Landmine Problem

There are landmines planted along the Burmese borders with Thailand and Bangladesh, as well as in many parts of the country where armed conflict has been and is being waged between government troops and ethnic armed groups, notably areas in eastern Burma. Mines are found widely in Mon, Shan, Karen, Karenni and Arakan states, and the Tenassarim Division. There are also reports of landmines in Kachin State. There are no reliable estimates of the number of mines planted in Burma, or the amount of land affected.

The Thai military asserts that most--perhaps 70 percent--of its 2,000 kilometer border with Burma is mined. The Thai military found in its initial survey of the border region that the total area of mined land was about fifty-three square kilometers.⁽³⁹²⁾ The Phuchatkan newspaper in Bangkok reported that 7,000 landmines were planted around the Kiu Phawok pass along the border.⁽³⁹³⁾

The government of Bangladesh has asked the government of Burma to demine a 25-50 kilometer stretch of border, which Bangladesh claims was mined by Burmese border police (Na Sa Ka) in 1995-1996. Many people, as well as elephants, have perished in this minefield.⁽³⁹⁴⁾ A woman living in a village in Chin State near the Bangladesh border said, "There were many landmines around our villages. So many animals blew up, especially at night time. We had to be careful of landmines since 1988. The Burmese Army warned us not to walk here and there, especially along the footpaths, the small footpaths, not the main paths which the army and civilians are using for traveling."⁽³⁹⁵⁾

Mined areas are not marked in Burma. Maps of minefields are rarely kept by soldiers of either side. Maps that are kept are not accessible to others. A former military advisor said, "Maps? The (ethnic faction) don't even know what a map is."⁽³⁹⁶⁾ In some cases ethnic organizations notify local villagers what areas and paths they have mined without specifying exactly where the mines are. However, villagers who are out tending their fields at the time, as well as neighboring villagers, are not privy to the information and frequently step on these mines.⁽³⁹⁷⁾ In addition, if the SPDC forces request accompaniment of villagers through a certain area known by the villagers to be mined by opposition forces, villagers are reluctant to inform the SPDC that the area is mined. If they do, they are considered collaborators with the enemy and are often tortured and/or executed.⁽³⁹⁸⁾

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations in Burma. Even in areas where groups have agreed to a cease-fire with the central government, no demining has occurred, as substantial talks with the government have yet to take place on issues of disagreement. Mine awareness programs appear to be non-existent.

Human Mine-Sweepers

In a particularly reprehensible practice, the Tatmawdaw has regularly seized people from villages and forced them to march ahead of the military in areas suspected of being mined by the ethnic armed forces.⁽³⁹⁹⁾ This is an extension of a common practice of forced labor and portering which is required by the military of the local population.⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾ There have been more and more cases of women and children being rounded up to march in front of troops for the sole purpose of detonating landmines. Amnesty International expressed concern about this practice as far back as 14 years ago.⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ A recent report by the International Labor Organization documented a large number of cases of forced laborer (porters) being used as human mine-sweepers.⁽⁴⁰²⁾ Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Burmese Nobel Laureate, has said "...in many cases it has been claimed that they are used as human mine-sweepers, they go ahead of the troops so that if there are any landmines, those landmines will blow up under them and therefore they clear the way. So [forced] portering is one of the most feared things in Burma. People lose their health and even their lives if they are taken to do a stint of portering."⁽⁴⁰³⁾

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

There is no centralized agency collecting statistics on landmine survivors. Most information has come from a few international non-governmental organizations, or through local medical facilities and practitioners who operate limited assistance programs either within Burma or along the common borders with Thailand and Bangladesh.

Medical assistance is received either in areas controlled by the SPDC or by ethnic organizations, or at facilities in Thailand. Access to first aid and surgical care is dependent on the victim's physical distance from health care facilities and the prevailing security situation in the area at the time of the accident. In a series of interviews with landmine survivors who received care along the Burma-Thai border, the victims traveled from 1.5 hours to 10 days to reach surgery facilities. Medical care received prior to surgery is primitive and dependent upon whether a medic was on hand. Survivors spoke of sometimes being able to receive treatments ranging from salt-water baths to blood-clotting antibiotics.⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾

Medical care is sought in areas where the survivors feel safest. Survivors in areas controlled by ethnic organizations may well seek care in medical facilities located in SPDC-controlled areas. In contrast, some survivors in SPDC-controlled areas may decide to seek assistance in a refugee camp along the Thai border. However, several medical practitioners believe that 50% of all people wounded by landmines die before receiving medical treatment, and at least one close observer of the situation in Karen State believes that figure to be conservative.⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾ Both the civilian and military health systems are believed to be chronically under-resourced and corrupt, with the result that there are reported cases of people not having access to prosthetic programs unless they can pay bribes.⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾

Current data allows for no definitive demographic information on who is being injured by landmines. However, figures from a joint prosthetic project run by the ICRC, the Myanmar Red Cross and the Myanmar Ministry of Health provide some indications. Over a 10-year period information was collected from more than 1,200 landmine survivors from border areas. Of these, 10% were children, 16% were women and the remaining 74% were male and potentially former combatants in the ethnic armies.⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ This figure does not include survivors among SPDC forces. A monthly breakdown of statistics for any given region of the country from any source is unavailable at this time. However, the opinion of medics operating in Karen State is that the rate of mine injuries is either remaining constant or increasing.

After surgery it can take anywhere from three months to nine years before a person finds a facility where they can receive a prosthetic device. Information uncovered seems to indicate that little knowledge is made available to landmine survivors as to where they can obtain prosthetic devices. Prosthetic devices are available through international assistance programs of Handicap International and ICRC, as well as through the Myanmar Ministry of Health, the Thai Government Hospitals and Thai Royal projects. The Myanmar Ministry of Health has fitted over 12,000 prosthetic devices over a 12-year period (this figure covers all types of prosthetic needs, not only landmine victims).⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾

Prosthetics made on the Burma-Thai border have a 2-3-year life span.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾ The the average life span of the prosthetics made by the Myanmar Ministry of Health is not known. Rehabilitation on the border is not extensive, as most people leave the program soon after they are fitted. The Myanmar Ministry of Health program has a duration of six months. There is little data available as to what happens to landmine survivors after they are fitted with their prosthetics.

Psychological care appears non-existent. Very disturbingly, one landmine survivor interviewed by Landmine Monitor researchers committed suicide the following day. He had exhibited classic signs of psychological stress such as listlessness, lack of social interaction and loss of appetite prior to committing suicide.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Mine Ban Policy

The People's Republic of China (PRC), one of the world's biggest producers and exporters of antipersonnel landmines, has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It has been one of the governments most opposed to a ban on antipersonnel mines, and most insistent on the military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel mines.

China was one of very few governments that did not participate--even as an observer--in any of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process or the ban treaty negotiations.⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ China was one of only ten governments that abstained on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging its full realization and inviting state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique. China did, however, send a representative to the ban treaty signing conference in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997.

China has stated that it supports "the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition" of antipersonnel mines. The 1998 Defense White Paper says:

China has all along attached great importance to the problem of threat to innocent people caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). It is in favor of imposing proper and rational restrictions on the use and transfer of APLs in a bid to achieve the ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition of such landmines through a phased approach. In the meantime, the Chinese government maintains that, in addressing the problem of APLs, consideration should be given to both humanitarian concern and the legitimate defense requirements of sovereign states.⁽⁴¹¹⁾

Chinese officials have said that China will not sign the ban treaty because they view antipersonnel mines as an effective defensive weapon necessary to protect China's very long land borders and because China, as a developing country, lacks the resources and technology to replace mines with more advanced defensive weapons. China cannot agree to a ban unless alternative weapons are available.⁽⁴¹²⁾ The Chinese position is that while China attaches importance to the humanitarian concerns about the landmine issue, it believes what causes today's landmine problem is not the weapon itself but the indiscriminate use of it. In addressing the problem of AP mines, consideration should be given to both humanitarian concern and the legitimate defense requirements of sovereign states. As a country with long land borders, China must reserve the right to use antipersonnel mines on its territory. The Mine Ban Treaty addresses only the humanitarian concerns of the issue, thus China is not able to sign.⁽⁴¹³⁾

The 1998 Defense White Paper has a section on "The Issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines," with the following statement:

The PLA [People's Liberation Army] has always exercised strict control over the use of APLs and prohibited the indiscriminate use and laying of such landmines while actively studying the possible alternatives to APLs. China has also actively participated in the revision of the Landmine Protocol (Protocol II) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the discussions on the question of APLs at the UN Conference on Disarmament. The Chinese government has all along adopted a very prudent and responsible attitude toward landmine export.⁽⁴¹⁴⁾

On the positive side, China has:

* announced in April 1996 a moratorium on export of AP mines which are prohibited by the revised Protocol II of CCW;⁽⁴¹⁵⁾

* announced a donation of U.S.$100,000 to the U.N. demining fund and support for mine clearance of mine affected countries;⁽⁴¹⁶⁾

* intensified mine clearance operations on the Sino-Vietnamese border;⁽⁴¹⁷⁾

* sent observers to participate in the ban treaty signing conference and international Mine Action Forum held from 2-4 December 1997 in Ottawa;⁽⁴¹⁸⁾

* sent a diplomat from the Chinese Embassy in Japan to the 3^rd NGO Tokyo Conference on AP mines organized by a Japanese NGO in November 1998.⁽⁴¹⁹⁾

While treaty advocates might see these as encouraging developments, Chinese officials state that there has been no pro-ban evolution in Chinese policy, and that the Chinese position has always been consistent.⁽⁴²⁰⁾

China supports the Convention on Conventional Weapons as a proper forum and approach to controlling antipersonnel mines. China ratified the CCW and its original Protocol II on mines on 7 April 1982.⁽⁴²¹⁾ On 4 November 1998, China ratified the revised Protocol II, surprising some observers by doing so before the U.S. and Russia, which have yet to ratify.⁽⁴²²⁾ In ratifying, China also decided to exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with key restrictions.⁽⁴²³⁾

China is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and has supported the CD as an appropriate forum to deal with the landmine issue.⁽⁴²⁴⁾ It has indicated its willingness to negotiate a transfer ban in the CD.⁽⁴²⁵⁾

Production

China is known as one of the world's largest producers of AP mines. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Chinese State Arsenals have been producing about twenty-two types of AP mines, six of which are based on Soviet designs and the rest of Chinese origin.⁽⁴²⁶⁾ Chinese conventional AP mines are among the cheapest in the world. China's widely distributed Type 72 sometimes sell for less than $3 each according to a U.S. State Department official.⁽⁴²⁷⁾

Among the Chinese mines are the Type 72 blast mine (and its variants), PMN blast mine, PPM-2 blast mine, POMZ-2 and -2M fragmentation stake mines, Type 58 fragmentation stake mine, Type 59 wooden box mine, Type 68 and Type 69 bounding fragmentation mines, and Type 66 Claymore-type directed fragmentation mine.⁽⁴²⁸⁾

China also produces four "scatterable" antipersonnel mines (those that can be delivered by aircraft, artillery or vehicles, not just hand-emplaced). They are the GLD 112 and three unnamed versions, two of which have self-destruct mechanisms.⁽⁴²⁹⁾ China began developing scatterable mines in the 1970s. The first were manually dropped from the air by parachute, but China soon progressed to mechanized placement via rocket and from ground vehicles, as well as fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. The Technical Equipment Research Institute of Wuxi is China's primary center for research and development related to mine fuzes, sensors, scatterable mines, delivery systems, and other combat engineer equipment.⁽⁴³⁰⁾

China may begin production of new antipersonnel mines that are compliant with revised Protocol II of the CCW, particularly scatterable mines that have self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms meeting the new technical requirements of the Protocol. There is little doubt they have the technological capability to make such mines.⁽⁴³¹⁾

China must stop producing its most common mine, the Type 72, to be compliant with the CCW revised Protocol II, unless it adds enough metallic content to meet CCW standards. The treaty prohibits production after 1 January 1997 of mines with less than eight grams of metallic content.⁽⁴³²⁾ Also under the terms of the treaty, China can no longer export the mine, and will have to stop using it within nine years, unless metal is added.

Transfer

China has been one of the world's biggest exporters of AP mines. The Type 72 may be the most frequently encountered mine in the world. It has been used in at least fifteen other countries, including Iraq, Kuwait, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Angola, Rwanda, Zambia, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Africa and Mozambique. The Type 69 has been found in Cambodia, Laos, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea and South Africa.⁽⁴³³⁾

On 22 April 1996 at the CCW Review Conference, the Chinese representative Mr. Wang Jon said the Chinese government would implement a moratorium on the export of those mines which are not in conformity with the Amended Landmine Protocol to the CCW, and would exercise the utmost restraint and strict control on the export of all AP mines.⁽⁴³⁴⁾

In practical terms, the moratorium means China has stopped export of the non-detectable Type 72 and of all remotely-delivered AP mines which do not have self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms. The Chinese Government has not declared a moratorium on the export of detectable "dumb"AP mines.

