NON-SIGNATORIES

ARMENIA

Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in conflict over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. As a result of the conflict, there are an estimated 100,000 landmines in the disputed region of Nagorny-Karabakh.⁽⁹⁷⁴⁾ In addition, some 6,000-8,000 landmines are estimated to lay along the Armenian-Azeri border.⁽⁹⁷⁵⁾ Also, the U.S. State Department reported in 1993 that there were unknown quantities of landmines along Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran.⁽⁹⁷⁶⁾

Armenia has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Armenia attended the treaty preparatory meetings, but did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997 and did not attend the Oslo negotiations in September. It came to the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December as an observer. It voted in favor of the pro-ban 1996, 1997, and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions. At the treaty signing conference the Armenian delegation stated: "Notwithstanding its security considerations, Armenia nevertheless believes that the human and social costs of antipersonnel landmines far outweigh their military significance.... Armenia supports the Convention, and is ready to take measures consistent with the provisions of the treaty.... Armenia's full participation in the Convention is contingent upon a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to adhere to the treaty and comply with its regime."⁽⁹⁷⁷⁾ Armenia has made it clear that it will not sign unless Azerbaijan agrees to do so.⁽⁹⁷⁸⁾

Armenia is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Armenia has expressed its belief that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the central forum for negotiating a global ban on mines, even though it is not a member of the CD.⁽⁹⁷⁹⁾

Armenian nongovernmental organizations established the Armenian Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in January 1999.

Armenia is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines, though it has no formal restrictions on production or trade in place. During the first stage of the conflict, in 1989-1990, Armenians widely used homemade mines. Subsequently, Armenians apparently acquired Soviet antipersonnel mines, possibly as a result of the 15 May 1992 Tashkent agreement under which Russia transferred weapons to the former Soviet republics.

Armenia is not known to have contributed to international mine action programs. Armenia inherited Soviet equipment which could be used for mine clearance.⁽⁹⁸⁰⁾ In 1994, the U.S. State Department indicated that there were approximately five to ten casualties per year in Armenia due to landmines.⁽⁹⁸¹⁾ Armenia received a total of $1.15 million in 1993 and 1994 through the U.S. Leahy War Victims Fund for the provision of prosthetics to amputees.⁽⁹⁸²⁾ A prosthetic workshop had already been put in place in Armenia after the 1989 earthquake. It is estimated that between 300-500 people per year since 1989 received a prosthetic, about half of whom had suffered war related injuries.⁽⁹⁸³⁾

AZERBAIJAN

Background

Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in conflict over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. As a result of the conflict, western Azerbaijan is plagued with landmines. On 12 May 1994 Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease-fire agreement; however, negotiations for a final peace agreement are still going on under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Landmines and demining are reportedly on the agenda of the peace negotiations, but no final language has been made publicly available.⁽⁹⁸⁴⁾

According to the UN, mine are still being used.⁽⁹⁸⁵⁾ Continuing tensions prevent mine action programs in many areas.

Mine Ban Policy

Azerbaijan has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the treaty preparatory meetings, but did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It did not participate, even as an observer, in the treaty negotiations in Oslo, nor did it attend the treaty signing in Ottawa in December 1997.

Azerbaijan voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. But, it was one of the few states that abstained on voting on the 1997 and 1998 UNGA resolutions in support of the Mine Ban Treaty.

One of the opposition parties, Vahdat ("Unity"), has declared that Azerbaijan should sign the Ottawa Convention.⁽⁹⁸⁶⁾ This declaration came in the wake of a project by the Azeri Institute of Peace and Democracy together with the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) called "Create Public Opinion in Azerbaijan against Landmine Use."

Azerbaijan has not signed the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine Protocol. According to the UN, Azerbaijan has expressed more interest in discussing the landmine issue in the Conference on Disarmament, although it is not a member.⁽⁹⁸⁷⁾

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Azerbaijan is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter. When the Soviet army left Azerbaijan in 1992, it left landmines and other weapons behind. It is believed that this is where Azerbaijan obtained its stockpiles. The number of mines in Azerbaijan's stockpiles is unknown.

Use

Landmines have been used throughout the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict. The UN indicates that mines continue to be used although data as to their exact location is difficult to obtain.⁽⁹⁸⁸⁾ Both Armenian and Azeri armed forces laid mines in the standard Soviet pattern, but records were not kept of their whereabouts, and infested areas were not fenced.⁽⁹⁸⁹⁾

The majority of the mines used were of Soviet origin, although Italian mines were also used. The most commonly found antipersonnel mines include the Soviet OZM-72 and PMN-2, as well as the Soviet MON-50, MON-90, and PMN, and the Italian TS-50.⁽⁹⁹⁰⁾

While the bulk of the Azerbaijan's landmine problem lies in Nagorny-Karabakh, mines were also used outside the territory of Nagorny-Karabakh. The most well-known incidents occurred from 1989 to 1994 in which mines were used on the railway from Rostov-Baku, on the road from Tbilisi-Baku, on a ferry from Krasnovodsk-Baku and in the Baku underground.⁽⁹⁹¹⁾

Landmine Problem

Estimates of the numbers of mines found in Azerbaijan and Nagorny-Karabakh vary. According to the UN and the U.S. State Department, Nagorny-Karabakh has an estimated 100,000 landmines on its territory.⁽⁹⁹²⁾ After its assessment mission, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) concluded that the landmine problem was not nearly as bad as original estimates portrayed, although it did acknowledge that landmines posed a serious threat to civilians in certain regions of Nagorny-Karabakh.⁽⁹⁹³⁾ There are no landmines on Azerbaijan's borders with Russia, Iran, or Georgia.

In the beginning of 1998 an international company, BACTEC International, was contracted to undertake a Level 1 Mine Survey in the Fizuli region. Accordingly, a partial Survey was conducted from mid-May to September 1998, surveying 260 of the 700 square kilometers potentially mined in the Fizuli region. A total of 3.2 sq. km. of suspected contaminated areas was marked in the process. Additionally, seventeen individual sites were surveyed in the Agdam region.⁽⁹⁹⁴⁾

The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines examined the problems of landmine use in the Fizuli and Agdam regions. According to the ACBL, in Fizuli it appears that sixteen villages remain heavily mined. About 3,000 hectares (almost 17 % of the arable lands of Fizuli district) are mined, concentrated around the sixteen villages.⁽⁹⁹⁵⁾ In February 1994 more than 280 mines were found and destroyed in one field near the village of Ashaghy Kurdmahmudlu.⁽⁹⁹⁶⁾ In the region of Agdam, the ACBL found that about 2,000 hectares (around 11 % of the arable lands of the Agdam district) are mined.⁽⁹⁹⁷⁾

Mine Clearance

The national Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Areas (ARRA), was created at the beginning of 1997. ARRA declared in April 1998 that it would cost $5.2 million to demine twenty-two villages of the Fizuli region, and another $70,000 to clear areas in Gazakh district on the border with Armenia and Georgia.⁽⁹⁹⁸⁾ Thus far, Norway has committed $134,000 for a survey of the mine situation.⁽⁹⁹⁹⁾

On 18 July 1998 the civilian Azerbaijan National Agency for Demining (ANAD) was established. It is now responsible for mine clearance, not the Ministry of Defense. The main purpose of the ANAD is to conceive and coordinate an integrated mine action program for Azerbaijan. The government has earmarked $600,000 for the agency, but it has yet to begin operations.⁽¹⁰⁰⁰⁾ The proposed objectives for the ANAD are: collection of information on minefields, planning, establish standards and regulations for mine clearance (based on the international standards), specialist training (international experts for an initial period), mine clearance, management and control, reporting, victim support, and resource mobilization.⁽¹⁰⁰¹⁾

After the cease-fire in 1994 the Azerbaijan Army's Military Engineers started mine clearance operations, dealing first with the Fizuli and Agdam districts in Nagorny-Karabakh. The Army was poorly equipped with old Russian mine detectors. Despite these obstacles, the Azeri Army removed almost 19,000 antitank mines and almost 22,000 antipersonnel mines from fifteen minefields.⁽¹⁰⁰²⁾ Most of these were lifted from the Fizuli Region between 1994 and 1997 and taken away for demolition or storage. Some of them were re-laid.⁽¹⁰⁰³⁾

The British firm Halo Trust began a mine clearance project in the region in 1995, which lasted for fifteen months. During the first three months of Halo Trust's operation, there were over thirty civilian casualties due to landmines and other unexploded ordnance.⁽¹⁰⁰⁴⁾ Halo Trust trained former members of the Nagorny-Karabakh army in humanitarian mine clearance and now demining continues under the auspices of the local deminers.⁽¹⁰⁰⁵⁾

The Prime Minister of Nagorny-Karabakh stated in December 1998 that more than 2,000 hectares of land had been cleared of landmines in Martakert, Askeran, and Hadrut and that he believed demining operations in those areas would finish by the spring of 1999.⁽¹⁰⁰⁶⁾ However, the UNMAS assessment mission stated that the Minister of Defense indicated that no mine clearance has been conducted since 1997 because the army no longer has the capacity to clear mines.⁽¹⁰⁰⁷⁾

Mine Awareness

Since 1996, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations Development Program and Halo Trust have carried out mine awareness programs in Nagorny-Karabakh. The ICRC programs has reached more than 500,000 people living in the front line areas.⁽¹⁰⁰⁸⁾ The ICRC's mine awareness program works in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education, UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).⁽¹⁰⁰⁹⁾

The ICRC has handed out posters and other informational brochures to 120,000 families, the majority of which were refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), who were living in mine-danger zones (refugee camps and southern parts of the country). After gathering information on mine victims the ICRC conducted training for the members of international NGOs and locals. Then they conducted two-hour classes at secondary schools on mine awareness in which 4,400 instructors and 70,000 students took part.⁽¹⁰¹⁰⁾ This program is ongoing.

Landmine Casualties

Based on the official data provided by the government of Azerbaijan, 5,561 people injured in the Karabakh conflict (78% military, 22% civilian) have been registered in the country. Many of these people have been victims of landmine explosions.⁽¹⁰¹¹⁾ Data from the Society of the Invalids of the Karabakh Conflict indicate that there are more than 7,000 invalids of the Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan and that more than 70% of these are mine victims.⁽¹⁰¹²⁾ In 1995, there were fifty-eight civilian mine casualties.⁽¹⁰¹³⁾

According to ACBL interviews with people in the Fizuli region, since the start of Karabakh conflict, forty-seven local people have been killed and seventy-four wounded in fifteen localities.⁽¹⁰¹⁴⁾ Twenty-three were killed and forty-six wounded by landmines after the cease-fire, between 1994 and 1998.

In the Agdam region, according to Mr. Khaliq Iskenderov, a member of Department of Society of the Invalids of Karabakh Conflict in the Agdam region, since the start of Karabakh conflict more than 5,000 local people have been killed and more than 60% are mine victims.⁽¹⁰¹⁵⁾

Survivor Assistance

In October of 1994 the Ministry of Labor and Social Defense of Azerbaijan and the ICRC signed an agreement on assistance to mine victims. The Ministry provided the ICRC with a building in Baku for establishing a center for prosthesis production. The first production began in August of 1995. A total of 549 prostheses were produced through 1996. The ICRC center is one of two orthopedic/prosthetic centers in Baku; the other is operated by the government, using German equipment.⁽¹⁰¹⁶⁾ From July 1994 to December 1995, the ICRC helped 786 mine victims. In 169 cases, victims had a limb amputated.⁽¹⁰¹⁷⁾

According to the Department for Social Welfare of the Fizuli Region, from 1992 to 1998 the local authority has registered twenty-two landmine victims whose families receive financial assistance. Psychosocial or physical rehabilitation programs are almost nonexistent.

BELARUS

Mine Ban Policy

Belarus has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Belarus authorities have stated that lack of funding needed for destruction of the existing stockpiles of landmines and mine clearance is the reason Belarus cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty at this time. The government has said that Belarus would need tens of millions of US dollars to destroy its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.⁽¹⁰¹⁸⁾ Belarus has stated that it hopes it will become a part of the treaty in the future, and that it welcomes international cooperation, financial and technical assistance for clearance and destruction of millions of antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Belarus.⁽¹⁰¹⁹⁾ Belarus legislators have also stated that they are committed to support the total ban of landmines as soon as assistance needed for destruction of existing stockpiles is provided.⁽¹⁰²⁰⁾

At the treaty signing conference in December 1997, Ambassador Mikhail Khvostov said that Belarus "welcomes the fact that the Convention foresees the mechanisms of international cooperation, financial and technical assistance for clearance and for destruction of stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. We believe that should these mechanisms proved to be effective, the Convention will soon be signed by those nations which entirely share its humane purposes, but because of a number of objective reasons are in no position to sign it now. And among those signatures there will be the signature of the Republic of Belarus."⁽¹⁰²¹⁾ Belarus attended the early ban treaty preparatory meetings, but did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It attended the Oslo treaty negotiations and the Ottawa treaty signing conference, but only as an observer in each case.

On 10 December 1996, Belarus was one of only ten countries to abstain in the vote on UN General Assembly 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines (passed 156-0). However, subsequently Belarus voted for the 1997 UNGA Resolution supporting the treaty signing and the 1998 UNGA Resolution welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

Belarus is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on landmines. According to a Foreign Ministry official, it has ratified the amended Protocol II but not deposited its instrument of ratification yet.⁽¹⁰²²⁾

Belarus has recently indicated that it supports a ban on mine transfers at the Conference on Disarmament, of which it is a member.⁽¹⁰²³⁾ However, Belarus was not one of the 22 CD members, including the Russia and the U.S., that in February 1999 jointly called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a transfer ban.⁽¹⁰²⁴⁾

Production

According to officials in the Belarus Ministry of Defense, Belarus has never produced, is not producing and will not produce antipersonnel landmines, or their components, including Claymore-type mines. They state that Belarus is not producing or conducting research on any munitions which might function like an antipersonnel mine and pose dangers to civilians (such as antitank mines with anti-handling devices, submunitions, cluster bombs), and that Belarus is not engaging in research on alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.⁽¹⁰²⁵⁾

There have been allegations in the past that Belarus produced antipersonnel mines, perhaps most notably by the U.S. State Department in 1993.⁽¹⁰²⁶⁾

Transfer

According to government sources, Belarus is not exporting AP mines nor has it exported them in the past.⁽¹⁰²⁷⁾ Again, there have been allegations by the U.S. government and others of past export, but no documented cases of export are known.⁽¹⁰²⁸⁾

In 1995 President Alexandr Lukashenka announced a moratorium on the export of all types of landmines from 1 September 1995 until the end of 1997.⁽¹⁰²⁹⁾ In late 1997 the president extended the export moratorium to the end of 1999.⁽¹⁰³⁰⁾ A decree at the beginning of 1998 banned the transit of AP mines and certain other goods through the territory of the Republic of Belarus.⁽¹⁰³¹⁾

Information on the importation of AP mines in the past is not available.

Stockpiling

Belarus has very significant stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, as indicated by its own estimate that it would require tens of millions of dollars to destroy its AP mines. In many countries, the cost of destruction has averaged $1 per mine. Belarus officials have thus far only acknowledged "millions" of stockpiled mines.⁽¹⁰³²⁾ The Belarus Ministry of Defense has indicated it will disclose the quantity of AP mines in its stockpiles as soon as international donors are identified who are ready to assist Belarus in the destruction of these stockpiles.⁽¹⁰³³⁾ Belarus is currently negotiating with potential international donors to assist in this matter.

The Belarus Ministry of Defense has identified the priorities in destruction of landmine stockpiles and disclosed the quantity of the types of mines to be destroyed first: one million PFM-1 landmines (BLU-43/B and BLU-42/B type).⁽¹⁰³⁴⁾ Officials indicate the budget for destruction could be considerably reduced if the equipment was provided as in-kind assistance by other governments. One of the technologies badly needed by the Belarus government is the one to destroy AP mines BLU-43/B and BLU-42/B.⁽¹⁰³⁵⁾

In accordance with Protocol II of the CCW, in 1996-1998 Republic of Belarus destroyed some 5,000 AP mines of different types and also some 1,000 booby traps.⁽¹⁰³⁶⁾

Use

The Belarus Ministry of Defense states that AP mines are not used on Belarus territory, for border defense or otherwise.⁽¹⁰³⁷⁾

Landmine Problem

Belarus has a problem with landmines leftover from World War II. There are an unknown number of World War II vintage German and Soviet mines scattered about old battlefields.⁽¹⁰³⁸⁾ In particular the Vitebsk, Gomel and Minsk regions where the major WWII battles were fought are mine affected. No records exist of the mined areas and no research has been conducted yet in this respect. Mined areas are marked as soon as they are located. Recently most of the UXO have been found in the Brest, Gomel, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk regions. The Vitebsk region is the most affected.⁽¹⁰³⁹⁾

Mine Clearance

No national program on humanitarian mine action currently exists in Belarus. The organization and co-ordination of mine clearance is done by the Department of Engineer Forces in the Main Headquarters of the Belarus Military Forces. There are forty-four mobile military groups that belong to the engineers' detachments of the Belarus army that are currently undertaking mine clearance and training operations in Belarus. For example, five districts in the Brest region and two districts in the Grodno region are served by two mobile military groups of six deminers.

Almost every day the groups are called to clear UXOs. Two specially equipped automobiles are used to deliver the groups to the location of detected UXO. Just recently the group cleared over one hundred UXOs, including AP mines, in the Baranovichi district, Brest region. UXOs are destroyed by explosion either on the spot or taken to a safe area for destruction.⁽¹⁰⁴⁰⁾

Annually, thousands of AP mines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) left after World War II are lifted from the Belarus soil. From 1991 until 1997 some 120,000 UXOs (including 1,000 AP mines) were cleared.⁽¹⁰⁴¹⁾ In 1996, 10,703 UXOs were cleared at a cost of more than $100,000.⁽¹⁰⁴²⁾

The total area cleared in Belarus from 1991 until 1997 is 300 square kilometers (most of it had not been used for agricultural or production purposes before clearance). The location of areas recently cleared: Krupsky district, Minsk region, Dubrovensky district, Vitebsk region, Baranovichi district Brest region. The cost of mine clearance is $12,000 per square kilometer. The records of areas cleared are maintained and these records are accessible.⁽¹⁰⁴³⁾ The major obstacle to a more effective mine clearance program is lack of funding.

The population has benefited from the clearance. The cleared land is used in most cases for agricultural purposes, but also construction and production purposes.

Mine Awareness

The demining groups use mine clearance operations for education aimed at UXO victim prevention. Deminers meet with the local population and educate them on the rules of behavior when they come across mines or other UXO. This policy has resulted in an absence of UXO victims on the territories served by the groups during six recent years.⁽¹⁰⁴⁴⁾ However, no systematic work has been done in this respect.

There are two nongovernmental organizations in Belarus which work on the landmine issue. The Belarus Support Center for Associations and Foundations (SCAF) was founded in 1996. Its mission is to promote the development of civic society in Belarus through providing support to NGO initiatives. The Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines (BCBL) was initiated by SCAF in 1998 to support public education programs regarding the landmines crisis and to support efforts toward a comprehensive, worldwide ban on landmines.

SCAF has received a positive reaction from the Belarus Ministry of Education and the Belarus Ministry of Defense which have agreed to collaborate in the development and initiation of mine awareness education programs in Belarus schools.⁽¹⁰⁴⁵⁾

Landmine Casualties

The landmine victims in Belarus can be divided into three groups. The first group comprises civilians who were affected by landmines during the Second World War when they were children. For example, just in the Rechitski District, Gomel region there are sixteen disabled people who stepped on landmines in 1941-1945. The second group comprises former military personnel affected by landmines during the Afghanistan war in the 1980s. The third group includes civilians affected by UXOs left after the Second World War.

In 1997 two children were killed and twelve people (including two children) were injured by landmines. In 1998 two people were killed and six injured.⁽¹⁰⁴⁶⁾

The following cases serve as examples:

Sergei Sidorenko (born in 1976) was injured by an UXO in the forest near the village of Voitovo, Vitebsk district, Vitebsk region on 19 November 1997. Both his legs were affected. It took less than three hours to get medical help and surgical care. No psychiatric counseling was received. He was able to return to his work five months after the injury had been received. The health care was provided free of charge and he was also receiving financial support while disabled.⁽¹⁰⁴⁷⁾

Victor Nakhaev (born in 1963) was injured by an UXO near the village of Levki, Orsha District, Vitebsk region on 4 April 1998. He lost his left arm. It took a quarter of an hour to deliver him to the hospital. The first surgery was done one hour after the incident. There was another surgery one month later. The health care was provided free of charge. No psychiatric counseling was received. He has not been provided with a prosthetic device yet and needs assistance in this respect. He is disabled and has not returned to his work. He receives pension from the government (some $10 a month). He was also assisted in receiving a new apartment.⁽¹⁰⁴⁸⁾.

Two students, Alexey Dralov and Alexey Toliadonok (both born in 1981), were killed by UXO in 1998 near the railway station in Kruglevschina, Dokshitsi district, Vitebsk region.⁽¹⁰⁴⁹⁾

Nikolai Kovalev (born 1976) was injured by an UXO in the field of the collective farm named after M.Frunze, Rechitsi District, Gomel region on 22 August 1997. He and three of his colleagues, who received minor injuries, were collecting potatoes.⁽¹⁰⁵⁰⁾

The example of Retchitsa district in the Gomel region could demonstrate the effect of the AP landmines on the life of the population of one of the 200 districts in Belarus. In the 1960s, some thirty pupils from the local school were killed and three injured by the AP landmines.⁽¹⁰⁵¹⁾ The disabilities of fifteen people in the district are caused by the AP landmines explosions that took place before 1996.⁽¹⁰⁵²⁾

In all cases it took less than three hours to get medical help and less than one hour to get surgical care. Each disabled person is assisted through individual programs of rehabilitation. However due to the current economic crisis, this care is not adequate.

Survivor Assistance

Medical, surgical, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine victims/survivors in Belarus through the network of central, regional and local hospitals and other health care institutions co-ordinated by the Belarus Ministry of Health.

Medical facilities (ability to stop bleeding, resuscitate from shock with fluids, relieve pain, and arrange for transport to a surgical facility) are available through the local and regional hospitals. However, due to the lack of funding, most of them are currently experiencing shortages. Surgical facilities are available through public hospitals throughout the country.

Prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities are available in Belarus. The Belarus Prosthetic-Rehabilitation Centre (BPRC) is the main producer and supplier of prosthetics. This network has the capacity to produce 259 wheelchairs and 1,220 prosthetic devices monthly. During ten months in 1998 some 1,670 prosthetic devices and 1,053 mobility devices were produced. They are distributed through the regional and local departments of social welfare among those who need them. The BPRC network has high potential for increasing the production and exporting prosthetic and mobility devices to other countries. It also welcomes co-operation with international donors and counterparts to improve its services to the UXO victims/survivors in Belarus.⁽¹⁰⁵³⁾

A private agency in support of the veterans of the war in Afghanistan was initiated by Victor Sivochin.⁽¹⁰⁵⁴⁾ His organization, "La Makha," is developing individual programs of support and rehabilitation for Afghanistan war veterans affected by AP mines and other weapons. There are no particular social and/or economic reintegration programs for landmine survivors currently available in Belarus. However, the Act on Local Governments allows and encourages the private, public and non-governmental organizations to provide support to those who may need it.

