with district authorities, Plan International and Oxfam Hong Kong on post-clearance development.⁸⁰ Of a planned 155 hectares to be cleared, one hundred will be used by the province as agricultural resettlement sites. During the approval process for MAG's project, Oxfam Hong Kong signed a memorandum of understanding to assist in development in cleared areas, a provision that was necessary for the project to begin.⁸¹ The Vietnamese government places a high priority on redevelopment and has supported and fostered partnerships among clearance agencies and development NGOs.

Mine/UXO Awareness Education

Awareness programs are encouraged by Vietnamese authorities and have been carried out mostly on the local or provincial levels. Mass organizations such as the Women's Union or Committee for the Care and Protection of Children (CPCC) are particularly appropriate to carry out mine and UXO education, as they have levels of membership reaching into every commune and village.⁸² Radio and television stations have produced reports on the danger and effects of explosives: for example, a half-hour prime time television documentary, "Mines and UXO in the Eyes of Children," aired on Quang Tri provincial television for two nights in January 2000. The documentary Vi cuoc song binh yen ("For a Peaceful Life," English version released as Deadly Debris), a valuable source of data and interview footage in its own right, was shown on national television in 1999.

Government officials and NGO staff who have attended mine conferences in Cambodia, Indonesia, Mozambique and elsewhere return with resources that are widely distributed and copied. In one case, JMU's Mine Awareness Program hired a local artist to adapt Cambodian materials to look more Vietnamese. In cooperation with the Quang Tri House for Children, JMU-MAP held a poster competition on "Keeping families safe from mines and UXO" in August 1999, with impressive results that have been distributed on calendars and notebooks. UNICEF's Mine Awareness Guidelines are understood and widely applied by the provincial People's Committee, especially the importance of making materials appropriate to the local cultural context.⁸³ The People's Committee is working on a standardized curriculum for mine and UXO education, with contributions from international organizations.⁸⁴

The Danaan Perry Landmine Education Center in Quang Tri is the first center of its kind in the country and contains displays and pictures relating to mine awareness. The center has been used as a base for PeaceTrees's tree-planting projects, using a mixture of American and Vietnamese volunteers. However, it has up to now been used only sporadically for education programs. JMU-MAP has conducted training courses for forty Women's Union and Committee for the Care and Protection of Children members, who will return and teach mine awareness in their home villages. A survey carried out in fall 1999 by JMU-MAP and the provincial Women's Union assessed mine and UXO awareness, casualties and socio-economic impact. Although the survey results are said to be complete, the province has not yet released them publicly.⁸⁵

Quang Tri's proposed provincial Mines Awareness Program would continue many of the activities of the James Madison project, as well as integrating detection, clearance, and rehabilitation activities into a cohesive structure. Target goals are reducing accidents through outreach and education; evaluating effects of mines and UXO on people's livelihoods, especially women and children; supporting victims; and updating information and statistics. Mobile teams, including education, clearance and medical components, would travel to schools and communities to carry out training programs.⁸⁶ If successful, this would be the first coordinated program of its kind in Vietnam.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In the first nationwide survey on mine and UXO casualties since the end of the war, the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) reported in September 1999 that 38,248 people have been killed and 64,064 injured through May 1998 (out of a total population of 78 million).⁸⁷ The U.S. State Department estimates 180 casualties per month.⁸⁸ Officials agree that the actual numbers may be much higher than reported as many accidents, especially when death is immediate, are not counted. According to one member of the Quang Tri People's Committee, "The number of victims is higher still in reality because the provincial authorities do not have enough money to spend on detailed investigation."⁸⁹

More detailed surveys have been carried out in Quang Tri province, although the data is often contradictory. Provincial authorities report a total of 5,035 deaths and 6,824 injuries due to mines and UXO dating from the end of the war.⁹⁰ Hong Xuan Khang, a commune chairperson in Gio Linh district, says that out of 6,300 commune residents, 271 have died and 544 been wounded by mines and UXO since 1975⁹¹--a 13% casualty rate. In one single village, where MAG is currently preparing resettlement sites, there have been 87 reported mine accidents since the end of the war.⁹² Neighboring Cam Lo district, site of several large former U.S. bases, claims 54 deaths and 262 injuries out of a population of 41,335 (0.8%).⁹³

According to one limited survey of amputees, mine-caused injuries peaked during 1975-77, remained stable through the 1980s, and were reduced to half in the 1990s.⁹⁴ Data collected by the Quang Tri Department of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs shows consistently declining casualty figures since 1991. The department's director concludes that fewer mines and UXO are being found on the ground surface, and thus assistance to existing victims should be a higher priority for the province than further clearance.⁹⁵

There is not adequate data to determine whether there has, in fact, been any reduction in casualties. Mine incidents continue to be reported with frequency in the Vietnamese press: one article in December 1999 cited figures of 63 accidents in the preceding three months, killing 78 and injuring 138. Examples came from at least twelve provinces in all areas of the country.⁹⁶ A survey of five national and provincial newspapers over a one-month period from March to April 2000 found eleven mine and UXO deaths reported in southern Vietnam (Mekong Delta and Central Highlands), including eight children and three scrap collectors.

Quang Tri officials and Handicap International estimate that more than half of casualties occur to scrap dealers searching for explosives.⁹⁷ Most injuries are classified as accidental or work-related. Adult men, most in their twenties or thirties, make up 85% of amputees.

Of 281 amputees receiving prostheses at the Quang Tri provincial hospital from 1994 to 1997, 78% had war-related injuries, 40% of which occurred since 1975. Antipersonnel mines, rather than UXO, accounted for the majority of injuries, but larger shells and bombs are of course more likely to kill their victims rather than maim them.⁹⁸

Little is known regarding the casualty rate among Vietnamese military deminers. Given the near-universal lack of international standard safety equipment, deaths and injuries are likely relatively high. For instance, at least two or three, and probably more, workers were killed in 1999 during construction of the road from Quang Tri to the Laotian border.⁹⁹ Thirty-seven soldiers were reported killed during demining along Vietnam's northern border from 1991-98.¹⁰⁰

Ministry of Health officials variously estimate the total number of people with disabilities in Vietnam between 3.5 and 5 million, or 4-7% of the population, with approximately 30% of the total due to war-related injuries. 70% of people with disabilities are in need of rehabilitative services, and 80% have below average living standards.¹⁰¹ No national-level baseline survey has yet been conducted. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimates the total number of amputees in Vietnam at 60,000 or 1 per 1,200. ICRC's rehabilitation program in Ho Chi Minh City, the first in Vietnam, fitted 15,000 people with prostheses from 1989-99.¹⁰²

Survivor Assistance

Vietnam's medical system is relatively effective for a poor developing country, with 90% of people having access to health care.¹⁰³ Government-run health stations exist down to the commune and village level, but outreach beyond commune centers is often a problem. In the past health care was provided virtually free of charge, but under a market economy patients are expected to cover the costs of an increasing amount of treatment. The quality of care available in major cities has improved substantially for those who can afford it, while market reforms have left many areas of the countryside behind. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs are typically conducted at provincial hospitals and in cities. In addition to seventeen government-run rehabilitation centers and fifty-four provincial hospitals, there are eighty "sanatoriums" throughout the country that provide physiotherapy.¹⁰⁴

The International Committee of the Red Cross opened a rehabilitation center in Ho Chi Minh City in 1989 with the cooperation of the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA). During the 1990s, prosthetic technology was introduced to other provincial capitals around the country. Since 1995, the ICRC presence has increasingly been taken over by non-governmental organizations, many following the Red Cross model, and expanded nationwide.¹⁰⁵

Nineteen international organizations currently conduct disability-related programs in Vietnam; of these, fifteen assist people with physical disabilities.¹⁰⁶ In 1998, state-run and non-governmental workshops combined to produce nearly 23,000 orthopaedic devices, including 13,500 prosthetic limbs. Despite these varied efforts, demand for limbs by amputees outstrips supply by more than two to one.¹⁰⁷

Total disability project funding over the period 1997-2001 is $17.3 million, with most funding coming from USAID and the European Union.¹⁰⁸ If mine victims make up an estimated 15% of the total disabled population in Vietnam, then $2.6 million of this funding can also be said to be mine-related.¹⁰⁹

In addition to these efforts, several NGOs and international donors are engaged in community development work in mine-affected areas. Oxfam Hong Kong first became interested in landmines through working in two districts in Quang Tri in the early 1990s where mines and UXO were a great obstacle to development; other NGOs had similar experiences.¹¹⁰ Oxfam is now coordinating with MAG's demining project on community development activities.

