Mine Ban Policy
Bangladesh signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 May 1998. It is the only South Asian nation to sign. It has not yet ratified the treaty. Bangladesh showed little interest in the Ottawa Process, did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and came to the Oslo negotiations and the signing ceremonies in Ottawa in December only as an observer. Thus, it came as a surprise to many when Bangladesh signed five months later. It had, however, indicated support for the ban treaty by voting for the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution backing the treaty. Some observers believe that Bangladesh is unlikely to ratify soon, and may not do so until its neighbors sign.(138)
In early 1998 Bangladesh undertook an in depth examination of the utility of antipersonnel mines. Many in the Bangladesh Army were against signing the Treaty, believing that in a country bereft of natural obstacles, mines could provide an effective defensive barrier system. But arguments in favor of signing prevailed: Bangladesh's desire to enhance its general pro-disarmament stance globally; the hope that it might induce others in the region to sign; the desire to participate more effectively in global demining efforts. Military arguments were also presented: given porous borders, landmines were not seen as cost effective barrier systems; in the asymmetric power equation with India, landmines would have only limited relevance; suitable alternatives were available, including barbed wire, Claymore mines, increased patrolling, and options such as remote surveillance devices, drones, early warning mechanisms, electro-optic devices and others. Combining sensors and ensuring effective human interface would provide the necessary defense assurance. Ultimately, though, it had to be a political decision to overrule the military.(139)
Bangladesh has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a strong proponent or opponent of mine negotiations in that forum.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Bangladesh is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It is thought to have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, though the number, types, and suppliers of the mines are not known.
The Bangladesh Army is not believed to have employed antipersonnel mines, even though prior to signing the treaty, the Army insisted on the right to use antipersonnel mines.
There are uncleared mines along the Burma/Myanmar border, laid by the Burmese Army. There appear to be few incidents of mine explosions. The Bangladesh Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that ten people have died and several more been injured by mines. Animals, including elephants, have also died from mine blasts.
The Bangladesh Army has several battalions with mine clearing capabilities. They have cleared mines on international peacekeeping operations. Bangladesh soldiers cleared some 5,500 square kilometers of mined territory in Kuwait after the Gulf War and lifted over 90 tons of explosives. It also had extensive experience of demining in Cambodia under the UNTAC.
Mine Ban Policy
Brunei signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify. Compared to neighboring Malaysia and the Philippines, Brunei's support for a total ban on antipersonnel mines evolved more gradually. Starting out as an observer in the Ottawa strategy conference on 3-5 October 1996, it moved to vote in favor of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S dated 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning APMs. As a member of the ASEAN, Brunei was also co-signatory to the final declaration of the 12th EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (in February 1997 in Singapore), wherein the parties "agreed to attach a high priority to efforts to deal with the suffering and destruction caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and called on states to work towards an agreement banning the use, stockpile, production and transfer of APMs."
However, Brunei failed to endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and attended only as an observer to the Oslo treaty negotiations in September 1997. Yet, it voted in favor of the 1997 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 52/38A supporting the December 1997 treaty signing, and then signed the treaty on 4 December 1997. It subsequently endorsed the UNGA Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 dated 4 November 1998 welcoming new state-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization, and inviting all state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999.
Brunei's signing of the MBT has been described as largely a "political decision" on the part of its monarch, His Majesty Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, who responded positively to the urging of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan as well as of pro-ban foreign leaders led by Canadian officials during the 1996 APEC summit held in Canada.(140) The position of most ASEAN member states also helped Brunei assume a pro-treaty stance.(141)
Brunei has not ratified the treaty. According to an officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussions among concerned agencies, particularly the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, have yet to be held in order to move the process forward, including possibly drafting an instrument of ratification in coordination with the Attorney-General's office, for approval of the concerned Ministers.(142)
As a small state with a population of approximately 300,000 and a total land area of 2,226 square miles, landmines have played a central role in Brunei's defense strategy. Thus, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense (MINDEF), Dato Mohd Alimin Abdul Wahab stated, although Brunei supports the ban on landmines, the current security environment remains fluid and not ideal for ratification. He indicated Brunei needs to retain the option of using these mines should it be necessary to the state's security since it cannot not rely on any other country or agency to defend it, and for this reason, it may not be in the position as yet to meet all the responsibilities of ratification.(143)
Ratification requires the Cabinet's endorsement and the King's approval. Notably, His Majesty Hassanal Bolkiah sits concurrently as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and his brother, His Royal Highness Mohammad Bolkiah, is the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Brunei has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
The MINDEF claims that Brunei is not a landmine producer. Neither does it produce any military hardware, including ammunition and guns, as these are all brought from abroad. Nor does Brunei have any intent to go into research and development of armaments. There are also no reports of Brunei exporting or being used as a transit point for the transfer of mines.(144)
In 1984 Brunei imported 600 M-18A1 Claymore mines from the United States.(145) It is not known what other mines Brunei possesses. APM stocks are maintained in Explosive Safety Houses in designated camps, but there has been no need for their use for warfare or defense purposes. "If there should be any need for it, it would be in a situation of war," said MINDEF's Permanent Secretary, indicating that landmines have been retained largely for training purposes.(146) It is doubtful the number of APMs is very large, considering that Brunei's armed forces and police force are small, with only approximately 5,000 and 4,000 men, respectively. There are no plans for the destruction of stocks.
Brunei is not mine-affected. There have been no reported incidents of injuries or deaths resulting from landmines.
Brunei has not participated in any humanitarian mine action program although it sent two members of its police force as observers to the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992. The MINDEF does not see Brunei contributing to humanitarian mine action in the near future due to its limited capability.
Cambodia, home to 10 million people and the fabled Angkor Wat temple, is also "home" to millions of landmines. War has injured the country socially, culturally and economically and the effects are visible in many ways but perhaps most poignantly in the number of children, men and women wearing prostheses or riding wheelchairs.
Mines laid by all factions in the Cambodian conflict continue to maim and kill civilians and military and make agricultural land unsafe. In 1998, 1,249 known new casualties occurred. More than 644 square kilometers of land is known to be mined, and another 1,400 square kilometers is suspected to be mined. In a country where 85 percent of the population is dependent upon agriculture or related activities, such a contamination represents a massive restriction of Cambodia's economic base. However through the Cambodia Mine Action Center (CMAC), and the non-government organizations that work alongside it, the people of Cambodia are tackling this legacy of conflict.
Mine Ban Policy
Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has yet to ratify. The delay in ratification can largely be attributed to political events in Cambodia following the signing of the treaty: the general election in June 1998, attempts by political parties to form a new coalition government, street demonstrations and disputes about the credibility of the general election. A new government was finally sworn in on 25 November 1998. Throughout this period the National Assembly met for a minimal number of days and passed little legislation.
In the meantime, the Cambodia Mine Action Center has translated the Mine Ban Treaty into the Khmer language and drafted a domestic law banning use, production, and trade of antipersonnel landmines. It would prohibit civilians, civil servants, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), military forces and the National Police from using antipersonnel mines in any circumstances, except for training purposes. The law would give the Cambodia Mine Action Center responsibility for destroying mines and for coordination of mine clearance organizations inside Cambodia. The law also outlines punishments for those who possess or use landmines on Cambodian soil.