The Law on Psychiatric Counseling has been just adopted by the Belarus parliament and hopefully will result in better services to be provided to AP mines victims/survivors. A national disability law exists in Belarus: "Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus."⁽¹⁰⁵⁵⁾ According to this law, the National Council on the Problems of Disabled and Handicapped co-ordinates the activities aimed at implementation of the law. It comprises top executives of the main ministries dealing with the problems of the disabled (Ministry of Social Protection, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, etc.). The council is headed by the First Deputy of the Prime Minister of Belarus.⁽¹⁰⁵⁶⁾

The law ensures tax reduced status of enterprises producing technical and other devices for the disabled. The profit of any enterprise in Belarus used for production of devices for the disabled or for providing services for disabled is tax exempt.⁽¹⁰⁵⁷⁾

The rehabilitation of the disabled is made according to his or her individual rehabilitation program, developed and approved by a special committee. The individual rehabilitation program is an official document that is to be followed by governmental, non-government and private agencies. The disabled receive medical and surgical care free of charge. They also receive a discount for major medicines.⁽¹⁰⁵⁸⁾

The disabled are guaranteed to receive secondary, professional and higher education free of charge. The employment of disabled is protected by the state. The state also assists enterprises in equipping the workplaces for the disabled with needed devices.⁽¹⁰⁵⁹⁾ The disabled are provided with a technical or any other device needed free of charge as soon as it is part of the individual rehabilitation program. Those who in line with their rehabilitation program get transportation devices (for example, automobiles) also get support for their maintenance and repair.⁽¹⁰⁶⁰⁾

The main agency responsible for protection and social reintegration of people with disabilities is the Belarus Ministry of Social Protection.

ESTONIA

Mine Ban Policy

Estonia has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty, even though it was one of the first governments to publicly support a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines, which it did during the preparatory sessions for the negotiations on the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1994. Estonia also voted in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. It participated in the Ottawa process diplomatic meetings, but did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and came to the Oslo negotiations only as an observer.

Despite its support for an AP mine ban in principle, according to Erik Männik of the Estonian Ministry of Defense the government is reluctant to sign the Mine Ban Treaty. Estonia believes that Conference on Disarmament can offer global, efficient, verifiable and legally binding prohibitions or restrictions on antipersonnel mines. Estonia is not a member of the CD. Estonia has yet to sign the CCW and its Protocol II regulating mines, but officials have indicated it will sign and ratify the CCW in the near future.⁽¹⁰⁶¹⁾

Tiit Aleksejev of the Foreign Ministry has similarly outlined the Estonian government position on the landmine issue: Estonia condemns the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel landmines and supports an effective ban on antipersonnel landmines, but is of the opinion that the CD provides the best mechanism for dealing with these issues. The CD counts all key countries as its members and also provides for the possibility of active participation by non-members. The prohibition of landmines will be effective only when all states engaged in their production, storage, use and transfer are included in the preparation and implementation of the respective international measures.⁽¹⁰⁶²⁾

Estonia also believes that it must have alternatives to antipersonnel mines before it agrees to a ban, and discussions with foreign and defense policy experts have been held on searching for possible alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.

The reluctance on the part of Estonia (and other Baltic states) to fully join the Ottawa process stems in large part from its occupation by the former Soviet Union, and continued concern about Russian aggression. The military has argued that antipersonnel mines can be an inexpensive and efficient tool to slow down a massive land invasion and to protect strategic targets, and that no affordable alternatives exist.⁽¹⁰⁶³⁾

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The government states that it does not use antipersonnel mines, except for training purposes.⁽¹⁰⁶⁴⁾ It also states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁽¹⁰⁶⁵⁾ The Estonian Foreign Ministry acknowledges that Estonia possesses antipersonnel mines, but maintains that they are limited in number--not exceeding that allowed for training purposes under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁽¹⁰⁶⁶⁾

The following legal acts regulate the use, production, storage, transfer and destruction of antipersonnel landmines in the Republic of Estonia:

1) Strategic Goods Export and Transit Act (signed in 1994);

2) Government of the Republic Regulation on Procedure for Export and Transit of Strategic Goods;

3) Weapons Act;

4) Minister of Defense Regulation on Import and Export of Weapons and Munitions in the Area of Government of the Ministry of Defense;

5) Minister of Defense Regulation on Procedure for Procurement, Storage, Conveyance and Carrying of Weapons and Munitions in the Area of Government of the Ministry of Defense; and

6) Customs Act.⁽¹⁰⁶⁷⁾

Landmine Problem

There are unpopulated islands in the Finnish gulf which were mined during WWII. They present only a minor danger, because still nobody lives on the islands, and they are protected from visitors. These islands are the only mined areas in Estonia.

Mine Action

The government has indicated that it will contribute to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance in 1999, and that it willing to contribute one platoon-sized unit of deminers (18 men) for mine clearance in mine affected countries. There is also a demining group under the Ministry of Interior. The U.S., UK, and Sweden have provided training assistance.

There are sergeants and officers in the Estonian Defense Forces who have passed special courses of demining and who have practical experience in the field of mine clearance. Estonian officers serving on the SFOR mission have successfully participated in demining in Bosnia. The government's preferred framework for this assistance and cooperation would be the U.S. Demining 2010 Initiative.⁽¹⁰⁶⁸⁾

FINLAND

Mine Ban Policy

It is of little surprise that Finland has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Finland has been one of the more vocal countries in support of the legitimate right of a government to self defense, including the use of APMs. While it did attend various of the Ottawa Process meetings as an observer, it was often outspoken in its opposition to a ban. Currently, Finland is the only country in the European Union that stands outside the Treaty and seems increasingly uncomfortable to be in that position.

In one analysis of the Finnish position, it was noted that the government had never expected that 122 countries would sign the Mine Ban Treaty and that it has become politically very difficult for the country. Finland does not want to be seen as an irresponsible member of the international community but continues to view APMs as vital for its defense. Finland fears signing the Treaty when potential aggressors have not, which it would see as harmful to its security. "The worst scenario for Finland would be to commit itself to a convention, 1) which prohibits defensive antipersonnel landmines but, 2) outside of which a number of militarily strong states decide to remain, and 3) which does not prohibit technologically advanced, remotely delivered mines, capable of being used for aggressive purposes."⁽¹⁰⁶⁹⁾

In 1997 a governmental working group was created to examine the landmine question. In December of that year the group, comprised of officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, declared that Finland is in the process of moving toward a total ban of antipersonnel mines and will be prepared to replace APMs with other methods of independent and reliable defense. At the same time, the governmental working group insisted that Finland needs additional money (several million US dollars) for such alternatives to APMs and that the time for the transitional period will be at least ten years. In the future Finland will allocate more money for the mine clearance programs and programs of mine awareness.⁽¹⁰⁷⁰⁾

According to the coordinator of the Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines, an explanation for why APMS are regarded as being so important for Finland and why the country has found it impossible to join the Ottawa process is bound up with perceptions concerning threats it has faced in the past and the notion of what sort of defense it can pursue:

"Finland has a relatively big area with a small population and is a smaller nation with limited resources. Finland has a big neighbor, Russia, with whom it has fought two wars less than 60 years ago. Finland wants to have, and to give the signal that it has, a 'strong, credible, independent defense,' but because of its limited resources Finland has to depend more on the 'psychological' side; on all levels are strong patriotic feelings, a conscript army involving all men from 18 years etc. Due to limited resources Finland has not had the chance to build a 'high-tech' and 'professional' army even if developments are pushing it in that direction. Finland has one of the biggest European reserves when you look at the population number. The conscription-based reserve does not possess very developed weapons. If the military were to admit that APMS are an out-dated form of defense, they would risk a discussion on the relevance of the whole current defense doctrine and the 'realism' of current defense plans. It is a discussion the Finnish defense establishment is unready to take up."⁽¹⁰⁷¹⁾

Finland has also had major difficulties accepting the Ottawa process itself. Being situated between what is traditionally seen as the East and West it has always strongly underlined "realism" in its foreign political thinking, and this is something which it has been much respected for during the Cold War. The Ottawa Process did not seek the approval of the superpowers; the negotiation process has been very open (NGO-friendly and responsive) and based on a strongly optimistic vision that smaller and medium-size powers can make a difference. This new, changed approach and the fast timetable of the Process has been too hard for Finnish foreign politics to follow.

Between 1995 and 1999, however, the attitude of official Finland toward the total ban of APMs has evolved quite a lot. At first, its position was firmly against a ban because of Finland's "legitimate defense needs." Finland argued that it could not accept a ban unilaterally because it does not believe that all the countries in the world would adhere to the ban.⁽¹⁰⁷²⁾

At a seminar on landmines held in the European Parliament in 1995, Mr. Pasi Patokallio, director of the unit on Non-proliferation and Arms Control at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, made the following remarks: "We know that many argue for a total ban on antipersonnel landmines. We don't agree, the reason being our legitimate defense needs, and I will come back on that. But even if a total ban were the best solution, the beast could once again turn out to be the enemy of the good. We certainly feel that it is better to gain a broad support for effective albeit limited steps (restrictions on use instead of a ban) than to end up with a situation where the total ban is adhered to by a very small group of Western countries while the rest of the world keeps its distance."⁽¹⁰⁷³⁾

In August 1996 Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen admitted that in all probability an international ban would come about. The Minister voiced support for the European Union's joint efforts on the landmine question, but at the same time she stated that Finland could not unilaterally get rid of its APMs, which are so important for the country. The Minister also said that the "normal" way to negotiate would be through the Conference on Disarmament (CD). What was new here is that the Minister stated that the Ottawa and Geneva processes could be complementary.⁽¹⁰⁷⁴⁾

During the Ottawa Process, Finland's position softened a little, but its statements still strongly underlined the fact that if the country were to join a ban on APMs it would have to be "legally binding," "global" and "verifiable." Speaking at an event in Helsinki in August of 1996, the Foreign Minister offered the following comment: "But it is increasingly clear that in the end, only a prohibition of inhumane and indiscriminate landmines use can bring a real solution. To be effective, such a solution must be legally binding, global and verifiable. As the first step, all states should adhere to and abide by the significantly strengthened landmine protocol to the CCW. I find it very hard to understand why two out of three UN member states continue to remain outside the Convention. As concurrent step, Finland proposes the initiation of global negotiations on a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines altogether...The natural forum for such negotiations would be the single negotiating body for disarmament that the international community has at its disposal, namely the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva."⁽¹⁰⁷⁵⁾

In September 1997 during the Mine Ban Treaty negotiations in Oslo the (observer) Finnish delegation expressed support for a verifiable treaty:

"Finland believes that through a global and effective treaty it is possible to stop the further spread of APMs and hold those who use APMs against civilians population to account. This is why Finland has pronounced her support for a global, verifiable treaty banning APMs. This is not an easy commitment for us, given the fact that APMs continue to have an important role in our national defense, but we are ready to follow through that commitment provided that the treaty will truly affect the landmine crisis….

"We also believe that there have to be effective mechanisms within the treaty to ensure that parties comply with the treaty commitments and that anyone not complying can be held accountable. Any future conflict will be the moment when credibility of the total ban treaty will be at stake; given the kind of conflicts where APMs have been used, mostly internal conflicts, one should not expect that the international community will be able to receive reliable information of violation of a total ban unless the treaty provides a mechanism for that. If it is possible to verify what is happening out in the field in conflict areas, the international community can have a credible norm. Efforts to water down the provision concerning verification of compliance through various filters and veto right for the suspected country only pave the way for the violation of the treaty commitment and are in flagrant contradiction with the humanitarian objectives of the process toward a total ban."⁽¹⁰⁷⁶⁾

But on the time frame for the destruction of stockpiled APMs as compared to the clearance of minefields, Finland argued:

"Isn't there something wrong with the priorities from a humanitarian perspective? No limit is established for destruction of mines that are the most dangerous for civilians - those mines that are the scattered outside marked minefields. Marked minefields also kill civilians, if poorly marked or poorly guarded, or both. On the other hand, APMs in stockpiles do not per se pose a threat to civilians unless taken out for use in the field. Under the total ban treaty, stockpiles should not be the most urgent priority. Indeed, one could argue that, from the humanitarian perspective, the first thing to ask ought to be to ask that all APMs be withdrawn into military storage...One could even wonder whether the inadvertent message is that countries should deploy their stockpiled APMs in the field in the order to gain time for their destruction and replacement with other means. Surely that is not the message this conference should send. For us, stockpiles are the key issue because all of our APMs are in storage."⁽¹⁰⁷⁷⁾

But even as the delegation in Oslo was expressing some support, eventually, for a ban, the contradictions within policy remained evident. On 4 September 1997, Finland's Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen spelled out clear reservations to a unilateral ban on landmines. "Why aren't they proposing a ban on Kalasnikows? They are killing more people - have killed more people," Lipponen told Reuters in an interview.⁽¹⁰⁷⁸⁾

Finland did send an observer delegation to Ottawa in December of 1997 for the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty. The day before the Treaty opened for signature in Ottawa, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued a press release stating that "Finland takes part in the Ottawa Meeting as a observer. A group of officers are to present a report for a total ban of APMs. It is researching how to replace the use of APMs in Finland's defense."⁽¹⁰⁷⁹⁾

Current Finnish policy is to voice support for the total ban of APMs⁽¹⁰⁸⁰⁾ and the government has indicated its "readiness" to ban antipersonnel landmines at some future date. "It is a process which will become true maybe in ten years time," according to Lt. Col. Kukko from the Main Headquarters.⁽¹⁰⁸¹⁾

Finland has signed and ratified both the original and the revised Protocol 2 of the CCW.⁽¹⁰⁸²⁾

As already noted, Finland has always supported the possibility of landmine negotiations in the CD and has been in the core of CD supporters, even after softening its position toward the Ottawa Process. In a statement to the First Committee of the United Nations in November of 1996, Counselor for Foreign Affairs Iivo Salmi outlined the Finnish position:

"The CD is an established forum which is available for new negotiations after the conclusion of CTBT…Provided that the political will is there. The only other credible alternative is the CCW process but it may not have an other review conference until 2001. We believe that the work at the CD could start faster and that the negotiations could be more intensive….The CD would not be unaffected by the political momentum that largely thanks within the CD, the momentum would increase and, we believe, expand into countries which are not yet committed to the goal of total ban. Accusations that the support for the CD as the forum would be a delaying tactic are totally unfounded. The momentum is there and it will remain....It is clear that the CD route would bring into the process countries that are not able to commit themselves here and now to an APL ban. This would be a more painful road to follow compared with a 'quick fix.' But through such a process, the commitment of most, if not all, those participating in the negotiations, would grow.…if a process could be started within in the CD, we believe that a treaty is achievable within a couple of years."⁽¹⁰⁸³⁾

Finland believed then and continues to believe that the way forward within the CD was through the appointment of a special coordinator to help establish an ad hoc committee to deal with issues related to antipersonnel mines:

"In order to obtain an effective ban, all the relevant countries should, from the outset, participate in the negotiations: as my minister announced at UN general Assembly last September Finland regards the CD as the most suitable forum for the negotiations on APLs [antipersonnel landmines]. With its members and observers, the Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating body of more than 90 countries. To reach concrete and notable results soon, a step-by-step approach could be considered as away forward. Now we are facing a procedural challenge: how to respond to this global call? The Conference on Disarmament should establish an ad-hoc committee on antipersonnel landmines and start serious negotiations. Therefore as an immediate task we would kindly invite you, Mr. President, to seek an urgent agreement on the appointment of a special coordinator to consult the way in which the issue of antipersonnel landmines could best be moved forward."⁽¹⁰⁸⁴⁾

Even though a special coordinator was appointed (Australian Ambassador Campbell), the CD has not proved capable of any agreement on discussions on landmines. Various countries oppose such discussions for a variety of reasons, not all of which are related to the concern of some that to negotiate anything related to APMs in the CD would undercut the establishment of the international norm provided by the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty. Finland continues to support, along with others, negotiations on a transfer ban of APMs in the CD. In February of 1999, the Bulgarian Ambassador to the CD issued a statement, co-sponsored by 21 other governments including Finland, calling upon the CD to begin negotiations of an antipersonnel landmine transfer ban.

Production

The Finnish government has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel mines and has not done so since 1981.⁽¹⁰⁸⁵⁾ Almost all APMs in stock are Finnish-made mines. The capability and the know-how to produce APMs exists and it is, in principle, possible that while there is no legislation which forbids production, it could begin if and when the government were to decide to do so.⁽¹⁰⁸⁶⁾

Until 1981 several Finnish companies produced components for simple mines which the army assembled as blast mines,⁽¹⁰⁸⁷⁾ fragmentation mines,⁽¹⁰⁸⁸⁾ and also some Claymore mines.⁽¹⁰⁸⁹⁾ Finland will not give details of the costs of producing and/or acquiring its mines. But as one army officer noted, "We do not give this information to the public, but they are more advantageous to produce in the large amounts."⁽¹⁰⁹⁰⁾

Information about APMs is not secret but neither is it easily available. Because the mines are Finnish-made it is quite difficult to compare them with international types and codes. Some known types include the SM 65-98 blast mine; the PM 68 stake mine,⁽¹⁰⁹¹⁾which according to a Defense Staff official is only used in command-detonation mode although it is possible to use them with tripwires;⁽¹⁰⁹²⁾ and the VM 88 directional fragmentation explosive,⁽¹⁰⁹³⁾ which like the PM 68 is to be used in command detonation mode although it can be used with a tripwire.⁽¹⁰⁹⁴⁾

According to the Defense Staff: "Antipersonnel mines are all produced by the Defense Force. Some components are may be bought from outside but never explosives."⁽¹⁰⁹⁵⁾ Nor has Finland licensed production of APMs in another country.⁽¹⁰⁹⁶⁾ An official of the Ministry of Defense said that "Finland does not transfer APM production technology to any other country. This concerns the CCW obligation which came into force on 3 December 1998."⁽¹⁰⁹⁷⁾

Finland does not produce Claymore mines and now classifies all Claymore mines as munitions, to be used in command-detonation mode only.⁽¹⁰⁹⁸⁾ But they have not been modified to make it impossible to trigger them by tripwires.⁽¹⁰⁹⁹⁾

According to the Defense Staff, "Finland does not produce or conduct research on munitions which could function as APMs. The Pohjamiina is an antitank mine which is of no danger to civilians. We follow CCW obligations very seriously and all the equipment is adjusted to CCW specifications."⁽¹¹⁰⁰⁾ On the other hand researcher Arto Nokkala notes that APM technology is very simple and from that perspective it is easy for any country to resume production of such weapons in the event of a change in policy. Finland, with its advanced electronics industry, has the basic capacity to develop devices which are allowed in treaties.⁽¹¹⁰¹⁾

Lieutenant-colonel Jaakko Martikainen from the Defense Staff affirms that Finland does not produce APM components, nor delivery systems that can be used for APMs.⁽¹¹⁰²⁾ And the military is monitoring the development of alternatives being researched in other countries.⁽¹¹⁰³⁾ Arto Nokkala says that it is difficult to assess such development, but Finland probably does research on systems which can replace APMs and which are in accordance with different treaties it has signed.⁽¹¹⁰⁴⁾

Transfer

Finland does not export APMs.⁽¹¹⁰⁵⁾ According to a senior government official in the Ministry of Defense, Finland has never exported APMs.⁽¹¹⁰⁶⁾ Additionally, Finland has announced that it "seeks to end the export and production of antipersonnel landmines worldwide. Finland has never itself exported antipersonnel landmines, nor has there been any antipersonnel landmine production in Finland since 1981."⁽¹¹⁰⁷⁾ Finland has made political declarations regarding exports but made no legally-binding decisions.⁽¹¹⁰⁸⁾ However Lieutenant-colonel Yrjö Kukko of the Defense Force stated, "Finland has exported components of mines but never whole APMs."⁽¹¹⁰⁹⁾

Finland has imported Claymore mines. The name of the model is VM 88, which probably means that the import year was1988. No other information is available.

Information also exists that bounding fragmentation mines had been bought from Germany in the 1940's, but the government denies that they are still in stockpiles and the Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines has been told that the army no longer trains troops to use bounding fragmentation mines.⁽¹¹¹⁰⁾

The transit of APMs is not possible except with the permission of the Ministry of Defense or Council of the State. If APMs come from a country which is the member of the European Union, Finland considers that another member country has prepared the documents needed before transiting any munitions through Finland. The transit of components and technology is also forbidden without permission.⁽¹¹¹¹⁾ Lieutenant Colonel Kukko says that the transit of APMs is speculative anyway as such a situation would not come about very easily given that Finland's attitude is quite negative.⁽¹¹¹²⁾

Stockpiling

Finland does not release precise information on the total number of mines in stock.⁽¹¹¹³⁾ The official statement is that they number in the hundreds of thousands but less than a million.⁽¹¹¹⁴⁾ The Finnish national daily, Helsingin Sanomat, has estimated quantities of APMs as more than the official range given: "The military does not want to tell how many APMs Finland has in stock. When the Ministry of Defense says 'enough' and the Defense Staff says 'plenty,' it is possible to estimate that there are millions of APMs in stock. There are probably fewer Claymore mines because they are more expensive than APMs."⁽¹¹¹⁵⁾

The Finnish Campaign has doubts that range of numbers of mines made public is close to accurate. "The stated amount is in clear contradiction with statements that APMs are an essential part of Finland's defense, and especially in consideration of Finland's long land border [with Russia] and with the statement that it would be very expensive to consider alternatives and destroy the stocks because Finland has more landmines on average than other European countries."⁽¹¹¹⁶⁾

Finland is not going to destroy stockpiles before it finds alternatives to APMs for its defense and signs the Mine Ban Treaty. A press release of 28 August 1998 from the Council of State announced that: "Research on Finland's possibilities to join to the total ban of APMs and to find replacing methods and arrangements will be continued. The aim is that first time the use of alternative methods and arrangements...is considered to happen by the year 2001."⁽¹¹¹⁷⁾ Even so, the government working group on landmines has suggested that if Finland finds alternatives to APMs for its defense, plus the money to acquire them, and then if Finland were to sign the Treaty in 2006, it would destroy all the APMs by the year 2010.⁽¹¹¹⁸⁾

But in compliance with the CCW's revised Protocol 2, Finland has had to adapt some of its existing mines and also destroy others. Finland has destroyed its old SM 57 and SM 61 blast mines. "We started to destroy old blast mines already before the end of last year (1998) and they are already all destroyed," according to Lieutenant Colonel Heikki Bäckström.⁽¹¹¹⁹⁾

The Defense Force is also obliged to make changes to SM 65 blast-mines,⁽¹¹²⁰⁾ which are still part of Finland's defense but do not contain enough metal to make them detectable - a requirement under revised Protocol II. After these changes these mines will be renamed Sakaramiina 65-98s. As noted above, Claymore mines are no longer defined as antipersonnel mines; as of 3 December 1998, they were classified as directional fragmentation explosives.⁽¹¹²¹⁾ All these old mines have been destroyed in Lapland or parts have been recycled. For example all the copper has been collected for re-use. ⁽¹¹²²⁾

Use

Finland continues to reserve the right to use APMs, Claymore mines and other weapons that might function as APMs. Thus, the statement from a Defense Force Brigadier General that "antipersonnel landmines are still an essential part of the Finnish defense doctrine." However, the General also adds that "There are no minefields in peacetime in Finland."⁽¹¹²³⁾ Many people believe that there are minefields in the guarded and closed border zone between Finland and Russia. All official statements refute this common belief.⁽¹¹²⁴⁾

Mine Action Funding⁽¹¹²⁵⁾

For various humanitarian mine action programs, Finland has spent US$14,445,000 between 1991-1998. The first country to receive support was Afghanistan, which received a total of US$1.5 million. between 1991-1994. During 1995 Finland allocated US$715,000 for mine programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique. That same year, the government spent US$715,000 to send mine clearance specialists on a fact-finding mission to Angola and Mozambique, in conjunction with UNDHA to assess the possibility of Finnish in-kind assistance and expertise for DHA demining operations.