In January 1996, a senior Chinese diplomat told the International Campaign to Ban Landmines that China had suspended antipersonnel mine exports in 1993 after the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for export moratoria by all states. "We respect the will of the majority," said Mr. Fu Cong, Deputy Director of the Disarmament Division of the Foreign Ministry. He aslo stressed, though, that China must retain the option of exporting to nations which need mines for self-defense.⁽⁴³⁵⁾

There is no evidence that China has exported antipersonnel mines in any significant number in recent years.⁽⁴³⁶⁾ However, Chinese officials have stressed that China's moratorium applies only to non-detectable mines and remotely-delivered mines not in accordance with the CCW.⁽⁴³⁷⁾

The 1998 Defense White Paper states, "The Chinese government has all along adopted a very prudent and responsible attitude toward landmine export. In December 1994, China joined in the UN General Assembly's consultation on its resolution concerning the moratorium on the export of APLs. In April 1996, the Chinese government solemnly declared its suspension of export of APLs that are not compatible with those APLs provided for in the Amended Landmine Protocol to the CCW."⁽⁴³⁸⁾

While not a vigorous proponent of discussions on a mine transfer ban in the Conference on Disarmament, China has indicated its willingness to do so. The June 1998 Sino-U.S. Joint Presidential Statement on landmines stated, "China and the United States agree to actively pursue at the Conference on Disarmament the commencement of negotiations on an antipersonnel landmines transfer/export ban by supporting the prompt establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee."⁽⁴³⁹⁾ Such as committee was not established in 1998, but attempts are again being made in 1999.

Stockpiling

China is believed to have the largest antipersonnel landmine stockpile in the world. While no hard evidence is available, several experts contacted by Landmine Monitor have concluded that a plausible estimate of the Chinese APM stockpile is some 110 million, including perhaps 100 million Type 72 alone.⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾

The amended Protocol II of the CCW, which China ratified on 4 November 1998, prohibits use of antipersonnel mines which are not detectable after a transition period of nine years after its entry into force. Thus, China will be prohibited from using the Type 72 in its present form after 2007. There are three options for the Chinese government to take: (1) destroy them; (2) replace them; or (3) add eight grams of metal to them so that they will comply with CCW specifications. Adding metal is the most probable since it is the cheapest option,⁽⁴⁴¹⁾ but Chinese officials have made no public statement on the matter.

An Indian official has said, "We would also be supportive of negotiations in the CD on ban on transfers on the basis of a mandate that reflects the interests of all delegations."⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾

Production

India produces two types of antipersonnel landmines. Both are copies of U.S. mines. The Indian AP NM M14 is a copy of the U.S. M14 pressure-initiated, blast antipersonnel mine. These mines are thought to constitute the vast majority of the Indian stockpile. The mine has a plastic body and very low metallic content, limited to the striker and detonator. Because of their undetectable nature, these mines are not permitted under CCW amended Protocol II. When India ratifies amended Protocol II, it will have to add metal to each of the mines, or destroy them.

The second Indian mine is the AP MN M16A1, a copy of the U.S. M16A1. This is a bounding fragmentation mine. The mine can be detonated either by pressure or tripwire. A first blast propels the mine into the air, then the main charge explodes when the mine is approximately one meter in the air, spraying cast-iron fragments in all directions.

Though not officially stated, India is most likely continuing to produce mines today, at least to replace existing mines and for training purposes.⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾

Various armed groups in India have manufactured improvised explosive devices (IED). Some IEDs are developed with great ingenuity using whatever explosives are available, with sophisticated detonators and a variety of timing and setting off mechanisms. Most are victim-actuated and are targeted primarily against people on foot and in vehicles.

Transfer

India is not thought to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. Until 1987 it was Indian government policy not to export any arms. Since then some arms have been exported, but these have not included antipersonnel mines. India announced a comprehensive moratorium on APM exports on 3 May 1996.⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾ It is of indefinite length.

Information is not available on any Indian import of mines. Insurgent groups have obtained mines through the global clandestine arms trade.

Stockpiling

India's antipersonnel mine stockpile may number as many as four to five million, according to some non-Indian governmental sources, although confirmed details are not available.⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾ Stocks of mines are well dispersed. Large quantities are held with the field formations ready to be laid at short notice. The great majority of mines in the stockpile are believed to be the Indian AP NM M14 mines.

Use in Past Wars

A brief history of use of mines in past wars appears in the International Committee of the Red Cross's Antipersonnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?, based on a report by retired Indian Major General Dipankar Banerjee:

India-Pakistan wars 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. The mine warfare carried out by both parties during the India-Pakistan wars was almost unique in the way in which it was conducted. In the 1947-48 war in Jammu and Kashmir, a very small number of mines were laid to protect certain installations . During the protracted build-up to the 1965 war, the main minefields had been laid on the plains by both parties. In the 1971 war, very few mines were laid because the terrain was soft riverine country. In all three cases mine warfare was conducted by well-trained and disciplined soldiers. The wars themselves were limited in their objectives, of short duration and fairly static. Minefields were carefully mapped, and maps were made available to both parties after the conflict, allowing the early removal of the mines and the return of land to food production soon after the end of the hostilities. It was significant that most minefields were on arable land which was of value to both countries and therefore particular care was taken. Because of the disciplined way in which the mines were laid and removed, civilian casualties were reported to be negligible although there were a few casualties among the engineers removing mines. The contribution of these minefields to the ultimate outcome of the conflict was considered to be marginal.

India-China War, 1962. No pre-planned minefields were laid at the start of the war but as conflict progressed some were laid in mountainous areas. This caused problems as AP mines had no effect in snow and worse still, they slid down the slopes, even if they were anchored, because of snow movement and precipitation. Mapping was extremely difficult and was ineffective.⁽⁴⁷¹⁾

Use Today

The Indian Army does not believe in the doctrine of border minefields in peace. According to the Army, no mines are laid for border protection or to prevent armed infiltration in the hills, such as the one presently in progress in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Army claims that it has never laid mines in internal armed conflicts. Some portions of the border both in the Punjab in the west and a limited area in the east against Bangladesh have been fenced to keep out intruders. These fenced areas are not mined.⁽⁴⁷²⁾

Mines are to be used only by the Indian Army. The police and paramilitary forces are not authorized to hold mines. In Indian military strategy antitank minefields are an integral element of an obstacle system that is considered essential to dissuade or defeat a surprise conventional attack by Pakistan. Antipersonnel mines are seen as vital to prevent easy lifting of antitank mines. The minefields are laid only when hostilities are imminent and detailed plans are prepared well in advance for doing so. In wartime mines are likely to be laid all along the very extended land border in the plains. In addition antipersonnel mines may be laid to provide additional protection to defended localities both in the plains and in the hills.⁽⁴⁷³⁾

Mines do not form an integral part of the defensive system in the mountains against China. The very high mountains there preclude any possibility of laying large numbers of mines. However, small quantities of APMs may still be laid to provide additional security to defended localities.⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾

Armed groups in India have used a wide variety and type of both regular mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). More than 700 incidents involving use of IEDs in Jammu and Kashmir were recorded from 1992-1996,⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾ and such attacks continue to this day. A November 1998 report stated that "Separatist guerrillas in Jammu and Kashmir...have intensified grenade, landmine and bomb attacks since the start of this month.... According to police records, 22 people have been killed and 120 wounded in at least 15 explosions...since November 1."⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾ The People's War Group in Central India (Andhra Pradesh stae) has also been using mines and IEDs.⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾

Landmine Problem

The Indian Government states that there is no problem with uncleared mines in India. Some reports indicate that there may be uncleared mines along the India/Pakistan border in Kashmir and along the India/China border.⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾

Mine Action Funding

At the International Meeting on Mine Clearance held in Geneva in July 1995, India announced a voluntary contribution of U.S. $50,000 to UN demining operations in the form of a broad range of services to be rendered by Indian experts. ⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾

Mine Clearance

The Indian armed forces have very extensive mine clearance capabilities. Its large engineering corps would be able to field hundreds of mine clearance teams. It is this that has enabled the Indian Army to clear mines in the last wars within a very short time. Mine clearance is done by the normal method of probing and blast, with indigenously manufactured equipment.

India's Ambassador, Arundhati Ghosh, has noted:

India has contributed consistently in many ways to efforts aimed at alleviating this crisis. The Indian Army has been associated with U.N. demining activities since the Congo U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in 1961-63. It has also participated in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia and Indian Army engineers are currently deployed in Rwanda as well as Angola. In Cambodia, Indian experts assisted in the training of civilians and worked closely with non-governmental Organisations in developing a data base, undertaking area fencing and sensitizing the local population. In Mozambique, Indian experts undertook humanitarian relief work including reconstruction and restoration of communications. The Indian Army has also suffered casualties in these operations.⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾

Mine Awareness

The Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines believes that there is a need for mine awareness programs in India as rebel groups are using mines and improvised explosive devices, resulting in civilian and police casualties. The Campaign has arranged National Conferences and Regional Seminars and Photo Exhibitions in state capitals and major cities.

Landmine Casualties

There are regular press accounts of landmine incidents and casualties in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere due to insurgent activities. Landmine Monitor has a list of twenty reported mine incidents resulting in deaths or injuries in Jammu and Kashmir in the nineteen months between February 1995 and August 1996.⁽⁴⁸¹⁾

KIRIBATI

Kiribati has not yet signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not participate in the Ottawa Process and is not a member of the United Nations. Kiribati is an independent republic with no regular military force. It is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. Kiribati does not contribute funding nor resources to mine action programs. Kiribati's Tarawa Island was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting during World War Two and considerable quantities of military wreckage and unexploded ordnance remain. Landmines are not believed to be among these UXOs. Other islands are also affected by UXO left over from the conflict. Much of the UXO on Tarawa has been removed by overseas contractors on a commercial basis to make way for a new port development.⁽⁴⁸²⁾

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Though the government has been largely silent on the issue, it is clear that North Korea does not support an international ban on antipersonnel mines, and continues to believe that they are legitimate and important weapons. North Korea was one of only ten governments that abstained on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. North Korea was absent for the votes on the pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

North Korea was one of the only countries that did not participate--even as an observer-- in any of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, or the treaty negotiations. Even public statements by the government on any aspect of the landmines issue have been extremely rare. During the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997, according to the Russian Tass news agency, Mr. Son Song Pil, the Ambassador of DPRK to Russia, criticized countries like the United States, South Korea and Japan for calling for an exception for the use of antipersonnel mines in the Korean Peninsula. In an interview on 14 September 1997, Mr.Son said that should such an exception be permitted, the treaty would lose its universality and comprehensiveness, and that North Korea is strongly opposed to any attempts to exempt any region from the mine ban treaty.⁽⁴⁸³⁾

Before the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 1998, Mr. Kim Sam Jong, the Counselor of the Permanent Mission of DPRK to the UN in New York, made a short statement on antipersonnel mines.⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾ He said that although North Korea recognizes antipersonnel landmines as a humanitarian concern, at this juncture it is impossible for it to join the Mine Ban Treaty owing to the complicated security situation of the Korean Peninsula.⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾ In a telephone interview on 24 February 1999, Mr. Kim Sam Jong would only reiterate that that statement is the current position of North Korea.⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾

A North Korean authority has said that, apart from the border with South Korea, there are no minefields in the DPRK, either left over from the Korean War or otherwise, and there are no mine problems on the borders with China or Russia.⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾ Though difficult to confirm,⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾ that appears to be a reasonable claim. Since1995, reportedly 100,000 people have fled from the DPRK to China. According to a Buddhist monk whose organization is assisting North Korean refugees in China and made personal interviews with 1,694 refugees from 30 September 1997 to 15 September 1998, no refugees mentioned landmines being present either in the border area or elsewhere in North Korea.⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾ Instead, refugees and journalists noted that DPRK guards are posted every 50-100 meters.⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾ The border area with Russia was declared a Free Trade Zone, Rajin-Song Bong, in 1991 and no minefield is suspected.

Occasional injuries due to mines in or near the DMZ and MCZ are likely, as is the case in the South.

Mine Action

North Korea has not contributed to international mine clearance. No known mine clearance mine awareness programs have been conducted. No information is available on mine casualties or survivor assistance programs.