Article 26 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia states: "The King shall sign and ratify international treaties and conventions after a vote of approval by the National Assembly."(147)
On 29 January 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty and the draft Landmine Law were presented at the Council of Ministers and recommended for the list of legislation to go before the National Assembly in the coming months. (148) It is unclear how long this process will take. On 14 August 1998, during a march for peace at Siem Reap, King Norodom Sihanouk called for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.(149)
The Cambodia Mine Action Center has advised the government of its reporting obligations under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and work on this will commence in the near future.(150)
Cambodia was one of the early supporters of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines. On 2 October 1994 Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, issued a declaration calling for a law against the use of antipersonnel landmines, the destruction of existing stockpiles, and a request to donor countries for demining support.(151) At the same time he began a series of personal donations to the work of the Cambodia Mine Action Center which by the end of 1998 totaled US$13,000.(152)
First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh announced at an international donors meeting on 11 March 1994 an immediate ban on the import and laying of landmines in Cambodia.(153) In August 1994, Ieng Mouly, the Chairman of the CMAC, announced the government's intention to legislate a ban on the use of landmines. No timetable was given for the legislation but he proposed the interim steps of criminalizing the re-mining of demining sites, ensuring that new minefields are marked and banning sales of mines to civilians.(154)
In January 1995, the Cambodian delegation to the governmental experts meeting in preparation for the Review Conference of the Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) and its Landmine Protocol called for a comprehensive ban on landmines.(155)
On 2 June 1995 Samdech Chea Sim, High Representative of His Majesty the King, reiterated the position of the Kingdom of Cambodia at the 1995 NGO Landmine Conference in Phnom Penh:
We call for severe punishments on the use and the laying of landmines, as well as for the outlawing of those who use and lay land mines. We appeal to all mine-producing nations to stop this production and to destroy all the existing arsenals of landmines. We call for the ban of sale and shipment of landmines. At the same time, we call for immediate cessation of new mine planting and for the immediate destruction of all landmines in the hands of the Khmer Rouge outlaws. In this spirit we are the fighters for a mine free Cambodia and a mine free world.(156)
At the closing ceremony of the same conference the Co-Minister of Defense, Lieutenant-General Tea Banh made a statement that the Royal Cambodia Armed Forces "fully and actively" supported "all kinds of efforts" to reduce the dangers caused by antipersonnel landmines.(157)
Draft landmine laws were written in 1995 and 1996 but never became law because of political changes in Cambodia at that time. The contents of the most recent Landmine Law are similar to that of the 1996 draft law. No legislation has yet been passed in Cambodia in relation to antipersonnel landmines.
It should be noted that during this period in which Cambodian leaders expressed strong support for a ban on antipersonnel landmines, there continued to be numerous reports of use of mines by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces against the Khmer Rouge.
Cambodia has been an active participant in the Ottawa Process from the beginning, attending the October 1996 strategy conference in Ottawa and all the treaty preparatory conferences in 1997, endorsing the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and taking part in the three weeks of treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997. It voted in favor of the December 1996 U.N. General Assembly Resolution calling on states to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines, but was absent from the votes on the pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1997 and 1998.
More recently, on the occasion of the Phnom Penh International Forum on Demining and Victim Assistance, 26 October 1998, Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, stated:
We Cambodians are also proud that while the Khmer Rouge continued the war, the Royal Cambodian Government has ordered the army not to lay any landmines. Last year the Cambodian Royal Government has drafted a law forbidding the use or possession of landmines in Cambodia, because the Royal Government of Cambodia, as well as the people of Cambodia, as well as the rest of mankind hope that our Cambodian Assembly could proceed with its work to approve this draft law as soon as possible.(158)
On the same day, 26 October 1998, Ieng Mouly, Chairman of the CMAC and Minister of Information, made the following statement:
Cambodia is totally committed to ban the use, stockpiling, and transfer of landmines. We were among the first signatories of the Ottawa convention. For the convention to take effect, the new National Assembly will have to ratify in the future. The National Assembly will have also to adopt a law on the ban and on the destruction of stockpile of landmines, a law that the current government has already drafted. This is to prevent new mines being planted. At the same time, we continue to mobilize our efforts to clear, as fast as possible, many million of landmines that are hiding in the soil of Cambodia.(159)
On 25 March 1997 Cambodia ratified the amended CCW Protocol II on landmines.(160) In an interview in February 1999, CMAC Chairman Ieng Mouly stressed that the government is against anything that dilutes the Mine Ban Treaty and will continue to promote all aspects associated with this treaty. (161)
Despite the millions of deadly mines in Cambodian soil, the government of Cambodia has manufactured only one kind of antipersonnel landmine, the KN-10, a Claymore-type mine. However, there are countless reports of homemade or improvised mines being produced across Cambodia by various actors. Cambodia manufactured the KN-10 in the early 1970s.(162) It is a directional fragmentation antipersonnel mine, similar to the Vietnamese MDH-10 and former Soviet MON-100 mines. The KN-10 is typically command detonated, however, it can be used with a tripwire, and is often found attached to a tree or similar item.(163)
Improvised or homemade mines are made by a variety of people and for a variety of purposes. Civilians make such mines for property protection (e.g. land, houses, village, bridge, and animals), for fishing or for settling scores in neighborhood disputes. The most recent report of such use was Rattankiri province, in the northeast of Cambodia, where poachers are trying to catch tigers with homemade landmines. Poachers buy explosives and detonators from middlemen, who are often the people commissioning them to kill the tigers. Each mine uses about 2 kilograms of explosive and costs less than US$20 to make.(164)
Since the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty Khmer Rouge soldiers continued to manufacture improvised landmines in small factories in the northwest of the country, though production is believed to have ceased now. Sources known to the Landmine Monitor researchers have met men who worked in these factories.(165) CMAC is charged with destroying all improvised mines and a technical adviser will visit the factory areas in order to devise safe means to destroy these mines. It is also believed that in some refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border Khmer Rouge soldiers forced civilians to produce landmines.(166)
As of February 1999, there is no concrete evidence of continued landmine production by any Cambodian group.
Since the early 1970s, many landmines have crossed the borders of Cambodia, though it is difficult to know which mines were imported by the Cambodian government, by opposition forces, and which were simply brought to Cambodia by foreign armies. (See list below of antipersonnel landmines encountered in Cambodia). It is known that Cambodia imported from the United States 622,458 AP mines, nearly all of them M18A1 Claymore mines, from 1971-75.(167)
Since King Sihanouk's 2 October 1994 landmine declaration, Cambodia has maintained a formal position against the import or export of antipersonnel landmines.(168) In an interview on 17 February 1999, the Deputy Commander in Chief of RCAF and Chief of Joint Staff Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun stated that the government was no longer importing landmines, and that he was unaware of any such trading in Cambodia.(169)
An informal survey of local markets notorious for the sale of weapons found that antipersonnel landmine were no longer for sale.(170) There are of course isolated cases. In 1998, a member of the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines in Sisophon was approached by a trader in Phnom Malai, Banteay Meachey province. He asked if a buyer could be found for his forty landmines.
The Cambodian government is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines in the past.
It is widely believed that antipersonnel landmines are clandestinely traded by groups or individuals through Thailand to the Burma border, but there is no formal evidence of such transfers.
On 17 February 1999 RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief Lieutenant General Pol Saroeun formally stated that the Cambodian government no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines.(171) Between 1994 and 1998 the government destroyed 71,991 antipersonnel mines. The following table shows the numbers of landmines destroyed by the RCAF.(172)
These landmines were destroyed by explosion, individually and in groups, as they were found. Cambodia received no financial assistance for this process.(173)
The relatively small number of AP mines destroyed--and reported by the military to be the entire stockpile--stands in stark contrast to previous estimates of Cambodia's stockpile of more than one million mines.(174)
The Cambodia Mine Action Center has retained less than one thousand antipersonnel landmines for training. These are kept in the regional headquarters and the training center in Kompong Chhnang. CMAC usually uses copies of landmines for training purposes.
