For the purposes of this report, those countries who have consented to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the States Parties Section.
Andorra signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 29 June 1998. At the treaty signing ceremony, the Minister of Foreign Relations pledged Andorra's support for United Nations demining efforts, and lamented the failure of some countries to sign the treaty.(1) Although Andorra did not participate it the Ottawa Process meetings, or the treaty negotiations, Andorra voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Andorra does not produce, trade, use, or stockpile antipersonnel landmines. Andorra is not mine affected.(2)
Mine Ban Policy
Austria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 29 June 1998. Prior to that in 1996, the Austrian government had adopted a Federal Law on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines, which entered into force on 1 January 1997. That law prohibits the production, transfer, use and stockpiling of APMs, and today, serves as the implementing instrument for the Mine Ban Treaty.
Therefore, at the time of the first Ottawa Meeting in October 1996, the Austrian government was already committed to a total ban of APMs. Austria played a crucial role during the Ottawa process and was responsible for drafting the working text for the Mine Ban Treaty. It was a member of the Core Group of governments that took responsibility for developing and promoting the ban treaty.
In Austria, the public discussion on APMs was started during the Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) which took place in Vienna in September of 1995. During that conference, which ended with little meaningful progress on dealing with the mine crisis, Austria publicly announced its support for an immediate and total ban. It was one of the first countries to do so.
Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel, who took an unequivocal position in favor of a total ban, described the process: "Already in 1995 Austria was pursuing a total ban. In summer 1995, we achieved our aim by destroying all our considerable stocks of antipersonnel mines, making Austria possibly the first comparable country to de facto implement a total ban of antipersonnel landmines. In 1996, a campaign organized by the Austrian Red Cross gained the support of 120,000 signatures in favor of a law banning antipersonnel mines. Such a law entered into force at the beginning of this year."(3)
Federal Law on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines
The ban law was the focus of the Austrian campaign, which involved numerous NGOs. An initial draft law was prepared by the Austrian Red Cross (ARC) with professional support by the ICRC.(4) To build public momentum for the ban law, advertising materials of the ICRC were adapted and used: posters (especially in schools), a cinema spot shown all over Austria for free, and advertisements in newspapers. Being confronted with 120,000 signatures gathered by the ARC, the Austrian Federal President, who is also the protector of the ARC, was prompted to strongly advocate a ban on landmines.
The Ministry for Defense had already destroyed its outdated stocks of APMs at the beginning of the ban campaign and had no plans for new acquisitions. The main concerns of the military were not to be forced to renounce antitank mines or command-detonated directional fragmentation mines (Claymore-types). The military also was interested in retaining the option of possible future acquisitions of antipersonnel mines.(5) By revising the draft law, the concerns about antitank mines and directional fragmentation munitions were addressed, and the Minister of Defense fully supported the ban law.
In December 1996 the parliamentary bill was introduced to ban antipersonnel landmines. It passed with great majority and the law entered into force on 1 January 1997. It prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, sale, procurement, import, export, transit, use and possession of antipersonnel mines and of antimagnetic devices (which cause a mine to explode when detected with a mine detector.)(6) The law allows some mines to be retained for training purposes; also excluded from the prohibition is the import, possession and storage of APMs for immediate dismantling or other destruction. The penal sanctions are formulated as follows: "Whoever takes, and be it negligently only, to contravene the prohibition laid down in § 2 of this Federal Law shall, if the offense is not subject to a more severe sanction under other Federal Laws, be sentenced to imprisonment for up to two years or a fine equivalent to up to 360 per diem rates."(7)
Austria's Role in the Ottawa Process(8)
At the conclusion of the Ottawa International Strategy Meeting in October 1996, Austria was asked by Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy (as the Chairman of the Conference) to elaborate a first draft of a ban treaty text. The challenge laid down by Minister Axworthy, to negotiate a ban treaty and return to Canada to sign it in just over a year was a "fast track" approach outside of normal diplomatic channels. In this context, a serious question was how to develop a text without jeopardizing its general acceptability, which was obviously critical for a successful negotiating conference and a high number of signatory states.
In order to facilitate the acceptance of the text and minimize the duration of future negotiations, language from other treaties was taken over wherever possible. Another principle was to keep the text as short and clear as possible. Another problem was the lack of legitimacy of a draft presented by one state. States had to be able to participate in the drafting to identify with the text. Therefore, soon after the Ottawa meeting, all Austrian embassies were instructed to forward the first version of the Austrian draft to their host governments for comments and proposals.
Additionally, a multilateral track had to be put in place to elicit comments from other states and to intensify the process leading towards a total ban. Austria invited all states, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines to attend an "Expert Meeting on the Text of a Total Ban Convention," held in February 1997 in Vienna. At this time, APMs were already prohibited in Austria which gave the country the necessary credibility both to have drafted a text and host a meeting to discuss key elements of a ban treaty. Some 111 delegations were present, and the main work consisted in building confidence and developing a common basis for approaching the problem. The many valuable comments and suggestions obtained during the Vienna Expert Meeting, as well as in the written replies from governments lead to a revised version of the text.
The second version of the Austrian text was circulated to States for comments and the final version incorporated some of the other proposals that were received in response. When the finalized Austrian draft was circulated worldwide on 13 May 1997, it represented a collective effort not only of Austria and other core group countries, but of some 70 States that had submitted comments, as well as the UN, ICRC, and ICBL. What was needed now was the transformation of a political process into a formal conference of states convened to negotiate a treaty on the basis of the Austrian draft. This significant achievement, and a consequential broadening of support, was confirmed at the Brussels Conference on APMs held in June 1997. In the Declaration of the Brussels Conference, participating states agreed on the Austrian draft as a basis for negotiations and "welcomed the convening of a Diplomatic Conference by the Government of Norway in Oslo on 1 September 1997 to negotiate such an agreement and also welcomed the important work done by the Government of Austria on the text of a draft agreement which contains the essential elements and decided to forward it to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference in order to be considered together with other relevant proposals which may be put forward there."(9)
By the conclusion of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference in September, the Austrian draft emerged as a stronger document than at the beginning of the meeting - very unusual in treaty negotiations. In the words of its primary author, Dr. Thomas Hajnoczi, of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The final product fulfilled our hopes. We had been successful in defending the integrity of the convention - a total ban without any loop-holes. The Austrian draft had rendered the service we had hoped for - it was instrumental in developing a total ban convention within a minimum of time."
The role of Austria within the Ottawa Process was critical. With justifiable pride, Foreign Minister Schüssel summarized the contribution of his country: "Austria provided the draft for the treaty and held extensive bilateral, as well as multilateral consultations on the text with all states interested in the goal. With the input of a great number of states from all regions, the draft was gradually further refined and the treaty text reached its final form at the Oslo Conference. I am satisfied that we succeeded in preserving the integrity of the treaty.... But most importantly, for the first time, a weapon in widespread use over decades throughout the world is prohibited because of its appalling humanitarian effects."(10)
Austria is now in the process of producing its country report for the United Nations as required under Article 7 of the Treaty. Austria has been considerably involved in developing a reporting format which will be presented at the first meeting of the States Parties of the Treaty in May 1999 in Mozambique. It is hoped that the Austrian report can be circulated as a test case proving the workability of the format. Austria is in favor of the widest possible publicity of the report.(11)
CCW and CD
Austria acceded to the CCW with its Protocol II on mines on 14 March 1983. It ratified 1996 amended Protocol II on 27 July 1998.
When efforts were first launched by the U.S. and others in 1997 to address landmines in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Austrian government position was that landmines were not so much a question of disarmament, but more a question of international humanitarian law. Negotiating in the CD would have slowed down the whole process, not to mention that some members would have opposed a total ban on landmines. While Austria continues to be skeptical of the value of negotiating on APMs in the CD, today its official position is as follows: Austria supports all efforts that might contribute to the total elimination of AP mines worldwide, in all appropriate international fora, including the CD, provided these efforts are in support of and consistent with the Ottawa Convention.
Production, Transfer, and Use
Antipersonnel mines (excluding Claymore-types) have not been used in Austria in decades, except for training purposes. APMs are currently used, in very limited numbers, for mine clearance training.(12)
According to the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, there has been no production of APMs in Austria since 1945.(13) This does not include directional fragmentation (Claymore-type) mines, which continue to be produced today. Reference works indicate that Austria has produced as many as 14 different types of directional fragmentation antipersonnel mines, as well as the SPM 75 (ARGES) bounding AP mine.(14) Companies involved in production have included Hirtenberger AG, Sudsteirische Metallindustrie GmbH (SMI), Dynamit Nobel Graz (formerly Dynamit Nobel Wien), and Armaturen-Gesellschaft GmbH (the SPM 75 bounding mine). Exact data about the past production of APMs is not available.(15)
Production of AP mines, as well as export and use, was formally renounced in September 1995. This does not apply to Claymore-type mines, which are now called "directional fragmentation charges,"and which are still produced, exported and can be used in Austria. However, only command-detonated Claymores are produced in Austria. Command-detonated Claymores, as opposed to tripwire-operated, are permitted under both the Mine Ban Treaty and the national law. The firm "Dynamit Nobel Graz" produces Claymores and exports them to members of NATO. Claymores are held in the Austrian Federal Army.(16)
The September 1995 production and export prohibition declaration was superseded by the domestic ban law. Transfer of mines is only allowed for the purpose of destruction. It is uncertain if, or to which countries, Austria exported its SPM 75 bounding mine.
The Austrian stockpile today consists only of directional fragmentation mines, and a very small number of AP mines (believed to be 58) for training and research purposes, as allowed under the treaty. Previously, the Austrian Federal Army stockpile consisted largely of U.S. M14 mines, classified as "Schützenminen M14."(17) The Austrian Army completed the destruction of all those APMs by the end of 1995. According to Parliamentary Deputy Irmtraud Karlsson, approximately 116,000 APMs were destroyed.(18) Other APMs stockpiled by the military were only prototypes, and therefore limited to maximum 10 pieces.(19)
In relation to other APMs, the Austrian Federal Law on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines contains the provision that "existing stocks of antipersonnel mines or anti-detection devices shall be recorded with the Federal Ministry of the Interior within one month and destroyed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior not later than one year after this Federal Law has entered into force by reimbursements of costs."(20)
In order to make them compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty and domestic law, the stocks of Claymore mines in the Austrian Federal Army were adapted by closing the inlet for the APM fuse to prohibit use in tripwire mode.(21)
At the Ottawa treaty signing conference, Foreign Minister Schüssel summarized the Austrian view on mine action:
A particular challenge confronts the international community in the need for intensifying demining operations and better rehabilitation of mine victims. Austria is ready to contribute its share. For some years, Austria is substantially assisting demining and mine awareness programs in Mozambique. We will not only continue to do so next year, but double the financial means available in 1998. Austria is also willing to look into assisting additional programs in the context of its development cooperation priorities. Moreover, the Austrian Armed Forces will increase the number of instructors for demining in the framework of UN demining operations such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fruitful cooperation in the field of demining will require active participation of research as well as the cooperation of private enterprises in the development of new and effective demining equipment adapted for the difficult conditions of operations in the field. I am particularly proud that through the efforts of one of the most active enterprises, Austrian demining equipment is now integral part of many demining operations in the world and Schiebel-equipment has gained worldwide reputation in this field. The recent development by this enterprise of a remotely controlled unmanned flying vehicle for mine detection and to establish surveys of mined areas could be an important contribution in helping to reduce the crucial time factor in demining operations."(22)
There is a whole range of activities related to mine action supported by Austria. These include direct financial assistance (governmental and non-governmental contributions), in-kind contributions, contributions to international organizations, research and development of technologies related to demining, among other programs.(23)
Austria is assisting mine action activities bilaterally as well as through the European Union. On a bilateral basis, Austria has given financial and technical assistance for demining activities, mine awareness programs and mine victims assistance programs in Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina and is supporting NGO programs in mine action in Namibia, Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. A recent example is the visit of the Austrian Chancellor Viktor Klima to Mozambique, where he donated 220 mine detectors.(24) Furthermore, Austria is offering technical assistance to field operations with trainers for humanitarian mine clearance through the Ministry of Defense to support the Mine Action Center in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina). In 1998, Austria has made available some 5 million Austrian Shillings for the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), a focal point of international coordination for mine action established in the United Nations under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.(25) Austria has contributed US$18,348 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.(26)
Since 1993, Austria has provided mine/UXO clearance teams. Training programs on mines and UXOs are offered by Austrian military personnel on duty in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Golan Heights (UNDOF) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) as well as for other actions, such as OSCE-missions, ECMM, or civilian experts for peace-building and peace-keeping.(27)
Over the last four years (1994-1998), Austria has contributed more than 54 million Austrian Schillings to United Nations agencies and to NGOs for demining, mine awareness and mine victim assistance programs. It is expected that the program will continue and expand in 1999.(28)
An Austrian Company, Schiebel Austria, has sold 40,000 mine detectors to the US Army during the 1990s. At present, 3,000 to 5,000 detectors are produced and sold worldwide. The main purchasers are Mozambique, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Angola. The company is also active in research and development, and receives money from the European Union for this purpose. Schiebel cooperates with the Austrian Federal Army. Its mine detectors are offered to the military for training purposes, and are at the same time being tested there.(29)
The Austrian Government continues to play a very active role in advocating the Ottawa Convention. It has developed a very fruitful cooperation with ICBL and is supporting the Landmine Monitor with US$80,000.(30)
Landmine Survivor Assistance
The Austrian Red Cross has long supported or led various mine victim assistance programs. There has been an on-going private fundraising campaign in Austria called "Neighbor in Need," one of the principal aims of which in 1998 was to help the victims of landmines in the former Yugoslavia. The Austrian Red Cross, together with Caritas Austria, a Catholic NGO, and the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) launched a country-wide fundraising campaign in order to assist the victims of landmines. The program started in April 1998 under the title "Help for victims of landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina." The program is implemented together with the ICRC in Banja Luka, while the Austrian Red Cross bears the administrative and staff costs. Until now, more than fifty projects have been started or already been successfully implemented.(31) They include training for blind victims as well as the complete restoration of the victims' homes. By the summer of 1999, the most basic needs of more than one hundred victims of landmines should be satisfied. The total budget is around four million Austrian Schillings.
Mine Ban Policy
Belgium signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. This act is the result of a global movement to ban antipersonnel landmines initiated in the early 1990's in which Belgium has played a decisive role. "In June 1993, the Belgian government established a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, before providing itself with legislation in 1995 which modifies the law of 3 January 1933 relating to the manufacturing, trade and carrying of firearms and the trade of ammunition. The law of 9 March 1995 which henceforth includes antipersonnel mines, booby traps or other devices of a similar nature was amended by the law of 24 June 1996 which provides for a complete ban concentrating on the use, stockpiling, manufacturing and the transfer of antipersonnel mines. Belgium was the first state in the world to declare de jure a complete ban of antipersonnel mines."(32)
Following its signature, the Belgian Senate ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 July 1998 with a unanimous vote.(33) The Chamber of Representatives then passed the ratification measure on 16 July 1998 with 137 votes for and two against.(34) The instrument of ratification, after having been signed by the King, was deposited at the United Nations on 4 September 1998.(35)
No interpretative declaration was filed with the instrument of ratification.(36) The ratification law appeared in the official bulletin, issued by the government giving details of laws and official announcements, of 18 December 1998 without any interpretative note.(37) It has not been possible to obtain a copy of the instrument of ratification. Because the Belgian law provides for a complete ban, no further implementing legislation is necessary.(38)
Belgium was at the root of the proposal for Article 18 during the treaty negotiations in Oslo.(39) In his speech on 3 December 1997 at the occasion of the signing of the Treaty, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erik Derycke, encouraged countries to commit to the article -- namely the provisional application of the important obligations of the Treaty before entry into force: "For many governments, Article 18 nonetheless represents the possibility to immediately apply the essential points of the Convention. I encourage all of the States Parties to use this possibility for provisional application without waiting for it to officially enter into force." In view of the internal legislation already in effect in Belgium at the time the treaty was signed, it was not necessary to make specific mention regarding the application of this article: "Indeed, this provision is not applicable for countries, such as mine, which have had a radical law for years which bans antipersonnel mines."(40)
Belgium has already begun preparing the requisite report to be handed over to the United Nations 180 days after the Convention went into effect, that is before the first of September 1999. In order to underscore its ongoing commitment to this process, Belgium expects to present the report before the deadline.(41)
Belgium's Role in the Global Ban Movement
In 1993 the Belgian Network of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was created and started to rally public opinion in support of a ban. In 1994 members of Parliament were mobilized and in March 1995 passed the first unilateral domestic law banning mines. From this time, the government began to take a lead internationally as well.
Early on, Belgium supported the role of the United Nations as the coordinating forum for mine action, and has co-sponsored a number of resolutions related to that matter. In 1994, its proposed the idea, later taken up by the European Union, of creating the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Demining.(42) An international conference on humanitarian mine clearance was held in Geneva in July of 1995. In presiding over the meeting, Belgian Foreign Minister Derycke emphasized the necessity of expressing a strong political commitment and to making available sufficient resources, both financial and in kind, to provide effective action against mines and to curb the humanitarian catastrophe. In his short introductory speech, he also mentioned the need to ban landmines: "My third appeal will request everyone to give more comprehensive thought to mines. It seems to me that the time has come for an initial examination of the timeliness of an international convention banning antipersonnel mines following the example mutatis mutandis of chemical and biological weapons."(43)
The government continued to back up its words with action -- its representatives participated in ICBL-sponsored meetings during the final sessions of the CCW Review Conference in Geneva in 1996. These sessions gave birth to what became the "Ottawa Process" when Canada offered to host a meeting later that year to strategize as to how to reach a global ban. During the Ottawa conference in October 1996, the head of the Belgian delegation took a very firm position in favor of a total and global ban: "the first element should be the total and immediate ban on the production of all antipersonnel mines , the second essential element to be included in the convention is also of paramount importance because it bears upon the rapid destruction of our stocks ."(44)
Belgium was a key member of the core group of states that carried the Mine Ban Treaty process through to successful completion. Before the Ottawa October conference, Belgium had already offered to host a follow-up meeting in June of the next year and was named in the "Ottawa Declaration" as the host of that very important conference, seen as the mid-way point of the Ottawa Process.
At the close of that watershed meeting, the secretary general of the conference declared, "What we wanted was the adoption of a declaration of the conference which restates the essential elements of the treaty which are not negotiable and we also wanted to know exactly how many of us share this objective. This had never been done before. I think that now it has. We have the participation of 153 states and today we have 91 signatures supporting and upholding the declaration of Brussels."(45)
In Oslo, Belgium actively participated in the negotiations of the entire text; its positions were very strong and one of the key elements in avoiding weakening the text.(46) And in Ottawa, at the time of the signing of the Treaty, Foreign Minister Derycke promised to continue efforts towards universalization: "Belgium will continue its efforts to rally countries which still feel hesitant in support of the convention. My country will carefully examine each request for assistance by a State Party in the enforcement of the treaty."(47)
Throughout the Ottawa process, a close collaboration between the representatives of the NGOs and of the government developed. In each of the conferences that marked the return to Ottawa for the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Belgian delegations included an NGO representative. This allowed for real, constructive collaboration, in particular throughout the negotiations in Oslo.
Belgium has contributed to the organization of the First Conference of the State Parties of the Ottawa Convention, in Maputo from 3 to 7 May 1999, in addition to its obligatory contribution. Foreign Minister Derycke announced the figure of 3 million Belgian francs (US$82,200) on the first of March 1999, the day the Treaty entered into force.(48)
Belgium has also been an active supporter of various efforts in the context of the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1997, BADC(49) supported Handicap international with 2,300,000 BEF ($63,000) for the organization of various activities for the Brussels conference for banning landmines, as well as participation in Belgium of the representatives of the ICBL and mine victims.(50) One million BEF ($27,400) was also given for the making of the 10 short films "Spotlight on a Massacre."(51)
In support of Handicap International's global plan of action, BADC is financing the organization for 1,400,000 ($38,350) for 1998 and 1,945,000 BEF ($53,289) for 1999 for its work coordinate the Belgian network of the ICBL and for continuing to build public awareness in Belgium of the landmine problem and its solutions..(52)
For 1998, the Belgian government allocated one million BEF ($27,400) to Handicap International Belgium as a member of the core group of the Landmine Monitor research team for the collection of data and preparation of this report.(53) Belgium also supported the Campaign of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1997 and 1998(54)
Belgium in the European Context
Belgium assumed the presidency of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1996 with the Birmingham declaration that consisted of an initiative on WEU demining actions, in the framework of the European Union (EU), without exclusion of other forms of collaboration. That approach was concretized by the EU joint action of November 1997 that gives to EU the possibility of using the demining capacities of WEU for EPCS actions (European policy for common security). The EU Council subsequently decided to provide assistance to Croatia for humanitarian demining. Belgium provided one expert trainer for that mission.(55)
In November 1997, Belgium launched an initiative in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for more transparency in state landmine policies, consisting of a questionnaire related to the legal and political measures adopted vis-a-vis landmines. Each year the secretariat will compiles the responses to the questionnaires and publish a report. The first report will be available in the Spring of 1999. The main objective of this initiative is a confidence-building measure among the members of the OSCE.(56)
Belgian National Legislation
In Belgium, largely because of the work of the Belgian Network of the ICBL to build public awareness of the landmine problem, there was a change in Belgian policy to support national legislation to ban antipersonnel landmines. The public pressure was supported by steps being taken in the European context and internationally. In December 1992, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling upon its member states to ratify the CCW and calling urgently for a five year European moratorium on the sale, transfer and export of antipersonnel mines.(57)
Then, on 11 February 1993, French President Francois Mitterand "announced that France calls for the rapid convening of a Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)".(58) This helped build momentum in Belgium which in 1993 Belgium enacted a moratorium on the export of mines.(59)
From that period, Belgium advanced on two fronts: the first on the process of ratification of the CCW and the second in the preparation of a law banning antipersonnel mines. The law banning antipersonnel mines was adopted on 2 March 1995. The first law banned the production, procurement, sale, export, use and custody of mines. (60) On 2 May 1996, the Parliament passed a second law which included a ban on stockpiling and imposed a deadline for destruction of stockpiles within three years from 9 July 1996.(61)
Belgium was the first member state of NATO, in fact the first country in the world, to adopt such a severe law, which worried some in the Belgian government. The Minister of Defense Delcroix, while supporting the principle of a serious restriction in the use of antipersonnel mines, booby traps and devices of a similar nature, was opposed to a total ban which would isolate Belgium within NATO and prevent it from fulfilling its military obligations vis-a-vis the other members of the Alliance.(62) "However, these arguments were rejected following the recognition of the risks of anarchic use of this armament, the very theoretical nature of the so-called necessity of their use (the last use of this armament by Belgian forces was in 1951 during the Korean War) and the important symbol which a total ban would represent in the view of the international community."(63)
The definition of mines in the Belgian law is interesting. The Belgian law deals with antipersonnel mines, booby traps and devices of the same nature. If the definition given is clear for antipersonnel mines,(64) this is not the case with booby traps and devices of the same nature. The introductory section of its report on the law, the Commission of Justice gives several examples : "it could be a question of antitank or anti-vehicle mines which are dealt with to explode not under the pressure of the weight of a tank or vehicle, but by contact with a person; or of 'sub-munitions'...which have been deliberately regulated to not explode from a first contact but can be disseminated and have the same effect as antipersonnel mines."(65) It seems obvious to NGOs that anti-handling devices should be considered as devices of the same nature and therefore fall under the ban law.
The Belgian army does not agree with this interpretation and considers that from the moment an anti-handling device is in place on an antitank mine, it becomes an integral part of the ATM and that ATMs are not prohibited by the law.(66) The army also acknowledges that "a certain percentage of antitank mines retained by the army are equipped with anti-handling devices."(67) Of course, the Ottawa Treaty excludes prohibitions on anti-handling devices (although the diplomatic record notes that if they act like an APM they should be considered one and thus outlawed(68)), but the Belgian law was written before the treaty and it contains strict penal codes which have priority over international law.
Convention on Conventional Weapons
Belgium signed the CCW on 10 April 1981, but did not ratify it until 7 February 1995.(69) One of the first acts of the Belgian network of the ICBL was to encourage the urgent ratification of the Convention so that Belgium could actively participate in the review conference.
Throughout the two sessions of this review conference, Belgium took the following position: "We have banned antipersonnel mines. We have a two-pronged political position which is namely in international matters, we would like to push every initiative towards a total ban on antipersonnel mines but regarding the conference here which was the finalizing of new regulations on the use, the production and certain technical aspects of the use of mines, we have aligned our position with the Joint Action of the European Union (Joint Action, 12 May 1995) with a specific focus on the extension of the scope of the protocol in internal conflicts and on detectability. The third point which was extremely important for Belgium and the European Union was the ban on transfers, that is to say, the international trade of mines."(70)
On 9 July 1998, the Senate unanimously passed the ratification of the additional Protocol and of Protocol II as amended in the CCW.(71) The Chamber of Representatives did the same on 16 July 1998.(72) The instruments of ratification were deposited at the United Nations on 10 March 1999.
Conference on Disarmament
While defending the ultimate objective of a total ban on mines, Belgium was already envisaging discussing mines in the CD during the international meeting on mine clearance in July 1995 when Minister Derycke, while talking about an international convention banning mines, stated, "Why not entrust the Disarmament Conference with the preliminary studies of such a convention."(73) At the end of the review conference of the CCW in Geneva on 3 May 1996, the head of the Belgian delegation declared: "We are prepared to devote several years to putting in place a system totally banning antipersonnel mines first by passing a resolution (at the General Assembly of the United Nations( and if possible by obtaining a mandate which would lead to the negotiation of a worldwide ban treaty at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. This takes time but it is possible, we did it for chemical weapons, we will finish by doing it for nuclear tests, we believe that it is possible for mines. But this would not be done tomorrow. It is a long-winded issue which requires a great deal of assiduity and which requires continuity in the political willingness of which, in Belgium, there is no doubt."(74)
After the conclusion of the Brussels conference, Belgium continued to favor an approach on a number of fronts: "It is true that at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, certain countries would like to discuss mines. Belgium is one of these countries. We do not see a contradiction between the Ottawa process and the Disarmament Conference. We are convinced that the only true objective is the ban of antipersonnel mines. The paths that we take to achieve this objective are a matter of indifference to us. Our analysis is that for the moment, the Ottawa process will lead us there more certainly and more quickly. However, we are open to any developments at the Disarmament Conference. What matters to us is the final objective."(75)
In March of 1999 the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs-confirmed this view: "Belgium's approach is inspired by a wish for integrity. We have always, from the very beginning of the Ottawa Process, expressed the desire to attend the two complementary processes. At the Disarmament Conference, there are countries which did not attend the Ottawa Process. Discussing these issues in different fora is one way to commit those countries towards the banning of APLs. But it remains clear that in our minds we will never agree with any initiative which should risk to weaken the Convention."(76) Belgium was one of twenty-two countries to co-sponsor a Bulgarian statement in February 1999 calling for negotiations of a transfer ban of antipersonnel landmines in the CD.
It was in 1778 that in Wetteren (which was not yet Belgium at this time) the first powder factory was created. By 1979, United Powder Factories of Belgium, or Poudreries Reunies de Belgique -- PRB held more than 73 factories around the world with production in 5 sectors: industrial explosives, foam, chemistry, defense and mechanical, and miscellaneous. The headquarters is located in Brussels.(77) Military production was carried out at six sites: Matagne, Clermont, Vivegnis (in Wallonia) and Mechelen, Kaulille and Balen (in Flanders).(78)
Mine production was mainly located at Balen.(79) However, in parliamentary debates on the law banning mines it was revealed that the "Matagne la petite" site had also produced mines.(80) In fact, mine production took place at three of the sites: at Matagne, elements were produced (plastic and metal); at Kaulille it was explosives; and at Balen, the explosive was poured into the cases.(81)
Before the 1990s, Belgium produced antipersonnel and antitank mines.
Antipersonnel mines included:
- The NR409 also known by the name PRB M409 is a blast mine which is placed manually. It was also produced in Portugal under the reference M411 or MAPS. This mine contains very little metal and is therefore difficult to detect. These mines have been found in Angola, Iraq, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and Zambia.(82)
- PRB BAC H-28: antipersonnel blast mine, precursor to the NR 409.(83) The Belgian army did not acquire this mine.(84)
- The PRB M35: small cylindrical blast mine which is found in Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Angola.(85) This mine was included in the basic equipment of the Belgian Army.(86)
- The NR 413 is a relatively simple fragmentation mine which is triggered by trip wires. It is found in Rwanda.(87)
- The PRB M966: bounding fragmentation mine copied from a series M2 model from the United States. This mine was also produced in Portugal under the reference M/966.(88)
- The NR 442: bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine.(89)
Antitank mines included:
- PRB M1, PRB M2 , PRB M3 and its variation PRB M3A1 are antitank mines with a blast effect.(90) The variation has two secondary fuze-wells for booby-trap purposes.
- PRB III: blast mine. The fuze is the same type as used on the M 35 antipersonnel mines.(91)
- PRB IV: The fuze is in fact an antipersonnel mine.(92)
- The PRB 408 blast antitank mine.(93)
- NR 141 and the NR 210: antitank mines with a blast effect. The NR 210 has a secondary fuze-well at the base of the mine for boobytrap purposes.(94)
In the 1980s, PRB experienced financial difficulties which led the company to declare bankruptcy in 1989 and the different branches were put into liquidation.(95) In a letter dated 25 January 1999, the trusteeship of the PRB Company confirmed that the bankruptcy of PRB had been closed on 27 December 1993, but did not release any details.(96) As for their side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms the destruction of the Belgian production capabilities: "The manufacturing of antipersonnel mines in Belgium has stopped since the bankruptcy of the PRB company well before the introduction of the national prohibitory legislation in this matter. The PRB substructures were dismantled by a specialized company."(97) A request had been made in order to obtain, if it exists, a copy of the certificate signifying the end of the demilitarization of the site. (98)
Belgium participates in various fora where studies relative to APM alternatives are being carried out. At the same time, it respects the letter and the spirit of the Ottawa Convention and the national legislation in this matter. To date, there have been no budgetary implications for alternatives.(99)
In June 1993, the Belgian government established a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, which was superseded by the national law of 1995.(100) It was not possible to obtain information on any import of mines in the past, but in view of the fact that the stocks of destroyed mines (see below) were Belgian-made mines, it is unlikely that any imports of large quantities ever took place.(101)
Stockpiling and Destruction
One year after the Belgian national ban law of 1995, stockpiling was also banned through a new law, which went into effect on 9 July 1996. From that moment on, the Belgian armed forces began the destruction of the stocks, in order to meet the three-year deadline.(102)
Belgian stocks mainly consisted of M35 antipersonnel mines, which were sent to a weapons dismantling plant in Pinnow, Germany. Not having adequate facilities in Belgium, a contract was signed for the incineration of 428,952 explosive devices.(103) "The demilitarization and destruction of the antipersonnel mines in Belgium's possession has been the subject of a contract (jointly with the Netherlands) fulfilled in 1997 by the German civil company 'BUCK INPAR GMBH, Am Waldrand, 2 at 16278-PINNOW.' The destruction was carried out by the dismantling of the components, followed by the destruction of certain elements by explosion. These operations were carried out in accordance with German law and European directives relating to respect of the environment. The certificate of destruction was delivered by the German company to the Ministry of National Defense, in accordance with the contract established between the two parties.(104)
This destruction was carried out in two stages with the departure of a first lot of more than 300,000 mines from the Bertrix military station munitions depot on 20 December 1996.(105) The media reporting the event mentions 313,472 mines loaded onto 272 pallets(106) which represents 6 freight wagons.(107) On 25 August, the Army's Media Service announced in its press release N°148, the departure of the second lot made up of 115,480 for Germany. On 26 August 1997, at 13H45 the 115,480 mines manufactured in the 1960s, approximately 45 tons, left in a convoy.(108)
On 8 November 1997, the media announced that dismantling operations had been completed. (109) It has not been possible to obtain any details regarding the types of mines destroyed. (110) However, a camera crew from Handicap International was able to get on site in Germany and film the dismantling of the Belgian mines. The mines that were filmed were type M35.(111) The cost of the destruction is estimated at 39.5 BEF ($1.08) per mine, plus German taxes and the cost of transport.(112) The total cost was more than 17,960,000 BEF ($492,068) which was borne by the Ministry of National Defense.(113)
Besides the dismantling of the above stocks, the Mine Clearance Service of the Armed Forces destroyed 4,489 antipersonnel mines. These operations were part of on-going military directives, carried out on the destruction grounds provided for this purpose and in accordance with standards decreed by the European Union and national legislation.(114) Belgium therefore destroyed 433,441 antipersonnel mines.
Belgium kept a small stock of mines for training and research purposes. The media reported some 8,800 mines in November 1997,(115) but in a document dated February 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced: "Today, Belgium has a minimum stock of 6,240 active type M35 antipersonnel mines. These are intended for the education and training of specialists in mine clearance operations as well as for 'mine awareness' instruction of personnel. The use of this stock, kept by the Ministry of National Defense, is subject to both strict military regulations and to the provisions provided by Belgian law."(116)
Various inert or rendered inoperative antipersonnel mines are also used for training purposes as well as in research and development programs for mine clearance methods and techniques. These mines mainly come from zones in which Belgium has been involved in mine clearance operations. Belgium has also supplied such mines to the Netherlands (11 cut and inert APMs) in July of 1998, in accordance with Article 3 of the Ottawa Convention.(117)
In the 1960s, the Belgian army had American type M2A1 bounding mines which were subsequently withdrawn from stocks.(118) As far as the Claymore type mines or munitions are concerned, "Belgium does not have any fragmentation mines which could be likened to antipersonnel mines."(119)
During the debates on the Belgian law in 1995 and 1996 and again at the time of the ratification of the Ottawa Convention, the question arose regarding the stockpiling and the transfer of non-Belgian mines in Belgium in the framework of NATO. On 1 December 1998, Hugo Vandienderen, Belgian Member of Parliament, questioned the Minister of Defense, Mr. Jean-Pol Poncelet, about this issue. The Minister replied that "Belgian legislation and the Ottawa Treaty ban the stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. U.S. authorities have been informed of this ban and they have confirmed that they did not organize the transport of antipersonnel mines on our territory .The situation regarding antipersonnel mines is studied at different levels within NATO .Our national legislation bans the transit of antipersonnel mines. Furthermore, this matter is regularly the subject of discussion within NATO."(120)
During the parliamentary debates of 1995, it was declared that Belgium had not used mines since 1951 in the Korean War.(121) The question was asked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which replied, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense that "To our knowledge, the Belgian troops did not place antipersonnel mines in Korea. Belgium does not have any information regarding the situation of mine fields in Korea."(122)
In Belgium today, the only legal uses of mines are for training or research projects for detection and mine clearance techniques. As noted above, the government stated that it has retained 6,240 M35 APMs for these purposes. It also noted that the stock is controlled by the MoD under strict military regulations and those of Belgian law.(123) According to information obtained from the Removal and Destruction of Explosive Devices Service (SEDEE), training mine clearance personnel does not, on their side, require possession of active mines.(124) However, SEDEE does use active mines for research projects for new techniques for mine clearance and detection(125)
The Engineering school does use active mines in its training. There are two types of training that call for active mines. One is "mine awareness": statutory one-day training for warrant officers and officers. This training includes an on-site demonstration of the explosion of a mine type M35bg in order to illustrate the noise, range and impact of the explosion. In 1998, there were some fifty such sessions. There will be approximately the same number in 1999. The second is specialized training of combat engineering members. Four categories of military personnel from this unit receive training, which includes the use of mines: the soldiers, two levels of warrant officers and the officers. The statutory training includes mine clearance. For this, type M35bg mines are used at first to illustrate (as in the above-mentioned training), subsequently, the individual defusing of a mine of that type and finally, a practical "mine plug" demining exercise with on-site destruction. These types of training require approximately 200 to 210 mines per year.(126)
Belgium is not deeply affected by mines, however, following the two world conflicts of 1914-18 and 1940-45, the territory has been affected by mines and unexploded ordnance. The latter still require the intervention of specialists in 1999. In Belgium, mine clearance is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Within the armed forces, operations are carried out by SEDEE. This Service consists of around 97 deminers who perform approximately 3,000 interventions per year. Throughout the 1990s more than 200 tons of devices have been destroyed each year, including 260 tons in 1998.(127)
In Belgium there is no need of mine risk education for the public. Mine awareness was carried out after the two World Wars but today mines are not considered a risk. Some mine awareness training is organized for the armed forces and for civilians who are going to be in a position to face dangers, e.g., journalists, diplomats.(128)
International Cooperation and Funding
In the framework of mine action, Belgium follows a multi disciplinary approach that prioritizes mined areas which are absolutely necessary for the survival of the civilian population. The approach follows some basic principles including the integration of demining programs into global regional development plans, the creation of local capacity, and the support of research and development of new demining techniques mainly oriented to "low-tech" solutions.(129)
Belgian support for humanitarian mine action includes financial contributions and in-kind support, in particular Belgian deminers of SEDEE, all of whom are NATO-certified and capable of mine clearance as well as for the treatment of UXO. They have participated in mine clearance operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Iraq, Bosnia, Cambodia and Laos.(130)
Since the creation of the United Nations Voluntary Fund in 1994, Belgium annually contributes a non-earmarked sum of 5,600,000 BEF ($150,000) to the Fund. In addition, Belgium granted an additional amount of 25 million BEF($685,000) in 1997 and has already contributed 10 million BEF ($274,000) to the Fund for the year 1999. Belgian also contributes through international organizations of which it is a member.
Since the 7 April 1992 start of United Nations and NATO operations in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 120 Belgian mine clearance personnel have participated in mine clearance activities there. In Croatia, one mine clearance expert will participate from February 1999 onwards in a WEU demining mission. In 1998, a budget of 3 million BEF ($82,000) was granted to a "lessons learned" project in Croatia. (BADC Budget, 1998)
In Cambodia, two mine clearance experts have served as technical advisors for the Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC) in a mine clearance project supported by Belgium up to 45 million ($1,233,000)(131) for the period from 28 February 1994 to 31 March 1999. The international financial and technical backing given to CMAC is coordinated with UNDP. Technical assistance is given with the goal of making the Cambodian CMAC teams independent. In 1997, the "Trust fund for Capacity Building in Demining Operations" was also supported by Belgium with 30 million BEF ($822,000) paid to the Voluntary Fund of UNDP (in the 1996 budget).
Since April 1998, three mine clearance experts have served as technical advisors for the Laos National Unexploded Ordnance Program (UXO LAO). This project aims to train Laotian mine clearance experts by Belgian specialists and is supported by a Belgian grant of to 15 million BEF ($411,000) for one year. Belgium is also supporting UXO-LAO with 15 million BEF ($411,000) for an awareness campaign of the existence of unexploded projectiles and of the cleaning up of affected areas. In order to see this program through to a successful conclusion, UNDP has established a voluntary Fund, which mobilizes donations.
The Belgian contribution to the program is allocated for the "Savannakhet Provincial Program" which is coordinated by Handicap International. This contribution was made on the 1998 budget and covered the activities for the period from the first of April 1997 to 31 March 1998. The operations of Handicap International in Laos are also supported with the secondment of an EOD expert to HI. The 1994 law enables such secondment of experts with less than five years from retirement; the costs in Laos are shared by the Ministry of Defense and Handicap International.(132)
Belgium is also member of the ad hoc "High-Level UN Mine Action Support Group" which was established apart from the United Nations in 1998 and mainly consists of the main donors countries to mine action.(133)
Assistance in the development of mine clearance technology(134)
Until now, Belgium has granted 26,255,400 BEF ($720,000) to the research program for mine clearance technology called "HUDEM", launched in 1997, at the instigation of the Ministry of National Defense. It is financed by the Ministry of National Defense and by the Secretary of State of Development cooperation (6,255,400 BEF, $171,400). This program is based on the sharing of expertise of eight Belgian University institutions in the fields of detection, locating and neutralization of mines and in the field of merging data. A new phase is planned for 1999.
In 1998, the Belgian government decided to grant 44,000,000 BEF ($1,205,400) for a European pilot project "Airborne Minefield Detection". This also involves a co-financing: 30,800,000 ($843,800)comes from BADC (in 1997 and 1999), 5,600,000 ($153,400)comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 7,600,000 ($208,200)from the Ministry of Defense.
Also in 1998, the government granted 10,743,150 BEF ($294,300) for the first phase of a project concentrating on the development of mine clearance technology. The project concerns research in the use of biosensors (rats) for humanitarian mine clearance operations. The aim of the research project - APOPO - is the development of an inexpensive and effective technology for the detection of mine fields. The general project is divided into two phases, of which the first two-year phase in Belgium consists of a concept feasibility study, and in the second phase, which consists of the pursuit of development of a functional mine detection system that will be developed in South Africa. A budget of 15,750,000 BEF ($431,500) has been given for the second phase in 1999.
Today in Belgium there are no longer accidents due to landmines. From time to time, UXO incidents occur in the civilian population. In Belgian peace keeping operations in Croatia and in Somalia, at least 3 accidents were reported. All three, which occurred in 1992 and 1993, were vehicle-detonated antitank mine incidents. One resulted in no serious injuries. But the other two resulted in one dead and one injured in Croatia and in the Somalia incident, 3 dead and two injured - all Belgian military. The Somalia explosion also injured one Somali passenger.(136)
For Belgium, policy to aid mine victims is placed in a double perspective : short term and long term. The actions conducted by Belgium in the short term are geared to have immediate socio-economic impact. For the longer term, the actions conducted by Belgium are aimed at sustainable development.