Disability Policy and Practice

Vietnam's 1992 Constitution provides that "[t]he State should develop and consistently manage health-care-for-people activities, mobilizing and organizing social forces-in the direction of prevention."¹¹¹ National ordinance 06-L/CTN on Disabled Persons, adopted in July 1998, gives persons with disabilities the right to an education, adequate health care and job opportunities. People who became disabled during the war are given preferential treatment, as are identified victims of dioxin poisoning (Agent Orange).¹¹² In February 2000, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai announced an allowance of 48,000-84,000 dong ($3.50-6) per month would be paid to disabled children of war veterans affected by toxic chemicals.¹¹³ Postwar mine victims do not yet receive this assistance, nor do veterans of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) or their children.

There is presently no national coordination body for disability issues. MOLISA is the lead agency dealing with mine victims; the Ministry of Education and Training and Ministry of Health are also involved, as are mass organizations such as the Committee for the Care and Protection of Children, the Fatherland Front, Veterans' Association, and Vietnam Women's Union. Among NGOs, a Disability Forum meets regularly at the VUFO-NGO Resource Center in Hanoi.

90 For text, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 433-434.

91 Transcript provided by the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.

92 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 435.

93 "Afghan Taliban accuse opposition of using landmines," Agence France-Presse, Kabul, 5 July 2000.

94 UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, email Response to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), regarding draft Landmine Monitor report, 19 July 2000.

95 See, for example, "Afghan Taliban accuse opposition of using landmines," Agence France-Presse, Kabul, 5 July 2000; "Taleban calls for action on landmines," BBC World Service, 14:29 GMT, 5 July 2000.

96 Ibid. See also Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 436.

97 "Land mines prevent delivery of food to Afghani refugees," Associated Press, Kabul, 27 November 1999.

98 Letter from Save the Children/USA to Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines, 17 August 1999. See also ACBL Newsletter, BAN, no. 19, August 1999.

99 Letter from ACBL to Burhanuddin Rabbani, dated 21 June 1999. Reprinted in ACBL Newsletter, BAN, vol. 4, no. 20, October 1999.

100 Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), Directory, 1999.

101 MAPA, monthly report for December 1999. Note: MAPA does not have a Victim Assistance component in its structure. Therefore funds received for Victim Assistance by other NGOs and aid agencies are not included here.

102 UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, email Response to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), regarding draft Landmine Monitor report, 19 July 2000.

103 United Nations Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan, Study and Report by Mine Clearance Planning Agency, December 1999. The information in the report is as of 31 December 1998.

104 UNHCR Peshawar Report, December 1999. Fewer refugees from Pakistan repatriated in 1999 than 1998.

105 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 436.

106 UN MAPA Monthly Report, April 2000. The precise totals are 207,200,317 square meters of mined land and 257,839, 994 square meters of battlefields.

107 Ibid.

108 MAPA Monthly Report, December 1999. The precise totals are 34,173,911 square meters of mined land and 75,680, 090 square meters of battlefields.

109 Ibid.

110 MAPA, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

111 Staff data from MAPA Monthly Report October 1999. Funding data from ACBAR Directory 1998-1999, February 2000. Clearance data from MAPA Monthly Report December 1999 and MAPA e-mail to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

112 AREA is the only mine clearance organization that recruits deminers from the mine-affected community and is community based. See Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), PRIO, "Towards Community Based De-Mining? AREA's project in Nangrahar province, Afghanistan," Landmines Memo no. 3, Peshawar, 24 May 1999.

113 MAPA Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

114 Mine Technical Training MAPA Report, December 1999.

115 MAPA Monthly Report, December 1999; and MCPA Monthly Report April, 2000, p. 2.

116 MAPA, Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in Afghanistan, December 1999, p. 25.

117 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section came from UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Richard Daniel Kelly, Programme Manager, e-mail Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

118 For a detailed analysis of AMAA see Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), PRIO, "Community Based Mine Awareness: AMAA's project in Heart province, Afghanistan," Landmines Memo no. 4, Peshawar, 24 May 1999.

119 Interview with Hayatullah Wahdat, Information and Communications Officer, CDAP, Peshawar, 21 December 1999.

120 Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC), PRIO, "Community Based Mine Awareness: AMAA's project in Heart province, Afghanistan," Landmines Memo no. 4, Peshawar, 24 May 1999.

121 MCPA is researching the use of landmines under principles of Islam. A parallel work that emphasizes the Christian ethics of war is Kristian Berg Harpviken & Mona Fixdal, "Landmines: Just Means of War?" Security Dialogue, vol. 28, no. 3., September 1997.

122 Frontier Post, 16 November 1999.

123 MAPA Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

124 MCPA, "Socio-Economic Impact Study," Interim Report, October 1998.

125 MAPA, Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines..., December 1999, p. 20.

126 MAPA Response to Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2000.

127 MAPA Report, January 2000.

128 MAPA, Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines..., December 1999, p. 20. Data from UNIDATA, UNDP/OPS, UNHCR 1990/1991 Afghanistan Wardak and Bamayan province socio-economic profiles, Islamabad.

129 Comprehensive Disabled Afghan Program, "CDAP in Brief," 24 November 1999. Also, Peter Coleridge, manager of Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Programme, quoted in Tahir Ikram, "UN steps up appeals to help Afghan mine survivors," Reuters (Islamabad), 28 April 2000.

130 MAPA, Socio-economic Impact Study of Landmines..., December 1999, p. 21.

131 UNOCHA Report, January 2000.

132 Dexter Filkins, "Where War's Legacy Is Just a Step Away," Los Angeles Times, 18 July 2000, p. 1.

133 Peter Coleridge, manager of Comprehensive Disabled Afghans' Programme, quoted in Tahir Ikram, "UN steps up appeals to help Afghan mine survivors," Reuters (Islamabad), 28 April 2000.

134 Ibid.

135 See ICRC Contribution to Landmine Monitor Report 2000.

136 The military junta now controlling the government of the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. In this report, Myanmar is used when referring to the policies and practices of the State Peace and Development Council, and Burma is used otherwise.

137 Explanation of Abstention of vote by the Representative of Myanmar during the 54th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/C.1/54/L.2 (no date).

138 Diplomatic Handbook, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yangon, pp. 313-314. Interview with unnamed Foreign Affairs personnel, August and October 1999.

139 Letter to the Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Tin Winn, Embassy of the Union of Myanmar, Washington DC, 16 July 1999; http://www.icbl.org/lm/comments.html While welcoming comment from the SPDC, Landmine Monitor researchers have repeatedly asked the SPDC for assistance and information on the range of landmine issues within the country, and received none. In attempting to develop dialogue on the issue, Landmine Monitor researchers delivered an advance draft of this 2000 report for comment and suggestion. No response has been received.

140 CRPP, Endorsement of the Committee Representing the Peoples Parliament of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, January 2000.

141 Interview with David McCracken, Technical Advisor for Mine Action, Thai Mine Action Center, October 1999. The Type 59 copy has been modified with a weather cap. Another source indicates the mines are produced by the Kahpasa at factories in Pyay and Ma-gway. Andrew Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw (Canberra: Strategic Defence Studies Centre), pp. 30-35.

142 Interviews with ethnic militia members in Burma, December 1999.

143 Ibid.

144 Unnamed source, Ministry of Defense, Rangoon, February 2000.

145 Letter to the Landmine Monitor from Ambassador Tin Winn, Embassy of the Union of Myanmar, Washington DC, 16 July 1999.

146 Press briefing at Bright Shan Mountain Camp by Col. Yod Serk, Military Commander, Shan State Army, December 1999.

147 Karen Human Rights Group, "Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts: Villagers Flee as SPDC Troops Resume Burning and Landmining of Villages," 25 April 2000.

148 Letter from former military advisor to the ethnic resistance, sent to Landmine Monitor, 11 November 1999. See also, Karen Human Rights Group, "Beyond all Endurance: The Breakup of Karen Villages in Southeastern Pa'an District," 20 December 1999, pp. 22-27.

149 Interview with People's Defense Forces, Foreign Affairs and Military Liaison officers, Songklaburi, Thailand, December 1999; interview with Thai Border Police Officer, March 2000.

150 Interview with Thai military based on the border, September 1999.

151 KNLA troops overran one forward Tatmadaw base in March 2000, apparently obtaining landmines and documents related to mine laying operations in Thailand by the Tatmadaw. These documents subsequently made their way to Thai authorities, copies of which were made available to Landmine Monitor. The authenticity of the documents cannot be completely verified.