A request for information for Landmine Monitor was submitted to P'yongyang through the Central Headquarters of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan in January 1999, however, no answer had been received as of 1 March 1999.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mine Ban Policy

South Korea has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. While acknowledging the humanitarian consequences of antipersonnel mines, the ROK is one of the governments that has been most vocal in insisting on the legitimacy and military necessity of continued use of antipersonnel landmines. The ROK has said it must retain mines until there is no longer a threat from North Korea, or until an effective alternative to antipersonnel mines is found. In his remarks to the United Nations General Assembly on 17 November 1998, Ambassador Lee See-young said that although the ROK was not in a position at present to subscribe to the total ban, due to its unique security situation, it would be able to accede to the Ottawa Convention if and when a durable peace mechanism was established on the Korean peninsula or a viable alternative to antipersonnel mines was developed.⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾

South Korea attended all of the treaty preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, the negotiations in Oslo, and the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December 1977, but in each case only as an observer. South Korea did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It was one of only ten governments to abstain on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/45, passed 156-0 on 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

South Korea recognizes the humanitarian crisis caused by antipersonnel mines. According to a 1997 policy statement: "The Republic of Korea fully shares the concerns of the international community over the scourge of antipersonnel landmines. We are well aware of the fact that the proliferation of APLs and their indiscriminate and irresponsible use have caused a great deal of sufferings and casualties, particularly among civilian population. Therefore we agree with the emerging consensus that the international community must stop this.... [Korea has] sympathy with the efforts of the international community to contain, minimize, and if possible to stop the tragic humanitarian consequences of APLs."⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾

The ROK maintains however, that it has a "unique situation that prevents her from fully subscribing to the complete ban on the use of APLs.... The ROK cannot at this time fully endorse international efforts to ban APLs until the North Korean military threat is diffused or an equally effective alternative to APLs becomes available."⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾

The ROK position is that mines are needed both as a deterrent, and for their combat value. "The use of APLs on the Korean peninsula has been an essential element in deterring the possible aggression. It has helped prevent the recurrence of another devastating war.... Mining along the north-south invasion routes would work to slow down and break up a North Korean attack.... Minefields have been an indispensable component of our defensive barrier system.... APLs have thus served as a powerful deterrent to military adventurism in Korea and will continue to do so."⁽⁵⁰¹⁾

These arguments were made forcefully by the ROK and by the United States during the Oslo treaty negotiations, when the U.S. formally proposed an exception in the treaty for mine use in Korea. But they were rejected by the almost ninety other governments participating. Negotiators, including some of the closest military allies of the U.S. and ROK, believed that the exception would undermine the treaty in a fundamental way, and that others would then insist on their own geographic exceptions.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines argued that, "While the geopolitical situation in Korea may be unique, the requirement for and impact of the use of AP mines is not.... The case cannot be made that only in Korea does the military utility of AP mines outweigh the humanitarian costs."⁽⁵⁰²⁾

Several former commanders of joint U.S.-ROK forces in South Korea have stated that antipersonnel mines can be safely eliminated from the ROK.⁽⁵⁰³⁾ Mr. Lee Yang Ho, a former ROK Minister of National Defense, has suggested that North and South Korea should get rid of their landmines jointly.⁽⁵⁰⁴⁾

South Korea is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine Protocol, though the government has told the National Assembly that it would like to accede to the CCW and amended Protocol II in 1999.⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾ It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, and has expressed a willingness to join efforts to negotiate an AP mine transfer ban in the CD.⁽⁵⁰⁶⁾

Production

South Korea has produced two antipersonnel mines, both of which are copies of the U.S. M18A1 Claymore mine. The Korean designations are K440 and KM18A1; the K440 is slightly larger. The K440 is made by Daewoo Corporation, the KM18A1 by Korean Explosives Ltd. They are directional fragmentation mines that are usually used in a command detonated mode, but can also be used with tripwires.⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾ According to the ROK Ministry of National Defense, a total of 10,721 M18A1s were produced from 1995-1997.⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾

Transfer

There is no evidence that the ROK government has ever exported antipersonnel mines. On 28 September 1995, the government announced a formal one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, which was extended in 1996. In 1997, the government decided to extend the moratorium for an indefinite period.⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾

South Korea imported 40,324 AP mines from the United States from 1969 to 1992 when a U.S. export moratorium went into effect. The final purchase was 31,572 ADAM mines from 1986-88, for $4.07 million. These are so-called "smart" mines that self-destruct in four to forty-eight hours. They are fired from artillery. South Korea is one of only a handful of nations to which the U.S. provided these mines. The U.S. shipped 1,035 non-detectable M14 blast mines in 1970, and more than 7,000 M-18A1 Claymore mines from 1969-1973.⁽⁵¹⁰⁾

Stockpiling

The number of antipersonnel landmines in the South Korean stockpile is a military secret. In a meeting with the ICBL in February 1998, Vice Minister of Defense Lee Jung-rin said that Korea has twice the amount of deployed landmines held in stock.⁽⁵¹¹⁾ It is commonly asserted that one million mines are deployed by the ROK in the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. government has publicly stated that the U.S. is stockpiling approximately one million M14 and M16 "dumb" (non-self-destructing) mines in Korea. (See U.S. country report for details).

Use

Landmines were used extensively by all combatant armies during the Korean War. According to U.S. Army documents, it was the U.S., not North Korea, which introduced mines en masse into Korea and the U.S. lost control of the weapon shortly thereafter. U.S. minefields were easily breached during the Korean War, sending U.S. troops retreating through their own unmarked minefields. More U.S. Army mine casualties in Korea were caused by U.S. defensive minefields than by the enemy's mines. The main source of landmines for the enemy in Korea was captured U.S. mines.⁽⁵¹²⁾

There are an estimated one million mines planted by the ROK and the U.S. in the Demilitarized Zone.⁽⁵¹³⁾ Mines were also allegedly planted in large numbers in 1962 during tensions surrounding the Cuban missile crisis.⁽⁵¹⁴⁾ Landmines may also be planted by the ROK and the U.S. around their military facilities and strategic locations elsewhere in the country.⁽⁵¹⁵⁾

The Landmine Problem

The government maintains that antipersonnel mines do not pose a danger to civilians in South Korea. "The actual mined area on the Korean Peninsula is restricted to the 155-mile Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The minefields there are fenced and clearly marked. They are thoroughly mapped and carefully documented. And they are also closely monitored by military personnel twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Civilian access is completely denied. What happened in Angola, Cambodia and some other places in the world has not happened and will not happen in Korea."⁽⁵¹⁶⁾

Yet, casualties do still occur, mainly near the DMZ. A 1993 U.S. State Department report said, "The Republic of Korea still has a problem with landmines from World War II and from the Korean Conflict," and notes that uncleared mines are located "along the inter-Korean border and in areas in which Korean War battles occurred."⁽⁵¹⁷⁾

Many of the casualties in recent years have occurred due to flooding or landslides caused by heavy rains that wash landmines out of minefields or storage sites and into areas frequented by civilians. In one incident in August 1998, it was reported that 200 M14 antipersonnel mines had been swept away by rains.⁽⁵¹⁸⁾ In April 1999, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly said that only 59 of 321 landmines washed away by rain storms in 1998 have been recovered.⁽⁵¹⁹⁾

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

In April 1999, the ROK Air Force started removing thousands of landmine laid in and around four of the Air Force's defense units in the outskirts of Seoul for fear they may be washed away in heavy monsoon rains during the summer.⁽⁵²⁰⁾ This is the first phase of a clearance effort that will remove mines from 10 air defense units, seven in Seoul and one each in Pusan, Kangwon and North Cholla provinces. ROK Lt. Col. Chung Sang-jong reportedly said that "Removing the landmines would require more guard personnel to protect the bases, but the decision comes in a bid to prevent possible damage to civilians when mines are washed away in heavy rains."⁽⁵²¹⁾

There are no humanitarian mine clearance programs in South Korea. Since the early 1960s there have been cases where civilians, especially farmers, have tried to clear mines from fields; some became victims. There are no mine awareness education programs in South Korea.

One Korean lawmaker has estimated that it would take US$10 billion to clear the mines in the DMZ.⁽⁵²²⁾

The ROK government has contributed $300,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.⁽⁵²³⁾ In 1998, the ROK contributed to mine action in Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Ethiopia.⁽⁵²⁴⁾

Landmine Casualties

The government has claimed that antipersonnel mine "use in Korea has not caused any civilian casualties and inflicted suffering on their lives.... In Korea, the use of APLs has not caused and is not likely to cause civilian suffering."⁽⁵²⁵⁾

Yet, according to the official records of the Korean Military Office, there were seventy-eight mine victims between 1992 and 1997, including twenty-nine civilians.⁽⁵²⁶⁾ Records from previous years were destroyed after being kept for five years. These numbers apparently only include those who lodged claims with the Korean government which those who step on mines in areas not considered mined have a right to do. As a result of lawsuits, the government made reparations totaling $213,000 to five landmine victims from 1992 to 1997.⁽⁵²⁷⁾

The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines has talked to many mine survivors who did not make legal claims because they were reluctant to make trouble with the military authorities, or were afraid they would lose. Recognizing the shortage of reliable data, the Korean Campaign estimates that, dating back to the war, there have been more than 1,000 civilian mine victims, and 2,000-3,000 military mine victims in South Korea.

The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines has undertaken a search for mine victims throughout the country. It has interviewed 27 victims or their relatives; records of the interviews are available.

Mine accidents occurred while civilians were walking on a beach, picking wild vegetables, fruit and herbs, gathering firewood, working in a melon field, a bean field, a rice field, hunting, wading in streams, and other activities.

According to the Korean Campaign, mine incidents have occurred in:

* Paengnyong-do. Paengnyongdo is an island in the north-westernmost point in South Korea. The government laid landmines on the northern beach of the island. There have been about 27 victims, including civilians. One of the residents testified that 7 civilians were hurt by landmines and 6 of them had died as a result. There are no warning signs or barriers.

* Marine camp in Jinchon-ri. Several accidents have occurred here. There is a mined area with no guards, no signs and no barriers.

* Papyong-myon, Paju-city, Keyongki-do. This area is near the DMZ. Many mines were laid in this area and they have often been washed away by rain. Once there was a landmine accident in Inchon-city which was presumed to have occurred due to flow from this area. 11 victims are recorded.

* Nogok-ri village. Mines were planted here in the early 1960s, including some in private fields. More than 10 victims live in this village.

*Daekwang-ri village. Every summer landmines carried away by rain plague this village. More than 10 victims live in this village.

* Baekhak-myon, Yonchon-kun, Keyongki-do. Workers in fields encounter mines that have been washed out of the minefields by flooding.

* Haean-myon, Yanggu-kun, Kangwon-do. A man working at the government office for 30 years could recall 24 mine victims in that time. This is very close to the DMZ.

* Daema-ri, Chorwon-kun, Kangwon-do. On 30 August of each year, villagers hold a memorial ceremony for victims of landmines. The population is about 900 and there have been between 40 and 50 mine victims over the past 30 years.

* Saengchang-ri, Kimhea-eup, Chorwon-kun, Kangwon-do. There are about 25 victims in a population of 500.

The Korean Campaign is compiling a record of landmine incidents, which currently has about 100 entries and is available to interested readers. Below are some recent incidents:

6 April 1998: Songnam-city, Keyongki-do, landmines laid near the air base were carried away to the valley by rain.

22 April 1998: Doshin-ri, Shinseo-myon, Yonchon-kun, Keyongki-do, Mr. Kim, Ju-Kwon (62) was killed by a landmine at the foot of a Yawolsan mountain while picking wild vegetables.

20 May 1998: Woisungdong-ri, Wonnam-myon,Chorwon-kun, Kangwon-do, three soldiers killed and one injured by landmine in the DMZ area.

July 1998: Byekje-dong, Dukyang-ku, Koyang-city, Keyongki-do, landmines were carried away by rain.

July 1998: Galgok-ri, Pobwon-eup, Paju-city, Keyongki-do, landmines were carried away by rain.

1 August 1998: Galgok-ri, Pobwon-eup, Paju-city, Keyongki-do, the army informed that landmines laid in 1980s were carried away by rain.

6 August 1998: Tongduchon-city, Keyongki-do, US army storage site was flooded and ten containers with landmines were carried away.

7 August 1998: Byekje-dong, Dukyang-gu, Koyang-city, Keyongki-do, army storage site was flooded, landmines washed away.

8 August 1998: Wonchang-dong, Seo-ku, Inchon-city, at the beach of the island Seodo, Mr. Shin, Dong-sun (45) stepped on a landmine carried by rain.

9 August 1998: Jangheung-myon, Yanggu-kun, Keyongki-do, at the rest place in Songchu valley, a antitank landmine was found.

10 August 1998: Anjung-ri, Paengseong-eup, Pyongtaek-city, landmines were carried away by rain at the air base.

10 August 1998: Hyunduk-myon, Pyongtaek-city, landmines were carried away by rain at the air base.

10 August 1998: Jangheung-myon, Yangju-kun, Keyongki-do, at the army storage site, landmines carried away by rain.

10 August 1998: Dukjung-ri, Eunhyun-myon, Keyongki-di, the air force reported that landmines were carried away by rain.

12 August 1998: Ganeung3-dong, uijongbu-city, Keyongki-do, at a position near the air base, three landmines found and collected.

13 August 1998: Haean-myon, Yanggu-kun, Kangwon-do, Mrs. Baek, Chun-Oak (62) stepped on a landmine at the edge of a stream.

28 August 1998: Byekje-dong, Dukyang-gu, Koyang-city, Mr. Baek, Young-Gil (37) found a landmine at a residential area.

12 October 1998: Anheung-myon, Taean-kun, Chungchongnam-do, Mr. Han, Kwang-Seok (36) stepped on a landmine while working on a telephone line at the Scientific Research Institute for National Defense.

LAOS

Mine Ban Policy

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, despite the fact that in December 1994 Laos was one of the first governments to call publicly for an immediate, comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines.⁽⁵²⁸⁾ Laos did not participate in any of the treaty preparatory meetings, did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and did not attend the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September even as an observer. Laos came as an observer to the treaty signing conference in December 1997 at the invitation of the Canadian government, but did not make a statement. Laos was absent from the votes on pro-ban resolutions in the UN General Assembly in 1996, 1997, and 1998.