It is widely believed that there are caches of mines in different parts of the country, left over from years of conflict in Cambodia. These mines are believed to be under the control of soldiers or village security, businessmen, or simply left undiscovered in the forest. Landmines are sometimes kept by individual villagers for fishing, property protection or settling scores. No records have been kept of such stockpiles and the Cambodia Action Center will undertake an information gathering process in relation to this issue in the next year.(175) Lt. General Pol Saroeun stated that any stockpiles which are found by the RCAF would be destroyed.(176) It is also widely believed that stocks of mines belonging to the Khmer Rouge still remain in cave areas in Thailand.(177)
Since the signing of the Ottawa Treaty on 3 December 1997 there have been reports of new use of antipersonnel landmines in Cambodia. Fighting broke out in O'Smach, Otdar Meanchey province, O'Beichoen, Banteay Meanchey province and Samlot district, Battambang province, and all sides of the conflict sustained many landmine injuries.(178) It is unknown, however, whether these injuries were caused by newly laid mines, or old mines. There is no concrete evidence to prove there was new use of landmines, but many observers consider it highly likely. Lieutenant General Pol Saroeun stated that the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces had not laid new mines.(179)
Funcinpec opposition forces under the command of Nhek Bun Chay controlled a small piece of land near O'Smach on the Thai/Cambodian border. It was literally ringed with a kilometer of landmines. Landmines were believed to be the primary weapon in their arsenal and were used to buy time while negotiations continued with the government.(180)
In the case of Samlot, defecting soldiers and their families mined and booby-trapped their villages as they retreated to Thailand in September 1997. They used mines recovered while clearing paddy fields and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) made from rockets and grenades. In the same district in the months that followed Division 16 (previously of the RCAF, then defected to the resistance forces) laid landmines to protect mobile headquarters.(181)
During October 1997 Khmer Rouge radio claimed that they would continue to exercise their right to lay landmines. During 1998 the Khmer Rouge was under extreme military and political pressure and used both landmines and IEDs to protect themselves from Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.(182)
At the time he signed the Mine Ban Treaty for Cambodia in Decebmer 1997, Foreign Minister Ung Huot stated, "Some press reporting can be misleading. Recent suggestions of newly laid mines in fact seem only to be a few buried improvised explosive devices. We can take a little comfort in that the need to use such crude devices shows that the resistance forces no longer have access to manufactured landmines."(183)
It is widely recognized that individuals continue to use landmines for fishing, for the protection of property and for settling scores. There have also been cases of police and poachers using mines.
On 10 August 1998 in Beoung Veng, six kilometers south of Phnom Malai, Banteay Meanchey, police surrounded a forest with mines in order to capture a murderer who had hidden there. The man emerged from the forest stepped on a mine and the police shot him. He died.(184) On 27 January 1999 in Ratanakiri province, homemade mines were used by poachers for catching and killing tigers. Tiger bones are highly sought by Vietnamese traders.(185)
Antipersonnel Mines found in Cambodia (186)
|Name of Mine||Producing Country|
|KN - 10||Cambodia|
|M - 62||Hungary|
|M 14||U.S, India, Vietnam|
|M 16A1||U.S, India|
|M 18A1||US, Chile, South Korea, Iran|
|MBV - 78- A1||Vietnam|
|MBV- 78- A2||Vietnam|
|MD- 82- B||Vietnam|
|MDH - 10||Vietnam|
|MON||Former Soviet Union, Bulgaria|
|OZM-3||Former Soviet Union|
|OZM-4||Former Soviet Union|
|OZM-72||Former Soviet Union|
|PMN||Former Soviet Union, China, Iraq|
|PMN-2||Former Soviet Union|
|POMZ-2||Former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Bulgaria|
|POMZ-2M||China, North Korea, Former Soviet Union, Former East Germany|
|PPMI- SR||Former Czechoslovakia|
|PPM-2||Former East Germany, China|
|Type 72||China, South Africa|
The Landmine Problem
After 30 years of conflict Cambodia is among the most mine/UXO affected countries in the world. In 1998, seven years after the 1991 peace agreement, mines and UXOs caused more than 1,200 casualties.(187) More than 644 square kilometers of land is known to be mined, and another 1,400 square kilometers is suspected to be mined. About 148 square kilometers of land has been cleared thus far. The great majority of mined areas are located in the provinces along the Thai-Cambodia border where most of the fighting occurred since 1979. The eastern provinces are mostly affected by UXOs as a result of the Vietnam War, though there are also some mined areas. A recent U.S. State Department report estimated the number of mines in Cambodia at 4-6 million.(188)
CMAC does not yet have an exact figure of the number of families affected by landmines. However, most of the rural communities living along the Thai-Cambodian border are affected by mines in various ways. There is a shortage of land for settlement, for agriculture, and it is difficult to the rehabilitate rural infrastructure (schools, road, irrigation systems). Landmines also restrict safe travel and income-generating activities such as gathering firewood, and threaten the security of children.
According to the World Food Program (as cited by CMAC), there are still over 110,000 Internally Displaced Peoples who are either waiting to resettle or have just returned to their village of origin. In most of cases these villages of origin are either mined or very close to suspected areas. There are also 37,000 refugees still living in Thai refugee camps who are currently returning to heavily mine infested areas in Samlot, Samroung and Anlong Veng.
There has never been a systematic Level One Survey of the mine problem in Cambodia, but a great deal of suspected and confirmed areas are registered in the Cambodia Mine Action Center Database. During the UNTAC period (1991-3), information was collected on the location of around 1,900 suspected mined areas. CMAC has collected and verified reports of suspected areas, and recorded them in the database since 1992. In early 1999, CMAC plans to start a systematic Level One Survey to assess the extent of the mine/UXO problem throughout the country, and develop a National Demining Plan. This survey will contain a socio-economic component, which will collect information on the number of people affected and the socio-economic potential of the contaminated areas.(189)
The information recorded to date in the CMAC Database is as follows:
Reported (suspected) mined areas: 572 fields covering 1,404 square kilometers
Verified mined areas: 790 fields covering 533 square kilometers
Marked mined areas: 402 fields covering 111 square kilometers(190)
Based on the CMAC Database register, the verified/marked mined areas are characterized as follows:(191)
|Priority 1||Land to be used for resettlement||265 fields||22%|
|Priority 2||Land to be used for agriculture||764 fields||64%|
|Priority 3||Land to be used for community development||106 fields||9%|
|Priority 4||Land to be used for infrastructure||57 fields||5%|
Mine Action Funding
The Cambodia Mine Action Center is the government demining agency for Cambodia. It receives funding from the Cambodian government, other governments, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations who act as custodians for government funds. CMAC's annual project costs are US$12 million. This does not include advisory support or in-kind donations.(192) From 1994-1998, cash contributions to CMAC totalled $63 million. In-kind contributions totalled millions more; the U.S. alone has provided $10 million in in-kind donations.(193) The breakdown of CMAC's expenditures are as follows: mine clearance 90%; mine verification 7%; mine training 2%; mine awareness 1%.(194)
Most of the funding has been given to a special Trust Fund for Cambodia established by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Assistance to Demining Programs in Cambodia." From December 1997 through December 1998, $9.14 million was received into the trust fund.(195) Contributors included: Netherlands (Dec. 1997) $2.4 million; Sweden (Dec. 1997/June '98) $2.6 million; Denmark (Jan. 1998) $878,000; Japan (Feb. 1998) $1 million; Australia (June 1998) $1.7 million; Finland (April 1998) $520,000; South Korea (Nov. 1998) $25,000. Thus far in 1999, New Zealand has contributed US$100,000, Japan has pledged U.S.$900,000, and Belgium has pledged 30 million Belgian francs to the UNDP Trust Fund for Cambodia.(196)
From 1993 to 1998 the Royal Government of Cambodia donated approximately U.S.$1 million to the Cambodia Mine Action Center.(197) In addition to this financial support the Royal Cambodian Government has donated 59 hectares of land in Kompong Chhnang province for the CMAC training center and land for the CMAC headquarters in Phnom Penh. The government has granted CMAC tax-free status, which has an estimated value of at least U.S.$2 million dollars.(198) All donations were given for the purposes of humanitarian demining by the Cambodia Mine Action Center.