152 "Thai Soldiers wounded by Junta's Landmines," Bangkok Post, 18 November 1999; "Landmines: Burma row leaves border vulnerable," Bangkok Post, 19 January 2000; "Ranger loses leg to mine," The Nation, 19 January 2000; "Landmine Kills 4 Soldiers at Suan Phung," The Nation, 21 January 2000; "Landmine blast injuries Thai soldiers," The Nation, 1 February 2000; "Border patrol-Five soldiers hurt by landmine," Bangkok Post, 2 February 2000; "Landmine blast injures four soldiers," The Nation, 4 February 2000.

153 Interviews with former Tatmadaw officers, August and December 1999. Sometimes different terms, such as "reclaimed" or "neglected," were used instead of "lost" mines.

154 Chakma villager from Walidong in Burma interviewed by Arakan armed opposition in Bangladesh, as told to Landmine Monitor/Bangladesh researcher.

155 Interviews with villagers living near the Burma border, Bangladesh, November 1999.

156 Interview with Bangladesh government officials, October 1999; interviews with humanitarian agencies working at the Bangladesh-Burma border, August 1999.

157 Interview with Bangladesh government officer, October 1999.

158 Mohammad Nurul Islam, "Where landmines take a heavy toll," The Independent, 28 May 1999, p. 14.

159 Interview with Bangladesh government official, August 1999.

160 Interviews with former Tatmadaw officers, August and December 1999.

161 Based on numerous interviews with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental authorities and other observers.

162 For more details on production, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 448. Until the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Khun Sa capitulated to the government in early 1996, the MTA had the most sophisticated mine production capacity of any ethnic group, with factories at Ho Mong with lathes, milling equipment, and a foundry. They produced a stake mounted fragmentation mine similar to the Kahpasa-produced MM2 mine. The facilities came under government control and 2,000 MTA mines were reportedly destroyed. Landmine Monitor correspondence with William Ashton, military analyst and freelance author, 7 May 2000, and notes from Ashton field trip, November-December 1999.

163 Photographic evidence given to Landmine Monitor by unnamed expatriate working among Christian ethnic communities on the Thai-Burma frontier.

164 Interviews with ethnic combatants, November and December 1999.

165 Interviews with ethnic militia members in Burma, December 1999.

166 Interview with former military advisor to the ethnic resistance, February 1999.

167 Based on numerous interviews with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental authorities and other observers.

168 Interview with ethnic militia officer, December 1999; press briefing at Bright Shan Mountain Camp by Col. Yod Serk, military commander, Shan State Army, December 1999.

169 Karen Human Rights Group, "Beyond all endurance: The Breakup of Karen Villages in Southeastern Pa'an District," 20 December 1999, pp. 22-27.

170 Letter from former military advisor to the ethnic resistance, sent to Landmine Monitor, 11 November 1999.

171 Emergency Press Release of God's Army People. Undated. Copy of document given to the Landmine Monitor, February 2000.

172 "Opinion of Standing Executive Committee of RCSS and Shan State Army-South on Anti-Personnel Landmines," undated, received in email to Landmine Monitor researcher in March 2000, circulated by ICBL on 3 April 2000.

173 Press briefing at Bright Shan Mountain Camp, December 1999.

174 Interviews with ethnic militia members, June 1999.

175 Interview with PDF officers, Sangklaburi, Thailand, December 1999.

176 Interview with Bangladesh Rifles (border forces) commander, Chittagong, 30 November 1999.

177 International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), "Burma: Repression, Discrimination and Ethnic Cleansing in Arakan," Report of International Mission of Inquiry, April 2000, p. 24.

178 Interview with Dr. Kyaw Win, President of the Myanmar Red Cross Society, Rangoon, October 1999.

179 For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 452.

180 Karen Human Rights Group, "Starving Them Out, Forced Relocations, Killings and the Systematic Starvation of Villagers in Dooplaya District," March 2000, p. 34; William Barnes, "Karen flee army roundups of `human minesweepers,'" South China Morning Post, 2 September 1999.

181 Karen Human Rights Group, "Beyond all endurance," 20 December 1999, pp. 22-27.

182 Shan Human Rights Foundation, Monthly Report, January 2000, pp. 1, 4.

183 Interview with refugee living in border camp across from Tenaserrim Division of Myanmar, 17 April 2000.

184 Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., "Results of Medical Examination of Refugees from Burma," Danish Medical Bulletin, Vol. 45, No. 3, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316; and Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., "Human Rights Violations in Burma/Myanmar in 1999," Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999, Danish Medical Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March 2000.

185 1,198 medical records from Township Medical officers in districts within Hpa-an District.

186 U.S. Department of State, "Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis," December 1994, p. 18.

187 Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., Danish Medical Bulletin, 3 June 1998, pp. 313-316; and Hans Draminsky Peterson, et al., Report of Fact-finding Mission in December 1999, Danish Medical Group, Danchurch Aid and Amnesty International (Denmark), 14 March 2000.

188 Interview with health workers, Rangoon, 25 April 2000.

189 Mohammad Nurul Islam, "Where landmines take a heavy toll," The Independent, 28 May 1999, p. 14.

190 Interview with Buddhist monk doing development work in border communities, Chittagong, 4 December 1999.

191 Somsak Suksai, "Elephants face risks in mine-strewn area," Bangkok Post, 10 September 1999. Sakchai Lalit, "Thai Elephant Steps on Landmine," AP Online, 24 August 1999; "Motala's jumbo operation," The Sunday Nation, 29 August 1999; "Vets encouraged by Motala's initial recovery," The Nation, 31 August 1999; "New limb offers for Motala," Bangkok Post, 7 September 1999.

192 Interview with Arakan insurgent, Chittagong, 3 December 1999.

193 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 453.

194 Landmine Monitor 1999 Burma (Myanmar) report.

195 Interview with WHO official in Yangon, January 2000. Also, "Human Development in Myanmar," United Nations Working Group, July 1998, p.14.

196 Interviews with displaced persons living in Thailand, December 1999.

197 National Rehabilitation Centre statistics and Landmine Monitor interview with Dr. Ye Hliang, Director, NRC, August 1999.

198 National Rehabilitation Centre statistics provided to the Association for Aid and Relief-Japan, December 1999.

199 The ICRC was providing components for prosthetics to hospitals under the Ministry of Defense in Rangoon and Maymyo. ICRC, "Tables and Graphs 1979-1998," dated 8 June 1999. Currently they are awaiting a new proposal to undertake support for the Ministry of Defense hospitals. If figures provided by the ICRC and the NRC are compared, then Ministry of Defense hospitals are providing 2.5 times the prosthetics distributed through the civilian system.

200 Interviews with BPHWT medics at training program on Trauma & Landmines in Mae Sot, Thailand, July 1999.

201 Telephone interview with a Chinese official, Tokyo, 26 February 1999.

202 Letter from Mr. Wang Xiaolin, Third Secretary, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, to Association for Aid and Relief (AAR)-Japan, 10 April 2000. Nearly identical language can be found in China's first annual report required by Article 13 of the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, submitted in October 1999.

203 White Paper: China's National Defense, Information Office of the State Council, People's Republic of China, 27 July 1998. The full statement is, "It is in favor of imposing proper and rational restrictions on the use and transfer of APLs in a bid to achieve the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition of such landmines through a phased approach."

204 Statement by H.E. Ambassador Sha Zukang at the first Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II annexed to the CCW, 15 December 1999.

205 Ibid.

206 Statement by H.E. Ambassador Shao Guanfu, Head of Chinese Observer Delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

207 Letter from Mr. Wang Xiaolin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2000. China's response to last year's report: "It is obvious that you attached importance to reflecting China's policy and position on the issue of landmines in your report. For that purpose, you must have done a lot of work and consulted relevant sources. We are grateful for your efforts in this regard. We appreciate the responsible attitude you adopted by quoting the exact statements made by Chinese officials in various occasions and the relevant section from the White Paper on China's National Defense. Meanwhile, we also noted that Landmine Monitor 1999 quoted some remarks of assessment or speculation by agencies from other countries or individuals on China's production, transfer, stockpiling and use of antipersonnel landmines (APLs). It is our view that such an approach is not appropriate."

208 Declarations and Reservations on CCW Protocol II entry into force 3 December 1998, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xxvi_boo/xxvi_2.html.