In 1996 the total amount spent was US$1,306,000 US, including in-kind contributions and mine clearance equipment worth US$196,000 for Angola and Mozambique; US$435,000 through the Finnish Red Cross and WHO for prostheses for mine victims in Bosnia; US$22,000 for a rehabilitation program of Save the Children in Bosnia; and direct contributions of US$218,000 and US$435,000 for Cambodia and Afghanistan respectively for mine clearance operations.

Finnish allocations more than tripled in 1997 to US$4,478,000 for mine-action programs in Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Cambodia and Laos. Of those funds, US$163,000 was allocated to establish a Finnish stand-by unit for humanitarian demining.

In 1998, the last year for which a breakdown of figures is available, Finland allocated US$6,565,000 mostly for mine action programs in Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique. Of the total, US$196,000 was channeled through the Finnish Red Cross to produce prostheses in Bosnia, and finally, US$1,620,000 was spent to purchase demining vehicles for the Finnish stand-by unit.

Between 1998-2001, Finland will allocate US$22.56 million for mine action programs.⁽¹¹²⁶⁾

GEORGIA

Background

In April 1991, the Republic of Georgia declared itself independent of the Soviet Union. In 1992, the long standing dispute over the political status of Abkhazia resulted in the outbreak of war. At the end of September 1993, Georgian armed forces withdrew from the territory of Abkhazia. Additional fighting took place in early 1994. After a cease-fire agreement in May 1994, the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CIS CPKF) were introduced into the region. In November 1994, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopted a new constitution and declared Abkhazia to be a sovereign republic, which can be bound by international law. No international diplomatic recognition has been extended to Abkhazia. Peace negotiations are being conducted by the United Nations and facilitated by the Russian Federation, with the representatives of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, acting as Friends of the UN Secretary General. No progress has been made on agreement on the political status of Abkhazia.

As a result of the fighting, and continued skirmishes, Georgia and Abkhazia are mine-affected (see also the special report on Abkhazia).

Mine Ban Policy

Georgia has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Nevertheless, the Georgian government has proclaimed its support for a mine ban. At the UN General Assembly in September 1996, President Shevardnadze said: "I, as the President of Georgia, declare that Georgia takes the obligation never to produce, use or import antipersonnel mines."⁽¹¹²⁷⁾

Georgian authorities have stated that they cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty for two reasons: first, antipersonnel mines have been used in the region of Abkhazia and Georgia cannot fulfill its treaty obligations to conduct mine clearance until Abkhazia is reintegrated with Georgia; second, Georgia lacks funds, proper equipment, and trained deminers to conduct the mine clearance operations.⁽¹¹²⁸⁾

Despite this reluctance, during a visit to Georgia in February 1999 by ICBL Ambassador and Nobel Laureate Jody Williams, President Shevardnadze stated his intention to sign the ban treaty and indicated that the Georgian Council of National Security was discussing the issue.⁽¹¹²⁹⁾

Williams reported that while political officials expressed support for the treaty, the minister of defense remained opposed, and insisted on the right of the military to retain and use antipersonnel mines.⁽¹¹³⁰⁾

Georgia attended the treaty preparatory meetings of the Ottawa process, although it did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It attended the Oslo treaty negotiations in September and the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December 1997 only as an observer. During the signing ceremony, the Ambassador of Georgia, Tedo Japaridze, said: "Georgia believes that the human and social costs of antipersonnel mines far outweigh their military significance.... Georgia...will in every way support and promote the ban on the use of the mines.... Therefore, Georgia supports the Ottawa Process and its goal--the prohibition of use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction...[but] without financial and necessary technological assistance from other countries Georgia will not be able to fulfil its obligations under the Convention (particularly to destroy antipersonnel mines during 4 years).... Georgia believes that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should be the main forum for negotiating a global ban."⁽¹¹³¹⁾ Georgia, however, is not a member of the CD.

Georgia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapon and its Protocol II on landmines, but it has not ratified the 1996 amended Protocol II.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Georgian authorities state that Georgia is not a producer of antipersonnel landmines or mine components.⁽¹¹³²⁾ Georgia's status as a possible past producer of landmine components for the Soviet Union is unclear.

Georgia is not a landmine exporter. The Minister of Defense of Georgia has stated that Georgia has not imported any AP mines since independence.

Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, though the exact size and composition is not known.⁽¹¹³³⁾ Georgia has not destroyed any of its landmine stockpiles.⁽¹¹³⁴⁾ In addition, there are antipersonnel mines stockpiled at military bases under Russian control. The most commonly found types of mines in Georgia and Abkhazia are MON-50, MON-100, MON-200, MON-90, OZM-72, PMN, PMN-2 (former Soviet Union); and the TS-50 (Italy).⁽¹¹³⁵⁾

Use

Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces have laid tens of thousands of mines. Georgian military units laid the majority of landmines in Ochamchira and Sukhumi districts, while the Abkhaz forces are reported to have laid the majority of mines in the Gali district.⁽¹¹³⁶⁾ Though most mines were used during the intense fighting in 1992-93, there are still allegations of ongoing use by both sides. There are numerous reports of groups from Georgia infiltrating into Abkhazia and laying antipersonnel mines. (See Landmine Monitor report on Abkhazia). There are also allegations of Abkhazian military groups or partisans laying mines in Georgia.⁽¹¹³⁷⁾

Russian soldiers laid mines around their military bases in Georgia, some of which have been transferred to the Georgians, some of which are still under Russian control. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, the Russians have not cleared any of the mines or provided any precise maps or registries of mined areas.⁽¹¹³⁸⁾

Residents of the village of Nikozi told the ICBL Georgian Committee that during the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict mines were used, but that there have been no casualties since the end of the fighting.

Civilians use antipersonnel landmines for fishing, uprooting of trees, and other purposes. According to General Gurgenidze, the Head of Georgian Peacekeeping Troops in the Tskhinvali Region, in 1992 after fighting broke out between Georgia and Abkhazia, the Sappers Regiment in Tskhinvali left its post and approximately 3,000 mines were abandoned. According to the General, the local community has used those mines.⁽¹¹³⁹⁾ This has led to several mine accidents.

Landmine Problem

According to the United Nations, there are approximately 150,000 landmines in Georgia and Abkhazia, the majority of which are near the Inguri river separating Georgia and Abkhazia.⁽¹¹⁴⁰⁾ The U.N. Development program has estimated that there are 15,000 mines just in two heavily mined areas along the Inguri River and the Gali canal.⁽¹¹⁴¹⁾ The mine problem is much more severe in Abkhazia than in any other region in Georgia. Outside of Abkhazia, mines pose dangers to civilians in Georgia mainly in areas near the border with Abkhazia and near military bases which have been mined.

Quite often the water level rises along the Inguri river because of floods and mines are washed out of minefields, posing a hazard to local civilians.⁽¹¹⁴²⁾

Across from a former Soviet military base in Osiauri (near Khashuri, in eastern Georgia), seventy-six hectares of forest were mined, as well as the perimeter of the base.⁽¹¹⁴³⁾ The former head of the Sappers Department in the Ministry of Defense of Georgia Colonel Kalandadze said that when the base was transferred to Georgia, the Russians left behind incorrect maps because Georgian sappers during the clearance operation removed nearly 1,000 mines instead of 361, as had been indicated on the map.⁽¹¹⁴⁴⁾

During her visit to Georgia, ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams visited the site of a Russian base with a still-mined perimeter. She reported that "the old and rusty barbed-wire fence was broken down and clearly anyone could walk off the main, heavily traveled road to the river not far from the road. The one sign regarding landmines in evidence was old, rusted and hard to read."⁽¹¹⁴⁵⁾

Mine Clearance

Georgia has no national programs for humanitarian clearance, mine awareness programs, or survivor assistance. The United States committed $39,000 for a landmine survey.⁽¹¹⁴⁶⁾ By the order of the President of Georgia, responsibility for mine clearance is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense for the zone of military actions and territory of military bases, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for populated areas, motor and railroads, and to the State Department for frontier areas. Effective clearance is complicated by the lack of coordination between the related institutions. Since 1994, CIS peacekeepers have conducted demining operations in the security zone along the Inguri River. The non-governmental organization HALO Trust is conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Abkhazia.⁽¹¹⁴⁷⁾ The alleged new use of landmines has delayed implementation of mine action programs and mine clearance in contaminated areas.

Mine Awareness

The ICBL Georgian Committee plans to undertake a mine awareness campaign, including mapping mined areas, organizing lectures and seminars for teachers in high-risk regions, and publication of a mine awareness brochure for people in Georgia and Abkhazia. The ICBL Georgian Committee is cooperating with Abkhazian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on these issues.

Landmine Casualties

There has recently been a reduction in the number of people killed or injured by antipersonnel landmines in Georgia because a large number of people have left the mined territories. However, after displaced persons return to their homes, it is anticipated that there will be an increased number of mine casualties.

According to information from the Head of Science and Technical Research Department of Georgian Army General Staff, Colonel Tavadze, about 70% of casualties during the war were landmine victims.⁽¹¹⁴⁸⁾

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Hospitals throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia, routinely run into shortages of basic medical supplies. Lack of surgical equipment and the facilities to store blood prevent adequate care for landmine survivors. No special rehabilitation assistance is provided to landmine victims in Georgia. In general, in Georgia there are medical rehabilitation centers for survivors, but expensive surgical and rehabilitation measures for survivors are inaccessible to most people. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) runs orthopedic projects for the war disabled, many of whom are landmine victims. It has centers in Tbilisi and Gagra (Abkhazia) where an average of thirty-one patients in Tbilisi and six patients in Gagra are fitted with prostheses or orthoses per month.⁽¹¹⁴⁹⁾ In 1997, the ICRC manufactured 669 prostheses in the Tbilisi and Gagra workshops, 184 of which were for mine victims.⁽¹¹⁵⁰⁾ There are no national programs to provide psychological counseling for landmine victims.

KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the early treaty preparatory meetings in 1997, but only as an observer, and it did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. At the regional conference on landmines in Turkmenistan that month, the Kazakhstan representative made no formal policy statements. It did not attend the Oslo negotiations nor the Ottawa signing conference. Kazakhstan voted for the 1996 UNGA Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, but was one of eighteen countries which abstained from the 1997 vote on UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing, and was one of nineteen nations which abstained from the 1998 vote on UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

Kazakhstan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). At an International Committee of the Red Cross-sponsored conference on international humanitarian law in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 1997, Kazakhstan declared its intention to ratify the CCW and its Protocols, but to date, no action has been taken.⁽¹¹⁵¹⁾

It is unknown whether Kazakhstan produced antipersonnel landmines or components in the past, but it inherited stockpiles from the Soviet Union. According to the U.N., Kazakhstan declared a comprehensive moratorium on production in December 1996 and declared a ban on the export and transfer of antipersonnel landmines in August 1997.⁽¹¹⁵²⁾ The duration of the moratorium was not specified.

The U.S. State Department in 1993 reported that an unknown number of German and Russian landmines from World War II were scattered about Kazakhstan.⁽¹¹⁵³⁾ However, Kazakhstan declared to the UN in 1995 that it was not mine affected.⁽¹¹⁵⁴⁾ There have been no recent reports of casualties due to uncleared mines. It is not known if or how much of the Kazakh-China border is mined. Kazakhstan is not known to have made any contributions to international mine action programs. The Kazakhstan armed forces reportedly have sophisticated mine removal and mine destruction capabilities.⁽¹¹⁵⁵⁾

KYRGYZSTAN

Kyrgyzstan has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the early treaty preparatory meetings in 1997, but only as an observer, and did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It attended the regional conference on landmines in Turkmenistan that month, but made no statement on mine ban policy. Kyrgyzstan did not participate in the Oslo negotiations, but sent an observer to the Ottawa signing conference. Also in 1997, the International Committee of the Red Cross held an informational seminar on landmines in Bishkek at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁽¹¹⁵⁶⁾ Kyrgyzstan voted for the 1996 UNGA Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA resolution welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty and urging its full realization. Kyrgyzstan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), although it declared its intention to ratify the CCW and its Landmine Protocol to the ICRC.⁽¹¹⁵⁷⁾

Kyrgyzstan is not known to produce or export antipersonnel landmines, though it has no restrictions in place governing production or export of landmines. It is thought to have inherited stockpiles of APMs from the Soviet Union.

There are landmines on the Kyrgyz-China border, laid during the time of the Soviet Union. The perceived need to maintain those minefields may be the reason Kyrgyzstan has not signed the ban treaty. How much of the Kyrgyz-China border is mined or how many mines are laid is unknown. However, Kyrgyzstan has recently begun discussions with China on how to clear the border minefields between the two countries.⁽¹¹⁵⁸⁾ There are no reports of casualties. Kyrgyzstan is not known to have made any contributions to international mine action programs.

LATVIA

Mine Ban Policy

Latvia has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Latvia attended the all the Ottawa Process diplomatic meetings, but did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and took part in the Oslo negotiations only as an observer. Latvia voted yes on the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. It signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on mines on 4 January 1993, but has not ratified.

At the Budapest Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 26-28 March 1998, a Latvian Foreign Ministry official said that Latvia "welcomes the efforts of the international community to put an end to the use of this weapon and to eliminate eventually all emplaced and stockpiled antipersonnel mines." He also said that Latvia "does not have practical problems to comply with [the treaty's] requirements. Antipersonnel mines are not produced or manufactured in Latvia. Latvia maintains no active minefields at her borders or elsewhere. The limited number of antipersonnel mines retained in the National Armed Forces stockpiles is estimated to be sufficient for training purposes for no longer than the next 7 to 8 years. The export of all types of antipersonnel mines has already been prohibited...since September of 1995."⁽¹¹⁵⁹⁾

He concluded, "Latvia looks forward to joining the Ottawa Convention in the nearest possible future. However, due to the very limited resources of military equipment and materiel forces available to the Latvian military, we must first seek suitable and cost-effective alternatives.... the problem of alternatives...is, in fact, the sole obstacle on our way to join the Ottawa process."⁽¹¹⁶⁰⁾

In 1998 while in Canada, Latvian Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis stated that Latvia intends to sign the Treaty in the future, but his statement has not been repeated by the new Minister of Defense. The Latvian military still holds that there is legitimate use of APMs, such as to protect strategic objects. Due to the weakness of the Latvian defense system, it considers that the use of antitank mines together with APMs can be an efficient tool in case of a massive land invasion.⁽¹¹⁶¹⁾ The reluctance on the part of Latvia (and other Baltic states) to fully join the Ottawa process stems in large part from its occupation by the former Soviet Union, and continued concern about Russian aggression. The military has argued that antipersonnel mines can be an inexpensive and reliable means to slow down an attack, and that no affordable alternatives exist.⁽¹¹⁶²⁾

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

The Latvian government states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁽¹¹⁶³⁾ In September 1995 the Latvian government instituted a formal, indefinite moratorium on export of all APMs. It was reaffirmed in 1997.⁽¹¹⁶⁴⁾ The government has acknowledged that it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. According to a military official, the number of APMs is about 20,000.⁽¹¹⁶⁵⁾

There is no evidence of recent use of antipersonnel mines by Latvian Armed Forces.⁽¹¹⁶⁶⁾ However, in Latvia, as well as other Baltic countries, explosives and homemade mines are used by criminal elements. According to the Riga City Police department, the number of explosions in Riga, the biggest city in the Baltics, in 1997 was 37, and in 1998 was 23. Most of them caused death, injuries and serious damage to vehicles or buildings. Most of explosions were targeted to other criminal elements or people involved in "business disputes."⁽¹¹⁶⁷⁾

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

The biggest problem for Latvia is mines and other explosives left during WWI, WWII and Soviet occupation. Every year Latvian Armed forces neutralize or dispose more than 3,000 ammunition items. Destruction is carried out by explosion and incineration. EOD personnel were trained in the U.S. and Germany. Equipment assistance has come from Denmark.

Following are statistics on explosives detected and destroyed in Latvia in the period of 1993-1997:

- mines (APMs, antitank mines, mines of special use) 24,251

- artillery and gun projectiles 4,082

- navy ammunition (mines, torpedoes) 53

- aviation bombs (weight, not exceeding 500 kg) 1,298

- hand grenades 62⁽¹¹⁶⁸⁾

About 10.3 tons of plastic and other explosives were also destroyed.⁽¹¹⁶⁹⁾

Comparing the three Baltic countries, the mine situation is the worst in Latvia where large areas of agricultural land still are closed for civil use. Unique is the situation in Cekule in the suburbs of the Latvian capital Riga, where in the area of 240 ha. the contamination of the soil is about 10-15 pieces of ammunition per cubic meter. Contamination is up to 3 meters deep. After several cases in 1995 and in 1997 when explosives were found and schoolchildren were wounded, the area is now partially protected and corresponding warning signs are displayed. According to U.S. experts, clearing Cekule would cost up to US$100 million, and it would be less expensive to cover the whole area with a layer of concrete.⁽¹¹⁷⁰⁾ Since 1994, engineering units of NAF of Latvia have been clearing the area, not deeper than 15 cm.

Another area of concern is Zvarde (24 000 ha), which as the former Soviet aviation test ground was closed to the civilian population after the WWII. Due to military operations during the war the area is mined, and the effort to reclaim the land for peasants often is useless, since the property can not be used for agricultural purposes because of the contamination.

According to the National Armed Forces representatives, Latvian Armed Forces are training EOD personnel from the Latvian Homeguard Units (voluntary defense organizations under the National Armed Forces), the Latvian Navy, and the Ministry of Interior. There are two levels of qualification of EOD personnel and about 200 Homeguards and 10 professional deminers are able to participate in demining operations (except sea operations). There are immense problems with the demining equipment, and specialized vehicles existing in the Latvian army.⁽¹¹⁷¹⁾

Since 1995 no state funds have been used for demining operations.⁽¹¹⁷²⁾ Local government funding for demining equipment has decreased from approximately US$4,000 to US$3,000.

There has been some Western assistance for demining operations by Denmark and the U.S.⁽¹¹⁷³⁾

Not very much is done in the area of mine awareness. Areas seriously contaminated by explosives are marked by signs and partially guarded.⁽¹¹⁷⁴⁾ One Latvian NGO, the Baltic International Center of Human Education, is now carrying out a mine awareness project financed by Open Society Institute and local organizations.

RUSSIA

Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. President Boris Yeltsin and other officials have stated Russia's willingness to sign at some point in the future, but it is clear that the Russian military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary weapon, and insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. Russia has also expressed concerns about its financial capacity to destroy its large stockpile within the four years required by the treaty. Russia has stated a strong preference for dealing with controls on antipersonnel mines through the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 10 October 1997, in response to the announcement that the International Campaign to Ban Landmines had won the Nobel Peace Prize, President Yeltsin was widely reported to have said, for the first time, that Russian would sign the ban treaty.⁽¹¹⁷⁵⁾ A few days later at a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac at the European Council Summit in Strasbourg, he reiterated, "We are supporting the idea and will endeavor to take the decision and sign the Convention."⁽¹¹⁷⁶⁾ At a regional landmine conference in Budapest, Hungary in March 1998, the Russian representative said, "As it is well known, Russia supports the efforts of the international community to achieve the complete banning and elimination of antipersonnel mines.... President B.I. Yeltsin has declared Russia's positive approach towards the Ottawa Convention. The representative of Russia reiterated this stand...on December 4, 1997 in Ottawa, emphasizing Russia's willingness to accede to this instrument in the foreseeable future."⁽¹¹⁷⁷⁾

Russian officials have also highlighted some of the positive steps Russian has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of non-detectable and "dumb" antipersonnel mines, a ban on the production of blast mines, the destruction of more than half a million of the stockpiled APMs.⁽¹¹⁷⁸⁾

Russia attended all of the treaty preparatory meetings, the Oslo negotiations, and the Ottawa treaty signing conference, but in each case only as an observer. It did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels declaration in June 1997. Russia was one of only ten countries to abstain in the vote on UN General Assembly 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines (passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996). It was also among the few who abstained on the 1997 UNGA Resolution supporting the treaty signing and the 1998 UNGA Resolution welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

In February 1999, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was expressed by Ambassador Boris Schiborin, Chief Counsellor of the Department of Security and Disarmament, and Andrei Malov, Counsellor of the same department: "Russia stresses its positive approach to the Ottawa Convention and its readiness to join the process within reasonable time limits in the future. This time frame will depend on solving a number of technical, financial and other problems stemmed from the Convention stipulations. Among them--the speediest possible preparations for the functional substitutes of APMs.... Russia believes that the goal for a complete APM ban should be achieved stage by stage. It is a process rather than a one-time action."⁽¹¹⁷⁹⁾

The views of the military were expressed by Colonel-General Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, Chief Commander of the Engineer Forces, in an article in Krasnaya Zvezda, a Ministry of Defense newspaper, on the eve of the ban treaty signing. Colonel-General Kuznetsov said Russia could not sign the treaty mainly because there are no "alternative means that could adequately substitute for APMs and fulfill their military task"and because it "requires the destruction of entire stockpiles of APMs within a four-year period," which he believed Russia could not manage financially.⁽¹¹⁸⁰⁾

Conference on Disarmament

Ambassador Schiborin has commented: "It is not a secret that diplomatically and politically Russia is intensively promoting the CD as the main forum for the mine action issue....Russia's initiative to strive for the soonest possible start of the negotiations in the CD on the global ban on the export (and then the transfer) of APMs has been actively supported by a whole range of states.... First, the CD could ensure the universal character of the solution to the problem. The CD is not aimed at splitting the international community into those who have joined the Ottawa Convention and those who have abstained from it (which is the case in the Ottawa process). Second, the CD possesses the experience to deal with such problems. Third, the CD is authorized by the UN Security Council for solving this level of problems. Fourth, almost all states which are mine producers or mine exporters are represented in the CD."⁽¹¹⁸¹⁾

Russia was one of 22 CD members that in February 1999 jointly called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export ban.⁽¹¹⁸²⁾

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on landmines. Russia agreed to the amended Protocol II in May 1996, but has not yet ratified it. According to a Foreign Ministry official, the ratification documents have been prepared,⁽¹¹⁸³⁾ but the government has refrained from submitting them to the parliament for consideration due to financial constraints. Officials from the Ministry of Defense have said, "Russian armed forces have been conducting preparations to fulfill the requirements of the 1996 Protocol II since 1996. Necessary recommendations on the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new requirements have been prepared and released to the related staffs and commanders of military units."⁽¹¹⁸⁴⁾ Colonel-General Vladimir P. Kuznetsov has said that revised Protocol II "reflects the agreed upon consensus positions and the interests of the majority of countries, including Russia" and ensures "a reasonable balance of military and humanitarian interests."⁽¹¹⁸⁵⁾

Production

It is believed that since 1992, Russia has been producing at least ten types of antipersonnel mines:⁽¹¹⁸⁶⁾

PMN - blast, pressure-type mine;

PMN-2 - blast, pressure-type mine;

PMN-4 - blast, pressure-type mine;

OZM-72 - fragmentation, bounding mine;

MON-50 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

MON-90 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

MON-100 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

MON-200 - fragmentation (directional) mine;

PFM-1S - blast mine (also used in KSF-1S cluster units)

POM-2 - fragmentation mine (also used in KPOM-2 cluster units)⁽¹¹⁸⁷⁾

In May 1998 official representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast APMs.⁽¹¹⁸⁸⁾ While further details have not been provided, it can be assumed this means that the following mines are no longer produced: PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S. The PMN-type mines are, along with the Chinese Type 72, the most widely used throughout the world. The PFM-type (known as the Butterfly or Green Parrot) was used in huge quantities by the USSR in Afghanistan.

