At the UN General Assembly in October 1998, the Bahrain representative stated that Bahrain supported a landmine ban and endorsed the Ottawa Convention.(98) Nevertheless, Bahrain has not signed the treaty. It showed little interest in the Ottawa Process; it did not attend the treaty preparatory meetings, or the treaty negotiations, even as an observer. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Yet, it did vote in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution supporting negotiations of a total ban on antipersonnel mines as soon as possible and the 1997 UNGA resolution inviting all states to sign the Mine Ban Treaty.
Bahrain is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Bahrain is not believed to be mine-affected. It is known to have produced or exported landmines. There is no information on whether it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines..
Bahrain has not contributed any funds to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other mine action programs.
Mine Ban Policy
Egypt has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Egypt participated in the Ottawa Process as an observer. It attended the October 1996 Ottawa meeting which launched the Ottawa Process, and the Vienna, Bonn and Brussels meetings, but did not sign the Brussels Declaration. It attended the Oslo negotiations as an observer, where it made its views known on key parts of the ban treaty text.
Egypt voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines (passed 156-0, with 10 abstentions), but it was one of just eighteen countries which abstained from voting on the 1997 UNGA Resolution inviting all states to sign the Mine Ban Treaty; and one of nineteen countries which abstained from voting on the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming new signatories to the treaty and urging its full implementation.
At the Brussels meeting, Egypt proposed some amendments to the draft treaty text, most of which were not accepted. It proposed that the time period allotted to stockpile destruction be extended "to a more feasible period of 5-10 years." It argued that destruction of emplaced mines "take into account the cost of such operations and the resources available for mine clearance efforts at the national and international level." Egypt was also concerned that "all major parties" including "producers, exporters, and affected countries" take part in the negotiations as their participation is viewed as "instrumental in the achievement of universal adherence and effective implementation" of the ban treaty.(99)
Egypt's reasons for not signing the ban treaty have been stated in various international fora. Arguments put forward by Egypt include that the treaty does not take into account "the legitimate security and defense concerns of states, particularly those with extensive territorial borders" which need landmines to protect against terrorist attacks and drug traffickers.(100) In addition, Egypt continues to voice concern at "a lack of financial and technical incentives" in the treaty to help the country deal with its landmine problem.(101) The government and military also express frustration that responsibility for clearance is not assigned in the treaty to those who lay the mines. Egyptian representatives have called this a "moral" issue. Millions of mines were laid in Egypt by German, Italian and British forces during World War II. Mines have also been used in the east in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 by Egyptian and Israeli forces. As noted above, Egypt publicly voices its need to use mines to defend its borders from terrorists and smugglers. In a February 1999 trip to Egypt by representatives of the ICBL, all these arguments were brought up repeatedly.(102)
It must be noted, however, that when Egypt voices its concern about the mines of the "Western Desert," it generally neglects to mention that, according to its own estimates, many millions of mines are also found in the "Eastern Desert," laid by Egyptian and Israeli forces in their various conflicts.(103) Nor does it mention its production of APMs, and its own transfers of mines to countries which have experienced armed conflict.
Egypt signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981, but has not ratified. Egypt is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, and has used this forum to push for responsibility of states involved in the deployment of mines in the territories of other states, and for national defense and security concerns.(104) In January 1999, Egypt said that it "welcomes the positive contribution of NGOs in the field of disarmament, and has repeatedly called for a more active NGO participation, most notably at the Conference on Disarmament."(105)
Egypt is the sole remaining known producer of APMs on the continent of Africa. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Egypt produces at least ten types of antitank mines and eight types of antipersonnel mines.(106) Antipersonnel mines include:
- the PP-MI-Sk stake mine, a copy of the Czech PP-MI-SK;
- two different types of T/79 scatterable or hand emplaced, plastic blast mines, both copies of the Italian TS-50;
- the MF 270 bounding fragmentation stake mine, a copy of the Soviet POMZ-2;
- the MF 45 bounding fragmentation mine;
- the "HAMDY"directional fragmentation mine, similar to the U.S. Claymore;
- a wooden box "Shu" mine;
- the T/78 blast "Shu" mine.
Egypt has produced mines in at least three facilities, all of them run by the Ministry of War Production as part of its 10-plant Egyptian Military Factories (EMF) group.(107) One of these firms, the Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries (EMF Factory 81) has exported a small plastic antipersonnel mine, the T/78 "Shu" mine, to a number of Middle Eastern countries. It is not known if EMF's other mine-producing facilities--the Kaha company for Chemical Industries (Factory 270) and the Maasara Company for Engineering Industries (Factory 45)--also have exported mines.(108)
The Heliopolis factory produced Italian TS 50 antipersonnel landmines (Egyptian designation T/79 or T/7931) in conjunction with the Italian mine producer, Tecnovar. Vito Alfieri Fontana, the owner of Tecnovar, stated that 1,242,000 TS 50 mines were assembled in Egypt between 1979-1993. He provided the following figures:
Year Number of Mines
Egypt has exported mines exported to at least seven countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Somalia.(110) As reported herein in the country report on Italy:
On 17 September 1996, a member of the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda found TS 50 AP mines in a stock of weapons confiscated from armed Hutu groups. After communications between the UN Secretary General and the Italian authorities, Italy's Representative to the UN confirmed that Tecnovar Italiana "manufactured the plastic parts of the yellow TS 50 type APMs in the period from 1980 to 1993, when the company stopped producing such items." He also revealed that "the Tecnovar company did not supply TS-50 type APMs to Zaire, Kenya or the United Republic of Tanzania"(111) while noting that the company had supplied plastic parts for TS 50 mines to Brazil, Egypt, Spain and the United States. According to the owner of Tecnovar, the landmines found in Rwanda were part of the weapons supply that Egypt delivered to Kigali in 1992. This included 200,000 T-79 APMs.(112)
Egypt announced at an Organization of African Unity conference in May 1997 that it no longer exported antipersonnel mines but subsequent efforts to get this statement confirmed in writing have not produced a response to date.(113)
Egypt is believed to have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines but no details are available.
As noted, mines were used by German, Italian and British forces during World War II in the Western Desert. Mines have also been used in the east by Egyptian and Israeli forces during their conflicts. Today, Egypt publicly voices its need to use mines to defend its borders and to protect against terrorists and smugglers.
Egypt is one of the most mine-affected countries in the world. The government claims "an estimated 22.7 million land-mines lie buried beneath Egypt's soil - a figure that calculates to approximately one mine for every 3 citizens."(114) A Ministry of Defense publication notes that 288,000 hectares of Egyptian territory are contaminated.(115)
In 1993, the U.S. Department of State listed a drastically lower number of "over 6,000 mines of WWII vintage" in the "El Alamein area, with unknown quantities along the area bordering Libya" and additional mines from various wars with Israel "remain in parts of Sinai." More recently, the State Department has avoided putting a number on Egypt's problem.(116)
Most of Egypt's uncleared mines are left over from World War II, particularly in the area of the El Alamein battlefield and in the Western Desert. In September 1942, at El Alamein, in anticipation of an Allied advance, German General Edwin Rommel ordered the creation of a "Devil's garden a minefield so long and so deep that it was considered virtually impenetrable."(117) Mike Croll states that 500,000 mines were laid at El Alamein in "two major fields running north-south across the whole front with a total depth of about five miles."(118) Others argue that the British Army led by Field Marshal Montgomery buried most of the "18 million landmines in El-Alamein."(119) The Egyptian government consistently states that 17 million mines were laid at El Alamein.(120)
Areas near the Egypt/Libya border, along the Red Sea coast of the Eastern Desert and areas of the Sinai peninsula are also mined from the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 conflicts. (Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982.) The landmines found in Egypt range from German, U.S. and British mines of World War II vintage to modern British, U.S., Russian and Israeli types.(121)
In March 1999, the United Nations reportedly proposed sending a team to assess the landmines problem in Egypt, and was "waiting for a green light" from the Egyptian Prime Minister."(122)
Mine Action Funding
Egypt has been aggressive in seeking international financial support to clear its mines. According to the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Disarmament, despite asking the international community many times for help, "no serious effort has been made to help us, except perhaps from a very small number of countries which one can count on the fingers of one hand."(123) Egypt seeks US$200 million in funding for mine clearance.(124) The United Nations reports that Egypt has requested that Western countries responsible for the El Alamein battle contribute US$142 million for mine clearance and the government would pay an additional US$50 million.(125)
Germany has provided Egypt's mine clearance efforts with metal detectors and protective clothing while the United Kingdom has given $145,189 in mine clearance funding and equipment. The United States Humanitarian Demining Program has allocated $1.5 million.(126) Italy has provided demining training.
The British Ministry of Defense has apparently also, from the early 1980s, provided the authorities in Egypt with copies of surviving maps of known minefields and supporting information on the types of mines laid and the techniques used by the Commonwealth forces during the war. It is unknown how many minefields had surviving maps. There have been three visits to Egypt by Royal Ordnance Disposal officers (in 1981,1984 and 1994). The RAF also conducted reconnaissance flights over the area in 1984. The Ministry of Defense is currently preparing a new version of the map and data package that "makes use of advances in technology where possible."(127)
An "informal donor's group" is working with the United Nations Development Program in Egypt to encourage more transparency and involvement in Egypt. Western governments indicated an interest in funding clearance, in the context of a national plan which would involve all relevant ministries and not just the Ministry of Defense. Since Egypt claims that the development of tourism, for example, along the coast of the Western Desert as well as the petroleum industry there is hampered by mine contamination, donor governments argue that the appropriate ministries should be involved in the development of such a plan.(128)
The Egyptian Army has been involved in demining efforts since the end of World War Two. Egypt has four military national demining battalions of 480 troops; "millions of dollars each year" are budgeted for mine clearance.(129)
To date, 120,000 hectares of land have been cleared, removing a total of 12 million landmines.(130) One problem has been a lack of information on the locations of mined areas pointing to a need for a comprehensive survey of the problem. Rain, wind and shifting sands have moved the mines from their original locations or caused them to sink deeper than one meter into the earth. There is also a problem in that antitank mines planted during World War Two become increasingly sensitive as they degrade over time, making them prone to function like an antipersonnel mine.
The Egyptian Army sees a need for an awareness campaign, including better minefield marking and radio and television advertising, to alert people, including foreign tourists, to the dangers of uncleared landmines.(131) When representatives of the ICBL were taken to El Alamein by the Ministry of Defense, they did not see any minefield markings at all.(132)
Non-governmental mine awareness efforts to date include those of the Landmine Struggle Center, established in December 1997.(133) There is also a fledgling Egyptian Campaign to Ban Landmines, established in September 1998 and comprised of twenty non-governmental organizations.
According to the Egyptian Army in February of 1999, landmines have claimed 8,313 casualties in Egypt, of which 696 were killed.(134) An undated publication by the Ministry of Defense gave a total figure of 8,301 mine victims. Of that number it reported that military casualties numbered 3,284, including 272 killed, and the civilian total was "estimated to be around 5,017 out of which 418 were killed and 4599 injured."(135) Landmine casualties are cared for by the state which provides first aid, medical treatment and artificial limbs plus there is some compensation for families of military mine victims.(136) One medical center has started to examine the psychological needs of landmine survivors.
Mine Ban Policy
Iran has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Iran attended the treaty preparatory diplomatic meetings, and the Oslo negotiations, but only as an observer. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It came to the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December 1997 as an observer, where it stated that it supported the efforts of the international community to ban landmines but before Iran could lend its support, it believed that "particular security concerns of states should be effectively addressed."(137) Iran was absent from voting on the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution supporting negotiations of a total ban on antipersonnel mines, and was one of eighteen countries who abstained from voting on the 1997 UNGA resolution supporting the December treaty signing, and one of nineteen who abstained from voting on the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming new signatories to the treaty and urging its full implementation.