209 Statement by Amb. Sha Zukang at the first annual conference for Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

210 People's Republic of China, Report to the First Annual Conference of Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II annexed to the CCW, submitted October 1999.

211 Telephone interview with a Chinese official, Tokyo, 25 February 1999. See also, "Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement," Beijing, 27 June 1998.

212 See Technical Annex, 2(a) of Amended Protocol II.

213 CCW/CONF.I/SR.11

214 See Human Rights Watch, The Mine Ban Treaty and Members of APEC, October 1998.

215 Telephone interviews with officials from Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and two Chinese embassies, Tokyo, 24, 25, and 26 February 1999.

216 See, "Sino-U.S. Presidential Joint Statement," Beijing, 27 June 1998. See also, White Paper: China's National Defense, 1998.

217 Based on interviews with governmental officials involved in Protocol II discussions with China.

218 Landmine Monitor discussion with Peoples' Republic of China Delegation, Maputo, Mozambique, 4 May 1999.

219 ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Amended Protocol II annual conference, Geneva, 13 December 1999.

220 China, Report to the First Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, October 1999.

221 Ibid.

222 Humanitarian Demining Website, U.S. Department of Defense, at http://www.demining.brtrc.com/maps/china.

223 Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defence, People's Republic of China, Postwar Demining Operations in China (1992-1999), December 1999, p. 1.

224 Ibid., p. 11.

225 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

226 Humanitarian Demining Website, U.S. Department of Defense.

227 China, Report to the First Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, October 1999.

228 Ibid.

229 Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, interview and correspondence with UN officials, April and June 2000.

230 Ministry of National Defence, Postwar Demining Operations in China, December, 1999, p. 4. China's Protocol II Article 13 report says operations were carried out from "the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1994 and from November 1997 to August 1999." There are press accounts referring to ceremonies to note the end of the clearance operations dated 11 August 1999. See for example, Beijing Xinhua, "PRC Clears Last Landmines on Border with Vietnam," 11 August 1999.

231 Postwar Demining Operations, p. 4. China's Article 13 report states "over 2.2 million mines and explosive devices" were removed.

232 Ibid., p. 5.

233 Daily News of Liberation Army, 10 August 1999.

234 Letter from Mr. Wang Xiaolin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2000.

235 Disabled Association of Fang Cheng Gang City, "Explanation of the below-knee disabled persons in the Guangxi Fang Cheng Gang City," 20 December 1999.

236 "Law of the People's Republic of China, 17^th meeting of the Standing Committee, 28 December 1990," http://www.gladnet.org.

237 Asian and Pacific decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2002: the starting point, UN, New York, 1993.

238 The Development of the Undertakings of Disabled Persons in China, China Disabled persons' Federation document.

239 "Health Report 2000, Annex Table 8 Selected national health accounts indicators for all Member States," last update 21 June 2000, WHO, 23 June 2000, http://www.who.ch.

240 The Europa World Year Book 1999, p 932, Vol. 1, Fortieth edition, Europa Publications Limited , London , 1999.

241 World Development Indicators 2000, p 90.

242 l'état du monde 2000, p 300.

243 "Law of the People's Republic of China, 17^th meeting of the Standing Committee, 28 December 1990," http://www.gladnet.org.

244 Asian and Pacific decade of Disabled Persons 1993-2002: the starting point, UN, NY, 1993.

245 Interview with retired Maj. Gen. D. Banerjee, Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies (New Delhi), Oslo, March 1999.

246 Ibid.

247 Interview with Dr. Pema Dorjee, Chief Medical Officer of Men Tsee Khang Clinic, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, 17 June 1999.

248 Grant Peck, "Animals and Landmines," Associated Press, Bangkok, 7 May 2000.

249 Statement by Ambassador Savitri Kunadi, Permanent Representative of India, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations (Geneva), to the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, 15 December 1999.

250 Ibid.

251 India's National Annual Report in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 1 December 1999.

252 Ibid. This was echoed by Ambassador Kunadi: "Self-destruction and self-deactivation devices fulfilling the required design parameter are undergoing user trials." Statement to the First Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

253 Statement by Ambassador Kunadi to the First Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

254 Ibid.

255 Interviews with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, BSF Camp and Army Headquarters in Sri Nagar, 6-9 January 2000.

0 Estimate provided by government officials involved in discussions with the Indian government during the CCW negotiations.

1 Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

2 Ibid.

3 "Mines Used by Pak Intruders," statistics provided by Ministry of Defense, Government of India, data as of July 1999. One press account alleged use of 5,000 mines. Times of India, 24 July 1999.

4 Amb. Inam-ul-Haque, Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN in New York, told the ICBL that "according to some accounts, India had planted mines up to a depth of 5 to 10 km on its side of the border." Letter to Stephen Goose, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, 19 October 1999. In an interview on 5 October 1999, India's UN Ambassador Kamalesh Sharma denied any Indian use of mines. The Taliban in Afghanistan has also accused India of providing "technical assistance" to opposition forces using Indian M14 and M16 mines inside Afghanistan. Pakistan TV: Indians Laying Mines in Afghanistan, FBIS Transcribed Text, 4 August 1999. There is no independent evidence to support this claim.

5 "Indian Army on Eternal Landmine Alert in Kashmir," Reuters, Poonch, India, 9 July 1999.

6 Statement by Amb. Kunadi to the First Annual Conference Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

7 Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

8 Landmine Monitor 1999 interview with former military officials.

9 For extensive details on the armed groups and mine use, see, Mallika Joseph and Suba Chandran, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi), "Use of Mines and IEDs by Non State Actors in South Asia," May 2000. This paper was prepared for Landmine Monitor.

10 "AP Minister's cremation today," The Hindu, News Update at 1800 hours (IST) on 8 March 2000.

11 The state government, including the Director General of Police, Ministry of Home Affairs, provided this information. A year-by-year breakdown of incidents and casualties is available.

12 Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

13 Interviews with Singh and other former Indian military officials who attended the Workshops on Banning Landmines in three border villages in the Jammu region, 21-23 January 2000.

14 Interviews with delegates from Arunchal Pradesh who attended the Regional Seminar & Photo Exhibition in Shillong state capital of Meghalaya in North East India on 4 March 2000.

15 Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

16 Ibid.

17 Statistics provided pertain only to the Kashmir valley and not the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.

18 Includes other police and paramilitary forces operating in the region.

19 Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

20 Fax from Grahame Morton, International Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, 30 March 1999.

21 UNICEF, Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, 22-31 March 2000, p. 3 and p. 6.

22 Statement of Mr. Kim Sam Jong, Counselor, Permanent Mission of DPRK to the UN in New York, 4 December 1998, found in Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Fifty-Third session, 79th plenary meeting (A/53/PV79), pp. 8-9.

23 Telephone interview with Mr. Ri Thae Gun, Counselor, Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN in Geneva, 1 March 1999.

24 See, Eddie Banks, Brassey's Essential Guide to Anti-Personnel Landmines (London: Brassey's, 1997), p. 164; Jane's Mines & Mine Clearance, 1996-1997, p.372, and Canadian Forces School of Military Engineering Mine Database 96.

25 Ibid.

26 Statement of Mr. Kim Sam Jong, UN General Assembly, 4 December 1998.

27 Bill Gertz, "In Korea's Misnamed DMZ, U.S. Defenders Rely on Mines," Washington Times, 23 January 1998.

28 Telephone interview with a North Korean official, Tokyo, 26 February 1999.

29 Interview, with Buddhist priest Bup Ryun, Chief Executive of Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement, Tokyo, 21 February 1999.

30 Statement of Mr. Kim Sam Jong, UN General Assembly, 4 December 1998.

31 "Serious Incidents in the DMZ, 1967-1995," Korean War Project website, http://www.koreanwar.org.

32 ICBL, Intersessional Update #5 (7 April 2000); See also www.gichd.ch.

33 Response of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations (NY) to Landmine Monitor researcher's questionnaire, 21 March 2000. It should be noted that many military experts and retired officers, including a former commander of joint U.S.-ROK forces, have publicly stated that antipersonnel mines can be removed without jeopardizing the defense of the ROK. (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for more detail).

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 See, Statement by the delegation of the Republic of Korea at the First Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW, 15 December 1999.

38 Statement of ROK Mission to the UN (NY) at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 15 October 1999.

39 See, Jane's Mines & Mine Clearance 1999-2000, and Eddie Banks, Brassey's Essential Guide to Antipersonnel Landmines (London: Brassey's, 1997), pp.200-201.