In the context of the Post-Ottawa process, the ICRC is called on to play an important role with respect to the application of article 6 paragraph 3 of the Treaty which provides for the support of states parties for victims of antipersonnel mines. The Belgian government decided from that moment on to release a sum of 16 million BEF($438,000) (6 million ($164,400) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 10 million ($273,600)from the development cooperation) for ICRC programs in 1998 to assist victims in rehabilitation, surgical and medical support, awareness program, "advocacy" campaign and special funds for the disabled.
Mine clearance is an important part of the cooperation program led in Angola. The mine clearance program is based on an integrated approach, on medical care and rehabilitation of disabled persons in coordination with Handicap International in Kuito. Belgium granted a sum of 5,200,000 BEF ($142,500) to this project.
BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA
Beginning with Marshal Tito's death in 1980 and accelerated with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) divided into five different countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Republic of Macedonia.
These Balkan States have a complex history that extends beyond the scope of this report. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, background on events, armies, and peace treaties is needed as each have influenced the use and clearance of antipersonnel landmines in the country. The information is provided to help the reader appreciate the challenges that face individuals living and working in this multi-ethnic country controlled by two separate entity governments.(137)
In March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from the SFRY. Days later, fighting broke out and led to a war lasting over three and a half years. Armed hostilities officially ended in December 1995. During this period, nearly three million people were displaced and over 250,000 are reported dead or missing.(138) UNICEF estimates war wounded at approximately 170,000 people.(139) The war destroyed families, communities, infrastructure, and left the country littered with landmines and unexploded ordnance.
For the most part, hostilities during the war were conducted by three distinct armies: the Bosnian government army (ARBiH), the Bosnian Croat army (HVO) and the Bosnian Serb army (VRS). In the SFRY, all men were required to complete one year of military service in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). It can be assumed that many soldiers involved in the war had prior military training. JNA military doctrine relied heavily on the use of mines as a deterrent against invasion. Though engineering units were primarily responsible for these activities, all soldiers were taught mine warfare doctrine and techniques (laying, recording and neutralizing).
In March and May 1994, a peace agreement was mediated between the warring Bosnian Croats and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and signed in Washington and Vienna. The Washington Agreement created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the agreement, the combined territory held by the Croat and Bosniak forces was divided into ten autonomous cantons. The cantonal system was selected to prevent dominance by one ethnic group over another.
The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as the Dayton Agreement) was signed on 14 December 1995. This agreement officially ended the war and, among other things, recognized that the country was comprised of two entities - the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter referred to as the Federation) and Republika Srpska (RS). It also established an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and a four-kilometer-wide Zone of Separation (ZOS) between the two entities. The IEBL was the front line when the war ended. Most minefields are found along the IEBL and within the ZOS.
To oversee treaty implementation, an Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) arrived in the country in early 1996. In December 1996, IFOR's duties were handed over to the NATO-led multinational Stabilization Force (SFOR). There are approximately 30,000 SFOR troops currently in the country. Among other duties, SFOR is responsible for training and supervising the demining teams for each entity army and helping to identify and assist with the destruction of weapon storage sites.
An additional body established to assist with legislation and treaty compliance is the Office of the High Representative. This office is instrumental in providing guidance and support for the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in following not only the Dayton Agreement, but also the obligations outlined in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.
Mine Ban Policy
Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. At the signing ceremony the government declared its intention to destroy its antipersonnel mine stockpiles and dismantle production facilities within four years.(140) The instrument of ratification was signed in Sarajevo on 29 August 1998 and deposited at the United Nations (UN) on 8 September 1998. A copy of the ratification document was provided to the Landmine Monitor.
Information about implementing legislation and reporting to the UN as required by Article 7 of the treaty was not readily available. It is believed that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Sarajevo is actively supporting BiH in this regard.
Bosnia and Herzegovina attended all the Ottawa Process meetings as a full participant and endorsed the Brussels Declaration but was absent from the UN General Assembly landmines resolution votes in 1997 and 1998.
Following the breakup of the SFRY, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared that it accepted the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 1 September 1993 and was hence bound by its provisions, including the rules contained in Protocol II. BiH has not yet ratified 1996 amended Protocol II.
During Tito's regime, the SFRY was one of the most prolific producers of landmines in the world. There were an estimated six million mines of all types in JNA stocks at the beginning of the conflict.(141)
Other estimates are three million JNA mines stockpiled prior to the war and an additional three million mines acquired or made during the conflict.(142) Three mine-producing factories were identified in the towns of Gorazde, Vogosca and Bugojno.(143)
According to one expert: "Gorazde is one of many factories in the former Yugoslavia that were owned by UNIS, part of the Associated Metal Industry. They still produce a lot of detonators, now mainly for commercial rather than military use. They also made the Gorazde mines. There are two variants of the Gorazde AP mine, though both look like the Canadian C3 Elsie: one fires upwards and the other downwards. The latter is made for use in the Gorazde AT mine, which is just a wooden box with fuse wells for two AP mines."
"Vogosca is just north of Sarajevo and made, among other things, the ORKAN rocket systems that dispense KB-1 and KB-2 submunitions. They also had a substantial research and development facility where they were working on an electric AT mine called ABABEEL (the Iraqi designation)."
"Bugojno (Slavko Rodic Bugojno, known as SRB) is the big one; you will see the SRB factory mark (in English or Cyrillic) on quite a few Yugo mines. They made several types including PMA-3, MRUD, TMRP-6 and the MPR-M85 electronic limpet mine. They are also working on some new AP and AT mines with electronic fuses. Most of these factories were heavily damaged and now run between 10-20 per cent capacity. Some of the buildings are damaged or destroyed and many have no power."(144)
Another mine produced in the country was the Caplinka mine, a tripwire-operated fragmentation stake mine fabricated in the Mostar Region.(145)
Reportedly, large numbers of SFRY-manufactured landmines were exported and have been found in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, and elsewhere.(146) There have been no reports of landmine import or export by Bosnia and Herzegovina since signing the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997.
The 1995 Dayton Agreement also includes specific obligations concerning the marking, removal and destruction of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). These are found in Annex 1A of the Agreement. Specifically, Article IV (2)(d) states: " The Parties immediately after this Annex enters into force shall begin promptly and proceed steadily to complete the following activities within thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority or as determined by the IFOR Commander: (1) remove, dismantle or destroy all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, and barbed or razor wire from the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation or other areas from which their forces are withdrawn; (2) mark all known mine emplacements, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices and demolitions within Bosnia and Herzegovina; and (3) remove, dismantle or destroy all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices and demolitions as required by the IFOR Commander."
Annex 1A Articles VI (3) (e) and VI (6) also gave IFOR, and its successor, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) the right to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles and the right to conduct spot-checks at any time and destroy any undeclared stockpiles.
COMSFOR's Instructions to the Parties (6 June 1997) required all Parties to declare the extent of their mine stockpiles and move them to officially agreed "cantonment" sites. The mines must remain at the sites and cannot be used or moved without SFOR permission.(147)
In December 1996, a conference was held in London to review the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. At that time BiH authorities were urged to formulate a plan to reduce antipersonnel mine stockpiles by 1 October 1997 and not acquire any additional mines.
At the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, Bosnia and Herzegovina pledged to destroy its AP mine stockpiles within four years. There are an estimated 400 stockpiles in the country. Weapon storage sites contain a wide variety of munitions and are not exclusive to antipersonnel landmines. Information on the location of the sites is not available to the public.
The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) is involved with assessing the content of the weapon storage sites to identify the training needed to destroy existing munitions and promote safety in working near these areas. SFOR is also providing technical and financial assistance for the destruction of weapon storage sites. Though partial or complete destruction of some sites has occurred, specific information is not available to the public. The main method of destruction is reportedly by explosion.
Antitank (AT) mines, AP mines and UXO found during demining or clearance activities are destroyed. The BHMAC accredited figures for 1998 are given below.
AT mines cleared: 192
AP mines cleared: 3,597
UXO cleared: 2,192
There are no mines being retained for training purposes as appropriate training models are available.(148) Stockpiles of AP mines by other countries or non-state actors have not been identified.
As noted above, all fighting factions used APMs during the war.
Other than rare sporadic use of AP mines on individual property areas, there are few allegations of relaid AP mines. The Jewish Cemetery in Sarajevo has had two incidents of AP mines found in previously cleared areas. Neither incident resulted in serious injury and the nature of these events is not entirely clear.
As a result of the war, the country is heavily polluted with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). As of January 1999, the country's focal point for humanitarian demining Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) reported 18,229 known minefields, of an estimated a total of 30,000 minefields in the country with 750,000 to one million landmines in the ground. Minefields can be found throughout the country, with concentrations along Inter-Entity Boundary lines. Some minefields follow military doctrine of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) but most are nuisance minefields. Of documented mines laid, the BHMAC reports that 83.55 percent are AP mines) and 16.45 percent are AT mines.
The United Nations Mine Action Center (UNMAC) was the UN-mandated agency established in BiH in June 1996 to coordinate demining activities in the country and supervise the establishment of national bodies to assume responsibility for mine action. It was the in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As a result of concerns expressed during the London conference in December 1996 to review the Dayton Agreement about the lack of progress in mine clearance, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were required to: use their military forces for demining in accordance with internationally recognized standards; assist the United Nations Mine Action Center (UNMAC) by providing data and assigning priorities to proposed demining projects; support the demining effort by exempting all aspects of mine clearance operations from taxes and customs duties.
On 15 October 1997, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning a national Mine Action Plan to address the problem of landmines. Under the MOU, all assets developed by UNMAC for the government of BiH and/or the entities are being progressively handed over to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Commission for Demining (BHCD). Handover of responsibility for mine action occurred on 1 July 1998.
The organizational structure for coordinated mine action in BiH is seen below.
Council of Ministers
|Board of Donors|
Bosnia and Herzegovina Commission for Demining (BHCD)
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC)
|Entity Mine Action Center (EMAC)||
Entity Mine Action Center (EMAC)
|Regional Offices: Mostar, Tuzla, Bihac, Sarajevo||Regional Offices: Banja Luka and Pale|
The Board of Donors provides guidance to the BHCD, BHMAC and the EMACs. It also oversees the management of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Trust Fund that supports the BHMAC. Members include embassy representatives (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, USA, and Slovenia), UNHCR, World Bank and SFOR. The Board meets every 3-4 weeks and is co-chaired by OHR and UNDP.
The primary role of the BHCD is to oversee the work of the BHMAC. The BHCD also channels resources to the entity governments, which are responsible for implementing the Mine Action Plan, facilitate cooperation between the Federation and the Republika Srpska, and report on progress in mine action within the country. The BHCD is a three-member commission with representation from Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.
BHMAC has three main components: 1) information (collect and maintain mine related information, public relations); 2) finance (create financial reports, trace how funds are spent, write proposals); and 3) coordination (establish and impose standards for mine action, accredit qualified demining operations, coordinate demining tasks in the IEBL).
EMACs responsibilities include: 1) conduct mine awareness, demarcation, surveying and clearance operations; 2) provide information to the central minefield database; 3) coordinate demining activities with other operational agencies, ensuring they address approved priorities and meet approved standards; 4) propose a list of urgent tasks to be undertaken within the entity; 5) provide information to the central minefield database.
Mine Action Funding
The London Peace Implementation Conference in December 1996 stated the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were to "support the demining effort by exempting all aspects of demining operations from taxes and customs duties." As of 1 January 1999, employees of the MACs should receive health cards entitling the bearer to receive free medical treatment and pension provisions. The Federation has honored the commitment, but the RS has not yet done so. Tax exemptions do not apply to personnel employed by NGOs or commercial companies.(149)
From 1996-1998, ten major donor states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, UK, and the United States) have reportedly provided US$35.66 million for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.(150) What percentages were spent in the country for what actions is difficult to assess.
BHMAC records its own budget needs and expenses and any funds allocated through it for other operational agencies. BHMAC does not have records of independently funded demining organizations, mine awareness actions or the wide variety of victim assistance programs being implemented in the country.
The newly established Slovenia Trust Fund could provide up to US$56 million for mine clearance and victim assistance activities for BiH. This is through a matching fund offered by the United States with a cap of US$14 million per year for two years. The MOU between Slovenia and BiH has been signed; Slovenia has until December 1999 to raise the funds for the first year of the match.(151)
At present, the World Bank is supporting a US$30 million War Victims Rehabilitation Project. The project duration is two years and was to be effective in 1996. This project is located only in the Federation and has four main components: 1) Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) (US$ 13.1 million) based in 38 poly-clinics located throughout the Federation; services offered include physical therapy, services for mental illness, and psycho-social rehabilitation. 2) Prosthetics and Orthotics Production (US$ 6.2 million) providing equipment, materials and building rehabilitation for six prosthetic centers in the Federation (Cazin, Mostar, Sarajevo, Livno, Tuzla, and Zenica). 3)Orthopedic and Reconstructive Surgery (US$ 8.8 million) providing medical equipment and building rehabilitation in seven surgical departments in the Federation (Mostar, Livno, Travnik, Bihac, Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Zenica). 4)Project Implementation Support ($US 1.9 million) providing office equipment, vehicles, technical assistance and training.(152)
The three armies involved in the conflict had some training in mine warfare and generally employed JNA mine-laying methods. Mines were often used to protect front line positions and avenues of retreat. In BiH the front line was relatively stable and follows the IEBL and ZoS. The majority of mines are found in these areas and in areas surrounding many of the ethnic enclaves besieged during the war. Though many mines were laid by entity armies according to JNA military doctrine, records for all mined areas have not been found. Mined areas have been recorded but, for whatever reason, the reports were not submitted. It could be that the person who was in charge of laying the mines recorded the areas, but did not submit the report, or may have been killed before the report was submitted. Additionally, the report may have been submitted, but could have been destroyed during the war by the fighting.(153) Local militia groups and individuals also laid mines and reporting from these groups is minimal.
Following the end of the hostilities, IFOR/SFOR were given a large number of minefield records and maps by the entity armed forces. It is generally held that these maps represent 50-60 percent of the minefields in the country. BHMAC stores these records as well as positions of non-mapped minefields that are discovered. BHMAC's database in Sarajevo is the focal point for information related to mine locations and demining activities.
Though Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a seriously mine and UXO-affected country, there has been no formal assessment (Level 1 Survey) of the extent of the problem. A Level 1 General Survey is planned for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999. This is contingent upon funding received by BHMAC. RS and Federation MAC survey teams already operational in the country will undertake the implementation of the survey. Results from the Level 1 Survey will supplement existing maps and information from demining agencies. It will also provide information about the kind of land that is mine-affected and the impact on the local community.
Specific Minefield Information
As of 25 January 1999, BHMAC recorded 18,229 minefields in the country. The current BHMAC estimate of the total number of minefields in BiH is 30,000. The BHMAC notes 290 square kilometers of ground are suspected to be mined. The summary of minefield records in the Federation and RS are provided below.
LOCATION MINEFIELDS POPULATION(154)
FEDERATION 13,472 2,201,720
Central Bosnia 2,125 252,617
Neretva 1,314 176,203
Posavina 408 38,666
Sarajevo 1,449 348,039
Tomislavgrad 768 78,750
Tuzla-Podrinje 3,196 615,673
Una-Sana 1,608 222,634
Upper Drina (Gorazde) 250 39,240
Zenica-Doboj 2,354 429,898
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA 4,756 1,398,000
TOTAL 18,229 3,599,720
Types of Mines Laid
As of 25 January 1999, the BHMAC reports 247,419 AP mines and 49,994 AT mines laid in BiH (AP 83.55 percent and AT 16.45 percent):
AP Mine Type (Number)
PMA 1 1A (18,950)
PMA 2 (30,587)
PMA 3 (40,503)
PMR 2A AS (86,527)
PMR 3 (2,890)
PROM 1 1P (11,852)
Other AP (10,522)
AT Mine Type (Number)
TMM 1 (7,592)
TMA 1 1A (1,031)
TMA 2 2A (533)
TMA 3 (7,730)
TMA 4 (6,118)
TMA 5 (1,427)
TMRP 6 (12,015)
Other AT (3,672)
Unknown AT (9,876)
TOTAL AT (49,994)
Minefield Marking and Mine Awareness Education
Clear marking of minefields and education about the risk of landmines are two methods used in preventing additional injuries from landmines. At this time, minefield marking is carried out by demining teams only for areas that are in process of being cleared. Other than marking at clearance sites or possible initiatives within a community, there is no preventative marking to ensure effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas.(155) The most common marking technique is to line the periphery of the area in question with red or yellow minefield tape, commonly known as police tape. "Mines" (written in black) is printed on the tape. Until now, a technical survey of a suspected mined area is directly followed by clearance activities. There have been no reports of a technical survey being followed only by marking of the minefield and leaving it without further action.
There is an extensive mine awareness program functioning at many levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Main actions and implementing bodies include: ICRC; Ministry of Education in both entities (with financial and technical support from UNICEF); BHMAC, EMACs and Mine Awareness Working Groups (MAWGs); and SFOR mine risk education for SFOR troops arriving in the country.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began mine awareness programs in BiH in March 1996. At present, ICRC has eleven sub-delegations in the country with eleven mine awareness officers. For direct community level activities (data collection and mine awareness) ICRC has recruited 122 Red Cross volunteers from the approximate 100 municipalities in the country. The volunteers/mine awareness instructors live in the mine-affected areas and work within the community in which they live. The long term plan is to hand over all activities to the local Red Cross structures.(156)
There are four components to ICRC's mine awareness program. community based approach (targeting adults, made by Red Cross volunteers); school program (children are targeted, drawing contests, compulsory mine awareness lessons, quiz competitions and puppet shows); media campaign (television, leaflets, radio used in early emergency phase); data gathering activities (collect information related to mine incidents to help monitor the impact of the mine awareness program and identify further needs).(157)
UNICEF became involved in mine awareness in Bosnian and Herzegovina in 1997. The most notable achievement is the collaborative work between UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC and the Ministries of Education in the Federation and the RS in providing mine awareness education as a part of primary school curriculum throughout the country. Information is provided as part of a weekly one-hour open education period. As of 1998, both Ministries of Education have designated staff (two in the Federation and one in the RS) to work full-time for mine awareness education.
Teacher training to introduce mine awareness in the school system started in 1997 in the Federation and in the RS in 1998. The program followed a train the trainer method whereby all primary school teachers should have received training through original teacher trainers. There are over 6,900 primary school teacher in the RS and more than 12,300 primary school teachers in the Federation.(158) All are assumed to have received teacher training for providing mine awareness education.
There are an estimated 266,918 primary school students in the Federation and 117,952 primary school students in the RS.(159) All students should have received mine awareness training in their schools.
UNICEF continues to provide Mine Awareness Kits for the school program which include posters, leaflets, stickers, student timetable, teacher's manuals, audio tape, video tape, jigsaw puzzle and three simple board games. In addition to the primary school program, UNICEF also supports: a mobile theater group providing mine awareness information in the cantons of Zenica, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Una Sana; provision of soccer balls and information materials to promote mine awareness in soccer clubs in both entities (started by the Spirit of Soccer and taken over by the Ministry of Sport in the Federation and RS).(160)
The first Mine Awareness Working Group (MAWG) started in May 1996 under UNMAC authority. This group developed mine awareness information standards that are generally followed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, each EMAC has a MAWG that meets regularly to improve coordination and share information among agencies and ministries involved in mine awareness. The groups also help prioritize needs for future mine awareness in their entities. The EMACs are also involved in directly providing mine awareness through trained mine awareness instructors.
Each multinational division (MND) in SFOR provides mine risk education to troops arriving in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Proper training of foreign staff working in a mine-affected country is important but often overlooked. The British SFOR division has a rigorous mine risk education program that requires monthly mine awareness training. The MND-North and Southwest divisions also give mine awareness to schools, community centers and clubs in their areas of operation.
Additional organizations involved in mine risk education programs include: 5+; Amphibia; Associacione dei Bambini; Association to Aid Refugees Japan (AARJ); GENESIS; Handicap International (HI); IPTF; Japan Emergency NGOs (JEN); Kreigs Kinder Not Hilfe; Landmine Survivors Network; MEDEX; Ministry of Sport in both entities; Norwegian People's Aid (NPA); Pisac.(161)
There are five main categories of officially recognized operators directly involved mine clearance efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.(162) These include commercial companies (international and local companies bidding for contracts, focus on infrastructure, most of the work funded by the World Bank); nongovernmental organizations (NPA, HI/APM, HELP); former warring factions (43 demining teams from the three entity armies; seven additional teams added; roughly 450 personnel doing demining); MAC teams (four teams - two RS and two Federation); and UNHCR teams (six teams - two RS and four Federation). Civil and Protection Organizations (RS and Federation) have teams specializing in Explosive Ordnance Disposal and house clearance.
Official demining activities began in 1996. There were few demining organizations at that time and progress was slow. There were no demining standards in place and much of the demining was "mine lifting" (clearing only the mines indicated on the map) rather than demining to humanitarian mine clearance standards.(163)
BHCD now requires any demining service to be accredited by BHMAC prior to receiving approval to work in the country. The three former warring factions are accredited and now conduct all demining according to humanitarian mine clearance standards. The UNHCR and MAC demining teams have also been accredited. For 1999, there are over forty organizations applying for accreditation to conduct demining in BiH.
As of January 1999, are nineteen organizations were accredited by BHMAC for demining operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Amphibia; Defense Systems Ltd (UK); Detektor; EMERCOM (Russia); FFG (Germany); GEOMINES (France); Handicap International (France)/APM Bihac; HELP-UDT (EU/Local); Lenz UKB (Germany/Hungary); MECHEM (S Africa); MINE-TECH (Zimbabwe); Norwegian People's Aid; Oktol; RONCO (USA); TAMAR Consulting (Germany); TWJ Demining; UXB (USA) and UNIPAK.
The demining employees are primarily local staff. Training for staff is generally provided by foreign experts. SFOR provides training and supervision for the entity demining teams, NGO's train their own staff, and the MACs also provide training for their teams. Sufficient security to mine action personnel is assured through the accreditation process.(164)
All records for mine survey and clearance are available at the BHMAC information center in Sarajevo.(165) These records are accessible and open to the public. Specific figures for 1996 were minimal. The BHMAC information center initially reported the total amount of land cleared and surveyed (area checked for mines but none were found) to humanitarian standards in 1997 was 6,833 square kilometers and in 1998 was 4,733 square kilometers. (A breakdown per month is available).
However, the figure for the total area cleared during 1997 has now been revised downwards from 6,833 sq km to 4,623 sq km. This revision is the result of an investigation that revealed monthly progress reports submitted to the UNMAC by all operators that did not match the figures entered into the national mines database from compilation reports submitted by accredited operators.(166)
The BHMAC also explains the figures for mines located/destroyed in 1998 are significantly less than figures for 1997. The BHMAC believes that this is due to a change in clearance from the three military teams doing mine lifting in 1997 and began clearance in accordance with international standards in 1998.(167)
According to BHMAC information center, the following is the breakdown of square meters surveyed and cleared according to land use. These are the total to date.
TYPE OF LAND USE SURVEYED (m2) CLEARED (m2)
Airports 261,512.50 21,581.00
Bridges 37,815.00 262,320.00
Communications -- 11,435.00
Education and Culture 12,417.00 150,863.00
Electric Power & Coal 286,904.00 1,184,509.00
Housing 374,903.00 1,262,622.50
Natural Gas/District Heating 32,000.00 101,682.00
Other 1,077,290.00 1,770,559.10
Railways 405,825.00 124,267.00
Roads 60,253.00 385,827.00
Urban - 14,230.00
Water/Waste Management 46,997.00 937,777.00
TOTAL 2,595,916.50 6,226,672.60*
Depending on the type of terrain and clearance method used, mine clearance cost estimates range from 3-20DM per m2 (in US dollars: $1.76 - $11.76 per m2).(168)
Priority lists are based on what cantons and aid agencies want done. EMACs collect this information, develop priority lists and work with operators in the entities to undertake these actions. Priority lists must be approved by the concerned entity. Specific priority lists were not readily available to the Landmine Monitor researcher. There are no apparent obstacles to the mine clearance program and there appears to be a good level of cooperation among government agencies, UN groups and clearance organizations.
Information about landmine casualties is collected directly from mine-affected communities (ICRC, local Red Cross, and other organizations involved in mine-related action), hospitals and health centers, local institutions for war disabled, police and military. Information pertaining to mine incidents or victims is electronically stored on the ICRC database and the BHMAC database.
From 1 January 1992 through 31 December 1998, the ICRC registered 3,885 mine victims (those injured or killed by landmines). There has been a progressive decrease in the number of mine victims in the country with monthly averages of 56 victims from 1992-95 falling to a monthly average of 5.5 victims at the end of 1998. (This number could increase due to delays in reporting.)
Period Number of Victims Monthly Average
Jan. 1992 - Dec. 1995 2,699 56
Jan. 1996 - Dec. 1996 580 49
Jan. 1997 - Dec. 1997 274 23
Jan. 1998 - May 1998 96 16
June 1998 - Dec.1998 37 5.5
TOTAL 3,686(169) 44
Information about location of mine accident, type of injury, age/gender of victim, and military/civilian status are compiled from data collected through 31 May 1998.
Location of mine accidents Number of Victims
Bijeljina (RS) 633
Banja Luka (RS) 611
Una-Sana (Federation) 452
Tuzla (Federation) 302
Pale (RS) 295
Trebinje (RS) 275
Sarajevo (Federation) 253
Bosnian-Podrinje (Federation) 145
Neretvian (Federation) 86
Zupanja (Croatia) 1
Since the end of the war, the most mine-affected areas in terms of the number of mine and UXO victims are as follows:
Sarajevo 180 victims
Tuzla 165 victims
Banja Luka 138 victims
Zenica-Doboj 120 victims
Una-Sana 99 victims
Central Bosnia 82 victims
Bijeljina 71 victims
Pale 30 victims
Neretvian 26 victims
Bosnian-Podrinje 22 victims
Trebinje 16 victims
The age breakdown for victims:
Age Number of Victims
0-5 years 14
6-10 years 95
11-18 years 317
19-25 years 619
26-35 years 1,017
36-45 years 712
46-60 years 396
over 60 119
While more than 80 percent of the victims were military during the war, this proportion reversed at the end of the conflict with more than 90 percent of victims identified as civilians. Since the end of the war, women represent less than 10 percent of mine victims.
From January 1996 to April 1998, 30-40 percent of the injuries or deaths were due to improvised munitions and UXO. Since January 1996, almost half the victims (40 percent) have had to undergo amputation of one or more limbs, 40 percent suffered crippling injuries, such as being blinded, and 20 percent of the victims died as a result of their injury.
Surprisingly, the number of fatal injuries increased in 1997 and 1998. ICRC explains this may due to the rise in injuries by UXO and IED, and by the greater length of time needed to reach a hospital (during the war, field hospitals were set up behind the front line).
BHMAC has information on mine accidents involving demining personnel and a summary of general mine incidents in BiH. Mine Accidents involving demining organization personnel from January 1996 to January 1999 are provided below.
Type of Organization Killed Serious Injury Minor Injury
Civilian Organization 9 15 10
Former Warring Factions 7 12 10
Unknown 3 11 0
TOTAL 19 38 20
BHMAC has reports of 1,165 mine victims from January 1996 - January 1999.
A summary of information of mine incidents from the BHMAC is seen below.
LOCATION KILLED SERIOUS MINOR
FEDERATION 147 423 157
Central Bosnia 14 65 17
Neretva 2 14 19
Posavina 4 8 2
Sarajevo 24 68 31
Tomislavgrad 2 12 7
Tuzla-Podrinje 51 103 28
Una-Sana 15 38 24
Upper Drina (Gorazde) 3 20 4
Zenica-Doboj 32 95 25
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA 113 213 81
UNKNOWN 8 7 16
TOTAL 268 643 254
Other organizations having detailed information about mine victims are Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) and Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). LSN has 460 in-depth interviews with landmine survivors and a registry of 200 additional survivors in the LSN database.(170) JRS works directly with 157 victims of landmines and houses specific information about these cases within their organization.(171) Both of these nongovernmental organizations will be described in more detail in the survivor assistance section of this report.
There are an estimated 7,000 amputees in Bosnia and Herzegovina (4,500-5,000 in the Federation and 2,000-2,500 in Republika Srpska).(172) Amputation may be the result of a landmine injury or due to other causes.
As of 1997, the were 27 hospitals in the country capable of performing amputations (12 hospitals in the Federation and 15 in Republika Srpska).(173) There are a large number of health centers and general hospitals located throughout the country. The level of care and conditions within these facilities are extremely varied.
For rehabilitation and prosthetic facilities the Ministry of Health in each entity is primarily responsible. There are thirty eight poly-clinics located throughout the Federation that offer physical therapy. This is under the World Bank War Victims Rehabilitation project. Concrete actions of material provision, building rehabilitation and training were seen in early 1998. The individual responsible for project implementation is Goran Cerkez. Queens University (Canada) is providing technical assistance for the physical therapy component.(174)
Nearly all prosthetic centers in BiH are under the Ministry of Health; there is one private center, Merhamet, in Sarajevo. In the RS there are three main prosthetic center locations: Banja Luka, Trebinje and Srbinje. In the Federation, centers are located in Vitez, Sarajevo (Neretva), Tuzla, Zenica, Cazin, and Livno. One center in Mostar and a center to replace Neretva in Sarajevo are under construction under the World Bank project.(175)
Though there are a large number of governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in these areas, they are far too numerous to mention. A general directory of organizations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be found at International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Sarajevo. It is produced annually and is organized according to region and work sector. Landmine Survivors Network will be working on a specific Rehabilitation Directory for Bosnia and Herzegovina and should be available by mid-1999.(176)
The main international organizations working with landmine survivors are:
Austrian Red Cross (Banja Luka) is supporting over sixty victims of landmines with provision of prostheses. Prosthetic equipment and materials are donated to the main prosthetic center in Banja Luka and this center will, in turn, provide prostheses for the cases designated by Austrian Red Cross.(177)
Jesuit Refugee Service (Bihac, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Bjeljina, Zenica, Sarajevo, Pale, Gorazde, Trbinje and Mostar) has a comprehensive program for mine victims (generally under age eighteen when injured) throughout BiH. The program has four main components:
- medical: prosthetics and rehabilitation, medical kit;
- material: food parcels, house repair, clothes, scholarships;
- legal: housing rights, rights of civil victims of war and the disabled:
- psychosocial: summer and winter camps, occupational (youth clubs), and therapeutic (direct visits and psychological counseling jointly with HI).(178)
Handicap International (Bihac, Banja Luka and with JRS) supports widely varied activities in BiH. In Una Sana Canton, HI supports a local demining organization (APM) and will begin a teacher training for primary school teachers to ensure mine awareness information in well understood. In Banja Luka, HI provided an upgraded training for orthotics and is involved in and AIDS program. HI works jointly with JRS to provide psychological support to mine victims through use of "expert teams" (French and local psychologists).(179)
ICRC (all country) though not regularly involved in direct victim assistance activities, ICRC provides support through information sharing with other organizations, logistical support as able and mine awareness education.(180)
Landmine Survivors Network (Banja Luka, Bihac, Bugojne, Mostar, Trebinje, Doboj East and Tuzla Podringe) has engaged seven landmine survivors as outreach workers to conduct all LSN's activities. Services offered by LSN are referral, peer support and hospital visitation, direct support for prosthetics, education, house repair, food parcels and income generation activities.(181)
National disability laws do exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina but the content and application vary between cantons and between the Federation and the RS.(182)
Mine Ban Policy
Bulgaria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 4 September 1998. At the treaty signing ceremony, Bulgaria's Ambassador to Canada noted that Bulgaria's major concerns with the Ottawa Process "were accommodated during the final negotiations in Oslo."(183) He also stated that Bulgaria would need financial assistance in order to carry out its obligations under the treaty.(184) A former producer and exporter of landmines, Bulgaria has established a national coordinating body to oversee implementation of the treaty, including destruction of existing stocks and demining efforts within the country.(185)
An official from Bulgaria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the Regional Conference on Landmines in Budapest, Hungary on 26-28 March 1998, as did Bulgarian nongovernmental representatives. The Foreign Ministry official urged all countries in the region to sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, which he called "a new beginning of the process to end the suffering of millions."(186)
Bulgaria attended the treaty preparatory meetings and the Oslo negotiations, but only as an observer. It did not endorse the final declaration of the Brussels Conference in June 1997. However, Bulgaria voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Bulgaria is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and ratified amended Protocol II on 3 December 1998. Bulgaria is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and favors using it as a negotiating forum on landmines.(187) In February 1999, Bulgaria's Ambassador to the United Nations delivered a statement to the Conference on Disarmament calling for negotiation of a ban on antipersonnel landmine transfers through the CD. In his statement, delivered on behalf of Bulgaria and 21 other countries, the Ambassador asserted that "the CD has a role to play in strengthening the existing international regime against antipersonnel landmines." An APL transfer ban, he said, would bring CD member countries that have declined to sign the Mine Ban Treaty "at least some of the way towards the goal of a total APL ban, and in due course encourage increased participation in the existing international instruments."(188)
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Bulgaria has produced five types of antipersonnel landmines: the MON-100, the PM-79, the POMD-1, the POMZ-2, and the PSM-1.(189) Bulgaria has also been a landmine exporter; its mines are reported to have been deployed by combatants in Cambodia among other places.(190) On 6 May 1996, Bulgaria declared a three year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines, and in December 1997 this ban was extended indefinitely. Speaking at the Budapest Regional Conference, a government official stated that as of May 1996, landmine production in Bulgaria had "practically stopped." He also stated that the General Staff of the Armed Forces had already developed a timetable for destruction of existing stockpiles of AP mines within four years of entry-into-force, but that Bulgaria required international assistance in its efforts to eliminate its landmine stockpiles.(191) It does not appear that stockpile destruction has begun. There is no information on the size of Bulgaria's stockpile.
Landmine Problem and Mine Action
During the Cold War, the Bulgarian government planted several thousand mines near its southern border with Greece, due to unfriendly relations with Greece and as part of its campaign to prevent members of Bulgaria's Turkish minority from crossing into Greece. In 1992, Bulgaria cleared parts of these minefields, but halted due to financial constraints. Demining resumed in 1997, but as of March 1998, only 10% of the existing minefields had been cleared.(192) A child was killed by a landmine in this region in 1997. The government announced in October 1998 that it would clear the remaining mines from the area.(193) Media reports have also suggested that there are uncleared mines along the border with Romania.(194) Speaking at the Budapest Conference, a government official stated that ten percent of the remaining mines in Bulgaria were cleared in 1997, and requested international assistance in completing this demining effort.(195)
With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) also begin to disintegrate. Different parts of the SFRY began to declare independence and throughout the region there have been varying degrees of conflict in different parts of the SFRY since 1991. The former SFRY is now divided into five different countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Republic of Macedonia.
Landmines were used in large quantities during the war in Croatia (1991-1995).(196) Given that the SFRY was a major producer of landmines (see report on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) landmines were readily available for use and all fighting forces used them. Some sources believe that there are as many as 1.2 million mines and UXOs in eastern and western Slavonia, in Baranja, Posavina, Banovina, Lika and Dalmacija.(197) The U.S. Department of State estimates 400,000 landmines and 3,000 tons of UXOs, contaminating nearly one-quarter of the national territory.(198)
Mine Ban Policy
The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ivo Sanader, signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 4 December 1997. In his remarks to the conference, he noted Croatia's early involvement in the ban movement, "It was in May 1996 that a group of countries declared their readiness and interest to have all landmines banned. I am proud to say that Croatia readily joined the 'Ottawa Process' of which Canada was the initiator .Signing the Convention, we should bear in mind that we have not completed our journey yet .Entering into force of the Convention should be our first step and I would herewith like to call upon all the signatory states to ratify it as soon as possible."(199) Croatia ratified the Treaty on 24 April 1998 and deposited its instruments of ratification at the United Nations on 20 May 1998.
In addition to participating in all of the Ottawa Process meetings and signing and rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty, Croatia has been involved in promoting the treaty in the region. A government delegation participated in the "Regional Conference on Landmines" hosted by the Hungarian government, ICBL and Hungarian Campaign to Ban Landmines for countries in the Baltic and Balkan regions from 26-28 March 1998. At that conference, the Croatian delegation offered to host another regional follow up meeting in 1999, which, as of this writing, is scheduled for June. Croatia acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on 2 December 1993. It has not yet ratified amended Protocol II.
Croatia has expressed support for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. In his address to the signing conference of the Ottawa Convention, Deputy Foreign Minister Sanader noted the importance of the process of the universalization of the Convention. He stated, "The initiatives to continue the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this issue are more than welcome, for it is the opportunity to bring to the table those countries which at this stage cannot join the 'Ottawa Process' and sign the Convention. I am confident that the spirit of that work would be complementary to the solutions achieved in the 'Ottawa Process' and the Convention."(200)
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
According to military and government sources, Croatia is not producing any type of mines at the present. On 4 December 1997, Deputy Foreign Minister Sanader stated that his country was "neither a producer nor an importer or exporter of landmines."(201)
In the past, especially during the war, some Croatian companies manufactured mines. In the very beginning of the war, Croatian forces did not have stocks of mines until taking over JNA barracks and stockpiles. During the war, Croatia developed its own capacity for mine production. Two producing companies have been identified, both government-owned -- "Vlado Bagat" in Zadar and "Rapid" in Virovitica - but information on types and quantities of mines produced is not available.(202)
During the conflict, mines were not imported. Croatian fighting forces acquired stocks during the conflict by capture and new production. There are some indications on Croatian mines exported to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) during confrontations between HVO (Croatian forces in BiH) and Army of BiH and also to Kosovo (via Split - Ancona; recently), but they are not confirmed by Croatian official sources.
All parties to the conflict in Croatia used landmines and there is some evidence of mine use since the end of the war. During 1998 there were four mine incidents in the county of Lika apparently caused by new mine laying. On 8 February 1999 the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (CHC)(203) gave a statement about recent incidents in Lika and confirmed information previously published in Novi List that 31 people were injured (10 fatally) from "surprise mines" that were placed in yards, gardens, houses and the like. Damir Gorseta, director of CROMAC, stated that it is impossible for a non-expert to make such explosive devices.(204)
Some APMs used by JNA and later by HV(205)
Name of the mine, year of development (D), year of production (P), manufacturer, description
D: till 1955. P: till 1960."Slavko Rodic", Bugojno.
Pressure activated, antimagnetic, blast mine
D: 1962. P: till 1970."Slavko Rodic", Bugojno
Pressure activated, antimagnetic, blast
D: 1967-1970. P: till 1976."Slavko Rodic", Bugojno
Pressure activated, antimagnetic, blast
D: 1952. P: till 1962."Tito", Vogosce, "Slavko Rodic", Bugojno
Trip wire activated, fragmentation
Pressure/trip wire activated, fragmentation
D: 1959-1962. P: unknown "Krusik", Valjevo
Pressure/trip wire activated, bouncing, fragmentation
Pressure/trip wire activated, bouncing, fragmentation
D/P: unknown"Slavko Rodic", Bugojno
Pressure/trip activated, bouncing, fragmentation
D: 1975-1980. P: unknown"Slavko Rodic", Bugojno
The Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) and military sources estimate the number of mines in the ground at between 700,000 - 1,000,000.(206) As noted above, the U.S. State Department puts the figure much lower, at 400,000 mines.(207) About 75% of mines are APMs.
The majority of mines are found along former confrontation lines during the war. Large concentrations of mines were left around big cities in conflict zones: Dubrovnik, Sibenik, Zadar, Knin, Karlovac, Osijek, Vukovar.(208) These cities and some other smaller inhabited areas are also contaminated with UXOs. The right riverbanks of Kupa and Korana Rivers, which are among the most mined areas in Croatia, are also littered with fragments, pieces of metal and unexploded ammunition. The concentration is so dense that is virtually impossible to use magnetic detectors and the mine detecting can be carried out only with probes.(209) Mined areas are also found deep in various provinces. Besides minefields, there are many solitaire mines and booby traps placed in order to terrorize the local population or to prevent the use of houses, farmsteads and agricultural land. Some 6,000 square kilometers of national territory are affected by landmines.(210)
A total of about 10.5% of Croatian national territory - that is 6,000 square kilometers - is considered potentially dangerous because of mines. The U.S. State Department reports that more than one-half of the affected area is in Slavonia; other heavily mined areas are in the former Serb-controlled Krajina as well as along the coast, north of Split.(211) In general, 14 types of mines have been found in 5,780 known mined areas, ranging over one-quarter of the country: houses and inhabited areas - 9.2%, Industrial areas - 5%, infrastructure (roads, railroads, airports, bridges) - 28%, agricultural areas - 27,8%, and meadows and forests - 30%.
The data from Croatian and UNPROFOR sources conflict due to different divisions of Croatian territory. UNPROFOR data corresponds to former UN-Protected Areas (UNPA) under its jurisdiction and that of the Croatian government to political divisions of the national territory into counties.
Early UNPROFOR data from the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 gave high figures for the number of deployed landmines. In the former South Sector (Dalmatinska Zagora, Lika up to Korenica) one million mines were said to have been placed. The same figure was given for the former North Sector (Lika from Plitvice, Kordun, Banovina and Posavina up to mouth of the river Una). There were no estimates for the former West Sector, that included parts of western Slavonia, that were occupied by Serbian rebels until May 1995, nor for the former East Sector (eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem).(212). In early 1996, when UNTAES took control of the former East Sector and as demobilization had begun (June 1996), it would seem that new data should have been compiled although it was not made public.(213) There was some speculation of a "few hundred thousand" mines.
Some of the later estimates by the United Nations have been drastically reduced -- for example for the former South Sector, 150,000 mines as compared to the earlier figure of one million. The estimates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) for each individual county that includes parts of South Sector, gave even smaller figures. According to MUP, for example, in the county of Sibenik 343 mine fields were laid by paramilitary forces and 239 mine fields by the Croatian Army (HV) with an approximate total of 15,000 mines.