The Cambodia Mine Action Center receives three kinds of support from other governments and non-governmental organizations: financial, advisory and in-kind support. For example, Norway contributes money to the UNDP trust fund, but also funds technical advisors through the NGO, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). The United States does not provide money to the UNDP trust fund, but has provided millions of dollars in in-kind support in the form of trucks, explosives, cars, demining equipment and so on. Other countries fund bilateral projects. Sweden is funding a three-year program to establish a mine detection dog program in Cambodia. Finland is funding a two-year project for mechanical demining by funding the testing and perhaps the operational development of two mechanical demining flails. (199) Donor countries are listed in the following table.
Contributions from Donor Countries to the Cambodia Mine Action Center, 1994 -1998(200)
Financial Support in Cash (US$)
|Australia (1994 - 98)||10.21 million||Yes|
|Belgium (1997)||0.82 million||Yes|
|Canada (1994 - 98)||2.83 million||Yes|
|Denmark (1993, 96-98)||4.15 million|
|Finland (1998)||0.52 million||Flail|
|Pope John Paul II (94)||5,000|
|King of Cambodia*||13,000|
|Japan (1994/96/98)||6.3 million|
|Norway (1994/95/96)||1.96 million||Yes, provided through Norwegian People's Aid|
|New Zealand (93-97)||0.54 million||Yes|
|Netherlands (93, 96-98)||7.76 million||Yes|
|Switzerland (1997)||$ 67,000|
|South Korea (1998)||$ 25,000|
|Sweden (1995-98)||8.83 million||Yes|
|United Kingdom (93-96)||4.119 million||Bilateral in context of Trust Fund (95-99)|
|USA (1994)||910,000||Leadership Training and in kind donations valued at $ 10 million.|
|Germany* Dir.CMAC.97||1.6 million|
|European Union*||5.3 million||Yes, provided through Handicap International|
|UNDP/CARERE* (93-2000)||4 million||Capacity building|
|UN Volunteers*||4 volunteers CMAC
4 x $35,000
* Not donated through the UNDP Trust Fund
Mine clearance operations in Cambodia are coordinated by CMAC. In addition to its own demining platoons, mine marking teams, EOD teams, and mobile mine awareness treams, CMAC coordinates NGO demining organizations--Mines Advisory Group, Halo Trust, and Norwegian People's Aid.
Total land cleared in Cambodia to date is 148 square kilometers. The CMAC database indicates that this has included land for resettlement (54.4%), agriculture (44%), infrastructure (1.2%), and economic development (0.4%).(201)
In 1998 CMAC cleared 11.5 square kilometers of land.(202) CMAC currently conducts major demining operations in seven provinces:
Demining Unit 1 - Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap
Demining Unit 2 - Battambang,
Demining Unit 3 - Kampot, Kampong Speu,
Demining Unit 4 - Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom
It conducts other mine/UXO clearance activities in an additional five provinces. Mine and UXO clearance teams, Community Mine Marking Teams, Mine Verification and Survey Teams and Mine Awareness Education Teams are active in Kampong Chhnang, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, Kandal, and Takeo.
All employees involved in demining operations in Cambodia are selected locally. The expatriates work as Technical Advisors dealing with demining operations, explosive ordnance disposal, verifications, mechanical mine clearance, training, mine detection dogs, financial and logistics techniques.(203)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
MAG Cambodia began its operations in October 1992. Today the organization operates five demining teams, seven Mine Action Teams (MATs) and two EOD teams. The MAT concept has been recently developed by MAG Cambodia. MATs primarily focus on clearing small plots of land for community use, for example around pagodas, water sources, clinics, schools and for resettlement purposes. MATs comprise one supervisor, 12 deminers, one Trauma Care trained medic and a driver. The team can be transported in one vehicle, which gives the team increased mobility and flexibility. Each MAT member is primarily deployed as a deminer. However to provide an integrated response to the mine and UXO problem faced by a community, each deminer is trained in a secondary skill such as Surveying and Marking, Mine Awareness, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and basic trauma care. MAG currently conducts operations in six provinces: Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampong Speu, Banteay Meanchey, Pursat, and Siem Reap.(204)
Funding for the Mines Advisory Group totalled $2.4 million in 1998. Contributors included the UK government (DFID), Australian government (AusAID), UNICEF, World Vision International, Church World Service, EZE, Lutheran World Federation, FinChurchAid/FIWIDA, DanChurchAid/DANIDA, and UNICEF.(205)
HALO Trust has been working in Cambodia since 1991. HALO currently has two base locations in Thmar Pouk and Siem Reap and two satellite locations in the towns of Samrong and Anlong Veng. HALO's activities in Cambodia can be summarized as: Mine clearance, Survey, Marking, Limited Mine awareness, Route proving, Promotion of development in remote areas.
HALO currently employs 560 local staff and expatriate Technical Advisors. In addition to the mine clearance teams in each location, a UXO call out team is prepared to provide rapid response to requests from civilians, government, non-government and International Organizations. In 1997 HALO conducted a trial use of an armored tractor fitted with a Bush cutter. HALO says they were so successful five units are now deployed and operating in Cambodia with a further five on order and planned to be deployed by mid-1999.
During 1998 HALO converted from the traditional Two Man One Lane to One Man One Lane system (OMOL), which HALO states has doubled the number of demining lanes for the same running costs with a significant improvement in productivity per lane. In early 1998 HALO conducted an investigation on land use of all sites cleared by HALO between 1992 and May 1998, and found that over 90% of land cleared by HALO had been used for purposes it was intended for when clearance took place, and that less than 1% of cleared land had been repossessed by the military.
Beginning in March 1999 all sites cleared by HALO will be revisited and the socio-economic template developed by the CMAC planning unit will be applied to each of these sites and a consolidated report generated. HALO has regular meetings with both CMAC and MAG to ensure no duplication of effort occurs and there is a two-way flow of information regarding survey, clearance and technological developments.