40 Response of ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables; U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales of Antipersonnel Mines FY 1983-1933, as of 11 August 1993.

44 "Anti-Landmine Crusader Williams Receives Cold Shoulder From Korea," Korea Herald, 4 February 1998.

45 Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000. See also, Statement by ROK at the First Annual Conference on Amended Protocol II, 15 December 1999.

46 See Landmine Monitor 1999, p. 333. The U.S. may also have a significant number of ADAM self-destructing mines stockpiled.

47 "Over 1.12 Million Landmines Laid Throughout ROK," Seoul Yonhap, 28 September 1999.

48 Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

49 Lt. Gen. (ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Alternatives to Antipersonnel Landmines, VVAF Monograph, Spring 1999, p.20. Gard cites the source as "In Korea's Misnamed DMZ," Washington Times, 23 January 1998. Another press account cites one million in the military control zone, and an unknown number in the DMZ. Susan Feeney, "Deadly Zone," Dallas Morning News, 24 November 1997.

50 Joongang Daily News, 18 January 1999, claims U.S. troops have laid tens of thousands of mines around important military installations. See also, Bae, Myong-Oh, National Politics, Issue 56, March 1998. According to one source, about 100,000 AP mines have been planted around military bases. Sisa Journal, 18 March 1999.

51 See Landmine Monitor 1999, p. 336.

52 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 113.

53 Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

54 John Larkin, South China Morning Post, 30 October 1998.

55 "Air Force Removing Thousands of Landmines," Korea Herald, 2 April 1999. A subsequent article said that 170 of 329 had been found, citing a military official. "Military Warns of Mines, Shells Spread by Flooding," Korea Herald, 7 August 1999.

56 "Military Units Fail to Recover Landmines," Chosun Ilbo, 5 October 1999.

57 "Military Warns of Mines, Shells Spread by Flooding," Korea Herald, 7 August 1999.

58 "Military Units Fail to Recover Landmines," Chosun Ilbo, 5 October 1999.

59 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 480-482.

60 "Air Force Removing Thousands of Landmines," Korea Herald, 2 April 1999.

61 "Over 1.12 Million Landmines Laid Throughout ROK," Seoul Yonhap, 28 September 1999.

62 See http://www.gichd.ch/docs/minebantreaty/mineclearance

63 The picture book, titled "Unfinished War - Antipersonnel Landmines," was published in 1999 by Korea Church Women United, a member of the KCBL.

64 Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid. The antipersonnel mine was washed away from a military storage site due to flooding.

68 Ibid. This probably does not include survivors injured during the war.

69 Ministry of National Defense, "The Present Condition of State Reparation," 9 July 1998.

70 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 480.

71 Response of the ROK Mission to the UN, 21 March 2000.

72

73 Jim Monan, Curse of the Bombies: A Case Study of Saravan Province, Laos (Hong Kong: Oxfam Hong Kong, 1998), p. 14.

74 UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

75 Handicap International, Living with UXO: Final Report National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR, 1997, p. 7.

76 Kieko Matteson and Robert Perkinson, "The Remnants of War: The deadly legacy of America's air war in Laos," Boston Review, undated, circulated on icblmedia@egroups.com, 30 March 2000. Can be found at http://bostonreview.mit.edu:80/BR25.1/matteson.html.

77 UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

78 Statement by H.E. Mr. Alounkèo Kittikhoun, Ambassador of Lao PDR to the United Nations, to the UN General Assembly, New York, 17 November 1998.

79 A figure of 1,015 is cited in Daniel Lovering, "Laos Faces decades of unexploded bombs," Globe, Paksong, Laos, 11 June 2000. See also "Laos sees new lease of life," Issues, 7 March 2000.

80 UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, 1 January-31 December 1999." Also, UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000. The total included just 2,176 mines and 86,917 UXO.

81 UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, March 2000."

82 Information on MAG's activities in Laos provided to Landmine Monitor via email from Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

83 Handicap International Laos, "Annual Report," 1999; with additional information provided by UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

84 Handicap International Activity Report 1999.

85 UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid.

88 Information from Milsearch, 1998.

89 Ibid.

90 Handicap International, Living with UXO, 1997.

91 Kieko Matteson and Robert Perkinson, "The Remnants of War: The deadly legacy of America's air war in Laos."

92 UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

93 Ibid., U.S. military technical assistance ended in September 1999.

94 UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

95 UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, 1 January-31 December 1999."

96 UXO Lao, "Progress Summary Report, March 2000."

97 UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

98 Lao National UXO Program, UXO Lao, Work Plan 2000, Vientiane, Lao PDR, March 2000. Also, UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

99 UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

100 UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

101 U.S. Department of State, "FY 2000 NADR Project Status." UXO Lao indicates the U.S. provided $2.5 million in 1999 in clearance equipment and training support. UXO Lao communication to Handicap International. 15 June 2000.

102 UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

103 UXO Lao, Nigel Orr, email response to Landmine Monitor, 18 July 2000.

104 Lao National UXO Program, UXO Lao, Work Plan 2000, pp. 28-30, Vientiane, Lao PDR, March 2000.

105 UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

106 UXO Lao, "Summary Report of UXO Accidents, 1 January-31 May 2000" and UXO Lao letter to Landmine Monitor, 15 June 2000.

107 Handicap International, Living with UXO, p. 28.

108 Kieko Matteson and Robert Perkinson, "The Remnants of War: The deadly legacy of America's air war in Laos."

109 HI, Living with UXO, p. 25.

110 Information on the COPE program provided to Landmine Monitor via email by Mike Boddington, POWER, 31 July 2000.

111 Amy Talbott, Landmine Survivors Network, "Landmine/UXO victim assistance in the Lao PDR-General overview," Vientiane, February 1998.

112 Handicap International Activity Report 1999.

113 Handicap International Internal Report, Brussels, Belgium, March 2000.

114 At a meeting with ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth, FSM parliamentarians including FSM's Federal Government Vice Speaker, the Hon. Claude H. Philip, promised to find out FSM's position on the treaty from the President's office. UNICEF, Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, March 22-31, 2000, p. 9.

115 Fax from Grahame Morton, International Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Neil Mander, Convenor of NZ Campaign Against Landmines, 30 March 1999.

116 Letter from M.J. Mace, Assistant Attorney General, Federated States of Micronesia to Neil Mander, Convenor NZ Campaign Against Landmines, 11 December 1998.

117 Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations, Concept of Mongolia's Foreign Policy, 1994. www.undp.org/missions/mongolia/fpguide.htm.

118 Mongolian Prime Minister Amarjargal, Statement to the Fifty-Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 5 November 1999.

119 Fax communication from Mr. D. Zorigt, Deputy Director, Department of Policy Planning and Co-ordination, Ministry of External Relations, to Landmine Monitor, 28 October 1999.

120 Letter to Landmine Monitor researcher from External Relations Minister, Ms. N. Tuya, 21 April 2000.

121 Mongolian officials have stated that the December 1999 UNGA vote does not indicate any change in their position regarding accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Interview with Mr. R. Mounkhou, Officer, International Organization Department, Ministry of External Relations, Ulaanbaatar, 13 March 2000. Also, Letter to Landmine Monitor Researcher from Ms. N. Tuya, External Relations Minister, 21 April 2000.

122 Interview with Mr. D. Zorigt, Deputy Director, Department of Policy Planning and Co-ordination, Ministry of External Relations, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 28 October 1999; interview with Mr. R. Mounkhou, Officer, International Organization Department, Ministry of External Relations, 13 March 2000.

123 ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, First Secretary to the Permanent Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose, Human Rights Watch.

124 Telephone interview with Mr. R. Mounhkou, Ministry of External Relations, 24 April 2000.

125 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Bayar Batzorig, Chief, Foreign Relations Department, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 9 November 1999; telephone interview with Ms. S. Oyun, Member of Parliament, 17 April 2000. She said that budget documents submitted to Parliament have never mentioned "landmines."

126 ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999.

127 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 491.

128 ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999. Interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 9 November 1999; with R. Mounkhou, Ministry of External Relations, Ulaanbaatar, 13 March 2000; with Mr. Sanduijav, Advisor, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 24 March 2000.

129 Interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, 9 November 1999; With R. Mounkhou, Ministry of External Relations, 13 March 2000; with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, Ulaanbaatar, 24 March 2000.

130 See, for example, the Prime Minister's statement to the UN, 5 November 1999, at footnote 2. Also, the need for mines for border defense was stated by Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, in meeting with ICBL, 17 December 1999.