Mine Action Funding
Mine clearance did not really begin in earnest until the government passed a 1996 law on demining. The government under MUP established a "Commission for Issues of Mine Clearance" which was to coordinate mine issues and clearance was to be carried out by a government-owned company, "MUNGOS," which was formed from the Civilian Defense Force and was envisioned to serve as the national demining agency. All international assistance had to be channeled through that agency. Then, and for the most part until now, the Croatian government has financed the majority of mine clearance operations.
In the same year, the United Nations established a Mine Action Center (MAC) to help the government to establish its own national mine action center to train national deminers and run a national demining program. In the summer of 1997, an agreement was reached whereby MAC would begin to merge with government operations. In February of 1998, a new demining law was passed in Croatia and the Croatian Mine Action Center formed. In June of 1998, the UNMAC completed merger with CROMAS; the UN remains in advisory capacity.(214)
In 1997, $16,150,000 was allocated in the federal budget for mine clearance.(215) By early October, all field operations had to stop due to total lack of finances - the entire allocation had already been spent. At the end of October the government ensured continuance of the mine clearance with an additional $10 million and promised to give more support the next year. In 1999 an increase of 4% in the federal budget for mine clearance operations is anticipated.
In his statement to the General Assembly in November of 1998, Croatian Ambassador Ivan Simonovic noted that "little international funding has been provided to assist Croatia in demining." In that light, his government does "highly appreciate donations by the Governments of Switzerland, Germany, Italy Belgium and the UK, as well as by the European Commission and the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Demining." The Ambassador went on to "applaud" a decision by the European Council to grant 435,000 ECU for clearance in 1998 as well as the Western European Union's intention to send experts to coordinate, supervise and train new Croatian demining teams.(216) According to the U.S. State Department, the total provided by bilateral donations and the UN Trust Fund between 1994 and 1998 was over $4 million.(217)
In early December 1998, an international donors' conference was held in Zagreb to raise funds for the overall reconstruction of the country. Reportedly, tensions between Croatia and Western governments over limited action on domestic non-discriminatory legislation resulted in far fewer pledges than hoped for. The majority of $9.1 million pledged by a handful of European countries and Japan was earmarked for mine clearance.(218)
As noted above, mine clearance began with the passage by the Croatian Parliament of the Mine Clearance Law in March 1996. The law described mine clearance as a "question of national security and ecological protection as well as protection of health for all citizens."(219) The law called for the organization of mine clearance to be based on a "Mine Clearance Plan" developed by the government, which is obligated to provide an annual report on the implementation of the Plan to the Parliament. All clearance operations were under the control of MUP's Commission for Issues of Mine Clearance and carried out by the Croatian Army, police or the government-owned mine-clearance agency, MUNGOS.
The Plan is to include data such as mined areas, available as well as needed personnel, devices and equipment, estimation of costs. and a list of areas needed to be cleared with fixed deadlines.(220) National priorities for mine clearance include houses and farmsteads in the process of reconstruction according to the plan of Ministry of R&D; schools and other objects that are important for the society; infrastructure (long distance power line, roads, railways, bridges, plumbing, telecommunications etc.); economic objects; fields, plowed fields, gardens and orchards; and forests, pastures, maquis, etc.(221) Finances for mine clearance are ensured by the State Budget and other sources.(222) Other sources are defined as "international financial investments in humanitarian mine clearance."(223)
In February 1998, the national law was changed to allow for more international participation in mine clearance operations. Several private agencies - along with MUNGOS -- are currently undertaking mine clearance in Croatia; the share of the latter has been quite small. Some foreign agencies are also engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction projects.
Between 1995-1998, some 50,000 mines were removed. The Army cleared 40,800 mines (81,6%) and the other approximately 10,000 mines were cleared by MUNGOS and other agencies. According to CROMAC, areas cleared include agricultural areas (5%); roads, not including surrounding areas (50%); infrastructure such as railroads, airports and bridges (50%); and inhabited areas (50%).(224):
Mine clearance by the Croatian Army, 1995-1997
1995: 13,326,200 square meters were cleared, removing 7,383 APMs, 6,444 ATMs and 3 584 UXO;
1996: 10,224,160 square meters were cleared, removing 5,083 APMs, 3,722 ATMs and 1 734 UXO;
1997: 10,959,742 square meters were cleared, removing 5,357 APMs, 2,982 ATMs and 680 UXOs.
Total: 34,510,102 square meters were cleared, removing 17,823 APMs, 13,398 ATMs and 5,998 UXOs.(225)
In 1997 the area of Podunavlje and eastern Slavonija were totally cleared of mines, that includes settlements: Antunovac, Bilje, Bogdanovici, Ernestinovo, Kopcevo, Apsevci, Donje Novo Selo, Lipovac, Podgradje, Kusonje and Brusnik. This was important for the Peaceful Reintegration program. In 1998, 15.6 million square meters were cleared (a breakdown by county is available).(226)
The quality control for cleared area has not been completed, which had been the responsibility of MUP and carried out by police and the Croatian Army. With the amended law of 1998, responsibility for quality assurance shifted to CROMAC. Two deminers were employed by CROMAC for that end and six more were planned to be hired and trained by the UN Quality Assurance Officer. Of 39 square kilometers cleared, only one square kilometer had been quality assured.(227) About 963,525 square meters of the ground were explored by HV during 1998, but no mines were found. Because of a tragic incident on 18 May 1998 when one military person was killed and three were seriously injured HV called off all the mine clearance activities. The HV is waiting for the improvement of salaries and safety measures for its personnel that are taking care of such a dangerous work.
From the early 1990s, UNICEF has been involved in mine awareness efforts in Croatia. UNICEF supported the Ministry of Education in the distribution of mine awareness kits for 800 primary schools. The program was limited by the lack of training for the teachers in best use of the materials. It continues its activities through mine awareness campaigns with television and radio spots, posters, leaflets and actions in mine-affected communities.(228)
In 1996, the ICRC began mine awareness programs through the Croatian Red Cross. It organized mine awareness training for future trainers from the local Red Cross. The ICRC also organized 4 seminars; 2 in Biograd, and one in Topusko and in Vukovar. It has trained 110 mine awareness instructors, of whom about 75 are still working.
Number of participants in Mine Awareness Education, 1 January 1996 - 31 December 1998
Source: Nela Sefic, ICRC, INFO-CODI Assistant
Currently, ICRC mine action programs are interactive and multimedia and are adjusted according to particular area and its own mine problems. They include theater performances, art exhibitions, teaching toys for children, video presentations, and feedback from the audience -- the most important element of the programs.(229)
The UN Mine Action Center in Croatia offered to provide MA training to the displaced population of Croatia follow a request by the Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR) in late 1996. It was decided to first conduct a pilot program for two months to see how the "direct training" method. Research for planning purposes was conducted at the ODPR Regional Offices and four instructors, who were all members of the Association of War Invalids (HVIDRA) and actually survivors themselves, were trained by UNMAC with the assistance of ICRC and the Croatian Red Cross from January to March 1997. The results of the pilot program were then analyzed and UNMAC recommended that the best method for disseminating the MA message to the displaced population would be through a combination of media and direct training methods. A proposal for mine awareness education for displaced persons and returnees in Croatia has prepared at an estimated cost of US$550,000.
One NGO, Strata Research, has worked on a mine awareness project combined with specific civic education program focusing on post-war reconciliation. Workshops consisted of two parts: a classical mine awareness training was followed by a broader discussion on reconciliation, on problems concerning various aspects of identity building (ethnic, professional, gender), and on the role of the NGOs in coping with the mine problem in the region.. Between 16 April and 14 June 1998, 16 workshops were held. Additionally, there were 4 radio shows featuring workshop coordinators, instructors and participants.
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
Between 1990-1995, 400 civilians were killed and 1,400 were injured in landmine incidents. According to incomplete data from 1995 to 1997, 560 people were injured or killed in 359 incidents. During 1998, 32 persons were killed, 16 seriously injured, 29 slightly injured.(230) Data on mine victims remains unreliable; in official statement by CROMAC it was said that there were 15 incidents with 12 killed from January to June 1998; but the STRATA RESEARCH analytical service notified 15 mine incidents with 19 killed in the same period. Elderly persons, agricultural population and workers in public companies (with objects placed on the mine -affected areas) seem to be the most exposed ones.
According to information given by ICRC there are no prosthesis workshops in Croatia. There are no national disability laws in Croatia. Mine victims do not receive any special treatment compared to other disabled. They get first aid and medical assistance in general according to their health insurance.
Mine Ban Policy
Denmark signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 June 1998, the fifteenth country to do so. Denmark has not yet passed domestic legislation implementing the treaty.
While there was no national legislation on a mine ban prior to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty,(231) Denmark was an early supporter of a ban. On 5 September 1995, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Niels Helveg Peterson announced Denmark's support for a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines (APMs). He instructed the Danish delegation to the CCW review conference in Vienna to work for a ban.(232)
On 23 May 1996 Denmark decided to renounce the use of AP mines. The Danish Ministry of Defense announced that "Denmark will unilaterally refrain from using AP mines in the Danish defense."(233) In noting that the result of the CCW review conference had produced "no major break-through towards a ban" and that the next review conference would not take place until 2001, the Danish government "deemed it necessary to take concrete action in order to send a clear and non-ambiguous political signal."(234)
Denmark participated in all the meetings of the Ottawa Process and endorsed the key UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Denmark signed the CCW and Protocol II on 7 July 1982. The government ratified revised Protocol II on 30 June 1998.
Production and Transfer
Denmark is not currently producing AP mines or mine components to APMs.(235) The government has stated that Denmark has not produced any antipersonnel mines since the 1950s.(236)
Others have alleged that production continued into the 1980s.(237) Companies involved in mine production in the past apparently include the government company, Ammunitionsarsenalet, and private companies ALUTOP Aps, DEMEX Consulting Engineers A/S, HAI Aluksering Horsens A/S - HAI Aluksering Korsør A/S, Korona Plast Aps, Lindys Maskinfabrik A/S and Nea-Lindberg A/S.(238) No information is available from the Ministry of Defense on types and quantities of the mines produced in Denmark.
Denmark has never been an exporter of the weapon.(239) Past production of mines was for the use of the Danish Army only.(240)
The Ministry of Defense indicates that Denmark has not imported APMs since 1990, but does not give any information on the type, quantity, value and date of imports.(241) According to correspondence from the Foreign Ministry, Denmark imported M14 mines (apparently from the US) and DM 31 mines (apparently from Germany) in the 1950s and 1960s, and M18A1 mines (apparently from the US) in the 1980s.(242) U.S. government sources indicate that the U.S. exported 1,576 AP mines to Denmark between 1983 and 1992.(243)
On the issue of the legality of transit of foreign mines through Danish territory, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the following statement: "In accordance with Article 1 of the Ottawa Convention, Denmark cannot transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, APMs or allow anyone to do so on Danish territory. According to Article 3, physical movement (transfer) of APMs are permitted if the purpose is the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, mine destruction techniques or if the purpose is destruction of APMs."(244)
Denmark started the destruction of its APM stockpiles in December 1997 after the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty.(245) The Ministry of Defense informs that the destruction is now almost completed and that all stocks, excluding the APMs retained for training purposes, will be destroyed by the end of 1999. The stockpile consisted of about 250,000 mines: 98,000 M47; 76,000 M56 (MLE 51-APID 51); 62,000 M58 (NM M14); 13,000 M66 (DM31), 1,000 M80 (M18A1 Claymore).(246) The Claymores will not be destroyed.
The APMs retained for training purposes are 4,962 NM M14s.(247) The Danish Defense Command is responsible for retaining these mines. The Claymore mines, now called "sector charges," have been rebuilt to ensure that they can be command detonated only.(248)
There are no APMs stockpiled by any other country in Denmark.(249)
Mine Action Funding
Denmark has contributed a sizable amount of money to humanitarian mine action programs throughout the years.
Mine Action Contributions, 1992-1998, in DKK
(Including mine clearance, surveying, training, awareness, survivor assistance, conference contributions.)
In addition to these funds, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spent a total of DKK 90,008,000 (1992-1998) on bilateral contributions to mine clearance and mine related activities. The money allocated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mainly channeled through various UN agencies, the ICRC and non-governmental organizations such as DanChurchAid, Danish Refugee Council (Danish Demining Group) and Norwegian People's Aid.(251)
Denmark reported to the UN that it considers itself a landmine-affected country on 16 June 1995. The UN country report for Denmark states that " landmines and ammunitions are still being cleared [in Denmark] fifty years after the end of WWII."(252) The peninsula of Skallingen is the most heavily affected area of Denmark and is closed to the public. The German occupying forces mined the area during WWII. It is estimated that less than 10,000 mines are still in the ground (including antitank mines).(253) According to the information on Denmark at the United Nations, the mines found in Denmark are Schultzmine, Holzmine 42, Pansermine, Schultzmine 42, Stockmine, Teller 35 and Teller 42.(254)
When asked about the mined area, an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that this area is of no interest to the public and that nobody currently seems to show an interest in using this land. He also doubted that the area would be of much use if cleared.(255)
The mine-infested area of Denmark is marked to ensure effective exclusion of civilians. It is currently being discussed whether the marking should be renewed, but no action has yet been taken. The marking of the mined area is the responsibility of the local police, but the mined area is almost fully owned by the Ministry of Transportation.(256) Mine awareness education for Danish citizens is currently not perceived as necessary.(257)
All Danish military engineer units receive training in the laying and lifting of mines. There are three demining units in Denmark during peacetime, and thirteen in time of war.(258) According to UN data on Denmark, the total number of square meters (sqm) cleared of mines since the WWII is 14,482,000. However, it is not clear when this report was written, so the number might be outdated. Of the area mentioned in the UN report, 6,086,000 sqm was cleared in Skallingen (1946-49), 140,000 sqm in Henne Strand (1981) and 7,256,000 sqm in Kalvebod (1981-1994). Explosive ordnance experts have cleared these areas.(259)
After the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, Denmark is obliged to clear all its mine-infested areas. Officials are currently in the process of discussing how this should be done, but no specific plan of action has been made public yet. The cost of clearing all the mine-infested areas in Denmark is estimated to be DKK 300 million.(260)
Specific numbers on landmine casualties in Denmark have not been found. All modern general health and surgical facilities are available in Denmark.
Mine Ban Policy
While France was not one of the first countries to fully embrace a ban and the Ottawa Process, it was an early leader in taking steps to deal with the global landmine crisis, and French nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were the catalyst to French action and ultimately for the government's shift to a pro-ban policy.
One of the first measures taken by France at the request of NGOs, as part of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, was the announcement in February 1993 by President François Mitterrand, during a state visit to Cambodia, of a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines.(261) Not long after, France officially requested of the Secretary General of the United Nations that a review conference be held to amend the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol II dealing with landmines. The review process, which spanned two and a half years, was the platform on which momentum was built that ultimately lead to the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty.
During the review conference in Vienna in September of 1995, France announced that it would ban the production and trade but not use of APMs. The French Campaign immediately began to lobby for public debate of the policy, that it be reinforced as law and for the establishment of a special commission to monitor the destruction of stocks.(262)
While France attended the October 1996 ban strategy meeting in Ottawa as a full participant, it had not taken part in meetings organized by the ICBL during the final sessions of the review conference to help forge a like-minded block of pro-ban countries. In Ottawa, it announced new steps toward a ban that it would outlaw the use of APMs, unless French soldiers are in danger. It also argued that ban negotiations should take place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). To the confusion and dismay of government representatives, these positions were not enthusiastically embraced by the ICBL, which was participating in the Ottawa meetings and voiced its disagreement with French policies.
France did not fully embrace the Ottawa Process until the Brussels Conference in June of 1997. It continued to maintain the view that only the Conference on Disarmament (CD) could negotiate a total ban on antipersonnel mines, but once France came on board the Ottawa Process, it became a strong advocate of the Process and a member of the expanded core group. When French Secretary of State for Overseas Cooperation, Mr. Charles Josselin signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, in Ottawa, he declared, "You can count on our unflagging determination, both to enforce the Treaty and to ensure its universal acceptance."
The Mine Ban Treaty was ratified unanimously by the French Parliament on 25 June 1998.(263) At the time of the vote, the Minister of Defense declared: "This law authorizing ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty will make France the first permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to adhere to these standards. It indicates our determined willingness to arrive at a total and universal ban on antipersonnel mines. This same determination to see a total mine ban recently led France to declare before the Atlantic Alliance that it would unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty. France will prohibit the planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military personnel. Furthermore, France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in any military operation calling for the use of antipersonnel mines."(264)
At the same time it voted to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, the French Parliament, after a second reading, unanimously passed implementing legislation with the intent of eliminating antipersonnel mines, in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty. This Law was published in the Official Journal on 8 July 1998.(265) France and Germany simultaneously deposited their respective documents of ratification with the United Nations on 23 July 1998.
The law authorizes the French Government to retain existing antipersonnel mine stockpiles until their destruction, at the latest by 31 December 2000; transfer antipersonnel mines with the intent to destroy them; retain or transfer a certain number of antipersonnel mines for the development of mine detection, demining, or destruction techniques, and for training in these techniques, the number of these retained mines not to exceed 5,000 as of 31 December 2000.(266) The law provides for criminal sanctions as required under Article 9 of the Treaty. Violations of the key prohibitions of the treaty will be punishable by ten years of imprisonment and by a fine of 1,000,000 francs. The French Law went into force on 1 March 1999, and applies equally in French overseas territories and in the collective territory of Mayotte.
A National Committee For the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines shall be created, to be composed of Government representatives, two Deputies and two Senators, representatives from humanitarian organizations, and representatives from corporate management and organized labor.(267) The National Committee shall ensure monitoring and enforcement of the present Law, and of international actions by France in the field of victim assistance and humanitarian mine clearance.(268)
The establishment of a National Committee undoubtedly represents one of the main innovations of the French law. Indeed, such a body is without precedent, as this is the first time the French Government has ever officially allowed NGOs to participate in the monitoring of its political processes. The very existence of the Committee demonstrates that the partnerships between NGOs and governments developed in many other countries throughout the anti-landmine campaign are gradually being created here in France.
From 1992 to 1998, loud calls to successive French governments from both NGOs and the French public brought about cooperation and exchange of information with the ministries involved in the landmine issue, a development which served to advance the cause of a total landmine ban and the signing of the Ottawa Treaty. The French Ban Campaign has undoubtedly helped to improve relations between NGOs and those government ministries involved in issues previously restricted to the public sector, e.g. matters of disarmament.
Actions by French deputies and senators were also of critical importance in the passage of the Law. Legislators were largely responsible for relaying NGO requests for a monitoring committee during the drafting of the bill. French parliamentarians will sit on the new Committee, which is not the case for the commission in charge of monitoring French enforcement of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, whose only members are ministerial representatives.(269)
The creation of a National Committee for the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines has brought new hope for greater transparency in French disarmament policy. Nevertheless, many questions remain about the Committee's method of functioning and the means it will have at its disposal. As of this date, the decrees authorizing the Committee to begin work have still not been published in the Official Journal. Despite the fact that the Law has already gone into effect, the Committee has never met.
Although French NGOs have widely applauded the establishment of the National Committee, these same organizations are now speaking out on the principles that must be put into place by France to ensure complete transparency in the monitoring and verification of the commitments it has undertaken.
One study commissioned by Handicap International, the lead NGO in the French Campaign and a co-founder of the ICBL, put forward recommendations as early as September 1998 for maximum transparency in monitoring and verification of compliance with the French law. While outlining French obligations under the provisions of the Treaty and/or law, and describing the state of affairs in France, the study makes a series of recommendations which can be summed up as follows :
1 - At the beginning of its work, the National Committee must have available every means allowing it to make a complete inventory of antipersonnel mines manufactured by French firms : the different types and quantities produced. This inventory will serve as a baseline to evaluate progress in eliminating mines, which constitutes the mandate of the Committee.
2 - The National Committee must possess every means to enable the drawing up of a complete report on antipersonnel mine stockpiles available to armies, both on the mainland and in overseas territories, as well as inventories of authorized transfers of French-made antipersonnel mines.
3 - The destruction of France's antipersonnel mine stockpiles should be the subject of a precise inventory and timetable. The method of destruction should be spelled out and elimination verified by the National Committee.
4 - The National Committee should be able to establish a report on the industrial conversion of companies and facilities which have served to produce antipersonnel mines.
5 - The National Committee should pay special attention to the transfer of non-specific antipersonnel mine components. A specific Registry for these transfers should be set up jointly between the National Committee and the Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Materiel Exports (CIEEMG).
6 - In order to facilitate mine clearance operations, French authorities should be able to confirm or deny allegations of the presence of French mines in foreign countries.
7 - The National Committee must give particular attention to booby-trapping systems adapted for antitank mines. Reports should be carried out by independent experts in order to ensure that there is no contravention of the antipersonnel mine ban.
8 - The National Committee should become an intermediary for satisfying the needs and preoccupations of organizations in charge of humanitarian demining, particularly concerning the technologies to be developed.
9 - The National Committee should be able to check and verify that replacement systems for antipersonnel mines do not circumvent the French Law or the Ottawa Convention.
10 - The monitoring and verification which form part of the National Committee's mandate do not imply a special role for the Committee in the process of choice or approval for weapons systems designed to replace antipersonnel mines.(270)
Among many other issues to be studied closely by NGOs is the case of anti-vehicle mines or other weapons systems which do not conform to the definition used for the Mine Ban Treaty or subsequent French Law, but which can have the same deadly effects as antipersonnel mines.(271) This was raised by some legislators during the debate leading to the passage of the French law. Said one, "If this is indeed our objective, then let's go all the way. Firstly, let's adopt a wider definition, since the one used in Ottawa was only a compromise, let's widen the antipersonnel mine definition to include all comparable devices to antitank mine booby-traps that use anti-handling devices, inasmuch as the treaty negotiators in Oslo recognized that if these mines can be triggered by an involuntary act, they may be considered as antipersonnel mines."(272)
CCW and CD
France ratified original Protocol II of the CCW on 4 March 1988; it ratified the May 1996 revised Protocol II on 8 July 1998. Decrees concerning the application of this most recent Protocol were published in the Official Journal of 5 March 1999.
On 25 February 1999, the Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly reaffirmed that France supports establishing an antipersonnel mine transfer ban in the CD. "In order to be truly effective, the ban decreed in Ottawa must be made universal. The fact that some major players, i.e., the United States, Russia, China, and India, have adopted a wait-and-see attitude is cause for concern. We feel that the opening of further negotiations at the Disarmament Conference, to deal first with the issue of mine transfers, would mark a definite step in the right direction and would help dry up supply markets for antipersonnel mines."(273)
Until the official announcement of a moratorium on the manufacture of antipersonnel mines on 26 September 1995 by Xavier Emmanuelli, Secretary of State for Humanitarian and Emergency Actions during the opening session of the First Review Conference for Protocol II of the 1980 CCW, France manufactured antipersonnel mines. The production ban has henceforth been rendered official through the law of 8 July, which prohibits all production of antipersonnel mines in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty. It has thus far been impossible to obtain information from the companies involved on the actual cessation of APM production or on programs for decommissioning of assembly lines, or to verify the real situation on the ground.
In a study published in February 1997(274) on behalf of Handicap International, the Observatoire Des Transferts d'Armements made a thorough analysis of French landmine production and related systems. Included in the study is a list of mine types and French manufacturers, but also a wider description of materials displaying antipersonnel features, along with a number of companies listed because of their willingness to introduce certain products designed to circumvent a possible landmine ban, notably in the form of munitions or machines said to be for the protection of equipment or sites.
Directional antipersonnel mine (MI AP EFDR F1)
Manufacturer: SAE ALSETEX
Scatters 500 shrapnel pieces at 60 degree angle and produces fatal wounds up to 30 or 40 meters.
Fixed antipersonnel mines ( MAPDV Mle 59, MAPDV Mle 61 et MAPDV Mle 63)
Manufacturer: SAE ALSETEX
Type of mine produced in series. Pressure or traction detonated (5kg) and detectable-at-will through addition of metallic ring. MAPDV 59 has been found in Mozambique and Angola.
Undetectable antipersonnel mine(MI AP ID 51)
Developed during Algerian War and designed to avoid demining by enemy forces. Appears not to be in service in French Army.
Bounding metallic antipersonnel mine (MI AP MT BON 51/55)
Manufacturer: SAE ALSETEX
Explodes one meter above the ground, projecting horizontal circle of shrapnel which is fatal up to 10 meters and still dangerous as far as 100 meters. Appears not to be in service in French Army.
Antipersonnel mine (NR 409/PRB 409)
Manufacturer: PRB (Giat Industries)
Difficult-to-detect antipersonnel mine due to low metal content. Mine has not been produced since PRB bankruptcy in 1990.(275)
Antipersonnel mine (NR-413)
Manufacturer: PRB (Giat Industries)
Detectable antipersonnel fragmentation mine, pressure detonated by 2 to 5 kg. Manufactured until 1990 in Belgium.(276)
Antipersonnel mine (PRB M966)
Manufacturer: PRB (Giat Industries)
Antipersonnel fragmentation mine, copy of American M2 mine. Also produced in Portugal. Detonated by 4.5 to 9 kg. of pressure. Manufactured in Belgium up to 1990.(277)
Munitions with AP Effects
Within the range of French-manufactured mines and comparable devices can be found products requiring especially close monitoring, i.e. so-called counter-clearance mines, certain antitank mine ignitions, and some booby-trap systems for these mines.
Counter Clearance Mines
Made by GIAT INDUSTRIES, mines of this type are used, notably in the Minotaur system, to prevent manual demining operations and are comparable to "booby-traps." This counter-clearance mine is presented as such in the 1994 GICAT catalog: "Double-sided counter clearance mine, homogenous with antitank mine, has 4 trip wire booby-trap deployment systems on each side, functions on ground by breakage or disturbance of booby-trap trip wires, radius of detection and efficacy (6m)."(278)
The 1992 GICAT catalog presents the Minotaur mine dispenser system, which allows the instant creation of large antitank, antipersonnel, or mixed minefields.(279) Two years later in 1994, and probably because of François Mitterrand's export moratorium declaration, Giat Industires modified the description of its Minotaur, as a system which could then instantly create large antitank, counter-clearance, or mixed minefields.(280) Obviously, the expression antipersonnel mine had been replaced by the counter-clearance mine, which has all the characteristics of an antipersonnel mine.
In the 1996 catalog, the Minotaur is described as dispenses only antitank mines.
In the opinion of some demining experts, these counter-clearance devices enable antitank mines to function like antipersonnel mines. The 1998 edition of the French Terrestrial Defense Matériel catalog makes no reference to the counter-clearance mine. However, the Minotaur System and associated antitank mines are still presented therein. The Minotaur and its antitank mines were on display at the 1998 EuroSatory Armaments Exhibition.
Antitank Mines and Booby-Traps(281)
Numerous French antitank mine models are presented as able to be booby-trapped. A military publication describes an antitank booby-trapping system in these terms: the anti-lifting ignitors are designed to explode if the AT mine is handled by army engineers.(282)
The undetectable pull-ignitor (model 1951) is presented in the Army Instruction Manual TTA 10. According to the technical data sheet, this booby-trap igniter is used on the ATM MACI 51 from Alstex Co. Traction pressure (between 1 kg and 2,5 kg on a straight axis and from 1 kg to 3.5 kg at 45) on the booby-trap tripwire is sufficient to explode this AT mine.(283)
Another magazine describes the ACPM antitank mine (mechanically emplaced antitank) from Lacroix Co.- offered for export at the time- which it is said can be incorporated in a booby-trapping device.(284)
An important problem has been reported concerning ACPM and HPD mines, to the effect that they are not significantly different from models which cannot be booby-trapped. During mine clearance operations, it is easy visually to confuse these two mine types with unbooby-trapped versions. This problem is not specific to French-made antitank mines: foreign-made ATM models possess the same features designated under the name "look-alike mines."(285)
The latest French Terrestrial Defense Matériel catalog presents two antitank mines from Alstex, able to be booby-trapped.(286) The antitank mine ACPR has a " booby-trap cavity." The English language presentation of ACPR specifies that it "resists demining by explosive charge."(287) The programmable antitank mine ACPR also includes an "anti-lifting device."(288) And the Ages-MACPED antitank mine from Giat Industries can also be user-programmed for life-cycle and for "anti-lifting mode."(289)
At this point, it would be useful to emphasize the unambiguous nature of the French position, stated during the debate on widening the definition of anti-handling systems : "A tank is a tool of war. There is no connection between antitank and antipersonnel mines. The removal of an antitank mine from the battlefield is obviously a military action."(290) For the Ministry of Defense, such an extension of the definition would be tantamount to the decommissioning of antitank mines. The Minister did not bring up post-war issues nor the real danger posed by these systems for demining crews and civilian populations.
Site Protection Systems
Such systems, used to secure military facilities and equipment, include a firing chamber for launching munitions of various types and may be potentially antipersonnel in function. "Officially, these devices may only be activated by an operator and cannot therefore be considered as antipersonnel mines, even though they use the same wounding technologies, particularly the dispersion of shrapnel."(291) Despite guarantees in manufacturers' catalogs that none of these munitions remain on the ground after launch, site protection devices constitute one of the weapons systems to be monitored by NGOs. It will be particularly important to verify that they cannot be indiscriminately detonated by sensor.
Société Lacroix's SPHINX system falls into this category. One version of this device, called the SPHINX MODER, is designed to fire wounding, warning, or practice munitions.(292) It is being produced in series and has been adopted by the French Army to take the place of antipersonnel mines.
Mine Delivery Systems
Giat Industries' French Minotaur, which possesses characteristics required for future combat, is part of a new generation of systems. The Minotaur may be adapted to various types of platforms. It has been mounted on British Alvis Stormer armoured vehicles, EGB vehicles (armoured machines from Giat Industries engineering), the 6-wheeled French ACMAT, and 4-wheeled mine-dispensers from the French firm Matenin.(293) Giat Industries, in joint-venture with the American company Alkan, has designed a Minotaur model capable of dispersing 270 antitank mines (8060 Pod Dispenser), which can be delivered by helicopter.(294) Another variant is the "Remote Controlled Mining Model" (Mitra), which can be transported by two men and can disperse 30 antitank mines (AC DISP LU 981).(295)
Finally, the Leclerc tank-repair vehicle from Giat Industries can be rapidly converted into a mine dispenser by using an adaptation of the Minotaur system, and it can also be equipped with a mine-clearance system.(296) One version of this Leclerc tank-repair vehicle, equipped with both a K2D demining kit and a Minotaur mine dispenser, was in fact on display at the EuroSatory Terrestrial Armaments Exhibition in June 1998.
The transport vehicle may have six or eight "modules," be direction-oriented, and contain 20 mine launcher containers (MLC). Each container can hold five antitank mines, 10 antipersonnel mines, or according to certain Giat Industries documents, counter-clearance mines. Mines can be dispersed over a maximum radius of 250 meters on each side of the vehicle and 90 meters to the rear, and over a distance of 2,400 meters.
A control panel allows the driver to program, directly from the vehicle cabin, minefield characteristics such as direction of dispersion (to the right, to the left, or toward the rear of the moving or stationary vehicle), dimensions and density of mining, and the duration of mine activation (from 1 to 96 hours).(297) Antitank mines used are standard French artillery issue, AC DISP F1 mines from Giat Industires.
The British Army tested the Minotaur system during the Gulf War. Several Minotaur systems (including 6 modules of 20-tube launchers) were adapted at the time to British Stormer armored track vehicles.(298)
The Minotaur System is currently in the process of being adopted by the French Army, which should receive approximately thirty systems. In May 1995, Giat Industires started delivery of the first 2,500 mine launch containers (MLC), as well as 12,500 AC DISP LU antitank mines, ordered by the French Army.(299)
Military units also use mechanical mine-layers or "mine buriers," which enable rapid mechanical laying, so avoiding the hazards of manual handling. These machines are mainly used to lay antitank mines, but documentation describing them, particularly from Jane's Information Group, indicates that they can be adapted to all types of mines. This is the case of GIAT ARE SOC-type mine-laying system, which although specially designed to "bury" HPD-type antitank mines from TRT Défense, can be adapted to other types of mines.(300)
Similarly, the Matenin mine-burier is capable of laying mines while leaving the terrain looking the same as before (vegetation is carefully put back in place after the laying operation). While this Matenin burier is presented as being designed to lay HPD antitank mines from TRT, the description provided by Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance leads one to suppose that other types of mines can be used.(301) The 1998 edition of the catalog French Terrestrial Defense Matériel presents two models from Matenin being used by the French Army: the "limited-operation antitank mine burier," and the "antitank mine distributor."(302)
One of the first measures taken by France after pressure by NGOs, as part of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, was the announcemnt in 1993 by President François Mitterrand, during a state visit to Cambodia, of a moratorium on the export of such weapons.
France is, however, on the list of those countries which exported landmines up to that date, despite the Minister of Defense's recent reaffirmation that France had stopped exporting mines in 1986: "On a unilateral basis, France stopped exporting landmines in 1986, and announced an absolute export ban in 1993."(303)
Indeed, the recent declassification of a document from the Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Matériel Exports (CIEEMG) shows that on 16 April 1992, the Ministry of Defense authorized the export to Rwanda of 20,000 APMs and 600 igniters.(304) It is not known whether these mines actually reached their destination.
As required for any arms sale, the Interministerial Commission for the Study of War Matériel Exports (CIEEMG) should have available accurate information on exports of French-manufactured landmines. The CIEEMG's archives are certainly the most important source of information on this officially authorized trade, and should also allow verification of compliance with the end-user certificates required by French legislation.(305)
If the mines were not sold, or handed over in the context of military cooperation, they may have been emplaced by French troops sent on overseas operations, which has been a fairly frequent occurrence over the past fifty years. The Ministry of Defense should be in a position to supply information on the presence of mines where French military units have been deployed.
The following list of countries where mines of French origin are deployed or stockpiled is certainly not exhaustive. It simply serves to point out that French-manufactured mines have been transferred (sold, transferred within the framework of military cooperation, or left on the ground by French troops engaged in combat).
The antipersonnel mine MI AP DV 59, found in Angola and in Mozambique, is a product of the Alsetex Company. The MI AP ED F1 Claymore type, and fixed types M61 and M63 from Alsetex, are presented as being "in service in the French Army and in other armies."(306) The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has reported French-manufactured landmines on the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and in Iraqi Kurdistan,(307) implying France supplied these mines to Iraq.
Old mines of the MI AP ID 48 type are reported by the U.S. Department of Defense as being in use in Nigeria and Iceland. In the past, some French-manufactured mines (NR 15, NR 18, NR 22, NR 22C1) have been transferred to the Netherlands in the context of licensing agreements.(308)
According to information from the U.S. Department of State, French-made landmines can be found in the following countries: Algeria (from the 1950s); Belgium (from WWII and before); Korea (from the Korean War); Iraq (antitank mines MIACAH F1); Lebanon ( M-35 AP, D-4, F1 AP, MAPS AP); Morocco; Mauritania; Syria; Tunisia (from WWII).(309)
Another document of American origin points out the presence of antipersonnel mines in the following countries: Iceland (AP mines MI AP ID 48); Netherlands (AP Mines NR 15, NR 18, NR 22, NR 22C1); Nigeria (AP mines MI AP ID 48).(310) According to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance: Angola (French Mine MAPDV 59); Mozambique (French Mine MAPDV 59).(311) According to Trends in Land Mine Warfare from Jane's Information Group, mines of French origin have also been used in Somalia.(312)
France has reported that it has 1.4 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile; it has not been forthcoming with additional details, as will be required by the treaty.(313) It is not known whether landmine stockpiles are located in French overseas departments and territories or on French military bases in foreign countries, particularly in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon, where there are technical services for naval infantry battalions which rely on matériel.
In compliance with French legislation and with the Mine Ban Treaty, France has announced that it will destroy its stockpile of 1.4 million antipersonnel mines. The destruction of French mines is normally carried out on French soil. Reports have also indicated that the Netherlands(314) and Spain(315) have handed over landmines for destruction by France.
Declarations from the Ministry of Defense at the time of the National Assembly debate on the proposed bill provide a precise timetable:(316) from September 1996 to April 1998, approximately 50,000 mines were destroyed by specialized army services. In order to speed up the process, a public invitation to tender was issued at the end of October 1997. The bids of three firms were accepted, and 50% of stockpiles should have been destroyed by the end of 1998. The remainder of stockpiles are to be destroyed in 1999 and 2000.(317) No precise information has been provided on categories of mines intended for destruction. Projected cost of the destruction is also unknown.
It should be pointed out that deadlines on stockpile destruction previously announced by the Ministry of Defense have not been met. In 1995, France effectively committed itself "to set about reducing stockpiles, with the ultimate aim of completely eliminating this type of weapon."(318) Several months later, the country once again committed itself to "reduce its landmine stockpiles by destruction, undertaken in September 1996."(319) Between 1995 and 1998, however, it appears that landmine destruction did not really meet published targets.
According to figures published by the Ministry, 650,000 mines remain to be destroyed in six months, if targets are to be met. This represents quite a challenge, considering the mere 50,000 mines destroyed by the army over nearly two years.
All three companies selected to carry out French APM stockpile destruction are specialists in the decommissioning of munitions. It would therefore appear that such a procedure has been opted for, as evidenced by a statement made during a 5 December 1998 television program by the Manager of Operations at AF DEMIL.(320) The designated companies are AF Démil, Formétal, and Sotradex,(321) which are all familiar with contracts for the elimination of out-dated munitions.(322) However, two of these companies, AF Démil and Formétal, have connections with the major French landmine manufacturer, Alsetex, raising the question if it is appropriate, from an ethical point of view, for mine manufacturers to profit as well from their destruction.
During the National Assembly debate of 24 April 1998, the Minister of Defense justified awarding the French mine stockpile destruction contact to private firms "in order to speed up the pace of operations" and "in order to initiate industrial-scale destruction."(323) Unfortunately, this move to the private sector has so far failed to foster the kind of transparency about French stockpile destruction that the Minister evoked during the same debate, where he affirmed that "the provisions on transparency and verification hold particular importance for this government."
Transparency was paradoxically lacking in statements made by the Manager of Operations for one of these companies: "Here we have had to destroy around 300-, 350-, or 400,000 mines for the French government. As far as the deadline is concerned, I would venture to say that we were even too quick for the legislators. Between the time we were asked if we could receive a parliamentary delegation and the announcement of their arrival, we were already supposed to have completed the decommissioning, according to the terms of the contract, and we did just that."(324)
The Ministry of Defense has announced that 5,000 mines will be retained by the Army for the training of its specialized demining units. This provision, in compliance with the treaty (Article 3), has been taken up in the French law, which stipulates that their number may not exceed 5,000 as of December 2000.(325) French NGOs have asked, if a limited number of antipersonnel mines may be kept for training purposes, would it not be advisable to use practice mines, which are identical to operational mines, only less dangerous?
Although there is apparently no evidence of new uses of antipersonnel mines on French territory, there are several questions concerning past uses of these weapons by French armed forces. Following allegations in the press in March 1998,(326) Defense Ministry officials admitted that Solenzara Air Base in south Corsica was protected by antipersonnel mines. Although the Ministry had announced more than a year before, on 10 October 1996, that the base would be demined "in the near future," it seems that the "mine scheme" was upset by flooding, which may explain the difficulty in carrying out demining operations. According to the daily newspaper Libération, mine clearance work around the Solenzara base was finally completed on 28 May 1998, despite a statement made by the French Minister of Defense, on 4 June, saying that clearance of those mines would be completed by the end of the year.(327)
In 1996 however, the Defense Minister was fairly vague about mined areas in France. In fact, following questions in the press, a Ministry spokesperson responded that "if there should be other military installations, where such passive protection might exist, the antipersonnel mines would be removed."(328) Even though no more specific information has been produced since that date by the Defense Ministry, published remarks allow us to entertain the idea that other military installations might have been protected by landmines during the same period.
The possible use of landmines by French troops recently engaged in overseas operations will also have to be verified in missions of peace-keeping, peace-restoring, and peace-imposition. This hypothesis is not without basis. A Senate report dating from 1997, in fact, mentions that "static protection of personnel is ensured by antipersonnel mines" in the context of overseas operations.(329) If this is the case, it is important to find out under what conditions the mines were laid and if they have been cleared.
Mine Action Funding
Contributions to Multilateral Funds:(330) (1 US$ = 6 FF)
UNMAS - 2 million francs (MF) ($U.S. 333,340)
1996-1997: For mine clearance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and assignment of two officers.
UNOPS - 2.9 MF ($U.S. 483,440)
Cost of providing 10 military instructors to Angola (on detachment from INAROE)
UNDP - 350,000 FF/$US 59,000
Cost of financing a mission of experts to Laos- Assignment of 6 officers to Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNHCR - 1 MF/$US 166,670 plus an undetermined percentage of a 20 MF ($US 3,333,340)
French contribution to special programs for geographical zones or countries of the HCR, including anti-mine actions. Cost of financing programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Detachment of two military officers to an antimine facility in Sarajevo.
1997 9 MF ($U.S. 1.5 million)
Aid program in favor of lNAROE (National Angolan Institute For Clearance of Explosive Devices). Program consists of providing technical, administrative, and financial aid, of leading programs for prevention and awareness-raising in the province of HUILA, and of putting a technical assistant at the disposal of the Ministry for Social Assistance and Rehabilitation.
1996-1997 - 4.6 MF/$US 766,666
Intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action of which 3.5 MF (US$ 58,330) is to support Handicap International's projects (logistical backup, supply of equipment, and definition of a rural mine-clearance strategy in local areas).