Iran is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). At the CCW Review Conference in Vienna in 1995, the Iranian representative stated that while the total elimination of mines backed by a comprehensive verification mechanism was the ideal, it did not seem realistic at present. He further called for a ban on undetectable mines and stated that future mines should be self-destructing.(138) Iran is a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
The U.S. Army indicates that Iran produced a copy of the U.S. M18A1 Claymore mine during the Shah's reign but its current production status is unknown.(139) The Iranian Defence Industries Organization lists two antipersonnel mines produced by Iran: the YM-1 antipersonnel mine, and the Pedal Mine No. 4 (which appears to be a copy of the Israeli No. 4 mine).(140)
Iran is believed to have been a significant exporter of antipersonnel mines. At the signing of the Ottawa Convention in December 1997, the Iranian Ambassador stated that Iran does not export antipersonnel landmines.(141) At the UN General Assembly in November 1998, the Iranian Ambassador stated: "We have declared a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines and expedited the process of accession to the strengthened Protocol II of the 1980 CCW."(142) However, there is no legislation in place barring export of antipersonnel mines. Although Iran has stated that it no longer exports landmines, Afghanistan's Taleban has accused Iran of supplying landmines and other weapons to the opposition.(143) In addition, the Iranian No. 4 Pedal mine has been found recently in Sudan, on the border with Uganda.(144)
Iran has also imported significant amounts of landmines. Between 1969 and 1978, Iran imported between 1.5 and 2.5 million antipersonnel landmines from the United States, primarily the M2, M14, M16A1, and M16A2 types.(145)
There is no reliable information on the current size or composition of Iran's mine stockpile.
Iran has a serious problem with landmines. The Iranian government reports that sixteen million landmines were laid in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 and the southern provinces in particular are severely affected.(146)
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began discussions with Iran in 1996 to develop a mine action program. UNDP initially invested $200,000, leading to a $3 million commitment from the Iranian government. Plans are underway to survey and mark mined areas and begin mine clearance. (See also the UNDP report).
Iran reports a lack of minefield maps and clearance equipment and places great emphasis on the international community's responsibility for transfer of technology and facilitation of demining. A total of 1.2 billion rials ($400,000) were allocated to clearing the Kordestan province in 1998.(147) Estimates of how many mines have been cleared vary. In 1995, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran stated that of the sixteen million mines littering Iran, only 200,000 had been cleared. By 1997, the Iranian army cleared an additional 7,600 square kilometers (2,900 square miles).(148) At the November 1998 General Assembly, the Iranian Ambassador stated that since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had been able to destroy about 6.2 million mines and "unexploded devices."(149)
Estimates of civilian casualties also vary. The government states that thousands of civilians are injured or killed each year and that on the border with Iraq alone, dozens of people are killed each year.(150) Villagers and shepherds often come into contact with landmines left over from the Iran-Iraq war. In December 1998, four shepherds were killed in a landmine blast in southwestern Iran.(151) The U.S. government lists 6,000 landmine casualties for Iran for an unspecified period of time.(152)
Iraq did not participate in any of the diplomatic meetings of the Ottawa Process and did not sign the Mine Ban Treaty. Iraq is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons. Iraq became a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1996. The Iraqi Ambassador to the UN urged the CD to launch negotiations on a global landmine ban in 1997.(153)
Iraq is both a producer and an exporter of antipersonnel mines. It is the only known mine exporter in the world that has not instituted an export ban or moratorium, or at least made a policy declaration of no current export. Iraq began producing mines in the 1970s. It has manufactured a copy of the Italian Valmara 69 bounding antipersonnel mine(154), at least one antipersonnel mine developed with Yugoslav assistance, one ex-Soviet model and two older Italian mine designs.(155) Though Iraq deployed enormous quantities of mines in Kuwait and Iraqi Kurdistan, the vast majority of mines used were imported. The U.S. Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency have identified antipersonnel mines from the following countries as having been used by Iraq in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Kuwait, on the borders with Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, or found in Iraqi stocks: Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States.(156)
Two of the most common landmines found in Iraq are the Italian Valmara 69 and VS-50. In 1991, seven executives of the Italian producer Valsella were convicted of illegally exporting nine million landmines to Iraq between 1982 and 1985.(157) Iraq then began manufacturing copies of the Valsella mines.
Iraq is severely mine-affected as a consequence of the Gulf War, the Iran/Iraq War, and two decades of internal conflict (see section on Iraqi Kurdistan for a discussion of the mine situation in that region). In addition to the many millions of mines in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is estimated that millions more are planted on the borders with Iran and Kuwait, in rural farmland, around water sources, and elsewhere in Iraq.(158) Mine awareness and mine clearance programs appear to focus solely on Iraqi Kurdistan.
Mine Ban Policy
Israel has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. At the treaty signing conference in Ottawa, Israel's Ambassador David Sultan, attending as an observer, stated: "Due to our unique situation in the Middle East involving an ongoing threat of hostilities as well as terrorist threats...we are still obliged to maintain antipersonnel landmines as necessary for self-defense.... Israel, regrettably is unable to sign the treaty until effective alternative measures are available to ensure the protection of civilians threatened on a daily basis by terrorists and to ensure the protection of Israeli forces operating in areas of armed conflict."(159) Prior to the Mine Ban Treaty signing at Ottawa, the Israeli Foreign Minister stated his support for the treaty, but said that "we have difficulty implementing the initiative because of our own problems along our borders."(160)
Israel participated as an observer in the treaty preparatory meetings throughout 1997, but did not attend the Oslo treaty negotiations. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Moreover, Israel was one of just ten countries which abstained from voting on the 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines; one of eighteen which abstained from voting on the 1997 UNGA Resolution inviting all states to sign the Mine Ban Treaty; and one of nineteen countries which abstained from voting on the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming new signatories to the treaty and urging its full implementation.
Israel is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Protocol II on landmines, but has not yet ratified the amended Protocol II (1996). Israel states that its use of antipersonnel landmines for self-defense purposes is in accordance with the requirements of the CCW.(161) It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter of efforts to negotiate a mine transfer ban in that forum.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
During the Mine Ban Treaty signing conference in December 1997, Israel stated that it "does not produce APLs [antipersonnel landmines]."(162) At a UN General Assembly meeting on landmines on 20 October 1998, the Israeli representative said that Israel had ceased the production of antipersonnel landmines.(163) It is not clear when Israel stopped production, and whether it now has a formal ban or moratorium in place. Earlier, Israel had instituted a two year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines in 1994; in 1996, it was renewed for three years. Israel said in December 1997 that it was considering extending the moratorium indefinitely, but that has not occurred.(164)
Israel had in the past been a significant antipersonnel landmine producer and exporter. Israel is known to have produced the M12A1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 6 ( a copy of the U.S. Claymore) antipersonnel mines.(165) Israel has produced and exported antipersonnel mines since at least the 1970s, when it provided some to South Africa.(166) Manufacturers have included Israel Military Industries (IMI), based in Ramat Hasharon, and Tel Aviv-based Explosive Industries Ltd. (EIL). Nations listed in the trade press as acquiring IMI mines include Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nigeria and Zaire.(167) EIL's No. 4 plastic antipersonnel mine was found by British deminers in the Falklands/Malvinas.(168) Israel has also imported landmines. It has imported no antipersonnel landmines from the U.S., but has imported over 1.9 million antitank mines.(169)
Israel is believed to possess a substantial inventory of antipersonnel mines. Details on the size and composition are not available.
Israel has used mines extensively in combat, and for border protection. Israel's borders with Jordan and Syria are mined, as are the territories occupied in the 1967 war. In addition, both Israeli forces and non-state actors, notably Hezbollah, are using mines in the Israeli-occupied zone in south Lebanon. Most recently, in February 1999, Lebanon accused Israel of laying landmines along a fence in the village of Arnoun.(170) The Israel/Lebanon Monitoring Group is examining the matter.
There are an estimated 260,000 mines in Israel, mostly along the borders, and the occupied territories. Israel and Jordan in 1997 carried out a combined project of clearing minefields along their border. It is unclear if any systematic mine clearance is now underway in Israel or whether Israel has undertaken any mine awareness programs directed at civilians.
Internationally, Israel contributed $98,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.(171) Israel has increasingly become involved in marketing its mine clearance products. Israel has considerable expertise in demining and has offered its assistance to mine-affected countries in the realm of mine surveys, mine awareness activities, and transfer of mine clearance equipment.(172) It is engaged in mine clearance and mine awareness operations in Angola.(173)
Landmine Casualties/Survivor Assistance
Civilians have fallen casualty to uncleared landmines in the Golan Heights, West Bank and other areas.(174) (See special report on Palestine). Israel maintains rehabilitation programs for its disabled veterans and their families, including medical services, psychological counseling, education, and vocational rehabilitation.(175) No information was available regarding similar programs for civilian victims.
Kuwait has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It has sent mixed signals on its mine ban policy. It voted for the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines. It attended the treaty preparatory meetings in early 1997, but did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Still, Kuwait came to the Oslo negotiations in September as a full participant, not an observer, and voted for the 1997 UNGA resolution supporting the December treaty signing. Yet, it came to the Ottawa signing conference only as an observer, and did not sign the treaty. Subsequently, it voted for the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming new signatories and urging full implementation of the treaty. Kuwait is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Kuwait is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. According to the UN mines database, Kuwait has said that it does not have a stockpile of AP mines, and in 1996 stated that it would not use antipersonnel mines, with certain unidentified exceptions.(176)
According to a 1993 U.S. State Department report, during the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi forces laid millions of mines to prevent Allied Forces from recapturing Kuwaiti territory.(177) Allied forces also dropped Gator scatterable antipersonnel mines from the air. Many failed to detonate on impact, and thus became de facto antipersonnel mines.(178) In the aftermath of the conflict, Kuwait had an estimated 728 square kilometers of land seeded with an estimated five to seven million Russian PMN, Italian VS-50 and VS-69, and U.S. Gator mines.(179) Mines were laid along the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia, along the Kuwaiti coastline, along power lines, highways, and around oil fields.(180)
The government of Kuwait spent US $800 million hiring over 4,000 private contractors from a number of different countries who cleared over 1.6 million mines and unexploded ordnance.(181) Eighty-four people lost their lives and 200 were injured in this massive clearance effort. Even with the demining, 1,700 Kuwaiti civilians were killed by landmines between 1991 and 1995.(182)
In 1995, Kuwait announced that it was officially cleared of the 5-7 million landmines leftover from the Gulf War. However, it noted that there were still some areas of Kuwait that had not been demined, particularly around Bedouin watering holes.(183) Although all of the 728 sq km of minefields have undergone initial mine clearance, because wind storms bury mines deep in the sand, many of the minefields did not pass quality assurance inspections and had to be re-cleared.(184)
Kuwait has not contributed any money to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance. It has made no known donations to other mine action programs.
Mine Ban Policy
Lebanon has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty and it showed little interest in the Ottawa Process. While it did not attend treaty preparatory meetings early in 1997, the government came to the Brussels conference in June 1997 but did not endorse the pro-treaty Final Declaration, nor did it participate in the treaty negotiations in Oslo. It attended the Mine Ban Treaty signing conference in Ottawa as an observer. Somewhat surprisingly then, Lebanon voted in favor of all three key pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
At the Brussels Conference in June 1997, the Lebanese government representative said, "At the moment, Lebanon cannot sign any treaty that has negative implications on national resistance against Israel in South Lebanon.... Lebanon suggests that the Treaty must contain clear items taking into consideration the self-defense principle, the state of occupied territories and the legal rights of member countries of the United Nations. But, a non-signatory state should not be deprived of any assistance in support of demining and other related mine related actions. Lebanon will sign the Treaty whenever Israel withdraws."(185)
The Foreign Ministry reiterated the government's position in December 1998: "Lebanon agrees to and appreciates all noble principles and objectives of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty. However, Lebanon did not sign the Treaty due to the Israeli occupation of West Bekaa and South Lebanon. Israel is still laying landmines in South Lebanon. Lebanon sees that all countries, signatory and non-signatory, should benefit from assistance in mine clearance and mine action."(186)
While this official position is clear, discussion about the landmine issue and the Treaty inside the country is beginning to take place. On 11-12 February 1999 the "Regional Conference on the Menace of Landmines in the Arab Countries" took place in Beirut. Organized by the non-governmental Landmines Resource Center in collaboration with the Lebanese Army, the conference was supported financially by Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, the ICBL and other organizations.(187) The conference brought together representatives from the governments and armies of a large number of the Arab countries, in addition to the ICBL and other non-governmental organizations from Arab and non-Arab countries, and international organizations such as UNICEF and the UNDP.
The Conference sought to begin developing collaboration and coordination among various parties on issues related to landmines and their eventual elimination. These issues included the exchange of data and information; a better understanding of the needs of mine-affected communities; advocacy and building public awareness; mobilizing and expanding resources; as well as expanding and institutionalizing commitments. The emphasis was on the importance of involvement and partnership among all concerned - particularly with community members and the armed forces -to develop a sustainable framework to achieve these goals. The final statement called for more financial assistance and support for mine action programs, but did not mention the Mine Ban Treaty.