131 Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000. He stressed the need for Mongolian Armed Forces to keep mines for such a purpose. The Mine Ban Treaty (Article 3) permits retention of AP mines for demining training and research purposes.

132 "The Earth Wound," documentary commissioned by the Ministry of Environment in 1996, shows Soviet landmines at former Soviet Army bases in Mongolia. Interviews with Mr. Ts. B. Adyasuren, Counselor, Ministry of Environment, Ulaanbaatar, 3 March 2000, and Mr. Shagrdarsuren, journalist, Ulaanbaatar, 6 March 2000. Both participated in the documentary research survey.

133 ICBL meeting with Mr. G. Jargalsaikhan, Mission of Mongolia in Geneva, 17 December 1999.

134 Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Advisor, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000.

135 Letter to Landmine Monitor researcher from General Ts. Dashzeveg, Headquarters of Mongolian Armed Forces, 14 April 2000.

136 Interviews with Ms. S. Enkhtuya, Program Associate, United Nations Development Program, Ulaanbaatar, 19 November 1999; Ms. Gabriela De Vita, UNICEF, Ulaanbaatar, 6 November 1999; Ms. Lynn W. Roche, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America, Ulaanbaatar, 10 November 1999; Marc Laporte, Save the Children - UK, Ulaanbaatar, 11 November 1999; Mr. Chris Johnstone, Canadian Honorary Consul to Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 11 November 1999; Mr. D. Tumurtogoo, Academician, Rector of the Mongolian State Pedagogical University, Ulaanbaatar, 21 February 2000.

137 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 19, said, "A slight problem with landmines in Mongolia exists in the east and north-eastern areas of the country. These regions were heavily mined by the Japanese during World War II, and many of the mines remain active.... There are occasional human fatalities." Yet, the follow-up report, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-2, listed Mongolia as not mine-affected. Lt. Col. Batzorig told Landmine Monitor that the Soviet Army placed antitank mines on the border with China, and removed them when it withdrew from Mongolia in 1992. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, 9 November 1999.

138 From July 1966 to December 1992, the Soviet Army had bases covering 414,000 square hectares of land in 15 provinces and in 4 districts of Ulaanbaatar. Map of Soviet installations in Mongolia, obtained by Landmine Monitor.

139 "The Earth Wound," documentary commissioned by the Ministry of Environment in 1996. Interviews with Mr. Ts. B. Adyasuren, Counselor, Ministry of Environment, 3 March 2000, and Mr. Shagrdarsuren, journalist, 6 March 2000. Both participated in the documentary research survey which was carried out in Baganuur, Choir, Mandalgov and various parts of Dornod province.

140 It is not known if these mines are still active.

141 Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000.

142 Ibid.

143 Letter from Mr. Mark W. Willis, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the United States, Ulaanbaatar, 14 April 2000.

144 Interview with Mark W. Willis, Deputy Chief of Mission and Lynn W. Roche, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States, Ulaanbaatar, 10 November 1999.

145 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Batzorig, Ministry of Defense, 9 November 1999. US Department of State, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 19, said, "There are occasional human fatalities" from landmines laid by Japan in World War II in the east and north-eastern areas of the country. The report also stated, "In the area where these incidents occur, few adequate medical facilities are available."

146 Interview with Mr. Sanduijav, Ministry of Defense, 24 March 2000.

147 Fax from Chitra Jeremiah, Assistant Director, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Nauru to Neil Mander, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, 11 May 2000.

148 Statement by Jabindra Aryal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Report on Second National Conference," 4 July 1999, p. 6. SAARC is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

149 Interview with Right Hon. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, Panchkhal, Kavre, 16 January 2000.

150 Interview with Home Minister Hon. Purna Bahadur Khadka, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Singh Durbar, Kathmandu, 21 December 1999.

151 It appears that some reports of use of "mines" are likely to refer instead to use of bombs or other explosives that do not fit the definition of antipersonnel mine (that is, explode from the contact of a person).

152 Kantipur Daily, Kathmandu, 30 January 2000, p. 1.

153 The NCBL conducted its interviews in Rolpa and Salyan districts from 30 November 1999 to 10 January 2000. There is frequent speculation that the mines come from India. See, Mahanagar Daily, 22 February 2000. A high-ranking Nepalese officer denied this and insisted that no outside government was supporting the Maoists. Landmine Monitor/India personal discussion with Lt. Col. Bijendra Gautam, Director of Military Training, Royal Nepalese Army, at landmine seminar in Wadduwa, Sri Lanka, 18-20 August 1999.

154 See, Nepal Samachar Patra Daily, 5 April 2000, p. 1. Interview with Hon. Prakash Jwala, Parliamentary Building, Singh Durbar, Kathmandu, 20 December 1999. NCBL also heard this in interviews with local communities.

155 Kathmandu Post Daily, 30 January 2000. This does not appear to be a description of an antipersonnel mine incident.

156 Hon. Surendra Prasad Pandey, member of National Assembly, in "An Interaction Program on Role of Parliamentarians on Ban Landmines," NCBL executive summary, Kathmandu, 8 August 1998.

157 Chris Cooter, First Secretary (Political), meeting with P. S. Chitrakar, Canadian Cooperation Office, Kathmandu.

158 Interview with Lieutenant of Royal Nepalese Army, Rolpa, 11 December 1999.

159 Telephone interview with former Parliamentarian Jagrit Prasad Vetwal, 24 December 1999.

160 NCBL interviews from 28 November 1999 to 20 January 2000 with residents of the ten districts. The list of the villages includes 43 in Rukum district, 33 in Rolpa, 24 in Kavre, 17 in Dolakha, 12 in Salyan, 11 in Dhading, 9 in Kalikot, 8 in Ramechhap, 8 in Sindhupalchok, and 7 in Sindhuli.

161 Interview with Dr. Kashiram Kunwar, Deputy Director, Birendra Police Hospital, Maharajgunj, Kathmandu, 21 April 2000.

162 Mr. Devandra Subedi, Deputy Superintendent of Police Headquarters, in "National Conference on Landmines and Human Rights," Kathmandu, 25 November 1997; South Africa Campaign to Ban Landmines and Human Rights Watch, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Global Campaign Against Antipersonnel Landmines," August 1998, p. 45.

163 Hon. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, House of Representatives, in "Role of Parliamentarians on Ban Landmines," Kathmandu, 8 August 1998; Mr. Rishikesh Shah, in "National Conference on Landmines and Human Rights, Kathmandu, 25 November 1997.

164 Interview with Arjuan Pathak, Management Section, Bir Hospital, Kathmandu, 21 April 2000.

165 Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 5.

166 Letter from Ambassador Inam ul Haque, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Pakistan Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Stephen Goose, Chair, ICBL Treaty Working Group, 15 November 1999.

167 Ibid.

168 Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 1.

169 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

170 Ibid., p. 5.

171 Ibid., p. 4.

172 Ibid., p. 3.

173 Pakistan National Annual Report submitted in accordance with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, 25 October 1999, p. 5.

174 ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

175 Protocol II Annual Report, 25 October 1999, p. 6.

176 Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 4.

177 A good summary of this incident is UK Working Group on Landmines, "Pakistan and the sales of anti-personnel mines in the UK," 9 December 1999.

178 Landmine Monitor has a copy of the faxed offer. In a letter dated 1 December 1999, POF stated that the items were not antipersonnel mines, but command-detonated mines, that it was a routine response to a query, and that export of the items is subject to issuance of permits by the government.

179 Michael Evans, "Pakistani `in deal for landmines,'" The Times (London), 7 December 1999.

180 ICBL Statement to the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

181 Statement of the Canadian Delegation at the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 15 December 1999.

182 Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 4.

183 Oral statement by Pakistani representative to the Annual Conference on Protocol II, Geneva, 16 December 1999. See also The News International (national English daily), 2 January 2000.

184 ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

185 Interviews by Landmine Monitor/India researcher with senior Border Security Force officials and Army officials in Kashmir, BSF Camp and Army Headquarters in Sri Nagar, 6-9 January 2000.

186 Interviews by Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines with local communities in the Bajaur Agency, July-November 1999.

187 Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 3. See also, Protocol II report, 25 October 1999, p.5, which also states, "Devices have been developed which will be incorporated to make the antipersonnel mine detectable."

188 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 497, cited in Banerjee, p. 23.