Phonesavanh Chantavilay, the chief of the Laotian Foreign Ministry's United Nations Division, has said that the main reason Laos has not signed is its concern that it would not be able to meet the treaty's deadline for destruction of mines in the ground.⁽⁵²⁹⁾ Another observer has said that Laos is likely to stay out of the treaty as long as China and Vietnam are not a part.⁽⁵³⁰⁾ One confidential source told Landmine Monitor, "They thought it was difficult for small, poor countries to do away with one of their only cheap means of defense....They consider mines as one of their only economically viable options."⁽⁵³¹⁾

Laos acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 3 January 1983, but has not ratified the amended Protocol II on landmines.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Laos is not thought to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Laos is believed to maintain a stockpile of mines, but no details are available. There are no allegations of recent use of antipersonnel mines by Laotian armed forces.

The Landmine/UXO Problem

The Lao People's Democratic Republic suffered intense ground battles as well as extensive bombing during the Indochina War era, especially during the period from 1964 to 1973. The fighting left a legacy of widespread contamination by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and landmines, that still cause death and injury more than 20 years after the war ended.

It has been estimated that Laos suffers from more than 9 million unexploded "bombies" (mostly BLU-26 bomblets) dropped by the U.S. Bombies become de facto anti-personnel mines when they do not explode on impact due to some technical reason, e.g., they were dropped at the wrong height or did not arm themselves properly. In such circumstances they remain a threat for years or even decades.⁽⁵³²⁾ The primary threat to civilians in Laos is this unexploded ordnance, not antipersonnel mines, though both are present. To the civilian population, there is little or no difference between the two -- they will likely explode if stepped on, kicked, or handled improperly.

In 1997, Handicap International (HI) released the results of a national survey it conducted on the impact of UXO and landmines in Laos. It is one of the most detailed surveys ever conducted on UXO/mine contamination in any country. Much of this Landmine Monitor report is drawn from that document.⁽⁵³³⁾ The reader is referred to that full document, as well as a much longer Laos country report prepared by the Landmine Monitor researcher, for much greater detail than there is space to reprint here.

HI reports, "The presence of landmines was reported in all provinces surveyed. More than 1,000 villages reported the presence of landmines in the past with 214 villages currently reporting landmine contamination."⁽⁵³⁴⁾ Over 3,800 villages, with a population of 1.3 million people, had been affected by UXO and mines. HI also states, "To date, clearance operations have concentrated in areas where there are few landmines. However, it is expected that when clearance operation expand, the risk of encountering landmines will increase." ⁽⁵³⁵⁾ In 1996, the UN estimated that 500,000 tons of UXO were still present in Laos.⁽⁵³⁶⁾

Mine Clearance

In 1994, the first UXO/landmine removal project was initiated by the Mines Advisory Group in Xieng Khoung, one of the most affected provinces in Laos.⁽⁵³⁷⁾ In February 1996 a Prime Ministerial degree (49/PM) established the Lao National UXO Program (UXO Lao) to coordinate all UXO related activities. Its main tasks are: (1) create a national capacity for UXO activities; (2) implement a national UXO strategy and demining projects; (3) coordinate UXO clearance, awareness and survey projects throughout the country. Operations were first conducted in three affected provinces, then in 1997 were expanded into an additional five provinces, and recently a ninth province was added.⁽⁵³⁸⁾ The Lao PDR ambassador to the UN has said, "By the year 1999 if all goes well as planned, the UXO offices will be established in all the 13 affected provinces, the Vientiane prefecture and the Saysomboune Special Zone."⁽⁵³⁹⁾

According to UXO Lao's 1997 Annual Report, in 1997 159 hectares of land were cleared, and a total of 43,098 items of ordnance, including 251 landmines, were destroyed. In 1998, through October, 239 hectares of land were cleared, and over 58,000 pieces or ordnance, including 222 mines, were destroyed.⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾ It has been noted, though, that the "National headquarters does not have sufficient tracking systems in place to determine if land cleared is eventually used for humanitarian, development or commercial purpose."⁽⁵⁴¹⁾

In the HI survey, 55 villages nationwide reported some kind of clearance operation in the area of the village, with about 50 percent of these areas being cleared by the Lao army. The army indicates that it has cleared important national roads, schools, wats and other sites to be used for the construction of buildings, irrigation schemes or public utilities. The Chinese army also assisted Chinese road builders in the north to clear areas around National Route 1.

The Mines Advisory Group has been working in Xieng Khouang since October 1994 and Saravane since July 1997. In Xieng Khouang, clearance teams were deployed to 47 different sites during 1997. The majority of sites were areas where schools were going to be built, improved or expanded. In Saravane, clearance teams have worked at the main provincial school, and at the airport where landmines were found around the perimeter. In both locations 228 AP mines and 13 antitank mines have been destroyed.⁽⁵⁴²⁾

Handicap International started clearance operations in Savannaketh in July 1997. Teams cleared 1.62 hectares of land including schools, agricultural land and the site of a government guest house.

Norwegian People's Aid started clearance operations in Attapeu in February 1998, clearing 2.5 hectares of agriculture land, and in Sekong in October 1997, clearing 1.9 hectares of land on the site of a government office.

Milsearch is a commercial ordnance clearance company that has been working in the Lao PDR, usually under contract. Most of its clients are private companies (Lane Xang Minerals, Phu Bia Mining Ltd, Laos Hunt Oil Company and CGG-Exploration Logistics) as well as the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The company has been performing reconnaissance and clearance activities in eight provinces of Laos including Savannaketh, Luang Phrabang, Houaphan, Bolikhamay, Xieng Khouang, Attapeu, Khammonuane and Champassak. The company has worked on reconnaissance and clearance of grid lines and drill pads for mining companies, land use for village relocation, hydro construction sites, and road and bridge construction sites.

In 1991 to 1992, Hunt Oil conducted a UXO verification survey prior to exploration which covered the four southern provinces (Saravane, Champassak, Sekong and Attapeu). The work was done in co-operation with the British firm CGG-Exploration Logistics. This company found numerous types of ordnance and 264 U.S. and Soviet-design landmines, including these types: M2A1, M2A4, M14, M16, POMZ-1, POMZ-2.⁽⁵⁴³⁾

The German company Gerbera has carried out UXO/landmines clearance work in Houaphan since November 1996 and in Luang Prabang since April 1998. In Houaphan province the work initially concentrated in Viengxay district, which is one of the key development zones in the Province, and in the second half of the year extended to two more districts. In 1997, clearance teams worked at 43 sites, including the sites of 7 schools, an orphanage in Han Long, the central square of Viengxay, a wat, the Viengxay Hospital, agriculture land, and areas for housing and gardens. Clearance work extended to Sam Neya district in the second half of the year.

The Belgian Army started clearance in Champassak in September 1997, clearing 15.93 hectares of land.

Mine/UXO Awareness

The Lao National UXO Program has established a Community Awareness (CA) section within the national organization. The objectives of the CA section are to create a new awareness among the rural communities of the continued danger of UXO, and to educate villagers on ways to minimize the hazard caused by UXO. Since 1996, 843 villages have been visited, and more than 207,000 people educated. Today CA activities are being implemented in nine provinces with 14 CA Teams and 94 CA Staff.⁽⁵⁴⁴⁾ The budget for community awareness in 1998 was U.S.$200,000.

Organizations working on mine/UXO awareness include Consortium, Gerbera, Mennonite Central Committee, Mines Advisory Group, Norwegian People's Aid, and UNICEF.

Training

Mine Action training and capacity building has been carried out by personnel from the UN, other governments, and non-governmental organizations. Four groups of U.S. instructors have conducted training at the Nam Souang Training Centre. Since 1996, 706 Laotians have graduated from training courses, mostly in UXO clearance, but also in community awareness, medic, team leaderership, and other areas.⁽⁵⁴⁵⁾ Expenditures on training and equipment totaled U.S.$1.4 million in 1996, $3 million in 1997, and $5.4 million in 1998.⁽⁵⁴⁶⁾

Mine Action Funding

In 1995 the Lao government, with assistance from UNDP and UNICEF, established a Trust Fund for unexploded ordnance, in order to finance a nationwide program of UXO clearance and awareness. To date more than $5 million in cash and more than $8 million in in-kind contributions have been pledged to the Trust Fund. "Overall annual resource mobilization targets for 1998 are U.S.$15.8 million to be received either as cash grant or as contribution in-kind, without which UXO operations will not be sustainable in the future," said Laos's UN ambassador.⁽⁵⁴⁷⁾

UN TRUST FUND⁽⁵⁴⁸⁾ BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Australia European Union

Belgium France

Canada Germany

Denmark Lao PDR

Finland United States

Japan UNICEF

Luxembourg Handicap International

Netherlands Mines Advisory Group

New Zealand Norwegian People's Aid

Norway

Sweden

United Kingdom

United States (USAID)

UNDP

UNV

Private Donation

Landmine Casualties

According to the Handicap International survey report, "Landmines were reported in every province in Laos and are responsible for 11 percent of accidents. In 12 percent of recorded accidents, the type of UXO or landmines was 'Unknown' because the victim died immediately or did not see the type of UXO or landmine that detonated."⁽⁵⁴⁹⁾

From 1973-1996, 1,171 people suffered landmine accidents, and another 9,473 suffered from UXO accidents. "Data from the survey clearly shows the national trend in accident figures during the period from 1973 to 1996. One-third of all recorded UXO accidents occurred in the first four years following the war (1973-1976). During these four years, Laos experienced 1,100 UXO-related accidents per year, an average of three accidents per day. In the following ten years (1977 to 1986), the annual casualty rate declined to 360, an average of one accident per day. From 1987 to 1996, the annual casualty rate remained constant, averaging about 240 accidents per year."⁽⁵⁵⁰⁾

Of the 10,649 recorded UXO/landmine accident victims,59 percent are adult men. Young boys make up 27 percent of the accident victims, women 10 percent, and young girls 4 percent.

The percentage of children involved in UXO/landmine-related accidents is increasing. Children represent more than one-third of recent accident figures as compared to one-fifth of accidents in the period following the war. In the majority of accidents involving children, the victims are male.⁽⁵⁵¹⁾

The average age of people having accidents with UXO/landmines was 26 years old, and the majority of these victims were aged between 5 and 35.⁽⁵⁵²⁾

The most frequent activity resulting in an accident was the handling of UXO (24%), followed by agricultural activities (22%), collecting forest products (14%), and domestic activities (12%).

The most common disability caused was amputation (65%), followed by paralysis (13%), loss of eyesight (9%), burns (7%) and loss of hearing (5%).

Survivor Assistance

The survey found 2,481 people with upper or lower limb amputations, but only 44 of these people reported the use of prosthesis.⁽⁵⁵³⁾ There is no current production of upper limb prostheses in Laos. Most of the devices only reach people living close to the provincial capitals, whereas most areas affected by UXO and landmines are more isolated and remote.⁽⁵⁵⁴⁾ There is no standard follow-up for amputees receiving prostheses from the six centers functioning in Laos.⁽⁵⁵⁵⁾

Of those casualties who managed to survive the initial accident and resulting trauma, nearly half made it to the hospital for treatment. Fifty percent of survivors did not choose to go to the hospital after the accident. Rather, villagers treated and took care of the person in the village with no medical intervention. As a result, villagers have developed ways of coping with injuries if the district or provincial hospital is inaccessible or too expensive.

Among the agencies providing assistance to UXO and landmine victims in Laos are: Consortium in Xien Khouang, Health Frontiers in Xieng Khouang, Handicap International at Mahasot Hospital in Vientiane, DED (German Development Service) at the National Rehabilitation Center, World Concern in Saravane Province, World Vision in Xieng Khouang and Savannaketh.

Two thirds of people with UXO/landmine related disabilities are still working in their fields, according to the HI survey results, with only 10 percent of surviving victims rendered inactive by their injuries. Most people appear to be supported by their families and are able to return to the fields.

The ability of Lao communities to remain inclusive of mine/UXO survivors is further supported by survey data on the marital status of people disabled by bomb or landmines. Only 19 percent of single, disabled people did not marry after the accident, which is just slightly higher than the percentage of single people in the general Lao population. The figures reported for men and women were not significantly different, although anecdotal evidence indicates that disabled women are more marginalized than men.