Lebanon is a non-signatory of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use
Lebanon is not believed to have either produced or exported antipersonnel mines. There are no formal restrictions on production or trade in place. During the war, the government of Lebanon imported mines from a number of different countries. The United States sold Lebanon 5,352 M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel landmines in 1983-84.(188) Details on other suppliers are not available. The Lebanese Army has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but the size and composition is unknown.
In the ongoing conflict in south Lebanon, mines continue to be used by both Israel and non-state actors. In February 1999, Lebanon accused Israel of laying landmines along a fence in the village of Arnoun.(189) The Israel/Lebanon Monitoring Group is examining the matter. Non-state actors in Lebanon, notably Hezbollah, have used both mines and improvised explosive devices, some of which may have been manufactured locally, and others obtained from external sources. It is likely that various armed groups in Lebanon have their own stockpiles of mines. It has been reported that Hezbollah's arsenal includes landmines, though more frequently it has used improvised explosive devices.(190)
Lebanon is recovering from fifteen years of civil conflict (1975-1990). The fighting involved many armed forces and factions, foreign and domestic -- both government and non-state actors. At one time or another, virtually all parties to the conflict used landmines. Fighting--and mine use--continues in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon.
Estimates of the number of mines and minefields in Lebanon vary greatly, and in most cases, the figures cited do not include mines in southern Lebanon. According to the United Nations, there are approximately 8,795 landmines in the ground in Lebanon,(191) but the U.S. State Department gives a range of between 8,795 and 35,000 landmines in Lebanon, in some 182 minefields.(192)
The Lebanese Army has said that "Lebanon is asking the world's assistance in clearing the more than 200,000 Russian, U.S., Chinese, and Israeli landmines littering the country."(193) But at the Regional Conference in February, the Army estimated that there are 681 minefields containing 28,508 mines, with another 868 suspected minefields containing 28,500 mines, excluding the Israeli-occupied regions of the South and West Bekaa.(194) Mines can be found in both urban and rural areas and there are virtually no maps.(195) In 1997, the Army said that the most endangered region is the eastern Bekaa Vally, where about 11 tons of mines and UXO are scattered in 70 square kilometer area inhabited by 20,000 people.(196)
As of July 1995, the following areas still had uncleared landmines:
1) Beirut - along the "green line," the old demarcation line;
2) North Metn - Wadi Jamajem, Sanine, Ain Teffahah, and Zeghrine;
3) Upper Metn - along the old demarcation line of Krayeh, Raas El Harf, and Aarbaniyeh;
4) Kessrouan - Ouyan Al Siman and Wadi Jeiita;
5) Byblos and Batroun - along the old demarcation lines (Ferghal, Bekhaz, Chebtine);
6) Chouf - along the old demarcation lines (Chahar Gharbi, Dayr al Kamar, and Barouk);
7) Souk el Gharb - along the old demarcation line (Souk el Gharb, Kayfoun, Kmatiyeh, Aytat, Bsaba and Maaroufiyeh);
8) Bekaa al Gharbi - Falouj.(197)
A mine survey was conducted in December 1996 through a project of the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health and the Association for the Welfare of the Disabled and the Elderly in Rashayya and West Bekaa. The project was implemented with technical and material assistance from the World Rehabilitation Fund. Other non-governmental organizations and community-based groups participated actively. The survey confirmed the seriousness of the landmine situation in Lebanon.
In Lebanon, mine clearance is carried out exclusively by the Army. It reports that from the end of the war in 1990 to June 1995, some 298 minefields were cleared and 15,250 AP mines destroyed.(198) The U.S. Department of Defense is providing support for the creation of the National Demining Office in the Lebanese Army, including training, equipment and operational costs. U.S. commitment to that project is US$6,134,000.(199) The French Army is also involved with technical assistance to the Lebanese Army. In addition, France has been involved in mine clearance around its embassy.
The number of trained clearance professionals in the Army is not adequate, which, coupled with limited material resources, hinders demining operations. As in too many countries in the world, clearance operations are also affected by incomplete information as to the size of the problem and the exact location and dimensions of all minefields. The terrain of Lebanon presents an additional difficulty and challenge; rocky mountainous terrain hampers all clearance efforts. Mine clearance teams suffered many casualties when they tried to first neutralize the mines in place and then remove them to be destroyed by explosives in a central location. Whenever possible, mines are now destroyed in place with explosives.(200)
The Army has found the following antipersonnel mines in the process of mine clearance: PRBM35 and PRBNR413 (Belgium); TYPE72A (China); PPMISR (Czech Republic); APEDF1, APDV51 and APDV59 (France); GYATA (Hungary); N4, N10 and M12A1 (Israel); VS50 and P25 (Italy) MAPS (Portugal)POMZ2, PMD, PMD6M, PMN2, PMN6 and MON-50 (Russia); FFV013 (Sweden); M14 and M18 (USA).(201)
Mine awareness and related education was very limited until the initiation of the World Rehabilitation Fund project in June of 1998. Until then, mine awareness activities included a poster designed, printed and distributed in 1996 by the Welfare Association for the Disabled and the Elderly in the area of West Bekaa; a conference in 1997 to disseminate the results of a survey of mine victims in the area of West Bekaa; a national conference in February 1998; and limited community meetings and meetings with decision makers. In addition, the ICRC has been active throughout Lebanon, distributing 50,000 pocket calendars and 300 wall calendars in support of the landmine campaign in 1997. Hezbollah members were among the recipients.(202)
In 1998, USAID approved $600,000 to support of a project of the World Rehabilitation Fund. The publicity campaign, "Preventing landmines Injuries and Managing The Social Burden Of Landmines In Lebanon," targets schools, public meetings and municipal councils.(203) This project has resulted in a remarkable increase in the number, scope and coverage of mine awareness activities implemented with NGO and community-based organizations. Activities include: community meetings, lectures, workshops and discussion sessions; posters, brochures, booklets, pamphlets and other widely-distributed printed materials; and radio and television programs. Target populations are groups at risk of injuries because of residing in mine-infested areas or in areas close to minefields. Particular attention is focused on children and individuals involved with farming related activities. The National Demining Office has cooperated with these mine awareness activities and has produced two posters and one pamphlet related to the issue.
Information about landmine casualties is incomplete and often unavailable. The first formal attempt to gauge the magnitude of the problem was a survey of victims conducted in fifty-two villages in the Region of West Bekaa near the end of 1996. The survey exposed many facets of the problem and gave a feel of the overwhelming resulting socio-economic burden.
The National Prosthetics and Orthotics Technical Unit of the Ministry of Health, established in 1995 in collaboration with the World Rehabilitation Fund, indicates that more than 35% of individuals in need of prosthetic and orthotic devices and services are survivors of landmine injuries. The Ministry of Health has estimated that over a 15-year period landmines have killed 189 people and disabled 212 others.(204) Available data shows that injuries due to landmines and unexploded ordnance occurred in different parts of Lebanon with clustering in regions of the South and West Bekaa where it is estimated that 60% of the injuries are due to unexploded ordnance.(205)
The Landmines Resource Center is currently spearheading and coordinating a nation-wide door-to-door survey in an effort to gain detailed understanding of the profile of victims and survivors, the nature and location of injuries and related needs. The survey was initiated late in August 1998 and results are expected by the second half of 1999. At this stage, the Landmines Resource Center is able to report the following:
* it is currently estimated that there are more than 1,200 mine survivors, including children and adults,
* injuries are still occurring at an average rate of one per week, with a higher proportion of males than females.
* there is one death for every one surviving injured person,
* there is around one landmine related injury (survivor/victim) for every 250 individuals in "risky" areas,
* the majority of survivors were injured while engaged in agricultural activities in the immediate vicinity or within walking distance of their homes.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Programs to assist survivors, families of victims and mine-affected communities are scarce. Various social welfare, assistance and development programs, and activities implemented by governmental bodies, NGOs and community-based organizations attempt to meet these needs, but the programs are inadequately funded and limited in scope and range of services.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), under the auspices of the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund which provides prostheses to mine victims, provided to Lebanon a total of just over $2 million dollars 1989 and 1991 fund.(206)
The Lebanese Government supports programs of the Ministries of Health and Social Affairs, but funds are extremely limited, and dedicated programs are non-existent.
First aid and emergency care are not readily available, and often absent, particularly in rural areas where injuries in farmland is common. Emergency transport is deficient as well as the skills of those providing first aid. Additionally, the skills and knowledge of "front-line" surgeons in medical and surgical management of landmine injuries is limited. This has an adverse impact on limiting the damage secondary to injury and results in delays and complications in rehabilitation services, particularly when there is need for prosthetic and orthotic devices.
Rehabilitation and social integration services targeting survivors are limited and mostly restricted to physical rehabilitation services. There are thirty-four prosthetic workshops in Lebanon and survivors receive a prosthetic from the Ministry of Health through a contracted workshop. Programs addressing the psychological needs of survivors are practically non-existent. Also, there is limited awareness among victims of available assistance and rehabilitation programs, particularly in rural areas. There are no known outreach programs. Survivors and their families have to seek services and have to cross and handle many barriers in the process. Services targeting families of victims are practically non-existent. The only related services are those targeting orphans.
Mine Ban Policy
Libya has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. In October 1998, the Libyan representative stated to the UN General Assembly that the treaty was a significant step, but that "implementation of the instrument should be global and should also address the question of demining.... Libya [requires] technical assistance for demining efforts."(207)
Libya attended several of the treaty preparatory diplomatic meetings, as well as the Oslo negotiations, but only as an observer in each case. Libya did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Libya was absent for the pro-ban 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions, and was one of only nineteen nations to abstain on the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming new signatories to the treaty and urging its full implementation. Libya is not a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use
Libya is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Libya has imported mines, presumably mostly from the former Soviet Union.(208) Mines found in Libya include PDM-1M, PMN, and POMZ-2 types. The size and composition of Libya's antipersonnel mine stockpile is unknown.
Libya planted mines during its 1977 war with Egypt. Palestinian refugees now camped in Libya have encountered these landmines.(209) Libya also planted mines from 1977 to 1987 in its conflict with Chad. Libya has used landmines as well for perimeter defense around both economically-important sites and military bases.
Libya is mined in the regions south of the Sahara, as well as in Benghazi. In addition, the beaches on the Gulf of Sidra and its borders with Egypt and countries to the south are known to be mined.(210) Estimates of the number of landmines in Libya vary. The U.S. State Department says that there are approximately 100,000 mines on Libya's territory, the majority of which are World War II-era German, British, U.S., and Italian mines.(211) Libyan officials have stated that there are "millions of landmines buried in Libya."(212)
Mine Awareness and Clearance
Libya has slowly begun to address its landmine problem. The Libyan People's Army has carried out some demining, but lack of maps and technical expertise has hampered efforts. Libya has begun removing mines from the Benghazi region as well as from the Sahara region. While the clearance of the Benghazi region benefits local civilians there, the clearance of parts of the Sahara facilitate natural gas exploration. Libya signed an agreement with Italy in July 1997 to receive financial and technical aid for demining and to map known minefields for future clearance efforts. A joint Libyan-Italian fund would be established to finance the rehabilitation of affected areas and the training of specialists to treat affected people.(213)
Libya's agriculture ministry estimates that the removal of mines buried on arable land will cost approximately 161.14 million dinars. The ministry estimates the loss of earnings from the non-use of mined arable lands to be about 511.47 million dinars, while it estimates the loss from non-use of mined grazing lands to pastures to be about 124.55 million dinars.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has distributed information kits on landmines to authorities in the North Africa region, although no specifics regarding Libya are known.(214)
Libya has recorded a total of 11,845 landmine victims including 6,749 deaths. The break-down below was compiled by Libyan police.(215)
Period Deaths Wounded Total
1940-1952 3780 3290 7070
1952-1975 1890 1645 3535
1975-1995 1079 161 1240
Libya's Department of Assistance to Victims of Mines, which operates within its Justice Ministry, estimates that for the period 1950 to 1977 the funds allocated to the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims amount to 2.042 million Libyan dinars.(216)
Mine Ban Policy
Morocco has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Morocco attended the treaty preparatory conferences, the Oslo treaty negotiations, and the Ottawa treaty signing ceremony, but only as an observer in each case. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Morocco voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines (passed 156-0, with 10 abstentions), but it was one of just eighteen countries which abstained from voting on the 1997 UNGA Resolution inviting all states to sign the Mine Ban Treaty; and one of nineteen countries which abstained from voting on the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming new signatories to the treaty and urging its full implementation.