Russia has so far produced APMs at state-controlled enterprises only. Research and development on antipersonnel mines was carried out, among other places, at the Balashikha Scientific Research Engineer Institute located about 10 kilometers to the southwest of Moscow. According to research conducted for Landmine Monitor by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War-Russia (IPPNW-Russia), other industrial enterprises that have been involved in the production of mines and/or their components and/or their assembling include:

* Saransky mechanical plant, republic of Mordoviya (PMN-2, PMN-4),

* Chapayevsky experimental plant for measurement instruments, Samara region (PMN,OZM-72)

* Shilovsky plant for synthetic fibres (OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, MON-200, KSF)

* Saratovsky instrument-mechanical plant (PFM-1, PMN-4)

* Y. Sverdlov plant (POM-2, PMN-4)

* Bryansky chemical plant (PMN, PMN-2).

The production system for landmines now is in transition. The Chief Commander of Russia's Engineer Forces has said that as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 90% of Russia's engineer ammunition and armament production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia, and that most of the enterprises that produced mines during Soviet times were located in Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former USSR.⁽¹¹⁸⁹⁾ But, within the last three to five years, the military has managed to organize in Russia the production of different modern types of the engineer ammunition, including mines and fuzes, which were previously produced outside its territory.⁽¹¹⁹⁰⁾ Some plants that have been carrying out assembly of AP mines are now mastering the technology of their destruction.

One particular mine type deserves special mention. It appears that Russia has equipped a MON directional fragmentation mine (Claymore type) with a light sensitive detector. In Chechnya, a soldier from the reconnaissance group of the Sophrino Brigade of the Russian Internal Forces encountered such a mine, which detonated when he pointed his flashlight at it while surveying the basement of a building in Grozny.⁽¹¹⁹¹⁾ There are grounds to believe that these APMs are still produced in Russia.

While all AP mines in Russia have been traditionally produced at state enterprises, many experts believe that a small number of landmines are being produced in Russia by private companies for sale on the black market.

Alternatives

The Russian Federation "carries out research to modernize the existing and develop new types of mines as well as to develop alternative types of weaponry."⁽¹¹⁹²⁾ Research work on alternatives to antipersonnel mines is reportedly under way, but few details are available.⁽¹¹⁹³⁾ The Russian Ministry of Defense says that "the development of systems alternative to APMs and accumulation of their minimal stockpiles will take up to ten years."⁽¹¹⁹⁴⁾ Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov says, "alternative means able to adequately substitute APMs will be developed and produced in necessary quantities by the years of 2007-2010."⁽¹¹⁹⁵⁾

According to the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, specialists are considering a broad array of alternative means to serve as replacements of AP mines, looking at "improving AP munitions" that are not defined as antipersonnel mines under the ban treaty. Under consideration are AP munitions which are actuated by an operator by radio, wire or automatically after a definite period of time. "The development may proceed along two directions: improvement of fragmentation munitions and creation of new means of control."⁽¹¹⁹⁶⁾

Among the institutions where R&D of AP mines and their alternatives are carried out are: V.V. Kuibishev Military Engineers Academy; Central Research, Development and Test Institute; proving range; Central Design and Technology Bureau and Design-Fortification Bureau; and the State Research and Development Engineer Institute (NIII).⁽¹¹⁹⁷⁾ NIII has been researching and developing mines, mine-laying systems, as well as means for explosive demining to support Engineer troops for fifty years, and is now conducting research on alternative means to AP mines.

The Science-Research Machinery Building Institute (NIMI) has developed a class of engineer ammunition called "Reactive Systems with Fragmentation Combat Elements (OBE)" for attacking personnel and non-armored material. According to the designers, it could be activated both through remote-control and autonomously (from the target's sensor), differentiating between people and vehicles. The designers of this new class of engineer ammunition argue that it does not fall under the restrictions of the CCW or the Mine Ban Treaty and thus they express hope that this system would attract attention abroad and would be exported in future.⁽¹¹⁹⁸⁾

Transfer

The Soviet Union was one of the world's largest exporters of antipersonnel mines, and Russia has also exported APMs. Before 1991, Soviet-made AP mines were supplied to dozens of countries.

However, on 1 December 1994 Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of APMs that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. On 1 December 1997 the moratorium was extended for another five years, until December 2002.⁽¹¹⁹⁹⁾ The moratorium "cannot be revised or revoked until its expiration in accordance with Russia's law."⁽¹²⁰⁰⁾

IPPNW-Russia has compiled some random statistics on Soviet AP mine exports:

- Afghanistan: 6,500 MON-50 mines, 90,000 POMZ-2M mines, and 6,000 PMN mines, 1989-91

- Nicaragua: 30,000 mines in 1984; 85,000 in 1988

- Mozambique: 30,000 in 1984; 21,000 in 1986

- Ethiopia: 120,000 in 1983; 152,000 in 1984; 7,500 in 1987

- Angola: 12,000 in 1984; 9,000 in 1983

- Cuba: 10,000 in 1986

Other countries where Soviet mines have been found include Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Vietnam.

Stockpiling

There is no official public number of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled by Russia. One published report states that Russia has approximately 60 million landmines which fall under the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁽¹²⁰¹⁾ ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock.

The types in stock are likely to include all of the mines listed in the "Production" section above as being currently or formerly produced by Russia and USSR. Stockpiles of APMs are located in various regions throughout the country: at manufacturing plants (in the cities of Saransk, Bryansk); sites of systematic APM destruction/recycling; within border adjacent territories under supervision of local military command-staff; and presumably at some nuclear facilities of the Russian Ministry of atomic energy--to be used for defense purposes in potential "endangering" situations.⁽¹²⁰²⁾

Destruction

Russia carries out systematic destruction of its older, obsolete APMs. It also recycles them, dismantling the APMs and extracting explosive substances that are further reprocessed and used for civilian purposes like industrial mining. Destruction is accomplished at industrial facilities in the cities of Saransk and Bryansk, at sites of engineer forces, and perhaps other locations.⁽¹²⁰³⁾

Some plants that have been carrying out assembly of AP mines are now mastering the technology of their destruction.

Mines currently slated for destruction include not only those obsolete mines and those with an expired period of storage, but also those which are not in compliance with the requirements of CCW Protocol II. Current plans call for destroying non-CCW compliant mines over an eight year period (1998-2005).⁽¹²⁰⁴⁾ In 1998, more than 500,000 non-CCW compliant AP mines were destroyed.⁽¹²⁰⁵⁾

The Ministry of Defense has calculated that it will cost 40 billion Roubles (about US$6.4 million) annually to destroy all of its non-CCW compliant mines. The Chief Division of Engineer Forces explained that the cheapest explosive destruction technologies would not be used due to environmental concerns, and instead the much more labor-consuming and hence costly dismantling technologies would be used.⁽¹²⁰⁶⁾

Russian officials have expressed concerns about their financial ability to destroy AP mines in the time frame required by the Mine Ban Treaty (four years), and also about their ability to rapidly create ecologically safe and effective technologies and means for destruction of all APMs.

Storage

The sudden influx of ammunition and antipersonnel mines into Russian storage areas from 1989 to 1993 from other former Soviet republics has worsened the conditions of storage of all types of ammunition, including mines. The stockpiles of some military districts, especially those which are now border districts, are overloaded, and the military have to keep ammunition in open places, creating a security and safety problem. Landmines are often stored in poor conditions. The inspection of storage conditions of Army and Navy munitions carried out by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office in late 1997 revealed various violations in 220 inspected military units and bodies of the Ministry of Defense, including the storage facilities of engineer munitions: "In a number of regions munitions stored in unacceptable conditions pose danger not only for environment but also for people's life."⁽¹²⁰⁷⁾ The Chief Military Prosecutor's report reveals that many munitions are outdated but haven't been destroyed or dismantled due to the lack of financial, technological and industrial means.

Use

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, antipersonnel mines were used most notably along the border with China (especially in the 1960s and 1970s) and during the conflict in Afghanistan (1979-89). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the period of disintegration of the Soviet Union, some military units of the Ministry of Defense located on the territories of the former Soviet republics, mainly in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, used antipersonnel mines to protect strategic sites, munition depots and command posts.⁽¹²⁰⁸⁾ Mines were also used in the early stages of the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh and during interethnic conflicts in Tajikistan and North Ossetia.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have used APMs most notably during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994 until June 1996 (see report on Chechnya). Mines were also used by Russians as part of the CIS peacekeeping contingent in the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict starting from June 1994, to protect strategic sites, infrastructure, and command posts, and as part of the peacekeeping contingent in Tajikistan to protect strategic sites and facilities, parts of the Tajik-Afghani border, military depots and posts, as well as for "blocking and isolating the areas occupied by the rebel forces, cutting possible rebel routes through the state (administrative border)."⁽¹²⁰⁹⁾

The AP mines most frequently used by Russian forces have been: PMN, PMN-3; OZM-72; MON-50, -90, -100; KPOM.⁽¹²¹⁰⁾

Landmine Problem

The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs after World War II. The problem was the most serious in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Caucasus. Uncleared mines and UXO from World War II are still a problem in some areas. According to recent reports, mines and UXOs are emerging again as an issue of concern for a number of reasons. The economic development of previously abandoned lands, including former battlefields, that were never previously cleared from UXOs is creating a problem. According to recent estimates, another ten to fifteen years of effort is required to clear these areas.⁽¹²¹¹⁾ Moreover, previous clearance operations never went deeper than 30-40 cm, while deeply laid UXOs have moved upwards to the surface since the end of the war. Thus, previously cleared territories deemed safe for many years are endangered anew.⁽¹²¹²⁾ There is also the danger posed to civilians from recent use of mines in ethnic conflicts.

Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories where World War II battles took place. Summarized data is given in the following table⁽¹²¹³⁾:

TERRITORY AREA NEEDING CLEARANCE (hectares)

Krasnodarsky territory 40,330

Murmansk region 42,000

Leningrad region 9,634

Novgorod region 60,200

Pskov region 13,836

Tver region 54,000

Voronezh region 48,800

Belgorod region 66,000

Rostov region 83,200

Kursk region 82,000

Total 540,000

Mine Clearance

Russia has not made any donations to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action programs within Russia.

In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried by the Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. There were three stages of mine/UXO clearance. During the first stage (1946-1953), 183,000 square km were cleared and over 56.7 million UXOs removed. During the second stage (1954-1965), only the most infested areas were cleared, i.e. Leningrad, Northern and Baltic regions. Over 12,000 square km were cleared of 10,000 UXOs. During the third stage (1966-1970) over 214,000 square km were cleared from 72 million UXOs.⁽¹²¹⁴⁾

Today demining operations are the responsibility of three structures in Russia: the Ministry of Defense's Engineer Forces; the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources' Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs' demining brigades.⁽¹²¹⁵⁾ Demining is also conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort" (Moscow), which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of engineer forces.⁽¹²¹⁶⁾

The following chart shows total UXOs (including mines) cleared and destroyed in recent years.

1989 131,086

1990 175,808

1991 112,258

1992 112,258

1993 64,411

1994 78,751

1995 35,303

1996 53,872

1997 103,832

The regressive tendency in the early 1990s reflects the worsening economic situation and shrinking of finances for demining purposes in Russia rather than the decrease of the explosive ordnance remaining in the ground.

The Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources has drawn up a draft plan to clear within five years the 540,000 hectares requested for clearance in ten provinces. This covers 30% of the territories that need mine clearance.⁽¹²¹⁷⁾ The Ministry will be responsible for clearance in the Leningrad and Voronezh regions.⁽¹²¹⁸⁾

Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and regions. According to official data, in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict engineers of the Russian peacekeeping forces searched for mines on more than 250 km of roads and up to 1,000 square km of terrain. As a result, more than 23,000 explosive units were found and destroyed. Russian peacekeepers in Tajikistan found and destroyed more than 18,000 landmines and UXOs. They have destroyed 13,500 landmines and UXOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations won an international tender for carrying out humanitarian demining in Bosnia.⁽¹²¹⁹⁾ Russian deminers began mine clearance operations Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1998. The specialists are to clear forty-five hectares of minefields. According to the Ministry of Disaster Resources data, twenty-three deminers previously working in this area have been killed. In 1998 there were three mine accidents with deminers and two with trained dogs.

Engineers of the Russian Armed Forces have taken part in demining operations in more than 20 countries, e.g. Algeria, Libya and Syria among others. The Draft Presidential Decree and Resolution of the Government on the organization of the participation of the Russian Federation in international projects on humanitarian demining were worked out in order to regulate Russian participation in demining operations beyond the Russian territory. The Russian Ministry of Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is planned and fulfilled within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign states via the federal state unitary enterprises GK "Rosvooruzheniye," "Promexport," or on the basis of bilateral agreements between the Russian Ministry of Defense and foreign governments.

Mine Awareness

During Soviet times, dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district military recruiting offices ("voenkomat").⁽¹²²⁰⁾ Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas.

After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities have ground to a halt. As a result of secondary education reform, the course on primary military training in secondary schools has been retracted, while district recruiting offices have received neither staff nor finances to continue mine awareness activities.⁽¹²²¹⁾

Landmine Casualties

In Russia, mines continue killing and maiming people more than half a century after WWII ended. In the last seven years, eighty-four cases of mine/UXO incidents have been registered, with 167 people injured, and seventy-nine children killed in Russia and CIS.⁽¹²²²⁾ According to other data, between 1992 and 1998 there were eighty-four accidents within the territories of former Second World War battlefields. Thirty-nine people died and sixty-seven were wounded (50% of the casualties were children). There have been a significant number of mine casualties in other parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya. (See report on Chechnya)

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during the World War II. The National Corps of Catastrophe Medicine Defense was very active in the Chechnya conflict and still continues to render medical aid and carry out rehabilitation programs to mine victims arriving from Chechnya.

Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. In Moscow, there is the Scientific Research Institute of Prostheses, Moscow Prosthetic Plant, and numerous workshops. Forty-eight children from Chechnya got treatment (reconstructive operations) in the Moscow pediatric hospital N 9; thirty-two got prostheses in the Moscow Institute of Prostheses. The federal government paid 60% of their cost and Moscow city government paid 40%.⁽¹²²³⁾ According to the 1995 Federal law "On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped" an individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for each handicapped person.

TAJIKISTAN

Background

Five years of civil war in Tajikistan were formally brought to a close on 27 June 1997, when a peace accord was signed between the government and the opposition, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).The implementation of the peace accord, however, has to date been plagued with difficulties and delays, and political instability and an overall absence of law and order remain. Since the end of June 1997, the country has witnessed fresh waves of fighting between rival government groups, high levels of political and criminal violence, and renewed hostage-takings of Tajik citizens and international personnel by armed factions. In mid-January 1998, following months of laborious negotiations, the UTO withdrew temporarily from the peace process, claiming that the government was reneging on many of its pledges. In March 1998, in clear violation of the peace accord, hostilities between armed groups allegedly loyal to the UTO and government troops erupted into full-fledged fighting near Dushanbe, the capital.⁽¹²²⁴⁾ Landmines were used throughout the fighting, and unconfirmed media reports suggest that landmines may have been used as recently as November 1998, when conflict again erupted in the north.

Mine Ban Policy

Tajikistan has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the early treaty preparatory meetings, but did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration and did not participate in the Oslo negotiations. It attended the regional conference on landmines in Turkmenistan in June 1997, but made no formal statement on mine ban policy. Tajikistan voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, but was one of eighteen countries which abstained from the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing. It was absent from the vote on the pro-treaty 1998 UNGA resolution. Tajikistan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

It does not appear that Tajikistan manufactures its own mines, but rather has utilized the stockpiles which the Soviet Union stored in the republic. It is not known if Soviet stocks have been supplemented with new imports. Tajikistan is not known to have exported APMs, but it has no restrictions on landmine production or export in place. Information on the size and composition of Tajikistan's current stockpile of antipersonnel is not available. Most of the mines laid by the government were of Soviet origin (see below). The UTO also has a stockpile of mines, apparently including Soviet, Italian and Pakistani mines. It is unknown if the UTO received its supply of mines from outside sources or if they were stolen from Tajikistan's stockpiles.

Both the government and the UTO opposition have been responsible for laying mines. According to the UN military observer team (UNMOT) in Tajikistan, the Tajik government used primarily Soviet PMN, PMN-2, PMD-6 and OZM antipersonnel mines. The UTO used a mix of antipersonnel, antitank (Italian TC-6, Pakistan P2Mk2 and Soviet TMN series), and booby-trapped antitank mines.⁽¹²²⁵⁾ Several CIS countries sent peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan, including Russia's Border Forces. The RBF planted antipersonnel mines along the Tajik/Afghan border.⁽¹²²⁶⁾

As recently as November 1998, rebel forces were concentrated in the Aini village, and news sources stated that the road may have been mined in order to prevent government forces from using it.⁽¹²²⁷⁾

Landmine Problem

Tajikistan has a serious problem with antipersonnel landmines. The U.S. State Department has estimated that there are approximately 100,000 landmines in Tajikistan.⁽¹²²⁸⁾ The UN Mine Action Service has estimated the total at 200,000.⁽¹²²⁹⁾ The mined areas are not generally well marked. The major areas affected by landmines are the central Tavildara region, the Garm Valley, Khalaikhum, and the border with Afghanistan. UNMOT observers discovered two minefields near the Tajik/Afghan border which it believed were laid by the Tajik army in 1994.⁽¹²³⁰⁾ Major roads and highways were mined. The Dushanbe-Khujand highway was one major road which was alleged to be mined. However, five days after the failed November 1998 rebellion, this highway was opened to civilian travel and there have been no reports of landmine accidents. The Dushanbe-Aini highway was another strategic area that was possibly mined.

The United Nations carried out assessment missions in Tajikistan in 1996 and 1997. The 1996 assessment mission concluded that a Mine Action Plan needed to be developed and a Mine Action Centre needed to be set up. The 1997 mission concluded that the landmine problem in Tajikistan was not as severe as originally thought, that mines had a limited humanitarian and developmental impact, and did not affect returning refugees.⁽¹²³¹⁾ The UN recommended moving ahead with the Mine Action Plan and Mine Action Center, but on a reduced scale.

Mine Action

There are no humanitarian mine clearance programs underway in Tajikistan. The 1996 UN assessment mission estimated that it would cost $736,425 to demine areas where civilians and UN and aid workers were at risk.⁽¹²³²⁾ The Tajik government has expressed support for mine awareness campaigns, but has limited funds. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has implemented mine awareness programs. The ICRC set up a data collection system to try to gather more detailed information about the whereabouts of landmines, and printed leaflets in Russian and Tajik which alerted people returning to their homes about the possible presence of landmines.⁽¹²³³⁾ The ICRC delivered medical supplies for the treatment of landmine and other war-related casualties. It is unknown how capable the Tajik hospitals are of caring for mine victims. In 1997, the ICRC flew fourteen amputees to Azerbaijan for the fitting of artificial limbs.⁽¹²³⁴⁾

Civilians and military personnel have been killed an injured by landmines. The Deputy Premier of Tajikistan, Munnavar Nazriyev, was killed by a landmine in 1994, on the day a ceasefire was to come into effect.⁽¹²³⁵⁾ The remote geography and poor medical facilities means that most mine casualties go unreported. The number of civilian casualties is uncertain.

TURKEY

Turkey continues to be in the grip of an ongoing war between Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish military. The PKK are seeking autonomy for Turkey's estimated 12 million Kurds living in the southeast of the country. Landmines have been used by both sides in the conflict.

Mine Ban Policy

Turkey has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty, though a Turkish delegation was on hand for the signing ceremony in Ottawa on 2-4 December 1997. In a news report published on 4 December 1997, an unidentified Turkish official was quoted as saying: "[W]e have to protect our borders. Although we respect the reasons for that treaty, in order to keep our borders secure, we have to take measures."⁽¹²³⁶⁾

According to an official at Turkey's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Turkey is "very much interested in signing on" to the treaty, but cannot do so at present due to security concerns related to Turkey's neighbors. Turkish officials have cited what they believe to be the military effectiveness of landmines⁽¹²³⁷⁾ as well as security concerns --the need to protect borders-- for refusing to sign the treaty.⁽¹²³⁸⁾ Turkey's deputy permanent representative at the United Nations, Tuluy Tanc, has stated that "Ankara can fulfil the aspects envisaged by the agreement only in stages" which he said owed to Turkey's geographical position and its neighbors in the southeast.⁽¹²³⁹⁾

On 22 March 1999, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Bulgaria signed an agreement committing both countries not to mine their common border and to remove the mines that are currently in the area. A joint statement by the foreign ministers said, "According to the Agreement, the two countries undertake not to use under any circumstances antipersonnel mines and to destroy or remove all stocked or emplaced antipersonnel mines from the area of application as defined in the Agreement. The Agreement also envisages a verification regime.... [B]y signing this Agreement the two countries have proved their determination to contribute to the ongoing efforts of the international community aimed at the total elimination of this inhumane weapon."⁽¹²⁴⁰⁾ Bulgaria has signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Turkish UN Mission said that on Turkey's borders with its other neighbors, especially in mountainous regions in the country's southeast, "landmines do play a role." The official stated that Turkey has become more supportive of an international ban in recent years, noting in particular that after abstaining from votes on UN General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban in 1996 and 1997, Turkey voted in favor of a similar resolution in 1998. The official said that Turkey would send a representative to the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. Without fixing a date or time period, the official said that Turkey plans to sign the Mine Ban Treaty "as soon as possible," but expressed the wish that parties to the treaty expand their focus to include mine use by rebel groups.⁽¹²⁴¹⁾

Turkey attended the Brussels conference but did not endorse the final declaration. Turkey also attended the negotiations in Oslo in September 1997, but only as an observer state. Turkey was one of only ten nations which abstained in 1996 from voting on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S, which called for a binding international agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of landmines, and was supported by 156 states. Turkey also abstained in 1997 from voting on General Assembly Resolution 52/38 A, which called on states to sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1998, Turkey signaled a new receptivity to the Mine Ban Treaty by voting in favor of General Assembly Resolution 53/L.33 in 1998, which uses language similar to the 1997 resolution calling on states to sign and ratify the treaty.