The Lao Disabled Peoples Association was formed in 1997. Draft rules and regulations were approved by the government. The association has requested the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare to draft a national law in support of the rights of disabled people.⁽⁵⁵⁶⁾

Note to Readers: A much longer country report on Laos has been prepared for Landmine Monitor which could not be used in full due to space considerations. It contains much greater detail on the landmine/UXO problem, casualties, clearance, and survivor assistance programs. The full report is available upon request. The full Laos country report also contains these appendices:

App 1 Map of Landmine in Lao PDR

App 2 Logistics prevent Laos from signing mine pact

Deputy Foreign Minister meets Canadian Mine Action

Ambassador

App 3 Number of the villages affected by mine

App 4 Map of UXO Lao activities 1998

App 5 Cash contributions committed to the Trust Fund during

The period 1 January - 31 December 1997

App 6 In-kind contributions received and pledged to 31 December 1997

App 7 In-kind and bilateral commitment to UXO Lao during the period 1 January - 31 December 1997

App 8 Contributions received by UXO Lao

App 9 Summary of Ca activities 1 January -31 December 1997

App10 Summary of activities coordinated by UXO Lao

App11 UXO Lao Staff chart (as at 1 November 1998)

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It did not participate in any of the Ottawa Process diplomatic meetings or the formal negotiations, even as an observer. It was one of only 19 nations to abstain on the 1998 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty (which passed 124-0). FSM, which does not have its own military, states that it "does not use, produce or stockpile anti-personnel mines."⁽⁵⁵⁷⁾

The Federation has close administrative and defense ties to the United States of America through its Compact of Free Association: "The U.S. Government has full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the FSM. The government of the FSM is required to refrain from actions that the Government of the United States determines to be incompatible with its authority and responsibility for security and defense matters."⁽⁵⁵⁸⁾

According to a government official, "the FSM National Police...is unaware of the existence of landmines in the FSM."⁽⁵⁵⁹⁾ However, the FSM has a very slight problem with UXO dating back to the Japanese occupation of the islands during Word War II. According to a government official, "when unexploded ordnance is located and believed to pose a hazard, it is typically taken off the island on which it is found and safely detonated. The FSM contacts the United States Embassy, which in turn requests assistance from the United States Navy in Guam in removing the explosives. There is no ordnance demolition team in the FSM."⁽⁵⁶⁰⁾ A government official interviewed said that he is "not aware of any recent victims of accidents involving the handling of ordnance."⁽⁵⁶¹⁾ He confirmed that the FSM does not have a national disability law.⁽⁵⁶²⁾

MONGOLIA

Mine Ban Policy

Mongolia has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. On 10 December 1996, Mongolia voted for UNGA Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines (which passed 156-0, with 10 abstentions). Mongolia did not, however, embrace the Ottawa Process. It did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and did not participate in the Oslo negotiations in September, even as an observer. It was one of just eighteen countries which abstained in the vote on the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing. However, Mongolia did attend the treaty signing ceremony and mine action forum in Ottawa in December 1997 as an observer. Mongolia subsequently voted for UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 on 4 November 1998, welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

Mongolia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the original Protocol II on landmines, but has not yet ratified the amended Protocol II. Mongolia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a ban on AP mine transfers in that forum.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Mongolia is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter. It has no legislation in place prohibiting production or export of landmines. The Soviet Union stockpiled an unknown number of landmines on Mongolian territory. The Soviet Union withdrew its troops from 1989-1992 and Mongolia is now seeking assistance in clearing hazardous materials from the Soviet military bases. It is not known if Mongolia has its own stockpile of mines.

Mine Action

Mongolia has a slight problem with uncleared mines in the eastern and north-eastern areas, from Japanese mining in World War II. There have been no reports of casualties.

Mongolia has made no contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance or to other mine clearance/victim assistance programs. It requested U.S. assistance in destroying landmines and unexploded ordnance left by withdrawing Soviet troops after 1989. The U.S. would survey the areas but leave clearance operations to Mongolian personnel to carry out.⁽⁵⁶³⁾

NAURU

Nauru has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Nauru is a republic which achieved independence from an Australian, New Zealand, and U.K.-administered UN trusteeship on 31 January 1968. It is unknown why Nauru has not supported the elimination of antipersonnel landmines. Nauru is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines and is not mine-affected.

NEPAL

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. The reason given by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official is that Nepal is not directly concerned by landmines: "Nepal is never against landmine ban treaties. We have not signed it only because Nepal has no mine problem."⁽⁵⁶⁴⁾

Nepal participated in all the Ottawa Process preparatory meetings, but only as an observer, including for the Oslo negotiations and the Ottawa treaty signing. Nepal did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels declaration in June 1997, but did vote in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Nepal has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) notes: "During our meeting with the government representatives they said, 'We fully support the campaign for the total ban on landmines but we have to wait and see whether all the nations of the world will sign the document on the total ban on landmines. If all the countries do not sign the document, the world will be divided into two groups and we will be labeled as this or that lobby. Therefore, we should not be involved in dispute.'" The Campaign draws the conclusion that the government of Nepal is in favor of the global ban on landmines but is afraid of the powerful nations and is hesitating to express its commitment."⁽⁵⁶⁵⁾ Some officials were reluctant to discuss the mine issue in detail.⁽⁵⁶⁶⁾

Use

It does not appear that Nepal has ever used antipersonnel landmines. In February 1996 the CPN-Maoist party launched an armed rebellion with a view to establishing a People's Republic dethroning the monarch. Senior Police Officer R. Bahadur Singh has stated the Maoist rebels have not used mines, but have used homemade devices that function like antipersonnel mines.⁽⁵⁶⁷⁾

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Nepal has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Government officials have indicated that Nepal does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. However, in 1998 parliamentarian Surendra Prashad Pandey "asked the government to remove the mines stockpiled at the Swoyambhu area as it could pose a great threat not only to the people living in the area, but also residing in the adjacent areas."⁽⁵⁶⁸⁾ The government has not responded to requests by the Nepal Campaign to clarify this issue.

Landmine Problem

Nepal is not a mine-affected country. The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines, however, is concerned about the use by the Maoist rebels of homemade weapons that function like antipersonnel mines, and the possibility they could use antipersonnel mines in the future, conceivably resulting in use by Nepalese forces as well. One parliamentarian has said, "With the beginning of the Maoist insurgency, the internal conflict has set in. The Maoists are using [homemade] mines and there is a strong possibility of the government retaliating with the insurgents using mines."⁽⁵⁶⁹⁾

Landmine Casualties

As Nepal is not mine affected, there have been no landmine victims inside the country. However, Nepalese soldiers have fallen victim to landmines while participating in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, and peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavian territories.⁽⁵⁷⁰⁾ Other Nepalese soldiers have apparently been maimed and killed by landmines while serving in foreign armies, such as India and UK.⁽⁵⁷¹⁾

PAKISTAN

Mine Ban Policy

Pakistan has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Pakistan has been one of the stronger defenders internationally of the continued possession and use of antipersonnel landmines, indicating that it recognizes the humanitarian concerns, but believes that security concerns are paramount.

Pakistan attended all of the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process as well as the Oslo negotiations in September 1997, but only as an observer in each case. Pakistan did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It was one of only ten nations to abstain on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 (10 December 1996) urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines. It was also among the small number of states to abstain on the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging its full realization and inviting state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

The Pakistan military dominates landmine policy. The Pakistan Armed Forces believes that antipersonnel mines are needed both for potential future conflict with India and for the situation in Jammu and Kashmir. According to some observers, no alteration in this approach is likely until major changes take place, either in its own security environment or in military technology.⁽⁵⁷²⁾ Pakistan has said it opposes a ban until "viable alternatives" are developed.⁽⁵⁷³⁾ Should a technological alternative be available in the future that can provide a viable alternative to the AP mines, Pakistan will be ready to consider reviewing its options.⁽⁵⁷⁴⁾

Pakistan recognizes the Ottawa process is majority driven and in its place would favor a consensus driven approach such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It feels that the security concerns of other nations have not been sufficiently addressed and that there is no flexibility in the Ottawa process to bring in other countries and accommodate their requirements. It considers the CD and the Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) the more reasonable processes.⁽⁵⁷⁵⁾

Pakistan ratified the CCW and original Protocol II on mines on 1 April 1985, but has not yet ratified amended Protocol II.

Mr. Shafqat Ali Khan, Second Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the U.N. said in November 1998, "Pakistan played an active role in the negotiations for the Revised Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We welcome the entry into force of the Revised Protocol II in the near future. Pakistan is expeditiously taking steps to formally assume its responsibilities under the Revised Protocol II of the CCW. Steps now need to be taken to ensure universal adherence to the convention and its protocols. We believe that further measures could be considered in relevant multilateral forums to address the problems arising out of the indiscriminate use of landmines."⁽⁵⁷⁶⁾

He also offered a complaint about the U.N. Secretary General's report on mine clearance: "In our view, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations simply does not have the mandate to deal with 'advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on antipersonnel mines."⁽⁵⁷⁷⁾

Pakistan is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not played a notable role either in support or opposition to efforts since 1996 to negotiate a ban, or a transfer ban, on antipersonnel mines in that forum.

The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines was founded on 1 September 1997. It has been registered with the Government of Pakistan as a non-governmental organization.

Production

Pakistan is a producer of antipersonnel and antitank mines. State-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) has earned a reputation as one of the most enthusiastic promoters of antipersonnel landmines and a wide range of other ordinance, munitions and small arms products. The company was founded in 1951. As of the late 1980s, it maintained fourteen factories in and around Wah with a workforce of 40,000. Sales literature from the early 1990s for the firm's low cost (unit price $6.75) P4 Mk2 stressed the careful calculation of the explosive charge to "make the man disabled and incapacitate him permanently," because "operating research has shown that it is better to disable the enemy than kill him."⁽⁵⁷⁸⁾

Pakistan produces six types of anti-personnel landmines: P2 Mk2, P3 Mk2, P4 Mk2, P5 Mk1, P5 Mk2 and the P7 Mk1.

The P2 Mk2 is a small antipersonnel mine with a plastic body with minimal metal content. A metal detection disc can be fitted. It can also be used as the fuze for Pakistani antitank mines. The mine produces few fragments and relies on the blast for its antipersonnel effects. The casualty radius is given as 3 meters with a damage zone extending to 10 meters.

The P3 Mk2 is a bounding antipersonnel mine. An initial blast propels an inverted ARGES-69 hand grenade (also produced in Pakistan) to a height of between 1.25 and 2 meters where it detonates to disperse steel fragments over a lethal radius of approximately 25 meters. The P7 Mk1 is very similar.

The P4 Mk2 is a conventional blast mine that can be used as antitank or antipersonnel. It has a plastic body, making it difficult to detect. A metal disc can be added.

The P5 Mk1 is a directional fragmentation mine of the Claymore type. When detonated, it sprays 760 steel balls in a 60 degree arc with a kill radius of 50 meters. The mine can be fired either by a tripwire or by electrical means from a remote position. The P5 Mk2 is a larger version.

Pakistan is reportedly converting its non-detectable APMs (P2 Mk2 , P4 Mk1) to detectable ones, as prescribed under Protocol II of the CCW.⁽⁵⁷⁹⁾

Transfer

Pakistan announced on 13 March 1997 that it would observe a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines. Pakistan said that this "unilateral" decision would take effect immediately, and hailed it as "a clear manifestation" of Pakistan's commitment to promote humanitarian norms governing the use of mines. The moratorium is comprehensive and of unlimited duration.

Pakistan had made significant exports in the past, with Pakistani mines being found in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and other locations. According to one expert, Pakistan appears to have been the largest supplier, by a wide margin, of mines deployed in Somaliland.⁽⁵⁸⁰⁾

Pakistan is not believed to have imported mines, as all are domestically produced.

Stockpiling

It is presumed that Pakistan holds significant numbers of each of the mines that it produces, but the government will not make any information available. It is guessed that there are hundreds of thousands of landmines stockpiled in Pakistan.⁽⁵⁸¹⁾ Mines are held only by the regular armed forces and are kept secure and well protected. However, irregulars have traditionally possessed a wide variety of arms and explosives in the country. Many such groups are likely to have independent stocks of mines and high quality modern explosives capable of being made into Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).⁽⁵⁸²⁾

Use

Pakistan has laid antipersonnel mines in front of its defended localities in Jammu and Kashmir.⁽⁵⁸³⁾ It has plans to lay mines on the border with India in times of war. Pakistan's defense policy is based on preventing a surprise, sudden attack from the east from India. It views obstacle systems as vital to offsetting India's conventional military superiority, and that these obstacle systems need to be strengthened by minefields. In wartime, minefields will be laid all along the border and will consist of both antitank and antipersonnel mines.⁽⁵⁸⁴⁾

Non-state actors use landmines and IEDs in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency , Kurram Agency , District Dir and the Azad Kashmir valley). Tribesmen use landmines in their personal conflicts.

Landmine Problem

While the government reports no problem with uncleared landmines, Pakistan is mine-affected in the tribal belt. No assessment or detailed survey has been made of the extent of the problem of landmines. The Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that agricultural and grazing land, as well as routes leading to schools, houses and mosques are affected by landmines.

Mine Action Funding

Pakistan's contribution to mine action has beenin theform of in-kindcontributions; it has played a very active role in the demining operations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Somalia, Angola and more recently in Bosnia.⁽⁵⁸⁵⁾ Pakistan has contributed to demining operations in Afghanistan since 1989. It has provided military contingents, mine detectors, training facilities and medical facilities for deminers injured in mine clearance operation. The resources have been allocated to the United Nations Mine Action Program for Afghanistan.

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

Currently, no agency is involved in mine clearance or training operations in Pakistan. However, according to the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, some of the local people have purchased mine detectors on their limited resources to save themselves and their respective families from falling victim to mines. They daily check the paths leading to their houses and agriculture land by using these mine detectors.

There are no mine awareness programs in place.