Morocco is not a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter of efforts to negotiate a mine transfer ban in that forum.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Morocco does not produce antipersonnel mines, and is not know to have exported mines. Morocco has imported numerous types of mines. According to an Italian research institute, during a three year period from 1976 to 1978, Morocco imported a total of $6.5 million worth of VS-50 antipersonnel and VS-1.6 antitank mines from the Italian company Valsella.(217) Morocco is also known to have mines of Spanish, Russian, French, and U.S. origin.(218) There is, at present, no concrete information on the number and types of mines Morocco retains in its stock.
Morocco has an estimated 200,000 landmines on its territory, the majority of which are concentrated in southern Morocco and Western Sahara.(219) (See also the special report on Western Sahara). Moroccan mine use has been concentrated in the disputed Western Sahara, of which Morocco currently controls over seventy-five percent. The battle for Western Sahara began in 1976 after the departure of Spanish colonial forces, Morocco laid claim to the territory but had to battle Mauritania and the Western Sahara independence movement Frente Polisario, the Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro. In 1979, Mauritania exited the conflict and Morocco soon annexed most of the former Mauritanian claim in the south of the Territory. During the 1980's, Morocco's strategy was to slowly consolidate its control over the territory. This strategy relied heavily on landmines. A UN brokered cease-fire and plan for a referendum on integration into Morocco or independence for the Territory came into effect in 1991. The planned referendum has experienced endless delays over the past eight years.
In 1982, the Royal Moroccan Army completed the first defensive wall, or berm, to secure the northwest corner of Western Sahara. The RMA completed constructed on subsequent defensive berms in 1984, 1985 and 1987. In all, six berms were built, four in the north of the territory and two further south. The current dividing line between Morocco and Polisario held territories is made up of part of berms four and five and all of berm six in the southern sector of the territory. The berms are made of earth piled two to three meters high and reinforced with security measures including extensive use of antitank and antipersonnel landmines.
Although not willing to give specifics about the mining of the berms, the RMA has told the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) that it mined "all approaches to their positions on the flanks and the rear in addition to minefields laid in front of their positions."(220) An unnamed RMA officer informed MINURSO, the UN mission to oversee the Western Sahara cease-fire and referendum process, that between one and two million mines were used to reinforce the berms.(221) Antitank minefields extend one hundred meters to the east of the berms towards the Polisario positions with antipersonnel minefields closer to the berm itself.(222) The UN assumes five to ten kilometers in front and to the rear of the berm to be dangerous and enforces a five kilometer buffer zone where no military or civilian personnel are allowed to the east of the berm.(223) Portions of the other berms that now stand within Moroccan held territory are suspected to still be mined by MINURSO personnel.(224)
In addition to the berm minefields, mines were used extensively by all three of the warring factions during the fifteen years of war. UN reports state that the RMA has lifted or reported to MINURSO most "useless" minefields and "sometimes basically marked" them.(225) There have been claims by Moroccan researchers that mines do not pose a threat in the Moroccan held territory because the RMA has all the necessary maps.(226) However, MINURSO Team Site personnel report that the RMA is not aware of all minefields and that accidents do take place.(227) In fact, old Polisario minefields in Moroccan held territory continue to cause accidents especially in the south of the Territory where the RMA Awserd commander reported eleven mine accidents among RMA troops in a seven month period in 1997.(228)
A list of mines found in all of the Western Sahara is contained in the Landmine Monitor special report on Western Sahara.
In addition to demining and UXO clearance, the SDU also worked in organizing the MINURSO Mine Action Cell (MAC) in Layounne and providing mine awareness to MINURSO personnel and visitors.(229) As part of the SDU mine awareness a booklet was produced with advice on avoiding danger, what to do in a mined area, what to do in case of an accident and illustrations and descriptions of mines found in Western Sahara.(230) UNHCR expressed a desire to establish a mine awareness program for returning refugees, but no updates are available.(231) Norwegian People's Aid has also implemented a mine awareness program in Western Sahara (see Western Sahara for more detail). After the departure of the SDU, two Pakistani engineers assigned to MINURSO were tasked with the MAC duties until they were to be repatriated by the beginning of February.(232)
To date, there have been limited efforts to survey mark and clear mines and UXO in the Moroccan territory. The RMA is reported to have lifted some of its minefields to the west of the berm, but there are no details on the number of mines or area cleared.(233) MINURSO Team Site reports also note that RMA forces would conduct clearance in areas where mine accidents have taken place.(234) In March 1999, the Moroccan government agreed to a proposal from the MINURSO Force Commander to begin mine removal in the Moroccan held territory.(235) The agreement provides for "the exchange of information about all previously identified mines and unexploded ordnance in the areas west and north of the defensive sand-wall (berm) and their step-by-step destruction by the Royal Moroccan Army, as well as about any incidents involving mines and unexploded ordnance."(236)
In late 1997 and early 1998, the United Nations approached Sweden for a demining capacity for the MINURSO mission and to address needs of UNHCR. UNHCR requests did not extend to the west of the berm as UNHCR had not yet received formal recognition from the Moroccan government and had conducted no reconnaissance in the area. The Swedish Demining Unit (SDU) arrived in Layounne in May 1998. The Unit was operational for only half of the five months it was in the territory, due to concerns by the Moroccan authorities about the import of essential equipment, which was resolved with signing of the Second Military Agreement (MA2) between MINURSO and the Moroccan authorities.(237) Only two of the six dogs brought by the Swedes became operational during deployment.
West of the berm, the SDU worked in and around MINURSO Team Sites in Smara, Dakhla, Mahbas, Tichla, Awsard, Guelta Zenmour, and Bir Gandouz.(238) The Unit also worked on the proposed Team Site area at Haouza. Of the 534 UXOs and two antitank mines the SDU destroyed in the field, ten UXOs were found and destroyed at two of the Team Sites where the Unit worked west of the berm.(239) The remainder of the items were found and destroyed in Polisario held territory. The Unit did not report any antipersonnel mines during its filed operations. Because of the short period of operation, The SDU did not complete work its work west of the berm related to the proposed Haouze Team Site and some other tasks to be identified by MINURSO. In its final report, the SDU noted that of the tasks it was assigned for the entire territory, there remains four months work for an EOD team and the need for a permanent EOD capacity for the life of the UN mission.
Western Sahara has been identified by the UN Mine Action Service as a priority for Level 1 Survey to identify contaminated areas and associated socio-economic impact to determine demining and victim assistance priorities and resource needs. While UNMAS notes that a survey is required, it adds that the current political situation creates difficulties in the execution of such a survey.(240)
Very little information is available about the extent of mine accidents, number of victims and access to medical and rehabilitation services in the Moroccan held portion of Western Sahara. As already noted, eleven accidents were reported by the RMA Awserd Commander in a seven month period in 1997. The UN Team Sites record mine accidents they are aware of in their individual sectors. From the beginning of the mission in 1991 until July 1998, the Team Sites west of the berm recorded almost fifty mine or UXO incidents.(241) A notable accident happened in 1996 during the Paris-Dakar Rally. During stage five of the 1996 Rally, a vehicle hit an explosive device near to Smara killing the driver and injuring two others.(242) However, according to Moroccan authorities, it was not a mine that caused the accident.(243)
Mine Ban Policy
Oman has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. At the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December 1997, Oman stated: "The Sultanate of Oman shares wholeheartedly in the aims of the campaign for a total global ban.... I also reaffirm that my Government is currently considering joining you as signatories to the Convention as soon as possible."(244) Oman attended the treaty preparatory meetings and the Oslo negotiations, but only as an observer in each case. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. However, Oman voted in favor of all of the pro-ban U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. In October 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs commended the efforts which led to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, but made no commitment for Oman to sign and ratify the treaty.(245)
Oman is not a signatory to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use
Oman does not produce or export mines but has no formal restrictions in place which would bar future production or trade. Oman has imported antipersonnel mines. The United States delivered a total of 802 M18A1 Claymore landmines to Oman in 1978 and 1981.(246) No information is available on other suppliers. It is assumed that Oman currently has a stockpile of APMs.
Oman is slightly mine-affected in its border areas. The UN notes that the British Mark-7 mine has been found in Oman.(247) There are no known mine action programs underway. Oman has not made any contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance or to other mine action programs. It suffers from fewer than ten landmine casualties per year.(248)
Saudi Arabia has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997 and attended the Oslo negotiations only as an observer. However, Saudi Arabia voted "Yes" on both the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines, and the 1997 UNGA resolution supporting the December treaty signing. It is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) or its protocol on landmines.
Saudi Arabia is not believed to be mine-affected. It is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Saudi Arabia has imported AP mines. The U.S. has supplied 87,666 antipersonnel landmines, including more than 43,210 M14s in 1976 and 30,000 M16A2s in 1977.(249) The size and composition of its current stockpile is unknown. Saudi Arabia has contributed $50,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.(250)
Syria has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Syria has been a strong defender of the continued need for antipersonnel mines, and has spoken out against the Ottawa Process. Syria attended the treaty preparatory meetings as an observer, but did not participate in the actual negotiations in Oslo. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Syria was one of just ten states who abstained from voting on the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international ban on antipersonnel mines (passed 156-0). It was also one of eighteen who abstained from voting on the 1997 resolution supporting the December treaty signing, and one of nineteen who abstained from voting on the 1998 resolution promoting the treaty. Syria has stated that antipersonnel landmines are an important weapon of defense against Israel, and for this reason, it is unable to sign the Mine Ban Treaty.
Syria is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) or its protocol on landmines. Syria is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a supporter of efforts to negotiate a ban on mine transfers in that forum.
Syria is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines; however, it has no formal restrictions in place which would bar future production or trade. Syria has imported large numbers of mines, but details are not available; likewise there is no information on the current size or composition of the Syrian landmine arsenal.
Minefields have been laid over the past twenty years in grazing areas adjacent to the UN buffer zone. The Golan Heights, currently divided between Israel, Syria and a UN buffer zone, are heavily mined with unmarked and unmapped minefields in which civilians, especially shepherds, suffer casualties on a regular basis.(251) The landmines found are of U.S., Russian, Czech and French origin.(252) The United Nations Disengagement Forces have been involved in mine clearance efforts. Several peacekeepers have been injured or killed by landmines.(253) In 1998, the U.S. State Department noted that Syria may have as many as 100,000 landmines along its highly restricted border areas and that Syria claims it has no landmine problem.(254)
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The United Arab Emirates has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has sent mixed signals with respect to its mine ban policy. It voted "Yes" on the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution supporting negotiations of a total ban on antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. It attended the treaty preparatory diplomatic meetings in early 1997. However, it did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. Yet, it then attended the Oslo negotiations in September as a full participant, and later voted "Yes" on the 1997 UNGA resolution calling on nations to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. But in Ottawa in December it did not sign. According to one source, the UAE had told the Canadian government that it was willing to sign the treaty, although not necessarily when it first opened for signature on 3 December 1997.(255) While it has still not signed, it voted in favor of the 1998 UNGA resolution calling on all states to sign the treaty and to attend the first meeting of States Parties in Mozambique in May 1999. The UAE is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons.
The United Arab Emirates is not mine-affected. It is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter and there are no known stockpiles of landmines on its territory. The UAE has not made any contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance or to any known mine action programs.
Northern Iraq is one of the most heavily mined areas in the world. Millions of mines were sown in the region by the Iraqi army in the years prior to the 1991 Gulf War.(256) Northern Iraq remains under the control of two main Kurdish factions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Periodic fighting between the two factions has involved the use of landmines which have occasionally hindered the distribution of United Nations relief work.(257) The region has been autonomous from Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War when the United States set up a "safe haven" for Iraq's Kurdish population. There is no formal diplomatic recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan or the KDP or PUK.