HALO is currently funded by ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office), the governments of the UK (DFID), Ireland (DFA), Finland, United States (State Department), and Japan (Embassy), UNDP/CARERE, and the NGO Association to Aid Refugees/Japan.(206)
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
NPA's clearance effort in Cambodia began in 1992. NPA currently runs two major projects, which could be defined as humanitarian mine action. Five Technical Advisers are involved in the process of improving the technical side of mine clearance, while empowering CMAC to develop into a self-reliant, sustainable organization. NPA also runs a project to help landless poor to settle on demined land. In addition, it gives support to the Cambodian School for Prosthetics and Orthotics, and has set up a light engineering factory in Phnom Penh, employing mine victims in the production of demining equipment. NPA's budget for 1998 was $1.43 million, including $905,000 for Community Development; $460,000 for Technical Assistance to CMAC (demining); and $65,000 for the School of Prosthetics.(207)
Since 1992, CMAC has maintained records of areas cleared. The records can be accessed from the CMAC Operations Branch or Database Unit.(208)
As at 11 December 1998:
|CMAC (209)||No. areas||Sqm Cleared||APM||ATM||UXO||Fragment|
|Total||254||46, 069, 599||38313||328||43457||0|
As at 30 November 1998:
|MAG (210)||No. areas||Sqm Cleared||APM||ATM||UXO||Fragment|
As at 14 December 1998:
|HALO TRUST (211)||No. areas||Sqm Cleared||APM||ATM||UXO||Fragment|
As at 14 August 1998:
|OTHERS (212)||No. areas||Sqm Cleared||APM||ATM||UXO||Fragment|
Reconstruction and development of cleared areas
CMAC Community Liaison Officers have conducted socio-economic assessments in 60 mined areas cleared by CMAC. The assessed areas constitute 25% of the total number of areas cleared, and 20% of the total surface area cleared, by CMAC. Thus they are not necessarily representative of what may later be found as the CMAC socio-economic efforts continue. However, there are interesting features of the data collected so far.
The proportion of land under dispute is quite limited -- only 4%. However, without proper coordination and cooperation, CMACs efforts in areas previously administered by the Army and from which the civilian population was displaced will be made difficult by the potential for land disputes.
Assessments of 60 cleared mined areas showed that 1,559 families have benefited from the land cleared: 46% IDP families and 54% local families.(213) Out of the total 1,559 beneficiary families, 700 (54%) have used the land for resettlement, 213 (14%) were already settled on the land cleared and 646 (41%) are cultivating it. The higher percentage of families using land for resettlement in Battambang (66%) and Banteay Mean Chey (48%) is due to the return of Internally Displaced People to their villages of origin. This proportion will increase significantly as the remaining assessments are made in the areas opened since the Khmer Rouge defections in 1996. The average agricultural land cleared used by one family is 0.8 hectare, ranging from 0.4 to 1.1 .The average housing plot used by one family is 1,376 square meters. It should be noted that housing plots in rural areas are not just used for building homes but also for cultivation of vegetable and fruit gardens.(214)
Assessments of 83 mined areas planned for clearance in 1998 and 1999 indicated that 6,300 families will benefit from the land cleared: 60.5% IDPs families and 39.5% local poor families.
This issue has been of concern to a network of NGOs who work in mined areas. During June 1998 a group of NGOs met in Battambang province and issued a statement that included an analysis of the situation and recommendations. That statement was adapted with experience from other NGOs and sent as part of the NGO Statement To The 1999 Consultative Group Meeting On Cambodia, Tokyo, 25-26 February 1999.(215)
Agencies working in development and reconstruction of mine affected communities, following mine clearance, in Cambodia include Norwegian People's Aid, Lutheran World Service, Jesuit Refugee Service, Church World Service, World Vision, Action Nord Sud and CARERE.
Despite the 1.1 million people who have received mine awareness education, it is evident given the number of accidents that result from tampering with mines that many people lack or have incorrect knowledge about the dangers of mines/UXO, especially children. An Information-Needs survey planned by CMAC to take place next year will provide more details about this issue.(216) CMAC is responsible for the national strategy and for coordinating all awareness-raising efforts.
Mine marking is a crucial form of mine awareness. CMAC has two kinds of teams involved in marking mined areas. 13 Mine Marking Teams (MMT) mark verified mined areas of high priority. Another 13 Community Mine Marking Team (CMMT) mark priority areas and do small scale clearance of minefields in remote villages.
However, effective exclusion of civilians from suspected areas requires more than just marking. Mine awareness programs and the active participation of local authorities play essential roles in modifying the behavior of villagers in suspected mine areas. Though there have been improvements, villagers driven by economic necessity often go to the dangerous areas.
There are three lead agencies in the area of mine awareness education. They include:
CMAC - 12 teams, mass media campaign, billboards, NGO Campaign;
MAG - 8 teams, billboards;
MATT- awareness integrated into World Vision's development activities.(217)
Other development agencies in mined areas have integrated mine awareness into their programs. None of the programs in Cambodia rely on training village people as awareness educators. Rather, each organization employs Awareness Teams, typically with four educators in each, visiting two to five locations a week (villages, schools, development projects, etc.)
Over the past five years, more than 1.1 million people have received mine awareness education, including more than 423,000 in 1998 alone.(218)
The Mine Incident Database Project reports that there were 1,249 landmine casualties in 1998.(219) Of those, 177 people died. The number of mine incidents per month is not constant over time. Over the past years the same trend has been observed: the numbers go up during the dry season and down in the wet season. Increased military activity and forest gathering activities during the dry season explain this trend. In 1998, the monthly incident figure ranged from 180 in January to 54 in October.(220)
The Mine Incident Database Project provides a clear picture of the landmine casualty situation in Cambodia. The database resulted from close collaboration of various agencies, chief among them the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC), which agreed to host the database project and sponsor data gathering teams in four provinces, and MAG, which deployed data gathering teams in five provinces. UNICEF has been the project's principal donor . Handicap International provided technical advisors, and field staff were responsible for setting up the data base along with training, coordinating and monitoring of CRC data gathering and data entry staff.
The Mine Incident Database Project has prepared graphs and diagrams highlighting the overall situation of landmine casualties in Cambodia. There is inadequate space to present them in this report, but they include:
1998 Mine Incidents: Casualties ranked by Province
Long Term Casualty Trends by Year 1979 -1998
Short Term Trend: Total Reported Casualties by Month, 1996-8
Total Casualties: Deaths vs. Injuries 1998
Casualties by Age Group 1998
Military vs. Civilian Casualties 1998
Casualties by Gender 1998
Incident by Occupational Category (Civilian vs. Military) 1998
Incidents by Occupational Status (Mine) 1998
Incidents by Occupational Status (UXO) 1998
Analysis of Casualty Types and Type of Amputation 1998
Accident Territory - by Mine/UXO 1998 (221)
The figures of the Mine Incident Database Project are not yet comprehensive, as there are still key areas where CRC has limited information on mine incidents (former Khmer Rouge areas along the Thai-Cambodian Border). However, it is planned to base data gatherers in these areas in 1999. Statistics experts suggest an additional 20% probably reflects a more accurate figure.
To date it has been impossible to have exact statistics on the total number of people disabled by landmines and still alive in Cambodia today. At least 14,500 people have died as result of landmines. At least 24,410 survived mine injuries initially.
Most Cambodian disabled are among the very poorest in a very poor country. Health costs for landmine injuries can completely bankrupt the family. Recent studies have shown that the average expenditure in health care is approximately $20-33 per capita/per year. Most Cambodians are paying far more than they can afford for generally poor quality, ineffective care.(223)
Most support for landmine survivors is provided by non-governmental organizations. The government provides a small pension to soldiers who become landmine victims. The pension ranges from 30,000 -180,000 riels per month (approximately US$8-50). It is often months late or collected by the commander of the division and never paid to the victim or the family.
The Cambodian government has developed a health plan with operational districts, which consist of referral hospitals and health centers. These health centers are planned to be within ten kilometers or two hours walk of the population they serve. In 1998 surgical facilities are available at the provincial level for landmine injuries. A special hospital for victims of conflict run by the NGO EMERGENCY exists in Battambang. Military hospitals caring for soldier victims include those in Battambang, Siem Reap and Phnom Penh.