Landmine Casualties

According to a Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines survey and news clippings, 400 people have fallen victim to mines in one area of Bajaur Agency, and the number of victims is on the increase. No detailed survey of the landmine victims has been carried out so far. However, based upon media reports and the data collected by PCBL from two mine-affected villages, approximately eight to ten people fall victim to antipersonnel landmines monthly in mine-affected areas of Pakistan.⁽⁵⁸⁶⁾

The victims have all been civilians, including women and children ranging from a baby who has just learned how to walk to a man walking with a cane. The landmine victims belong to the tribal belt of Pakistan (all the seven agencies), District Dir, and Azad Kashmir in particular, and in few cases other areas of Pakistan. In addition, thousands of Afghan refugees maimed by landmines have been treated in hospitals and rehabilitation centers in Pakistan.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Since the mine-affected areas are far away from the major cities of Pakistan, even first aid facilities are not available for landmine victims, let alone advanced facilities. Generally victims are rushed to hospitals in the big cities, though some die on the way.

There are no psychological, social and rehabilitation facilities provided to them by the Government or any national or international organization. Prosthetic and assistance device facilities are available in Pakistan but they are available only against payment. It is beyond the ability of most victims to afford these facilities.

PALAU

Palau did not participate in the Ottawa Process and has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. One possible reason could be Palau's close economic, political and defense relationship with the United States, a non-signatory of the treaty. Since 1994, Palau has been an independent nation and member state of the United Nations but the United States continues to retain some rights to a third of Palauan territory through a Compact of Free Association which will last for fifty years.

There was fierce fighting in the islands of Palau in the latter stages of World War Two, but Palau is not believed to be mine-affected. Palau is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Mine Ban Policy

Papua New Guinea has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty despite many indications that it would do so. Papua New Guinea voted for the 1996 and 1997 pro-ban landmines resolutions of the UN General Assembly, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997 and was a full participant to the Oslo negotiations in September 1997. But it did not come to the Ottawa treaty signing conference in December 1997, and was absent from the vote on the November 1998 UNGA resolution endorsing the ban treaty.

In a letter dated 3 November 1998, the Secretary of Papua New Guinea's Department of Foreign Affairs, Peter S. Tsiamalili, said that "Papua New Guinea will sign the said Convention as soon as the newly appointed Permanent Head Representative of the Papua New Guinea Permanent Mission to the UN in New York arrives to assume his new role as PNG Ambassador to the United Nations," a statement repeated by the Head of Legal and Treaties Branch and the Deputy Secretary of Papua New Guinea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Grace Dom.⁽⁵⁸⁷⁾

Ambassador Peter Dickson Donigi arrived in New York to take up the posting in November 1998. Papua New Guinea's Acting Director of International Organisations Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sakias Tomea, told Landmine Monitor in March 1999 that the Instrument of Authority giving the ambassador "full power" to sign the treaty was sent to New York in November 1998 "but must have got lost" and a second Instrument of Authority sent earlier this year "may have got lost too."⁽⁵⁸⁸⁾ Papua New Guinea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jimi Ovia, responded to requests for information from the New York side by saying "there is nothing I can tell you, it is part of the government process itself, we act when given instructions."⁽⁵⁸⁹⁾

The lack of signature seems to be due to bureaucratic confusion rather than opposition to the treaty as no government representative is on record in opposition. The Chief of Staff of Papua New Guinea's Defence Force, Colonel Takendu, has said, "We fully support the Ottawa Convention."⁽⁵⁹⁰⁾

Production, Trade, Stockpiling, Use

According to military officials, including Chief of Staff Colonel Takendu, Papua New Guinea has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported, stockpiled, and used only command-detonated Claymore mines.⁽⁵⁹¹⁾ Papua New Guinea imported Claymore antipersonnel mines twenty years ago from the Australian Government.⁽⁵⁹²⁾ The Claymore mines are now held by Papua New Guinea's Defence Force at the Engineer Battalion base at Lae and are used for training.⁽⁵⁹³⁾

For the past ten years Papua New Guinea has engaged in a conflict with an armed insurgency on Bougainville Island known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Forty thousand Bougainville islanders were displaced from their homes and up to 20,000 people were killed until a ceasefire was reached in April 1998. Claymore antipersonnel landmines were used by the PNG Defence Forces in the conflict, but not widely. Many diplomatic, humanitarian and military sources believe that there are currently no landmines in Bougainville.⁽⁵⁹⁴⁾

The Army laid Claymore antipersonnel landmines in Bougainville in 1994 but then removed all of them, except for two that were later found and destroyed by Captain Martin Donoghue, the New Zealand Army officer in charge of clearing mines and booby traps ahead of the 1994 peacekeeping expedition to Bougainville. He said that the two Claymore antipersonnel mines were laid by Papua New Guinea's Defence Force and were part of a bigger defensive perimeter in which other mines had been removed by the PNGDF.⁽⁵⁹⁵⁾ He did not find any mines or improvised explosive devices laid by the Bougainville rebel army.

It is possible, though unconfirmed, that the BRA manufactured and used improvised explosive devises. According to Oxfam New Zealand, "the BRA's ability to manufacture all kinds of weapons out of [left-over] WW2 weaponry and bits of hardware left over from the [copper] mine is legendary."⁽⁵⁹⁶⁾ According to one source, improvised explosive devices have been used in other parts of the country, including the capital Port Moresby, around the perimeter of property to deter intruders.⁽⁵⁹⁷⁾

Sandline mercenaries involved in the final phase of the conflict may have brought landmines with them but according to the Chief of Staff, "These were never used and all were returned to the U.K."⁽⁵⁹⁸⁾

Mine/UXO Problem

Papua New Guinea still has a problem with unexploded ordnance from World War II. According to the Chief of Staff of Papua New Guinea's Defence Forces, there are UXO in Milne Bay, Lae, Wewak, Madang, Rabaul and Bougainville which engineer teams continue to clear but there are no landmines.⁽⁵⁹⁹⁾

There have been a few casualties to UXOs and these victims are usually treated in the local hospital and then sent home to be cared for by their extended family. Workers' Accident Compensation caters for workers injured while in employment but not self-employed farmers or unemployed people.

Note: This report is based largely on a mission to Papua New Guinea conducted by John V. Head in November 1998.

SINGAPORE

Mine Ban Policy

Singapore has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Nor has it signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Landmines Protocol. Senior government officials have stated that they are still studying both conventions carefully: "...in line with our standard practice, we will consider signing them only when we are sure that we can fulfill all their provisions after taking into account our own defense and strategic needs."⁽⁶⁰⁰⁾

Singapore did not attend the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and came only as an observer to the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997 and the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December.

However, Singapore voted in favor of the December 1996 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines, and the 1997 UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December treaty signing. Singapore has acknowledged that "the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of antipersonnel landmines pose not only grave dangers to civilian populations, it also poses a serious threat to the safety and lives of UN personnel participating in humanitarian, peacekeeping and development programmes."⁽⁶⁰¹⁾

In May 1996, Singapore stated that "it is not practical to have a blanket ban on all types of APLs as many countries still see the need for APLs for legitimate self-defense purposes. In our view, the fundamental cause of the humanitarian problems are APLs with no self-destruct or self-neutralizing mechanisms.... Singapore is committed to working with members of the international community to find a durable solution to this problem."⁽⁶⁰²⁾

Singapore also voted for UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 on 4 November 1998, which welcomed the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urged its full realization and invited state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique. At the time, the Singapore representative stated, "However, we believe that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defense of any state cannot be disregarded."⁽⁶⁰³⁾

Production

In February 1999, a Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated, "Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS) is the only company in Singapore that produces landmines, and these are for use of our defence forces only."⁽⁶⁰⁴⁾

Chartered Industries is controlled by the state-owned Sheng-Li holding company (Sheng-Li mean "victory" in Chinese). One authoritative source notes that while the Ministry of Finance is the legal owner of the Singapore Defense Industries and oversees its finances, Sheng-Li's operations are largely supervised by the Ministry of Defense, which to a very large extent sets the main policy guidelines for the operations of the different defense companies.⁽⁶⁰⁵⁾

Chartered Industries is reported to have produced the following antipersonnel mines:

Valsella Valmara 69 bounding fragmentation mine

Valsella VS-50 (also designated SPM-1 by Singapore) scatterable blast mine

Tecnovar TS-50 scatterable blast mine ⁽⁶⁰⁶⁾

All three mines are copies of Italian mines. The VS-50 and TS-50 are largely non-detectable, plastic mines.⁽⁶⁰⁷⁾

Vito Alfieri Fontana, a former owner of the Tecnovar Company denies that Tecnovar ever gave production licenses to Singapore.⁽⁶⁰⁸⁾ A memo from Gaetano Paola Agnini, a former marketing manager of Valsella, stated that beginning in 1982 Chartered Industries of Singapore imported fully assembled mines from Valsella and then re-exported them to different countries. Later Valsella "shipped large quantities of CKD components to be assembled and loaded with explosive charge by the Singapore-based company--primarily for the supply of mines to the Iraqi Forces."⁽⁶⁰⁹⁾ From 1982 to 1986 Valsella exports to Singapore totalled US$18.6 million (see Italy report). No Valsella exports to Singapore were recorded after 1986.

Although there have been rumors that Valsella moved some mine production equipment and operations to Singapore after the ban in Italy took effect, there is no evidence to substantiate this. Gaetano Paola Agnini, the former Valsella marketing manager, has denied it, stating that no Valsella "plant machinery and equipment" was transferred to Singapore.⁽⁶¹⁰⁾ The Singapore government states that private companies from other countries have not set up factories to produce landmines in Singapore.⁽⁶¹¹⁾

According to the Foreign Ministry, Singapore has not transferred landmine production technology to another country and is not producing or conducting research and development on any munitions that might function like an antipersonnel mine and pose dangers to civilians (such as antitank mines with antihandling devices and certain submunitions/cluster bombs).⁽⁶¹²⁾

Transfer

On 8 May 1996 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a Press Statement declaring a two year moratorium on the export of "antipersonnel mines which have no self-destruct or self-neutralising mechanisms."⁽⁶¹³⁾ On 5 February 1998 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the "Singapore Government has now decided, with immediate effect, to extend the moratorium to the export of all types of antipersonnel mines." This moratorium will be in force indefinitely.⁽⁶¹⁴⁾ Government officials have stated categorically that no landmines have been exported from Singapore since May 1996.⁽⁶¹⁵⁾

A partly declassified United States Army Intelligence study confirms that Italian-designed Singapore produced-mines were found in Iraqi arsenals after the Gulf War.⁽⁶¹⁶⁾ Aside from Iraq, it is not known to which countries Singapore exported antipersonnel mines in the past. Chartered Industries has records of all landmines exported from Singapore but these are kept confidential.⁽⁶¹⁷⁾

Singapore imported 3,843 M-18A1 Claymore mines and ten M-14 blast mines from the United States from 1970-1981.⁽⁶¹⁸⁾ It is not known if Singapore has imported antipersonnel mines from other countries.

Stockpiling

Given its opposition to the ban treaty, its statements about the need for mines for legitimate self-defense, and the very fact that it has an export moratorium in place, it seems certain that Singapore has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. No details, however, are available. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, "For security reasons, we cannot discuss the numbers, types and locations of Singapore's APLs, or if there was such a stockpile in the first place."⁽⁶¹⁹⁾

Use

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares that no landmines have been laid in Singapore.⁽⁶²⁰⁾ There is no evidence to the contrary.

Landmine Problem

While landmines pose no danger to civilians, Singapore does still have sporadic cases of unexploded WWII ordnance found on beaches and at various sites under development. Army Engineers are employed to destroy any UXOs found.⁽⁶²¹⁾

Mine Action

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said, "We share the humanitarian concerns of the international community and would support their efforts to resolve the problem of uncleared mines."⁽⁶²²⁾ To date, the government has not made any direct financial contribution to mine action programs. A Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated, "We are actively studying ways in which we can effectively contribute towards international efforts on mine clearance and victim assistance. These include proposals to set up a demining training centre in the Asian region and a Third Country Training Programme for Demining."⁽⁶²³⁾

Transparency

Official sources have been reluctant to provide information on the production, storage, export and use of landmines. A Landmine Monitor researcher traveled to Singapore from 6-12 February 1999 and met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁽⁶²⁴⁾ and the Ministry of Defense⁽⁶²⁵⁾ as well as a Member of Parliament, a retired Army Officer an academic and diplomats from five countries.

SRI LANKA

Background

The Sri Lankan government has been engaged in an intense civil war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since 1983. Mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been used extensively by the LTTE in the conflict. Government forces have also used antipersonnel mines.

Most of the conflict has taken place in the northern and eastern provinces which are heavily contaminated with landmines.⁽⁶²⁶⁾ One severely mined area is the Jaffna peninsula, which the government now controls and is encouraging resettlement of people displaced by the war. The UN Development Program (UNDP) noted in 1998, "Landmines laid by both the Sri Lankan military and by the Armed Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have caused increasing numbers of civilian deaths and casualties particularly as returnees begin to rehabilitate their dwellings and to re-cultivate gardens and fields. Naturally, many innocent children become victims."⁽⁶²⁷⁾ Fighting, and use of antipersonnel mines by both sides, continues to this day.