With no international recognition, neither faction has been able to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Dilshad Miran, the London representative of the KDP said, "We are totally against landmines in all their forms.... They destroy people's lives in the region and hinder reconstruction."(258)
There is credible evidence that landmines continue to be used in northern Iraq, albeit on a limited scale during the periods of factional fighting that have engulfed the region. Since 1991 there has been sporadic fighting in the region which has involved the KDP, PUK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Iraqi military and the Turkish military. In 1997, for example, the PUK laid antitank mines along the road stretching through the Balisan valley to halt the advance of the Turkish tanks.(259) According to UN representatives mines have also been laid between the frontlines of the KDP and PUK after clashes.(260)
The situation has been complicated by the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq. The PKK uses the Iraqi border as a base to launch assaults against Turkey and regularly clashes with the KDP. Fighting for Kurdish autonomy in southeastern Turkey, the PKK presence has repeatedly brought the Turkish military into the region. The KDP have accused the PKK of laying mines in the region; reports have suggested that the roads between Sarsang and Amadiyah have been mined by the PKK.(261) The majority of reports of new use revolve around mines allegedly laid by the PKK in the border region which have hindered Turkish military operations against the PKK.(262) In May 1997, for example 12 Turkish soldiers were reportedly killed by PKK landmines in northern Iraq on the Iraqi side of the border.(263) While mines apparently continue to be used, the numbers are small compared to the vast number of mines laid by the Iraqi government, which remain the mainstay of the problem in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Large swathes of northern Iraq remain heavily mined. The U.S. State Department estimated in 1993 that there were five to ten million landmines in Iraq; by 1998 it estimated that there were ten million mines in Iraqi Kurdistan.(264) The most heavily mined area is the Halabja region along the border with Iran. Mines have been placed in a vast number of different places ranging from roads, power lines, grazing land, depopulated villages and former military barracks used by the Iraqi army. All in all there are several thousand minefields of various sizes that have been charted by agencies involved in clearance.
Landmines have prevented the return of refugees and displaced persons, particularly in the area bordering Iran. The most vulnerable people are farmers living in rural areas, livestock herders and children unaware of the dangers of mines.(265) Mines also contribute to a cycle of poverty in the region. People unable to return to their villages are forced to remain without employment in towns. The presence of mines also hampers reconstruction efforts in destroyed villages as every mine has to be cleared before villagers can return in safety. Those who do try and return to their villages are often maimed or killed by mines if the area has not been cleared.(266) If any records exist they are in the hands of the Iraqi government and are not available to outside inspection. The four governorates in Iraqi Kurdistan have respectively 1,278 minefields (Sulaymanya governorate), 549 minefields (Erbil governorate: specifically in the districts of Chorman, Soran and Merga Sor), 295 minefields (Dohuk governorate: specifically in the districts of Amedia, Duhok and Zakho), 201 minefields ( New Kirkuk governorate: specifically in the districts of Khanqin, Darbanikhan and Chamchamal).(267) The greatest concentration of mines, though, is along the Iran-Iraq border, specifically in the districts of Penjwin, Sharbazher and Qaladiza.(268) In 1993, Middle East Watch surveyed fifteen minefields where there was an absence of signs and where the minefields were located near land utilized by civilians for farming or other purposes. Shirawash, Sardekan Hill, Derband Gorge, Konyarasukosa, Nowpredam, Eenay, Pirdi Kashan, Chapazra, and Zakho are but a small sample of the minefields scattered throughout northern Iraq.(269)
Other mined areas include: former Iraqi military installations, destroyed villages, grazing/agricultural areas, and roads.(270) Of primary importance, though, are the number of villages affected by mines. According to the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 800 villages are affected by mines, which makes up nearly 20% of the rural area in the region.(271)
MAG indicates the following landmines have been found in northern Iraq:(272)
No. 4 Israel
Under the UN brokered deal of oil for food with Baghdad, US$16.5 million was allocated for mine clearance and surveys in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1998. The funds were earmarked for the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), which is involved in mine clearance in the region.(273) A number of countries have donated mine action support funds, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.(274)
There are three agencies involved in clearing mines in northern Iraq: MAG, Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), and UNOPS. All the agencies operate with the cooperation and help of the local regional authorities - either KDP or PUK.(275)
MAG has cleared 1.2 square kilometers of land in ninety-six minefields, removing 37,000 landmines and 143,493 pieces of UXO.(276) The priority has been given to areas of habitation, transport and greatest population density. Border and uninhabited areas are given a low priority.
Although the local authorities are providing protection, threats to demining organizations exist in the region. Baghdad has demanded the withdrawal of MAG and NPA from the region, claiming the organizations are working illegally in the area. In December 1998, Iraq sent a letter to the Secretary General of the UN stating that it opposed the mine clearance because it violated Iraq's sovereignty and national integrity, and requested that the deminers be removed.(277) Booby traps have also been attached to cars belonging to demining personnel in the region.(278)
All known mined areas in the region are marked either by signs or by strips of wire placed along the mine affected area.(279) MAG runs a mine awareness program which operates throughout the region, visiting villages, collective towns and schools. As part of this program, MAG developed a "Safer Village Strategy" which involves communities in finding nontechnical solutions to landmine problems and targets mine clearance resources to areas of greatest need.(280) MAG has worked with UNICEF and local officials to produce a mine awareness book for schools to help children identify landmines and teach them how to avoid them.(281)
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
According to MAG, a total of 5,394 people have been injured and 2,933 killed by landmines since 1991.(282) Mine casualties have been declining significantly in the region since 1991.(283) In 1998 forty people were killed and 207 were injured.(284) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Iraqi Red Crescent run victim assistance centers and orthopedic centers in Iraqi Kurdistan. There are a variety of local hospitals where landmine victims can be treated. Hospitals are found in all major towns: Zakho, Dohuk, Salahudin, Erbil and Sulymanya. Whether the victim reaches a hospital is another matter. Those who are hurt in more rural areas tend to have a lesser chance of survival if transport is not immediately available.
Prosthetic limbs are manufactured by Handicap International (HI), which has workshops in Sulaymanya and Ranya. HI opened its Sulaymanya workshop in 1991. By April 1993, it had assessed 1740 cases and determined 950 people were injured by landmines. In that same time period, HI produced 1,206 prosthetic devices.(285) Victims receive no financial compensation from the respective regional authorities who, in any case, simply do not have the funding.
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established in 1994 following the Oslo Agreement of 1993. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip identifies areas under Israeli and Palestinian control. Zone A comprises the six cities in the West Bank, and the Palestinian Council has full responsibility for internal security. Zone B comprises the Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank, in which the Palestinian Council has responsibility for civil authority and Israel has overriding security authority. Zone C comprises the unpopulated areas of the West Bank and Jewish settlements, for which Israel retains responsibility.(286)
Decades of war and instability have left thousands of antipersonnel and antitank landmines on these lands. The problem of landmines and UXO has not yet been discussed in the peace negotiations between Israel and the PNA.
Mine Ban Policy
The PNA does not have the international legal status to sign or ratify international treaties, including the Mine Ban Treaty The PNA has not made any public policy statements with regard to the treaty, or a landmine ban more generally. In February 1999, a representative of the Palestine National Liberation Army called on developed countries which produce, sell and transfer antipersonnel mines to halt immediately.(287)
The number of landmines planted in Palestine is not exactly known and there are no precise and comprehensive statistics from any source. In addition to the mines that have been planted by numerous armed forces over the years, unexploded ordnance (UXO) left behind by the Israeli army following military training represent a threat to the Palestinian people. Landmine and UXO explosions occur frequently in the Palestinian territories and tens of victims, as a result, fall annually.(288)
A study by Defense for Children International/Palestine Section indicated that most of the mines are laid, and 94% of mine and UXO accidents have occurred, in Zones B and C.(289) Palestinians currently have restricted or no access to large areas of land in Zones B and C. Lieutenant Jihad Jayousi from the operation division at the National Security Leadership in the West Bank gave a presentation on minefields and UXOs in the West Bank.(290) Lieutenant Jayousi indicated that the Israeli government has declared the existence of sixteen minefields in the West Bank: five minefields in Jenin district, one minefield in Tulkarem district, two minefields in Qlaqilya district, three minefields in Bethlehem district, three mine fields in Ramallah and Jerusalem Districts, and two minefields in the Hebron district. Lieutenant Jayousi made the following remarks:
Most of the landmines were planted by the British army during the British Mandate or by the Jordanian army before the 1967 War. The purpose of planting landmines by the Jordanian army was to delay an Israeli possible military attack using tanks. Most of these minefields include anti-tank landmines are found on the sides of strategic roads that lead to the main towns of the West Bank.
There is no definite information that the Israeli army has expanded the borders of the minefields after the occupation of the West Bank except for the main minefield east of Qalqilya.
After the occupation of the West Bank, Israel has not attempted to clean those fields although they are located in the center of the West Bank and have no military value. The exception was the removal of fences around the minefield near al-Nabi Elias village in the Qalqilya district and declaring the area as safe. A number of explosions took place since the removal of the fences that resulted in the injury of several Palestinian civilians.
The majority of minefields are located in areas under the Israeli security authority (Zones B and C). Legally and ethically speaking, Israel is responsible for the safety and security of Palestinians residing in those areas.
According to published information concerning the victims of landmines, all victims were Palestinians. We have not heard of any Israeli who have been killed or injured in a landmine or an UXO explosion in the West Bank, whether they are from the Israeli settlements or from the Israeli military forces in the West Bank. Israeli soldiers know very well about the exact locations of landmines and have full details about minefields.
Israel has not declared the existence of minefields other than the ones specified above. However, military experts believe that there are a number of other minefields that include antipersonnel and anti-tank landmines. These minefields are located in the first defense line along the border areas between Jordan and the West Bank (from Ein El Bayda in the north to the Dead Sea in the south). Large minefields are located in areas close to Damia Bridge, Al-Karameh - Allenby Bridge, and King Abdullah Bridge and on the sides of main roads in the Jordan Valley that lead to Jerusalem and Nablus. Other minefields are located in the second defense line especially around the agricultural and military colonies in the Jordan Valley and in other strategic areas leading to the central areas of the West Bank.(291)
There are a number of areas in the West Bank used by the Israeli army as military training areas, which are now UXO-affected. Those areas include: the fields northeast of Tubas, Tayaseer, Tammoun, Tel El-Maleh, and Wadi Al-Bathan, the fields between Dyook to Oja villages in the Jordan Valley, the fields east of the Bethlehem and Hebron districts, the fields close to the military camps in Zababdeh (south of Jenin), Sanoor (southwest of Jenin). Arrabeh (west of Jenin), and Howarah (south of Nablus) and the fields in Al-Khan Al-Ahmar (east of Jerusalem), and Bardala and Kardala (northern area of the Jordan Valley).(292)
The ability of the PNA to clear landmines and UXO in areas under its jurisdiction is limited. It requires international technical assistance, training, equipment, and funding. Lieutenant Eisa Khrais from the operation division at the National Security Leadership in the West Bank, indicated that: "The first step in landmine clearing is to specifically identify the locations of minefields and landmines. Obtaining maps from the parties that planted the landmines is useful. A team of experts with equipment will be needed to identify the locations of landmines."(293)
Palestinian nongovernmental organizations are working to develop a comprehensive mine action program which would raise awareness and create interest from local institutions on the problem of landmines and UXOs. Current proposals suggest targeting residents of border areas, residents of areas close to military training camps, and high-risk groups (children / farmers / students).
A new project was implemented in March 1999 by Defense for Children/Palestine Section, War on Want, Norwegian People's Aid, Handicap International, and Rädda Barnen.(294) The project intends to create awareness among the Palestinian community and local organizations about the effects of landmines and UXOs on human beings and the environment; support people with disabilities (mainly landmines and UXO survivors) by training them to cope with their economic, social and emotional problems; mobilize landmine and UXO survivors to come forward with their experiences; and to lobby with Palestinian, international and Israeli-interested organizations to place the issue of landmines and mine survivors on the political agenda of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, so preventive actions could be taken.
The project also intends to create a database on the landmine and UXO-issue in Palestine. This database will include documentation of casualties and how they occurred, action taken, socio-economic conditions of casualties and mapping results of areas at risk. Access to this data will be free and be available to relevant local and international organizations.
The target group of the project is the rural population of the West Bank, numbering approximately 500,000 people. The rural, northern part of the West Bank (the regions of Jenin, Tulkaram, Qalqilyia and Nablus) will be especially targeted since it is the area with most frequent landmine and UXO incidents.
According to a study carried out by Defense for Children International/Palestine Section in 1998 on the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance in the Palestinian territories, since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, there have been more than 2,500 landmine and UXO victims--an average of more than eighty victims per year. Most of the explosions occurred in Zone C (65%), then in Zone B (29%) then in Zone A (6%).(295)
The U.N. landmine database shows that in the West Bank, an estimated thirty Palestinians have been killed and dozens more injured by landmines in the past few years.(296) According to the U.S. State Department, there have been 464 casualties in the West Bank during an unspecified period of time.(297)
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Most of the time, mine accidents cause economic disaster for the victims and their families. In many cases, victims of explosions need to undergo a number of expensive surgeries. In the absence of an effective health insurance system, the cost of treatment is paid by the family.