Turkey is not a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Protocol II on landmines. Turkey is a member state of the Conference on Disarmament and favors using it as a forum for negotiating a ban on mine transfers. In February 1999, Turkey was one of twenty-two countries to endorse a statement advocating the negotiation of a transfer ban through the CD. The statement, delivered by Bulgaria's Permanent Representative at the United Nations in Geneva, stated that a CD-sponsored transfer ban would "play an important role in stemming the supply of APLs" and that its negotiation would involve "the relevant States not yet party to the Ottawa Convention or CCW."⁽¹²⁴²⁾

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

A 1993 U.S. Department of State report listed Turkey as a landmine producer, though not an exporter.⁽¹²⁴³⁾ A recent reference work on antipersonnel mines indicates that Turkey has produced copies of two U.S. mines: the M14 non-detectable blast mine, and the M16 bounding fragmentation mine; both manufactured by MKEK in Turkey.⁽¹²⁴⁴⁾ Turkey also produces three types of antitank mines: the 2kg antitank mine, the 4.5 kg antitank mine, and the M19.⁽¹²⁴⁵⁾ On 17 January 1996 Turkey declared a 3-year moratorium on landmine exports and increases in Turkey's landmine stockpile. This moratorium was renewed for another three years in 1999.⁽¹²⁴⁶⁾ Data on any possible landmine exports by Turkey prior to 1996 are unavailable.

Turkey imported more than 35,000 antipersonnel landmines from the United States between 1983 and 1992.⁽¹²⁴⁷⁾ U.S. mine exports to Turkey have included the conventional, hand-placed M-18-A1 Claymore mine and the modern "scatterable" Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) mines. In 1988 the US sold 34,476 ADAM mines to Turkey, one of the few customers for this "smart" mine. The ADAM is artillery-fired for remote delivery, and arms on delivery, sending out seven tripwires which, when triggered, blow fragments in all directions. It has a self-destruct mechanism.⁽¹²⁴⁸⁾ The interviewed Turkish official was unaware of any current importation of mines by Turkey. It is unknown how many landmines remain in Turkey's stocks.

The principal non-state actor regarding landmines in Turkey is the PKK, a rebel group which is seeking autonomy in the mainly Kurdish south east of the country. Turkish troops hunting the rebels in the south east of the country - as well as northern Iraq - regularly recover caches of APMs among other weapons that have been stockpiled by the rebels. In May 1996, for example, two antipersonnel mines were in a cache discovered by security forces in Igdir near the border with Iran.⁽¹²⁴⁹⁾ Similarly in November 1997 three APMs of an unstated type were among a stockpile of weapons reportedly recovered by troops in the Agri region of eastern Turkey⁽¹²⁵⁰⁾. No independent efforts have been made to establish the number or quantity of mines stockpiled by the PKK.

Use

Turkey uses mines on its border regions, particularly in the southeast region bordering Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The Turkish mission to the UN claims that all areas mined by the Turkish military are clearly marked with warning signs. In 1996, however, a commission of Turkish parliamentarians reported that the military does not have charts for many of its minefields and that in some cases PKK rebels knew these fields better than Turkish soldiers.⁽¹²⁵¹⁾ The PKK also uses landmines in its campaign against the Turkish government, particularly on roads traveled by Turkish military personnel in the southeast. The Turkish UN mission denied reports that Turkish military forces have used landmines to deter villagers from returning to evacuated villages which are considered sympathetic to the PKK.

There is evidence that landmines continue to be used in Turkey. New landmine use is almost exclusively in the southeast of Turkey where the Turkish military continues to be embroiled in a guerrilla war with the PKK. PKK weapons caches, regularly uncovered by Turkish security forces, often include landmines. In an effort to halt PKK attacks on Turkey from neighboring Iraq - which has a number of PKK bases - Turkey's military have mined large swathes of the Iraqi-Turkish border.⁽¹²⁵²⁾ In 1992 the Turkish military commander of the border region, Gen. Necati Ozgen, was quoted by Turkey's semi-official Anatolian news agency as saying, "There will be no point left unmined along the border this year."⁽¹²⁵³⁾ Given the large number of mines that have obviously been sown along such border areas, it would be difficult in the extreme to determine whether casualties in such regions are from new or old use of APM's.

As both sides have used landmines the exact number of mines scattered throughout Turkey's southeast remains an unknown quantity. There are no records for the number of mines that have been laid by the PKK and records of the numbers laid by the Turkish military are unavailable. In addition it must be taken into account that access to the south east of Turkey is periodically forbidden to all independent news organizations - occasionally all foreigners - by the Turkish government.

Determining exactly who is laying landmines and where - if they are not detonated - in the ongoing conflict thus remains extremely difficult. Concerning many reports of landmine deaths it remains next to impossible to ascertain either who has died or who laid the mines. In June 1997, for example, the semi-official Anatolian news agency reported that four PKK rebels had been killed by mines they themselves had planted in the Hakkari province of Turkey.⁽¹²⁵⁴⁾ There was, though, no independent confirmation as to who had died or who had laid the mines. In all probability, given the large unknown and unmapped numbers of mines that have been laid, it would be impossible to say whether the mines had been laid by the PKK or the Turkish military. Turkish officials regularly admit that soldiers in the southeast are killed by landmines, which they say have been laid by the PKK.

The PKK are regularly accused of planting mines by the Turkish military. Captured PKK weapons displayed to journalists often include APM's. In December 1997, the then deputy Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, said that the government planned to lay asphalt roads in the south east of the country to guard against PKK landmines.⁽¹²⁵⁵⁾

While there has been no in-depth assessment of the extent of the problem in Turkey there have been parliamentary inquiries into mines along the Turkish - Syrian border. ⁽¹²⁵⁶⁾ Turkey's Parliamentary border security commission was quoted as reporting that between the towns of Kilis and Cizre along the Syrian border there are several hundred thousand mines.⁽¹²⁵⁷⁾ The commission reported that the mined area existed along a 600 kilometer stretch of the border and was between 400 - 600 meters deep. The report also stated that no military maps of the minefield existed. ⁽¹²⁵⁸⁾

In a parliamentary debate on the findings the report concluded: "In the end these mined areas are not an obstacle to terrorists or smugglers, but to the security forces…these minefields which serve no purpose from a security point of view should be cleared, cleansed and opened to agriculture."⁽¹²⁵⁹⁾

In addition large areas of Turkey's border with Iraq have been mined by the Turkish military. Other areas that are affected by APMs are roads, national parks, grazing and agricultural areas - again almost exclusively in the south east of the country. In the Kilis province of Turkey, fires lit by farmers burning crops around the village of Arpakesmez reportedly set off a number of APM's, which were said to have been heated by the fires.⁽¹²⁶⁰⁾ No information was available on either the types or number of mines that exploded.

Turkish human rights and green activists have sought to draw attention to some of the areas affected by mines, which they say are destroying the ecosystem.⁽¹²⁶¹⁾ In the case of the Munzur National Park, which the activists maintained had been heavily mined, situated in the south eastern province of Tunceli the activists were denied access to the park by the Turkish military. ⁽¹²⁶²⁾

Mine Action Funding/Mine Clearance

Turkey has not contributed to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, but has pledged $25,000 for a project to modify tanks for mine clearance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey has also offered to provide mine clearance assistance to Egypt.⁽¹²⁶³⁾ In 1995, however, Turkey barred the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) from delivering equipment to support its mine clearance work in the heavily mined northern area of Iraq. Turkish government officials claimed that the equipment could come into the possession of the PKK.⁽¹²⁶⁴⁾ Ankara has given support to the idea that mines should be cleared from border areas between Turkey and countries such as Georgia with which Ankara has good relations.⁽¹²⁶⁵⁾ No information was found on mine awareness activities in Turkey.

Landmine Casualties

The conflict between Turkey and the PKK has lasted fourteen years and resulted in more than 28,000 deaths. Landmine casualties in the region are reported to be common.⁽¹²⁶⁶⁾ In July 1998 six Kurdish militiamen fighting against the PKK for the Turkish government were killed by a landmine.⁽¹²⁶⁷⁾

In 1997, allegations surfaced that the Turkish military had forced Kurdish villagers to act as human mine detectors.⁽¹²⁶⁸⁾ In March 1997 a Turkish parliamentary commission investigated allegations by villagers in the Batman region that troops had forced them to walk through a minefield.⁽¹²⁶⁹⁾ According to Hadji Mohamed, a local farmer,

"The security forces came to the village and rounded up 30 of our men and forced us into their cars. They said we were being taken to collect wood. Instead they drove us to a huge field they dais was full of mines."⁽¹²⁷⁰⁾

Another man, who refused to give his name said:

"The lieutenant who was leading the operation ordered us to stand in a line and start walking towards the field. We were terrified. When we refused, he began cursing us, slapping us and beating us with his rifle butt. He (the lieutenant) said, 'From now on you will be mine detectors and I will make you walk through this field every day for the rest of your life.'"⁽¹²⁷¹⁾

The villagers said they spent hours wandering around the field. Local security forces denied the allegations.

UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Uzbekistan attended the early treaty preparatory meetings in 1997, but only as an observer, and it did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. At the regional conference on landmines in Turkmenistan that month, the Uzbekistan representative stated only that the government was carefully studying the issue.⁽¹²⁷²⁾ It did not attend the Oslo negotiations nor the Ottawa signing conference. However, Uzbekistan did vote for the 1996 UNGA Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, and for the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing. It was absent for the 1998 UNGA resolution vote. Uzbekistan is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not yet ratified the 1996 amended Protocol II on landmines. The International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a conference on international humanitarian law in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 1997, at which the CCW and landmines were widely discussed.⁽¹²⁷³⁾

Uzbekistan is not considered to have a mine problem.⁽¹²⁷⁴⁾ It is not known if mines were laid on the border during the time of the former Soviet Union. Uzbekistan is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines, but there are no formal restrictions in place which would bar future production or exports. It likely inherited stockpiles of APMs from the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan is not known to have contributed to any international mine action programs.

YUGOSLAVIA⁽¹²⁷⁵⁾

Background

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was established after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The FRY consists of two Republics: Serbia and Montenegro. The Republic of Serbia has two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which are administratively part of the Republic of Serbia. Serbia has a mixed ethnic population of which a small percentage is Albanian, but most of the population in Kosovo is ethnic Albanian. The FRY has been involved in armed conflict in one way or another almost since the disintegration of the SFRY. Currently, fighting is taking place between the FRY and the Kosovo Liberation Army. Antipersonnel landmines are being used in the conflict.

Mine Ban Policy

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The only official statement about the Treaty was given by the Deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1998 at the Budapest regional conference on antipersonnel landmines for countries from the Baltic and Balkan regions. The Deputy Minister said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not signed or ratified any international conventions or documents since 1992, when it was officially suspended from the United Nations. Since then, the government has not participated in international treaty negotiations, although it did attend meetings of the Ottawa Process as an observer, and it has no intention of signing or ratifying the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

Probably the primary reason that the FRY has stayed outside the Mine Ban Treaty is the attitude of the Yugoslav military toward APMs. One of the landmine experts on the General Staff of the Yugoslav Military outlined their simple point of view: "Considering the fact that Yugoslav military doctrine is primarily defensive, antipersonnel and antitank landmines have a very important place in our defensive system."⁽¹²⁷⁶⁾

But not all share this view, Colonel Dr. Miodrag Starcevic (retired), currently a professor at the Yugoslav School of National Defense, said that "antipersonnel landmines lost their military importance; that is why FRY has to rethink its attitude toward the Ottawa Convention."⁽¹²⁷⁷⁾ There has been no response to this view either from the government or the Ministry of Defense. Nor has there been any reaction to two public protests held on 3 and 4 December 1997 in Belgrade. These protests, organized by the NGO "The Women in Black" to mark the signing conference of the Treaty in Ottawa, called on the FRY to stop producing landmines and to join the countries that have signed the Mine Ban Treaty.⁽¹²⁷⁸⁾

But there has been no movement in government policy, despite the pressure from the Yugoslav Campaign to Ban landmines, the Yugoslav Red Cross and other NGOs in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. In researching this report, the Yugoslav Campaign had a difficult time in establishing contact with the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Defense to gather information about landmines. Almost all questions regarding the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of landmines were declared to be "military top secret" by the Army and Ministry of Defense. Even those officers who were open to talking with the Yugoslav Campaign have asked not to be named in this report.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) signed and ratified the CCW and its Protocol II on mines on 1 April 1982. Because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wants to be recognized as the legal successor of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the CCW has become part of Yugoslav national legislation. The FRY has not ratified revised Protocol II.

Production

Even before the Second World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia produced antipersonnel landmines. After that time, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the top ten producers in the world, producing the following types of antipersonnel landmines:

- PMD-1 wooden-box mine (similar to the Russian PMD-6);

- PMR-1 (1) fragmentation mine (similar to the Russian POMZ-2M but has nine instead of five rows of fragments);

- PMR-2 fragmentation mine (similar to the Czech PP-Mi-Sb);

- PMR-2A fragmentation mine (equivalent of the Russian POMZ-2 and Czech PP-Mi-Sb stake lines);

- PMA-1 (2) non-magnetic mine;

- PMA-2 non-magnetic mine;

- PMA-3 non-magnetic mine;

- PROM-1 (3) bouncing mine;

- PROM-2 (4) bouncing mine;

- MRUD-1 (5) directional fragmentation mine (Claymore-type mine).

The SFRJ also produced these types of antitank mines: TMA-1, TMA-2, TMA-3, TMA-4, TMA-5, TMA-5A, TMD-1, TMM-1, TMRP-6. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia currently produces the TMRP-6.

The General Staff officer referenced above, Colonel Dusan Stanizan described Yugoslav mine layers -- armed vehicles which contain four to eight containers, each of which has fifteen to thirty cassettes with six to eight antipersonnel mines.⁽¹²⁷⁹⁾ The Yugoslav mine layer is likely a design based on the Russian type UMZ system, but evidence to confirm the supposition was not available. It is also believed that helicopters can also be used for dropping containers with antipersonnel mines. Stanizan also noted that multiple rocket launchers with a cassette warhead can be used for delivering landmines. One type of multiple rocket launcher he mentioned is the "Orkan," with a caliber of 262mm and a range of 50 km.⁽¹²⁸⁰⁾

The information about types of landmines that were produced in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was provided by a retired colonel, a former engineer who until three years ago was one of the managers in the Yugoslav military industry. This information was confirmed by General-Colonel Ilija Radakovic (ret.). General Radakovic was one of the top four officers in the Yugoslav People's Army (Army of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and was manager of the military sector for armament, equipping and supplying of logistical support.

The General said that the production of the antipersonnel landmines in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was substantial. He thinks that the SFRY produced several tens of millions of APMs. The main factory for production of antipersonnel landmines in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was called "Slavko Rodic," located in the town of Bugojno.⁽¹²⁸¹⁾

An official from the Ministry of Defense said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was producing antipersonnel landmines until several years ago. The FRY was producing all types that were already specified in the previous passage regarding production in the SFRY, (except the one from the first generation), in the military factory "Miloje Zakic" in the town of Krusevac.⁽¹²⁸²⁾

According to both the government and others, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has now stopped producing antipersonnel landmines. The un-named retired colonel cited above thinks that the FRY stopped production of antipersonnel landmines in 1992. In his opinion the reason is the existence of the Mine Ban Treaty, even though the FRY has not signed. General Radakovic has quite a different opinion about the reasons for stopping production.⁽¹²⁸³⁾ He thinks that production continued for several years after 1992 in the "Miloje Zakic" factory, and maybe in some other factory. He believes the main reason that the FRY continued the production of antipersonnel landmines was to send large quantities to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina; he stated the ex-commandant of the Republika Srpska Army, General Ratko Mladic, closed the border with Bosnia using a large number of antipersonnel landmines. General Radakovic thinks that the other reason that production of APMs has stopped is that the Yugoslav military industry is suffering from an economic crisis. Export of arms and military equipment has stopped because of economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the United Nations.

Though there is not concrete evidence, it is possible that the Kosovo Liberation Army has started to produce explosive ordnance, such as crude mines and improvised explosive devices.

Transfer

While the military sources for this report confirm that the SFRY was a big exporter of antipersonnel landmines, concrete information about where mines were exported, the quantities of APMs exported to the other countries, the costs of exported antipersonnel landmines, their types, etc, is not available. Most sources believe that the SFRY mostly exported large quantities (millions) of antipersonnel and antitank mines to the "countries of the third world," such as Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq. General Radakovic thinks that the FRY exported antipersonnel landmines only to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, during the war 1992-1995 until the Dayton Peace Accords. After that, exports of APMs stopped. One source from the Ministry of Defense claims that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has stopped the export of antipersonnel landmines, as well as their production.⁽¹²⁸⁴⁾

According to General Radakovic, neither the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nor the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ever imported antipersonnel landmines, because Yugoslavia always had its own well developed industry and production of antipersonnel landmines.

It has been alleged that the Kosovo Liberation Army is importing arms from Albania. Border troops of the Yugoslav Army have confiscated various types of arms from Albanian groups. The magazine of the Yugoslav Army published various lists of arms the Yugoslav Army has confiscated from the Albanian groups, but has never mentioned antipersonnel or antitank landmines. While the Ministry of Defense claims the KLA is importing or smuggling mines from Albania, there is no hard evidence.⁽¹²⁸⁵⁾

Stockpiling

Official sources from the Ministry of Defense declared that all information about stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines is a "military top secret." This source told us that the Yugoslav Army has enough antipersonnel landmines in stocks for Yugoslavia's needs.⁽¹²⁸⁶⁾ General Radakovic says that stockpiles contain a large number of antipersonnel landmines, which are stocked at the brigade, battalion and troop levels. All stocks are well secured. Radakovic thinks that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at this moment has probably several million APMs in stock.⁽¹²⁸⁷⁾ While there is no hard evidence, the KLA may have stocks of antipersonnel landmines and/or improvised explosive devices in areas of Kosovo under their control.

Use

The Yugoslav Army planted combined antipersonnel and antitank minefields on the northern Yugoslav border. Minefields had been planted near a community called Sid, mostly on the left bank of Bosut River. In September 1997 a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross said: "There are not a lot of mines in Yugoslavia. Mines are planted only at the area of the town, Sid. We are working together with the Yugoslav Red Cross on the mine awareness program for people who go fishing in the areas which are not safe."⁽¹²⁸⁸⁾ A source in the Ministry of Defense claims that these minefields are marked according to the standards set by amended Protocol II. Military officials claim that the maps and records of these minefields are known only to the Yugoslav Army. In 1997 the FRY refused the proposal of the administrator of East Slavonia, West Srem and Baranja, Mr. Jacques Klein that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia should demilitarize the border area and fifteen kilometers into their territories.

In the Yugoslav republic of Montenegro, the peninsula of Prevlaka, which is also the southern Yugoslav-Croatian border, is full of antipersonnel landmines. This peninsula is still under the control of international peace-keeping forces.

There is much evidence that antipersonnel landmines are being used in Kosovo. While there has not been official confirmation from the Ministry of Defense, there are many claims that the Yugoslav Army planted antipersonnel landmines along the border with Albania and with the Republic of Macedonia. According to information from several local NGOs run by Kosovo Albanians,⁽¹²⁸⁹⁾ mines are planted from the Yugoslav side of the border, both with Albania in the area of Djakovica toward the border and the town Junik (close to the Albanian border) and with the Republic of Macedonia, near Jazince (close to the Macedonian border.) The government claims that the illegal crossing of Albanians into the Yugoslav territory ranges between several individuals to two hundred people daily and that these people bring all kinds of weapons, including antipersonnel landmines into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ⁽¹²⁹⁰⁾

International organizations working in Kosovo provided very precise information about the use of antipersonnel and antitank landmines inside the territory of Kosovo. These included the UNHCR office in Pristine and the Kosovo Verification Mission, Mine Action and Information Center in Pristine.⁽¹²⁹¹⁾ British Army officer, Capt. Rupert Burridge, acting in Kosovo Verification Mission, Mine Action and Information Center, provided a document entitled "Summary of Mine/UXO/ /Booby Trap Reports" in Kosovo. The report includes some 55 incidents from August 1998 through early February of 1999. Some reports are verified and some are unconfirmed.

Examples of the incidents include the following:

August 1998: At the road from Stimlje to Suva Reka, six mined charges were located in culvert. They were cleared by detonation. Also verified reports of mining along tracks from Bukos to Budakovo, South East of Suva Reka.

14 September 1998: Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission armored vehicle was destroyed, when it detonated an antitank mine buried in the gravel road between Likovac and Pluzina.

25 September 1998: A soft skinned Serbian Police vehicle was destroyed when it detonated something on a gravel track between Likovac and Gornje Obrinje. Five men were killed.

30 September 1998: A soft skinned ICRC vehicle was destroyed when it detonated something on a gravel track between Likovac and Gornje Obrinje. One dead, two injured.

20 October 1998: DAT personnel have seen one booby -trapped antipersonnel landmine in a school north of main road in Bajgora. Factory in Bajgora is also been reported unsafe. In Bajgora two children were injured in a house when they picked up booby -trapped pen.

27 October 1998: Minefields of antipersonnel landmines and antitank mines have been reported on both sides of the road and both sides of the border with Albania. ( Border crossing West of Morina).

12 November 1998: UNHCR report that villages Hulaj , Pobergje, Voksh, have been reported as mined. Some villagers report they suspect there are mines nearby the main Peja- Decane road. At the same day UNHCR reported that the boy found a grenade in a pile of straw in village of Babaloc. UNHCR also reported that in Drenovac Police throw non-exploded grenade. UNHCR also reported that in a village Gramacel a boy found mine in a school yard. Also mine was found in the corridor of the school building. The school is now reported as cleared downstairs.

17 November 1998: PSF report an antitank mine under some pallets in the middle of the yard of a building material company, (two hundred yards from the Health Center) at the place called Malisevo.

17 November 1998: Kosovo Liberation Army reported two antipersonnel landmines two hundred meters from the Malisevo-Orahovac road.