Mine Ban Policy

Sri Lanka has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. Government officials say that Sri Lanka is opposing the ban for internal security reasons. ''Sri Lanka welcomes, in principle, a verifiable ban on APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] but is not in a position to accede to such a treaty in the near future due to legitimate national security requirements arising out of the current situation."⁽⁶²⁸⁾ At the ban treaty signing ceremony in Ottawa in December 1997, the Sri Lankan representative said, "As a matter of principle the Government of Sri Lanka welcomes a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines as it has a laudable humanitarian goal. However, such as ban should certainly encompass the use of antipersonnel mines by security forces as well as by terrorist groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam."⁽⁶²⁹⁾

The representative continued, "The Government of Sri Lanka is therefore conscious of the fact that antipersonnel mines are a legitimate defense weapon in the context of protecting the security forces installations against the threat caused by terrorist groups. Further, at a time when Sri Lankan armed forces are engaged in a war with the LTTE terrorists...it is not conducive for Sri Lanka to be a signatory to a convention which totally prohibits the production, use, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines."⁽⁶³⁰⁾ Some observers believe that the government is unlikely to agree to a treaty banning landmine use by states until the question of IEDs and use by non-state actors in internal armed conflicts is satisfactorily addressed.⁽⁶³¹⁾

Sri Lanka attended the preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, including the negotiations in Oslo and the treaty signing in Ottawa, but always as an observer, not a full participant. At the Vienna conference in February 1997 to discuss elements of a ban treaty, out of the 111 governments attending, Sri Lanka was one of only four who spoke openly of their continued need to use antipersonnel mines.⁽⁶³²⁾ Yet, Sri Lanka voted "yes" on the pro-ban UNGA Resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998, indicating its support at some level for a ban at some point in time. Sri Lanka has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Sri Lanka is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a notable proponent or opponent of mine negotiations in that forum.

Use

The LTTE were originally trained in use of mines and IEDs by Indian security forces and later used these techniques with great effect against them during 1987-90. The LTTE are considered among the most skilled in the world in improvised explosives use.⁽⁶³³⁾ According to a U.S. government report, "The separatists mine specific routes used by government forces, and usually warn the local population, thereby lowering civilian casualties."⁽⁶³⁴⁾ They use pressure mines captured from government forces as well as their homemade mines and IEDs.⁽⁶³⁵⁾ Use has been particularly heavy in the northern and eastern regions.

In February 1999, Sri Lankan officials were quoted as saying they could not sign the ban treaty because the armed forces fighting Tamil rebels heavily depend on various types of mines.⁽⁶³⁶⁾ The government has used mines to defend localities against rebel ambushes and raids. The UNDP has noted that government forces have laid two types of antipersonnel mines: Chinese Type 72A and Pakistani P4. It has also said, "Although minefield records have been produced they are rarely accurate.... Mines have been laid in front of defensive positions which have subsequently been hurriedly evacuated and the mines forgotten about. We have also encountered numerous examples in similar locations of ordnance rigged to an initiation chain and command wire. The most notorious example so far has been two 20 kg charges located under a classroom floor in a Technical College, abandoned, undocumented and forgotten about by the Army."⁽⁶³⁷⁾

According to the UNDP, both sides of the conflict have agreed that they will not lay mines in any of the areas targeted by the UNDP mine action project in Jaffna.⁽⁶³⁸⁾

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

The Sri Lankan government is not thought to be a producer of antipersonnel mines. The LTTE has manufactured IEDs and homemade mines in significant numbers, including one known as a "Johnny" or "Jony" mine.⁽⁶³⁹⁾ UNDP describes this as the "most commonly encountered" mine, a small wooden box with 3-400 grams of TNT or C4 that explodes from pressure. The LTTE also makes and uses a directional fragmentation, Claymore-type mine.⁽⁶⁴⁰⁾

It is likely that the government has received antipersonnel mines from China and Pakistan. The government claims that a wide range of weapons are readily available to the LTTE, including explosives and mines. In particular, the Army claims that antipersonnel mines have been supplied to the LTTE by Bulgaria and Romania, or obtained from these countries by clandestine traders.⁽⁶⁴¹⁾ The size of the APM stockpiles of the government and the LTTE are unknown.

Landmine Problem

There are an estimated 25,000 landmines planted in Sri Lanka.⁽⁶⁴²⁾ The northern and eastern provinces are badly mine-affected. Landmines littering the Jaffna peninsula have slowed down the government's efforts to resettle civilians there. The UNDP has noted that on the Jaffna peninsula, "landmines are scattered widely, sometimes indiscriminately, and often outside marked minefields; it is common for them to be found in gardens and buildings.... Many of the people returning to their homes and fields have become mine casualties, being unaware of the presence of landmines or UXO in a formerly safe environment."⁽⁶⁴³⁾

UNDP has also said, "The greater proportion of mines in Jaffna are the antipersonnel type and they can be found virtually anywhere from marked minefields, to agricultural land, to houses and gardens. Quantities are difficult to calculate, but it is estimated that there are around 50 to 75 square kilometres of suspect or contaminated land."⁽⁶⁴⁴⁾

Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness

The Army conducts some mine clearance operations. According to the UN, however, "It is common for the Army to declare an area clear and a day or two later for a mine casualty to be reported there.... In one case Sri Lanka sappers were clearing a minefield containing 55 mines they had laid, using their own records as reference. They failed to recover three mines which they considered a satisfactory result."⁽⁶⁴⁵⁾

In late 1997, the UNDP conducted a feasibility study which concluded that there was a serious mine problem and that it was feasible to initiate a mine action program to reduce the impact of landmines on local communities.⁽⁶⁴⁶⁾ A pilot project was started in Jaffna in April 1998. The UNDP states, "A mine action plan was formulated which addressed several aspects of mine action, but which stopped short of the systematic clearance of densely mines areas. Instead, the plan focused upon a more cost-effective and locally appropriate approach."⁽⁶⁴⁷⁾ Elements of the plan include: a mine awareness program with UNICEF; a level one survey to identify suspect areas and facilitate prioritization; followed by a level two survey supported by mine dog teams aimed at accurate surveying and physical marking of densely mined areas; a rapid response capacity to clear reported mines and UXOs posing an immediate threat to people or vital facilities; a victim rehabilitation component. Systematic clearance of minefields must wait for peace. "As long as mines continue to be laid by either side it is difficult to justify the risk and cost of systematic demining in the country."⁽⁶⁴⁸⁾

According to press accounts, the project is expected to take about two years and cost $3.5 million. British sniffer dogs will be used. Some mine areas will be cordoned off and not cleared.⁽⁶⁴⁹⁾

The project was initially supposed to be fully operational by August 1998, but due to the "lengthy and complex bureaucratic process" of the government, it is now hoped that full operational capacity will be reached in mid-1999, though "further difficulties suggest this target will slip yet again."⁽⁶⁵⁰⁾

To date, only a few areas close to Jaffna have been cleared of mines. Vast stretches of farmland and villages in the peninsula remain mine infested.

Landmine Casualties

There are no official Sri Lankan government figures of casualties. According to UNDP representative Svend Madsen between 15 and 20 people in the Jaffna peninsula become mine casualties every month.⁽⁶⁵¹⁾ Children are particularly vulnerable. A U.S. government report indicated that there have been thousands of mine casualties, now occurring at a rate of 15 per month.⁽⁶⁵²⁾ Non-governmental groups say at least 196 people were killed between May and December 1996. Udayan, a top-selling Tamil language weekly published from Jaffna, said 84 people died and 145 were injured between January and August 1997. Landmine Monitor has a list of major landmine incidents in Sri Lanka 1995-1997 compiled from the United Nations Demining Database.⁽⁶⁵³⁾

Survivor Assistance

The UNDP notes that hospitals are poorly equipped and unable to acquire basic drugs such as anaesthetics. Because of the conflict, there is no reliable road or air link between Jaffna and the main city of Colombo. There is the possibility of air evacuations by military aircraft, but it cannot be counted on. "The alternative is to enhance local capacity by importing expertise and providing dedicated drug supplies to enable casualties to be treated in Jaffna. The professional competence of local medics is reasonably high, but there are serious shortcomings in management practices."⁽⁶⁵⁴⁾

TONGA

The Kingdom of Tonga did not participate in the Ottawa Process and has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a member of the United Nations but as a state, it can sign the ban treaty if it chooses. Tonga is not mine-affected and is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines.

TUVALU

Tuvalu, formerly known as the Ellice Islands, did not participate in the Ottawa Process and has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a member of the United Nations, but as a state it can sign if it chooses. Tuvalu has no defense force and is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. The islands of Tuvalu were the scene of heavy fighting during World War Two resulting in unexploded ordnance in some locations, however Tuvalu is not believed to be mine-affected.⁽⁶⁵⁵⁾ There are no known UXO awareness or clearance activities underway at present and civilian casualties to UXO are unknown.

VIETNAM

Mine Ban Policy

Vietnam has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the treaty preparatory meetings in Vienna and Brussels, but only as an observer. It did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and did not participate in the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September.

Vietnam sent a representative to the treaty signing conference in Ottawa, Canada in December 1997, who made the following statement: "Vietnam welcomes the efforts made by the Canadian government and governments of other countries, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and other NGOs in completing an international comprehensive treaty on the banning of antipersonnel landmines. Vietnam has not yet participated in the Convention because of her territorial defense reasons.... Being a war victim, including antipersonnel landmines, Vietnam believes that other countries understand her position."⁽⁶⁵⁶⁾

Nearly one year later Vietnam was one of just 19 governments that abstained on the 4 November 1998, UN General Assembly First Committee vote on Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting state parties and observers to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.

Vietnam signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981, but has yet to ratify the CCW or its revised Protocol II on mines. Vietnam is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a mine transfer ban in the CD.

Production

Vietnam has produced antipersonnel landmines in the past, though it may not be manufacturing them currently.⁽⁶⁵⁷⁾ No formal moratorium or prohibition is in place. A recent reference work indicates the most commonly produced Vietnamese mines are the MBV78A1 fragmentation stake mine (similar to the POMZ), MBV78A2 can-shaped fragmentation mine, MN79 plastic blast mine (exact copy of U.S. M14), MB82B plastic blast mine (similar to the U.S. M14), MDH10 Claymore type directional fragmentation mine (similar to the Soviet MON 100), NOMZ2B fragmentation stake mine and P40 "Apple" ball mine.⁽⁶⁵⁸⁾ According to Jane's, in 1989 reports emerged of a new Vietnamese antipersonnel mine, the "Apple mine," which turned out to be a conversion of U.S. BLU-24 bomblets recovered from the war.⁽⁶⁵⁹⁾

Transfer

In the past, Vietnam exported antipersonnel mines to Cambodia and perhaps elsewhere. In December 1997, however, at the ban treaty signing conference, a Vietnamese official declared, "Vietnam does not export antipersonnel mines."⁽⁶⁶⁰⁾ It is not known if this constitutes a formal moratorium or ban on exports.

Vietnam is not known to have imported antipersonnel mines in recent years, relying instead on domestic production. Vietnam likely received supplies of mines from others during the 1960s and 1970s, although U.S. Army documents indicate that the main source of landmines for North Vietnam was captured U.S. mines and mine components; by 1969, ninety percent of all component parts in mines and booby traps used against U.S. troops in Vietnam were U.S.-made. It was the U.S., not North Vietnam, that introduced mines in large numbers into the conflict.⁽⁶⁶¹⁾

Stockpiling

The size of Vietnam's stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not known. It is likely to consist mainly of the domestically-produced AP mines listed above.