Victims sometime need sophisticated and long-term rehabilitation. In the past few years, a network of good rehabilitation services was established in Palestine. However, services do not cover all areas and their capacity to deal with serious cases is limited. Prosthetic workshops exist in Palestine. However, these workshops have the capacity to deal with only very simple cases which do not include serious landmine injuries. Eighteen percent of the victims have taken legal actions and requested compensation from the Israeli army.
Western Sahara is considered to be one of the most heavily mine-affected regions in the world. After years of colonial and post-colonial conflict, mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) litter the landscape. The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front (Frente Polisario, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). Moroccan and Polisario forces fought intermittently from 1975 to 1991, when a cease-fire went into effect and a United Nations peacekeeping force, MINURSO, was deployed to the region. Landmines have been used by both sides, and in particularly large numbers by Moroccan forces.
At the heart of the peace accord was an agreement to hold a free and fair referendum on self-determination or integration into the Moroccan Kingdom, but there have been long delays in the referendum process. The UN has proposed a new initiative with a referendum date of December 1999. The Polisario Front has approved, but the UN awaits the Moroccan government's acceptance of the plan. If implemented, a major task for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be the repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees from the camps south of Tindouf, Algeria, as well as from other neighboring countries. The repatriation faces two major obstacles; supplying water and avoiding mined areas. UNHCR reconnaissance trips into the eastern portion of the territory have discovered numerous mined areas that cross the repatriation route.(298)
Mine Ban Policy
In 1976, the Polisario Front declared a government in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. It was formally seated by the Organization of African Unity in 1984, and today is recognized by over seventy nations, mostly in Africa and Asia. However, it is not universally recognized and has no official representation in the United Nations, and thus was unable to sign the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa in December 1997. A senior Polisario official has told Landmine Monitor that the government is in favor of the treaty and its stipulations, and that the Polisario government would sign and ratify the treaty, if eligible to do so.(299) In a statement released on 1 March 1999, when the ban treaty entered into force, "the Saharawi government announced its willingness to sign" the Mine Ban Treaty and "its desire to participate" in the First Meeting of States Parties to the ban treaty in Maputo in early May 1999.(300) The POLISARIO government also called on the international community and NGOs mobilized in the fight against AP mines "to put pressure on Morocco so that the UN mission tasked with the elimination of mines can do its work."(301)
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Considering the possibility of resumed fighting, the Polisario military has offered no information regarding the number, types or storage of landmines in its possession. It is difficult to track the source of Polisario military supplies, though Algeria and at one time Libya have supplied assistance.(302) Another source was what the Polisario Army could take from the Moroccans during the conflict. Western Sahara does not produce its own mines, and is not know to have exported mines.
The majority of mines in Western Sahara were used during the conflict that ensued after the departure of Spanish colonial forces in 1976. The conflict initially included Morocco, Frente Polisario and Mauritania; in 1979 Mauritania withdrew and made peace with Polisario. The Mauritanian role in the war left minefields in the southern portion of the province.(303)
The Moroccan strategy in the armed conflict became one of attrition. In 1981, the Moroccans began construction on the first of six defensive walls, known as berms. These earthen walls with a height of about three meters were fortified with antitank and antipersonnel landmines. The first berm was completed in 1982, effectively closing off the northwestern portion of the territory. Successive berms were completed in 1984, 1985, and 1987, consolidating Moroccan held areas from the north to the south with the sixth and final berm closing off a majority of the southern portion of the territory.(304)
In addition to the estimated one to two million mines used to fortify the berm, mines were used by all parties throughout the conflict.(305) Polisario forces deployed mines as they retreated in the face of the Moroccan advance leaving minefields within the area presently under Moroccan control.(306) The Moroccans also made advances beyond their present position, leaving mines behind in the area now under Polisario control.(307) Polisario deployed its own mines in defense of these Moroccan advances. New mine usage diminished by 1991 when the cease-fire was signed. Air distributed munitions, specifically cluster bomb units, were also used during the conflict. The high rate of failure of these munitions has left extensive areas contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO), in essence de facto AP mines.
The Landmine Problem
While Western Sahara is heavily mine-affected, the exact dimensions of the problem in terms of number of mines, area contaminated and socio-economic impact are still unknown. Continued delays in a final settlement between the two warring parties have hindered efforts to gauge and address the problem.
Estimates on the number of mines in Western Sahara range from 200,000 by the US Department of State to ten million.(308) The exact number and distribution of explosive remnants in the territory is not known, making the determination of resources needed to address the problem a matter of guess work. A list of antitank and antipersonnel mines confirmed by MINURSO and Polisario to exist in the territory includes the following: (309)
|Former Soviet Union||TM-57, TM-64||POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMD-6, PMD-6M, MON 50, OZM 3,|
|Italy||MATS/2, VS 1.6, VS 2.2, VS 3..3, VS HCT 2, VS HCT 4, SB 81, SB 81 AR||VS 50,VS MK2,Valmara 69, TS 50, SB 33, SB 33 AR,|
|France||M 52 MACI||MI AP MP M 51, MI AP ID 51, MI AP DV 59, MI AP DV M 61, MI AP DV M 63 PIQ|
|Belgium||NR 141, NR 201, PRB M3,||PRB M35, PRB 409, NR 413, NR 442|
|Egypt||PP MI SK, T 78, T 79, U 1 BOUND, U 1 STAKE, U 1 WOOD, U 1 DIR FRAG|
|USA||M 15, M 19, M6 A2||M 16 A1, M 2 A4, M 18 A1 (Claymore), BLU 61/63 (Cluster bomb units)|
The Berm: The area of the Berm is known to be the most heavily mined area in the territory. A UN report quotes an un-named Moroccan military official that between one and two million mines could have been planted in defense of the Berm.(310) Usually the minefields extend for 100 meters. They are principally antitank mines with antipersonnel mines closer to the Berm. Polisario reports that mines along the Berm are sometimes booby-trapped or reinforced, sometimes with LP gas bottles.(311) MINURSO enforces a 5 kilometer Buffer Zone east of the Berm, which has been declared off-limits to all parties and civilians. The area of danger is thought to extend up to 10 kilometers to the east of the Berm in some areas.
Moroccan held territory: The MINURSO report states that Moroccan forces have removed most of the useless minefields to the west of the berm. Remaining minefields have been reported to MINURSO and sometimes marked with barbed wire or stones. However, individual Team Site reports note that Moroccan forces are not always sure of mines and advise staying to known tracks.(312) Team Site reports also state that Moroccan forces conduct clearance in areas after mine accidents have taken place. The MINURSO report also notes the problems encountered by the Royal Moroccan Army with old Polisario minefields left as they were retreating, especially in the southern sector of the Moroccan controlled territory. Portions of previous Berm sections that now lie behind the present divider are also regarded as suspect areas by MINURSO Team Site members.
MINURSO Team Sites keep a record of mine accidents in their sector and those reports are compiled at MINURSO's Mine Action Cell in Layounne. The reports marked on a map show the greatest percentage of accidents have occurred in the Polisario held territory. Some Polisario military officials claim the actual number of accidents in the Moroccan held territory far out paces accidents in the Polisario held territory, but that it is not in Morocco's best interest to publicize mine accidents, especially those involving Saharawis.(313) The MINURSO reports are not assumed to be comprehensive due to the reliance on local authorities for reporting and the vastness of the territory.
Polisario held territory: A Polisario Defense official reports that it has maps of contaminated areas east of the berm exist, but the detail and accuracy of these maps is unknown. Polisario authorities are thought to know the location of mined areas, though its knowledge is not comprehensive. Polisario military in the field admit they are unsure of the placement of Moroccan and Mauritanian minefields. The location of UXO, which is distributed throughout former battle zones, is also a matter of speculation. Despite the existence of mine maps by either side, the desert conditions of sand, wind and occasional heavy rain make mine shifting a constant phenomena. Likewise, the number of mine victims is unknown and their access to emergency services, especially in remote areas, is limited to military medical facilities. All serious injuries would require evacuation to the Polisario center south of Tindouf, Algeria. During a recent visit inside the Polisario held territory, accidents were discussed with military and civilians and it appears that camels are the most common victim of mines and UXOs as they graze for food.
In April 1998, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) began the first mine awareness project for Saharawis in the refugee camps south of Tindouf, Algeria. The project was scheduled to run through March 1999 and provide awareness training to the over 100,000 refugees, mostly women and children. There are efforts underway to extend the project in the camps and expand into Mauritania and the Territory where no mine awareness is currently available.
The mine awareness project has teams consisting of six members each in the four major refugee camps, Aauin, Awserd, Smara and Dahkla as well as a smaller camp based at the 27th of February women's training school. The project employs two expatriate advisors and around fifty local staff as Team Leaders, instructors and administration. The project's curriculum centers on mine, UXO and danger area recognition, proper behavior to avoid accidents and response to mine accidents. To date, the NPA project has provided at least one-hour of training to over 30,000 Saharawi refugees. A theater group was recently formed to begin work with children.
To date, some clearance has been conducted by militaries from both sides though it only totals a small percentage of the problem. Moroccan forces are thought to have lifted most of their "non-essential" minefields, though no information is given on the number or area cleared.(314) In late 1997 and early 1998, the United Nations approached Sweden for a demining capacity for the MINURSO mission. The Swedish Demining Unit (SDU) arrived in Layounne in May 1998. Although deployed from May until October 1998, the Unit was only operational for 2 ½ months stemming from problems with Moroccan authorities allowing the import of essential equipment.(315) The SDU concentrated its efforts on areas for establishing or extending MINURSO Team Sites. Of the limited areas it cleared, the SDU destroyed 534 UXOs and only two antitank mines. The Unit did not report any antipersonnel mines. Because of the short period of operation, many of the MINURSO and UNHCR demining requests were left unfinished, including areas of the repatriation route. In its final report, the SDU noted that of the tasks it was assigned, there remains four months work for an EOD team and the need for a permanent EOD capacity for the life of the UN mission.
Part of the Swedish contingent were officers located in Laayoune at the Mine Action Cell. The Cell has the responsibility of all mine related matters concerning the MINURSO mission. After the departure of the Swedish officers, the MAC was handed over to Pakistani engineers who continue to work in the Cell. However, with the departure of the SDU, MINURSO is left with no demining capacity.
Presently, there is a cooperative relationship between Polisario 3rd Regional Command in Mijek and MINURSO Mijek Team Site in identifying and marking danger areas along MINURSO patrol routes. The marking system uses red painted stones to indicate danger. Throughout the Polisario held territory there is a lack of uniform marking. Depending on the area, stones, tires, sticks, blue sandbags and wooden signs may be used to indicate danger. Unfortunately, several of these markers are also used at times to indicate safe routes, opening the possibility for confusion. The NPA mine awareness project is attempting to initiate a uniform system with the Polisario military using red stones, which it will teach to refugees during its mine awareness training.
In the Secretary General's report dated 28 January 1999, he notes the assignment of the two Pakistani engineers to address mine and UXO related issues at the Mine Action Cell in Layounne.(316) The report also introduces the idea of a pilot demining project presented to both parties to start marking and destroying mines and UXO. The report notes that this pilot project would not be a substitute for the demining unit required by MINURSO to complete the remaining tasks. The pilot project idea was mentioned by MINURSO Team Site officials in various locations during a recent visit in February.
Under the current Global Landmine Survey initiative spearheaded by the Survey Working Group, a group of mine action related non-governmental organizations and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Western Sahara is a top priority for survey. Proposals are currently being developed to implement a Level 1 Survey to determine the extent and socio-economic impact of mines and UXO in Western Sahara. An Advance Mission visited the Polisario government south of Tindouf, Algeria and into the Polisario held territory to assess the feasibility of a Level 1 Survey in the Territory. Level 1 Surveys are scheduled to take approximately one year to complete and will provide relevant information on the extent and the impact of explosive remnants for policy makers and project implementers to determine follow on Level 2 Survey and clearance requirements.
From the MINURSO mine accident reports and interviews with military and civilians in the Polisario held territory, mine accidents are occurring, though not in large numbers. This is partially a function of the small population that inhabits the territory. The return of tens of thousands of refugees will increase the number of accidents. Another possible reason for the low number of accidents is the enforcement by MINURSO of the five kilometer buffer zone where the greatest concentration of danger exists.