570,000 FF/$US 95,000
Financing of two studies dealing respectively with the retraining of former Angolan military personnel, the institutional reinforcement of INAROE, the rehabilitation of farm land, and the establishment of a mine-clearance training facility.
1995-1996 - 4 MF ($U.S. 666,667)
Financial aid for demining in the Angkor region.
1996 - 1.64 MF/$US 273,334
Intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action.
1997 - 0.4 MF ($U.S. 66,667)
Intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action.
1999 - ?
After Hurricane Mitch, the French Minister of Defense dispatched a team of 6 demining experts (mines displaced by flooding).
1996 - 8.9 MF ($U.S. 1,483,330)
Program for training and equipping local demining crews in the province of Maputo-Moamba.
1997/1998 - 18 MF ($U.S. 3 M)
Financing of a project to demine electric cables.
1997 - 0.3 MF ($U.S. 50,000)
Intervention of the Service for Humanitarian Action.
1998 - 1 MF ($U.S. 166,667)
Co-financing of Handicap International's NGO project for prevention of mine accidents.
1997 - 1 MF ($U.S. 166,667)
Aid given through the Organization of American States.
1995 - 2.3 MF ($U.S. 383,334)
Training project for 100 deminers from the Chad Army Corps of Engineers.
1996-1998 - 2 MF ($U.S. 333,340)
Cost of providing a mine-clearance advisor to the Chad Army Corps of Engineers.
This information was outlined by Ambassador Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais during a symposium held in Paris on February 25, 1999. "As the European Union is obviously the number one financial contributor in this field, with 120M ECU paid out between 1995 and 1998, and taking into account the size of France's budget share within the community, it is this which we must first consider : some 142 MF ($US 27 M), or practically double the amount of our bilateral operations over the same period, aside from research costs, which means a total of 214 MF ($US 37 M).(332)
This body of data requires further commentary. France's anti-mine activities were for many years led by different departments or individuals connected with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, and Defense. Such a situation did nothing to facilitate things, as evidenced by the difficulty in drawing up a first quantitative report on these activities.
Study of these tables reveals that a certain percentage of French contributions to the UNHCR, for example, was manifestly used for anti-mine projects, without revealing how much of the funds were used or for what. The fields of intervention by the Service for Humanitarian Action are equally vague. A budget of $US1,483,330, approved in 1996 for the training and equipping of local demining crews in Maputo-Moamba province of Mozambique, has still not been spent.(333) The $US3 million, allocated to finance a private company's (CIDEV) mine clearance project for electric cables, has allowed only a limited number of the original objectives to be met. On the other hand, a demining project co-financed to the tune of 1 MF ($US 166,667) in 1998, by France and the APM Association of Bihac in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does not even appear in the Ministry's official data.
Hopefully the Ambassador In Charge of Coordinating French Anti-Mine Activities, appointed in January 1999, will bring some focus and coordination to French policy in this area.
For obvious reasons, the efforts of our military should be concentrated on training and passing on know-how; though their resources may be among the best qualitatively speaking, they are limited from a quantitative point of view: this will require making geographic choices or interventions by our European partners or others. NGOs have a different approach, which complements that of our armed forces. The realization has gradually dawned that cleaning up economically deprived rural areas, severely affected by the presence of mines and often difficult to reach, will require long-term programs and budgets, in which the notion of commercial profitability has no sense. Local mine-clearance is an ineluctable necessity if we are truly to take to heart the immediate rescue and future development of these populations, too often forgotten or ignored. It is within the context of the National Committee, where the entire ensemble of actors will meet in a new and balanced way, that truly national options will be put forward.(334)
Such a program appears sufficiently ambitious to make one hope that the Committee for the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines gets to work as quickly as possible.
Mine Ban Policy
Germany, a leader in the development of landmines since the Second World War, began a shift in policy in 1994 to work toward a ban on antipersonnel mines, largely because of enormous public pressure from NGOs and engaged citizens. Its first step was a unilateral export moratorium on AP mines that year; in January 1996 the government prolonged the moratorium indefinitely; in April 1996 the Federal Armed Forces (FAF) renounced the use of AP mines and in December 1997 the last AP mine stockpiles were eliminated.(335)
While taking these steps domestically, initially Germany favored international negotiations toward a ban within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons over the Ottawa Process. The government believed that negotiating within the CD and CCW would result in agreements of a more binding character and force internationally because all the main producers of landmines and superpower nations (i.e., USA, Russia, and China) were convened in these bodies.(336)
With the lack of movement in the CD in Geneva in 1996, Germany warmed to the initiative of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy to force the negotiation of a treaty banning AP mines outside normal UN procedures.(337) In ban negotiations, Germany sought the inclusion of strong verification mechanisms and to make the definition of AP mines as narrow as possible to exclude AT mines and other mine-like weapons. Germany hosted an Ottawa Process-related conference near Bonn on 24-25 April 1997, the focus of which was discussions of verification measures in the context of an international treaty banning AP mines.
7-Point Action Plan
Prior to the beginning of the Ottawa Process, on 18 July 1996, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel presented the government's "Seven-Point Action Program on Antipersonnel Mines."(338) He noted that, "The Federal Government has taken action. In January 1996 it imposed a unilateral unlimited moratorium on all exports of anti-personnel mines. In April 1996 the Federal Armed Forces relinquished totally and unconditionally the use of anti-personnel mines. Existing stocks will be destroyed. The conference to review the UN Conventional Weapons Convention which ended on 3 May 1996 agreed on more extensive prohibitions and restrictions on landmines. This was not enough. I therefore propose a seven-point action program on antipersonnel mines."(339)
The essential elements of the action program included: 1. a call for an international ban on AP mines; 2. a summary of German efforts to help with mine clearance; 3. an outline of the contribution of the Federal Armed Forces (FAF) toward training experts in mine detection and clearance; 4. a request that NATO and WEU support efforts to clear mines; 5. a call for the speediest and widest possible application of the revised Mine Protocol adopted on 3 May 1996; 6. establishing that contributions of mine-afflicted countries to resolve their mine problems would be a criterion for support from German financial and technical cooperation programs; and 7. urging the United Nations to make mine clearance part of UN peace-keeping missions.(340)
This program demonstrated that the requests of many NGOs and of the mine afflicted countries influenced the policies of the government and it focused not only on the disarmament aspect of a ban on AP mines but also on humanitarian mine action.(341)
Ratification and Implementation Laws
Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. On this occasion in his speech to the delegates, then Foreign Minister Kinkel noted that the verification mechanism of the Mine Ban Treaty was a "great improvement."(342) He also announced that Germany would hold a conference on modern demining technology in June 1998.(343) In concluding, he reflected on the post war situation in Europe after the Second World War, when "80 % of the scattered mines were cleared after a few years, because there was the political good will and financial resources."(344)
Within a week after signing the German parliament debated the ban treaty.(345) All parliamentary parties agreed that the ban of AP mines is an important step toward a more humane world and that the parliament had to ratify the convention before summer of 1998.(346) But differences arose as to the nature of the role Germany had played within the Ottawa Process. The Green Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism deputies disputed that the German government had played a leadership role since the government coalition parties - Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union and Liberal Democratic Party had failed to do anything about AT mines.(347) Both deputies also pointed out that the decisive pressure group for a ban of mines had been the NGO community, especially the German Initiative to Ban Landmines.(348) In contrast the deputies of Christian Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic Party stressed German efforts to ban AP mines since 1993: with the establishment of a mine documentary center followed by stopping all exports of AP mines in 1994.(349) Neither saw any chance to ban AT mines, as there is no international consensus to stop using AT mines, given their military utility. They concluded that, if at all, a ban of AT mines would be a long term goal.(350)
Another issue at question was if the government had provided enough funds to aid landmine survivors and for mine action. The deputies of governmental parties argued that the government had been spending a sufficient amount for these issues, including the provision of military demining technology.(351) But the deputies of the Green Party and Party of Democratic Socialism noted the difference between military and humanitarian demining and that the Government should focus its efforts on humanitarian mine action and decrease allocations for research and development of mines and military mine clearance technology.(352)
The suggestion of the deputy of Social Democratic Party to suspend all support to those states who are not willing to sign the convention met with approval of the government coalition.(353) This means that in support of the efforts of Germany to establish a strong verification mechanism within the treaty, German policy reserves the right to stop support for mine clearance and survivor assistance if a state does not sign the ban treaty or violates its treaty obligations.
Finally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs summed up the government's view of next steps: 1. To ratify the Convention as soon as possible and to urge non-signatories to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty; 2. to support more mine awareness in the afflicted countries; 3. to offer extensive aid to the landmine survivors from the provision of prostheses to medical and social care; and 4. to intensify the research on demining technology.(354) The deputy of the Green Party outlined the demands of the party as follows: 1. To prohibit worldwide development, production and export of mines, including technology transfer of mines with self-destruct mechanisms; 2. to make public all research projects and exports, all military mission plans and all stockpiles within Germany; and 3. to be transparent in the destruction of all existing mines.(355)
Germany ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in several phases. The first phase was the transformation of the Mine Ban Treaty into national law on 12 May 1998.(356) The second phase was the development of implementing legislation.(357) The third phase was the deposit of the instruments of ratification at the United Nations in New York on 27 July 1998. Apparently, there was no vote against the ratification of the ban treaty.(358)
Memorandum of Understanding
The government bill presented to the Upper House contains a remarkable memorandum,(359) representing the official and binding policy of the German government and comments in detail on each article of the Mine Ban Treaty. Generally the treaty is assessed "to establish new standards within international law as there is set a sweeping prohibition of all types of AP mines accompanied by humanitarian measures."(360) Of concern is the memorandum's language on the treaty's Article 1: "The commitments of the Convention concerns all AP mines of a State Party. In addition to this are also AP mines which are stored within foreign territory. A state party is possibly not accountable for those AP mines which another state keeps within the territory of a state party. If these AP mines are not under its authority and control, then the state party is not bound by law to destroy them."(361) This argument is taken up again in the interpretation of treaty Article 4: "Stocks from foreign armed forces do not come under definition of article 4 if they are not under one's authority and control of a State Party."(362) These interpretations are clearly intended to address U.S./NATO mines on German soil.
With regard to the treaty's Article 6 on international cooperation, the memorandum states: "Article 6 contains essential provisions of the treaty. Their inclusion was decisive to get approval of many African and Latin American states to join the Convention. Furthermore the regulation expresses one of the crucial requests of nongovernmental organizations.... Getting this passage NGOs and Third World Countries had their way above all. Donor countries - among them the Federal Republic of Germany - made their countermove to demand not to impose inappropriate restrictions on provision of equipment and information for humanitarian purposes (paragraph 8)."(363) The memorandum also notes, "From the beginning the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany took the view that the Convention...has important disarmament-oriented meaning and therefore verification has to be a central aspect to prohibit these weapons."(364)
The implementing legislation of the Mine Ban Treaty (phase 2) was accomplished without any vote against it (according to available sources)(365) and came into force at 6 July 1998.(366) One notable provision is the breadth of application: "Offenses out of the territory of this law...count as offenses irrespective of the national law of the scene of the crime...if the perpetrator is German."(367)
Ratification documents were deposited at the UN on 23 July 1998.(368) With this the process of ratification was completed. One day after deposit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release which emphasized,"One priority of German efforts within this issue [mine clearance] is the support of mechanical demining technology to clear mines faster and safer than before. It is absurd that humankind is able to fly to the moon while clearance of huge mine fields still is done by manual work!"(369)
CCW and CD
Germany ratified revised Protocol II of the CCW on 23 April 1997 and deposited its instruments of ratification on 2 May 1997.(370) Germany was one of the first states to do so, but on the occasion then-Foreign Minister Kinkel remarked that the Protocol is unsatisfactory as it does not include a general ban on AP mines worldwide.(371)
Germany's Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, clearly summed up his government's position on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 30 July 1998: "The primordial task is now to make acceptance of the Ottawa Convention or its objectives as universal as possible. We are aware that a number of states, including some large military powers and major regional powers with huge APL stockpiles and significant production capabilities, have decided not to adhere to the Ottawa Convention immediately. Many of them, however, have expressed their willingness to contribute to the resolution of the humanitarian aims of the Ottawa Convention by banning APL transfers. Germany therefore strongly supports the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on APL by the CD and an early start to negotiations on a universal ban on APL transfers. We should like to emphasize here that this agreement will have to be fully compatible with the Ottawa Convention and that it must not detract from its objectives."(372) This statement was renewed by Ambassador Hartmann in 25 March 1999.(373)
Antitank Mine Ban
The German ban campaign has long called for a ban on all landmines, both antitank and antipersonnel. The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer has asked for the possibility of a ban of antitank mines, but the Federal Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping signaled that the Federal Armed Forces are not willing to give up the use of antitank mines.(374) Over 700,000 people in Germany have signed the demand to ban all landmines without exceptions.(375)
In the late 1950s, the Armed Forces began to procure their first AP and AT mines, under license from foreign countries.(377) Germany has procured five types of antipersonnel mines: DM-11, DM-31, DM-51, DM-39, and MUSPA. The government does not categorize the DM-51, DM-39, or MUSPA as antipersonnel mines. It has procured eight types of antitank mines: DM-21, AT-1, At-2, DM-31, PARM-1, PARM-2, COBRA, and MIFF.
The DM-11 was the first AP mine produced by Germany. It was a product of the Swedish company LIAB - a metal-free blast mine whose explosive charge is strong enough to damage vehicles.(378) This landmine was produced under license by Diehl, a German company with headquarters in Nürnberg/Röthenbach, in its factory of Mariahütte (Saarland). According to government sources, the FAF bought a huge number of these landmines until 1964 at a cost of 19.2 million DEM (U.S. $10.9 million).(379) Specific data is classified even though these landmines were removed from stockpiles in 1994. It is estimated, though, that the total number of procured mines could be three million.(380)
The DM-31 AP mine was produced from 1962-1967 by the company Industriewerke Karlsruhe (later: Industriewerke Karlsruhe Augsburg, IWKA) for the Federal Armed Forces. This mine is a bounding device which, upon explosion of its bursting charge, showers the surrounding area with small fragments of chopped steel rod.(381) According to government sources these procurements cost 49.2 million DEM (U.S.$ 27.9 million).(382) The German government keeps the number of procured mines secret. (383) It has been estimated that the the total number of procured mines could be between one and one and a half million mines.(384) According to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense 3,000 DM-31 mines have been retained for training purposes by the Federal Armed Forces.(385)
In the early 1990s, the DM-51 AP mines were acquired from the disintegrated Armed Forces of Former East Germany. With this mine the Federal Republic of Germany gained a so-called Claymore mine for the first time. According to government sources, some 33,000 mines were inherited from the former East Germany.(386) The DM-51 is based on the Russian MON-50 AP mine. It has a plastic body with rows of imbedded fragments on the side facing the target. On the top center of the mine is a peep sight with a fuse well on either side. These fuse wells will accommodate a variety of fuses, including tripwire, breakwire, and command detonation.(387) Although there is no independent verification, it has been assumed that they were eliminated in December 1997.
The Armed Forces also has DM-39s, which it calls "explosive charges" ("Sprengkörper"). However, other sources, including the U.S. Department of Defense, classify the DM-39 as an antipersonnel mine.(388) DM-39 are designed to protect DM-11 and DM-21 AT mines from neutralization. In other words, this "explosive charge" is used as an anti-handling-device.(389) If anybody tries to clear an AT mine fitted with a DM-39, a pressure release fuse is activated, causing an explosion powerful enough to detonate the AT mine.(390) The plastic-bodied DM-39 is available in a sheet-metal version, the DM-39A1.(391) The costs and number of these devices are unknown.
The MUSPA is made by Rheinmetall/Daimler Benz Aerospace/Thomson-Dasa-Wirksysteme. Even though the Ministry of Defense and its producers consider MUSPA to be a "submunition," the U.S. Department of Defense classifies the weapon as an AP mine: "The MUSPA is an antimaterial/antipersonnel fragmentation minelet dispensed as a submunition from the former West German MW-1 weapon system. The mine is a heavy fragmentation munition with 2,100 steel pellets as the primary lethal mechanism. Once it has been parachute delivered, the MUSPA self-rights and arms. An acoustic sensor then actively senses for an aircraft engine signature. A nearly identical submunition, the MUSA, differs only in that no fuse is present; instead it self-destructs at a preset time."(392) Remotely deliverable with fighter jets or dispenser systems, MUSPA can be deployed by the thousands and extremely quickly over long ranges, greatly enhancing the offensive aspect of mine warfare. The number of MUSPAs in stock is classified.(393) According to reliable estimates the number of procured MUSPA is 90,000, at a cost of around 210 million DEM (U.S. $119.3 million).(394)
Antitank Mines and Delivery Systems
The company Industriewerke Karlsruhe (IWK, later: IWKA) developed for production a new, improved German AT mine, called the "Panzermine II." This metal bodied mine weighs less than 10 kilograms(395) and is scatterable by helicopter. An ignition canal exists at the bottom of the mine, which is able to be connected with DM-31 anti-handling devices.(396) IWK sold it facilities to Diehl, which produced this mine for the FAF under the designation DM-21 from 1980-1982.(397) According to government sources, the cost of procurement amounted to 88.1 million DEM (U.S. $50 million(398)).(399) The number of mines has been estimated at 150,000.
In 1970 , the FAF introduced the LARS (Light Artillery Rocket System - Leichte Artillerie Raketen System) rocket launcher, which also could be used to scatter AT-1 mines.(400) From 1970 to 1972 the Federal Armed Forces procured 209 of these landmine delivery systems, at a cost of 72.2 million DEM.(401) According to government sources, between 1978 and 1980, 108.6 million DEM were spent to buy 15,000 LARS each fitted with eight AT-1 mines.(402) Approximately 65 of these mine delivery systems are still in use.(403)
AT-1 antitank mines were procured by the Federal Armed Forces in about 1978. The AT-1 is first generation scatterable mine. It is a plastic stake mine with a mechanical vibration fuse which responds to sustained pressure driving over it. The mine is equipped with an antihandling device and a self-destruct mechanism.(404) Approximately 120,000 AT-1 were procured at a cost of DEM 108.6 million (U.S. $61.7). According to government sources these mines were transformed to rockets for exercise purposes between 1990 and 1993.(405)
The AT-2 antitank mine was introduced in the 1980s.(406) The AT-2 is an armor-penetrating belly-attack mine that uses a shaped-charge of pressed RDX/TNT. In addition to the explosive train, the system includes an impact sensor, fuse, timer, and lithium battery. Six selectable self-destruct times are available.(407) Government sources indicate that between 1981 and 1986, 564.7 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines, designed to be scattered by the LARS mine layer.(408) These acquisitions included 60,000 LARS each fitted with five AT-2 mines from Dynamit Nobel for a total of 300,000 mines.(409) Between 1984 and 1992, 763 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines usable with the "Skorpion" mine layer system from Dynamit Nobel, as well.(410) At least 32,000 magazines of mines were procured each consisting of twenty AT-2 mines for a total of 640,000 mines.(411) And finally between 1993 and 1995, 783.6 million DEM were spent on AT-2 mines usable with the MARS/MRLS rocket launcher.(412) For this the Federal Armed Forces bought 9,360 rockets each consisting of twenty-eight AT-2 mines, for a total of 262,080 mines.(413) This means from 1981 until 1995 a total of more than 2.11 billion DEM (U.S.$1.2 billion) were spent for more than 1.2 million AT-2 mines.
From 1985 on the FAF procured the mechanical mine delivery system 85. It is a trailer with an integrated plough developed in Sweden, which allows the laying of the DM-31 AT mine on the surface or under the ground. The DM-31 was produced in Sweden by the company FFV. The DM-31 is a shaped charge ATM with a magnetic fuse. The fuse contains 2 magnetized balls that sit in a path under the edge of the mine lid functioning as an antilift device. The DM-31 can be laid mechanically or by hand.(414) Government sources indicate 125,000 mines were procured between 1988 and 1992. (415) Information on the cost of these procurements is inconsistent. In information given to the parliament the Ministry of Defense specified the costs at 160 million DEM in 1995 , while in the media the costs were quoted as 182.2 million DEM. Finally, at the time of order in 1985, the costs were calculated to be merely at 141.2 million DEM.(416)
From 1996 to 1998, the PARM 1 anti-armor system was offered by Daimler Benz Aerospace together with THOMSON (France) by joint venture with Thomson-DASA Armaments or Thomson-Dasa-Wirksysteme.(417) Government sources indicated that 12,000 PARM-1s had been procured at a cost of 99.6 million DEM (U.S.$56.6 million) by 1998.(418) This figures differs from the information provided by DASA, which indicated a cost of 100.5 million DEM.(419) The PARM-1 stand on an adjustable tripod, with 360 degrees of movement and an elevation of -45 to +90 degrees. A reel of fiber-optic cable is laid along the aimed line of sight, the timer is activated, and the mine is armed following a 5-minute delay. When the PARM 1 warhead is fired, a counterweight is ejected out the back and stabilizing fins extend to guide the warhead to the target. The warhead contains a shaped-charge lethal mechanism that penetrates the target with an impact of up to 40 km/h.(420) After public pressure generated by shareholders of Daimler-Benz, the Director of Daimler Benz Jurgen Schrempp announced in late 1998 that production of PARM-1 would be stopped by the end of the year as well as the development of PARM-2.(421) About 50,000 DEM was planned to be allocated to PARM-2 and a total of DEM 278.0 (U.S. $157.9) for its research and development.
But similar new high-tech mines are still under development in other European joint-ventures - such as the ARGES, developed by Dynamit Nobel (Germany)/Honeywell (Germany)/GIAT (France)/Hunting (Great Britain). It is a rival product of the PARM-2 and one of the most modern off-route mines offered to the European market. The one mine costs approximately 12,000 DEM. ARGES will be used as a standard NATO weapon, but is not expected to be introduced before 2000. ARGES, like the PARM 2, is an autonomous, sensor-controlled anti-armor weapon, which destroys the target from the side with a hollow charge warhead. The acoustic alarm sensor of the ARGES mine, which can make out close- and long-range targets, can "hear around corners" and therefore also be deployed in confined areas. A microprocessor calculates the distance, direction, speed and the length of the target vehicle. The length of the vehicle is crucial in deciding whether it is a combat target or not. There is the obvious question of how capable the system will be at differentiation of civilian and military vehicles.
Area defense mines, such as the COBRA area-defense mine from Rheinmetall Industrie, constitute another example in high-tech mine category. Government sources indicate that 310 million DEM (U.S. $176.1) are projected to be spent on the system over the next few years and 45 million DEM has already been spent.(422) This autonomous, "intelligent" mine symbolizes the future technology of European high-tech mines Equipped with the Smart 155 munitions from the German companies Rheinmetall Industrie and Diehl, the COBRA is a "top attack" weapon. The target is recognized through seismic and acoustic sensors and the mine when activated is fired to a height of approximately 150 meters. There, suspended from a parachute, it searches, finds and finally fires the sensor fused munitions on the target over a radius of more than 300 meters. "False targets, e.g. light commercial vehicles, can therefore be reliably identified and not targeted" assure official sources. No comment is forthcoming on how the mine reacts to large commercial vehicles. Military publications report that warnings should be issued against the current risks associated with this development, especially with remote delivery by missile.(423)
Another antitank mine is the MIFF, which can be used with an antihandling device. Some 125,000 were procured. These are stockpiled but their status is unknown.
Provision of funds for landmines and landmine dispenser systems are subject to a cycle of research and development followed by procurement. For example in 1990-1995 a total amount of 2,367.6 million DEM (US$1,345.2 million) was spent for the procurement of landmines, while in the same period an amount of 34.5 million DEM (US$19.6 million) was allocated for research and development of landmines. From 1996-1998 "just" an amount of 107.0 million DEM (US$60.8 million) was spent for the procurement of landmines, while 67.7 million DEM (US$38.5 million) was spent on research and development. This means at the present, Germany is in a phase of research and development of new landmines (especially the area defense mines COBRA and ARGES) and it is foreseeable that an extensive procurement will follow in the near future.(424)
DM31 Destroyed (3,000 stored for training purposes)
DM-51 (Claymore) Destroyed
DM-39 (antihandling device) Stockpiled
MUSPA ("submunition") Stockpiled
DM-21 (AHD poss) Stockpiled
AT-1 (AHD poss) Changed into warheads for exercise purposes
AT-2 (AHD is possible) Stockpiled
PARM-2 under development but stopped since end of 1998(426)
COBRA (Surface defense mine) under development
MIFF (AHD is possible) Stockpiled
German landmine exports are classified, so verifying them is difficult. One official document contained detailed information on just one sale: twenty AP-2 antitank mines to the Armed Forces of the Netherlands on 17 September 1993.(427) Other official information indicates: between 1985 and 1990 three authorizations for a total of 262 landmines; between 1991 and 31 July 1995 ten authorizations for a total of 45,139 landmines.(428) According to the magazine "Wehrdienst," 87,024 AT-2s were delivered to United Kingdom in 1995.(429)
In spite of the difficulties in obtaining data on exports of landmines, the following transfers of landmines seem certain:
1. Until 1994 Italy received MIFF, MUSPA and MUSA mines, together with one hundred MW 1 submunition dispensers for the combat aircraft Tornado;
2. In 1994 Finland got probably more than 100,000 TM-62 antitank mines from the stockpiles of the former Armed Forces of East Germany;
3. At the end of 1990 and beginning of 1991, the United Kingdom obtained four Skorpion mine delivery systems and 15,000 AT-2 mines as German military support for the Gulf War. These weapons were returned after the war;
4. Also during Gulf War, Israel got around one hundred of several types of landmines from stockpiles of the former Armed Forces of East Germany to use for research;
5. In the same context and for the same purposes, the United States obtained 552 PMP 2, TM 46 and TM 63 mines (all from the Former East Germany). Later, additional mines were provided;
6. Saudi Arabia received twenty antitank mines in 1996;(430)
7. In 1997 Norway procured 468 Mars rocket launchers fitted with AT-2 mines from Germany;(431)
German mines have been found elsewhere, including conflict zones. In answer to the question of how DM-11 antitank mines could have shown up in Somalia and DM-31 antipersonnel mines in Angola, the German government answered on 5 September 1995, that no permission for such transfers had been given, so they do not know how these transfers could have taken place.(432) This demonstrates the difficulties of enforcing national prohibitions of weapons if the arms are developed and produced by multilateral joint ventures, and is something that needs to be addressed.(433)
Known mine transfer from Former West Germany:(434)
DM-11 AP - France and Somalia;
DM-31 AP - Sweden, Angola, Zambia;
AT-2 (AHD is possible) - United Kingdom, France, Italy and Norway;(435)
MUSPA AP (submunitions) - Italy;
MIFF AT (AHD is possible) - Italy;
PARM-1 Off-route AT - Sweden.
Known mine transfer from Former East Germany:(436)
PMP 71 AP mine - Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia;
POMZ-2 AP mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Former Soviet Union, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe;
POMZ-2M AP mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Former Soviet Union, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, North Korea, South Africa, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe;
PPM-2 AP mine - Angola, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former East Germany, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa, Zambia;
PM 60 AT mine - Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia;
TM-46 / AT mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany, Iraq, Israel, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Cambodia, Zambia;
TM-62P3 AT mine - Egypt, Former Soviet Union, Poland;
TMN-46 AT mine - Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany, Iraq, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Poland, South Africa, Somalia, Zambia.
According to official information from the government, the Federal Armed Forces finished the elimination of all of their AP mines in December 1997, destroying about 1.7 million antipersonnel mines.(437) The destruction was carried out by private companies, observing environmental standards, at a cost of 4.2 million DEM.(438) The exact names of the companies, their methods of destruction or their kinds of environmental standards are not available.
A total of 3,000 DM-31 antipersonnel mines are being retained, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, to train demining personnel and to test demining technology.(439)
On one controversial issue, stockpiling and transfers of U.S. antipersonnel mines are still allowed within Germany. The German government argues that according to the "Status on Forces Agreement" (SOFA), weapons of foreign forces within Germany are not covered by German law and control.(440)
The German campaign is concerned that use of MUSPA, DM-39, and antitank mines with antihandling devices, such as the AT-2, may not be consistent with the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore the area defense mine COBRA is still under development, and will be fitted with antihandling devices.(441) The diplomatic record of the Oslo treaty negotiations shows that governments consider that such devices, if they explode from innocent, unintentional acts, are considered to be APMs and thus, illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.(442)
Mine Action Funding
Funding for mine action programs comes from different ministries. The principal budget for mine action is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The projects it supports include the following:
- concrete projects of mine and UXO's clearance;
- training of local demining personnel;
- strengthening national mine clearance structures with the support of German experts;
- testing of modern mine clearance technology and detection/sensor technology;
- procurement of technical equipment for mine clearance;
- supporting of mine awareness projects within afflicted communities.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the lead role in funding for humanitarian demining, while the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development takes the lead on funds for survivor assistance.(443) These measures are concentrated on physical and psychological therapy as well as orthopedics and fitting of prostheses.(444) In its assistance for landmine survivors, the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development favors efforts to reintegrate landmine survivors into social and economic structures and to support the acceptance of landmine survivors within the society.(445)
Support for humanitarian mine action is concentrated on the technical aspects of mine clearance and on mine awareness of the afflicted communities. In comparison with this, survivor assistance and development-oriented mine action have less support. Between 1993 and 1998 the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development support amounted to around 31.22 million DEM (around US$17.94 million), while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated approximately 51.28 million DEM (around US$29.47 million) over the same period.
Ministry of Foreign affairs (AA) Mine Action Funding 1992-1998(446)
1992 - DEM 100,000 (U.S. $57,471)
1993 - TOTAL: DEM 590,000 (U.S. $339,080)
1994 - DEM 796,491 (U.S. $457,753)
Afghanistan, Georgia, Cambodia, Mozambique
1995 - DEM 2,210,300 (U.S. $1,270,287 )
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nogorno-Karabach
1996- DEM 17,850,228 (U.S. $10,625,135)
Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Laos, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sudan
1997 - DEM 17,794,768 (U.S.$10,226,878)
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Guatemala, Laos, Mozambique.
1998 -: DEM 18,970,000 (U.S. $10,902,298)
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Cambodia, Chechnya, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia & Abkazia, Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam.
TOTAL from 1993 - 1998: DEM 58,311,787 (U.S. $33,878,902)
In addition, between 1993 and 1998, the Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development spent DEM 31,223,233 (U.S. $17,944,386) on mine action in countries including Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique and Vietnam. This was spent on activities including survivor assistance, mine clearance and training and reconstruction.
One of the important goals of the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is support for the development of modern mine clearance technology to speed up mine clearance operations.(447) The Foreign Ministry also supports the use of dogs to detect mines in some regions. This technique, according to the Foreign Ministry, is very effective and cheap. Therefore they would like to strengthen mine detection by using dogs in Afghanistan and other suitable regions.(448)
Funding for procurement and development of mines and mine clearance technology continues to dwarf that for humanitarian mine action-- 60 million DEM versus 20 million DEM in the draft 1999 budget. From 1993 to 1998, the goverment spent 1,207 million DEM (US$686 million) on procurement, research and development of landmines;(449) 250 million DEM (US$142 million) on
mine clearance and dismantling frontier fortifications at the former German-German frontier;(450) and 82.5 million DEM (US$47 million) on humanitarian mine action.(451)
The German ban campaign has expressed concern over support to companies which have been involved in mine production. In particular, it has noted that in 1997 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the field testing of "Rhino" in Cambodia.(452) This mine clearance device has been developed by the company MAK-System, which belongs to the joint-stock company "Rheinmetall Industrie,"(453) which is the former producer of MUSPA and a developer of the new COBRA area defense mine. A second example is the mine clearance device "Minebreaker 2000," whose field trial in Bosnia-Herzegovina was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998. "Minebreaker 2000" was developed by Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG), which belongs to the armament company Diehl.(454) The German campaign has said these are examples of "double dipping," in which landmine producers want to make profit twice - to make money on the problem they helped create.
From 1961 until 1985 the Former German Democratic Republic laid approximately 1,322,700 mines along the German-German frontier. In 1985 Former East German leader Erich Honecker agreed to clear the mines in return for a financial aid package from West Germany. These mines would be cleared by soldiers of the GDR from 1985 on, but after reunification of Germany the scrutiny of the mine protocols showed that the elimination of 33,864 mines had not been verified. Since 1995, some 943 of these mines were found by German mine detection teams. It is estimated that 17,992 of the mines, which are shown to have been laid but not verified as having been cleared, are so called wood box mines, PMD-6 ("Holzkastenminen"). As it is likely that most of them deteriorated completely, there is currently no search underway for these mines. Regarding the rest of the 17,992 mines which were not founded, it is believed that most of them have been triggered by weather influences or game and that in fact they are already cleared and the documentation of the soldiers of Former East Germany was deficient.(455)
By 30 March 1995, 83.1 million DEM (around US$47.76 million) had been earmarked for the mine detection of the former German-German frontier in 1994-1995.(456) On 5 December 1995, a press release of the Federal Ministry of Defense announced that all mine affected areas on the old east-west divide had been cleared and that the last zone, near the Bavarian town of Hof, was reopened to the public. In the press release the total cost for mine clearance as well as for dismantling former frontier fortifications was put at more than US$142.04 million.(457)
Note to readers: A longer, more detailed version of this report is available from Landmine Monitor and can also be found at www.landmine.de
The Holy See signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 February 1998. The Holy See has been vocal in its opposition to landmine proliferation for several years. In April 1996, immediately prior to the Geneva review conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Pope John Paul II publicly called for a total ban on antipersonnel landmines,(458) and the Vatican strongly criticized the conference when it failed to produce such a ban.(459) Subsequently, Pope John Paul II embraced the Ottawa Process. On the eve of the Mine Ban Treaty coming into force, the Pontiff said, "I pray to God to give all people the courage to make peace, so that the countries that have not yet signed this important instrument of international humanitarian law do so without delay, and so that they persevere with the work of clearing landmines and rehabilitating the wounded."(460)
The Holy See is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the 1996 amended Protocol II on mines. The Holy See does not produce, transfer, or stockpile antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine affected.
The Holy See has donated $4,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.(461) At the Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony, the Holy See pledged to donate $100,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross for mine victim assistance.(462)
Mine Ban Policy
Hungary signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 6 April 1998, the eighth country to do so. Hungary has been an active participant in the Ottawa Process. It attended all the treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations. Hungary also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on antipersonnel landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Hungary is also a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and ratified the amended Protocol II on mines on 30 January 1998. Hungary is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and supports using it as a forum for negotiating a ban on mine transfers.(463) In February 1999, Hungary was one of 22 countries that endorsed a statement advocating the negotiation of a transfer ban through the CD.(464)
The government and national assembly of Hungary hosted and co-sponsored the Budapest Regional Conference on Anti-personnel Landmines in March 1998. The conference, which was also sponsored by the city of Budapest, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, was attended by government representatives and non-governmental organizations from 19 Central and Eastern European states.(465)
Addressing the conference, Hungary's Foreign Affairs Minister Laszlo Kovacs stated, "We consider the drive to achieve the earliest entry into force of Amended Protocol II of the CCW and the campaign to achieve a more universal adherence to the Ottawa Convention as high priorities."(466) Kovacs also discussed Hungary's "Agenda '98" for mine-related activities: (1) hosting the regional conference; (2) eliminating the country's landmine stockpile by the end of 1998--a date since pushed back June 1999; (3) supporting the amended Protocol II of the CCW as an effective complement to the Mine Ban Treaty; (4) supporting Hungarian academic research on victim rehabilitation and sharing methods and technologies with other countries; (5) dedicating resources to the development of alternative technologies for troop protection; and (6) supporting, along with the German government, a demining initiative in the Eastern-Slavonia region of Croatia.(467)
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Hungary, a significant producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines in the past, has ceased all production and transfer of landmines and has stated its intention to eliminate its landmine stockpile by June 1999.(468)
Hungary informed the United Nations in 1995 that it no longer produces or exports antipersonnel mines.(469)
Hungarian state factories produced six types of landmines: the GYATA-64 blast mine (similar to Soviet PMN) , the M62 and M49 blast mines (similar to Soviet PMD-6), the RAMP blast mine (WWII-era), the No. 1131 bounding mine, and the Model 36 fragmentation mine.(470) Hungary's mines have been used in Cambodia, Angola, South Africa, and elsewhere.(471)
Humanitarian Mine Action
Hungary is not mine affected.(472) In addition to the above-noted initiative in Croatia, Hungary has pledged to support confidence building measures, training, and other cooperative efforts related to landmines with the armed forces of other countries. Hungary has also offered technical and training assistance to international organizations involved in demining.(473)
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Ireland signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997, and deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations the same day--the second nation to ratify, after Canada. This was a fitting demonstration of Ireland's commitment on this issue. The government was one of the few to support a call for a ban as long ago as 1994, at the beginning of the review process of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Ireland became a member of the core group of countries responsible for developing and promoting the Ottawa Process, and continues to play an important role in the movement to eliminate once and for all antipersonnel landmines. In his speech at the signing conference, Foreign Minister David Andrews said, "International public opinion will not tolerate for much longer the absence of countries, in particular significant states from the roll call of States Parties to this most significant instrument for the abolition of lethal devices which serve no military purpose and the use of which or the preparation for the use of which must quickly be deemed unacceptable anywhere by anyone."(474)
Cooperation between Irish NGOs and the government began early in the ban process. When the Irish Campaign to Ban Landmines was launched on 29 March 1994, the chairperson of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee was at the NGO's press conference and invited the new Campaign to make a presentation on the mine issue at the next meeting of his Committee. Members of the Campaign also met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss landmines and the ban movement.(475) After its presentation to the Committee in July, the Irish Campaign continued to work with the Foreign Affairs Committee on options for action, both domestically and in the European Parliament.(476) The Campaign vigorously lobbied the government and the political parties in the opposition for a unilateral ban on antipersonnel landmines in Ireland. This resulted in a private member's bill being introduced in 1996 in the Dail for a unilateral ban on landmines. However, the government opposed the bill. But, as Irish public opinion was very high in support of a unilateral ban, and the government had to respond.
On the basis of the Explosives Act originating in 1875, a legislative ban on antipersonnel landmines was passed in the Dail on 12 June 1996 entitled Explosives (Land Mines) Order, 1996. In her statement on the law, Minister of State Joan Burton stated that the Order "copperfastens our national policy of not allowing the manufacture, sale or import of landmines. It significantly enhances our international advocacy of a total ban on antipersonnel landmines." The Minister clarified that the Order, however, did not apply to Defense Forces. Burton also stated that the government had requested a review by the Minister of Defense with a view to renouncing operational use of APMs by the Defense Forces.(477) Obviously, Ireland came to the view that it could and must prohibit the use, as well, of antipersonnel landmines.
Ireland has continued to play a key role since the signing of the Treaty. The government has taken a particular interest, along with other core group states, in the development of the Landmine Monitor initiative of the ICBL. The government hosted a meeting of Monitor researchers in Dublin in September of 1998, providing facilities for the meeting and logistical support as well. Foreign Minister Andrews addressed the meeting, and remarked, "The unique capacity which you are proposing to develop in the Landmine Monitor will, I believe, become the benchmark for the evaluation of progress in realizing the objectives of the Convention. It will become the basis for scrutiny by the international community of States Parties' treaty implementation; and it will become a working resource for focusing on the needs of demining and mine victim assistance." He also announced that the government of Ireland would contribute US$150,000 to the Landmine Monitor.(478)
Ireland is a state party to the CCW and ratified the amended Protocol II on 27 March 1997.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use
Various meetings of the Irish Campaign with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letters from the Ministers, and public statements and presentations in the Dail since March 1994 have affirmed that the Irish State has never produced or exported landmines.
The Irish Defense Forces possess around 130 live antipersonnel landmines and they are solely for training purposes. Considering the size of the country, the Irish Defence Forces play an important role in UN Peacekeeping Operations which exposes them to the dangers of antipersonnel landmines for which they must be adequately prepared.
Despite the legacy of a long conflict on the island of Ireland spanning the last thirty years, there exists no record of any civilian, or member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Garda, the British Army, the Irish Defence Force or any person engaged in paramilitary activities ever being injured or killed by antipersonnel landmines. No antipersonnel landmines have been found in the ground in the State or along the Northern Ireland border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. (It is, however, common knowledge that commercial and homemade explosives were used by the paramilitaries in the Northern Ireland conflict.)
Mine Action Funding
The annual contribution of the Irish Government for mine action programs has steadily increased since 1994. Regular meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, periodic interventions at the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs, political lobbying, media work and the campaign as a whole in Ireland has contributed to this steady increase. At the Ottawa signing conference, Foreign Minister Andrews stated, "Ireland is steadily increasing its funding for mine clearance and victim assistance and in 1997 we have doubled our disbursements in this area. We are committed to a further increase in 1998."(479)
The government reported that its mine action contributions for 1997 had included: Angola ($366,000); Bosnia ($225,000); Cambodia ($294,000); Chechnya ($363,000); Mozambique ($240,000), and the UN Trust Fund ($225,000).(480)
A November 1998 "Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support" fact sheet lists these Irish contributions:(481)
Afghanistan U.S. $ 41,578 (UNOCHA/mine action)
Angola U.S. $252,971 (Handicap International/prosthetics)
Bosnia U.S. $166,310 (UNDP Trust Fund/mine clearance)
Cambodia U.S. $357,567 (Halo Trust/mine clearance)
Cambodia U.S. $157,995 (Trocaire/ four clinics)
Mozambique U.S. $317,652 (Country Program/mine clearance)
The United Nations reports that Ireland has donated US$787,841 to the Voluntary Trust Fund for Demining.(482)
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Macedonia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 September 1998. It had participated in all the Ottawa Process treaty preparatory meetings and the Oslo negotiations, and endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It did not sign when the treaty opened for signature in Ottawa for reasons unrelated to the treaty itself, but informed the Canadian government of its intent to accede to the treaty (a process by which states can become bound without signature). Macedonia also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Macedonia attended the Budapest Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines in March 1998, where an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed support for the ban treaty and hope that it would facilitate demining and victim assistance efforts.(483)
Macedonia is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (30 December 1996), but has not ratified amended Protocol II on mines.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
It is believed that some of the former Yugoslavia's mine production facilities were located in Macedonia, which gained independence on 17 November 1991. Some production may have occurred post-independence, but this is not confirmed.(484) Macedonia is not known to have exported AP mines. The size of its stockpile inherited from the former Yugoslavia is not known. The former Yugoslavia produced at least 16 kinds of antipersonnel landmines, including: the MRUD, the MT-4, the PMA-1, the PMA-2, the PMA-3, the PMD-1, the PMR-1, the PMR-2, the PMR-2A, the PMR-2AS, the PMR-3, the PROM-1, the TM-100, the TM-200, the TM-500, and the UDAR mine.(485)
Macedonia is considered not to be mine-affected.(486) In the summer of 1998, landmines were detected near the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia) by soldiers from the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. The Macedonian government stated that the mines had been laid by the troops of the FR Yugoslavia, and that, despite some reports, the mines were all on FY Yugoslavia territory, not Macedonian territory.(487) The mines were apparently laid by Yugoslavia to prevent smuggling of arms and recruits from Albania to Kosovo.