Use

Mines were used in all phases of the war in Vietnam, including by the French forces in the 1950s.⁽⁶⁶²⁾ They were used extensively by U.S., South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese forces. According to an authoritative study, "At the end of the war, the number of mines was estimated at 3,500,000 principally as a result of the conflict waged from 1965 to 1975.... In 1993, a document provided by the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs stated that during the Indochina war, APM were laid in the beach areas in the Province of Haiphong, in the Province of Quangnam-Danang, and in the Province of Quang Tri, along with other centrally located provinces south of the 17^th parallel."⁽⁶⁶³⁾

An ICRC study on the military utility of mines states, "Neither the French, North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, Americans, or Australians kept full records of their minefields, especially those dropped from the air. In general, mines were not marked, especially the many tons of mines and sub-munitions dropped on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. No evidence has been found of attempts by any of the armies concerned to stop the indiscriminate use of AP mines."⁽⁶⁶⁴⁾ U.S. Army documents indicate that one-third of all U.S. Army casualties in Vietnam were caused by mines and booby traps.⁽⁶⁶⁵⁾

More recently, Vietnam a laid significant number of mines on its border with China. A U.S. State Department report states, "It is believed that there are significant minefields along the Chinese border that pose a risk to rural populations."⁽⁶⁶⁶⁾

The Landmine Problem

The U.N. and the U.S. State Department estimate the number of mines in Vietnam at 3.5 million.⁽⁶⁶⁷⁾ There has never been a comprehensive nationwide landmine survey, but government health officials track landmine incidents and have collected a good deal of information about mine types and locations.⁽⁶⁶⁸⁾

The most affected region is Quang Tri Province which includes the former border between North and South Vietnam, and contains the highest proportion of disabled in the country.⁽⁶⁶⁹⁾ It is reported that there are more than 58,000 landmines and unexploded ordnance in Quang Tri Province.⁽⁶⁷⁰⁾ One source indicates that, using average costs for mine removal in Cambodia, it would cost $17.5 million to clear the remaining mines in Quang Tri province.⁽⁶⁷¹⁾

There are also problems with mines near the border with China, and in the mountainous regions bordering Laos.⁽⁶⁷²⁾

Mine Action Funding

Vietnam has neither contributed to international demining efforts, nor received assistance from other nations. According to the Services of Defense, which is in charge of mine clearance in Vietnam, they are in need of financial support from foreign agencies.⁽⁶⁷³⁾ In December 1997, a Vietnamese official said, "Vietnam appreciates international efforts and cooperation in demining and resolving antipersonnel landmine consequences and is ready to cooperate with and to receive any assistance in technology, equipment and finance to continue the process of demining and to assist landmine victims."⁽⁶⁷⁴⁾

Mine Clearance

The Vietnamese Army undertook organized mine clearance during the decade after the war's end in 1975. The Army trained residents of local communities to look for mines and other unexploded ordnance, who would erect a warning flag and wait until experts came to remove it.⁽⁶⁷⁵⁾

In August 1996, a team of four retired U.S. military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts worked side by side with Vietnamese people to clear 18 acres of an area near the town of Dông Ha in the old demarcation military zone.⁽⁶⁷⁶⁾

The UN has estimated that 58,747 mines have been cleared in Vietnam.⁽⁶⁷⁷⁾ In 1997, however, the Vietnamese government claimed that it had cleared more than 100,000 landmines from its side of the border with China over the past five years. It stated 2,265 acres of land in the border province of Lang Son had been declared mine free, but that another 1,112 acres were still contaminated.⁽⁶⁷⁸⁾

According to the Handicap International, as of early 1997 the Services of Defense, which is in charge of mine clearance activities, was not allowed to deal directly with any foreign agencies that might assist in mine action. Services of Defense claimed they did not need technical advice, only financial assistance to conduct large-scale clearance.⁽⁶⁷⁹⁾ After a Handicap International exploratory visit in June 1997,⁽⁶⁸⁰⁾ the Services of Defense appeared to be sensitized to international standards for security and sustainability of demining, but these standards were not applied in the field. In fact, young, non-specialized soldiers were engaging in demining.⁽⁶⁸¹⁾ Later in 1997 the Services of Defense decided to allow an expatriate presence, but only inside the training center and not in the field.⁽⁶⁸²⁾

At the end of January 1999, Mr. Nguyen Buong (chairman of Quang Tri Province People's Committee) and the Danish Foreign Minister, Mr. Niels Helveg Petersen, inaugurated a project to remove mines and ordnance in Quang Tri's Gio Linh District. The Danish government will fund the $1.1 million project. In the first year, the work will be carried out on 120 hectares of Gio Linh District and implemented by the People's Committee in collaboration with the UK-based Mines Advisory Group.⁽⁶⁸³⁾

Mine Awareness

According to Vietnamese authorities, mine awareness education is not a priority because people already know the danger of mines and UXOs.⁽⁶⁸⁴⁾

The NGO PeaceTrees Vietnam is engaged in a clearance and awareness project, "Landmine Clearance--Tree Planting." A team of PeaceTrees Vietnam volunteers dedicated the first landmine education center on 18 September 1998.⁽⁶⁸⁵⁾ PeaceTrees' Danaan Parry Landmines Education Center will be a resource center for the people of Quang Tri Province and for anyone concerned with the landmine problem in Vietnam. Through mine awareness lessons and interactive displays, PeaceTrees Vietnam hopes to reduce the weekly occurrence of landmines related injuries. The Center will also serve as a training classroom for Vietnamese and international volunteers, who will teach landmine education in the community outreach program. Moreover, the building will house a prosthetics registry desk designed to assist landmine victims with their rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.⁽⁶⁸⁶⁾

Handicap International is preparing to implement a mine awareness micro-project in cooperation with the Quang Tri Popular Committee, consisting of a 15-minute film which is slated to be regularly broadcast on local television.⁽⁶⁸⁷⁾

Landmine Casualties

A U.S. State Department report estimates that there are 180 landmine casualties in Vietnam each month.⁽⁶⁸⁸⁾ The Quang Tri Department of Health, based on incomplete data, recorded more than 900 mine casualties from 1985-1994 in Quang Tri. In 1995, officials at the Quang Tri provincial hospital reported that the province had the nation's highest casualty rate from mines and UXO, with nearly six people per day (over 2,000 per year) requiring treatment for their injuries. According to Dr. Phan Huu Tai, there had been no discernable reduction in the number of injuries in the 20 years since the war.⁽⁶⁸⁹⁾

In November 1997, Handicap International conducted a survey using Quang Tri Provincial rehabilitation center data, on 320 lower limb amputees who were given prostheses.⁽⁶⁹⁰⁾ The report concluded that "accidents most often happen to the young adult working population." Ninety-eight percent of amputations due to war or post-war accidents were caused by mines, and two percent by bombs.⁽⁶⁹¹⁾ The report notes that shells rarely cause amputation because ordnance with high bursting charges kill their victims.

Survivor Assistance

The ICRC established an orthopedic project in Ho Chi Minh City in 1988. The project set up a local center for the production of orthopedic components, feet and knee joints.⁽⁶⁹²⁾. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Disabled Veterans of America, Vietnam Aid for Handicapped (USA), and Handicap International have established programs to assist the government and local organizations in Vietnam with the production of prosthetic and orthopedic devices, as have other international NGOs.⁽⁶⁹³⁾

Since 1994, Handicap International has cooperated with Quang Tri Province's health services to implement, within the provincial hospital, a rehabilitation center, including an orthopedic workshop. Partners include Quang Tri Provincial Hospital, Vinh Long Provincial Rehabilitation Center, Lâm Dông "Peace Village," Khanh Hoa Education and Health Center for Handicapped Children, and Hô Chi Minh City Rehabilitation Center for Handicapped Children. These programs involve treatment of physically handicapped persons (orthopedic devices, physiotherapy, basic surgery), technical support to the community network, including socio-economic rehabilitation, as well as an approach toward adult beneficiaries.⁽⁶⁹⁴⁾

OTHER

TAIWAN

Mine Ban Policy

Taiwan is not eligible to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Likewise, it cannot sign the CCW. It is not a member of the United Nations, or the Conference on Disarmament. While no official statements on Taiwanese policy toward the ban treaty are available, an official of the National Defense Ministry said that Taiwan has stopped use of antipersonnel mines.⁽⁶⁹⁵⁾

Production

The National Defense Ministry official also stated that Taiwan has stopped production of antipersonnel mines, and already developed an alternative weapon.⁽⁶⁹⁶⁾ In the past, the company Hsing Hua produced copies of U.S. M16A1 bounding fragmentation mines, M2A4 bounding fragmentation mines, M3 blast mines, and M18A1 Claymore mines.⁽⁶⁹⁷⁾

Transfer

There is no evidence that Taiwan has exported antipersonnel mines. A 1993 U.S. State Department communication indicated that Taiwan "may be attempting to sell [its] landmines abroad."⁽⁶⁹⁸⁾

The United States has exported 36,747 antipersonnel mines to Taiwan. Most recent was a 1992 sale of 2,592 ADAM scatterable mines -- one of the last U.S. shipments before its export moratorium went into place, and one of the few U.S. exports of "smart" mines.⁽⁶⁹⁹⁾ The U.S. also shipped 34,155 M3 mines in 1970 and 1974.⁽⁷⁰⁰⁾ It is not known if Taiwan imported mines from other nations.

Stockpiling

Details on Taiwan's stockpile are not available. It likely contains a combination of domestically produced mines and U.S.-supplied mines, and perhaps Type 72 mines.

On Kinmen Island (also known as Quemoy), located just 1.8 miles from mainland China, mine dumps were identified by the Pakistan-based NGO, Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). Following is a quotation from its report:

DESCRIPTION OF THE OPEN MINE DUMPS:

Mines collected from surrounding areas have been stored in an open area. A concrete wall with a height of about 50cm and width of approximately 30cm has been constructed around the mines. The wall has been painted in red and yellow colors and danger signs have been installed. Two rows of sandbags have also been placed on the wall. High vegetation and trees have grown on the mine stores. The mines were stored about 30 - 35 years ago. A total of nine such stores (dumps) exist in the island.

No data is available about the type, quantity or any other technical specifications of mines stored in the open dumps. The military also has no data maps or any other information about these mine dumps. In accordance with the local mine victims interviewed, both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines are present. According to their descriptions and drawings made by a mine victim it seems that Type-72 AP mines may also be stored in the dumps.

According to a village chief and other locals, mines had been collected from the surrounding areas and then stored. The surrounding area was hardly used for farming or any other activities. When asked how do they know that the area is 100% cleared, they had no assurance. The village chief said that most parts of the area has been farmed in the past (3 - 4 years ago). However, the head of the disabled association of the island said that areas around the mine dumps have not been used at all and could potentially be dangerous.

It is suspected that in addition to landmines other devices including land surface ammunition (LSA) and other unexploded devices (UXOs) might be stored in the dumps as well. Houses are located in a distance of about 500 meters either side of the landmine dumps. ⁽⁷⁰¹⁾

Use

An official of the National Defense Ministry has said that Taiwan has stopped use of antipersonnel mines.⁽⁷⁰²⁾ Most parts of Kinmen (Quemoy) Island were mined in the 1950s due to its strategic location.⁽⁷⁰³⁾

Landmine Problem

Kinmen Island is contaminated by landmines. According to one press account, there are eight abandoned minefields in Kinmen, "which has been plagued by the danger posed by landmines for over four decades."⁽⁷⁰⁴⁾ The Mine Clearance Planning Agency report states:

Mines were used in coastline areas and areas around military installations. Most of the landmines used around military installations were removed from the ground and stored in open dumps some thirty years ago. However, landmines from the coastal areas have not yet been cleared. A number of mine incidents involving civilians have taken place in the past. The island is currently being developed to be a National Park for tourist attractions. However, the presence of mines is a serious problem faced by the local residents and will discourage tourists. The army claims that they can deal with the mined areas in the coastal areas but due to high risks involved, they are reluctant to deal with the mines stored in the dumps.⁽⁷⁰⁵⁾

Mine Action

The Ministry of National Defense has set aside NT$380 million (New Taiwan) dollars for removing all landmines from Kinmen. In 1997, Gurkha Services of the UK won a NT$47 million contract to clear the minefield in front of a temple in Hsiputou village. The demining was completed in May 1998 as scheduled. Gurkha Services won another one-year contract in November 1998 to clear the remaining seven minefields. Work began in December. "The British firm is expected to clean up all landmines at the five minefields in Hsiputou village by the end of April 1999, and the two minefields at Shuangjushan and Houpan village will be cleared up before the end of next November," said Major General Hu Chieh, deputy commander of the Kinmen Defense Command.⁽⁷⁰⁶⁾

There is no information on mine awareness programs, landmine casualties, or survivor assistance programs. The NGO Eden Social Welfare Foundation has donated wheelchairs for mine victims in a number of countries, and has sponsored an anti-landmine conference in Taiwan.

330. Jaime Laude, "Rebs' explosives seized at the foot of Mount Banahaw," The Philippine Star, 5 August, 1998.

331. Statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Republic of the Philippines during the official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Chamcar, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1995.

332. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996 for the Meeting of Experts on the Military utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.

333. Interview with Lt. Col. Adrien R. Quidlat, M.D., FPCS, FPOA, Chief of Orthopedic Surgery Services and of Clinics, Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC), and Maj. Benedicto Jovellanos, Assistant Chief and Administration Officer, AFPMC, Quezon City, 10 March 1999.

334. Ibid.

335. Ibid.

336. Based on knowledge acquired in previous field researches/interviews in rebel areas.

337. Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998.

338. Human Rights Watch Arms Project Fact Sheets, "Nations Calling for a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines," April 1996 and January 1996.

339. Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998.

340. Reuters, "Afghan Taleban Say Seize Iran-Supplied Mines," Islamabad, 4 December 1998.

341. Interview with Deputy Military Attache, Embassy of Afghanistan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, (information contained in fax received 4 January 1999).

342. Frontier Post, 18 November 1998; see also Frontier Post, 19 November 1998, and VOA (The Nation) 27 October 1998.

343. Press release, Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 November 1998.

344. Interview with Deputy Military Attache, Embassy of Afghanistan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, (information contained in fax received 4 January 1999).

345. Much of the remainder of this report on the Landmine Problem and Mine Action is drawn from the MCPA Interim Report to U.N. MAPA, "Socio-Economic Impact Study of Mine Action Operations Afghanistan" (SEIS), October 1998. This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date information available. However, it should be recognized that it is an interim report and its authors, the Mine Clearance Planning Agency, take full responsibility for the information and analyses in the SEIS.

346. UNDHA, "Afghanistan: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capabilities," February 1998, p. 9, citing UNOCHA estimates, as quoted in U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. 58.

347. MCPA, "Socio-Economic Impact Study of Mine Action Operations Afghanistan," Interim Report by MCPA to United Nations, MAPA, October 1998.

348. United Nations, MAPA, Work plan 1997 and Work plan 1998.