18 November 1998: Kosovo Liberation Army reported that road Zociste-Retimlje-Opterusa is mined.

28 November 1998: UNHCR convoy leader was informed that the school and two houses in the village Lipljan were mined.⁽¹²⁹²⁾

Victims of the landmines have been civilians, members of Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbs. It appears that mines and explosive devices are used by both sides. Antitank mines are much more present than antipersonnel landmines inside the Kosovo territory. There are more victims stricken by antitank mines than antipersonnel landmines. Apparently inside Kosovo territory there are no big concentrations of antipersonnel landmines. Otherwise, such minefields covered by antipersonnel landmines would be reported to the Mine Action and Information Center. Finally, there are lot of improvised explosive devices and home-made explosive devices which can be a serious threat especially to the civilians, particularly children.

Landmine Problem

Yugoslavia has a mine problem, particularly the southern part of the country is mined and UXO affected. It is believed that the Yugoslav Military and Police have some records of mined areas. Documentation of minefields in Vojvodina and Montenegro is known only to the Yugoslav Army. The Kosovo Verification Mission, particularly the Mine Action and Information Center in Pristine, has the most valuable documentation of mined areas.

It would be very hard to give precise data about types of mine-affected land in Yugoslavia. As already noted, areas along the borders between Yugoslavia and Croatia, in the north and south, and along borders between Yugoslavia and Albania, and Yugoslavia and Macedonia are the most mine-affected. Only the Yugoslav Army has information about how many kilometers of the border areas are mined.

Within Kosovo, the most affected areas are roads. The second most affected areas populated areas, particularly houses and schools. The third are forests. It would be very difficult to determine the actual amount of mine-affected land. With the unstable situation in Kosovo, changing from day to day, this level of detail is not impossible.

The FRY has not started any mine clearance on its territory. There are antipersonnel and antitank minefields along the border between FRY and Croatia, despite the Dayton Agreement. The political situation in Kosovo is much more complicated so Yugoslav authorities are not likely to be prepared to clear minefields planted at the border. However, it is more likely that Yugoslav Army engineer units are going to clear roads and minefields inside the territory of Kosovo for their own benefit.

Mine Awareness

The mine awareness program in the SFRY was well prepared as it was seen as an important element of Yugoslav military doctrine. One of the main postulates of this doctrine was: "We are living as if the peace in the world will last for thousands of years, but we are prepared in case war starts tomorrow." Thus, the SFRY had a well-developed educational program for the population. Not only mine awareness, but also preparedness in case of a nuclear attack or from other types of modern weapons.

In secondary schools and universities everyone had to take a course called "General National Defense and Social Self-Protection." Working people received similar training at their workplace; the unemployed, children and pensioners took these courses in their communities. These courses were handled by medical staff who had received special training. The last such course for medical staff was in 1988 at ten places in the SFRY. Over two thousand medical personnel were prepared to educate people over the entire territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to Dr. Nikola Bogunovic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has never organized such mine awareness programs for the general population.⁽¹²⁹³⁾

UNICEF is organizing a large mine awareness campaign for primary school children in Kosovo, and their teachers and parents. Educational material has already been prepared and will be distributed to all primary schools and local health ambulances in Kosovo. The materials consist of fliers in Albanian (100,000 copies), in Serbian (15,000 copies) and 15,000 posters in Albanian and 1,500 in Serbian. "The fliers and posters are designed to be understandable to the youngest population. Priority in designing this material is to teach children how to properly react when they see landmine, not to frighten them by landmines and other explosive devices," according to Svetlana Marojevic from the Belgrade office of UNICEF.

These materials will be distributed to teachers who will use them to educate school children and their parents how to protect themselves from landmines and other explosive devices. UNICEF, UNHCR, the Yugoslav Red Cross, and Norwegian People's Aid will participate in the distribution. The budget for this campaign is US$60,000.⁽¹²⁹⁴⁾ The Yugoslav Campaign is planing to join this campaign by printing and distributing a primer about landmines. Some 500 copies of the primer have already been printed in Serbian and will also be printed in Albanian. The primer contains basic information about technical characteristics of APMs and their effects, a history of the movement to ban landmines, and international documents that restrict and ban antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Casualties

In the period from 1991 to 1995 the FRY took complete care of approximately six hundred landmine victims injured in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.⁽¹²⁹⁵⁾ Nobody has precise statistics. Dr. Nikola Bogunovic, vice manager of the Yugoslav Health Institute,⁽¹²⁹⁶⁾ reported twelve persons in 1997 with landmine injuries. In 1998 when armed conflict in Kosovo became more serious, there were ten injured and twenty dead; by mid-March in 1999, thirteen landmine casualties were reported.

Some examples include: in September 1998 in Kosovo six men died and two were injured by antitank mines; in October 1998 in Kosovo eleven men died and one was injured by landmines; in November 1998 in Kosovo three men died and seven men were wounded by landmines and improvised explosive ordnance; and in January 1999 in Kosovo eleven men were injured by antitank landmines.

Survivor Assistance

The FRY took care of six hundred landmine victims during the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁽¹²⁹⁷⁾ The government provided complete surgical treatment and hospitalization; full rehabilitation, both physical and psychological, and all necessary prosthetic and mobility devices for all these victims. The government also started a program for the social and economic reintegration of landmine survivors. Fabrication of prosthetics and mobility devices in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is very expensive; one prosthesis costs approximately two thousand US dollars. All materials for the fabrication of prosthetics in the FRY must be imported. Continued assistance for landmine victims became a big problem for the government, particularly for the Ministry of Health. Assistance for mine victim programs was provided by Handicap International and the ICRC in 1991 and 1992.⁽¹²⁹⁸⁾

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite its economic and social problems has very developed surgical and rehabilitation services for landmine victims, as well as reintegration services for landmine victims. Medical infrastructure throughout the country has been able to provide treatment within three hours. For example, towns in Kosovo and Metohia, with populations of at least 5,000, are covered by health ambulance services which provide basic first aid and transport to hospitals. With the conflict, some parts of the region are not as accessible as before.

But all landmine and UXO victims from Kosovo receive necessary surgical treatment in hospitals in Kosovo. For example all wounded policemen received surgical treatment in Pec's General Hospital. Surgical capacities in Kosovo are six hundred and nineteen beds for patients. Orthopedic capacities are two hundred and fifty-three beds.

In the FRY there are several Health Clinic Centers which all have both surgical and orthopedic capabilities. The Military Health Academy Institute, in Belgrade, is well known for its surgical and orthopedic specialties. Beside the Clinic Centers of Serbia and the Military Health Academy, Belgrade has several clinics with surgical and orthopedic capacities. "Health security" is free so every citizen of the FRY can have completely free treatment in any of these hospitals, both surgical and orthopedic. All landmine patients from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia had received surgical and orthopedics treatment in Belgrade's Clinics.

The Institute of Orthopedic Prosthetics is located in Belgrade.⁽¹²⁹⁹⁾ This is the only institution in the FRY that can provide full treatment for landmine victims, including an orthopedic wing, a rehabilitation wing, capacity for production of prosthetics and programs for reintegration in society. For all landmine victims from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, this institution provided their temporary and then first permanent prosthetics. In the FRY there are other institutions which have capacities for prosthetics production in Nis, Novi Sad and Podgorica. Their area of operations covers the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to all rehabilitative treatment, all patients who have health security are entitled to receive their first and second permanent prosthetics and all other mobility devices for free.

One problem is that all amputees must wait for three years before receiving a replacement prosthesis after having received the first permanent device. According to the chief prosthetist at the Institute of Orthopedic Prosthetics, this regulation should be changed. The needs of younger patients, for example, are not the same as older, more sedentary people. Another problem is the lack of financial resources for the production of prostheses because of the economic crisis. ⁽¹³⁰⁰⁾

The FRY has seventeen rehabilitation centers, but none are located in Kosovo.⁽¹³⁰¹⁾ Landmine survivors, during their rehabilitation process, are provided skills training in state factories and companies for work compatible with their disability. But this program is not functioning very well because of economic crisis so most landmine survivors are left to the care of their families.⁽¹³⁰²⁾

There is also private fund named "Kapetan Dragan" which has a program to educate the disabled to work on computers. But after finishing the course, it has been very hard for these people to find jobs.⁽¹³⁰³⁾ Most of the landmine survivors are receiving disability pensions, but all the pensions in FRY are very low, so it is very difficult for a person to live only on the pension.

Since 1996, the Republic of Serbia has had a disability law, the "Law of Qualifying for Work and Employing Invalids."

OTHERS

ABKHAZIA

Background

In April 1991, the Republic of Georgia declared itself independent of the Soviet Union. In 1992, the long standing dispute over the political status of Abkhazia resulted in the outbreak of war. At the end of September 1993, Georgian armed forces withdrew from the territory of Abkhazia. Additional fighting took place in early 1994. After a cease-fire agreement in May 1994, the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CIS CPKF) were introduced into the region. In November 1994, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia adopted a new constitution and declared Abkhazia to be a sovereign republic, which can be bound by international law. No international diplomatic recognition has been extended to Abkhazia. Peace negotiations are being conducted by the United Nations and facilitated by the Russian Federation, with the representatives of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, acting as Friends of the UN Secretary General. No progress has been made on agreement on the political status of Abkhazia.

As a result of the fighting, and continued skirmishes, Georgia and Abkhazia are mine-affected (see also the report on Georgia).

Mine Ban Policy

Since Abkhazia is not an internationally-recognized state, it cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. Abkhazian authorities have made no statements in support or opposition to the ban treaty, but it would appear that mines are still viewed as a legitimate and necessary weapon.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

It is not believed that Abkhazia has produced or exported antipersonnel mines. One report on the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict speculates that, prior to the conflict, Abkhazia received small arms and light weapons (possibly including mines) from Russian or Soviet sources, and that once conflict began, Abkhazia obtained weapons (again possibly including mines) from raids on Russian facilities in Abkhazia, raids on Georgian facilities, black market purchases, and direct transfer from Russian forces.⁽¹³⁰⁴⁾ There is no concrete evidence, however, as to whether Abkhazian forces availed themselves of the Soviet stocks or if they obtained their landmines and other weapons elsewhere. There is no evidence of transfers of mines to Abkhazia in the past few years.

Abkhazia no doubt currently maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, though the size and composition are unknown. Most mines used in the conflict were of Soviet types, and it is likely those types that are now in the Abkhazian arsenal.

Use

Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces used landmines extensively during the war of 1992-93. Georgian military units laid the majority of landmines in Ochamchira and Sukhumi districts, while the Abkhazian forces are reported to have laid the majority of mines in the Gali district.⁽¹³⁰⁵⁾

Landmines are still being used today in Abkhazia by groups which infiltrate from the territory of Georgia. UN reports have detailed numerous landmine incidents. For example, in 1997, the UN noted: "The mine problem in the Gali district has worsened...with mines killing or maiming innocent civilians and threatening the population of the district. Mines continue to prevent humanitarian organizations from working in all areas of the district outside of the town of Gali. This is of particular concern as reports from civilians who have traveled to villages indicate a precarious humanitarian situation that must be addressed as soon as possible."⁽¹³⁰⁶⁾

The UN also noted that during August and September 1998, ten separate incidents of mine attacks and ambushes against the Abkhazian militia by armed groups operating in the lower Gali region caused the death of twenty-five Abkhazian militia. Sixteen soldiers of the CIS peacekeeping force were wounded in the same period in similar attacks.⁽¹³⁰⁷⁾

There are two main Georgian groups that claim responsibility for these mine attacks, the "White Legion" and the "Forest Brothers," which have been operating since 1996.⁽¹³⁰⁸⁾ After five peacekeepers were killed and three others injured in a landmine incident on 12 July 1998, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the killings as an act of terrorism by Georgian guerrillas and said that "any attempts to present the White Legion or the Forest Brothers as organizations that have nothing to do with Georgian special services are an attempt to ignore reality."⁽¹³⁰⁹⁾ Human Rights Watch has noted that despite Georgian denials, there are "persistent and highly credible reports that partisan groups had links to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Defense, and to the State Security Service and to some members of the government."⁽¹³¹⁰⁾

Low intensity protracted conflict continues in Abkhazia, and the UN Security Council noted that allegations of mine use in the region continue: "The Security Council also condemns the continued laying of mines, including more sophisticated types of mines which has already caused several deaths and injuries among the civilian population and the peacekeepers and observers of the international community."⁽¹³¹¹⁾

The United Nations Development Program has said that "nuisance mining is reportedly common in Gali province, where antitank and directional landmines are laid to disrupt travel along the road network in lower Gali and to harass Abkhazian military forces and the CIS peacekeeping force."⁽¹³¹²⁾

Landmine Problem⁽¹³¹³⁾

The Government of Abkhazia estimates that there are between 30,000-35,000 landmines scattered in approximately 500 mined locations throughout Abkhazia.⁽¹³¹⁴⁾ The Halo Trust demining organization estimates that there are closer to 50,000 landmines in Abkhazia.⁽¹³¹⁵⁾ According to the UN, landmines are estimated to affect at least 2,000 hectares of arable farm land, as well as schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings in the Ochamchira region.

The landmines laid during the war are concentrated along old confrontation lines by the Gumista River, throughout the Ochamchira region, especially along the main roads, in the upper Kodor valley, along the Gal canal and the Ingur River. The landmines along the Gumista River run through the western edge of Sukhum. These landmines were laid in 133 separate minefields that stretch from the upper bridge over the Gumista approximately ten kilometers south to the Black Sea. North of the upper bridge, landmines were laid along the ridge lines of the mountains cut by the Gumista. The Gumista river area was formerly an area of light manufacturing and agriculture. Today, factories destroyed during the fighting remain untouchable because of heavy landmine contamination. The high fertility of the soil along the river has attracted a number of families, who continue to live in the local neighborhoods and farm small plots of maize and orange groves, despite the close proximity to large minefields.

This population continues to suffer occasional landmine casualties, as well as regular livestock losses. Given the proximity to the minefields by the river, the normal cycle of rain and snow washes significant numbers of landmines into the river and down to the sea. Twelve antipersonnel landmines were removed from beaches near the Gumista estuary in 1997 by Abkhazian engineers. These landmines pose a potential hazard to commercial fishermen as well as bathers in the areas around the mouth of the Gumista River. None of the mined areas along the Gumista have been fenced off or marked.

The Ochamchira district is one of the most heavily mined regions in Abkhazia. About thirty percent of the tea plantations in this region, or approximately six hundred hectares, have been mined. In addition, villagers indicate that up to forty percent of their livestock are killed by landmines before they normally would be slaughtered. Approximately thirty kilometers of electric power lines are mined in this region, preventing crews from repairing them.

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

No comprehensive program on humanitarian mine action currently exists in Abkhazia. The Abkhazian authorities have a limited capacity to deal with the landmine threat. There is a lack of funds, equipment, and trained personnel. Abkhazian engineers have demined some essential areas, such as water and electricity supply systems. The CIS CPKF and the HALO Trust are conducting humanitarian demining in Abkhazia.

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS CPKF has been conducting demining operations in Abkhazia. All the networks of roads, as well as the most crucial elements of the infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River, have been surveyed and demined by the Russian deminers. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, some 10,000 explosive devices have been cleared since 1994.⁽¹³¹⁶⁾

The HALO Trust started demining operations in 1997 with their first two demining platoons. Eventually, it plans to field five platoons of twenty deminers to tackle the landmine problem in Abkhazia. According to the UN Assessment Mission this project appears capable of clearing Abkhazia of landmines within five to seven years, although it would benefit greatly from the addition of mechanized clearance components.⁽¹³¹⁷⁾ HALO Trust estimates that it has cleared 1,209 antipersonnel and antitank mines.⁽¹³¹⁸⁾ The continued use of landmines has delayed implementation of mine action programs and mine clearance in contaminated areas.

The Norwegian Refugee Council ran a mine awareness campaign in 1994 that was limited to internally displaced persons and returnees in the areas around Zugdidi and Gali.⁽¹³¹⁹⁾ The ICRC has distributed some brochures to refugees in the Zugdidi region of Georgia, yet not to the actual population of mine affected regions in Abkhazia. Occasionally the ICRC's video clips are shown on television about the danger posed by the landmines. The Centre for Humanitarian Programmes, together with the "Scouts of Abkhazia," are planning to develop mine awareness programs.

Landmine Casualties

UN military observers, CIS peacekeepers, Abkhazian militia and army personnel, as well as many civilians have fallen victim to mines in Abkhazia since the cease-fire in 1994. Altogether the number of victims runs into the hundreds. The UN estimates that forty-one Abkhazians were killed or injured by landmines in the last half of 1997.⁽¹³²⁰⁾ In January 1997, CIS peacekeepers left the road near Saberio and accidentally entered a minefield. Two CIS peacekeepers were injured.⁽¹³²¹⁾

There is no organization in Abkhazia that specifically collects data on the landmine casualties in Abkhazia. The landmine and UXO incidents in Abkhazia are registered by different agencies according to their nature, location and outcome. Some landmine or UXO incidents have not been reported or registered.

Survivor Assistance

The ICRC in cooperation with the Ministry of Health of Abkhazia runs orthopedic projects for the disabled, many of whom are landmine casualties. According to the Abkhaz Social Security Foundation there are some 490 amputees in Abkhazia and some 380 of them use the ICRC orthopedic workshop for free prostheses.⁽¹³²²⁾ No psycho-social rehabilitation programs for landmine victims are provided on the regular basis.

Initial information indicates that the Abkhazian medical system has the expertise but often lacks the resources adequately to treat landmine injuries. However, the Abkhazian authorities at the Republican Hospital in Sukhum say that they lack some surgical equipment, cardiac monitors, anesthesia machines, respirators, and facilities properly to handle and store blood.⁽¹³²³⁾

CHECHNYA

Background

In September 1991, Chechnya proclaimed independence from Russia. The Chechens adopted the full name Chechen Republic Ichkeria. On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation sent troops into the Chechen Republic and used mines extensively. On 20 August 1996, talks on a peace agreement were held. The Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed, in which a decision on the Chechen Republic Ichkeria's status was delayed till 1 January 2001. Today, the Chechen leadership claims that the Republic is independent, and urges the leadership of Russia to recognize this, although Russia maintains that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation. The current legal status of Chechnya is undefined: Russian officials insist that Chechnya is undisputedly a subject of the Russian Federation and that Russian law must apply there; Chechen officials insist on the independence of Chechen government institutions (but are careful to state their willingness to cooperate with Russian governmental and legal bodies) and allow that Russian law may apply so long as it does not contradict Chechen law.

The humanitarian situation in Chechnya has deteriorated steadily since the end of the war, creating worsening conditions of great human need and a catastrophic lack of humanitarian assistance. The problem is exacerbated by the withdrawal of nearly all international organizations from the Republic due to the security situation.

Mine Ban Policy

Chechnya is not an internationally-recognized sovereign state, and therefore cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. The Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Akhiad Idigov has expressed his support for the Mine Ban Treaty, and said that the Chechen Republic Ichkeria would be ready to send its official representatives to sign the landmine ban treaty.⁽¹³²⁴⁾ At the same time, many military officials say APMs are indispensable because of the existing threat of war and shortage of other kinds of arms in the Chechen army.

Production

It is unclear if, or how much, landmine production capability was located in Chechnya before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed that there is currently no domestic production of mines in Chechnya. Some plants in the Chechen Republic have produced military materiel -- the Krasny Molot plant repaired tanks, the Anisimov and Lenin chemical plants produced fuels and other military components, the Elektropribor plant produced military electronics -- but it is unclear at this time if any of these plants produced landmine components in the past or what their capability is to do so in the future.⁽¹³²⁵⁾

Transfer

Chechnya has not made an official declaration regarding its position on the export or import of APMs. The landmines that are in the republic were brought in during Soviet times and were kept in depots with other ammunition. During the war, it appears that Chechens obtained antipersonnel mines from two sources: Chechens bought mines from Russian soldiers and officers, and mines also came from the Trans-Caucasus, delivered by groups on horseback across the mountains. Chechnya has not exported mines.

On the internal black market one can find almost any kind of mine produced in Russia. The average black market price of a mine is not more than $10. Non-Russian mines are rare.

Stockpiling

It is not possible to get accurate information on the quantity of mines in Chechen stockpiles, but they consist mostly of Soviet-produced PMN and OZM mines. According to Mr. M. Arsaliev, the chief deminer of the Chechen Republic, the pre-war arsenal stored in the Chechen Republic consisted mainly of PMN, OMZ-72, MON-50, MON-90, and MON-100 antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antitank mines.⁽¹³²⁶⁾ At the present time in Chechnya, it is believed that the arsenal may also include PMN-2, POMZ, and KPOM antipersonnel mines. Chechnya has not destroyed any stocks of APMs. Depots and stocks of APMs, like that of other kinds of arms, were moved to secret camps and bases in mountain regions during the war. There are armed groups and private individuals, such as black market merchants, who have stocks of APMs.

Use

Both sides used mines in the Chechen conflict. Russian forces laid mines around their bases and checkpoints. They also mined the cities, including access to city sewers. Chechen forces were reported to have used mines as booby traps in houses and mined corpses of Russian soldiers during the battle for Grozny. ⁽¹³²⁷⁾ Russian officials also admitted that they had mined the main road between Grozny and Nazran, in Ingushetia, in March 1995. A refugee bus traveling on the road struck a mine and ten people were killed and another five wounded.⁽¹³²⁸⁾

There have been allegations of new use of landmines since the end of the war. In May 1997, the British demining firm HALO Trust said it had seen new minefields laid by Russian Interior Ministry forces along Chechnya's borders with Ingushetia and Dagestan since the peace agreement was signed in 1996.⁽¹³²⁹⁾

At present antipersonnel mines are used by various armed groups and armed robbers. They are mostly used in attacks against political figures or in attacks designed to destabilize the situation in the republic. The mines have been laid in busy places, frequented by civilians. People who have been targeted in mine attacks include: the President, the Chief mufti, and the Minister of State Shariat Security. All these cases involved mines with electronic remote-control. Various armed groups allegedly have training camps where military skills, including mine use, are taught and practiced.

Chechen officials claim not to use APMs at this time, but haven't discarded the right to use them in case of aggression.

Landmine Problem

During the fighting (1994-1996), the control of many territories was passed from one side to another several times, and each time the territories were mined again. According to Mr. Arsaliev, there were about 500,000 mines on the territory of Shali tank regiment alone.⁽¹³³⁰⁾ By some estimates, 80% of Chechnya is affected by landmines and UXOs.⁽¹³³¹⁾ However, there are no reliable estimates of the number of mines in Chechnya because no minefield maps have been made available and no comprehensive survey conducted.⁽¹³³²⁾ The most heavily mined areas are on the outskirts of Grozny and in the south, which was a stronghold of Chechen resistance.⁽¹³³³⁾ HALO Trust, a British firm conducting mine clearance operations in Chechnya, estimates that 20,000 hectares of farmland cannot be used because the presence of landmines.⁽¹³³⁴⁾

The following data about the mined areas of Chechnya was provided by the Chief of Staff of the Chechen forces:

• Achkhoy-martan District, mined area: 3229 hectares.
• Grozny District, mined area: 9022 hectares.
• Gudermes District, mined area: 439 hectares.
• Vedeno Region, mined area: 445 hectares.
• Shatoy District, mined area: 302 hectares.
• Kurchaloi District, mined area: 1415 hectares.
• Shaly District, mined area: 925 hectares.
• Urus-martan District, mined area: 4824 hectares.
• Stary-urt District, mined area: 39 hectares.
• Town of Johar, mined area: 150 hectares.