Monaco signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 November 1998. In December 1996, Monaco voted for the UN General Assembly resolution calling on states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines. Monaco endorsed the pro-Mine Ban Treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September 1997. Monaco also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in late 1997 and 1998. Monaco is a state party to the CCW (12 August 1997), but has not ratified amended Protocol II.
Monaco does not produce, trade, stockpile or use antipersonnel landmines, nor is it mine-affected.(488) Monaco has donated $27,519 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.(489)
Mine Ban Policy
Norway signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. The ratification bill was passed in the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting) on 16 June 1998, and deposited at the UN on 9 July 1998. Implementing legislation was also passed by the Parliament on 16 June 1998.
Norway has been a global leader in banning antipersonnel mines. It was one of the most important members of the pro-ban "core group" of governments, and played a central role in the Ottawa process leading up to the December 1997 Treaty signing. The government was instrumental in the shaping of the Brussels Declaration in June 1997 and together with Canada actively worked to include African countries in the process and financially supported activities like the ICBL conference in Mozambique and the OAU meeting in South Africa.(490) The Norwegian government also took on the responsibility of hosting the final treaty negotiations in Oslo from 1-18 September 1997.(491) It is one of the most significant donors to mine action programs globally, and continues to be a key promoter of the universalization and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Landmines used to be a part of the Norwegian defense system. Norway's geographical location, bordering in the north with Russia, had an impact on strategic political and military thinking during the Cold War. A strong emphasis was placed on Norwegian security policy and the defense capability of the country. Norway's position in NATO and close relations with the United States have been important and Norway has adapted military doctrine in accordance with NATO's changes after the Cold War.
While Norway has been an active player on the issue of landmines for many years, it did not always support a total ban on APMs. During the expert meetings in 1994 and 1995 leading up to the Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, the official Norwegian view was that a total ban position would be too radical. When the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Mr. Bjørn Tore Godal, was asked in Parliament if Norway would work for a total ban during the CCW review conference, his response was that since there was hardly any international support for such a move, Norway would instead seek to strengthen the CCW.(492)
The Norwegian Campaign to Ban Landmines was the main proponent of a Norwegian ban on APMs and the campaign was active in lobbying various political parties and Parliamentary committees in 1995 to promote the ban issue domestically. This eventually led to a Parliamentary proposal by the Center Party to support a total ban on the production, stockpiling, sale, purchase and use of APMs and on 6 June 1995 the Norwegian Parliament accepted the proposal by consensus. With this action, the Parliament asked the Norwegian government to support a total ban on APMs, but this did not seem to have a notable impact on Norway's stance in the ongoing CCW revisions. In fact, a newspaper article in April 1996 quoted Minister Godal expressing the same opinion of strengthening the CCW when there was no international support for a total ban.(493) This stance was openly criticized by proponents of a total ban and the Norwegian Campaign to Ban Landmines.(494)
Despite the slow shift in the government policies to incorporate the Parliamentary decision to support a total ban on APMs, the issue gained momentum in 1996 as the CCW Review Conference drew to its uninspiring conclusion with the rather limited improvements to Protocol II. Norway was one of the increasingly pro-ban countries that participated in the ICBL-sponsored meetings in Geneva to help forge a block of like-minded states that would actively work toward a ban after the close of the review conference. Norway soon emerged as one of the key allies for the ICBL in promoting a comprehensive ban.
As a result of Norway's signing of the Mine Ban Treaty and as a necessary step to carry out its obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation was passed by the Parliament on 16 June 1998. Instead of making adjustments in already existing laws, a separate law was formulated. Not only did this make the legal process of incorporating the articles of the Treaty into Norwegian law less complicated, it also symbolized the extent of Norway's commitment to the achievement of a ban against APMs.(495)
The law builds upon the text of the Mine Ban Treaty and prohibits the actions that the treaty prohibits. Penal sanctions for violation of the law include fines or up to two years imprisonment. Persons guilty of gross negligence of the law can be fined or sentenced to up to six months imprisonment.(496) Section 5 of the law provides for special exceptions from penal sanctions for foreigners, primarily military personnel, whose own country has not ratified the treaty. In other words, this provides for a situation where American military forces enter Norway during training exercises with antipersonnel mines that are legal by American law, without being prosecuted in Norway. The exceptions to the law are based on an interpretation of article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty whereby legal and other measures for the implementation of the treaty should be "appropriate." According to Norwegian official views, "a possible prosecution of allies in such a situation cannot be seen as appropriate."(497)
According to officials in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, work has begun on the report to the United Nations required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban.(498) While there is no obligation to report to the first meeting of states' parties in Maputo in May 1999, MFA signaled that most of the information for the official report should be gathered before the meeting so that the report can be finished well in time for the September 1999 deadline.(499)
CCW and CD
On 20 April 1998, Norway ratified Protocol II of the CCW, as amended on 3 May 1996. Norway is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Its position on negotiating a ban on APM transfers in the CD is that it is superfluous to have a partial ban when one has a total ban already in place on APMs.(500)
Norway has never engaged in large-scale or technologically advanced production of landmines. There are indications of minor military production in the early 1950s of some very primitive mines, made out of a wooden box filled with TNT. Due to the time of production and the rather primitive model, the data regarding this production is rather insignificant for the purposes of this report. Norway is not producing delivery systems that can be used for APMs or any other landmines.(501)
However, in its report "Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersonnel Mines," Human Rights Watch (HRW) revealed that in the early 1990s the American-based company Dyno Nobel, Inc. (formerly Ireco), whose parent company is the Norwegian Dyno Industrier AS, produced components for mines and mine delivery systems. Dyno Nobel's response to the revelations by HRW was the renunciation of future production at Dyno Nobel.(502) Norway is currently not producing components that are designed for use in APMs. However, multiple-use detonators and chips which can be important components of legal military or civilian items are probably part of Norwegian military stocks.(503)
Norway is not producing Claymore mines, but has a record of importing such mines. The last purchase of these mines (which are called "sector charges" in Norway) occurred as late as 1997 from the Austrian company Südsterische Metall Industrie (SMI).(504) There are no plans for further purchases, but eventual new purchases of Claymores are not ruled out.(505) The critical question in Norway has been whether steps have been taken to ensure that these mines are rebuilt to be command-detonated only. Focus was placed on this issue at the time of the Oslo conference in 1997, when the media discovered the recent military purchases. The Minister of Defense at the time, Mr. Jørgen Kosmo, then admitted that nothing had been done so far to ensure that the mines would be rebuilt to be command-detonated only.(506) An operation to rebuild the Claymores in Norwegian stockpiles started during the fall of 1998 and is projected to take two years and cost approximately NOK 55 million in total.(507) This process is being carried out at LIAB in Sweden.(508)
Norway is seeking alternatives to substitute for the combat effect that APMs represented, but at the moment is not engaged in developing such alternatives. Norway is monitoring international developments in this arena.(509)
Norway is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. It is currently neither exporting nor importing APMs, in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty. Norway does reserve the right to import Claymore-type mines and antitank mines, including those with anti-handling devices. The anti-handling devices on these mines were an issue of much discussion in the article on the definitions in the Mine Ban Treaty. The diplomatic record records the discussion and the consensus that if an anti-vehicle mine with an anti-handling device explodes due to an innocent act that mine would be considered an APM under the Ottawa Treaty and thus illegal.(510)
Norway imported APMs in the past, but the last purchases (excluding the previously mentioned Claymores) were made about thirty years ago. Documentation is not available on the exact date, quantity, value and suppliers of the imports, but it is clear that a large amount of the mines were transferred to Norway in the aftermath of World War II at the time of the Marshall Plan. APMs in Norwegian stocks included the M2A-series, 1951 C (Norwegian model), M16, M-14 and the M19 Claymore mine.(511) Inquiries have been made to the Ministry of Defense about a type of Swedish Claymore, but no answers or clarifications on the possible possession of this mine have been received at the time of submission of this report. According to the Defense Ministry and the Defense High Command, plans had been made to import new APMs. This did not happen before Norway signed the ban treaty and, for obvious reasons, the plans were canceled.(512)
The transit of another country's APMs across Norwegian territory is not prohibited by Norwegian legislation.(513) Norway's position on the issue of transit is a matter of concern to many in the ban movement. Norway has chosen to view APMs that are moved through or transferred into the country only as a Norwegian "concern" if the transfer happens both physically, by the mines being moved to Norway, and in terms of property rights, meaning that the ownership of the mines are changed. This issue has proved to be sensitive due to the presence of American stockpiles of APMs on Norwegian territory. According to the Norwegian interpretation of the Treaty, the American-owned mines on Norwegian soil are defined as outside of Norwegian concern.(514)
There are two likely reasons for this position. First, Norway believes its national security is enhanced from having a US military stockpiles on Norwegian territory and this is probably one of the reasons the stocks were agreed upon in the first place, as a continuation of the "base policy" Norway adhered to during the Cold War.(515) Second, Norway might be afraid of losing immediate US material support in case of an emergency if the issue of inhibiting movement or removing the APMs is pushed too hard.
Norway completed destruction of the antipersonnel mines in its stockpile in October 1996, long before signing the Mine Ban Treaty. Today, Norway does not have APMs in stockpile, except a small number retained for training purposes, and Claymore mines which the government no longer classifies as APMs. The destruction was carried out at the Norwegian military's destruction site in Lærdal, Norway. The destruction method was explosion of the mines.(516) It should be noted that parts of Norwegian stocks had been destroyed prior to its decision to ban the weapon, simply because the mines were old, outdated and not usable.(517)
The specific amount spent on the destruction is not readily available, both because of the time frame of the total destruction process and because the Ministry of Defense claims that the resources spent on this activity are included in the general figures in the budgets for military personnel and activities and therefore not specifically stated.(518)
The USA has stocks of APMs on Norwegian territory through a bilateral agreement. The information on locations, type and quantities is classified. In a 1997 article in the newspaper Dagbladet, it was revealed that American stocks most likely to contain APMs at the time was located in Trøndelag, Norway.(519) The presence of American APMs was a hot issue in the process when Norway signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty and it remains sensitive today.
Nongovernmental organizations and other critics of the government's interpretation of the Treaty text in 1997 voiced their concerns through various media, but the government stood firm on their interpretations of the Treaty which, as previously mentioned, allow for American APM storage, transfer and transit to/on Norwegian national territory. The understanding between American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Vollebæk at the time of the Norwegian ratification was that nothing would happen with the American military stocks for a period of 4 years, starting from the entry into force of the treaty. (This time frame is a reflection of the provision in the Treaty allowing for four years from entry into force of the Treaty - which would be 1 March 2003 - for destruction of existing stockpiles of APMs). In a letter to Secretary Albright, Minister Vollebæk wrote that the United States can transport mines in and out of the storage areas during this period and that Norway will not oppose transit of American mines across Norwegian territory during military operations. Furthermore, Norway will not report on American APMs on Norwegian territory in this period.(520) A permanent solution to the issue of American stocks will have to be finalized no later than year 2003, when American APMs must be gone from Norway. At the present this issue is not being widely discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense.(521)
The actual number of APMs to be retained for training purposes in Norwegian military stocks is unknown, but currently there are less than ten APMs in Norwegian stockpile. This number will change over time, as APMs will be imported by the Norwegian Defense Ministry for training purposes. These APMs are for the most part used by the Engineer Regiment for training of demining personnel and dogs and for personnel going abroad on missions. The training APMs are not yet stored in the specific places that are designated for this purpose, but will be located in two military depots, one in the south and one in the north of Norway. These two depots will be available for inspection by anyone who wishes to apply for entrance. Other military storage facilities in Norway are only available for inspection by Norwegian citizens with special permission.(522)
During World War II, the Germans used mines in Norway, especially in the north, but there is no evidence that Norwegian forces used mines in any structured way during that time. There is no evidence or allegations of any other use of APMs in Norway.(523) Norway does not have a landmine problem in terms of mine affected areas that can be a hazard to the civilian population.
Norway reserves the right to use command-detonated mines, which are being altered to ensure that they can be used in command-detonation mode only. Tripwires are removed from all mines, while anti-handling systems for ATMs are used.(524)
Mine Action Funding
In a statement to the United Nations by a Norwegian official in 1998, it was noted that "For more than ten years Norway has been active in mine action activities around the world - both through the UN system and through bilateral programs involving NGOs like Norwegian People's Aid."(525) This humanitarian engagement has been supplemented further in the aftermath of the Treaty signing conference in Ottawa. Norway committed to contributing US$120 million over a five-year period to mine action activities.(526) This commitment emphasizes the importance of the humanitarian aspect of the landmine discussion, and is a strong statement of Norway's the commitment to this issue. Further signals are given in the careful prioritizing on the use of the funds: MFA is trying to channel funds to countries that have serious landmine-problems and at the same time are signatories of the treaty. (527)
In 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated funds for mine action and other mine related activities to various UN offices and programs, WHO, the NATO SFOR mine clearance program, Norwegian Red Cross (which channels money to the ICRC), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Organization of American States, and a large number of other actors that received funds in support of landmine-related conferences and seminars in Norway and abroad. In October 1997, Norway donated US$200,000 to the ICBL and its Landmine Monitor initiative.
Overview Of Funds Allocated By The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs To Mine Related Activities, 1994-1998. (in NOK)
|Mine Clearance & Surveys||28,860,225||48,664,923||66,906,824||46,433,676||93,045,904|
|Conferences & Information||150,000||722,325||61,665||5,908,296||7,184,209|
In addition, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) provides a smaller amount of funds to mine action activities. The NORAD funds have been channeled through Norwegian People's Aid, Handicap International and UNDP. Activities include mine clearance, victim assistance and mine awareness programs.
Overview Of Funds Allocated By Norad To Mine-Related Activities In The Time Period 1994-1997 (in NOK million)
Neither MFA or NORAD have any statistics that identify the specific breakdowns of how money is spent in Norway and abroad of the funds allocated to humanitarian demining. However, for example, when NPA receives funds for projects implemented abroad, the organization usually receives a small amount for administration costs. There is not a separate office in MFA that deals with landmine issues. This means that the funds that are spent on administration domestically remain small.(529) It must be pointed out that MFA can do this because it is not directly involved in project work, but instead channels money through nongovernmental organizations, international organizations and multilateral institutions like the UN.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), as the largest Norwegian organization working with mine action, also receives funds for its activities from foreign sources. These include USAID, SIDA, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Austcare, DANIDA, Statoil and WFP.(530)
It is very difficult to calculate in-kind contributions to humanitarian mine action. Neither MFA nor NORAD has any statistics that identify the proportion of in-kind contributions in their assistance.
Norway is not considered a mine and UXO affected area. From time to time mines and explosives from World War II are discovered, but this does not represent a great danger to civilians.
As noted in the above section, Norway is a leader in providing support for mine clearance activities in mine-affected countries. The largest NGO humanitarian mine clearance organization in the world, NPA, is supported by the Norwegian government, among others, and carries out mine action programs in various regions of the world.
Mine Awareness Education
There is no need for mine awareness education programs aimed at Norwegians in Norway, as Norway does not have a mine problem. However, Norway sends both civil and military personnel on missions to mine-infested areas, and they need to be trained in mine awareness. This mine awareness education is carried out by the Engineer School, and they have had courses for a variety of groups, including personnel serving for UNIFIL, NORBN, SFOR Bosnia, Macedonia UNPREDEP and CIV POL UN, as well as UN observers.(531)
Norway has a refugee population from all over the world, many of whom wish to return to their home countries, some of which have severe landmine-problems. There is a need for mine awareness education among these refugees to prepare them to return to their home countries. Returnees often face a more difficult situation than the people that stayed during a conflict where landmines were used because they simply do not have any knowledge about where mines were laid, and which areas are safe.
Recognizing this concern, Norwegian People's Aid in 1996 established a mine awareness project for Bosnian refugees in Norway. To date, this project has reached out to most Bosnian refugees living in Norway (11,370 people) with information about the landmine problem in their home country and with mine awareness education. The project has also reached refugees living in Sweden. Mine awareness lectures are the main element of the educational program, but the project has produced a detailed mine awareness brochure in Bosnian, a teacher's manual in mine awareness education for Bosnian teachers in Norway and elsewhere, and the plan is to produce a mine awareness instruction film in 1999. In addition, mine awareness articles have been published in the exile-newspaper "Bosanska Posta," and mine awareness programs have been made for Bosnian radio programs in Norway, reaching Oslo and 12 other municipalities. The project was funded in 1998 with NOK 528,000 from the Department of Immigration.(532)
Mine Ban Treaty
Portugal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 February 1999. Portugal first voiced its support for an immediate and total ban on antipersonnel mines on 3 May 1996 during the negotiations on the Landmine Protocol of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. At that time, it also announced an indefinite moratorium on landmine production, export, and use, except for training purposes.(533) In December 1996, it voted for the UN General Assembly resolution calling on states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines. Portugal took part in all the Ottawa Process treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September 1997. Portugal also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in late 1997 and 1998. Portugal is a state party to the CCW (2 June 1983), and ratified amended Protocol II on 31 March 1999. Portugal is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament. Speaking at the Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony, Portugal's representative said: "We accept that work in this field needs to be carried out also in other international fora, such as the disarmament conference. But, not only should it be complementary in nature, it should not imply any exceptions to the terms of the treaty which we are now signing."(534)
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Portugal has produced at least seven types of antipersonnel landmines, including the PRB M409, the M453, the M432, the M/996, the M421, the M412, the M/969.(535) Portuguese mines have been found in Angola, Iraq, Namibia, Somalia, South Africa, and Zambia.(536) As noted above, in 1996 Portugal announced an indefinite moratorium on landmine production, export, and use, except for training purposes. Portugal has destroyed part, if not all, of its stockpile since then, while retaining an unknown number for training.
Humanitarian Mine Action
Portugal is not mine-affected. Portugal has donated $150,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, $100,000 of which was directed to demining in Angola. The Portuguese military also assists Angola with demining through a military exchange program.(537)
San Marino signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 March 1998. While not an active participant throughout the Ottawa Process, San Marino endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and took part in the Oslo treaty negotiations. San Marino also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998. San Marino does not produce, transfer, stockpile or use antipersonnel landmines, and is not mine affected.
Mine Ban Treaty
The Slovak Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified ("approved") it on 25 February 1999. Slovakia took part in all of the Ottawa Process treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and was a full participant in the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September. It also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
At the Regional Conference on Landmines in Budapest, Hungary on 26-28 March 1998, a Foreign Ministry official stated that Slovakia was committed never to produce, export, stockpile, or use antipersonnel landmines.(538)
Slovakia is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (28 May 1993), but has not ratified 1996 amended Protocol II on mines. A member of the Conference on Disarmament, Slovakia was one of 22 countries that endorsed a statement in February 1999 advocating the negotiation of a ban on transfers of antipersonnel landmines through the CD.(539)
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
The former Czechoslovakia was a significant producer and exporter of arms, including landmines. However, when the country divided, Slovakia did not inherit any of Czechoslovakia's landmine production facilities.(540) Speaking at the Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony, the head of Slovakia's delegation said that "from the very first day of its independent existence, Slovakia does not produce any antipersonnel landmines."(541) Slovakia has had a moratorium on exports in place since 1994. The status of Slovakia's antipersonnel mine stockpile is unclear.
Humanitarian Mine Action
Slovakia is not mine-affected. Slovakia has donated $10,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, and Slovak engineers have helped to check and demine more than 3 million square meters of land in the former Yugoslavia since 1993.(542) Slovakia has also engaged in demining and victim assistance in Western Sahara, and produces demining equipment and mine awareness and education materials.(543) Pursuant to the provisions of Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Slovakia has expressed a readiness to provide assistance in mine awareness programs, mine clearance and mine clearance training, and stockpile destruction. Slovakia has also been active in developing new mine clearance technology - the Bozena and Belarty demining machines.(544)
Mine Ban Policy
Slovenia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 27 October 1998. Slovenia took part in all of the Ottawa Process treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and was a full participant in the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September. It also voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting a ban on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998. State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ivo Vaigl attended the Regional Conference on Landmines in Budapest, Hungary on 26-28 March 1998. Slovenia is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the 1996 amended Protocol II on mines.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Slovenia is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines in the past. Speaking at the Budapest Regional Conference, Mr. Vaigl stated that as of 5 November 1996, Slovenia committed never to produce, transfer, stockpile, or use antipersonnel mines.(545) According to Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Slovenia has a stockpile of approximately 145,000 antipersonnel mines. Slovenia is expected to approve a stockpile destruction plan in 1999, with all APMS, except for some 7,000 retained for training, destroyed by April 2003.(546)
The government of Slovenia has reported a problem with landmines remaining from both World Wars and the brief war of independence in 1991, during which the Yugoslav army laid mines near military targets and in other areas of Slovenia. Many of these mines and other unexploded ordnance were removed in 1992, but the number remaining is unclear.(547)
Slovenia's delegate at the Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony said that "Slovenia considers the regional approach as the most effective way of its engagement" with humanitarian mine action.(548) As such, Slovenia has concentrated its landmine-related humanitarian efforts on neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which it donated 200 million Tolars for mine victim assistance in 1995.(549) Slovenia has been seeking international funding for an international trust fund for demining and mine victim assistance in Bosnia.(550) In January 1999, the governments of Slovenia and the Czech Republic signed a declaration of cooperation in support of this fund,(551) which has been named the International Trust Fund of the Republic of Slovenia for Demining, Mine Clearance and Assistance to Mine Victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is headquartered in Ljubljana.(552) Slovenia also has offered demining training through its Centre for Search and Rescue and assistance for mine victims through its Institute for Rehabilitation.(553)
Mine Ban Policy
On 3 December 1997, Spain signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It officially deposited its instruments of ratification at the United Nations on 19 January 1999, the sixtieth nation to do so. From the point of view of the Spanish Campaign to Ban Landmines, the delay in the ratification process was disappointing. The same day Spain signed the treaty, its political leaders publicly promised to be among the first 40 countries to ratify the Treaty. During a meeting in June 1998 with Campaign members, Spain's President José Mͺ Aznar, announced that the government was willing to be among those first countries.
On 17 September 1998, the Spanish parliament passed the "Law Banning Antipersonnel Landmines as well as those Arms with Similar Effects " (Law 33/1998), and it entered into force on 7 October 1998. (554) While Law 33/1998 basically follows the articles of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, it apparently does not constitute implementation legislation. The law does not include any penal sanctions. The annex to Law 33/1998, which describes "other dispositions," states that sanctions will be developed in implementing legislation.
On the positive side, the law includes an article on humanitarian mine clearance, and another on aid to landmine victims (which was not included in the first draft offered by the government). The fourth article of the law also bans the use, production, stocking, and transfer of landmine delivery systems. Unfortunately, like the Mine Ban Treaty, the law does not define antitank mines with anti-handling devices as antipersonnel mines. The Spanish Campaign has also expressed concern about the length of the period for destruction of stocks, and has called for transparency with all aspects of its plan for the destruction of landmines -- both to members of the Spanish Parliament and to NGOs during the process -- including visits by NGOs to the Spanish company, FAEX, where the destruction will take place, to witness the destruction of APMs.
Though it attended all the ban treaty preparatory meetings, Spain was a reluctant participant in the Ottawa Process. The government appears to have embraced the process only when it was impossible not to, because of the momentum and visibility at the international level, and also because of the pressure generated by the Spanish Campaign, with the support of the Parliament, the media, and the high level of public awareness of the issue in Spanish society. For example, Spain did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Final Declaration of June 1997 until the Brussels Conference was already over. Even at this mid-point of the Ottawa Process it was impossible for NGOs to determine the intentions of the Spanish government. It is likely that the government had not developed a definitive position. Spain appeared to follow the lead of other western states, such as the United States or Germany.
During the Oslo negotiations, Spain was one of the few governments to support the United States and its various proposals which would have seriously undermined the total prohibition of APMs. Furthermore, the Spanish representatives in the Oslo floated a proposal that sought an exception to the ban when national security necessities demanded it -- in essence saying APMs would be banned only during peace time. It was not until the last day of negotiations that Spain withdrew this proposal, and publicly stated its willingness to sign the final text.
The decision to join the Ottawa Process and to sign the treaty was largely due to pressure the government had from both the NGOs of the campaign, the media and the Parliament. NGOs pointed out the role being played by Spain during the whole process was starkly different from that being portrayed by the government at home in Spain. In fact, Spain was among those countries that would have preferred to deal with this issue inside the Conference on Disarmament. It repeatedly claimed that the Ottawa process was going to be useless, due to the absence of the major landmine producers and also to the lack of efficient mechanisms to control the enforcement of the treaty.
Spain did not oppose the notion of a ban so much as it did the Ottawa Process approach. As the government has pointed out, it adhered to the Joint Action of the European Union, on 28 November 1997, and supported resolutions in the UN General Assembly and the European Parliament against the use or trade of landmines. Moreover, in the preamble of the 1998 Law passed by the Spanish parliament on 17 September and legally binding since 6 October 1998, the government declares its will to strengthen its efforts to promote the adherence of all the countries to the Mine Ban Treaty, and to include this issue in the agendas of the principal international forums, as well. Finally, it also declares its commitment to the victims of landmines and, therefore, will support such humanitarian tasks as landmine clearance, landmine destruction and medical and psychological care for mine victims (Law 33/1998).
Before the Mine Ban Treaty, the only domestic legislation was a unilateral moratorium on the export of some types of landmines to certain countries. This was first one-year moratorium was passed in February 1994 (though it did not enter into force until July 1998), and again one year later (February 1995). Finally, in May 1996 the government proposed an indefinite moratorium. However, NGOs discovered that Spanish APMs producers in 1996 were seen at international arms fairs, where they were advertising their products and, among them, the landmines they used to produce.(555)
Spain ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 29 December 1993. At that moment, the ratification did not include the protocols, but just the text of the Convention. On 5 May 1994, the Official Journal of the State (BOE) contained a correction, noting the ratification of the Convention's Protocols as well. Spain also participated in the CCW review conference and ratified the amended Protocol on 27 January 1998.
As previously noted, Spain would have preferred that negotiation take place in the CD and has supported the attempts to inspire a negotiation of a ban on mine transfers in that forum.
Although Spain no longer produces antipersonnel mines, it has in the past. Officially, Spanish production of landmines was stopped in May 1996. Spanish companies used to produce five types of APMs, including the Expal P4B blast mine, the Expal P4A blast mine, the Expal P5 blast mine, the P5 AR (with anti-handling device), and the P Salta bounding fragmentation mine.(556)
Mines were produced by five Spanish private companies: Bressel, Explosivos Alaveses (Expal), Explosivos de Burgos (EDB), Fabricaciones Extremeñas (FAEX), and Unión Española de Explosivos (UEE). Three of them (EDB, Expal, and FAEX) all belong to a bigger company, UEE, itself owned by the KYO group (a company from Kuwait) until it was sold to Pallas Investment, from the Netherlands. All are a part of the group DEFEX (Defense and Export), which, in turn, is controlled by the INI (the Industry National Institute). That means that although they are private companies, they receive public subsidies, and most of their sales come through so-called FAD loans (Development Aid Funds, which are a type of Spanish Official Aid for Development).(557) Spain has produced landmines under the license of companies of other countries (Italy, for instance). Today under Law 33/1988 production is banned in Spain.
Apparently Spanish companies are not producing Claymore mines. It is unclear if these munitions are banned under Law 33/1998 as "Arms of Similar Effects." These kind of arms with similar effects to antipersonnel landmines are described in the revised 1996 Protocol 2 of the CCW. It does not seem that Spain is engaged in research and development on or production of alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.
Spanish companies used to produce cluster bombs, antitank mines, landmine delivery systems and others munitions, some of which might function like an antipersonnel mine.(558) It is not known if Spain is producing components (e.g. casing, fuse, detonator, chip) that are designed for use in APMs but, it was done so in the past.(559) Delivery systems designed to be used for APMs have been banned by the 33/1998 Law. However, in November, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines asked for follow-up on negotiations between a former Italian landmine producer Valsella Meccanotecnica- and Expal, one of the former Spanish producers. Although the Italian firm had ceased production been converted to civilian production, it still had some commitments with foreign companies. Among those was the production of the ISTRICE delivery system for use with both APMs and antitank mines for Expal. The Spanish Campaign has sought clarification in writing from both Expal, and the Spanish government. As of yet, there has been no response from either.
Before the Mine Ban Treaty, the Spanish government passed a unilateral moratorium on the export of landmines. This was first approved in 1994 (February) and again one year later. Finally, in May 1996 an indefinite moratorium was approved by the Spanish government. The ban on the exports in the 1998 Spanish law has replaced the former moratorium.
As far as exports and imports are concerned, it is still very hard to obtain information on recipients, quantity, types, value, date of transfer, etc. from governmental sources, since these matters are usually considered to be state secret. However, Spanish landmines have been found in Iraq, Mauritania, the Falklands, and Morocco, as the Red Cross has revealed. The same lack of transparency affects data on imports as well. The only thing we could add is that the Spanish army was entirely supplied by Spanish companies.
Spain's position on the legality of another country transiting APMs across Spain's national territory is also well defined. The Spanish Law clearly bans the transit of another country's APMs across Spain's national territory, since it applies to its whole; this affects the US stockpiles in Spain.(560)
Spain has begun destroying its stockpile of antipersonnel landmines. Under the 1998 Law, Spain has a period of three years to finish this task, which began on 27 July 1998. Currently, the Spanish Army is said to have stocks of around 819,678 antipersonnel landmines. That apparently includes 149,548 Expal P4B landmines; 580,251 mines of the Expal P5 type; 28,188 P5 AR landmines; and 61,691 bounding mines (PS). Information about the quantity of P4A landmines is not available.(561)
It is unclear whether the amount includes 200,000 antipersonnel landmines which had gone past their useful date and should have been destroyed long time ago. This numbers do not include Claymore mines, which were not produced in Spain, according to both official and independent sources. The value of Spanish stockpiles has been calculated to be around 1,500 million pesetas.
The last time antipersonnel landmines were produced for internal consumption was in 1991. Since that time, Spanish stockpiles have decreased around twenty percent. This was not the result of a policy to limit the production of mines, but the consequence of the need to withdraw from stocks those mines were going past their useful date and were already deteriorated. The Air Army bought some landmines for the last time in 1994.
From 1994 to 1996 the army bought a number of blank cartridge mines, without explosives inside, to be used for training purposes. These are mines the government will keep, as allowed by the Ottawa Treaty and the Spanish Law. Ten thousand landmines will be retained for training purposes under Article 3 of the treaty. The Defense Ministry (Ministerio de Defensa) and the Spanish army plan to use 1,000 annually for training purposes, which include detection training and another one focused on deactivation. At the moment, there is no data available related to the numbers of various types of mines being retained.
According to governmental estimates, every day 1,200 landmines are destroyed. Given that the process began on 27 July 1998, more than 225,600 landmines (around 30 percent of stockpiles) should have been destroyed by now. However, there has been no official information to verify this figure. According to the Spanish law, the process of destruction must be completed three years after the entry into force of the latter, that is to say, in October 2001. However, governmental sources have recently stated that the destruction process could end within 22 to 28 months, providing that 1,200 mines are destroyed every day.(562)
Mines are being destroyed by incineration in a four step process. During the first phase, the landmines are taken apart. Next, the different components of each mine are taken to the incinerator; there they are incinerated in an oven containing up to five kg of explosives; finally, the gases produced during the whole process are neutralized in order to prevent toxic emissions that could damage the environment. The destruction is being carried out by one of the former producers of landmines, the company Fabricaciones Extremeñas, (FAEX) in its plant located in Villa El Gordo (Cáceres). It is the only plant in Spain that conducts the destruction of munition and explosives and, according to governmental sources, its environmental safety is totally guaranteed.(563) The total cost of destruction will be 527 million pesetas: that means 638 pesetas per landmine.(564)
The USA, a non-signatory country of the Mine Ban Treaty, has landmine stockpiles on its military bases located in Spain. As far as we know, the biggest stockpiles are located in Rota (Cádiz), which is supposed to contain around 2,000 US mines since the Gulf War. Since the US bases in Spain remained under the jurisdiction of the Spanish government and, consequently under Spanish rule, these stockpiles must be whether destroyed or retired to US territory, according to the Spanish law. The third article of the 1998 Law specifies that "the government shall inform the Parliament once a year, and until the destruction of APMs is completed all around the Spanish territory" (Law 33/1998).
The Spanish authorities have told the US that they will be required to withdraw their stocks and they have already begun to negotiate the terms and conditions of the withdrawal. At the same time, Spain is not pressing them to do it immediately; the Spanish government doesn't consider it urgent because the terms stated by the Treaty are long enough to do it without a hurry, but also because it pursues a "flexible attitude" on the matter.(565) The deadline for the end of the withdrawal of all the US landmine stockpiles has been fixed on the 1 July 1999. A news account in March 1999 said the US will be withdrawing the 2,000 mines at Rota.(566)
It is unclear if any non-state actors (e.g. rebel groups) have stockpiles of APMs in Spain. Some time ago it was said that the ETA (a nonstate group in the Basque Country) might have landmines, although they have never used them in their anti-government actions. According to media reports, the Basque government had been buying some landmines from 1991 until 1996 to train the police, just in case ETA was thinking about using them. Some 300 blank cartridge landmines acquired by the Basque government were subsequently destroyed, according to official sources.(567)
There is no use of APMs in Spain. The last time Spain used APMs was in 1975, when the army placed 22,000 antipersonnel landmines all along the border between the former Spanish Sahara and Morocco, in order to stop the Green March, organized by King Hassan. The Spanish Army kept some landmine stockpiles and planned to use them in case there was any serious conflict with Morocco, that could pose danger to Ceuta and Melilla particularly.
During the Ottawa process in Spain there was the rumor that a number of antipersonnel landmines were lying along the borders between Ceuta and Melilla, and Morocco, in order to stop the flows of migrants from Africa. The Defense Minister, Mr. Eduardo Serra, stated that there were no mines placed in Spanish territory, including Ceuta and Melilla.
Mine Action Funding
Spain has contributed to humanitarian mine action programs since 1995. Its contributions have gone to two main agencies, the United Nations Trust Fund and the Organization of American States, which oversees demining programs in Central America. The total amount of money has been allocated as follows:
Spain's Contribution to Humanitarian Mine Action Programs
(U.S. dollars have been calculated at constant prices, 2 February 1999)
United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund - Total 124,897,065 PTAs (U.S. $865,416)
1995 21,331,275 PTAs (U.S. $147,805)
3,565,790 PTAs (U.S. $24,707)
1997 50 million PTAs (U.S.$ 346,452)
50 million PTAs (U.S. $346,452)
OAS demining program - 100 million PTAs (U.S. $692,905)
1996 25 million PTAs (U.S. $173,226)
1997 25 million PTAs.(U.S. $173,226)
50 million PTAs (U.S. $346,452)
In 1998, 50 million PTAs (US$346,452) was given to both the UNVTF and the OAS programs.(568)
Spanish and local nongovernmental organizations have not received any funds for demining actions, because the government considers that they are not well equipped for mine clearance. However, some have obtained governmental funds to develop survivor assistance projects and mine awareness education, although figures for this support are not available.
According to the Presidency Ministry, some money has been used in Spain to buy specialized equipment for demining and to support Spanish soldiers in the field, for mine clearance done by personnel from the army and the police, to pay extra to their salaries, justified because of the risks of their work.
As noted, the OAS received 100 million PTAs (US$ 692,905) and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund obtained 125 million PTAs. (US$865,416). In the first case, Spain gave the money with a single condition: it was to be spent in Central America for specific mine clearance projects. The recipient countries were Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras. Within the UN Fund Trust, Spain co-financed the Mine Clearance Program in Angola (its monetary participation represents the 6.25 per cent of the total amount). In the field, 45 per cent of the funds were spent on mine clearance and surveying (around US$701,244). On the other hand, US$857,077 were spent on survivor assistance.
Mine Ban Policy(569)
Swedish discussion on landmines gathered momentum in 1993, when several Swedish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), largely as a result of international attention to landmines, started to highlight the issue. The landmine problem was of course not new, but no real discussion about the legitimacy of landmines or a possible ban of the weapon had occurred prior to 1993. One of the first responses in Sweden to the growing concern around the use of landmines, was a declaration by the arms manufacturer Bofors in October 1993. The company stated that it would no longer manufacture AP mines.
Also, in 1993, following the lead of France, Sweden together with that country and the Netherlands submitted a resolution to UN General Assembly, requesting a review conference on Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol II on mines. At that time Swedish policy was that the landmine problem should be tackled through restrictions on the export of mines and by strengthening the CCW. But this policy was increasingly questioned as Parliament began to take up the issue.
On 2 June 1994, Parliament finally decided that "Sweden in connection with the review conference (of the CCW) should declare that an international prohibition against AP mines is the only real solution to the humanitarian problem caused by the use of mines. Sweden should in this connection present proposals to achieve such a prohibition."
Following the decision in Parliament, the Swedish government formally presented a proposal for an international prohibition on the production, transfer, stockpiling and use of AP mines, at a meeting in August 1994 of governmental experts preparing for the review conference of the CCW. While this proposal made Sweden the first country during the review process to formally present a text calling for a total ban on AP mines, the government did not seriously push this option and it was withdrawn during the review conference in Vienna in October 1995.
Parallel with the review process of the CCW, the landmine debate in Sweden continued, and by the end of 1994, the issue of a unilateral Swedish ban on AP mines emerged. In response to a question in Parliament in October 1994, the Swedish Defense Minister declared that - while Sweden was firm in its support for an international ban on AP mines - a unilateral Swedish ban would have no effect at all at the international level while considerably weakening the Swedish defense capability. The position of the Defense Minister was challenged by various organizations and parliamentarians and public pressure for a ban continued to build. On 13 December 1996, the Swedish Parliament imposed a unilateral ban, prohibiting the use of AP mines, and requiring the destruction of all AP mines before the end of 2001.(570)
Despite this national position, Sweden was a surprisingly lukewarm participant in the Ottawa Process. Not a member of the Ottawa Process core group, Sweden was largely quiet throughout and then during the Oslo negotiations offered a proposal to increase the number of ratifications necessary for the MBT to enter into force to 60 (the number settled on, of course, was 40) which was certainly not viewed by the ICBL as "ban friendly."
Sweden signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa 3 December 1997. On 5 February 1998 the Swedish Government informed the UN Secretary General that the general obligations under Article 1.1 were applicable, according to Article 18 of the Treaty. The Treaty was ratified on 25 November 1998 and the instruments of ratification deposited at the United Nations on 30 November 1998. At the time of ratification the Swedish parliament reaffirmed applicability of the treaty under Article 18.(571)
Sweden has ratified the CCW, both the original Protocol 2 and the revised 1996 Protocol 2 (ratified in July 1997).(572) In 1997 Sweden submitted a resolution 52/42, to the UN General Assembly First Committee, whereby the member states were urged to ratify the revised 1996 Protocol 2 on mines. Sweden supported Resolution 52/38 H, submitted by Finland together with, among others, Australia, Russia and US on negotiating a ban on mine transfer in the CD. While Sweden is focusing on the work to get as many signatories as possible to the Ottawa Convention rather than negotiating a ban on transfers, it will not oppose a ban on transfer in the CD as long as the criteria and definitions used are at least as strict as those used in the Ottawa Convention.(573)
Explosives have been the Swedish industry's most important contribution to global AP mine production. The Swedish companies FFV, Bofors and LIAB, produced and developed 21 different types of AP mines since World War II. The major part of the production was transferred to the Swedish Armed Forces.(574)
Swedish AP mines:
Weapon, Material, Characteristics, Comments(575)
- Airfield blast mine made from wood, not considered by the army to be an AP mine but designed to destroy landing planes. Destroyed (Discarded);
- AP 12 directional fragmentation mine. To be remodeled for command-detonation only;
- M-11 bounding, fragmentation mine. Will be destroyed;
- M-12 fragmentation mine. To be remodeled for command-detonation only;
- M-46 cardboard blast mine. Its stockpile status is unknown;
- M-41 wooden blast mine. Will be destroyed;
- M-43 cardboard blast mine. Its stockpile status is unknown;
- M-43T cardboard blast mine. Its stockpile status is unknown;
- M-48 fragmentation mine. Will be destroyed;
- M-49 cardboard blast mine. Destroyed;
- M-49B cardboard blast mine. Will be destroyed;
- M-43 (47mm) fragmentation mine. Destroyed;
- M-43 (80mm) fragmentation mine. Will be destroyed;
- M-43T (1-cm) fragmentation mine. Will be destroyed;
- Model 43 & 43(t) made from concrete and metal. Will be destroyed;
- Truppmina 9 fragmentation mine. Will be destroyed;
- FFV013 directional fragmentation Claymore mine. Not considered AP;
- FFV013R directional fragmentation Claymore mine. Not considered AP;
- Mina 5. Not considered AP;
- LI-11 plastic mine. Will be destroyed;
- LI-12 directional fragmentation. To be remodeled for command-detonation only.