189 ICBL meeting with Brig. Feroz Khan, Director Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Geneva, 16 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

190 Dipankar Banerjee, then-Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, "South Asian Regional Survey," prepared for Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 23. Banerjee based this on observations from the South Asian Regional Landmines Workshop, held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 7-8 December 1998, which included active duty and retired military officers from Pakistan.

191 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 137, states "there are significant minefields along [Pakistan's] disputed border with India in Kashmir.

192 Banerjee, p. 22.

193 Ghulam Hasnain, "Under Cover of Night: The presence of Pakistani soldiers deep in enemy territory disproves Islamabad's claims of innocence," Time, 12 July 1999, p. 20-21. Pakistan's claim has been that the intruders fighting at Kargil were freedom fighters and the Pakistan Army had nothing to do with it.

194 India's Protocol II Article 13 report, 1 December 1999.

195 "Mines Used By Pak Intruders," statistics provided by Ministry of Defence, Government of India, data as of July 1999.

196 See, for example, "India Accepts Pakistan Talk Offer as battle rages in Kashmir," Agence France-Press, Srinagar, India, 8 June 1999; "Militants Kill 19 in Kashmir attacks," Reuters, Jammu, India, 20 July 1999.

197 Letter from Mr. Shahbaz, Director General (Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, to Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor/HRW, 12 July 2000. Landmine Monitor's letter of inquiry was addressed to the Foreign Minister, dated 26 June 2000, and stated, "We anticipate that Pakistan will be identified in this report as a government that has used antipersonnel mines since March 1999. This relates, in particular, to use of mines in the conflict with India in Kashmir. Landmine Monitor welcomes any comment on this, including a confirmation or denial...."

198 "Indian forces say 250 Kashmir militants eliminated in last four months," BBC Monitoring of Doordarshan television, New Delhi, 6 May 2000.

199 Protocol II Article 13 report, 25 October 1999, pp. 4-5.

200 The PCBL conducted interviews at different intervals in 1999 and 2000, but most were conducted from July to November 1999. Details of the PCBL study are contained in the full draft version of the Pakistan country report for Landmine Monitor prepared by the PCBL. It is available to the public.

201 Protocol II Article 13 report, 25 October 1999, pp. 8-12.

202 Ibid.

203 Statement by the Representative of Pakistan at the First Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999, p. 4.

204 Protocol II Article 13 report, 25 October 1999, p. 7.

205 UNICEF, Report on the Pacific Visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, March 22-31, 2000, p. 4 and p. 10.

206 Letter from Joseph K Assaigo, Director Multilateral, Legal and Treaties Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Papua New Guinea, to Neil Mander, Convenor, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, 2 June 2000.

207 UNICEF, Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, March 22-31, 2000, p. 6.

208 Letter from Shamala Kandiah, for the Permanent Secretary, Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor researcher, 4 May 2000.

209 Statement by Major Kenny Lim, Singapore, "Singapore's Explanation of Vote after the First Committee Vote," 8 November 1999, provided as an attachment to the letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

210 Radio Singapore International, 1 April 1999; "Where Singapore Stands on Landmines," BIG-O (national monthly magazine), March 2000.

211 Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

212 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 503-504. It cites annual Jane's publications listing the Valmara 69, VS-50 (Singapore designation SPM-1) and TS-50. But, Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, on-line update, 18 November 1999, no longer lists the TS-50.

213 Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

214 Ibid.

215 In an 11 February 1999 letter to Landmine Monitor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares that no mines have been laid in Singapore.

216 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 506 for details.

217 Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

218 Telephone interview, Major Kenny Lim, Singapore Ministry of Defence, 12 March 2000.

219 Letter from Shamala Kandiah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 May 2000.

220 Interview with Lee Mui Ngah, Assistant Director, Singapore Volunteers Overseas Programme, Singapore, 13 March 2000.

221 Statement of Sri Lanka, to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, undated, but 4 May 1999.

222 Hansard (Official parliamentary record), 1 March 2000, Vol.128, No.3, col. 457, 458.

223 "UN General Assembly would convene 2001 conference on illicit arms trade," M2 Presswire, 9 November 1999, citing comment of Sri Lanka on the resolution during First Committee consideration.

224 Press Release, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, SRSG-CAC/PR/5, 12 May 1998.

225 This campaign includes Sinhalese and Tamil communities living in Australia; the Australian Council for Overseas Aid; and the Victorian section of the Australian Network of the ICBL.

226 "News Fax," Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 3 March 2000.

227 One recent report stated, "Ground troops had to negotiate a very large number of anti-personnel mines planted by the LTTE which resulted in troops having to spend a considerable time before assaulting the bunker line," Daily Mirror, 11 July 2000, p. 1.

228 Hansard (Official parliamentary record), 1 March 2000, Vol.128, No.3, col. 458.

229 Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, 4 May 1999.

230 Edward Chalmers, Mine Action Coordinator, UNDP/UNOPS Mine Action Project, Jaffna, e-mail communication to Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka, 31 March 2000. See also, UNDP, "Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna," undated, but February 1999.

231 Chalmers, UNDP/UNOPS, email, 31 March 2000.

232 Ibid.

233 UNDP, "Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna," undated, but February 1999, p. 1.

234 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

235 Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

236 UNDP, "Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna," undated, but February 1999, p. 4. One subsequent press account reported, "The UNDP said although initial information indicated 10 to 12 percent of the 1,068 square kilometer Jaffna peninsula was mined, the actual mined area was about two percent." "Dogs sniff for mines in UN project in Sri Lanka," Reuters, Colombo, 5 August 1999.

237 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-2.

238 Statement of Sri Lankan Representative to the First Meeting of States Parties, 4 May 1999.

239 United Nations Office of the Resident Co-ordinator, Colombo, Sri Lanka, Press Release, 28 April 2000.

240 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 511, cites several press accounts.

241 This figure was provided by UNDP. One press account stated, "UNDP officials said the cost of the project has risen to almost $4 million against initial expectations of $2 million." "Dogs sniff for mines in UN project in Sri Lanka," Reuters, Colombo, 5 August 1999.

242 Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

243 Matthew Todd, IT/Database Specialist, JRRP, UNDP/UNOPS, email to Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka, 7 July 2000.

244 Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

245 Matthew Todd, UNDP/UNOPS, email to Landmine Monitor researcher for Sri Lanka, 7 July 2000.

246 Chalmers 31 March 2000.

247 Minutes of the Technical Meeting on Landmines held on 30 March 2000 at the UNHCR office, Colombo.

248 Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Ibid.

253 Letter from Sri Lanka High Commission in Australia to the ACFOA, Sri Lanka Peace Project, Deakin, Australia, dated 16 June 1999.

254 Chalmers, 31 March 2000.

255 Telephone interview with Mr. Cyril Siriwardene, Secretary, Jaipur Foot Center, Colombo Head Office, 25 January 2000.

0 Letter from Sri Lanka High Commission in Australia to the ACFOA, dated 16 June 1999.

1 Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, 4 May 1999.

2 UNDP, "Mine Action Pilot Project Jaffna," undated, but February 1999, pp. 4.

3 Telephone interview with Mr. Cyril Siriwardene, Secretary, Jaipur Foot Centre, Colombo Head Office, 25 January 2000.

4 Letter from Feleti P. Teo, Attorney-General, Government of Tuvalu to Elizabeth Bernstein, Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 31 March 2000.

5 Letter from Elizabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator to Feleti P. Teo, Attorney-General, Government of Tuvalu, 11 April 2000.

6 Hon. Telke P. Lauti promised ICBL Ambassador Tun Channereth that he would find out the status of ratification. UNICEF, Report on the Pacific visit of Tun Channareth, International Campaign to Ban Landmines Ambassador, 22-31 March 2000, p. 9.

7 Don Tuan Phong of the People's Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM), speaking at the Forum on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 26-29 January 1999.

8 "Queen Noor sees war legacy first hand," Viet Nam News, 18 October 1999.

9 Interview with Chuck Searcy, VVAF, Hanoi, 3 January 2000.

10 Interviews with members of a Vietnamese government study tour to mine action centers in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, 14 April 2000.

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), "Van de Min sat thuong" (The Question of Antipersonnel Mines), internal document provided to Landmine Monitor-Vietnam, 2 March 2000.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.; Oxfam Hong Kong interviews with members of the government mine action study tour group, 21 April 2000.

14 Landmine Working Group, Joint Goals Statement, March 1998. Active members of the group include Catholic Relief Services, Handicap International, Oxfam Hong Kong, PeaceTrees Vietnam, Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped, and VVAF.