Figures provided by the Ministry of Health detail patient intake for hospitals in 1998. They indicate that of the 177 people who died from landmine injuries, only 21 died in hospital. Of the 1,249 victims, 735 received hospital teatment.
NGOs in Cambodia do not differentiate between funds used for care and other services for landmine victims and those used for victims of other disabilities.
Five international organizations have taken responsibility for the production and distribution of prosthetics in Cambodia. They include the American Red Cross, Cambodia Trust, Veterans International, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Handicap International. There are some fifteen workshops located throughout Cambodia. In 1998 the total number of prostheses produced was 5,858, an average of 484 per month.
The National School of Prosthetics and Orthotics (NSPO) is located in Phnom Penh, sponsored by American Friends Service Cambodia, American Red Cross, Cambodia Trust and Veterans International, and operated by Cambodia Trust. The School has the capacity to train 12 students per year in a three-year curriculum course, which has international accreditation. The School's director estimates that 100 technicians are required to required to meet Cambodia's minimum needs. In 1997 six students graduated, followed by seven graduates in 1998. The School is also developing a role in the region, as two students from the Laos joined the program last year.
The Foot Factory is a private business with technical assistance from Handicap International. It uses local materials to produce vulcanized rubber, solid ankle, and cushioned-heel prosthetic feet. The feet are purchased by Handicap International and given to agencies. The ICRC - funded and operated Components Factory supplies Prosthesis and Orthotics parts to the majority of the workshops in Cambodia.
Many of those who lose both their legs in a landmine accident require a wheelchair for their life and work. Three organizations produe wheelchairs in Cambodia: Jesuit Refugee Service Cambodia, Veterans International, and Association to Aid Refugees--Japan. Together in 1998 they produced a total of 1,581 chairs. Assessment of wheelchair users, training in wheelchair use and follow up is also done by these agencies. A national plan for wheelchair distribution has been partially successful. ICRC, ARC, HI, CT and various NGOs and individuals purchase and distribute wheelchairs to the handicapped. There is a policy among wheelchair producers and distributors that wheelchairs made in Cambodia, by Cambodians, for Cambodian conditions are the most suitable. Import of wheelchairs from other countries is discouraged. To date very few users are able to afford the US$75 to pay for a wheelchair, however many users have made small donations toward the cost of wheelchair production in Cambodia.
Vocational Training and Socio-economic Reintegration
As the number of disabled in Cambodia is so large, vocational training centers which give preference to the disabled have been essential. The number of disabled who meet entrance criteria or policy standards for other vocational centers is extremely small. However, vocational training centers are certainly not the answer for all disabled to attain income generating skills. Most are better empowered in their own localities with agricultural skills or family income possibilities.
The following organizations operate vocational and skills training centers:
Association to Aid Refugees--Japan; Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees; Cambodian War Amputees Rehab. Social; Jesuit Refugee Service Cambodia; Maryknoll; Rehab Craft Cambodia; United Committee of Cambodia; Marist Mission Australia; International Labor Organization; Ministry of Social Affairs Labor and Veterans Affairs.
Socio-economic reintegration attempts to address psycho-social, economic, cultural, religious and educational needs at the village level. It is often done informally by the village community itself. Development activities in mine-affected communities are also vital in addressing these needs. A survey to determine the socio-economic situation of people disabled by landmines is currently underway. To date, no estimates of the cost of socio-economic reintegration are available.
The following organizations perform community-based work with disabled people in Cambodia: Action on Disability and Development (ADD); American Friends Service Cambodia; National Center for Disabled People; Social Services for Cambodia (SSC); Handicap International (HI); Servants; Veterans International; Jesuit Refugee Service Cambodia. Other organizations working with the disabled include the Disability Action Council and the Cambodian Disabled People's Organization.
The "Draft Law to Protect the Rights of Persons with Disabilities" has been completed, but has not yet been submitted to the National Assembly. A report on the Draft Law stated:
The draft law is designed to be sort of a set of practical approaches to deal with some of the numerous problems facing people with disabilities in Cambodia. There are many other provisions that could have been included here, such as accessibility requirements for transportation systems and telecommunications systems. .... this law is but a first step in a long term process of developing a law that fits the current situation in the country, and can serve as a solid foundation for change.(224)
Note to Readers: A much longer country report on Cambodia has been prepared for Landmine Monitor which could not be used in full due to space considerations. It contains much greater detail on the landmine problem, casualties, clearance, and survivor assistance programs. The full report is available upon request. The full Cambodia country report also contains these appendices:
One--Draft Law on the Ban of Antipersonnel Landmines
Two--Cambodian Returnees Joint Press Statement, 15 February 1999
Three--Draft Law to Protect People with Disabilities
The Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, Sir Geoffrey Henry, signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. In a statement to the signing ceremonies, he described how the Cook Islands and other nations of the Pacific had first learned "almost instantaneously" of the landmine problem through the media, especially radio and television, and that shocked and appalled at the terrible problem, "[t]he Cook Islands and other countries of the Pacific ... were determined to lend their voices of opposition to the continued use of anti-personnel mines."(225)
The Cook Islands has not yet ratified the ban treaty despite a pledge by Henry to the treaty signing conference that "before the next session of our Parliamenrt rises in the Cook Islands we will have given legislative effect to the Ottawa Treaty."
The Cook Islands is not a member of the United Nations and therefore did not vote on key pro-ban United Nations General Assembly resolutions but as a state it was eligible to sign the treaty.
It did not participate in any of the Ottawa Process preparatory meetings or the formal negotiations.
It is believed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Cook Islands has never produced, transfered, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. Its larger neighbor, New Zealand, is responsible for its foreign affairs and defense.
The Cook Islands is a member of the sixteen-member South Pacific Forum and at the December 1997 treaty signing Henry noted that as Chairman of the South Pacific Forum, he was "proud to say that many Forum member countries are represented here ready to sign the Convention. I am confident that all will in due course."
Mine Ban Policy
Indonesia signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but it has yet to ratify. Indonesia was slow to embrace the Ottawa Process. It attended the treaty preparatory meetings, but did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and participated in the treaty negotiations in Oslo only as an observer. It did however vote for the pro-ban U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1996 and 1997.
At the treaty signing in Ottawa, Minister of Defense Edi Sudradjat said that Indonesia did not decide until 17 November 1997 "to join the majority of the international community" in signing the ban treaty, "after thoroughly examining the technical aspects of antipersonnel landmines, including its humanitarian effects particularly to civilians." He noted that "Indonesia hopes that eventually all major countries which traditionally produce, use and export, as well as mine-infested countries will join as parties to the Convention to ensure the universal adherence and effective implementations."(226)
Indonesian Major General Ferry Tinggogoy, who is on the Army Staff, but also a member of Parliament, has said that Indonesia has no substantive problems with ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty and expects to do so before very long. There are only administrative obstacles due to the great number of draft bills concerning the reformation process.(227)
Indonesia has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Indonesia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a strong supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a comprehensive mine ban, or a transfer ban, in the CD.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
According to Indonesian officials, Indonesia has never produced antipersonnel mines.(228) There is no evidence or allegation to the contrary. Indonesia is not believed to have ever exported antipersonnel landmines. Indonesia previously imported AP mines in limited number from foreign countries, including Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.(229) The United States shipped 102 M-18A1 Claymore mines to Indonesia in 1986.(230) According to officials, antipersonnel mines are used only in military training programs for engineers, not for operational purposes.(231)
Indonesia stockpiles antipersonnel mines in a limited number. The number, types, and location are still military secrets. General Ferry Tinggogoy indicated Indonesia will destroy most of its antipersonnel mines in the future as they are not useful for mlitary defense, but will retain some APMs for military training programs.(232)
The Indonesian government maintains that it has not laid mines to defend its borders, nor used antipersonnel mines in internal combat.(233) This claim appears to be substantiated by Indonesian soldiers, rebel fighters, and political opponents.