The Polisario government has no systematic statistics on the number of people injured by mines.(317) The NPA mine awareness teams interviewed thirty-seven mine and UXO victims during August 1998. These interviews represent only a sample of the survivors living in the camps. The most often mentioned problem by survivors was the lack of prosthetics. Twenty-six of those interviewed were injured during military operations and of those seven were attempting to remove mines. The other civilian injuries occurred during travel, herding or had picked up UXO. Six of those interviewed were under the age of seventeen when they were injured.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Medical facilities in the Polisario held territory are very limited. Each of the six military regions only has facilities at its headquarters to treat injuries. Surgical care is only available in the refugee camps in Algeria, some six to thirty hours away or more depending on where the accident occurs and what transportation can be obtained. On some occasions, MINURSO has provided assistance in treating and transporting mine victims. In preparation for repatriation, Polisario has constructed two hospitals, one in Tifiriti in the north and the other in Mijek in the south. However, these facilities are not yet complete and require equipment and staffing.
In the camps, there are two hospitals. The National Hospital is staffed with Cuban and Saharawi doctors and has some facilities to treat seriously wounded patients. The other is the military hospital where the majority of mine accident patients are treated.
Rehabilitation services are almost non-existent. There is the Military Rehabilitation and Education Center located in the administrative center of the camps. The center has patients with a variety of injuries, almost all are former military. Some of the men have their families with them. The director listed the three main challenges facing the center as lack of treatment for curable cases, care for paraplegics and prosthetics for amputees. He also mentioned that there is a lack of quality food necessary for recuperation. The Director, himself, walks on an above knee prosthetic device that is twelve years old. Like others with prosthetics, he received care outside the camps in Algeria or Spain. Few amputees stay at the center as the level of personal care they receive at home with their families in the camps is better. Due to a lack of resources, the center is severely limited in medicines and rehabilitation it can offer. The physiotherapy room consists of only a padded table, an exercise bicycle and a rowing machine. In addition to medical services, the school offers basic courses, as well as some computer instruction, for the patients, most of who did not have the opportunity to receive education during their military service.
Recently the Minister of Health signed a cooperative agreement with a group of Spanish NGOs to provide aid including care for children mine survivors.(318) The plan will bring Spanish physicians to the camps to identify patients and then fly the children to Spain to receive treatment.
95. UN Database, Country Report: Tunisia, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/tunisia.
96. UN, Country Report: Tunisia..
97. Tunis Declaration, adopted at " Inter-Maghreb Seminar on Anti-Personnel Landmines," Tunis, Tunisia 25-26 January 1999.
98. UN General Assembly First Committee, Press Release GA/DIS/3116, 20 October 1998.
99. Egypt Statement to the Brussels Conference in Handicap International and International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Conference Report: Brussels International Conference for the Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 24-27 June 1997, p. 28.
100. Ibid; Mohammad Monieb, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Disarmament, Egypt, Letter to Mohammad Monieb, Secretary-General, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, 28 December 1998, reprinted in "Cairo Explains Landmines Policy," African Topics, Issue 22, January-March 1998, p. 16.
101. Aly Sirry, Counseiller, Embassy of Egypt to Tunisia, verbal statement to plenary recorded by Mary Wareham, HRW, Inter-Magreb Seminar on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Tunis, Tunisia, 25 January 1999.
102. Jody Williams and Liz Bernstein of the ICBL visited Egypt on 13-14 February 1999, where meetings were set up under the auspices of the Canadian Embassy in Egypt. Meetings were held with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense, among others. In a trip to El Alamein in the Western Desert, hosted by the MoD, it was pointed out that the main reason that Egypt refused to sign the Treaty was that no responsibility was assigned in the Treaty and that the former WW II allies should be responsible for the mine clearance. This sentiment was again echoed in a meeting hosted by Geneva-based NGOs from the ICBL at the United Nations on 2 March 1999 for representatives of UN Missions and others, where the Egyptian representatives strongly and repeatedly argued this point.
103. During a public exchange at the United Nations in Geneva on 2 March 1999, an Egyptian representative acknowledged to the ICBL's Jody Williams that Egyptian forces had used mines extensively in the Sinai.
104. Egypt Statement to the Brussels Conference in Handicap International and International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Conference Report: Brussels International Conference for the Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 24-27 June 1997, p. 28.
105. "Statement by the Observer from Egypt," Inter-Magreb Seminar on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Tunis, 25-26 January 1999.
106. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD Rom; see also, Eddie Banks, Antipersonnel Landmines: Recognizing and Disarming (London: Brasseys, 1997), pp. 96-101, which also lists a M396 plastic "schu" blast mine.
107. This information is drawn from Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics, 1992-93; Forecast International, Ordnance and Munitions Forecast - Landmines (International), 1993; and Nazir Hussain, Defense Production in the Muslim World (Karachi: Royal Bok Company, 1989).
108. "Mine Facts" CD Rom on Massara.
109. Alberto Chiara, "Io non sono un trafficante," Famiglia Cristiana, n. 47, 27 November 1996. (See Landmine Monitor report on Italy.)
110. Egypt has been identified as an exporter of AP mines in several U.S. Government documents including: U.S. Department of State, SUBJECT: landmine export moratorium demarche, Outgoing Telegram, 7 December 1993; U.S. Department of the Army, Foreign Science and Technology Center, Letter to Human Rights Watch, 1 November 1993.
111. Letter dated 22 January 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex: Addendum to the third report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), United Nations, S/1998/63.
112. Frank Smyth, Soldi, Sangue e politica Internazionale, Internazionale, n. 27, 14 May 1994, synthesis of The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War."
113. "Africa's Last Antipersonnel Landmine Producer," African Topics, Issue 22, January-March 1998, p. 15.
114. Egypt Statement to the Brussels Conference, p. 28.
115. Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Defense, "The Iron Killers: Mines Tragedy in Egypt (A.E.R.), undated, p. 2.
116. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1994, p. 20; U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. A-4.
117. Mike Croll, The History of Landmines (London: Leo Cooper, 1998), p. 61.
119. Ahmad Lufti, "Unearthing the Lethal Menace," African Topics, Issue 22, January-March 1998, p. 14.
120. "Cairo Explains Landmines Policy," African Topics, Issue 22, January-March 1998, p. 16.
121. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1993, p. 84.
122. Elizabeth Bryant, "UN Proposes Landmine Team for Egypt," Houston Chronicle, 19 March 1999.
123. "Cairo Explains Landmines Policy," African Topics, January-March 1998, p. 16.
124. Notes taken by Mary Wareham, HRW, of Egyptian Army presentation, in "The Situation from a Military Point of View Panel," Regional Conference on the Menace of Landmines in the Arab Countries, Beirut, Lebanon, 11 February 1999.
125. United Nations, "Country Report: Egypt," UN Landmine Database, www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/egypt.htm, p. 2.
126. "Mine Action Bilateral Support," prepared for the Mine Action Support Group Meeting, New York, 4th edition, 16 November 1998.
127. Hansard, 17 December 1998, cols. 655-656. See Landmine Monitor country report on the United Kingdom.
128. Informal discussion with various Western governments and ICBL representatives, Cairo, 14 February 1999.
129. United Nations Country Report, p. 1.
130. Notes taken by Mary Wareham at Beirut Conference, 11 February 1999. The Ministry of Defense publication, "The Iron Killers," states that 103,000 hectares have been cleared of 11 million mines.
131. Notes taken by Mary Wareham, at Beirut Conference, 11 February 1999.
132. Observation by Jody Williams after a trip to El Alamein hosted by the Egyptian MoD on 14 February 1999.
133. "Landmines Struggle Center (Egypt)," booklet, undated.
134. Notes taken by Mary Wareham at Beirut Conference, 11 February 1999.
135. "The Iron Killers," pp. 3-4.
137. Statement by H.E.S. M.H. Adeli, Ph.D. Ambassador of I.R. Iran in Ottawa Reflecting the Positions of Islamic Republic of Iran (as the Observer) in the Signing Conference of Anti-Personnel Land Mines Treaty, Ottawa 1-4 December 1997.
138. Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, CCW/Conf.I/SR.4, 3 October 1995.
139. U.S. Army Engineer Center, Mine Recognition and Warfare Handbook, Ft. Leonard Wood, November 1990, 102-3. Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by Human Rights Watch.
140. Defence Industries Organization Military Products Brochure, Islamic Republic of Iran.
141. Statement by Amb. Adeli, Ottawa, 1-4 December 1997.
142. Statement by H.E. Mr. Hadi Nejadj-Hosseinian Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations before the Fifty-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Agenda Item 42: Assistance in Mine Clearance, 17 November 1998.
143. "Afghan Taleban Say Seize Iran-supplied Mines," Reuters, 4 December 1998.
144. Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to All Sides in the Civil War in Sudan, Vol. 10, No. 4(A), August 1998, p. 20.
145. One official U.S. source cites the 2.5 million figure, with a breakdown of sales year by year: U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. Another official source gives the 1.5 million figure, without further details: Defense Security Assistance Agency, "US Landmine Sales by Country," March 1994.
146. Cited by the United Nations and the U.S. Department of State. See United Nations, Country Report: Iran, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/iranisla.htm, and Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, U.S. Department of State, 1998.
147. "Iran Steps up Mine-Clearing Efforts in Kordestan Province," BBC Monitoring Service, 29 June 1998.
148. United Nations, Country Report: Iran.
149. Statement by H.E. Mr. Hadi Nejadj-Hosseinian to UNGA, 17 November 1998.
150. United Nations, Country Report: Iran.
151. "Landmine Explodes in Iran Killing and Wounding Four," Agence France Press, 27 December 1998.
152. Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, U.S. Department of State, 1998, A-4.
153. Stephanie Nebehay, "Iraq Calls on Middle East States to Reveal Arms," Reuters, 14 August 1997.
154. Middle East Watch, Hidden Death: Land Mines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1992), p. 40-41.
155. U.S. Army Intelligence Agency - Foreign Science and Technology Center, Operation Desert Shield Special Report: Iraqi Combat Engineer Capabilities, Supplement 2: Barriers and Fortification Protection, 30 November 1990, AST-266OZ-131-90-SUP 2, p. 31.
156. Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1993), p. 104.
157. Ibid, p. 198.
158. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 104; Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 24.
159. Ambassador David Sultan's Address to the Plenary Session of the Landmine Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997.
160. "Israel to Attend Landmine Conference in Ottawa," Reuters, 11 November 1997.
161. Statement by H.E. Mr. Eytan Bentsur, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 4 September 1997.
162. Statement of the Israel Delegation, Ottawa Forum for Mine Action, December 1997, document 1.12.97/17119.
163. United Nations General Assembly Press Release GA/DIS/3115, 20 October 1998.
164. Ambassador David Sultan's Address to the Plenary Session of the Landmine Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997.
165. U.S. Department of Defense Mine Facts database.
166. James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa (London: Quartet, 1984), p. 93.
167. Cited in Human Rights Watch Arms Project/Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 94.
168. Defense News, January 26, 1987.
169. U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command data, analyzed by Human Rights Watch Arms Division.
170. "U.S. Department of State - Press Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman," M2 Presswire, 25 February 1999.
171. See http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/vtf.htm.
172. Israel Delegation, Israeli Capabilities in Demining and Rehabilitation of Victims, Ottawa Forum for Mine Action, December 1997.
173. Statement by H.E. Mr. Eytan Bentsur, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 4 September 1997.
174. Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, U.S. Department of State, 1994.
175. Ambassador David Sultan's Address to the Plenary Session of the Landmine Conference, 4 December 1997.
176. Country Report: Kuwait, United Nations. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/kuwait.htm.
177. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 114.
178. Sean Roberts and Jody Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines (Washington: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995), p. 261.
179. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, 1993, p. 114.
180. Roberts and Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent, p. 261.
181. Country Report: Kuwait, United Nations.
182. Roberts and Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent, p. 262.
183. Country Report: Kuwait, United Nations.
184. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, December 1994, p. 20-21.
185. Letter from Thafer Al Hassan, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Lebanon, read by Lebanese representative at the Brussels International Conference for the Total Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines, 24-27 June 1997.
186. Letter from Thafer Al Hassan, General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Lebanon to Landmine Monitor, Beirut, 18 December 1998.