15 Interview with Bui Minh Tam, Hanoi, 15 March 2000.

16 Stephen D. Biddle, "Landmines in Asia," paper presented at the Phnom Penh Landmines Conference, 1995.

17 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 513-514. See also, Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (Human Rights Watch: New York, 1993), p. 54, 102.

18 MOFA, "Van de Min sat thuong."

19 Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, pp. 103-4; Paul Davies, War of the Mines (Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 13-19, 44.

20 Viet Nam News, 7 January 2000.

21 Communication from Landmine Monitor-Burma researcher, 15 February 2000.

22 Interview with Roger Hess, UXB International, 30 March 2000.

23 Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000; Oxfam Hong Kong interview, 20 April 2000.

24 MOFA, "Van de Min sat thuong."

25 Le Huy Hoang, Bui Minh Tam and Le Van Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges," paper presented at the International Forum on Demining and Victim Assistance, Phnom Penh, 26-28 October 1998. (Unclear whether this refers to total tonnage or total numbers.)

26 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-3, citing UN database.

27 Communication from Roger Hess, UXB International, 7 March 2000; similar information presented in Vi Cuoc song Binh yen ("For a Peaceful Life"; English version released as Deadly Debris), a documentary film produced by Nguyen Luong Duc and Vu Le My, Hanoi, 1999.

28 Hoang, Tam and Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

29 Cited in Vi Cuoc song Binh yen; identical data presented in "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

30 Quang Tri military authorities estimate over 225 million total mines and UXO remaining in the province, while the UN database estimates more than 58,000 mines and UXO. Quang Tri People's Committee, "General Introduction About Quang Tri Province," March 2000. The editor of the document concedes that "it is not sure the figures in the statistics are accurate," but this is the most recent data.

31 Interviews with U.S. veterans, tour guides and provincial officials, Quang Tri, 12-13 January 2000.

32 Interviews with Bui Minh Tam, Director, Ministry of Defense Mine Technology Center, Hanoi, 15 March 2000, and Chuck Searcy, VVAF, 3 January 2000.

33 Thanh Nien (Youth) daily newspaper, 27 March 2000, p.5; Huw Watkin, "Help Needed to Clear Bombed Road Route," South China Morning Post, 24 March 2000; "Unexploded Bombs Found in Xuan Son Ferry Area," Lao Dong (Labor) daily newspaper, 22 March 2000, p.1.

34 Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for a Mines Awareness Program, March 2000; UXB International, Mobile Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team Proposal.

35 Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000.

36 Cited in Vi Cuoc song Binh yen; Hoang, Tam and Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

37 Hoang, Tam and Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

38 Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000; "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

39 Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview with Vu Xuan Hong (Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations), Hanoi, 27 April 1999.

40 Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000.

41 PACCOM, "Bao cao mot so Van de lien quan den Bom min va Vat lieu chua no" (Report on Some Questions Concerning Landmines and Unexploded Materials), October 1999.

42 Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview, 27 April 1999.

43 PACCOM, "Bao cao mot so Van de..."

44 Oxfam Hong Kong, Landmines Advocacy Strategy 1999.

45 Interviews with provincial and district-level officials, Quang Tri, 12-14 January 2000; Viet Nam News, 2 February 1999.

46 Figures provided to Landmine Monitor by Imbert Matthee (PeaceTrees Managing Director), 7 March 2000.

47 Information provided by Nick Proudman, MAG Program Manager, Quang Tri, 12 January 2000 and Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

48 Communication to Landmine Monitor from Lutz Vogt (Potsdam Kommunikation chairman), 17 March 2000.

49 Calvin Trice, "Land Mine Center Receives Grant," Richmond Times Dispatch, 21 June 1999.

50 Paul Richter, "Cohen Begins Vietnam Visit, Pushes for Relations Between Militaries," Los Angeles Times, 14 March 2000; "US should do more to help overcome war legacy," Viet Nam News, 14 March 2000, p.1.

51 Jan Scruggs (Vietnam Veterans Memorial Foundation) and Bui The Giang (Communist Party External Relations Department), speaking at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Corporate Council delegation seminar, Hanoi, 25 April 2000.

52 Interview with Chuck Searcy, VVAF, 3 January 2000.

53 Interview with Hoang Anh Quyet, Director, Department of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs, Quang Tri, 31 March 2000.

54 Ministry of Defense officials, quoted in Vi Cuoc song Binh yen.

55 Hoang, Tam and Trung, "Vietnam: Demining Activities and Challenges."

56 Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) daily newspaper, 28 March 2000, p. 2.

57 Interview with Chuck Searcy, VVAF, 3 January 2000.

58 Interview with Tran Thanh Binh (Oxfam Hong Kong), 19 April 2000.

59 For example, Thanh Nien, 20 March 2000, p. 15; Phu Yen newspaper, 21 March 2000, p. 4; Tien Phong (Pioneer), 8 April 2000, p. 10.

60 Interview with Hoang Anh Quyet, Quang Tri, 31 March 2000.

61 Interviews with MAG staff, January-February 2000; MAG Quarterly Progress Report, 30 September 1999, and email from Tim Carstairs, MAG Communications Director, 28 July 2000.

62 Interviews with GERBERA and UXB staff, January-February 2000.

63 Interviews with MAG, GERBERA and UXB staff, January-February 2000.

64 Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposals for Demining in Cam Lo and Gio Linh Districts, 1997-99.

65 MAG Vietnam, "Community Level Mine Action" (discussion paper), March 2000; UXB International, Mobile EOD Team proposal; Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for a Mines Awareness Program.

66 Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview with Vu Xuan Hong (VUFO), 27 April 1999.

67 Oxfam Hong Kong telephone interview with Le Huy Hoang, 22 June 1999.

68 Interview with Bui Minh Tam, 15 March 2000.

69 PACCOM, "Issues of Interest to the Vietnamese Delegation on Studytour to UXO Centers in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia" (discussion paper), 12 April 2000; interviews with study tour participants, 14 April 2000.

70 Working Notes from the Landmines, UXO and Agent Orange Sectoral Group, Forum on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, Phnom Penh, 26-29 January 1999.

71 Interview with Nguyen Duc Quang, Quang Tri External Relations Department, 22 February 2000.

72 Oxfam Hong Kong interview, 27 April 1999.

73 Interviews with Hoang Dang Mai, Quang Tri Province External Relations Department, and other current and former provincial officials, 12-17 January 2000.

74 "Memorandum of Understanding between Foreign Relations Department, Provincial People's Committee of Quang Tri, and James Madison University & Peace Trees Vietnam for a Landmine Awareness Project," February 1999.

75 Interviews with international NGOs and Quang Tri officials, January-February 2000.

76 Cited in Vi Cuoc song Binh yen.

77 Monan, Landmines and Underdevelopment, gives many case studies and anecdotal evidence to support this point.

78 Interview with Wolfram Schwope (GERBERA), 23 February 2000.

79 Nong nghiep Viet Nam (Vietnamese Agriculture) magazine, 1 March 2000, p. 2.

80 Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG, 23 February 2000.

81 Interview with Tran Thanh Binh, Oxfam Hong Kong, 21 February 2000.

82 Interviews with Mark Pirie, JMU-MAP, 14 January and 23 February 2000.

83 Ibid.

84 Interview with Nguyen Duc Quang, Quang Tri External Relations Department, 22 February 2000.

85 Interview with Mark Pirie, JMU-MAP, 14 January 2000.

86 Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for a Mines Awareness Program, March 2000.

87 "Leftover Ordnance In Vietnam Deadly," San Diego Union-Tribune, 5 September 1999; "Explosive legacy of war kills more than 38,000," South China Morning Post, 24 December 1999.

88 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, 1998.

89 Cited in Jim Monan, The Impact of Landmines on Children.

90 Quang Tri Statistical Office data collected by MAG, 1999.

91 Cited in Vi Cuoc song Binh yen.

92 Gio Linh People's Committee Annual Report, 1999.

93 Quang Tri People's Committee, Proposal for Demining in Cam Lo District, 1997.

94 Handicap International, prosthetic survey from the Dong Ha (Quang Tri) clinic, November 1997. PACCOM cites statistics of 22,000 casualties in 1976 and 1977 alone.

95 Quang Tri People's Committee, "General Introduction about Quang Tri"; Landmine Monitor interview with Hoang Anh Quyet (DOLISA), 31 March 2000.

96 Pham Khuong, "Nhung noi dau dai dang" (Prolonged Suffering), Cong An Nhan Dan (People's Police) daily newspaper, 20 December 1999.