Mine Action Funding

Funding for demining is almost nonexistent. Denmark committed $815,000 for mine clearance in Chechnya and Germany trained two mine action experts in Germany.⁽¹³³⁵⁾ There are no funds in the Chechen Republic budget for humanitarian demining. According to an agreement between Chechnya and the Russian Federation, financing of those programs was to be carried out by Russia, but because of the financial crisis this program has not yet been implemented.

Mine Clearance

When Russia withdrew from Chechnya in 1996, it cleared one minefield near Shaly, but the rest of the minefields were left uncleared.⁽¹³³⁶⁾ According to specialists in the engineering services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Armed Forces of Russia, at least thirty years would be required for mine clearing in Chechnya. Maps of minefields have not been provided by either side. According to the 1996 peace agreement, Russia is supposed to provide minefield maps to the Chechens in order to help with mine clearance, but they have not. The lack of maps was due both to the hasty withdrawal of Russian forces from their bases throughout Chechnya, during which "everything was lost in the hurry," and to the fact that for many areas Russian forces had no such maps.⁽¹³³⁷⁾

There is only one local private firm which does mine clearing. It is headed by former Soviet Army officer Colonel M. Arsaliev, who is now also at the Headquarters of the Chechen Forces. His firm has ten men who have conducted mine clearance for the past two years. Work is carried out using Soviet-made equipment.

HALO Trust conducted a mine assessment mission in January 1997 and proposed a demining project in cooperation with the Chechen army.⁽¹³³⁸⁾ They proposed to initially train 100 local deminers, and more at a later time.⁽¹³³⁹⁾ Chechnya has a severe shortage of mine clearance equipment; HALO Trust purchased equipment from Russia and received from the UK Ministry of Defence a donation of ten tractors to be adapted to mine clearance purposes.⁽¹³⁴⁰⁾

Chechen government officials informed a Norwegian People's Aid fact-finding mission that Russians are training local military forces and are participating in demining, although all mine clearance activity remains under the authority of Chechen officials.⁽¹³⁴¹⁾

Mine Awareness

There are no training brochures, films or leaflets produced locally. All materials on mine awareness come from abroad. Literature and films are mostly are in English and require translation. ICRC activities in Chechnya have been curtailed since the assassination of six ICRC workers in 1996; nonetheless, it still provides invaluable assistance. Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN - a British NGO) distributed mine awareness posters from 1996 to February 1998 when it withdrew. It also disseminated information about location of mines to HALO Trust.⁽¹³⁴²⁾

Landmine Casualties

The failure adequately to mark off mined areas, sloppy demining, and the inherently indiscriminate nature of landmines contributed to as many as 500 civilian mine casualties during the first year of the war, according to international relief organizations.⁽¹³⁴³⁾ Since the end of the war in 1996, there have been an estimated 600 to 800 landmine casualties in Chechnya, about half of whom are children.⁽¹³⁴⁴⁾ Immediately after the war, the number of casualties from mines appeared to increase as people returned to their homes. Laman Az reported that during this time period, there were fifty-seven landmine casualties in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky region, forty-five landmine casualties in the Achoi-Martanovsky region, and thirty landmine casualties in the Urus-Martanovsky region.⁽¹³⁴⁵⁾ Information on other regions, especially remote areas, is difficult to come by.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Chechnya has historically been one of the poorest of the Soviet republics. The health care system was inadequate before the war; currently, it is in a crisis state. Chechen medical facilities are ill-equipped to handle war victims. The main hospital in Grozny was bombed by the Russians in 1996. Although it is still operational, there is a severe shortage of equipment, medicine, and water.⁽¹³⁴⁶⁾

The hospitals have very limited resources. The medical institutions do not keep separate statistics for the victims of APMs. Activity of the orthopedic center is hampered because of the absence of funding, materials and equipment. Carriages, prosthetic appliances, crutches, and special boots are purchased with money supplied by the victims.

Many people have lost limbs and suffered other injuries. At present, there are approximately 3,500 people registered by the Ministry of Public Health in the Chechen Republic as needing artificial limbs. It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many of the above suffered as a result of landmines, but Chechen Health Ministry officials estimate up to 20 percent.⁽¹³⁴⁷⁾ The availability of prosthetics in Chechnya is very limited; a few who can afford it travel for costly treatment in Moscow or Azerbaijan. The Deputy Minister of Industry of Chechnya is trying to establish an orthopedic clinic which would provide prosthetics for free to poor victims.⁽¹³⁴⁸⁾ The Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD) and Handicap International, with the Agency for Rehabilitation and Development, are presently working to re-open the Chechen Orthopaedic and Prosthetics Centre in Grozny, which ceased working in 1995. The Chechen Ministry of Health is assisting in the establishing of this project.

At the Ministry of Public Health there is a department of rehabilitation for those injured during the war, created under the initiative of the Minister of Public Health Services. The department of rehabilitation conducts registration, selection and direction of patients for treatment in other regions, as there are no facilities in Chechnya.

Presently, the only real help to injured people requiring prostheses is rendered by the Republic of Azerbaijan, with which the Chechen Republic Ichkeriya has concluded an agreement for free treatment of citizens injured during the war. In this agreement an item is included about free prostheses for injured people in the prosthetic centers "Akhmedli" and "Darkagul," which are in Baku (Azerbaijan). In this agreement three parties participate:

* Ministry of Social Protection and Ministry of Public Health of the Republic Azerbaijan, ensuring free prostheses in prosthetic centers in Baku (Azerbaijan).

*the humanitarian organization "Help the Injured" from Kuwait (representation in Baku), feeding patients during stay in Baku (Azerbaijan) and transportation after fitting of prostheses to Grozny.

* Ministry of Public Health of the Chechen Republic Ichkeriya, sending monthly by group injured people in quantity of 25-30 persons to Baku (Azerbaijan).

There are serious disadvantages to this method, as travel to Baku is difficult and costly, and repeat visits for re-fitting/repairs are problematic.

The Chechen Orthopaedic and Prosthetics Centre, when functioning, made the following kinds of orthopaedic products: prostheses of lower extremities (different types), prostheses of upper extremities, wheelchairs, crutches, and canes. The Centre is an independent enterprise, working on contract basis with main management of the prosthetic-orthopaedic assistance to the population under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.

The majority of children in Chechnya are suffering material hardship and psychological trauma as a result of the war. CPCD set up the Little Star children's psychological rehabilitation Centre in a former children's sanatorium on the edge of Grozny in May 1997, in the 'Krasnaya Turbina' region. The present premises are leased from the Chechen Ministry of Health. Ten percent of children attending psychological rehabilitation courses at Little Star suffer acute post-traumatic stress disorders as a result of landmine accidents. Seven hundred children with PTSD attend the Little Star Centre every year, having been diagnosed by CPCD psychologists in schools.

In Grozny, two thirds of hospitals and clinics were destroyed in the war. Those that remain run at around 30% of their original capacity. Medical staff have received wages for only three months of the last two years. Hospitals are hopelessly lacking in medicines. A plague of kidnappings of foreign workers and the murder of Red Cross workers in 1996 has meant that the urgently needed help from international organizations has been almost totally absent.

900. Lupan, Statement made at the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS.

901. "Moldova: US Experts to Help Clear Minefields in Moldova," FBIS, FBIS-TAC-99-029, 29 January 1999.

902. U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 25.

903. "Moldova: Transdniester's Arsenals 'Largest in Europe,' Unguarded."

904. Lupan, Statement made at the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS.

905. U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 25.

906. "Het Landmijnenprobleem (The Problem of Landmines)," letter of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and for Development Cooperation, The Hague, 25 August 1995, 24 292, nr. 1.

907. "Afschaffing van anti-personeelsmijnen (Abolition of antipersonnel mines)," letter of the Minister of Defense to Parliament, The Hague, 25 August 1995, 24 292, nr. 1.

908. Letter of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, The Hague, 18 June 1996, 24 400 V, nr. 76.

909. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 12 November 1998, Twenty-fourth Session, p. 1573.

910. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 10 February 1999, Fifieth Session, pp. 3331-3341; 11 February1999, Fifty-first Session, p. 3369.

911. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 12 November 1998, Twenty-fourth Session, p. 1574; 10 February 1999, Fiftieth Session, p. 3337.

912. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 12 November 1998, Twenty-fourth Session, pp. 1565-1575; 17 November 1998, Twenty-fifth Session, p. 1594.

913. Handelingen Eerste Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Senate), The Hague, 02 February 1999, Eighteenth Session, pp. 639-642.

914. Letter to Parliament of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, The Hague, 18 June 1996, 24 400 V, nr. 76, p. 4.

915. Platform tegen Wapenhandel, "Nederlandse wapenhandel in de jaren '90 (Dutch Arms Trade in the Nineties)," Stichting Uitgeverij Papieren Tijger, 1998, p. 39.

916. Telephone conversation with a representative of the Ministry of Defense in January 1999.

917. Eddie Banks, Antipersonnel Mines: Recognizing and Disarming (London: Brassey's, 1997) pp. 161-163.

918. "Afschaffing van anti-personeelsmijnen (Abolition of antipersonnel mines)," letter of the Minister of Defense to Parliament, The Hague, 11 March 1996, nr. D 113/96/3834; Materieel Projektenoverzicht 1998, KL 13, KL 14, KL 15, Ministry of Defense, The Hague, 1997, Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 10 February 1999, Fiftieth Session, pp. 3339-3340.

919. Letter of the Minister of Defense to Novib, The Hague, 5 December 1997, nr. D97003224, pp. 3-4.

920. Telephone conversations with a representative of the Ministry of Defense, Pieter van Rossem of Pax Christi Netherlands and Martin Broek of the Anti-Militaristic Research Collective (AMOK) in January 1999.

921. Letter of Mr. P. van den Ijssel, Head of the Non-nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Section of the UN Political Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995 to the Phnom Penh Landmines Conference, 6 July 1995, nr. DPV/NN-1381/95.

922. US Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Foreign Military Sales of Antipersonnel Mines, as of 8/11/93." See also, Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, p. 73.

923. "The Netherlands and Landmines: Highlights of recent initiatives," attached to Foreign Minister's speech to Ottawa treaty signing conference, 3 December 1997; Letter of the Minister of Defense to Novib, the Hague, 5 December 1997, nr. D97003224, p. 3.

924. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 12 November 1998, Twenty-fourth Session, p. 1573; Handelingen Eerste Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Senate), The Hague, 2 February 1999, Eighteenth Session, p. 641; Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 10 February 1999, Fiftieth Session, p. 3338.

925. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 30 November 1994, Twenty-ninth Session, pp. 133-135.

926. Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg (report of a general meeting of the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense), 13 March 1997, 25 000 V, nr. 72, p. 7.

927. Ibid, pp. 7-8; telephone conversation with Mr. E. Buskens of the information desk of the Ministry of Defense on 26 February 1999. At the treaty signing conference, the Netherlands indicated it would be retaining about 1,500 AP mines for training in mine clearance. Statement of Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs van Mierio, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

928. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), 10 February 1999, Fiftieth Session, p. 3340.

929. Telephone conversation with Mr. P.M. Kraan, Humanitarian Aid Department (DCH/HH) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 January 1999.

930. Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg (report of a general meeting of the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence), 13 March 1997, 25 000 V, nr. 72, pp. 7-8; telephone conversation with a representative of the Ministry of Defense in January 1999; Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 10 February 1999, Fiftieth Session, p. 3339.

931. Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 12 November 1998, Twenty-fourth Session, pp. 1574-75; Twenty-fifth Session, p. 1594; Handelingen Eerste Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Senate), The Hague, 2 February 1999, Eighteenth Session, p. 642; Handelingen Tweede Kamer (Acts of Parliament, Lower House), The Hague, 10 February 1999, Fiftieth Session, p. 3340.

932. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Kazimierz Tomaszewski, Senior Counselor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland, 26-28 March 1998.

933. Ibid.

934. Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999; see also Tomaszewski statement, Budapest Conference Report, p. 22

935. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.

936. United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines," A/50/701, 3 November 1995, p. 15.

937. Ibid, p. 7. See also, statement of Mr. Tomaszewski to the Budapest Conference; Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/8/99).

938. Statement of Mr. Tomaszewki to Budapest Conference, 26-28 March 1998; Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database.

939. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 143.

940. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, pp. C-3, C-6.

941. Delegation of Romania, Statement to the Ottawa Signing Conference, 3 December 1997.

942. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Anca Visan, Deputy Head of NATO-WEU Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Romania, in International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998," p. 22.

943. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Anca Visan; see also, Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html

944. Statement by Ambassador Petko Draganov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and the other International Organisations in Geneva, (undated) February 1999.

945. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.

946. Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1993), p. 104.

947. United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines," A/50/701, 3 November 1995, p. 7; Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Anca Visan, 26-28 March 1998.

948. The Mines Advisory Group has estimated that it could be several million, based on discussions with Romanian officials. See MAG Stockpile Fact Sheet, September 1998.

949. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Anca Visan, 26-28 March 1998.

950. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 146.

951. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. C-3.

952. Press Release, Ukrainian Ambassador to Canada Mr. Volodymy D. Khandogiy, 24 February 1999.

953. Mykhailo Osnach, Representative of Ukraine at the Budapest Conference, 26-28 March, 1998.

954. Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.

955. Statement of Amb. Volodymyr Furkalo at the Global Ban on Landmines Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

956. Mykhailo Osnach, Representative of Ukraine at the Budapest Conference, 26-28 March, 1998.

957. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.

958. Ibid.

959. United Nations, Country Report: Ukraine, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/ukraine.htm.

960. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.

961. Military Parade magazine.

962. Statement by H.E. Volodymyr Furkalo, Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada, Head of Ukrainian Delegation, at the Global Ban on Landmines Treaty Signing Conference and Mine Action Forum, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

963. General Volodymyr Vorobiov, Head of the Corps of Engineers, 28 April 1998.

964. United Nations, Country Report: Ukraine, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/ukraine.htm.

965. Ukrainian Peacekeepers Veterans Association, Annual Report 1998.

966. Report of General Volodymyr Vorobiov, Head of the Corps of Engineers, 28 April 1998.

967. Ibid.

968. Landmine Monitor interviews with Ministry of Defense officials.

969. SPDT Bombs Disposal Division report, 19 February 1999 (Dnepropetrovsk).

970. United Nations, Country Report: Ukraine, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/ukraine.htm.

971. Chief of Staff General I.E. Yazovskih, Annual Report about Results of Demining of the Ukrainian Territory for 1998.

972. SPDT Bombs Disposal Division report, 19 February 1999 (Dnepropetrovsk).

973. Colonel Valery Ablasov, Deputy Head of State Committee for Veterans Affairs, Soviet Staff and Arms Technics Losses in Afghanistan (1979-1989), 15 December 1998.

974. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A1.

975. Felix Corley, "Landmine Use Now Set to Continue," Jane's Intelligence Review - Pointer, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 2.

976. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 48.

977. Statement by the Armenian Delegation at the Treaty Signing Conference and Mine Action Forum, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

978. Felix Corley, "Landmine Use Now Set to Continue," Jane's Intelligence Review - Pointer, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 2. See also: "Armenia Reluctant to Ban Landmines," RFE/RL Newsline, 18 November 1997.

979. Ibid.

980. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 48.

981. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 24..

982. Portfolio Synopsis: Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, United States Agency for International Development, October 1997.

983. Telephone interview with Allen Randlov, former Director of the War Victims Fund, 15 March 1999.

984. United Nations Mine Action Service, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, 5 November 1998, p. 13.

985. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 14.

986. Azadliq (Independent), (Baku), February 25, 1999 (in Azeri).

987. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 13.

988. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 14.

989. Ibid., p. 8.

990. ACBL (Arif Yunusov and Khafiz Safikhanov) interviews with Azeri soldiers in Nagorny-Karabakh, November 1998 - January 1999. See also, UNMAS, p. 8.

991. Sodrujesctvo (Friendship), (Baku), No. 1,3, 1995 (in Russian).

992. United Nations, Country Report: Azerbaijan. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/azerbaij.htm. See also U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, 1998, p. A-1.

993. See UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan.

994. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 9.

995. ACBL study. A list of the villages, and additional information, is available.

996. ACBL interview with Mr. M. Namazaliyev, Chief of the Executive Authority, Fizuli district.

997. ACBL study.

998. Yeni Musavat (New Musavat), (Baku), 13-19 August 1998 (in Azeri).

999. UNMASG Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support Fact Sheet, 16 November 1998.

1000. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission, pp. 11, 14. As of November 1998, the agency had not been staffed.

1001. Alan Beaver, Consultant on De-Mining, United Nations Development Program. Report at the Workshop of ARRA, Baku, 2 July 1998.

1002. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 8.

1003. Ibid.

1004. United Nations, Country Report: Azerbaijan. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/azerbaij.htm.

1005. George Fitzherbert (UK Working Group on Landmines), Landmines in the former Soviet Union, 1997, p. 16.

1006. "Karabakh PM on Land Privatisation Plans," FBIS Daily Report, FBIS-SOV-98-348, 14 December 1998.

1007. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 8.

1008. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997.

1009. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 12.

1010. K budushemu bez min (Future without mines). Report on the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998, p. 51 (in Russian).

1011. Yeni Musavat, 13-19 August 1998 (in Azeri).

1012. Azadliq, 12 August 1998 (in Azeri).

1013. Fitzherbert, Landmines in the former Soviet Union, p. 16.

1014. ACBL interviews.

1015. ACBL interview.

1016. UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan, p. 13.

1017. Miny na territorii bivshego SSSR (Mines on the Territory of the former USSR), Report of the British working group, translated into Russian, Moscow, 1998, p. 30.

1018. Statement by H.E. Mikhail Khvostov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Belarus to Canada, at the Landmines Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, 3 December 1997. Belarus officials have told Landmine Monitor that it may cost $50 million to destroy stocks and clear mines.

1019. Statement of Mr. Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary at the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

1020. Interview with Piotr Zhushma, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs and Relations with CIS, House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Minsk, 22 February 1999.

1021. Statement by H.E. Mikhail Khvostov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Belarus to Canada, at the Landmines Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

1022. Interview with Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary at the Belarus Foreign Ministry, Minsk, 15 February 1999.

1023. Statement of Sergei Martynov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus at the Conference on Disarmament, 11 February 1999.

1024. Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.

1025. Letter # 17/1043 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to the Support Center for Associations and Foundations ( SCAF), "About Information on Landmine Issues," 24 November 1998. Also, interviews with Ignaty Misuragin, Colonel, Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense and Sergei Luchina, Colonel, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 21 January 1999.

1026. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993. More recently, the Belarus government indicates that a misunderstanding was caused by incorrect translation of the statement made by the representative of the Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Budapest Landmine Conference in March 1998, when the statement made in Russian, "Belarus doesn't produce antipersonnel mines," was translated as, "Belarus will discontinue production of antipersonnel mines."

1027. Statement of Mr. Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary at the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

1028. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.

1029. Decree # 335 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "Introduction in the Republic of Belarus Moratorium on Export of Landmines, " 22 August 1995.

1030. Decree # 628 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "About the Prolongation of Moratorium on Export of Landmines Till the End of 1999," 4 December 1997.

1031. Decree #27 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, "About State Control Over Transit Through the Territory of the Republic of Belarus Specific Goods," 10 January 1998.

1032. Statement by H.E. Mikhail Khvostov, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

1033. Interview with Ignaty Misuragin, Colonel, Head of Department of Engineer Forces, and Sergei Luchina, Colonel, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 21 January 1999.

1034. Letter #1274/18 from the Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs to SCAF, 1 February 1999 and Letter #17/70 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to SCAF, 26 January 1999.

1035. Interview with Sergei Luchina, Colonel, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Minsk, 21 January 1999.

1036. Interview with Sergei Luchina, Colonel, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Minsk, 21 January 1999.

1037. Letter #17/1043 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to SCAF.

1038. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, 1993.

1039. Nikolai Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes..."

1040. Nikolai Kuts, "Among Terrible Remnants of the Past", 7 Days, 24 October 1998.

1041. Letter #17/1043 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to SCAF.

1042. Nikolai Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes..."

1043. Letter #17/1043 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to SCAF.

1044. Ibid.

1045. The following agencies have made a commitment to promote mine awareness education in Belarus: 1) Main Department of General Secondary Education, Belarus Ministry of Education; 2) Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense; 3) BCBL/SCAF.

1046. Interviews with Ignaty Misuragin, Colonel, Head of Department of Engineer Forces, and Sergei Luchina, Colonel, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Minsk, 21 January 1999.

1047. Interview with Sergei Sidorenko, Sirozh, Vitebsk Region, 17 December 1998.

1048. Interview with Victor Nakhaev, Levki, Orsha District, Vitebsk region, 18 December 1998.

1049. Interviews with relatives of Alexey Dralov and Alexey Toliadonok, Kruglevschina, Dokshitsi district, Vitebsk region, 19 December 1998.

1050. Interview with Nikolai Kovalev, M. Frunze, Rechitsi District, Gomel region, 21 December 1998.

1051. Data is provided by Vitaly Kovalev, Rechitsa, Gomel region.

1052. Interviews, Rechitsa district, Gomel region, 11-12 January 1999.

1053. Letter # 12-17/458 from the Belarus Ministry of Social Protection to SCAF "About Co-operation with NGO SCAF", 13 November 1998; BCBL Interviews with Representatives of the Belarus Prosthetic-Rehabilitation Centre network, 18-20 November 1998.

1054. N. Nalivaiko, "There is a Hope for Afghanistan Veterans", Republic, 30 May 1998.

1055. Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus, 25 November 1991.

1056. Ibid., article 6, p. 36.

1057. Ibid., article 4, p. 36.

1058. Ibid., article 13, 15 pp. 39-40.

1059. Ibid., article 29 p. 44.

1060. Ibid., article 40 p. 48.

1061. Telephone interview with Erik Mannik, Estonian Ministry of Defense, 27 January 1999. Fax memorandum from Mannik, March 1999.

1062. Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, Estonian Foreign Ministry, Tallinn, 29 January 1999; E-mail message dated 10 February 1999.

1063. Interview with Mr. Krivas, Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, Vilnius, 22 January 1999; telephone interview with Mr. Mannik, Estonian Ministry of Defense, 27 January 1999; interview with Mr. Aizporietis, Latvian National Armed Forces, Riga, 15 December 1998.

1064. Interview with Erik Mannik, 11 March 1999.

1065. Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, 29 January 1999; fax message from Erik Mannik, 11 March 1999.

1066. Ibid.

1067. Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, 29 January 1999.

1068. Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, 29 January 1999; E-mail message, 10 February 1999.

1069. Lauri Hannikainen, Correspondents' Reports, Comments on Finland's Position on Anti-Personnel Landmines: Fact Sheet of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Political Department, 26 August 1997, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 1, T.M.C. Asser Press, 1998, pp. 436-437.

1070. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, press release No 352, 16 December, 1997; Jalkaväkimiinatyöryhmän raportti (Report of the APM Working Group), Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 December, 1997.