187. ICBL representatives were able to meet with Prime Minister Hoss, who did not move beyond the official position. There also were informal discussions with members of parliament and the business community, and also the opportunity to speak with various military informally. In these settings, it was possible to de-link somewhat the MBT from Israeli occupation. Some noted one important issue was the position of Syria vis-a-vis the Treaty and that Lebanon would take its lead from Syria. Some military privately voiced support for a ban, but noted it was too early to publicly say so. (Landmine Monitor intervew with Jody Williams, ICBL Ambassador, 29 March 1999.)
188. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables.
189. "U.S. Department of State - Press Statement by James B. Foley, Deputy Spokesman," M2 Presswire, 25 February 1999.
190. See, for example, Edward Ezell, Small Arms World Report, Vol 4, No. 4 (December 1993), p. 26
191. United Nations, Country Report: Lebanon, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/lebanon.htm.
192. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, (Washington: Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, 1998), p. A-2; Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 116; Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 21.
193. United Nations, Country Report.
194. Lebanese Army report, given at the Regional Conference on the Menace of Landmines in the Arab Countries, Beirut, 11-12 February 1999.
195. Hidden Killers, 1993, p. 116; Hidden Killers, 1994, p. 21.
196. "Over 200,000 Landmines Threaten the Lebanese," Agence France Presse, 30 March 1997.
197. United Nations, Country Report.
199. United Nations, "Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support," 4th Edition, 16 November 1998.
200. United Nations, Country Report.
201. Lebanese Army report, given at the Regional Conference on the Menace of Landmines in the Arab Countries, Beirut, 11-12 February 1999. A somewhat different list of mines found in Lebanon can be seen on the UN website at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/lebanon.htm
202. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997, 1 June 1998.
203. Nicholas Blanford, "US Backs New Campaign to End the Lethal Land Mine Scourge," The Daily Star (Lebanon), 5 September 1998.
204. Agence France Presse, 30 March 1997.
205. Survey of landmine victims conducted by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health and the Welfare Association for the Disabled and the Elderly, December 1996.
206. Portfolio Synopsis: Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, United States Agency for International Development, October 1997.
207. Statement by Ibrahim Al-Besbas to the United Nations General Assembly, Press Release, GA/DIS/3116, 20 October 1998.
208. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1993, p. 118.
209. "Stranded Palestinians Face New Danger from Mines," Reuters, 27 October 1995.
210. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1993, p. 118.
211. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. A-2.
212. Statement by Ibrahim Al-Besbas to the UNGA, Press Release, GA/DIS/3116, 20 October 1998.
213. Assembly Discusses International Mine Clearance Efforts, Urging Member States to Provide Resources and Information to Strengthen UN Mine Action Ability, Press Release GA/9505, Statement by Isa Babaa to the United Nations General Assembly, 17 November 1998.
214. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1996: Tunis, Regional Delegation (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco/Western Sahara, Tunisia), 1 June 1997.
215. Cited in United Nations, Country Report: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/libyanar.htm.
216. Information provided by Libyan Red Crescent.
217. Francesco Terreri. Produzione Commercio ed Uso Delle Mine Terrestri, il Ruolo dell'Italia. Forum on the Problems of Peace and War. Comune di Firenze. October 1996.
218. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1993, p. 126.
219. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. A-2.
220. MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation, February 1998.
223. MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998; Discussions with MINURSO Team Site Members in Team Sites east of the berm. February 1999.
224. "UXO's / Minefields SSC MAB G2 Briefing," MINURSO Mine Action Cell, Layounne.
225. MINURSO, "Updated Mine Situation," 1998.
226. Association de soutien à un référendum libre et régulier au Sahara Occidental (ARSO). "There is no mine Problem in Morocco," Western Sahara Weekly News, Week 07 14.-20.02.1999. See www.arso.org.
227. "UXO's / Minefields SSC MAB G2 Briefing," MINURSO Mine Action Cell, Layounne.
228. MINURSO, "Updated Mine Situation," 1998.
229. Ibid, p. 4.
230. MINURSO/SDU, "Mine Awareness Aide- Memoire Western Sahara." Mid-1998.
231. United Nations, Country Report: Western Sahara, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/westerns.htm.
232. United Nations Secretary General, " Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara." Paragraph 7. S/1999/88. United Nations: New York. January 28, 1999.
233. MINURSO, "Updated Mine Situation," 1998.
234. "UXO's / Minefields SSC MAB G2 Briefing," MINURSO Mine Action Cell, Layounne.
235. United Nations Secretary General, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation concerning Western Sahara." Paragraph 13. S/1999/307. United Nations: New York. March 22, 1999.
237. "Report on SDU and MAC Activities May-Nov 1998," MINURSO Interoffice Memorandum. November 10, 1998,pp. 1-2.
238. Ibid, p. 3.
239. Ibid, Annex C.
240. "UNMAS Discussion Paper on the Application of Survey and the Impact of the Ottawa Treaty," UNMAS: New York. Version 1.2/98. Annex C.
241. MINURSO, "Updated Mine Situation," 1998, Map.
242. Paris-Dakar Rally. Stage Five report, January 3, 1996. See www.dakar.com.
243. Ibid. Stage six report. January 4, 1996.
244. Sultanate of Oman's speech at the Signing Ceremony for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, December 2 - 4, 1997, Ottawa, Canada.
245. "Sultanate to sign CTBT," Middle East Newsfile: Times of Oman, 8 October 1998.
246. U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command data, analyzed by Human Rights Watch Arms Division.
247. United Nations, Country Report: Oman. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/oman.htm.
248. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, A-4.
249. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act.
250. See http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/vtf.htm.
251. United Nations, Country Report: Syrian Arab Republic. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/syrianar.htm.
252. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 161.
253. United Nations, Casualty and Incidents: Syrian Arab Republic. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/casualty/syrianar.htm.
254. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-3.
255. Sana Bagersh, "UAE to Sign Canadian Landmine Treaty," Middle East Intelligence Wire, 20 November 1997.
256. Middle East Watch, Hidden Death: Landmines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan, (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1992).
257. "UN Says Iraq Food Handouts not stopped by Raid," Reuters, 7 December 1997.
258. Landmine Monitor interview, 9 January 1999.
259. Landmine Monitor interview with Jabber Farman, PUK Minister of Defence, 24 April 1998.
260. "UN Says Iraq Food Handouts Not Stopped By Raid," Reuters, 7 December 1997.
261. Saadet Oruc, "Another Facet Of Iraqi Kurds," Turkish Daily News, 9 August 1998; "Kurdish KDP Radio Says PKK Faction Burns Two Villages," BBC Monitoring Service (Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan), 1 September 1998; "Kurdish Sources Reportedly Say PKK Gaining Strength In Barzani Areas," Al Hayat newspaper, 27 August 1998.
262. "Number of Bodies Of 'Terrorists' Found In Cross-Border Operation Now 77," BBC Monitoring Service (source: TRT TV), 21 April 1994; Suna Erdem, "Turkey Risks Rift With NATO Over Iraq Incursion," Reuters, 22 March 1995; Alistair Bell, "Turkey Continues Assault Kurds in Iraq," Reuters, 22 March 1995; "Kurdish Sources Reportedly Say PKK Gaining Strength In Barzani Areas," Al Hayat newspaper, 27 August 1998; Suna Erdem, "Turkey Risks Rift With NATO Over Iraq Incursion," Reuters, 22 March 1995.
263. Osman Senkul, "Turkey Presses On In North Iraq Despite Outcry," Reuters, 20 May 1997.
264. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1993; Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998.
265. Owen Boycott, "Heroic Volunteers Are Themselves The Target," The Guardian, 2 March 1999; Hidden Death.
266. Jonathon Lyons, "Nine Years On, Mines From Iran-Iraq War Still Killing," Reuters, 26 December 1996; Dominic Evans, "Hidden Mines Haunt Kurdistan," Reuters, 20 July 1998.
267. Correspondence from Mines Advisory Group received by Landmine Monitor researcher.
268. Correspondence from Mines Advisory Group received by Landmine Monitor researcher.
269. Middle East Watch, Hidden Death: Land Mines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan.
270. Correspondence from Mines Advisory Group received by Landmine Monitor researcher.
271. Correspondence from Mines Advisory Group received by Landmine Monitor researcher.
272. The Common Types of Landmines in Kurdistan, The Mines Advisory Group - Northern Iraq (undated).
273. Hassan Hafidh, "UN Tackles Mine Danger In Northern Iraq," Reuters, 17 August 1998.
274. Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support, database maintained by Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
275. "Protection For Iraqi Kurds," Anadolu news agency, 12 January 1999.
276. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. 97.
277. "Iraq Attacks UN over Landmine Clearance in North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 January 1999.
278. Owen Boycott, "Heroic Volunteers Are Themselves The Target," The Guardian, 2 March 1999.
279. Gilles Paris, The Sanctuary Of Iraqi Kurdistan, Le Monde, 19 December 1998.
280. Mines Advisory Group, Northern Iraq, brochure prepared by Mines Advisory Group, Cockermouth, United Kingdom, 1998.
281. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. 97.
282. Correspondence from Mines Advisory Group to Landmine Monitor researcher.
283. In the Sulaymanya province alone, in 1991, 338 men, 127 children and thirty women were killed compared to seventeen men, three children and one woman in 1998.
284. Correspondence from Mines Advisory Group to Landmine Monitor researcher.
285. Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, After the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines (Washington, DC: Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, 1995), p. 259.
286. From the Main Points of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 25 September 1995.
287. Lt. Sultan Abu Al-Ainan, Palestine Liberation Organization/Palestine National Liberation Army, Statement prepared for presentation, "The Situation from a Military Point of View Panel," Regional Conference on the Menace of Landmines in the Arab Countries, Beirut, Lebanon, 11 February 1999.
288. Defense for Children International / Palestine Section, A Seminar Report on the Problem of Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Munitions Remnants in the Palestinian Territories, 25-26 March 1998, p. 6.
289. Defense for Children International / Palestine Section, A Report on the Field Study On The Victims of Landmines and the Remnants of the Israeli Army in the West Bank in the Period from June 1967 till February 1998, p. 31-34.
290. Lieutenant Jihad Jayousi, National Security Leadership in the West Bank, presentation.
291. See, Defense for Children International / Palestine Section, A Report on the Field Study On The Victims of Landmines and the Remnants of the Israeli Army in the West Bank in the Period from June 1967 till February 1998, and A Seminar Report on the Problem of Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Munitions Remnants in the Palestinian Territories, 25-26 March 1998.
292. A Report on the Field Study On The Victims of Landmines and the Remnants of the Israeli Army in the West Bank in the Period from June 1967 till February 1998, p. 14.
293. Landmine Monitor interview.
294. Defense for Children International / Palestine Section, Mine Action in the Palestinian Territories, Project Proposal, 1998.
295. Defense for Children International / Palestine Section. A Report on the Field Study On The Victims of Landmines and the Remnants of the Israeli Army in the West Bank in the Period from June 1967 till February 1998.
296. United Nations, Casualty and Incidents: Israel. At http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/casualty/israel.htm.
297. Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, U.S. Department of State, 1998, p. A4.
298. UNHCR Tindouf Road Reconnaissance Mission Report, August 1998.
299. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario Minister for Special Affairs Mohamed Sidati, Brussels, 22 February 1999.
300. Fronte POLISARIO. "Mines Antipersonnales," Sahara Libre - RASD Periodique national d'Information, No. 1., 22 March 1999.
302. Usher, Rod, "A Nation Lost in the Desert," Time, 1 February 1999. Vol. 153 No. 4, pp. 38-40.
303. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario 1st Regional Command (Dougaj), 4 February 1999.
304. Landmine Monitor interview with Saharawi Military Engineers, June 1998.
305. MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998.
306. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario Military Engineers, June 1998.
307. Landmine Monitor interviews with Polisario Regional Commands, February 1999.
308. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. A-2; Norwegian People's Aid, Western Sahara web page, August 1998. See www.npaid.no.
309. MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998.
310. MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998.
311. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario Regional Commands, February 1999.
312. "UXO's / Minefields SSC MAB G2 Briefing," MINURSO Mine Action Cell, Layounne.
313. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario Regional Commands, February 1999.
314. MINURSO, "Western Sahara: Updated Mine Situation," February 1998.
315. "Report on SDU and MAC Activities May-Nov 1998," MINURSO Interoffice Memorandum, 10 November 1998.
316. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, 28 January 1999. See www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s199988.htm. S/1999/88.
317. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario Minister of Health Bachir Seyd. Smara Refugee Camp, 30 January 1999.
318. Landmine Monitor interview with Polisario Minister of Health Bachir Seyd. Smara Refugee Camp, 30 January 1999.