Simon is a political activist from Irian Jaya (West Papua) who was imprisoned from 1982-1990, with 70 other prisoners, many of whom were involved in armed struggle against government troops. None were aware of any use of antipersonnel mines.(234) Mujikar, formerly with the Marine Corps, was involved in combat operations in West Papua 1962-1964 and 1973-1974, on the Malaysian border (North Borneo) 1965-1972, and in East Timor 1976-1978, but says that antipersonnel landmines were never used by government or rebel forces.(235) Xanana Gusmao, a noted East Timor leader, stated in an interview that neither Indonesian soldiers nor East Timor fighters ever used antipersonnel landmines.(236)
But Simon of Irian Jaya claimed that landmines were planted around Abepura prison between 1983-1984, and that one of his fellow inmates, Sianipar, was injured by a mine.(237) Major General Ferry Tinggogoy insisted that landmines were never used in that fashion.(238)
Mine Action Funding
Indonesia has contributed US$40,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, with funds earmarked for the demining effort in Cambodia.(239)
It should be noted that numerous Indonesian military officers and political officials refused to give interviews or provide information to Landmine Monitor researchers.
Mine Ban Policy
Malaysia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. Along with the Philippines, Malaysia was among the first ASEAN countries to adopt a pro-ban position. Indeed, in a December 1994 U.N. General Assembly speech, Malaysia became one of the first nations in the world to call for an immediate and total ban on antipersonnel mines. In the 1996 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a Malaysia initiative led to the inclusion in the Chairman's Statement of a moral commitment to stricter measures against the proliferation of landmines and to assisting landmine victims.
Malaysia sat as an observer in the Ottawa strategy conference on 3-5 October 1996 and voted in favor of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 51/45S dated 10 December 1996, urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning APMs. As a member of the ASEAN, Malaysia was also co-signatory to the final declaration of the 12th EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (held in February 1997 in Singapore), wherein the parties "agreed to attach a high priority to efforts to deal with the suffering and destruction caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and called on states to work towards an agreement banning the use, stockpile, production and transfer of APMs."
Malaysia attended all the ban treaty preparatory meetings in 1997, endorsed the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, took part in the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September as a full participant and subsequently signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. It voted for the 1997 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 52/38A supporting the treaty signing, and the 1998 UNGA Resolution welcoming the addition of new States to the Mine Ban Treaty, urging its full realization and inviting all state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999.
At the treaty signing in Ottawa, Ambassador Dato' Abdullah Zawawi B. Haji Mohamed, stated, "The landmines problem is first and foremost a humanitarian problem. Malaysia is firm in its conviction that the humanitarian impact of antipersonnel mines far outweighs their military utility and economics."(240)
By early March 1999, the Cabinet paper for ratification drafted by the Attorney General's office had been prepared and will reportedly be tabled in the next Parliament sitting.(241) After ratification, the Parliament must pass implementing legislation.(242) In July 1998, the Ministry of Defense issued a statement signed by its Minister committing to observance of the Treaty.(243)
Malaysia is not a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
According to government officials, Malaysia has never manufactured landmines.(244) The Foreign Affairs secretary-general has stated, "At present, Malaysia does not produce any antipersonnel mines which are banned under the Convention."(245)
A former military doctor in the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) who treated landmine victims in insurgency areas near the Thai border likewise claimed that the Malaysian government did not manufacture landmines in its counter-insurgency operations in the 1950s to 1970s: "Malaysia never manufactured or used landmines in our fight against the communist insurgency."(246)
According to defense officials, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) rebels used to manufacture "booby traps" from the 1950s and the 1980s. These were jointly cleared by the rebel and government forces after negotiations were successfully conducted in December 1989.(247)
Prior to its declared commitment to a landmine ban, mine supplies, including Claymore mines, were bought from Britain and the United States.(248) Malaysia acquired 88,278 M18 and M18A1 Claymore mines from the United States between 1969 and 1978.(249)
In the past, mines purchased were brought straight from the port to the ammunition depot for delivery to the military regions in the north, south, central and east. These were then distributed to battalions or camps which have their own ammunition dumps. APMs were issued to companies while Claymore mines were supplied down to the section level.(250)
The Malaysian government is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines to other countries, but acknowledges that it may engage in transfer of mines for training purposes, as allowed under the treaty.(251) MINDEF spokespersons claim that Malaysia has never been used as a transfer point for landmines.(252)
As to a published statement that Sabah may be a source of supply for the manufacture of homemade APMs in Mindanao, MINDEF spokespersons denied any knowledge of such activities. The book on Muslim rebels in Southern Philippines written by a Filipino author states: "(MNLF Chair Nur) Misuari knows only too well that while he is now in the saddle of either ARMM or SPCPD, Sabah's officials' support is necessary in terms of providing investment to the region, and is indispensable when it comes to checking the smuggling of arms and ammonium nitrate (used in the region not as fertilizer but in the making of landmines) from Sabah."(253) Moreover, MINDEF spokespersons claim the sale of this and similar materials used for the manufacture of explosives is under strict police control and are undertaken solely by licensed distributors as part of government measures to contain quarrying and the use of illegal fishing techniques like blasting of coral reefs.(254)
The military's stockpiles of landmines are presently maintained at ammunition dumps located in Army camps in the 13 states and two territories making up the Malaysian Federation. According to a military official, each mine has a lot number which is kept in a ledger.(255) MINDEF spokespersons declined from giving any figures as to the number of mines and their types in the stockpiles. It can be assumed that a significant number of the 88,278 Claymore mines provided by the U.S. remain in stockpiles.
Although the directive not to use mines is in place, no order to destroy the stockpiles has been issued. The MINDEF expects the order to be issued after the Parliament ratifies the treaty, and the destruction procedure to comply with the requirements of the treaty is set. Even then, some stocks shall be retained for training purpose.(256)
According to the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "[S]ince Malaysia is involved in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the Malaysian Armed Forces retains or transfers anti-personnel mines only for training purposes in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques permitted under Article 3 of the Convention."(257) Mines used for training purposes are assigned to instructors who undertake the training in military schools.(258)
The Malaysian military used British-made APMs for perimeter defense of their jungle camps near the Thai border, but these were allegedly removed upon dismantling of the camps.(259) Military officials claim no new use of landmines has taken place since the CPM and the government conducted negotiations in December 1989. A directive not to use mines is in place.(260)
The Malaysian military claims that Malaysian communist insurgents planted booby traps in areas bordering Thailand in West Malaysia from the 1950s up to the 1980s to secure guerrilla territory. The use of these homemade mines were at its peak from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, and declined thereafter.(261) Use of landmines by the CPM was apparently an important part of its Maoist-inspired revolutionary strategy which emphasized armed struggle. A 1984 paper described the CPM's activities as follows:
The CPM seems to have been increasingly adept at jungle warfare, using techniques which can be considered quite innovative. Two of these techniques, ambush and landmines (booby traps), have been successful in inflicting SF (Security Forces) casualties, but it is also believed that the SF have begun to take effective counteraction."(262)
Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia allegedly have no history of landmine use despite the separatist movement in Sarawak led by the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP).
While some mines remain from the guerrilla insurgency, especially along the Thai border, injuries caused by mines are very rare.