The Swedish government has stated that Sweden has not produced or exported AP mines since 1974.(576) According to a report on mines that SPAS issued in 1994, Bofors produced Truppmina 12 (Claymore) mines until 1992. Furthermore, FFV 013, which is the commercial notation for the Fordonsmina 13 (Claymore), which officially is an antitank mine, still belongs to Bofors product program. In 1994 The Inspectorate-General of Military Equipment (KMI) told SPAS, "(T)he mine (FFV 013) cannot be categorized as an antitank mine, but should be categorized as antipersonnel."(577) Both Truppmina 12 and Fordonsmina 13 offer command and tripwire detonation options.
The Swedish Armed Forces have nine different types of AP mines in stock, all of which will be destroyed before the end of 2001. Sweden is not engaged in developing alternatives to AP mines. This is due to financial constraints on the armed forces and the fact that Sweden is dismantling traditional territorial defenses against foreign military invasion. So there are neither funds nor the need for developing alternatives to APM in the Swedish Armed Forces.(578)
The Swedish export of AP mines has been limited, mostly consisting of mine components.(579) But Bofors did export large numbers of AP mines to Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. Switzerland purchased AP mines from Bofors from 1958 to 1964, and more than one million mines in 1971.(580) The company exported 33,000 Mina 5 to Pakistan in 1958. Some reports indicate that these mines, apparently resold by Pakistan many years later, were deployed by mujahadin guerillas in Afghanistan.(581)
Bofors is also known to have sold 573 tons of explosives (RDX) to the Italian industry Valsella 1981-1983. Another 670 tons of explosives were sold to Valsella via the French company SNPE. Arms researchers believe that the explosives transferred to Valsella were used in mines exported to Iraq. Some of this explosive, shipped via Singapore, was later found in Singapore-assembled mines in Cambodia. Bofors exported more than 750 tons of explosives to the Portuguese industry SPEL 1982-1984 and 231 tons of explosives to the industry FDSP in Yugoslavia 1985.(582)
As noted above, the Swedish government says that APMs have neither been produced or exported since 1974. This is accurate. But apart from large amounts of exports of explosives, Sweden has also exported Fordonsmina 13 and 13R (FFV 013 and 013R), which is a Claymore-type mine with tripwire detonation options, to Norway (1978), Ireland (1987), Japan (1990) and Switzerland (1991?).(583)
The Government has declared that the stockpile of AP mines will be destroyed before the end of 2001, except for small numbers of AP mines retained for R&D and training purposes. Sweden has started to destroy its stockpile of AP mines, but the number of mines in stockpile remains classified. According to an official at the Swedish Armed Forces HQ there was a discussion during the fall of 1998 if the data should be made public. It was decided that it "was not meaningful to make the data public now,"(584) as the information will be reported to the United Nations as required by Article 7 by September 1999. So, according to the official, the data on numbers of APM in stockpile, cost of destruction, location, numbers of APMs being retained for training purposes and so on will be classified until Sweden informs the UN Secretary General.(585)
Nevertheless some information has been available. The agency responsible for the destruction of APMs, the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV), put out a bid for the destruction of Truppmina 10 mines on the European market in May 1998. There are strict instructions concerning safety and environmental standards for the destruction process. The Swedish Company NAMMO LIAB (former Bofors) received the contract due to its high environmental standards for destruction and for its low cost. In December 1998 another bid was put out for destruction of the remaining APMs. The eight other types of AP mines to be destroyed are: Trampmina m/41, Trampmina m/49B, Betongmina m/43T, Granatmina 8 cm, Granatmina 10 cm, Truppmina 9, Truppmina 11 and Splittermina m/48. NAMMO LIAB will destroy these AP mines too.(586)
A dismantling technique will be used to destroy the APMs and recycle the parts. The explosives (Trotyl), for example, will be used in the mining industry to blast away rocks. No recycled parts will be used for military purposes. FMV requires the company to recycle at least 80 percent of the explosives and NAMMO LIAB will recycle at least 90 percent of all dismantled parts.(587)
According to an official at FMV there are some 3 million AP mines to be destroyed before the end of year 2001. Truppmina 10 accounts for 2.5 million of these mines. The total cost of destruction is estimated to 25.5 million SEK (US$3.2 million).(588) In December 1998 approximately 315,000 Truppmina 10 were destroyed.(589) The destruction of the other mines will begin in February or March 1999.
No decision has yet been made as to how many APMs will be retained for training purposes. The decision is to be taken sometime during the year 2000. The armed forces have declared that it needs 3-4 APMs for every group that is trained for demining. Currently, approximately 10 groups are trained each year. An additional 1-2 mines are needed for every training site and year. The determining factor, though, is how many APMs will be required for extensive testing of mechanical demining devices. As yet, that number has not be deteremined. The armed forces will test Bofors΄ "Mine-Guzzler" during 1999 and after that it will be possible to estimate how many AP mines are needed for every test. Then there will be a testing of the mechanical demining device from Countermine Technologies and maybe three more tests in the coming ten-year period.(590) The location of the retained AP mines will not be public in the future, as they might be desirable to some groups, e.g. criminals.(591)
The Swedish Armed Forces uses four Claymore-type mines: the AP mines Truppmina 12 and 12B and the antivehicle-mines Fordonsmina 13 and 13R. Truppmina 12 and 12B are directional, fragmentation mines that are usually used as an ambush or tripwire-triggered mine against uncovered troops. These mines can be fired by firing device 12 or by a pull wire or by a tripwire.(592) Fordonsmina 13 and 13R are directional fragmentation mines for use against vehicles, helicopters and aircraft on the ground and for troops. The mine is fired by a firing device or by a tripwire. The difference between the Fordonsmina 13 and 13 R is that the 13 R is lighter in weight to make it easier for the soldier to use.(593)
As mentioned above, Fordonsmina 13 and 13R are officially antivehicle-mines, but are also described as useful against troops. According to the instructions, the tripwire for Fordonsmina 13 and 13R should be attached two meters from the ground, in which case they would be intended for vehicles larger than a regular car.(594)
The Swedish Armed Forces will continue to use a modified version of Truppmina 12 and 12B (Claymore), now called Försvarsladdning 21 and 22. FMV has put out on order for the remodeling of Truppmina 12 and 12B to ensure that they can be used in command-detonated mode only. The remodeling will start 1 September 1999 and will be completed before the end of November 2000. There is no technical data yet available for the modified Truppmina 12 or 12B.(595)
The antivehicle-mines Fordonsmina 13 and 13R (Claymore), are not intended to be modified for command-detonated mode only. Sweden is interpreting the Ottawa Convention as not to include Fordonsmina 13 and 13R as they are designed to be detonated by the presence of a vehicle. Furthermore, as one official said, "These mines are not a problem in the world. I would not recommend that anyone use the mine against troops or by tripwire detonation. They are very expensive to use and the tripwire mechanism is not suitable even for vehicles."(596)
The work to update materials and instructions concerning Swedish landmines has just started. "Every publication and operation instruction that contains AP mines or tripwire mines will be updated or discarded. FMV is at the moment updating several publications that contain AP mines for the armed forces."(597)
The Swedish Armed forces has the following antitank and antivehicle mines at its disposal:
- Stridsvagnsmina m/41-47;
- Stridsvagnsmina m/47;
- Stridsvagnsmina m/47-52;
- Stridsvagnsmina m/52;
- Stridsvagnsmina 5 (When adapted with Fire device 15 -- antenna mode -- it is very sensitive to contact);
- Stridsvagnsmina 6 (Anti handling option);
- Fordonsmina 13;
- Fordonsmina 13R;
- Fordonsmina 14.(598)
Mine Action Funding
On 10 February 1999, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lind gave a speech in the Swedish Parliament outlining Swedish foreign policy for 1999. In that speech she said that Sweden "has a leading role in the work for demining and for support to mine victims."(599)
The Swedish International Development Agency, SIDA, is responsible for funding of humanitarian aid and other international humanitarian projects, such as mine victim assistance and rehabilitation. SIDA has provided data on its support for mine action, specifying every project, channel and for what action (i.e. demining, awareness and rehabilitation) for the years 1990-1998.
SIDA's fact sheet shows that Sweden devoted 417 million SEK ($52.1 million) for the period 1990-1998 to support mine action. The funding has increased every year and amounts to 133 million SEK ($16.6) for 1998. Of these funds, 30 million SEK ($3.75 million) is for technical development. The absolute majority of support has gone to mine clearance, while minor allocations have gone to awareness and rehabilitation projects..(600)
The fact sheet provided by Sida shows that the support has mainly been channeled to:
- Angola, 41.1 million SEK (NPA, WFP, UNAWEM III, UNICEF, UNDP/INAROEE);
- Mozambique, 53.4 million SEK (UNDP, ADP-fund, CND, NPA, HI);
- Afghanistan, 105.4 million SEK (UNOCHA);
- Northern Iraq, 48.9 million SEK (MAG);
- Cambodia, 77.8 million SEK (MAG, UNDP TF, CMAC);
- Laos, 13.7 million SEK (MAG, UXO, UNDP, UNDP TF);
- Bosnia Herzegovina, 12.0 million SEK (DBKO/BHMAC, NPA, UNOPS/BHMAC);
- Honduras, 12.1 million SEK (Govn/OAS);
- Nicaragua, 12.9 million SEK (Govn/OAS);
- Costa Rica, 1.1 million SEK (Govn/OAS);
- International Coordination, 7,5 million SEK (DHA);
- R&D, other studies, 31.4 million SEK (MAG, FMV, FOA).
Landmine Survivor Assistance
SIDA funding for 1998 or 1999 does not mention support for mine victims.(601) When it comes to actual support for mine victims all of it goes through ICRC. Swedish general support to ICRC throughout the world was 208 million SEK ($26 million) in 1998. The responsible official at SIDA estimates that a maximum of 10 percent of the general support is related to the production of artificial limbs, mine victim assistance and rehabilitation.(602) When this was checked with ICRC it was found that the Swedish government responded to the ICRC΄s special appeal for mine victim assistance launched in 1997 and 1998 with 500,000 SEK ($62,500) for 1997 and with no support at all for 1998.(603)
This contradiction -- that SIDA indicates 100 percent of the Swedish support to mine victims goes via ICRC and that the ICRC says that 100 percent of its mine related work for 1998 is financed by the contributions to its special appeal - remains quite unclear.
During 1998, the Swedish Armed Forces spent some 70 million SEK ($8.75 million) to prepare for and/or conducting mine clearance in conjunction with different international missions. Mainly this is broken down to 10 million SEK for research on ground penetrating radar conducted by the Defense Research Establishment, FOA; 40 million SEK has been spent for a Swedish EOD and demining battalion in Bosnia; 10 million SEK is related to a demining mission in the Western Sahara and 7 million SEK for demining training at SWEDEC. The 70 million SEK spent on mine clearance corresponds to 0.17 percent of the armed forces budget.
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs spent 25 million SEK ($ 3.1 million) on the demining mission in the Western Sahara.
During 1999, the Swedish Rescue Service Agency, SRV, will begin a program to support development and testing of different demining projects and plans to become a prominent demining actor. SRV intends to spend some 20 million SEK ($2.5 million) on its programs for 1999.(604)
Additionally, there are a number of research projects underway, which are fully or partly financed by different companies or institutions. FOA is studying a method for chemical analysis based on mass spectrometry to define the detection levels of different types of explosives. In 1998 FOA asked for 7.5 million SEK from the Defense Ministry to conduct a three-year joint project with the Norwegian Defense R&D Institute, FFI. SRV decided to co-finance the project.(605)
The Swedish Armed Forces Dog Instruction Center trains mine dogs, both in Sweden and in Cambodia.
The company Biosensor Application Sweden AB is developing an "artificial dog-nose" biosensor to detect mines containing the explosive TNT. It is a private company, which partly has been financed by the Foreign Ministry in a joint project with FOA for developing a multi sensor. SRV has decided to cofinance the biosensor project. The Norwegian FFI is discussing support for the project as well.(606)
FOA is leading a project to develop a multi sensor, consisting of the biosensor from Biosensor Applications, a metal-detector from CelsiusTech Electronics and ground penetrating radar from FOA. The project is due to being completed before the end of 1999.(607) Celsius AB has received 30 million SEK ($ 3.75 million) from the European Union to develop a multi sensor, based upon the FOA project but without the biosensor.(608)
As noted previously, Bofors has developed a mechanical demining device, which can be compared to a huge rotary cultivator, the Mine-Guzzler. SWEDEC and SRV intend to test the device during 1999.(609) The private company Countermine Technologies has developed a similar device and intends to conduct demining operations on contract.(610)
Swedish Non-Governmental Mine Action Activities
Since 1993 the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS) has supported the Mines Advisory Group in Iraqi Kurdistan. Initially, SPAS raised funds for MAG's mine clearance project in Choman; subsequently its support has mainly been devoted to MAG's mine awareness project for children. Today SPAS lectures in schools about the mine problem and ICBL, and has produced a photo-exhibition about MAG's mine awareness activities in Iraqi Kurdistan. In late 1998 SPAS began a newsletter concerning Swedish mine clearance efforts. The newsletter reaches every interested partner in Sweden, the Defense and Foreign Ministries, R&D agencies, companies, journalists, governmental agencies and NGOs.
The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) is one of the major NGO actors in mine action. Since 1991 SCA has cooperated with UN on the Disabled Afghans Project. SCA has spent some 10 million SEK ($1.2 million) each year on mine victim assistance. Additionally it runs an extensive mine awareness program via the 650 schools it supports. SCA estimates that the program reaches approximately one million individuals.(611)
Radda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children)(612) works in different ways to support those who have been affected by mines or live in mine affected areas. In Afghanistan and in Yemen Radda Barnen runs a rehabilitation program and a mine awareness program. In Yemen, it initiated a program to teach children how to teach other children about the dangers of landmines. Radda Barnen also supports mine clearance missions at playgrounds in Afghanistan. In the years leading up to the Mine Ban Treaty, Radda Barnenn was a key actor in the ICBL, serving as a member of its steering committee. The organization arranges seminars and other activities in Sweden and abroad to highlight the landmine issue. Currently Radda Barnen's involvement in the landmine issue is a part of their work for children in war. The total budget for its international work for children in war and refugee children was 25 million SEK ($3.1 millions) in 1998. Only a small part of that is directly for mine related work.
The Swedish Red Cross runs a mine awareness project in Mozambique worth 2.5 million SEK ($ 0.3 million).
Forum Syd(613), an umbrella organization for international aid conducted by Swedish NGOs, has workers in Cambodia engaged in the rehabilitation of mine victims. Forum Syd continued the support in relation to a mine awareness campaign. In the spring of 1999 Forum Syd is arranging a seminar on mine clearance. Forum Syd is involved in the support to the organization Kurdistan Solidarity and their mine clearance programs in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Mine Ban Policy
Switzerland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In signing for the Swiss Confederation, President Flavio Cotti emphasized three key points during his speech to the Conference: "The first point is the need to obtain universal acceptance of the agreement .The second area we need to address is implementation of the agreement .All nations must work together to help those faced with the enormous task of mine clearing and above all helping the victims .It is crucially important - and this is my third key point - that this ban is not merely circumvented in the future by the deployment of other weapons with comparable effects of the development of new technologies."(614)
Switzerland ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 March 1998 and deposited its instrument of ratification in New York the same day. The Treaty was ratified within 3 months, even though ratification procedures in Switzerland usually last for several years. Switzerland, under Article 18, committed itself to immediately abide by Article 1 of the Convention until the Mine Ban Treaty comes into effect.
Switzerland has not always been in the front line of the battle against mines. In May 1996, during the final session of the CCW review conference in Geneva, it supported language regarding the continued use of "smart" mines and long transition periods before new restrictions take effect. Yet not long after, government policy changed and Switzerland became firmly committed to the Ottawa process. This political change was due in large part to the pressure generated by public opinion against these weapons which grew as a result of the strongly critical campaign led by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL) and that pursued by the ICRC whose headquarters are in Geneva. These efforts helped convince the Swiss Parliament to pass legislation in favor of a total ban on 6 December 1996, making it the third country in the world to enact a domestic ban. Switzerland joined the leading group of countries fighting against mines.
The Swiss law is not just specific to APMs, but a broader law concerning war materiel. The section specific to antipersonnel mines forbids the development, manufacture, procurement as an intermediary, acquiring, passing on to any person, importing, exporting, transporting, storing or possessing antipersonnel mines. Its definition includes devices both designed or adapted to function as APMs, therefore the Swiss prohibition is broader than the Mine Ban Treaty. Initially, this was not the case. Despite strong criticism from the SCBL, the first definition of APMs contained in the law included the word "primarily."(615) But, in order to coincide with the definition in the Mine Ban Treaty, a motion to modify the law was passed in the Parliament on 4 March 1998, and the word "primarily" was removed from the definition.(616)
The Swiss law does not encompass antivehicle mines with anti-handling devices, even when such devices cause them to function as APMs when an individual unintentionally disturbs them. The diplomatic record of the MBT negotiations indicates that such weapons would be prohibited under the Treaty.(617) The Swiss Campaign is pressing the government to modify the national law without delay in order to have it coincide with the diplomatic understanding concerning antivehicle mines with anti-handling devices.
Switzerland was an active member of the core group of governments that led the Ottawa Process and took responsibility for developing and promoting the treaty. During the negotiations of the treaty, the Swiss delegation proposed that the number of ratifications for the Mine Ban Treaty to enter into force should be reduced to 20 countries. This proposal was introduced in order to counterbalance a proposal by other countries who wanted this critical number to be 60. Of course, the number of ratifications necessary for entry into force was ultimately decided as 40. One rather curious point is that the SCBL was able to get the government to raise the issue of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices as a concern vis-a-vis the MBT, only to have Switzerland not deal with the problem in its domestic law.
Switzerland has already begun to draw up the report for the UN General Secretary as required by the MBT. The government intends to hand it over officially and make it public during the Maputo Conference in Mozambique, some four months before it is required under the Treaty. Until then, the Swiss authorities have been reluctant to release data for the Landmine Monitor, in the belief that the Treaty's trustee ought to be the first to receive the information. After several negotiating sessions with the Swiss Campaign, some information has been provided, which is included in this report.(618)
Switzerland ratified and deposited amended Protocol II of the CCW on 24 March 1998.
During the Ottawa process, Switzerland opposed dealing with the mines question within the Conference on Disarmament in order to avoid the risks both of undermining the Mine Ban Treaty and that action in the CD would allow governments to not support the Ottawa Process in favor of a less restrictive regime.. Switzerland opposes tackling the subject of a transfer ban within the CD if the definition is not the same as that of the Ottawa Treaty.
In the past, Switzerland produced antipersonnel mines as well as some components. From 1967 to 1969, stake mines and Type 64 bounding mines were produced at a government-controlled facility. The quantities, costs and technical characteristics of these mines are unknown.(619) Switzerland also produced detonators for antipersonnel mines, for antitank mines and for sea mines, however it has been impossible to gather information about them. An answer made to a member of parliament by the Federal Council on 16 June 1993 stated, "Two firms produce detonators for mines in the field of artillery. One of them manufactures detonators for armor mines, and the other for floating mines." In the 1980s two firms, Dixi and Relhor, manufactured micro-engineering and micro-electronic devices for antipersonnel mines. Relhor produced delayed action devices.(620)
Switzerland was involved in the transit of explosives between Bofors in Sweden and Valsella in Italy through a Swiss office based in Geneva, Cofitec and Casalee AG in Zürich.6 The Geneva-based firm Tavaro, S.A. manufactured self-neutralizing and self-destruction mechanisms for antipersonnel mines (621) In 1996, the Dixi was offering self-destruction devices for mines. For years, the company Ems-Patvag, belonging to a Swiss member of parliament Christoph Blocher, has manufactured detonators. His group is also in control of another firm which produces explosives in Döttikon, Switzerland.
With the Swiss law, all production of mines and mine components has ceased. Switzerland does not produce Claymore mines. With the end of production, there was no conversion program concerning production activities. These sectors just closed, because the production was not very important.
Regarding components, Switzerland does not produce any component devised to be part of antipersonnel mines; manufacturing for this is expressly forbidden by the Swiss law. The law specifies that such activity would be punished by imprisonment for a maximum of ten years if an individual intentionally: a) develops, manufactures, procures as an intermediary, acquires, passes on to any person, imports, exports, transports, stores or possesses antipersonnel mines, b) incites another person to commit any of the acts mentioned under paragraph a); or c) aids or abets the execution of any of the acts mentioned under paragraph a). Thus the manufacturing of components comes within the provisions of paragraphs b and c.
Switzerland neither produces nor does research into developing munitions that might have the same effects as antipersonnel mines. Research is being carried out in electronic closed-circuit devices as a possible alternative to antipersonnel mines.(622) Finally Switzerland did not license production of mines in other countries, nor transfer production technology to another country. The Swiss law provides for severe sanctions in case of infringement of the law: imprisonment for a maximum of ten years and a maximum fine of five million francs may be imposed. The law has no specific verification mechanism, but the Swiss NGOs keep a watchful eye on weapons manufacture and are ready to denounce publicly any infringement of the law.
On 11 May 1994 Switzerland announced a moratorium on the export of mines and components to non-signatories of Protocol II of the CCW. This moratorium was superseded by the December 1996 ban. Switzerland is not likely to have exported antipersonnel mines. On the other hand for several years, detonators and explosives were exported. In Switzerland export authorization is not required to export explosives.
Regarding imports, in 1958-59, Bofors sold AP mines to Switzerland. They were delivered until 1964. In 1964 and 1965 Switzerland imported Type 63 bounding mines from Germany.(623) The amounts and the costs are unknown. In 1970 Switzerland purchased 12 Claymores (M18A1) from the United States. This purchase was to test the reliability and efficiency of the mine. These mines were destroyed.
In 1992, Switzerland transferred bounding mines (type 64) to Austria to Sudsteirische Metallindustrie Gmbh (SMI) for destruction. These mines had become old and obsolete.(624) In 1993 Switzerland transferred 88,376 Type 49 antitank mines for destruction to this company.
Finally concerning transit, Swiss law forbids the transit of any mines through its territory, including those for any peackeeping operations or the UN. In 1996 and on demand of the Swiss government, the first law permitted this kind of transit but, further to an amendment introduced by the Swiss CBL, such exceptional authorizations were deleted from the law by a vote in the Parliament. The policy is clear: no mine shall either exist on or pass through Swiss territory.
All stocks have been destroyed and no mines were retained for training or any other purpose. Destruction of all APM stocks was completed in December 1997.
The following mines were destroyed:
- Bounding mine, Type 63: the whole stock has been destroyed (numbers unknown, military secret);
- Bounding mine, Type 64: the whole stock was destroyed in Austria (numbers unknown, military secret);
- Antitank mine, Type 49: the entire stock of 88,376 mines was destroyed in Austria.
- Type 59: the entire stock of three million mines was destroyed in Switzerland over a period of 3 years. These mines were dismantled and their explosive recycled. The 8 employees of a highly specialized firm achieved the task.(625)
Costs of the destruction:
- Bouncing mines, Type 63, in 1993: US$1 million;
- Bouncing mines, Type 64, from 1992 to 1994: US$3.7 million;
- Type 49: (unknown cost); and
- Type 59, from 1994 to 1997: US$3.6 million.
There has been no independent verification of the destruction of these stocks.
Switzerland retains Claymore mines whose name was changed after removal and destruction of their tripwires (at the beginning of 1996). They are now called: "charges dirigées 96 légères" (96 directional fragmentation explosives) The number in stock is unknown. But, in 1991 Switzerland bought FFV 013 Claymore-type mines worth US$17 million from Bofors in Sweden.(626)
The SCBL sought two expert lawyers' advice on Claymores. According to their specialist knowledge of the interpretation on the Swiss law, they consider that the possession of Claymore mines, though altered, could be contrary to the Swiss law concerning antipersonnel mines. Therefore the Swiss Campaign will press this matter.
Swiss stocks also include antitank mines, Type 88 (A/T HPD F2 mines) from Thomson Brandt Armament worth US$225 million. They were purchased between 1991 and 1994. All of them are fitted with an anti-handling device type « senseur de mouvement ». (movement sensory device).(627) Some of them (about 100,000 pieces) were assembled in Switzerland by the Firm Tavaro S.A. (Geneva) and fitted with both self-neutralizing and antilift devices.(628)
Given the steady political situation and Swiss neutrality, there is no risk of use of antipersonnel mines in Switzerland. APMs have not been used in the past.
Various programs are being financed by the Swiss government and by private organizations. Funds allocated by the Swiss government from 1993 to 1997 include US$5.5 million for mine-clearance; $11 million for victim assistance; and $400,000 for mine awareness. The recipients have been mostly ICRC and United Nations for programs in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Bosnia. The sums allocated in 1998 by the Swiss government are still unknown.
In December 1997 the Swiss government announced in Ottawa the creation of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. In 1998 the Swiss government launched the Bern Manifesto, a joint project with WHO and UNICEF for victims of violence and war.
From 1993 to 1996 the Swiss authorities, a private donor and the Foundation Pro Victimis-Switzerland financed an individual research project on the manufacturing of various bomb-disposal robots. Funding has ended and the project was suspended.
The foundation Pro Victimis, in Geneva, has financed 6 humanitarian mine clearance programs, between 1991 and 1999, for Cambodia (3), Haut-Karabakh (1) and Abkhazia (2), for a total amount of $1,525,700. It also supported the Geneva Center with a grant of US$800,000 in 1998.
Several NGOs support programs for mine victim assistance. The SCBL does not have concrete data on all such programs but notes that projects in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Mozambique, Rwanda and Cambodia are supported by the Swiss Protestant Mutual Aid, the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid, the Swiss Organization for Workers Mutual Aid, the Swiss Afghanistan Friends Organization, Insieme per la Pace, among others.
Founded in 1997, the Swiss Mine Clearance Federation carried out two mine clearance programs in Sarajevo throughout 1998, clearing 67,800 sqm at a of approximately $180,000.
In 1998 the Swiss Red Cross offered mine awareness programs to Bosnian refugees in Switzerland during the war.
At the end of the 1980s, landmine victims from Afghanistan were treated, fit with prosthesis and given rehabilitative training in Swiss University Hospitals. These particular programs have been widened to include all victims, whether due to war, violence or terrorism.
Turkmenistan is the only country in Central Asia that has signed and ratified the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It signed on 3 December 1997 and was the fourth country to ratify on 19 January 1998. However, it has not yet passed national legislation implementing the treaty. At the treaty signing conference, Her Excellency Mrs. Aksoltan Ataeva noted, "Turkmenistan from the very beginning actively supported the idea of comprehensive elimination of antipersonnel miens."(629) Turkmenistan attended the early treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and participated in the Oslo negotiations. It was absent from the pro-ban 1996 UNGA resolution vote, but voted in favor of the pro-treaty 1997 and 1998 UNGA resolutions.
The Turkmenistan government hosted the first regional conference on landmines in Central Asia in Ashgabat in June 1997. Forty participants attended, representing governments and nongovernmental organizations. The conference addressed the importance of expanding mine clearance efforts and assistance for victims. As the first forum for discussion of landmines in Central Asia, the conference raised the profile of the landmine issue, possibly opening the door to further action.(630) Ambassador Ataeva said, "The Ashgabat Joint Communique has become an important document which marked the beginning of active involvement of Central Asian states in the large scale political campaign.... The Conference has been a step forward toward creating conditions for signing the International Convention by a greater number of states."(631)
Turkmenistan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), although at an International Committee of the Red Cross-sponsored conference on international humanitarian law in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 1997, Turkmenistan declared its intention to ratify the CCW and its Protocols.(632)
The government declares, "There are no uncleared landmines" in Turkmenistan.(633) There are no reports of landmine casualties. Turkmenistan is not believed to have ever produced or exported landmines. Turkmenistan acknowledges that it "has a small stockpile of landmines,"(634) likely inherited from the USSR. Turkmenistan is not known to have contributed to any international mine action programs.
Mine Ban Policy
The UK's position on antipersonnel landmines (APMs) has progressed significantly since 1994, culminating in its participation in the Ottawa Process, and the signing and ratification of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While the UK attended the first meeting of what became the Ottawa Process in October 1996, it was not part of the early core group of pro-ban countries. Also in October 1996 the UK signed an EU Joint Action supporting a comprehensive global ban at the earliest possible date, supporting mine clearance and implementing a common export moratorium on all APMs.(635) The UK subsequently supported the key December 1996 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45S, urging states to pursue vigorously an international agreement to ban landmines, passed by a vote of 156-0, with ten abstentions. Even so, until after May 1997 British general election, the UK was not fully committed to the Ottawa Process and a rapid solution to the global landmine crisis.
Immediately after the election of a new (Labor) government in May 1997 a new UK policy was announced. First, the destruction of all APM stocks and a ban on their use by 2005 at the latest. Second, a moratorium on use until either 2005 or an "effective international agreement enters into force, whichever comes first." Third, to negotiate "constructively" for an international ban in the Ottawa Process while working in the Conference on Disarmament for a wider ban. Finally, to retain use in "exceptional circumstances" authorized by Ministers and reported to Parliament; this included the potential use of the JP233 airfield denial weapon (containing the HB876 air-scattered antipersonnel mines), and the L27 antitank mine.(636)
In a written answer to a Parliamentary Question by Helen Jackson MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Robin Cook said:
We shall implement our manifesto commitment to ban the import, export, transfer and manufacture of all forms of anti-personnel landmines. We will accelerate the phasing out of our stocks of anti-personnel landmines and complete it by 2005 or when an effective international agreement to ban their use enters into force, whichever comes first. In the meantime we have introduced a complete moratorium on their operational use, while we participate constructively in the Ottawa Process.(637)
This positive change in policy, however, was not fully reflected by the UK delegation to the Inter-Governmental Conference for a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines, held in Brussels in June 1997. For example, the UK requested an exemption from any requirement to clear minefields in the Falklands/Malvinas; this was sought on the grounds that full clearance may not be economically viable and that it is of lesser priority than mine clearance in Angola and other severely affected countries. UK nongovernmental organization (NGO) observers reported that the UK government delegates were skeptical about the Ottawa Process and apparently remained convinced of the military utility of APMs.(638) However, in its closing statement in Brussels, the UK delegation expressed its hope that more countries would join the Ottawa Process, and that the Oslo meeting would lead to an "effective international agreement that we will be able to sign."(639)
By the time of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference of September 1997, to negotiate the final text of the Treaty, the UK was a full participant in the Ottawa Process. Surprisingly to some NGO observers in Oslo, the UK delegation remained silent in the face of US proposals that would have seriously undermined the Treaty - unlike, for example, Spain and Japan, which strongly supported the US in the negotiations.
On 12 November 1997, Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, announced that she would sign the treaty in Ottawa in December.
I shall proudly sign on behalf of Britain to join the landmine ban. I will emphasise the Government's commitment to achieving the widest possible support for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines. We shall follow up the Ottawa Convention in other negotiating bodies. We shall also pursue with vigour our programme of de-mining. The British delegation will take part in the parallel round table discussions, which will include discussion of plans to speed up and coordinate de-mining internationally.(640)
On 3 December 1997 Clare Short signed the Mine Ban Treaty on behalf of the United Kingdom.
Ratification and Implementing Legislation
The UK Parliament has no formal, constitutional role in treaty making.(641) Instead, the power to make treaties is vested in the executive. It is the practice in the UK for treaties simply to be laid before Parliament by the executive for at least three weeks, following which the government can proceed with the deposition of instruments of ratification with the United Nations. However, Parliament does have a role when a treaty requires a change in UK law for its implementation. Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty required the UK to take appropriate administrative and legal measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent breaches of the treaty's provisions on UK territory.
Having signed the treaty, the UK government repeatedly stated that the Parliamentary timetable was too full to provide time for adopting implementing legislation, and no commitment was made to a future date when such time would be made available. The government had previously announced that it would be one of the first forty countries to ratify the Convention. Following public and media pressure, on 1 July 1998 Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that a bill would be put before Parliament before its summer recess. On 3 July 1998 a Landmines Bill was published to bring implementation of the treaty into British law, and to enable the UK to ratify it. This started the main stages of its passage through Parliament in the House of Commons a week later. The Landmines Act received Royal Assent on 28 July and the United Kingdom formally deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations on 31 July 1998, placing it among the first forty to ratify.
The Landmines Bill was not published without criticism. Among NGOs, including the UK Working Group on Landmines (UKWGLM), the most important concern was, and remains, Clause 5, (now Section 5), which the UKWGLM believes is contrary to the Mine Ban Treaty's Article 1 prohibitions. The bill created a loophole for British forces engaged in "international military operations," such as NATO operations, with countries not party to the treaty (for example the U.S.). It provides a defense for people committing an offense relating to antipersonnel mines when they take part in a military operation, or the planning of a military operation, which takes place "wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom." In these circumstances the legislation effectively prohibits only the actual laying of APMs.
Despite political opposition, Clause 5 remained in the Bill passed by Parliament. The government has made a number statements on the issue, some of which gave a more positive interpretation of the "US/NATO loophole" in the Landmines Act than can be read from the wording of the Act itself.
Sections 5(2) and 5(3) provide that in proceedings for an alleged violation, "it is a defense for the accused to prove that --
(a) the conduct was in the course of, or for the purposes of, a military operation or the planning of a military operation;
(b) the conduct was not the laying of an antipersonnel mine
(3) This section applies to a military operation if --
(a) it takes place wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom
(c) the operation is one in the course of which there is or may be some deployment of antipersonnel mines by members of the armed forces of one or more States that are not parties to the Ottawa Convention, but in the course of which such mines are not to be laid in contravention of that Convention."(642)
The Landmines Act appears to contradict the Mine Ban Treaty by separating the actual laying of antipersonnel landmines in international military operations from other prohibited activities such as acquiring, possessing, or transferring APMs and assisting, encouraging or inducing others to lay them. This interpretation of the UK legislation suggests that even the planning of a mine laying operation in international operations is permitted. It is clear, however, that the Mine Ban Treaty forbids these other activities as absolutely as it forbids the laying of APMs.
During its Parliamentary passage and since it became law, the Landmines Act has been the subject of a number of explanatory statements by the government. These were intended to support the view that the Act does not contradict the treaty. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told the House of Commons "that the Bill gives full effect to the provisions of the Ottawa Convention."(643) However, a Defense Minister in the same debate said that clause 5 "enables United Kingdom service men and women to engage closely in the planning and conduct of an operation with those who may, lawfully for them, use anti-personnel landmines."(644)
At the same time, the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said:
Clause 5 does not provide British servicemen with any loophole to take part in the deployment of landmines. British forces will be instructed in their rules of engagement for any exercise or operation that they must not use, possess, transport or handle landmines. Clause 5 provides British servicemen with a shield against unreasonable prosecution because they took part in a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation exercise in which American forces deployed landmines. Without clause 5, any British Army officer present at a NATO planning meeting who heard that American forces taking part may possess landmines would be obliged to say that he must leave the meeting, or would render himself liable to a prison sentence of 14 years.(645)
When the legislation completed its passage through Parliament, the Foreign Secretary announced that the government had "[p]laced in the Library the note accompanying the instrument of ratification, which sets out our understanding that the mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity by the United Kingdom's Armed Forces, or individual United Kingdom nationals, conducted in combination with armed forces of States not party to the Ottawa Convention, is not, by itself, assistance, encouragement or inducement for the purposes of Article 1, paragraph 1(c) of the Convention."(646)
UK NGOs, including the UK Working Group on Landmines, argue that it is difficult to see how "a total ban, without exception" can allow "the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity by the UK's armed forces" which involve antipersonnel landmines. It is also difficult for NGOs to accept that being engaged "closely in the planning and conduct of an operation with those who may, lawfully for them, use anti-personnel landmines" amounts to "mere participation" in such operations.
The UK Working Group on Landmines' analysis that the Landmines Act does not faithfully and fully reflect the Mine Ban Treaty is supported by legal advice on the government's requirement for the exemption, which was obtained from a lawyer at the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office. This opinion is that:
The UK soldier could not be considered a passive actor if he knows he is transporting landmines since he is doing a positive act with the intention to do so, thereby risking a 14-year sentence under the UK legislation. As a result, the Foreign Office came to the view that a line needed to be drawn for joint military operations. The draft Bill, in their view, does this by drawing a line between the prohibition on putting landmines in the ground (still applicable to UK soldiers involved in joint operations) and all other aspects of assistance during joint military operations (such as the transport of landmines).(647)
The UKWGLM was also disturbed when the government described the existing moratorium on the use of APMs as having become "a total ban, without exception" on the day that the UK's instrument of ratification was deposited with the UN,(648) but at the same time also announced that it retained the right to use APMs in "extreme circumstances" until entry into force of the treaty. This was explained by the Foreign Office in a letter dated 27 April 1998 to the UK campaign:
The position with regard to use of anti-personnel landmines by UK Forces is that there is a moratorium in place, which will only be lifted in extreme circumstances of self-defense, where Ministers consider that the lives of UK Forces would be jeopardized without the use of such mines. Such circumstances would be reported to Parliament. The moratorium on use will become a complete ban when the Ottawa Convention enters into force for us.(649)
Convention on Conventional Weapons
The Convention on Conventional Weapons was signed by the UK on 10 April 1981, but not ratified until 13 February 1995. Ratification of the CCW allowed the UK to participate fully in the Convention's review conference, which started in September 1995 and closed in May 1996. The UK's letter of acceptance of Amended Protocol II of the CCW was deposited with the UN Secretary General on 11 February 1999.(650)
The UK defined its position for the CCW review conference in February 1995. First, it supported a ban on non-detectable antipersonnel mines and the extension of the CCW to cover civil wars and other internal conflicts. Second, it wanted clear definitions and standards for self-destructing mines, stipulating when and how minefields should be marked and ensuring mapping. Third, it called for an international code on the transfer of APMs, but also argued for such a code to allow for the export and use of self-destructing mines. Fourth, it sought to secure agreement on the provision of assistance to humanitarian agencies working in mined areas.(651)
However, on 22 April 1996, before the final session of the CCW review conference, the UK government announced a substantive change in policy "in order to make greater progress in achieving international agreement." The main move was to back a total international prohibition on APMs. Meanwhile the UK would destroy 46 percent of its APM stocks; upgrade the rest of its stocks to be self-destructing; use APMs only in "exceptional circumstances" and in accordance with the CCW; and seek alternatives to APMs and if successful cease to use them and destroy all its stocks. The UK repeated this policy as its opening statement at the Ottawa Conference in October 1996.(652)
Conference on Disarmament
The UK government's position at the end of 1996 was that a comprehensive ban on APMs should be sought in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In January 1997 the then government proposed an Ad Hoc Committee "to negotiate, for conclusion at the earliest possible date, a universal, effectively verifiable and legally-binding international agreement to ban totally the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines."(653)
The UK argued in the 1997 session that any agreement on APMs had to include the major producers, exporters and users of APMs (implicitly arguing - incorrectly -- that the Ottawa process did not). The UK proposed a phased approach to banning APMs beginning with a universal ban on transfers with use, production and stockpiling to be dealt with in the future.(654)
Following the UK's signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, the government announced that it continued to see value in pursuing complementary activity in the CD, taking "every opportunity to urge as many countries as possible to sign the Ottawa Convention and [to] press for complementary action, to promote a global ban on anti-personnel landmines, in international fora, including the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva."(655) This, the government suggested, will ensure the widest possible participation in a ban of these weapons.(656) It continues to follow this policy today.
The UK has been a major past producer and developer of APMs. Private companies produced antipersonnel mines in the UK, including the following:
- Thorn EMI Electronics produced the "Ranger" antipersonnel mine in two forms: a scatterable, plastic APM and an inert practice APM (the "Ranger Inert");
- Royal Ordnance produced the No6 blast APM; also the L1E1 PJRAD projected area defense antipersonnel mines until 1986;
- British Aerospace/Royal Ordnance produced the L9 Bar Mine. This antitank mine was originally developed with simple single-impulse and double-impulse fuses, but is apparently "also available with both antitilt and antidisturbance fuses as part of the Marconi Full Width Attack Mine fusing program;"(657)
- Hunting Engineering produced the JP233 "Airfield Attack Weapon," a cluster bomb that carries two hundred and fifteen HB876 APMs as well as runway cratering bomblets. Hunting Engineering also produced four different antitank mines.
In 1995 the Defense Manufacturers Handbook listed British Aerospace Defense, British Aerospace (Royal Ordnance), Hunting Engineering, and Plalite as having landmines among their products. However, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that "Thorn EMI Electronics, Royal Ordnance and Hunting Engineering are the only British companies to have produced land mines since 1965." Furthermore, MoD was "not aware of any British companies which currently manufacture components for land mines."(658)
British firms have also cooperated with French firms on the production or development of mines: the APILAS produced by Manurhin, British Aerospace Systems and Equipment, and Giat; and ARGES (Automatic Rocket Guardian with Electronic Sensor), a rocket-launched ATM system produced in a consortium of Giat Industries, Hunting Engineering, Dynamit Nobel and Honeywell Regelsysteme.(659) The MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), manufactured by a consortium of European companies including Hunting Engineering, also has an antitank mine, the German AT2, with a fuse that UK NGOs believe can be activated by a person.