1071. Laura Lodenius, 25 February 1999.

1072. Newspapers: Kansanuutiset, 29 June, 1995 and Helsingin Sanomat, 27 July 1995.

1073. Pasi Patokallio, Director of the Unit on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at a seminar of The European Parliament on Finland's position towards a ban, 22 March 1995.

1074. Minister for Foreign Affairs Tarja Halonen, speech at Hiroshima event in Helsinki, 6 August 1996.

1075. Minister for Foreign Affairs Tarja Halonen, United Nations, 27 September 1996.

1076. Ambassador Pasi Patokallio, head of the Finnish observer delegation, Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Oslo, Norway, 2 September 1997.

1077. Ibid.

1078. Newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, 5 September 1997.

1079. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release, 2 December 1997.

1080. Council of State, Report to the Parliament, 17 March 1997.

1081. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Yrjö Kukko, Main Headquarters, Defense Force, 12 December 1998.

1082. Finland signed the CCW treaty 10 April 1981 and ratified it 8 May 1982. Finland signed the revised protocol 2 and ratified it 3 April, 1998, Defense Forces, Press Release 200, 2 December 1998.

1083. Counselor for Foreign Affairs Iivo Salmi, First Committee of the United Nations, 4 November 1996.

1084. Ambassador Markku Reimaa, Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, January 1997.

1085. Defense Staff, Press Release, 3 December 1998; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel, Jaakko Martikainen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.

1086. Laura Lodenius, Finnish Campaign Coordinator, 31 January 1999.

1087. In Finnish, "polkumiina tai räjähdemiina."

1088. In Finnish, "sirpaloituvat miinat (putkimiina)."

1089. Directional fragmentation mine in Finnish, "sirpaloituva viuhkamiina." Nowadays classified as munitions.

1090. Kukko, 5 February 1999.

1091. International classification U/I FI (AP.1).

1092. Mikkonen, 18 February 1999.

1093. "Sirpale viuhkaräjähdepanos" in Finnish; a Claymore-type mine.

1094. Mikkonen, 18 February, 1999;. Miinojen käyttö Suomen puolustuksessa (Using Mines in Finland's Defense), Ministry of Defense, Seminar on Landmines, 1 October 1997.

1095. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jaakko Martikainen, Defense Staff, 5 February 1999.

1096. Mikkonen, 18 February 1999.

1097. Kukko, 5 Feburary1999.

1098. Ibid; also Martikainen, 5 February 1999.

1099. Mikkonen, 18 February 1999.

1100. Martikainen, 5 February 1999.

1101. Interview with Arto Nokkala, 14 February 1999.

1102. Martikainen, 5 February 1999.

1103. Kukko, 12 February 1999.

1104. Interview with Arto Nokkala, 14 February 1999.

1105. Defense Force, Press Release no: 200, 2 December 1998.

1106. Interview with Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.

1107. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press Release no 292, 22 August 1996.

1108. Defense Force, Press Release no: 200, 2 December 1998; Takanen, 5 February 1999.

1109. Kukko, 12 February 1999.

1110. Lodenius, 31 January 1999.

1111. Interview with Senior Customs Inspector Siv Kanerva, National Board of Customs, 18 February 1999.

1112. Kukko, 12 February 1999.

1113. Kukko, 5 February 1999.

1114. Remarks of Major Markku Nikkilä, 21 September 1995.

1115. Newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, 23 November 1997.

1116. Lodenius, 31 January 1999.

1117. Council of State, Press Release 171/98, 28 August 1998.

1118. Report on antipersonnel mines, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 December 1997.

1119. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Heikki Bäckström , 22 December 1999.

1120. Sakaramiina SM 65.

1121. Defense Staff, Press Release, 3 December 1998.

1122. Bäckström, 22 February 1999.

1123. Brigadier General Kari Rimpi, Defense Force, Press Release, 2 December 1998.

1124. Lodenius, 31 January 1999.

1125. Finnish assistance on mine action in 1991-1998, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development Cooperation, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, 25 January 1999.

1126. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development Cooperation, Press Release, 18 December 1998.

1127. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, "Georgia and Problem of Anti-Personnel Mines," June 1998.

1128. Address of H.E. Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador of Georgia at the Signing Ceremony of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Ottawa, December 1997.

1129. "Georgian Leader Supports Joining Convention on Banning Landmines," Kavkasia-Press news agency, Tbilisi, 9 February 1999, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.

1130. Jody Williams, report to ICBL on visit to Georgia, email dated 22 February 1999.

1131. Address of H.E. Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador of Georgia at the Signing Ceremony of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Ottawa, December 1997.

1132. Landmine Monitor interview with Colonel K. Kalandadze, Head of Sappers Department of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia, April 1998.

1133. Ibid.

1134. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.

1135. United Nations, Country Report: Georgia. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/georgia.htm.

1136. United Nations Development Program, United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia (United Nations, March 1998). See http://www.abkhazia.org.

1137. Landmine Monitor interview with M. Rapava, Head of Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia.

1138. Landmine Monitor interview with K. Kalandadze, Ministry of Defense, April 1998.

1139. Landmine Monitor interview.

1140. United Nations, Country Report: Georgia. At: www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/georgia.htm. The UNDP estimates 50,000 mines throughout Abkhazia, which makes the UN estimate of 150,000 for all of Georgia seem high.

1141. UNDP, Needs Assessment Mission, March 1998.

1142. Newspaper Droni, No. 96.

1143. Landmine Monitor interview with staff of Osiauri Military Unit.

1144. Landmine Monitor interview with K. Kalandadze, Ministry of Defense, April 1998.

1145. Jody Williams, report to ICBL on visit to Georgia, email dated 22 February 1999.

1146. Mine Action Bilateral Donation Support, compiled by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

1147. Aleksander Rusetsky, Report on the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS.

1148. Landmine Monitor Interview with Colonel G. Tavadze, head of the Main Department of the Strategic Planning and Science-Technical Research.

1149. International Committee of the Red Cross, Update No. 98/01 on ICRC Activities in Georgia, 4 June 1998. See http://www.icrc.org.

1150. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997, Georgia, 1 June 1998.

1151. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997.

1152. United Nations, Country Report: Kazakhstan, at: www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/kazakhst.htm.

1153. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993. P. 111.

1154. United Nations, Country Report: Kazakhstan.

1155. Hidden Killers, p. 111.

1156. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997.

1157. Ibid.

1158. Correspondence from International Committee of the Red Cross official, Tashkent, 13 January 1999.

1159. Statement of Mr. Ingemars Biseneiks, Security Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, to the Budapest Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 26-28 March 1998.

1160. Ibid.

1161. Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 15 December 1998.

1162. Interview with Mr. Krivas, Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, Vilnius, 22 January 1999; telephone interview with Mr. Mannik, Estonian Ministry of Defense, 27 January 1999; interview with Mr. Aizporietis, Latvian National Armed Forces, Riga, 15 December 1998.

1163. Interview with Ingmars Bisenieks, Latvian Foreign Ministry, Riga, 23 November 1998.

1164. Ibid.

1165. Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 13 January 1999.

1166. Ibid.

1167. Interview with Ieva Zvidre, Press Center of the Riga City Policy Department, Riga, 24 February 1999.

1168. Diena Newspaper, 3 January 1998.

1169. Ibid.

1170. Diena Newspaper, "Area in Cekule will be restricted," G. Nagle, 12 September 1998.

1171. Interview with Guntis Aizporietis and Egil Lescinsikis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 13 January 1999.

1172. Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, 13 January 1999.

1173. Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, 13 January 1999.

1174. Latvian Radio News, Riga, 22 February 1999.

1175. New York Times, 11 October 1997.

1176. "Nezavisimaya gazeta," 14 October 1997.

1177. Statement by Mr. B.A. Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Seminar, 26-28 March 1998.

1178. See, for example, Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, "Russia and Antipersonnel Mines," position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.

1179. Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, "Russia and Antipersonnel Mines," position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999.

1180. Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, "Ottawa Process and Russia's Position," Krasnaya Zvezda Daily, 27 November 1997.

1181. Schiborin and Malov, "Russian and Antipersonnel Mines," 26 February 1999.

1182. Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.

1183. Interview with Andrei Malov, Counsellor of the Department of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999.

1184. Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference "New Steps To a Mine-Free Future," IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998.

1185. Ibid.

1186. Russia's Arms Catalogue, Volume 1, Army 1996-1997, published by "Military Parade," JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, p. 276-83. See also, "Landmines: Outlook from Russia," Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.

1187. Other notable antipersonnel mines produced by the Soviet Union in the past include PMD type box mines (PMD 6/6M/7/57), POMZ type stake fragmentation mines (POMZ 2/2M), other OZM types (OZM 3/4/160), and the PFM-1 scatterable blast mine.

1188. B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry; presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998. A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.

1189. Mine production technologies and facilities presumably also remained in the Central Asian Republics as well. See, Vladimir Kuznetsov, "S Uchetom Boevogo opyta zivut I uchatsya ingenernie voiska," Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999; A. Raylyan "Like a Phoenix From Its Ashes," Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 64-65.

1190. Vladimir Kuznetsov. "Novyi Oblik Ingenernych Voisk" (New outlook of the Engineer Troops), Armeiskii Sbornik (Army's journal) No.1, 1998, p. 11.

1191. M. Nagorny, Department of the Chief Commander of Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense, verbal statement at the working group meeting on 18 November 1998.

1192. A. Overchenko, "Traditional and New Tasks," Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1997.

1193. Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, Moscow, 27 May 1998; A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.

1194. Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, Moscow, 27 May 1998.

1195. Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, Moscow, 25 February 1999.

1196. "Landmines: Outlook from Russia," report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces.

1197. Vladimir Kuznetsov, "Russia's Engineer Troops," p. 31.

1198. V. Kireev, "NIMI: noviye inzhenernyie I artilleriiskie boepripasy (New Engineer and artillery ammunitions)" Voennyi Parad (Military Parade), January 1998, p. 46.

1199. Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.

1200. Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1999.

1201. Andrei Korbut, "Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No.39, 1997, p. 6.

1202. V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Counsellor of the Russian Ministry of Disaster Resources, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998; B. Schiborin, Russian Foreign Ministry, verbal statement at the working group meeting, 18 November 1998; A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise "Fort", verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998; N. Shnitkina "Munition Depots Blow Up More And More Often," Independent Military Review, No. 4, January 1998.

1203. V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998; A. Kostiukov, "Fort," 10 November 1998; N. Antonenko "Second Wind," Armeysky Sbornik Magazine.

1204. Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999 ; N. Antonenko, "Second Wind," Armeysky Sborni Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 62-63.

1205. Ibid.

1206. Ibid.

1207. N. Shnitkina "Munition Depots Blow Up More And More Often."

1208. "Landmines: Outlook from Russia" Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.

1209. . L. Medlev, L. Gavaza, "Sappers Are Needed By All Power-Enforcement Ministries", Armeysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1999; .A.V. Nizhalovsky Deputy Chief Commander of Engineer Forces, statement at the 1998 Moscow Conference, 28 May 1998.

1210. IPPNW-Russia, "Materials of the First International Conference on APMs in Russia-CIS, 27-28 May 1998," Moscow, 1998, p. 30.

1211. Ibid.

1212. Ibid.

1213. "Landmines: Outlook from Russia," report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.

1214. "Landmines: Outlook from Russia" Report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense.

1215. Presidential Decree #1010 of November 13, 1995, "On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian Operations."

1216. A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise "Fort": verbal statement at the working group meeting, November 10, 1998.

1217. S. Kudinov, Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Direct Action: presentation at the Moscow Conference, May 27, 1998.

1218. V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources; statement at the 1998 Moscow conference.

1219. Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, Moscow, 25 February 1999.

1220. The so-called "District Military Committee" - "raivoenkomat."

1221. V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.

1222. S. Kudinov, Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Direct Action, presentation at the Moscow Conference, 27 May 1998.

1223. V. Rosinov, orthopedic surgeon, All-Russian Center for disaster medicine, presentation at the Moscow Conference, 28 May 1998.

1224. Human Rights Watch, Leninabad: Crackdown in the North, Vol. 10, No. 2(D), April 1998, p. 4.

1225. Country Report: Tajikistan, United Nations. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/tajikist.htm.

1226. Ibid.

1227. Galina Gridneva and Valery Zhukov, "Tajik Troops Taking Measures Against Rebels," ITAR-TASS World Service, 5 November 1998. Other news sources stated that the Dushanbe-Aini road had been successfully cleared of landmines: "Tajik Government Forces Recapture District Centre in North," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 November 1998.

1228. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A2.

1229. UNMAS Working Document: Mine Action Profiles, 15 November 1998.

1230. Country Report: Tajikistan, United Nations.

1231. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs Interoffice Memorandum, on the Concept for Mine Action in Tajikistan, 10 October 1997.

1232. United Nations, Demining Programme Report: Tajikistan. At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/program/tajikist.htm.

1233. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997.

1234. Ibid.

1235. United Nations, Casualties and Incidents: Tajikistan, At: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/casualty/tajikist.htm.

1236. "Turkey: Citing Security Concerns, Ankara Opposes the Ban," Turkish Daily News, 4 December 1997.

1237. Elif Semiha Kuflu, "Canada Seeks Turkey's Support to Ban Landmines," Turkish Daily News, 17 November 1997.

1238. "Citing Security Concerns, Ankara opposes the Ban."

1239. "Official Explains why Turkey Won't Sign Landmines Agreement," Anatolia news agency, 16 October 1998.

1240. Joint Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Repubic of Turkey, H.E. Ismail Cem and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, H.E. Ms. Nadezhda Mihhailova, Sofia, 22 March 1999, on the "Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on non-use of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Removal from or Destruction in the Areas Adjacent to their Common Borders."

1241. Landmine Monitor interview with official at Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, 26 March 1999.

1242. Statement by Ambassador Petko Draganov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and the other International Organisations in Geneva, (undated) February 1999.

1243. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: Landmine Export Moratorium Demarche, 7 December 1993.

1244. Eddie Banks, Antipersonnel Mines: Recognizing and Disarming (London: Brassey's 1997), pp. 212-213.

1245. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.

1246. Landmine Monitor interview with official at Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, 26 March 1999.

1247. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, U.S. Landmine Sales by Country, March 1994.

1248. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, 1995) p. 34

1249. "Syrian Reportedly Among Terrorists Captured In Central Turkey", TRT TV (via BBC monitoring), 31 May 1996.

1250. "Kurdish Rebel Organizer Surrenders To Security Forces In East", TRT TV (via BBC monitoring), 28 November 1997.

1251. "Turkey Hindered by own Landmines on Syrian Border," Reuters News Service, 6 December 1996.

1252. "Turkey Puts Minefields Along Iraq Border," Reuters News Service, 8 April 1992.

1253. Ibid.

1254. "Turkey Says Rebel Kurds Killed By Own Mines," Reuters news service (Quoting Anatolian agency), 17 June 1997.

1255. "Government to Asphalt Roads," Yeni Yuzil newspaper, 23 December 1997.

1256. "Turkey Hindered by Own Landmines On Syrian Border", Reuters news service, 6 December 1996; "Border Security Report," Sabah newspaper, 11 March 1997.

1257. Hurriyet newspaper, 11 October 1998.

1258. "Border Security Report", Sabah newspaper, 11 March 1997; "Turkey Hindered By Own Landmines On Syrian Border," Reuters news service, 6 December 1996.

1259. Hurriyet newspaper, 11 October 1998.

1260. Hurriyet newspaper, 16 October 1998.

1261. "Turk Activists To See Green Cost Of Kurd Conflict," Reuters news service, 24 September 1997.

1262. "Turkish Military Turn Back Activists," Reuters news service, 26 September 1997.

1263. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998) p. C-4.

1264. "Turkey Blocks Mine Clearance," Financial Times, 22 March 1995.

1265. "Official Explains Why turkey Won't Sign Landmines Agreement," Anatolia news Agency, 16 October 1998.

1266. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/26/99).

1267. "Six Kurd Militiamen Die in Turkey Mine Blast," Reuters News Service, 6 July 1999.

1268. "Turk Parliament to Probe Human Mine Detector Claim," Reuters News Service, 20 February 1997.

1269. Amberin Zaman, "Turks Used Kurds As Mine Detectors", The Daily Telegraph, 6 March 1997; "Parliamentary Committee Investigates Disturbing Allegations," Sabah newspaper, 12 February 1998.

1270. Zaman, "Turks Used Kurds as Mine Detectors."

1271. Ibid.

1272. Communication from ICBL representative to the Turkmenistan conference, June 1997.

1273. ICRC, Annual Report 1997.

1274. U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 24.

1275. This country report does not cover the expanded fightning, including NATO air strikes, occurring as Landmine Monitor went to print.

1276. Colonel Dusan Stanizan, "Mines: Weapon without Aim," Novi glasnik, March/April 1996.

1277. Bojana Oprijan Ilic, "How to extract the seeds of evil," Nasa Borba, 18 and 19 July 1998.

1278. The NGO " The Women in Black" is a humanitarian organization and was founded in Belgrade in 1992. The primary work of this organization is public agitating against the war in parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

1279. Stanizan, "Weapons without Aim."

1280. Ibid.

1281. Interview with General Ilija Radakovic, Belgrade, 15 December 1998.

1282. Interview with source from Ministry of Defense with the previous Yugoslav Campaign co-ordinator Aleksandar Resanovic, Belgrade, September 1998.

1283. Interview with Radakovic.

1284. Interview with source from Ministry of Defense.

1285. Interview with source from the Ministry of Defense.

1286. Ibid.

1287. Interview with Radakovic, 7 January 1999.

1288. Ljiljana Gojic, "Evil shadows of the war", Nasa Borba 30 September 1997.

1289. Information on mining was provided by Dr. Vojsa Dobruna, Center for protection of Woman and Children; Aferdita Saracini Kelmendi, Radio 21; Pajazit Nussi, Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms in Pristine.

1290. Interview with source from the Ministry of Defense.

1291. Interview with John Campbell, security advisor, UNHCR, Pristine; Captain Rupert Burridge, Kosovo Verification Mission, Mine Action and Information Center, Pristine.

1292. Yugoslav Telegraph Agency's called Tanjug report, 20 February 1999.

1293. Interview with Dr. Nikola Bogunovic.

1294. Interview with Svetlana Marojevic, UNICEF, 22 February 1999.

1295. Interview with Bogunovic; also interview with Savic and Jovanovic.

1296. Interview with Bogunovic.

1297. "The Serbian Republic of Krajina" was part of the Croatian territory under the control of ethnic Serbs. In this part of Croatia, Serbs were the biggest population. After Croatia declared its independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ethnic Serbs in Croatia declared this particular part of Croatia as the "Serbian Republic of Krajina," independent of the Croatian state. For several years they managed to control this part of Croatian territory.

1298. Interview with Dr. Nikola Bogunovic, Vice-Manager of the Yugoslav Health Institution, Belgrade, 15 January 1999; interview with prosthetics ward chief Ljubisa Jovanovic and technician chief Branko Savic from the Institute of Orthopedic Prosthetics, Belgrade, 29 January 1999.

1299. Interview with Ljubisa Jovanovic.

1300. Interview with Branko Savic and Ljubisa Jovanovic.

1301. Interview with Bogunovic.

1302. Interview with Jovanovic and Savic.

1303. Interview with Dragan Vasiljkovic, Director of the "Fund Captain Dragan," Belgrade, 24 January 1999.

1304. Human Rights Watch Arms Project/Human Rights Watch Helsinki, "Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict," Vol. 7, No. 7, March 1995, pp. 17, 44.

1305. United Nations Development Program, United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia (United Nations, March 1998). See http://www.abkhazia.org.

1306. UN reference S/1997/47 paragraph 13.

1307. UN reference S/1998/1012 paragraph 35.

1308. Amnesty International Reports, 1997 and 1998. Georgian media reports.

1309. RFE/RL Newsline Vol 2, No. 134, 15 July 1998, quoted in Amnesty International, EUR 56/02/98, p. 19.

1310. Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), p. 263.

1311. United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1997/50, 6 November 1997.

1312. UNDP, United Nations Needs Assessment to Abkhazia, Georgia, March 1998.

1313. The following section is drawn from the UNDP's Needs Assessment Mission.

1314. Statement on the Situation with Landmines in Abkhazia, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, No. 11, 22 January 1999.

1315. UNDP, Needs Assessment Mission.

1316. Deputy Commander of Engineers Adam Nizhalovsky, Report on the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, Moscow, 27-29 May 1998, p. 15.

1317. United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Needs Assessment to Abkhazia, Georgia.

1318. HALO Trust report provided to Abkhazian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1998.

1319. United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Needs Assessment to Abkhazia, Georgia.

1320. UNDP Needs Assessment to Abkhazia, Georgia.

1321. United Nations, Casualty and Incidents:Georgia. www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/casualty/georgia.htm.

1322. Centre for Humanitarian Programmes interview, August 1998.

1323. UNDP, Needs Assessment to Abkhazia, Georgia.

1324. Interview with Akhiad Idigov, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 1998.

1325. Interviews with former chief technologist of Electropribor plant Mr. A.Z. Satuev, laboratory assistant at Anisimov plant Mr. T. Larsaev, and former engineer at Krasny Molot plant Mr. T. Akhmetkhanov.

1326. Interview with Mr. M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen Republic.

1327. The UK Working Group on Landmines, Landmines in the former Soviet Union, June 1997, p. 8.

1328. United Nations, Country Report: Russian Federation. See http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/russianf.htm.

1329. Carlotta Gall, "Land Mines, Chechnya's Hidden Killers," Moscow Times, 21 May 1997.

1330. Interview with Mr. M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen Republic.

1331. Chechen officials to a Norwegian People's Aid delegation. Cited in NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," 11-19 June 1997, Annex A-24.

1332. NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," p. 4.

1333. Landmines in the former Soviet Union, p. 8.

1334. Carlotta Gall, "Land Mines, Chechnya's Hidden Killers."

1335. Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support, database maintained by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

1336. Landmines in the former Soviet Union, p. 10.

1337. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview with Maj. Gen. Alexander Nikolaevich Shvetsov, co-commander of the Joint Kommandatura, Grozny, October 21, 1996. Regarding maps, Maj. Gen. Shvetsov stated, "I think they do not exist." Cited in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Russia/Chechnya - Report to the 1996 OSCE Review Conference, Vol. 8, No. 16 (D), November 1996, p. 10.

1338. Landmines in the former Soviet Union, p. 10.

1339. NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annex A-19.

1340. "UK Donates Mineclearing Vehicles," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 April 1998.

1341. NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annex A-23.

1342. NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annexes A-3 and A-15.

1343. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Russia/Chechnya - Report to the 1996 OSCE Review Conference, p. 10.

1344. Roman Gashaev, Chairman of the "Laman Az," Voice of the Mountains Public Organization. Presented at New Steps for a Mine-Free Future, Report on the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, IPPNW-ICBL, Moscow, May 27-28, 1998.

1345. Ibid.

1346. NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annex A-20.

1347. Landmine Monitor interview.

1348. NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annex A-8.