The UK government reported in 1995 that production of conventional antipersonnel mines for the Ministry of Defense ceased in 1983, and of antitank mines in 1991.(660) But according to later government statements, the most recent MoD order for antipersonnel mines was placed in 1991.(661)
Thorn EMI provided the UK government with Ranger L10A1 antipersonnel mines, reportedly in large numbers up to 1986. Royal Ordnance's L1E1 PJRAD projected area defense mines were purchased in 1986.(662)
Hunting Engineering produced the HB876, an APM that is contained in the JP233 airfield denial weapon, for the UK government. The government claimed in 1995 that the HB876 mine "is designed specifically to destroy military airfields and prevent repair" and refused to reclassify the weapon as an antipersonnel mine. UK NGOs argued that this weapon should be reclassified as an APM or at the very least as a dual-purpose (antipersonnel and antivehicle) landmine. Eventually, the government announced that this APM would be destroyed by 1 January 2000. Ministers accepted in June 1998 that the JP233 fell within the definition of an antipersonnel mine under the terms of the revised Protocol 2 to the CCW and so was "covered by the moratorium that we have announced."(663)
As it will no longer procure any antipersonnel mines, MoD has canceled the Future Anti-Personnel Scatterable Mine (FAPSM) project.(664) However, in 1996 the government ordered a replacement for the JP233, the Conventional Armed Stand-Off Missile (CASOM), which is due to enter service in 2001. More information about this system is being sought.
According to UK Working Group on Landmines research, Hunting Engineering, Ferranti Instrumentation, Royal Ordnance, Irvin Great Britain, Venture Technology, ML Aviation Company, and Thorn EMI Electronics all supplied components of the JP233.(665) The fuses for antitank Barmine systems were made by Marconi Radar and Control Systems, a division of General Electric Corporation (GEC), and by Royal Ordnance. According to GEC, the company ceased the development of mine fuses "some seven or eight years ago."(666) Royal Ordnance stated in 1996 that it is "not currently procuring landmine components and has in fact not done so since April 1987."
On 27 July 1994, the government announced a partial export moratorium, which applied only to conventional ("dumb") APMs, in other words those that did not self-destruct or self-neutralize. The government stated that the UK had not in any case exported these "for at least the last 10 years."(667)
This partial export moratorium was extended on 15 March 1995. The government described the moratorium as "indefinite" and applied it to exports of all types of APMs to countries not ratifying the CCW, alongside a "total ban" on the export of any non-detectable mines. The government subsequently told Parliament in May 1996 that no export licenses had been applied for, or granted, for antipersonnel landmines or for specially designed components of such mines since 1990.(668)
Since April 1996 there has been a moratorium on the export of all types of antipersonnel mines to all destinations.(669) (Imports of self-neutralizing or self-destructing mines were not banned until May 1997.)
The export from the UK of all landmines and their designs has been controlled by Export of Goods (Control) Orders under powers conferred to UK Ministers by the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defense) Act 1939. The Orders have been amended and extended in relation to landmines on a number of occasions, including 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997. For example, following the signing of the Ottawa Convention by the UK, the Export of Goods (Control) (Amendment No 3) Order was made, to take effect from 15 December 1997. This removed a 1994 clause that permitted the export of antipersonnel landmines that had been imported into the UK for transit, and suggests that imports for re-export were permitted until that date.
Section 2(1) of the Landmines Act 1998 is now the primary UK legislation banning the production and transfer of APMs as defined in the Act and Mine Ban Treaty. The sanction for contravening this ban on exports is 14 years in prison or a fine or both, on conviction. Section 3 of the Act prohibits UK nationals from doing anything outside the UK that assists, encourages or induces people to transfer, produce or possess APMs.
In 1993 the US Foreign Science and Technology Center (now known as the National Ground Intelligence Center) asserted that the UK was in the "top 10 list for sources of landmines found in the ground throughout the world" until the mid 1980s, and that it was one of the primary export countries of "advanced mine and countermine technology and equipment." According to the UK government, there have been no exports of antipersonnel landmines from the UK since the late 1980s. Neither the Foreign Office nor the Department for Trade and Industry, which is responsible for export licenses, has yet released details of UK arms export licenses. Neither department has yet replied to NGOs' detailed questions about export licensing.
There has been conflicting information released by the UK government as to past exports of landmines. In 1997, a UK government minister told Parliament that it is "clear from earlier research...that no mines considered to be anti-personnel mines at the time of export have been exported for over a decade."(670) This implied that mines that are now considered to be antipersonnel mines have been exported more recently. Previous government statements to Parliament in 1996 had claimed that antipersonnel mines have not been exported from this country for many years.
Various sources have reported UK APMs being used in conflicts in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Somalia.(671) The No6 blast APM, manufactured by Royal Ordnance, has been reported in Zimbabwe as well as Mozambique.(672) It is known that Thorn EMI was active in marketing its Ranger APMs in the 1980s, with more than one million Rangers sold to overseas clients, including Nigeria in 1981.(673) Thorn EMI has also exported its Ranger antipersonnel mines to Jordan and at least two other countries. It is not known whether the mines sold to Nigeria are still in Nigerian stockpiles or whether they have been re-exported or used. This transaction with Nigeria appears to be the only APM export to which the UK government has admitted for the period between 1979 and 1997. However, the Minister giving this information did not consult the Department of Trade and Industry (which issues export licenses) before making his statement to Parliament. He stated that the information on which he based his statement came only from records available in the Ministry of Defense, which "may not be definitive."
In 1995, the UK government gave details of mine purchases from overseas suppliers as follows:
- C3A1 Elsie, purchased between 1965 and 1968 from Canadian Arsenals Ltd;
- M18A1 Claymore between 1965 and 1968, and in 1989 from the U.S. Department of Defense.
The government told Parliament that there are no records of the cost of these procurements.(674)
The UK has also imported the L27 off-route antitank mine manufactured by Giat Industries in France, where it is called the MIACAH F1. In May 1997, the UK classified this as an antipersonnel mine because it is activated by tripwire. (See stockpiles below.)
The UK is known to have imported 5,604 antipersonnel mines from the US, including 5,502 M18A1 Claymores in 1991, twelve M18A1s imported in 1989, and 90 M14s imported in 1973.(675) In the past, British forces (probably Special Forces) also reportedly possessed the U.S. Pursuit Deterrent Munition (PDM). Stocks of PDM were said to have been destroyed after the Gulf War. However, there is no independent evidence of this, or of the numbers involved.
In December 1995, the UK ordered a Vehicle Launched Scatterable Mine System (VLSM) from the US firm Alliant Techsystems at a cost of $179 million (£110 million).(676) This system is known in the UK as Shielder, and although described by the UK government as antitank, UK NGOs have serious concerns about its antipersonnel characteristics. The system is to be used on a British vehicle, the Stormer armored personnel carrier, which has been modified by Alvis Vehicles Ltd. of Coventry. Specific requests by NGOs for assurances from the government on the fusing and anti-handling characteristics of Shielder have not yet been answered, despite statements in Parliament by Ministers that such information has been provided.
Further details of the characteristics of these mines are given below. It is worth noting that information given above on procurement and imports was confirmed by a government statement in 1997 that gave details of those companies that have produced mines for the UK's Ministry of Defense:
Available records indicate that the following companies/organizations have, since 1979, met orders from [the MoD] for:
(a) antipersonnel mines: Thorn EMI, Royal Ordnance, the United States Department of Defense and Alliant Techsystems of the United States
(b) antitank/armored vehicle mines: Royal Ordnance, Hunting Engineering Ltd, Alliant Techsystems, the MLRS European Production group, and GIAT Industries and SOFMA of France.(677)
Currently available information, in detail below, shows that the UK government still holds stockpiles of APMs, although a large proportion of stocks have been destroyed. Descriptions of the full range of UK mine stocks as of July 1998, plus the newly acquired Shielder, are summarized in Table 1 below.
Although the government has made various announcements on Army stockpiles and their destruction, these have fallen short of revealing the extent of stocks held by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and UK Special Forces. A stockpile destruction program was to be published, but neither this nor the numbers involved in destruction have been made public.
Table 1: Types of Mines held by the UK and their Government classification
(as of July 1998)
- C3A1 Elsie: blast AP mine.
- Ranger: blast AP mine; used with vehicle-mounted firing system.
- Projector Area Defense (PJRAD): fragmentation AP mine.
- M18A1 Claymore: directional fragmentation AP mine; usually command detonated, but may be target activated; in command detonated mode, not classified by UK government as a mine.
- L27 Off Route Mine: blast AT mine, classified AP because it is activated by tripwire; withdrawn from service, to be replaced by ARGES in 2004.
- Mk 7: blast AT mine; two types, standard and waterproofed, to be phased out in 2000/01.
- Barmine: blast AT mine; several fuse options, including the Anti Disturbance Double Impulse (ADDI) fuse, and the Full Width Attack Mine Electronic (FWAM (E)) fuse; the latter has a seismic and magnetic sensor.
- AT2: shaped charge AT mine (scatterable); self-destructing, but contains integral anti-handling device; dispensed by rocket (MLRS), 28 mines per rocket, from a maximum range of 39 km; is fully armed within twenty seconds of landing.
- Shielder Vehicle Launched Scatterable Mine System (new addition to UK stocks). Vehicle: Alvis Stormer (adapted). Mine laying system: Volcano. Each vehicle fires 720 L35A1 mines (self-destructing, but with full width attack with magnetic influence fuses). Moving the mine, once armed, through the earth's magnetic field will cause detonation.
The first indication of the numbers held by the UK was given in a statement to Parliament by Defense Secretary George Robertson. He stated in June 1998 that 438,727 antipersonnel landmines have been destroyed since 1 May 1997, representing 45.6 per cent of the total number of such landmines held by the UK.(678) Assuming this figure is accurate, this suggests a stockpile of about 960,000. However, information released to Mines Advisory Group at the same time by the Ministry of Defense suggests that a more accurate estimate was a total stockpile of about 1,250,000, of which 430,000 had been destroyed by July 1998, with 850,000 remaining.(679) This information is summarized below.
There is little dispute about the numbers and classification of the Ranger and Elsie APMs, both of which have had significant proportions destroyed. There is less information about the numbers and destruction program for the HB876, the APM that is contained in the JP233 airfield denial weapon. The government accepted in June 1998 that the JP233 falls within the definition of an antipersonnel land mine under the terms of the revised Protocol 2 of the CCW and so it is to be destroyed.
Two other British mines have been re-classified as APMs when used in a specified fashion: the PJRAD "directional fragmentation mines" and the US "Claymore" in UK stocks. These are now both classified as antipersonnel mines when used in automatic (victim-operated) "stand-alone" mode. But they would not have been considered antipersonnel mines before mid-1996. The PJRAD was understood to remain in service in Northern Ireland at least until mid-1998. It is also unclear what the position is regarding the stockpiles and destruction of these mines.
Table 2: APMs in UK Stockpiles (by type)
Mines classified by Government as APMs:
June 1998 1 March 19991
Elsie C3A1 142,000 0
L10A1 Ranger 1,110,000 0
HB876 (JP233) est. 25-30,000 All
Mines with potential AP effects (including ATMs)
June 1998 1 March 19991
Mk7 Not known Not considered APMs by MoD
L1E1 PJRAD Not known Not considered APMs by MoD
M18A1 Not known Not considered APMs by MoD
AT2 Not known Not considered APMs by MoD
PDM Not known Not known
L27 Not known Not known
Shielder Not known Not considered APMs by MoD
Notes: 1Figures given exclude stocks retained for testing destruction and detection techniques. There is conflicting information on stocks of PDM and L27: one source suggests none are held.
Prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, the government announced that 44 per cent of APM stocks were to be destroyed, comprising 60 per cent of Elsie stocks and 40 per cent of Ranger APMs. In addition, all L27 ATMs were removed from service because the government accepted that its fuse makes it antipersonnel.(680)
January 2000 is the target date set by MoD for the destruction of UK stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Defense Secretary:
The speed at which this [the destruction of almost all of the APLs in UK stocks] can be achieved will depend upon a number of factors, including the capacity of contractors to carry out the destruction, work which involves careful environmental safeguards. I am please to tell you that we expect that destruction of the Army's stocks will be completed two years from now, well before the deadline of the Ottawa Convention.(681)
However, as with official information about the size of UK stockpiles, there was no mention of Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, or Special Forces stocks of landmines.
Since MoD's announcement on stockpile destruction in January 1998, no further details emerged until 22 February 1999, when the Defense Secretary announced that "all British Army anti-personnel landmines have been destroyed, yet another demonstration of our commitment to the obligations we accepted when ratifying the Ottawa Treaty." The commitment to the total destruction of APMs by 1 January 2000 was confirmed; the "large Army capability has now been destroyed, and the supplementary RAF JP233 capability will be destroyed by this date [1 January 2000], four years earlier than required under the terms of the Ottawa Treaty."(682)
Most destruction of stocks has reportedly been carried out by the use of explosives on UK military ranges, by the UK military, although the Ministry of Defense has not confirmed this. The cost of destroying the stockpiles was expected to be some $8.2 million (£5 million).(683)
APMs for Training
The government announced in April 1998 that the UK will "retain about 4,000 anti-personnel landmines, less than half of one percent of current stocks, in order to be able to carry out training in demining."(684) At present, there is little information as to APM types being held for training or their specific uses. One source reports that between 1,000 and 2,000 each of Ranger and Elsie stocks are being retained to test destruction and detection techniques, as permitted by Article 3 of the Treaty. It is clear that UK forces possess "inert" APMs, which are designed for training purposes, and that the UK does not use live mines for training. In the light of this, and the training possibilities for UK forces posted overseas in carrying out humanitarian mine clearance, the UKWGLM believes retention of stocks for training appears unnecessary.
In written answers to questions put to Tony Lloyd, FCO Minister of State, at a meeting in March 1998, the government stated that "NATO itself does not have stocks of APL. There are no US stocks in Britain. The question of transit is being looked at carefully by legal advisers." Also, according to the UK government, the UK holds no stocks of antipersonnel mines outside UK territories.(685) However, official US sources indicate that the US has thousands of APMs stored on Diego Garcia, a UK dependent territory in the Indian Ocean. (See U.S. country report).
At present, there are no reports of use of APMs in the UK, except for testing purposes as allowed by the Treaty. However, the UK Working Group on Landmines has expressed concerns about the compatability of potential use of certain mines with the Mine Ban Treaty, including the Shielder system mines and AT 2 antitank mines. The magnetic influence fuse on the mine used by Shielder is reportedly highly sensitive.(686) Table 2 above notes the range of mines retained by the UK government, not classified as antipersonnel but which are known to have antipersonnel effects.
Mine Action Funding
According to the Department for International Development (DFID), between 1991-1998 the UK had spent about $57 million (£35 million) on humanitarian demining.(687) For most of this period, total funding stood at less than $8.2 million (£5 million) a year. At the Ottawa Conference in December 1997, the UK confirmed that the annual UK commitment to demining activities would be doubled over the three years to the year 2001 to $16.3 million (£10 million). By February 1999, the government had spent $10.1 million (£6.2 million) on humanitarian mine action in the 1998/99 financial year.(688)
Recent UK government support has been given directly to mine clearance projects in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Northern Iraq and Mozambique. Directly supported projects all involve manual clearance methods though some also use mechanical devices and dogs.(689) The aim of this support is "to reduce the social and economic impact of landmines in developing countries."(690) The grants are to be used to support the detection and clearance of antipersonnel landmines and are to help developing countries implement their obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including stockpile destruction. In 1999, the UK made a contribution of US$300,000 in support of the ICBL's Landmine Monitor initiative.
Table 3 gives details of government figures for UK expenditure on mine clearance projects, including integrated mine awareness activities, by country for the period April 1992 to November 1998. It shows that twelve countries have received UK funding since 1992, with a maximum of eight countries receiving funding in any one year.(691)
Table 3: UK Government expenditure on mine clearance projects, including integrated mine awareness activities by country (US$)
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Somalia
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Northern Iraq, Mozambique
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Northern Iraq, Mozambique, Rwanda, Yemen
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Northern Iraq, Laos, Mozambique, FR Yugoslavia
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Egypt, Northern Iraq, Laos, Mozambique, Yemen, FR Yugoslavia
1998-1999 (up to 30 November 1998): 7,059,000
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Georgia, Northern Iraq, Laos, Mozambique, FR Yugoslavia
All DFID-funded activities except for Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) funded activities and value of surplus equipment re-deployed by DFID and MoD to mine clearance projects.
Further details of mine action expenditure have been made available by the UK government, showing how much has been spent in the field on different activities funded principally through the Department for International Development. Table 5 shows that, of the $49.2 million (£30.2 million) of expenditure for which this information was made available, 94 percent went to humanitarian mine clearance projects. Of this, some went to integrated mine awareness activities or the clearance of other unexploded ordnance.
Three and a half percent of these funds went to research and development. However, as noted below, the Ministry of Defense spends far greater sums on military demining technology. None of the resources made available by DFID went to commercial mine clearance.
In 1998, surplus equipment valued at $611,250 (£375,000) was donated by the government for mine clearance, including a gift to the Halo Trust of ten surplus Volvo medium wheel tractors, valued at $203,750 (£125,000). Ministers told Parliament that "they will increase considerably the rate of mine clearance and the safety of operators once the Halo Trust has suitably armored them."(692) Mine detection equipment with a value of $815,000 (£500,000) was provided from the overseas aid budget in 1996. A further $163,000 (£100,000) for such equipment was committed in financial year 1997-98.(693)
MoD-funded activity since 1992 has also taken place in Bosnia, as part of the wider military operation there. These activities have included training and supervision of mine clearance programs and the provision of mine awareness training to some 15,000 school children. However, it should be noted that serving British Army personnel are generally not permitted to work in minefields in peacetime. In recent years, UK military personnel have been attached to the Mine Action Center in Kosovo and the UN Mine Action Service in New York. The UK government announced in October 1997 that additional service manpower would be assigned to assist with demining programs in Bosnia, Africa and other areas of the world affected by landmines.(694)
The Ministry of Defense has apparently also, from the early 1980s, provided the authorities in Egypt with copies of surviving maps of known minefields and supporting information on the types of mines laid and the techniques used by the Commonwealth forces during the war. It is unknown how many minefields had surviving maps. There have been three visits to Egypt by Royal Ordnance Disposal officers (in 1981,1984 and 1994). The RAF also conducted reconnaissance flights over the area in 1984. The Ministry of Defense is currently preparing a new version of the map and data package that "makes use of advances in technology where possible."(695) It is believed that Libya has also requested information about minefields or financial reparations.
An official UK delegate at an Ottawa seminar of March 1998 reportedly claimed that, according to UK records, 250,000 mines were laid by British troops during World War II. A German delegate was said to confirm a similar figure. This contrasts sharply with repeated public statements by the Egyptian government that many millions of mines are in the ground in Egypt. (The Egyptian government contends that it cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty because there are no provisions for requiring those who laid mines to remove them.)
Funding through the EC
The UK has indirectly funded mine clearance through the European Community. Some $5.5 million (£3.37 million) was contributed to EC activities between 1992 and 1996, and nearly $12.2 million (£7.5 million) for the calendar year 1996.(696)
In addition, $15.7 million (£9.6 million) for humanitarian mine clearance was contributed through various UN funds and programs between 1992 and November 1998. These included the UN Voluntary Trust Fund ($978,000/£600,000); the Sarajevo UN Mine Action Center ($359,000/£220,000); the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance for Afghanistan; and the UN Development Program. The Government of Egypt received $957,312 directly (£587,308).
More than $28.7 million (£17.6 million) has been allocated in the same period to NGO agencies including MAG and HALO.
Spending on mine action programs in the UK
The Department for International Development (DFID) funds research and development of new technologies to improve the safety, efficiency and speed of humanitarian mine clearance. According to the DFID this funding goes toward "initiatives to trial new technology and adapt existing technology to the specific needs of humanitarian mine clearance."(697)
Although it is unclear what specific development work is being done, DFID partners in this program include the UK Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), UK companies and specialist NGOs. One example of this work given by DFID is support for building and using armored tractors in Cambodia for removing vegetation cover, which is said to speed up clearance rates by fifty per cent in some places. As Table 4 below shows, this source of support for research and development has been small in scale until recent years.
The Ministry of Defense is also responsible for spending on mine action programs in the UK. First, it monitors and maintains the minefields in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, including the presence of an Explosives Ordnance Disposal Response Team. The official view is that it has not been possible to cost this work because it is only one part of the duties of those involved. Second, MoD has funded applied research into military clearance technology (not humanitarian mine clearance technology); Ministers state that this funding has increased significantly over the past three years and is expected to remain high for the next five years at least. The Department currently spends approximately $4.9 million (£3 million) per annum on research into counter-mine technologies, although MoD's remit is to fund research only into military operation demining, rather than humanitarian mine clearance. MoD is researching sensors and countermine technologies, including "Ground Penetrating Radar," for military demining.(698)
Table 4: UK Government grants for research and development (DFID only)(699)
Year US$ (£)
1994-1995 171,033 (104,928)
1997-1998 613,977 (376,673)
1998-1999 893,799 (548,343)
at 30 Nov. 1999 -
Total 1,678,809 (1,029,944)
Details of new MoD assistance to demining were announced by the Secretary of State for Defense in October 1997. As part of a five-point plan, he announced that a new military post would be created in MoD to lead inter-departmental coordination on landmines and that an inter-departmental (MoD/FCO/DFID) working group on the issue would be formed. A focal point of post-conflict mine clearance research has been established by MoD at the Defense, Evaluation and Research Agency's (DERA) facilities at Chertsey in Surrey to complement the research being conducted in support of operational mine clearance. The DERA is to examine the suitability of commercial "off-the-shelf" equipment for demining and will publicize its findings.
The Defense Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) conducts research into counter-mine warfare on behalf of the British Government, and makes publicly available any results relevant to humanitarian de-mining. The Ministry of Defense and the Department for International Development are also actively involved in the international exchange of information and co-operation on mine clearance technologies and will continue to contribute to international work on humanitarian mine clearance.(700)
Finally, a new Mine Information and Technology Center at the Royal Engineers Battlefield Engineering Wing in Minley, Surrey, was also established in November 1997; this provides information on demining operations and offers mines awareness training to both military and civilian personnel in the UK. However, despite its broad mandate, MITC has only a small permanent staff consisting of one captain, one warrant officer and one senior NCO, although it will be able to draw on expertise from elsewhere in the Army and MoD. It is not yet clear what program of action MITC is pursuing. The additional annual cost to the defense budget is $203,750 (£125,000).(701)
Table 5: UK Government grants by activity (US$)
|Year||Humanitarian mine clearance1||Military initiative mine clearance2||Mine Awareness||Researcher & development|
|30 Nov 1998||407,5003||204,000||-||-|
2MOD funded: $204,000 (£125,000) (30.11.98) denotes value of surplus equipment re-deployed
The UK government contributes to international assistance to landmine survivors through organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Health Organization. In addition, in November 1997, the European Community committed some $9.6 million (£5.9 million) to the ICRC's 1997 and 1998 Special Appeals for Assistance to Mine Victims; the UK share of this assistance was about $1.4 million (£860,000) - or less than ten percent of the total.(702)
Funds have been raised by charitable organizations in the UK for projects assisting mine survivors overseas, although details of direct expenditure have, in many cases, proven difficult to separate from wider programs that may also assist mine survivors. Incomplete data provided by a small number of UK agencies suggest that a minimum of $2.9 million (£1,770,000) in charitable funds was spent on survivor assistance in 1997, and a further $972,000 (£596,000) in 1998. Further work to assess the extent and nature of charitable assistance for projects for survivors by UK agencies, other than government-funded projects, is necessary.
In January 1999, The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, set up to commemorate the Princess of Wales and to support causes with which she was associated, donated $1.7 million (£1,055,225) to thirteen charitable organizations working with landmine survivors. These grants are to address "the problems of people and communities who have been physically, mentally and economically affected by landmines." The projects involved are based in South Sudan, Bosnia Herzogovina, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, Laos, Sri Lanka, Palestinian Territories, Cambodia and Afghanistan, and are summarized in Table 6 below.(703)
Table 6: Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund supported projects (1999)
Action on Disability and Development: Working with Sudanese disabled persons organizations, including landmine survivors: to support meeting fundamental needs and human rights.
Leonard Cheshire International/Landmine Survivors Network: Landmine survivor support services, Bosnia Herzegovina: to provide training for empowerment of landmine survivors who have suffered traumatic injury.
Concern Worldwide: Vocational Training Center, Kuito, Angola teaching people injured by mines practical skills including carpentry and shoemaking.
The Jaipur Limb Campaign: Working with the Mozambique Red Cross to set up a rehabilitation center in Manjacaze, Mozambique: to provide social and economic rehabilitation and local production of mobility appliances.
Motivation: Wheelchairs for El Salvador: to train a team of mostly disabled trainees in wheel chair production, distribution and education using locally available materials.
Disability Awareness in Action/Pan African Federation of Disabled People: Leadership training seminar on landmines and human rights for disabled people's organizations in Africa.
POWER: Prosthetics and orthotics fitting, and training local people to fit them, with Ministry of Public Health and Cambodian School of Prosthetics and Orthotics. Based in Laos.
Voluntary Services Overseas: Provision of a physiotherapist in Sri Lanka: to provide therapy, walk-training and to train local physiotherapists and technicians.
War on Want: Mine action in Palestinian Territories: to provide mine awareness, support and advocacy for people with disabilities, including support for legal rights of disabled people.
World Vision: Vocational rehabilitation in Battambang Province, Cambodia: to provide business management support and loans and business workshops, including agricultural training for disabled people.
Save the Children Fund: Working with ADEMO in Mozambique, researching the needs of people with disabilities: to provide advocacy material, raise awareness and improve opportunities for disabled people.
Tim's Fund/Christian Aid: With the Afghanistan-Afghan Awareness Agency: mine awareness and marking minefields.
Most of the UK and territories currently under its administrative authority are not significantly mine-affected or UXO-affected. There is a particular problem in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, where APMs, including remotely delivered scatterable mines, were used by British and Argentine forces in the war of 1982. The Ministry of Defense reported that "landmines were used in the Falklands by our forces during the 1982 conflict, and in its aftermath. One British anti-personnel landmine remains unaccounted for although every effort has been made to clear our devices."(704) However, no real in-depth assessment has been made of the extent of the problem remaining, and available information on figures and locations remain based on estimates from 1986.
The official UK assessment is that there is "no reliable figure for the number of Argentine mines in the Falklands. Our best current estimate is that some 18,000 Argentine mines and similar devices of various types were laid, including some 14,000 anti-personnel landmines. About 1,400 Argentine mines were cleared following the conflict, before work was suspended after a number of serious injuries to clearance personnel."
Remaining minefields, or areas where it is suspected that mines might be, have been marked and fenced. These areas are monitored regularly to ensure that remaining mines present no danger to civilian or military personnel on the Islands.(705)
Other estimates of the number of APMs remaining range from 14,000 to 40,000; they have resulted in twenty square kilometers of the islands being fenced off as being potentially dangerous.(706) The U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program lists the Falklands/Malvinas as a mine-affected territory with the quantity of mines estimated at 25,000 to 30,000.
Argentina offered funding for the clearance of an estimated 30,000 mines in January 1994. These were said to include the Israeli No 4, the Italian SB-33, the FMK-1 APM, and the FMK-3 ATM. This latter mine uses an APM as a fuse; in other words, it can be detonated by a footstep.(707)
Another expert source, a former British army officer involved in the last minefield clearance in the Falklands/Malvinas in 1986, gave a more comprehensive listing of the types of mines found there. These are given in Table 7 below. The minefields are also reportedly very clearly fenced off, but have denied access to peat cutting areas, for example the main peat cutting area on Stanley Common. Peat is used as the main fuel for cooking and heating.
Table 7: Mines remaining in the Falklands/Malvinas
Antipersonnel mines: No.4 (Israel); SB-33 (Italy); FMK-1 (Argentina); P4B (Spain).
Antitank mines: FMK-3 (Argentina); No. 6 (Israel); M1A1 (U.S.); SB-81 (Italy); C-3-B (Spain).
Submunition: BL-755 AT and AP bomblet (UK).
1. Statement by His Excellency Mr. Albert Pintat, Minister of External Relations of the Principality of Andorra, Treaty Signing Ceremony of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
2. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/15/99)
3. Speech of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Wolfgang Schussel, at the Ottawa Conference, 3 December 1997.
4. Alexander Lang, Legal Affairs Division, Austrian Red Cross, Speech during a Conference of the European Council, Budapest, Hungary, 7 March 1997.
6. Section 2, Federal Law on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines, 10 January 1997.
7. Ibid, Section 5: Penalty.
8. This section is based upon an article written by Dr. Thomas Hajnoczi, Head of the Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nuclear Affairs, Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. See also, Hajnoczi, Desch, Chatsis, "The Ban Treaty," in To Walk Without Fear (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 292-313.
9. Final Declaration, Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines, June 1997.
10. Speech of the Foreign Minister, 3 December 1997.
11. Telephone interview with Dr. Thomas Hajnoczi at the Foreign Ministry, 15 February 1999.
12. Telephone interview with Hans Hamberger, 4 March 1999.
13. Telephone interview with Dieter Skalla, Austrian Chamber of Commerce, Department for Defense Economy (Wehrwirtschaft), 2 March 1999.
14. See for example, Eddie Banks, Antipersonnel Mines: Recognizing and Disarming (London: Brassey's, 1997) pp. 45-59; annual volumes of Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics.
15. Telephone interview with Mr. Schnabl, Austrian Ministry for the Interior, Head of the Department II/13 (Kriegsmaterial), 4 March 1999.
16. Telephone interview with Dieter Skalla, 2 March 1999.
17. Telephone interview with Hans Hamberger, 4 March 1999. According to U.S. data, these would all have been exported prior to 1969.
18. This number could not be confirmed by the Ministry of Defense.
19. Telephone interview with Hans Hamberger, 4 March 1999.
20. Austrian Federal Law, 10 January 1997, Section 4: "Destruction of existing stocks." (Unofficial translation by the Austrian Red Cross.)
21. Alexander Lang, Legal Affairs Division, Austrian Red Cross, Report on the Demonstration and Information Meeting, Felixdorf, Austria, 18 December 1997.
22. Foreign Minister's Speech, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1999.
23. A complete list of Austrian activities related to mine action is available from Landmine Monitor.
24. Wiener Zeitung, "Klima Hands Over Mine Detectors," 8 February 1999.
25. Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nuclear Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austrian Mine Action Programs, provided by Gerhard Doujak.
26. UN General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Assistance in Mine Clearance," A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29.
27. Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Nuclear Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austrian Mine Action Programs, provided by Gerhard Doujak.
29. Telephone interview with Mr. Skalsky, Head of Human Resources, Schiebel Austria, 5 March 1999.
30. Interview with Dr. Thomas Hajnoczi, 15 February 1999.
31. Austrian Red Cross, Department for Disaster Relief and Development Cooperation, Landmines in Bosnia: Projects of the Austrian Red Cross.
32. Belgian response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 26 February 1999; responses coordinated by the Ministry of Defense, the State Secretariat for Cooperation and Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the coordination of the latter, p. 2. This is further referred to herein as "MFA response."
33. Report of the plenary session of the Senate, Ordinary Session 1997-1998, afternoon session, 9 July 1998.
34. Report of the plenary session of 16 July 1998 of the Chamber of Representatives, Nominal vote N°87.
35. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fax memorandum from Legal Affairs General Direction, Treaties Service, 23 October 1998.
36. UN website, www.un.org/Depts.Treaty/final/ chapter XXVI Disarmament, N°5.
37. Le Moniteur, Official Journal, 18 December 1998.
38. MFA response
39. APL/CW.47 Amendment proposed by Belgium, Article 16 Bis, 2 September 1997.
40. Speech of Mr. Eric Derycke, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signing Conference of the Mine Ban Convention, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
41. Discussion with the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Service at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 March 1999.
42. MFA response.
43. Speech of Foreign Minister Erik Derycke, Chairman of the International Meeting on Demining, Geneva, 6 July 1995.
44. Intervention of the Belgian head of delegation, "Towards a Global Ban on Antipersonnel Mines," Ottawa, Canada, 3 October 1996.
45. Video interview of Ambassador Mernier, general secretary of the Brussels conference, Handicap International, 27 June 1997; see also, Robert J. Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair, and Ralph Lysyshyn, "The Ottawa Process and the International Movement to Ban Antipersonnel Mines," To Walk without Fear, Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, Brian W. Tomlin (eds.), (Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1998), pp. 173-174.
46. Observation of the researcher who was the NGO member of the official Belgian delegation in the Oslo Treaty negotiations.
47. Speech of Minister Derycke, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
48. Statement of Minister Derycke, Press Conference, 1 March 1999.
49. Belgian Administration for Development and Cooperation.
50. Royal Decree of 22 September 1997.
52. Ministerial Decree, 24 April 1998; Ministerial Decree, 19 January 1999.
53. Letter from MFA, 2 February 1999.
54. MFA response.
56. MFA response; discussion with the Department of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, MFA.
57. European Parliament, Resolution B3-1744/92, December 1992.
58. Antipersonnel mines: For the banning of massacres of civilians in time of Peace, facts and chronologies, 2nd edition, June 1997.
59. MFA response.
60. Law related to antipersonnel mines, booby traps and devices of the same nature. N95-778.
61. Law of 24 June 1996 modifying the Law of 3 January 1933 relative to the production, trade and carrying of arms and of commerce of ammunition with the intent of prohibiting the Belgian State or its public administrations from holding antipersonnel mines in depots. F96-1435, published in the Belgian Monitor on 9 July 1996, p. 18777.
62. Parliamentary document, Senate, 1994-1995, 1009-2 (1993-1194), report by Mr. Pataer, pp. 7 ss., 35.
63. Ibid, pp. 22-26.
65. Parliamentary document, report by Mr. Pataer, p. 2.
66. Discussion with the representatives of the interdepartmental meeting of 18 March 1999.
68. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines," Oslo, 18 September 1997.
69. UN website: www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc2.pl?53807
70. Video interview of Ambassador Mernier of the Belgian Delegation, Geneva Review Conference, 3 May 1996.
71. Report of the plenary session of the Senate , ordinary session 1997-1998, afternoon session of 9 July 1998.
72. Report of the plenary session of 16 July 1998 of the Chamber of Representatives, Nominal votes N°71 and 81 (137 yes / 2 no).
73. Derycke, Geneva, 6 July 1995.
74. Mernier, Geneva video interview, 3 May 1996.
75. Video interview of Ambassador Mernier, Handicap International, Brussels, 27 June 1997.
76. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Service, MFA, 9 March 1999.
77. PRB, 1778/1978, brochure published at the occasion of the 200th anniversary, Brussels, 1978.
79. PRB Alternative report : "Alternatief Verslag," Aktiekomitee aan de wapenhandel omschakeling wapenindustrie en de vlaamse vredeuniversiteit", Nico Van Duffel en Ernst Gulcher, 1985, p. 3.
80. Report done in the name of the Justice Commission of the Belgium Senate, session 1994-1995, 20 December 1994, R.A 16526, p. 5.
81. Confidential source.
82. Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 1997-1998, p. 51; U.S. Department of Defense, Mines Facts," CD Rom.
83. "Mine Facts" CD Rom.
84. Comments by Colonel Paul Frank (ret),military engineers, now volunteer at Handicap international.
85. Jane's, p..51; Mine Facts. Angola is mentioned only by Jane's.
86. Colonel Paul Frank (ret),military engineers, now volunteer at Handicap international.
87. Jane's, p. 51; "Mine Facts" CD Rom. Rwanda is mentioned only by Jane's.
89. "Mine Facts" CD Rom.
91. "Mines Facts" CD Rom.
95. Press coverage: De Morgen, Het Gazet van Antwerpen, Le Soir, l'Echo de la Bourse, 1990/1991.
96. Letter de Ronald Parijs , trusteeship office, 25/01/99, ref : RP/SD/99/F/ARCHIV.
97. MFA response, p. 3.
98. Request of 9 March 1999.
99. Supplement to the Belgian response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire, fax from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 1999.
100. MFA response, p. 2.
101. Letter of request written by the GRIP, 25 February 1999.
102. Belgian law 24 June 1996, Le Moniteur, official journal, 9 July 1996.
103. Vers L'Avenir, 27 August 1997.
104. MFA response, p. 2.
105. Armed Forces Press Service, Press Release 354/1, 19 December 1996.
106. This figure is quoted in the following newspapers : La Lanterne, 28 August 1997; La dernière Heure, 8 November 1997; La Wallonie, 8 November 1997; Het Nieuwswsblad, 29 August 1997, Vers l'Avenir 27 August 1997; La Libre Belgique, 27 August 1997, Le Soir, 27 August 1997.
107. Vers l'Avenir, 27 August 1997.
108. This figure is quoted in the following newspapers: La Lanterne, 28 August 1997; La dernière Heure, 8 November 1997; La Wallonie, 8 November 1997; Het nieuwsblad, 29 August 1997; Vers l'Avenir, 27 August 1997; La Libre Belgium, 27 August 1997; Le Soir, 27 August 1997.
109. Le Soir, 8 November 1997; La Dernière Heure, 8 November 1997; La Wallonie, 8 November 1997.
110. Request of 19 November 1998 and repeated 7 March 1999 at the Ministry of Defense, The requests to the firm of Buck failed to obtain information.
111. Visit made in May 1997; Footage available at Handicap International.
112. Het Volk, 20 December 1996; Le Soir, 27 August 1997 and 8 November 1997; La Wallonie, 8 November 1997; Het Nieuwse Blad, 29 August 1997; La Libre Belgium 27 August 1997.
113. MFA response.
115. Le Soir, 8 November 1997; La Wallonie, 8 November 1997.
116. MFA response, p. 3.
118. Colonel Paul Frank (ret),military engineers, now volunteer at Handicap international
119. Supplement to the Belgian response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire, fax from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 1999.
120. Response of the Vice Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in Charge of Energy , Jean-Pol Poncelet, public meeting of the National Defense Commission, 1 December 1998, ref: C 683. p. 2.
121. Senate of Belgium, session de 1994-1995, 20 December 1994, Bill, report done in the name of the fait Justice commission by Mr. .Pataer. doc ref 1009-2, p. 35.
122. Supplement to the Belgian response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire, fax from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 1999.
123. MFA response, p. 2.
124. LM Researcher telephone interview with Major Lambrecht, second in command at the SEDEE, 8 March 1999.
126. LM Researcher telephone interview with Adjudant-Major Henkinet, section commander of the DMTCC (Destruction, mines, travaux de campagne et camouflage) at the Engineering school. 16 March 1999.
127. Statistic table received from Col. Devroe, Commander of SEDEE, March 1999.
128. LM Researcher telephone interview with Adjudant-Major Henkinet.
129. MFA response.
131. 45 million cover the costs of the technical advisers during that period.
132. Management files of the Savannaketh project , Handicap International, 1997-98.
133. MFA response.
134. All information below is from the Belgian response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire, MFA, 26 February 1999.
135. Ibid, except where otherwise indicated.
136. LM Researcher telephone interview with the Major Lambrecht.
137. According to the last census in 1991, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was 4,209,308 citizens of whom 43.7 percent identified themselves as Bosnian Muslims (known since the war as Bosniaks), 31.3 percent as Bosnian Serbs, and 17.3 percent as Bosnian Croats. A further 7.7 percent were either of other ethnic origins or identified themselves as Yugoslavs.
138. The World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Toward Economic Recovery, 1996.
139. UNICEF, Bosnia and Herzegovina Women and Children Situation Analysis 1998, p. 3.
140. ICRC and UNHCR, The Silent Menace/Landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997, p. 12.
141. MAG and The Cooperative Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997, p.2.
142. ICRC and UNHCR, The Silent Menace, p. 15.
143. E-mail exchange from Colin King to David Crenna, 18 February 1999.
145. E-mail exchange from David Armitt to LM researcher, 1 February 1999.
146. Jane's Information Group Special Report, Trends in Landmine Warfare, July 1995.
147. ICRC and UNHCR, The Silent Menace, p. 14.
148. Interview with SFOR official, Sarajevo, 29 January 1999.
149. E-mail correspondence from Peter Isaacs to LM researcher, 12 March 1999.
150. Zahabia Adamaly, Sunil Gupta and Vibeke Hjortlund, A Matter of Mines: Living with Them and Paying the Bill.
151. Interview with Peter Isaacs, Sarajevo, 29 January 1999.
152. World Bank Information Brochure, Projects Supported in BiH, 1998.
153. E-mail exchange from Dave Armitt, 1 February 1999.
154. UNHCR figures at 31 August 1997 (statistics provided by entity authorities).
155. Interview with Peter Isaacs, 29 January 1999.
156. Interview with Mirsada Hodges, Sarajevo, 27 January 1999.
158. UNICEF, BiH Situation Analysis, 1998, pp. 55-56.
160. Interview with Esperanza Vives, Sarajevo, 28 January 1999.
161. List of organizations was based on MAWG participant lists in each entity.
162. Interview with Peter Isaacs, 29 January 1999.
164. Interview with Zoran Grujic, Sarajevo, 28 January 1999.
165. BHMAC information officer, Zoran Grujic provided documentation noting official BHMAC figures given in this report.
166. E-mail from Zoran Grujic (BHMAC) to LM Researcher, 10 March 1999.
168. Interview with Peter Isaacs, Sarajevo, 28 January 1999.
169. This number is different from the 3,885 total reported cases as mine incidents continue to be recorded. The last comprehensive update of the ICRC mine victim database was 31 May 1998.
170. Interview with Plamenko Priganica, Tuzla, 30 January 1999.
171. Interview with Pierre Girardier, Sarajevo, 27 January 1999.
172. ICRC and UNHCR 1997 report, The Silent Menace/Landmines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.43; Interview with Goran Cerkez, Sarajevo, 28 January 1999.
173. ICRC and UNHCR report, p. 43.
174. Interview with Goran Cerkez, 28 January 1999.
176. Interview with Plamenko Priganica, 30 January 1999.
178. Interview with Pierre Girardier, 27 January 1999.
179. Interview with Karen Perrin, Sarajevo, 28 January 1999.
180. Interview with Mirsada Hodges, 27 January 1999.
181. Interview with Plamenko Priganica, 30 January 1999.
182. Interview with Pierre Girardier and Valerie O'Brien, Sarajevo, 27 January 1999.
183. Statement by His Excellency Mr. Slav Danev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bulgaria to Canada, Treaty Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
185. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Trayko Spassov, Senior Specialist, Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998.
187. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/3/99).
188. Statement by Ambassador Petko Draganov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and the other International Organisations in Geneva, (undated) February 1999.
189. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.
190. Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1993), p. 104.
191. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Trayko Spassov, 26-28 March 1998.
193. "Bulgaria to Clear Landmines Near Greek Border," Agence France Presse, 23 October 1998. See also "Bulgarian Officer Deactivates a Landmine on Border with Greece," Reuters News Picture Service, 27 October 1998.
194. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993), p. 60.
195. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Trayko Spassov, 26-28 March 1998, p. 20.
196. Ozren Zunec, The Mine Planet, (Zagreb: Strata, 1997), p. 171. The Dayton Agreement (22 November 1995) is considered as the end of the war in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
197. Interview with Hrvoje Babic and Milan Bajic, members of the CROMAC Council
198. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, (Washington: Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, September 1998), p. 81.
199. H.E. Dr. Ivo Sanader, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Address: "A Global Ban on Landmines," Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997.
202. Interview with Dubravko Taras, official in the Ministry of Defense.
203. Interview with Petar Mrkalj, Assistant Director, Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights.
204. Novi List, 6 February 1999.
205. Ozren Zunec, The Mine Planet, p. 21.
206. The most recent statement by CROMAC.
207. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, p. 81.
208. Roberts & Williams, 1995.
209. Vjesnik, 24 August 1996.
210. Ambassador Ivan Simonovic, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, "Statement to the Fifty-third Session of the General Assembly: Agenda item 42: Assistance in Mine Clearance," United Nations, New York, 17 November 1998.
211. Hidden Killers, p. 83.
212. Roberts & Williams, 1996.
213. Vjesnik, 14 April 1996.
214. United Nations, Assistance in mine clearance: Report of the Secretary-General, (New York: United Nations), A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 10.
215. Gorseta, Novi List, 21 December 1998.
216. Statement of Ambassador Simonovic, United Nations, 17 November 1998.
217. Hidden Killers, p. 86.
218. "Croatia Attracts Little Foreign Aid but for Mines," Reuters, 5 December 1998.
219. Mine Clearance Law, Article 2.
220. Mine Clearance Law, Article 3 & 4.
222. Mine Clearance Law, Article 4.
223. Mine Clearance Law, Article 5.
224. Ivanusic, CROMAC official.
225. Dubravko Taras, Ministry of Defense.
226. Provided by Vanja Sikirica, CROMAC.
227. Jutarnji list, 1 October 1998.
228. UNICEF, Antipersonnel landmines: Policies, Strategies and Programs, (New York: United Nations, undated) in Hidden Killers, p. 85.
230. Gorseta, Novi list, 21 December 1998.
231. Danny Annan, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, written answers to LM, 24 March 1999.
232. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Landmine Update," No. 12, December 1995.
233. Ministry of Defense, Press Release, 28 June 1996.
234. "Ban Movement Chronology", ICBL homepage: www.icbl.org, 22 March 1999.
235. Major Per Lyse Rasmussen, Danish Ministry of Defense, written answers to LM, 25 March 1999; telephone interview, Niels Munk, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1999.
236. See, Michael Borg-Hansen, Counsellor, Royal Danish Embassy, Washington, DC, letter to Human Rights Watch, 11 July 1996, in response to ICBL questionnaire.
237. See, Tom Vilmer Paamand, "Danish mine-producing companies," 27 April 1995. Peace on the Net: www.fred.dk/peace/danmines.htm. He states that "antipersonnel mines have not been produced in Denmark since the 1970s, but in 1980 some were renovated for the Danish Army. One company produced parts for antipersonnel mines until 1982."
238. Tom Vilmer Paamand, "Danish mine-producing companies," 27 April 1995. Peace on the Net: www.fred.dk/peace/danmines.htm.
239. Royal Danish Embassy letter to Human Rights Watch, 11 July 1996.
240. Major Lyse Rasmussen, 25 March 1999.
242. Royal Danish Embassy letter to Human Rights Watch, 11 July 1996.
243. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, "U.S. Landmine Sales By Country," March 1994. It appears these were all M18A1 Claymore mines.
244. Annan, 24 March 1999.
245. Munk, 23 March 1999.
246. Royal Danish Embassy letter to Human Rights Watch, 11 July 1996.
247. Major Lyse Rasmussen, 25 March 1999.
248. Major Lyse Rasmussen, 25 March 1999.
250. See, Tom Vilmer Paamand, "Danish mine-producing companies," 27 April 1995. Peace on the Net: www.fred.dk/peace/danmines.htm. He states that "antipersonnel mines have not been produced in Denmark since the 1970s, but in 1980 some were renovated for the Danish Army. One company produced parts for antipersonnel mines until 1982."
251. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Danish Humanitarian Contributions to Mine Clearance and Mine related Activities from 1992-1998."
252. United Nations, "Country Report: Denmark", United Nations Demining Homepage: www.un.org/Depts/Landmine, 22 March 1999.
253. Munk, 23 March 1999.
254. UN Country Report: Denmark.
255. Munk, 23 March 1999.
256. Annan, 24 March 1999.
258. UN Country Report: Denmark.
260. Munk, 23 March 1999.
261. On the occasion of Mitterrand's announcement, he had been presented with 22,000 signatures which had been collected in support of Handicap International's call to end the "Coward's War" and stop the use of APMs.
262. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Landmine Update, No. 12, December 1995.
263. French Law No. 98-542.
264. Extract from speech by French Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Debate, Official Journal of the French Republic, unabridged report of Parliamentary sessions of Thursday, 25 June 1998, pp. 5402 and 5403.
265. French Law No. 98-564.
266. Law No. 98-564 of 8 July 1998 with the intent of eliminating antipersonnel mines, Article 3.
267. Law No. 98-564 of 8 July, 1998, article 9.
268. Ibid, article 10.
269. Decree No. 98-36 of 16 January 1993, relative to the sharing out of administrative tasks for the application of the Convention of 13 January 1993, on the banning of the development, manufacture, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and their destruction. Official Journal of January 1998, pp. 813 to 815.
270. Belkhacem Elomari, Bruno Barillot; The Elimination of antipersonnel mines, principles for Control and Verification, the case of France, (Lyon, Observatoire des Transferts d'Armements, September 1998).
271. Ibid, p. 45.
272. Speech by Deputy Marie-Hélène Aubert during the 24 April Session of the National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, Official Journal of the French Republic, pp. 3051-3057. The Oslo diplomatic record shows that antitank mines with anti-handling devices which explode in the carrying out of an innocent act by an individual function as APMs and thus are illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18 September 1997.
273. Contribution by Mrs. Bujon-Barre, Sub-Department For Chemical and Biological Disarmament and Control of Conventional Weapons, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at symposium "For a World Without Mines," organized by Handicap International, Paris, 25 February 1999.
274. Belkacem Elomari, Bruno Barillot, "The French Manufacuring Complex For Landmines and Related Systems, Lyon, February, 1997.
275. See report on Belgium.
278. 1994 GICAT Catalog, p 1-10-0-10.
279. 1992 GICAT Catalog, p. 1-10-0-9.
280. 1994 GICAT Catalog, p. 1-10-0-11.
281. The Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines, pp. 48-49.
282. Africa Defense, December 1990, p.46.
283. The Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines, p. 48.
284. International Defense and Armaments, January 1990, p. 65.
285. DIA-US Foreign Science and Technology Center, Landmine Warfare Trends & Projections, December 1992, pp. 3-34 to 3-37.
286. French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998 Edition, Volume A
287. Alsetex SAE document, handed out at 1998 Eurosatory Exhibition.
288. According to information provided by Alsetex Co. in French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998, Volume A, p. 376, these mines are fitted with a battery giving them a lifespan of 1 to 365 days.
289. 1994 GICAT Catalog, p.1-10-0-13.
290. National Assembly, session of 24 April 1998, Official Journal, Parliamentary Debates,
291. Elimination of Antipersonnel Mine, p. 68.
292. French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998 edition, Volume A, p. 360.
293. Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 1996-1997, p. 399.
294. 84 1994 GICAT Catalog, p. 1-10-0-10 and Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 1996-1997, p. 399.
295. Jane's Mine and Mine Clearance, 1996-1997, p. 399. The Matenin mine launcher equipped with Minotaur is also presented in French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998 Edition, Volume B, p. 156.
296. Defence Industry Report (Jane's Defence Weekly), May 1998, p. 3. See also French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998 Edition, Volume B, p. 150.
297. Giat Magazine, March 1997, p. 4.
298. Ibid, p.34.
299. Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 1997-1997, p. 399.
300. Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 1997-1997, p. 398.
301. Ibid., p. 399.
302. French Terrestrial Defense Matériel, 1998 Edition, Volume B, pp. 154 and 158.
303. Response by the Minister of Defense to a written question from Deputy Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, 13 April 1998.
304. Investigation of the Rwandan Tragedy (1990-1994), Volume 2, appendices, National Assembly Report N 1271 by Paul Quilés, 15 December 1998.
305. The decree of 2 October 1992, in respect of procedures for the import and export of war matériel, arms, munitions, and associated equipment, provides that export authorization may be subordinated to a commitment by qualified authorities in the importing country not to allow, without prior permission from French authorities, the resale or transfer in any form whatsoever to a third country, all or part of the equipment planned for shipment (Article 12). In concrete terms, this provision takes the form of an end-user certificate attached to all arms-export contract files.
306. Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, pp. 355-356.
307. Trends in Land Mine Warfare, Jane's Special Report, 1995, pp. 78-79.
308. U.S. Department of Defense MineFacts CD-ROM,.
309. Hidden Killers , U.S. Department of State, July 1993.
310. 51 U.S. Department of Defense, CD-ROM MineFacts.
311. Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 1996-1997.
312. Trends in Land Mine Warfare, Jane's Special Report, 1995, p. 78.
313. AFP, 5 March 1998.
314. Declaration by Alain Richard, Minister of Defense, National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, Official Journal, session of 24 April 1998, p. 3043.
315. "One More Year," TV program broadcast over Canal Plus in December 1998.
316. National Assembly, Analytical Minutes, session of 24 April 1998.
317. AFP, 5 March 1998.
318. Official Journal, National Assembly, Questions, No. 34827, 4 March 1996.
319. Notice NA No. 3032, Volume VII, "Emergency Humanitarian Action," by Michel Fromet, 10 October 1996.
320. Interview with Jean Marc Pelletier, Manager of Operations at AF DEMIL, for the program "One More Year," broadcast over Canal Plus on 5 December 1998.
321. AFP, 5 March 1998.
322. Notification of munitions-destruction contract award to same three firms, in BOAMP, 23 August 1996.
323. National Assembly, Official Analytical Minutes, session of 24 April 1998.
324. Interview with Jean Marc Pelletier, 5 December 1998.
325. Law of 8 July 1998, with the intent of eliminating antipersonnel mines, Article 3.
326. Libération, 4 March 1998.
327. French Senate, Group of Republican Communists and Citizens, session of 14 June 1998, Banning and Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines.
328. Le Monde, 14 October 1996.
329. Senate Report n 85, Appendix n 44, by François Trucy, 20 November 1997, p. 66.
330. Data provided by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1999.
332. Contribution by Samuel Le Caruyer de Beauvais, Roving Ambassador, Action for Mine-Clearance and Aid to Victims of Antipersonnel Mines, at a symposium "For A World Without Mines," organized by Handicap International, French Senate, Paris, 25 February 1999.
333. Handicap International
334. Contribution by Ambassador Samuel de Beauvais, symposium "For A World Without Mines," Paris, 25 February 1999.
335. Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), Weltweite Ächtung von Antipersonenminen. Der Vertrag von Ottawa - Eine Herausforderung für die Zukunft (Worldwide Ban on AP Mines - the Treaty of Ottawa - A Challenge for the Future), June 1998, pp. 55.
336. Interview with Jörg Alt SJ, 23 February 1999.
338. www.auswaertiges-amt.de, Seven-Point Action Program on AP Mines, presented by Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Klaus Kinkel (English Version), Bonn, 18. July 1996.
339. Ibid., p. 1.
340. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
341. Please find an assessment of these efforts in the Mine Action section.
342. Speech on the occasion of Signing Conference of Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction, Speech of Federal Minster of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa, 3. December 1997; p. 1. www.auswaertiges-amt.de
343. Ibid., p. 2.
344. Ibid., p. 2 f.
345. DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), Deutscher Bundestag - 13. Wahlperiode - 210. Sitzung, Bonn, den 11. Dezember 1997, (Plenary Protocol 13/210, Bonn, 11 December 1997), pp. 19189.http://dip.bundestag.de
346. Ibid., pp.19190.
347. Ibid., p. 19190; p. 19195.
348. Ibid., p. 10190; p. 19195.
349. Ibid., p. 19191.
350. Ibid., p. 19192; p. 19194.
351. Ibid., p. 19192; p. 19195.
352. Ibid., p. 19191; p. 19196.
353. Ibid., p. 19194.
354. Ibid., p.19197.
355. Ibid., p.19190.
356. Bundesgesetzblatt Teil II (Federal Law Gazette, Part II), 11 May 1998, pp. 778, Gesetz vom 30.04.98 (Law from 30 April 1998).
357. Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I (Federal Law Gazette, Part I), 09 July 1998, pp. 1778, Ausführungsgesetz zum Übereinkommen über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der Herstellung und der Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren Vernichtung vom 3. Dezember 1997 (Law of application of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction from 3 December 1997).
358. DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings): Bundesrat Plenarprotokoll (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 721, 06 February 1998, p. 23B, 37C-38D; Bundestag Plenarprotokoll (Lower House of the Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 13/219, 12 February 1998, p. 20061C-D20073C-20077D; Deutscher Bundestag (Lower House of the Federal Parliament), Document 13/10197, 25 March 1998; Bundesrat Plenarprotokoll (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, plenary protocol) 723, 27 March 1998, p. 148. http://dip.bundestag.de
359. Bundesrat, Drucksache 34/98, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung vom 16.01.1998 (Upper House of the Federal Parliament, Document 34/98, bill of the Federal government from 16 January 1998).http://dip.bundestag.de
360. Ibid., p. 24.
361. Ibid., p. 26.
362. Ibid., p. 28.
363. Ibid., p. 28.
364. Ibid., p. 29; p. 30.
365. DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), Ausführungsgesetz zum Übereinkommen über das Verbot des Einsatzes, der Lagerung, der Herstellung und der Weitergabe von Antipersonenminen und über deren Vernichtung vom 3. Dezember 1997 (Law of application of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction from 3 December 1997). http://dip.bundestag.de
366. Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I (Federal Law Gazette, Part I), No. 43, 9 July 1998, pp. 1778.
367. Ibid., p. 8.
368. www.auswaertiges-amt.de, press release from 24 July 1998, Auswärtiges Amt: Deutsche und französische Ratifikationsurkunde zum internationalen Übereinkommen für das Verbot von Antipersonenminen in New York hinterlegt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: German and French Ratification document on Conventon on Ban of AP mines is deposit in New York).
369. Ibid., p. 1.
370. DIP - Das Informationssystem für Parlamentarische Vorgänge (Information System on Parliamentary Proceedings), GESTA: XA012, Gesetz zum Protokoll II in der am 3. Mai 1996 geänderten Fassung und zum Protokoll IV vom 13. Oktober 1995 zum VN-Waffenübereinkommen (Law concerning Protocol II, revised version of 03 May 1996 and Protocol IV from 13 October 1995 concerning UN armament convention). http://dip.bundestag.de
371. Press release, 2 May 1997.http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de
372. Third Session of the Conference on Disarmament 1998, Statement by the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, Geneva, 30 July 1998 (Original version in English), p. 4. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de
373. Statement by Ambassador Dr Rüdiger Hartmann, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control, Geneva, 25 March 1999.
374. Welt am Sonntag, 24 January 1999.
375. AP (Associated Press), 25 February 1999.
376. There is currently no detailed information available on production of landmines in Former East Germany. Therefore the following chapter concentrates on landmines in the Federal Republic of Germany.
377. Thomas Küchenmeister, "Gute Mine" zum bösen Spiel: Landminen made in Germany (Idstein: KOMZI-Verlag, 1995), p. 30.
378. Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322).
379. Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), June 1998; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), 22 May 1995, p. 3. Http://dip.bundestag.de
380. Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), pp. 30-31; Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), 22 May 1995, p. 3. Http://dip.bundestag.de
381. U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-31.
382. Using 1999 exchange rate: DEM 1.76 = U.S. $ 1.
383. German Parliament, Document 13/1473 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473), pp. 3-4.
384. Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 33.
385. Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn 14 February 1997.
386. Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 46; see also: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 1.
387. U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set MON-50.
388. See U.S. Department of Defense (http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-39).
389. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 3; see also: Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 35.
390. Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 35.
392. U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set MUSPA.
393. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 8.
394. Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), pp. 50-51.
396. Ibid., p. 39.
397. Ibid., p. 38.
398. Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 14 February 1997.
399. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4.
400. Ibid., p. 39.
401. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 7.
402. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 8; see also: Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 40.
404. Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 40; see also: U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set AT 1.
405. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 8.
407. U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set AT-2.
408. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4; see also: Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 42.
409. Küchenmeister (1995); p. 41.
410. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4.
411. Küchenmeister (1995), p. 43.
412. Bundesdrucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4. http://dip.bundestag.de
413. Küchenmeister (1995), p. 43.
414. U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set DM-31 AT.
415. Federal Ministry of Defense, letter to Marcel Pott (Journalist), Bonn, undated (May 1995), as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45
416. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 13/1473 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473), p. 4; Federal Ministry of Defense, letter to Marcel Pott (Journalist), Bonn, undated (May 1995), as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45, "Wehrdienst" ("Military Service" - magazine), No. 185, 1985, as cited in Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 45.
417. This joint venture ended in early 1998 and TDW is again 100 % a subsidiary company of DASA (source: Soldat und Technik (Soldier and Technology), October 1998, p. 654).
418. Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).
419. KNA (Catholic News Agency), 29 May 1998.
420. U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com, data set PARM-1.
421. RIB-Rundbrief (RIB information letter), No. 21, November 1998.
422. Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).
423. Thomas Küchenmeister, 1998.
424. According to a report of KNA (Catholic News Agency) from 29 May 1998 ARGES will go into production in 2005. But it seems that ARGES is already produced: According to governmental sources of Norwegian Defense Department a contract was signed for AGRES in 1997. The contract sum is said to be around 65 million. DEM (around US$ 36.9 million ) (source: odin.dep.no/fd/publ/anskaffelser/eng/contracts.html).
425. Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, undated (December 1997).
426. RIB-Rundbrief (RIB information letter), No. 21, November 1998.
427. Bundesdrucksache 13/2252 (German Parliament, Document 13/2252), pp. 3-4.
428. Bundesdrucksache 13/2432 (German Parliament, Document 13/2432), pp. 1-2.
429. Wehrdienst (magazine: Military Service) as cited by Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 119.
430. All data from Thomas Küchenmeister (1995), p. 119.
431. Report of international conventional arms transfers, 1997. www.auswaertiges-amt.de
432. Bundesdrucksache 13/2252 (German Parliament, Document 13/2252), p. 3.
433. Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), June 1998, p. 55.
434. All data (with one exception) from U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com.
435. Report of international conventional arms transfers, 1997. www.auswaertiges-amt
436. All data from U.S. Department of Defense: http://www.demining.brtrc.com.
437. Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Public Relations), June 1998, p. 57.
438. Europäische Sicherheit (European Security), 3/1998, editor: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, p. 5.
439. Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 14 February 1997.
440. Spiegel, 21/1998, p. 20; see also: Federal Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 02.12.1997; "Wie alle andern Waffen unterliegen auch die US Landminen aufgrund obiger Bestimmungen nicht der Kontrolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland." ("Due to regulations mentioned above [SOFA; M.H.] US landmines like all other weapons do not fall under control of the Federal Republic of Germany.")
442. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18 September 1997.
443. Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 15. January 1999.
446. Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995.Exchange rate: DEM 1.76 = US-$ 1.
447. Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999.
449. Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322 (German Parliament, Document 13/1473; 13/1023; 13/11322).
450. Federal Ministry of Defense, Press Release, 5 December 1995.
451. Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 22 November 1995; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 17. September 1997; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999; Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Bonn, 15 January 1999.
452. Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 2 February 1999.
453. www.rheinmetall.com/html/struktur.htm (promotion of the company itself).
454. http://www.diehl-gruppe.de/diehl_1.htm; see also "Das Geschäft der Allesfresser" ("The deal of omnivores"), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 November 1998.
455. http://dip.bundestag.de, Bundesdrucksache 13/1023 (German Parliament, Document 13/1023), p. 1.
456. Ibid, p. 2.
457. Federal Ministry of Defense, Press Release, 5 December 1995.
458. "Pope Calls for Total Ban on Landmines," Reuters News Service, 21 April 1996.
459. "Vatican Condemns Decision of Landmine Conference," Reuters News Service, 6 May 1996.
460. "Pope Urges all Countries to Sign Anti-Mine Treaty," Reuters News Service, 28 February 1999.
461. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. C-1.
462. Statement of His Excellency Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, Secretary for Relations with States, on the occasion of the Signing Conference of the Convention on the Global Banning of Antipersonnel Landmines, Ottawa, 3-4 December 1997.
463. Statement by H.E. Mr. Laszlo Kovacs, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March, p. 7.
464. Statement by Ambassador Petko Draganov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and the other International Organisations in Geneva, (undated) February 1999.
465. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998."
466. Speaking at Budapest Regional Conference, 26 March 1998, in ICBL Conference report.
467. ICBL report, Regional Conference, 26-28 March 1998, pp. 6-8.
468. Telephone interview with Dezso Horvath, Deputy Permanent Representative, Hungarian Mission to the United Nations, 25 February 1999.
469. United Nations General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines," A/50/701, 3 November 1995, p. 6.
470. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM; Eddie Banks, Antipersonnel Landmines: Recognizing and Disarming (London: Brassey's, 1997), pp. 128-132.
471. Ibid. Also see, Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 1993), p. 104.
472. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 100.
473. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. C3.
474. Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. David Andrews, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
475. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Landmines Update, No. 7, April 1994.
476. Landmines Update, No. 8, September 1994.
477. Minister of State Joan Burton, Statement of 19 June 1996, as cited in Landmines Update, No. 13, July 1996.
478. Opening Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. David Andrews at the Landmine Monitor Meeting, Dublin Castle, 15 September 1998.
479. Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. David Andrews, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
480. US State Department, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. C-6.
481. UN Mission of Norway, "Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support," 16 November 1998.
482. United Nations, Assistance in mine clearance: Report of the Secretary-General, A/53/96, 14 October 1998, p. 29.
483. Statement by Mr. Stefan Nikolovski, Assistant Minister in Charge of Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported in International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998," p. 21.
484. The UN landmine database seems to indicate production. See, Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html
485. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.
486. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database.
487. "Defence Ministry Denies any Landmines within Macedonia," BBC Monitoring Service, 8 August 1998; "Macedonia Major Weapons Supply Route to Kosovo," Reuters, 16 August 1998; "Yugoslavia mines its border with Macedonia," Associated Press, 5 August 1998.
488. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/12/99).
489. UN General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Assistance in Mine Clearance," A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29.
490. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Project list, mine related activities 1994-1998."
491. Interview with official at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Oslo, 22 December 1998.
492. Question in Parliament from Parliamentary Representative Marit Arnstad (Center Party) to Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal (Labour Party), 1 February 1995, www.stortinget.no/spti, 15 March 1999.
493. Minister of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal, "Kampen mot de fæle minene", Dagbladet, 22 April 1996. (Statement in the daily newspaper Dagbladet.)
494. Kristian Berg Harpviken, "Norges minekrav er utilstrekkelig", Dagbladet, 29 April 1996. (Statement in response to Minister Godal in the daily newspaper Dagbladet.)
495. Telephone interview and written comments, official at MFA, January 1999.
496. Beslutning I Odelsting nr. 77 (1997-98), Lov om gjennomføring av Konvensjonen on forbud mot bruk, lagring, produksjon og overføring av antipersonellminer og om ødeleggelse av slike miner, § 5. (Law on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On their Destruction, § 5.)
497. "Odelstingsproposisjon nr. 72 (1997-98), Om lov om gjennomføring av Konvensjonene on forbud mot bruk, lagring, produksjon of overføring av antipersonnelminer og om ødeleggelse av slike miner (Parliamentary Bill no. 72, About the law on the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On their Destruction)," p.10.
498. Telephone interview with official at the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MoD), 20 January 1999; telephone interview with official at MFA, January 1999.
499. Telephone interview and written comments with official at MFA, January 1999.
501. LM Researcher telephone interview with official at MoD, 27 January 1999; interview with official at the Norwegian Defense High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
502. Human Rights Watch, "Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of Antipersonnel Mines," (New York: Human Rights Watch).
503. LM Researcher interview with official at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
504. Nils-Inge Kruhaug, "Norges store minebløff", Dagbladet, 28 August 1997.
505. LM Researcher interview with official at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
506. Nils-Inge Kruhaug, "Stortinget ført bak lyset", Dagbladet, 29 August 1997. (Article in the daily newspaper Dagbladet.)
507. U.S. $1 equals approximately NOK 7.5.
508. LM Researcher telephone interview with official at the High Command, 12 March 1999.
509. LM Researcher telephone interviews with official at MoD, 20 January and 27 January 1999.
510. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18 September 1997.
511. LM Researcher telephone interview with official at MoD, 20 January 1999.
512. LM Researcher Telephone interview with official at MoD, 27 January 1999; interview with official at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
513. LM Researcher interview with official at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
514. Odelstingsproposisjon no. 72 (1997-1998), p. 3-4. (Parliamentary Bill no. 72.)
515. For more information, see Olav Riste, "Isolasjonisme og Stormaktsgarantiar: Norsk Tryggingspolitikk 1905 -1990", Forsvarsstudier 3/1991.
516. LM Researcher interview with official at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
517. LM Researcher telephone interveiw with official at the High Command, 27 January 1999.
518. LM Researcher telephone interview with official at MoD, 20 and 27 January 1999.
519. Nils-Inge Kruhaug, "Her er USAs minelagre", Dagbladet, 13 September 1997.
520. Letter from Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk to United States Secretary of State Albright, 20 May 1998.
521. LM Researcher telephone interview with official at MoD, 20 January 1999; Interview with official at MFA, 22 December 1998.
522. LM Researcher telephone interviews with official at the High Command, 27 January and 12 March 1999.
523. LM Researcher telephone interview with official at the High Command., 12 March 1999.
524. LM Researcher interview with offical at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999.
525. Janne Haaland Matlary. Statement to the United Nations, New York, 17 November 1998.
526. Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Vollebæk to Norwegian People's Aid, Oslo, 6 July 1998.
527. LM Researcher interview with official at MFA, Oslo, 22 December 1998.
528. NORAD. "Assistance to mine clearance and mine related projects in the years 1994-97 via NORAD."
529. LM Researcher telephone interview and written comments with official at MFA, January 1999.
530. Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian People's Aid, "Portfolio of Mine-related Projects 1998."
531. LM Researcher interview with official at the High Command, Oslo, 22 January 1999
532. LM Researcher interview with Emil Jeremic, Norwegian People's Aid, Oslo, 15 December 1998.
533. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/10/99).
534. Address by Dr. Luis Amado, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, on the occasion of the Treaty-Signing Conference for the Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
535. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD ROM.
537. UN General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Assistance in Mine Clearance," A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29; United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, pp. C-1, C-3, C-6.
538. Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Marcel Babicz, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovak Republic, in International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998, p. 26.
539. Statement by Ambassador Petko Draganov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations Office and the other International Organisations in Geneva, (undated) February 1999.
540. This was told to ICBL delegates to the CCW negotiations in 1994-1996 by both Czech and Slovak officials.
541. The Address of the Head of Delegation of the Slovak Republic to the International Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, Ottawa, 2-4 December 1997.
542. UN General Assembly, "Report of the Secretary-General: Assistance in Mine Clearance," A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29; Slovak Republic Non-Paper, issued at signing ceremony for Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa, 2-4 December 1997.
543. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, pp. C-1, C-3. Also see Statement at Budapest Conference by Mr. Marcel Babicz.
544. Slovak Republic Non-Paper, issued at signing ceremony for Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa, 2-4 December 1997.
545. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998," p. 26.
546. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.
547. Country Profiles, United Nations Demining Database, http:www.un.org.Depts/Landmine/index.html (Ref. 3/1/99).
548. Address of H.E. Dr. Boris Frlec, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia at the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
549. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. C3.
550. Ibid, p.C7.
551. Czech News Agency report, 7 January 1999.
552. Memorandum issued by Slovenian delegation to Ottawa conference, 3 December 1997.
553. Address of H.E. Dr. Boris Frlec, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
554. A copy of the law can be found in the official journal of the state, Boletín Oficial del Estado, number 239-1998, on 6 October 1998.
555. Greenpeace, A un paso de la muerte...o de la esperanza. La necesidad de prohibir las minas y submuniciones de características similares, Madrid, March 1998, p.25. This has been extra-officially confirmed by members of the Spanish Domestic Affairs Ministry.
556. González, "Aznar inaugura;" Greenpeace, A un paso de la muerte.
557. González, "Aznar inaugura."
558. Greenpeace, A un paso de la muerte. Some examples of them are: such cluster bombs as the Rockeye II, produced by FAEX; and the BME-300, produced by Expal. The latter produced, as well, delivery systems, like that designed for the M56 US helicopter or the german SKORPION. Expal also produced different kinds of anti-tank mines, some of which were used during theFalklands War: they are known as the C-3-A and the C-3-B.
559. Greenpeace, A un paso de la muerte. These components include cluster munitions, detonator devices, fuses etc. They were produced by more companies than those which produced landmines: Instalaza or Santa Barbara are some of the most important, together with Expal, FAEX, UEE, EDB, and Bressel.
560. Ayllón, L, "España insta."
561. L. Ayllón, "España insiste a EE.UU. para que destruya sus minas antipersonal," ABC, 2 November 1998, p.23; J. De Mazarras, "Iniciada la destrucción de minas antipersonal," Revista Española de Defensa, September 1998, pp.16-17; González, M., "Aznar inaugura la destrucción del arsenal de minas antipersonas,"El País, 28 January 1998, p.28. Although none of these sources state the exact amount of mines of the type P4A, they are considered by the government to be antipersonnel landmines. At least, the Revista Española de Defensa (Spanish Defense Magazine), edited by the Defense Ministry, has always considered this kind of mine to be so.
562. De Mazarras, "Iniciada la destrucción;"
563. De Mazarras, "Iniciada la destrucción;"
564. De Mazarras, "Iniciada la destrucción;" González, "Aznar inaugura."
565. Ayllón, "España insta."
566. M. Gonzalez, El Pais, 8 March 1999, p. 20.
567. González, "Aznar inaugura." Later, the basque authorities confirmed that version to the media.
568. Ministerio de la Presidencia (Presidency Ministry)
569. This section is partly drawn from the study made by Radda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children) in 1996: Carl von Essen, Minrapport (Radda Barnen, 1996), web version www.rb.se/kampanj/mine1.html.
570. Government Bill 1997/98:175.
573. Email from the Swedish Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1999.
574. Lars Jederlund, Dödens Fält - Om minor och dess offer (Deadly Fields - Mines and their victims), (Stockholm, Svenska Freds, 1994), p. 11.
575. Lars Jederlund, Dödens Fält - Om minor och dess offer (Deadly Fields - Mines and their victims), (Stockholm, Svenska Freds, 1994), p. 11; and also U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts," CD Rom.
576. Government Bill 1997/98:175.
577. Jederlund, Dödens Fält, p 12.
578. Telephone interview with Olof Carelius, the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 7 January 1999.
579. Jederlund, Dödens Fält, p. 11.
580. Ibid, p. 13.
581. Ibid, p. 13.
582. Ibid, p. 13.
583. Government Bill 1997/98:175.
584. Telephone interview with Olof Carelius, the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 7 January 1999.
586. Telephone interview with Anna-Helena Brandt, FMV, 8 January 1999. We tried to get copies of the orders but they were classified. The list of AP mines that are to be destroyed was published in an internal magazine for FMV (Vi I FMV #7/98).
587. Telephone interview with Hugo Kreij, Branch Manager, NAMMO LIAB, 21 January 1999.
588. Telephone interview with Anna-Helena Brandt, FMV, 8 January 1999.
590. Telephone interview with Olof Carelius, the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 29 January 1999.
591. Telephone interview with Olof Carelius, the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 7 January 1999.
592. Beskrivnig Landminmateriel, cMV, 1996, p 183.
593. Ibid, p. 114.
594. Telephone interview with Camilla Gustafsson, FMV, Division VapenP, 28 January 1999.
596. Telephone interview with Olof Carelius, the Swedish Armed Forces HQ, 29 January 1999.
597. Email from FMV, 28 January 1999.
598. Bestrivnig Landminmateriel, FMV, 1996, pp. 7-146.
599. Speech by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lind in the Swedish Parliament, 10 February 1999.
600. Swedish International Development Agency, Support to Demining 1990-1998, Fact Sheet, December 1998.
601. UD97/1827/IC Regleringsbrev för budgetaret 1998 avseende anslag genom Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingsarbete (Sida) and UD/98/1567/IC Regleringsbrev för budgetaret 1999 avseende anslag genom Styrelsen för internationellt utvecklingsarbete (Sida) (The Governments directives for SIDA 1998 and 1999.)
602. Telephone interview with Peter Swartling, Division for Humanitarian Assistance, SIDA, 20 January 1999.
603. Fax from ICRC, Mines-Arms Unit, 19 February 1999; follow-up phone interview with Mr Julier, Deputy Head of External Resources Division, 23 February 1999.
604. Humanitär Minröjning (Humanitarian Mine Clearance), Memorandum, SRV, 3 November 1998.
605. A FOA Research Project for Military Mine Clearance and Humanitarian Demining, Speech by Lena Sarholm, FOA Weapons and Protection Division, held at a mine clearance hearing in the Swedish Parliament, 9 December 1998.
606. Biosensorprojektet, Memorandum, Biosensor Applications Sweden AB, 11 November 1998.
607. A FOA Research Project for Military Mine Clearance and Humanitarian Demining, Speech by Lena Sarholm, FOA Weapons and Protection Division, held at a mine clearance hearing in the Swedish Parliament, 9 December 1998.
608. Speech by Jan Cederlund, manager, Celsius, held at a mine clearance hearing in the Swedish Parliament, 9 December 1998.
609. Speech by Allan Carlsson, Sales Director, Bofors held at a mine clearance hearing in the Swedish Parliament, 9 December 1998.
610. Demining Policy, Memorandum, Countermine Operations AB, 1998.
611. Afghanistan-nytt, (Svenska Afghanistankommittén) 4/98 and telephone interview with Peter Hjukström, Secretary-General, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, 21 January 1999.
612. The facts were gathered through a questionnaire which was sent out to thirteen of Sweden's largest NGOs working with international aid.
614. F. Cotti, President of the Swiss Confederation, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
615. "By antipersonnel mines are meant explosive devices placed under, upon, or in proximity to the ground or other surface, and primarily designed or adapted to explode upon the presence or proximity of, or contact with a person, and intended to put out of action, wound or kill one or more persons." Swiss law, 6 December 1996.
616. Swiss law, 4 March 1998.
617. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Statement to the Closing Plenary of the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines, 18 September 1997.
618. The Swiss Campaign would like to thank the government for its cooperation with information for this report.
619. Manufacture de munitions de Thoune, Switzerland.
620. L'Express, 10 May 1995.
621. Presentation of the device by the company management during a symposium held in Montreux, Switzerland in April 1993.
622. Information supplied by the Swiss authorities.
623. Information provided by the Swiss authorities.
624. Information provided by the Swiss authorities.
625. Information provided by the Swiss authorities.
626. Press release, 16 December 1991.
627. Information given by the Swiss authorities.
628. Press release.
629. Statement of H.E. Mrs. Aksoltan Ataeva, Head of Delegation of Turkmenistan, to Ottawa Treaty signing conference, 3-4 December 1997.
630. Communication from ICBL conference representative.
631. Statement by Amb. Ataeva, Ottawa, 3-4 December 1997.
632. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997.
633. Essen Aidogdyev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Turkmenistan to the United Nations, New York, letter to Human Rights Watch, N051/'99, 18 March 1999.
635. EU Joint Action 96/588/CFSP, 1 October 1996.
636. Hansard, 21 May 1997, col. 72; FCO Press Release, 21 May 1997.
637. Hansard, 21 May 1997, col. 72.
638. UK Working Group on Landmines, No Exceptions, No Loopholes, No Reservations, (London: UK Working Group on Landmines, 1997).
640. Hansard, 12 November 1997, col. 898.
641. House of Commons Public Information Office, Treaties and the House of Commons (London: House of Commons, 1995).
643. Hansard, 10 July 1998, col. 1347.
644. Ibid, col. 1391.
645. Ibid, col. 1348.
646. Hansard, 31 July 1998, col. 692.
647. Letter dated 16 July 1998 from the legal officer to Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC to the Rt. Hon. Baroness Williams of Crosby.
648. Hansard, 31 July 1998, col. 728.
649. Letter dated 27 April 1998 from the Security Policy Department of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to the UK Working Group on Landmines.
650. Hansard, 11 February 1999, col. 360.
651. FCO Minister of State David Davis reported in Hansard, 15 March 1995, col. 863.
652. Hansard, 22 April 1996, col. 28.
653. CD/1443, 30 January 1997.
654. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines (Canada: DFAIT, 11 March 1997).
655. Hansard, 4 December 1997, col. 300.
656. Hansard, 12 January 1998, col. 130.
657. Forecast International/DMS Market Intelligence Report, Ordnance and Munitions Forecast (1992).
658. Hansard, 2 May 1995, col. 204.
659. Belkacem Elomari and Bruno Barillot, Le complexe francais de production des mines et systemes associes (Lyon: Observatoire des Transferts d'Armaments, 1997).
660. Hansard, 2 May 1995, col. 204.
661. Hansard, 12 February 1997, col. 1180.
662. Jane's Information Group, Military Vehicles and Logistics, 1986.
663. Hansard, 16 June 1998, col. 6.
664. Paul Bowers and Tom Dodd, Antipersonnel mines and the policies of two British Governments (RUSI Journal, February 1998).
665. UK Working Group on Landmines, Briefing paper on Britain's HB876 landmine (London, March 1996).
666. UK Working Group on Landmines/Mines Advisory Group, British Landmines, 1996.
668. Hansard, 16 May 1996, col. 540.
669. Hansard, 22 April 1996, col. 28.
670. Hansard, 12 February 1997, col. 180.
671. The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993) pp104, 206, 225.
672. The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) p. 199.
673. Hansard, 12 February 1997, col. 180.
674. Hansard, 2 May 1995, col. 202.
675. US Army documents obtained by Human Rights Watch.
676. Hansard, 24 February 1997, col. 120.
677. Hansard, 12 February 1997, col. 180.
678. Hansard, 18 June 1998, col. 265.
679. Mines Advisory Group, UK Landmines Stockpiles, 11 June 1998.
680. Hansard, 3 May 1996.
681. Ministry of Defense press release, 27 January 1998.
682. Ministry of Defense press release, 22 February 1999.
683. Hansard, 10 July 1998, col. 1369.
684. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, letter to UK Working Group on Landmines dated 27 April 1998.
685. Hansard, 20 March 1998, col. 746.
686. Sunday Telegraph, 5 April 1998.
687. Department for International Development, Landmines and Poverty: Breaking the link, (London: DFID, 1998).
688. Hansard, 23 February 1999, col. 252.
689. Hansard, 2 February 1998, col. 470.
690. Department for International Development, Landmines and Poverty: Breaking the link, (London: DFID, 1998).
691. Hansard, 2 February 1998, col. 470.
692. Hansard, 9 March 1998, col. 11.
693. Hansard, 15 December 1997, col. 25.
694. Paul Bowers and Tom Dodd, Antipersonnel mines and the policies of two British Governments, (RUSI Journal, February 1998) p. 15.
695. Hansard, 17 December 1998, cols. 655-656.
696. Paul Bowers and Tom Dodd, Antipersonnel mines and the policies of two British Governments, (RUSI Journal, February 1998) p. 17.
697. Department for International Development, Landmines and Poverty: Breaking the link, (London: DFID, 1998).
698. Hansard, 28 April 1998, col. 64.
699. Hansard, 2 December 1998, cols. 176-179.
700. Hansard, 20 October 1998, col. 1067.
701. Paul Bowers and Tom Dodd, Antipersonnel mines and the policies of two British Governments, (RUSI Journal, February 1998).
702. Hansard, 3 March 1998.
703. Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund Press Release, 12 January 1999.
704. Hansard, 28 April 1998, cols. 64-65.
705. Hansard, 28 April 1998, cols. 64-65.
706. The Independent, 30 March 1998.
707. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD Rom.
708. Interview with Colonel Lulzim Salillari, Director of Engineering Directory in the Ministry of Defense.
709. Statement by Mr. Agim Pasholli, Director of Multilateral Initiatives and UN Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Budapest Regional Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 26-28 March 1998.
710. Interview with Colonel Lulzim Salillari.