The Malaysian government (through its army and police), the Thai government, and the CPM jointly conducted mine clearing operations in the Malaysian-Thai border areas from 1990 to 1991 as part of a special operations program called "Operasi Bersih." CPM members helped identify where these mines were planted. The retrieved mines were turned over to the police. The informants do not have data available on the number of such mines that were retrieved and whether or not they were subsequently destroyed.(263)
The Malaysian Armed Forces sent one troop (two officers, 32 soldiers) to undertake mine clearing operations in Cambodia from March to August 1992. In Bosnia, the MAF sent one squadron (10 officers, 160 men) for mine clearance. In all, the MAF has been involved in 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1960 and has sent 16,500 personnel as observers, battalion groups, or staff officers.(264)
No mine awareness program is being undertaken by any group in Malaysia. MINDEF spokespersons attribute this absence to the fact that Malaysia is not directly mine-affected.(265)
Malaysian soldiers were the primary victims of the improvised landmines or booby traps planted by communist insurgents in the Malaysian-Thai border. These landmine incidents were at their peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s.(266) Since 1979, there have been approximately 95 casualties ending up as amputees.(267) The last reported MAF victim of landmines in Malaysia was in 1993. A soldier on patrol in the state of Kedah was injured by one of the few remaining mines planted by CPM rebels which the joint clearing operations failed to retrieve. In 1994, Major Ramli Shari died from a "jumping mine" incident in Bosnia. Major Ramli belonged to the Malaysian contingent of the U.N. peacekeeping mission.(268)
While some rebels were also victimized by MAF APMs, the number is unknown as rebel victims of exploded APMs were brought back to their guerrilla camps for treatment.(269) On the whole, the scale of victims was relatively small and deaths resulting from landmine incidents very few. There have been no reports of civilian victims of landmines.
Maldives signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 October 1998, the 133rd country to do so. It has not yet ratified. Maldives did not participate in any of the Ottawa Process meetings, or the negotiations in Oslo in September. However, it did vote in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Maldives is not mine-affected. It does not have a regular army, but rather a paramilitary police force, the National Security Service.(270) It is not known to have ever produced, exported, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines.
The Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 4 December 1997 but it has not yet ratified. While the Marshall Islands voted for the 1996 and 1997 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines, it was the only ban treaty signatory to abstain from voting on 1998's resolution 53/L.33 supporting the ban treaty's universalization, ratification and First Meeting of States Parties. One possible reason for this abstention and for the lack of ratification could be the close economic, political and military dependence between the the Marshall Islands and non-signatory, the United States, as defined by the Compact of Free Association.
The Marshall Islands is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. There are considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance left over from World War Two when Japanese and American forces fought over many of the islands.
Mine Ban Policy
The Philippines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has yet to ratify it. The Philippines was an early supporter of a global ban on antipersonnel landmines, and was an original member of the "core group" of governments that took the lead in developing and promoting the Mine Ban Treaty, serving as the regional focal point for Asia. The Philippines government was an active partner in the Ottawa Process, attending all the treaty preparatory meetings. It was a full participant in the Strategy Conference on 3-5 October 1996 in Ottawa, Canada, endorsed the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September 1997.
The Philippines voted in favor of all the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on antipersonnel mines, namely, the UNGA Resolution 51/45S urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel landmines on 10 December 1996; UNGA Resolution 52/38A supporting the December Treaty signing; and Resolution A/C.1/53/L.33 during the 53rd U.N. General Assembly on 4 November 1998, welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging its full realization and inviting state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.
On 3 December 1997 when it signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa, Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon Jr. said, "It is because we can no longer abide such grievous loss that we have heeded the call of human conscience, and have come here to end any further use, production, transfer and stockpiling of this rogue and shameful weapon." He lauded the "many private citizens and non-government who also labored, with unflagging determination, for the global ban on landmines."(271)
The government's pro-ban stance was officially declared in December 1995 when, in a state visit to Cambodia, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued a statement expressing the government's support to the international community in opposing landmines and supporting mine-clearing activities and destruction of stockpiles.(272) President Ramos's statement was preceded by several memoranda issued in October 1995 by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff and the Department of National Defense (DND) providing data on APM stockpile and landmine incidents and upholding the six-point Policy Positions proposed by the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL). The six-point proposals called on the government to immediately ratify the 1980 CCW and its annexed Protocols; to support the ICBL position for an international total ban and contribute to humanitarian mine action; to confirm or deny reports that the Philippines is a landmine producer; to factor landmine issues into negotiations with the various rebel groups; to contribute concretely to humanitarian mine action in the form of professional and technical support; and to provide special assistance to neighboring Cambodia in mine clearance, victim rehabilitation and peace and reconstruction work.(273) In the first week of December 1995, President Ramos met with peace groups, including the PCBL, where these policy proposals were further discussed.
In July 1997, the Philippines along with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Philippine Red Cross Society, co-sponsored the Asian Regional Seminar for Military and Political Experts in Manila to examine the military value of landmines. In that meeting, it was concluded that the humanitarian cost of using these weapons far outweigh any military utility.(274)
Despite having been one of the first countries to call for a total ban, ratification of the Treaty was delayed because of the change in administration. An instrument of ratification was signed by President Ramos on 30 January 1998 but the Senate failed to act on it before the sessions ended to give way to the May 1998 national election. The 1987 Philippine Constitution requires that any international treaty be passed by the Philippine Senate by a vote of two-thirds majority before it becomes valid.(275)
Shortly after the 11th Congress convened in early July 1998, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta, at the request of the local campaign, introduced a resolution urging the Philippines to concur in the ratification of the Treaty.(276) In November 1998, newly elected Philippine President Joseph Ejercito Estrada resubmitted the Convention for the Philippine Senate's consideration and concurrence. The letter enclosed a draft Senate concurring resolution. The Senate failed to table the resolution in 1998 in the face of other national concerns. Finally, on 25 February 1999, the Senate Committee chaired by Senator Blas Ople convened the public hearing necessary before the Committee adopts its position on the matter. Representatives of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and National Defense, as well as of the local campaign all endorsed the treaty's ratification which can thus be expected to take place soon.
The Philippine Senate ratified the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines 4 June 1996. On 12 June 1997, it ratified the amended Protocol II.
Peace/Cease-fire Agreements with Rebel Groups
The government's landmine policy and rebel groups' concurrence to a moratorium on landmine use are embodied in peace and cease-fire agreements with the rebel forces, as follow:
1) The Joint Guidelines and Ground Rules for the Implementation of the 1993 Interim Cease-fire Agreement between the Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) included "landmining" under prohibited hostile acts. In September 1996, a comprehensive Peace Agreement was forged, effectively ending the armed conflict between the two parties.
2) In Art. 1.3.b of the Operational Guidelines of the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities between the Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) forged in 14 November 1997, landmining was listed among the prohibited hostile acts.
3) In the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights & International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF) signed in March 1998, the right not to be subjected to landmines was recognized, and both parties committed to uphold the observance of international humanitarian law. (Part III,Art. 2.15; Part IV, Art. 4.4; Part II, Art. 4 of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law). However, in late February 1999, negotiations between the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-NDF-New People's Army (NPA) were suspended by President Estrada following the arrest by an NPA command in Mindanao and the Bicol region of military officials.
The Philippines was listed in both U.S. Army and U.S. State Department documents in 1993 as a landmine producer.(277) However, the U.S. Department of Defense's landmine database, released in July 1995, did not include the Philippines in the list of landmine producers.
Previous allegations of production of landmines are reinforced by information from a military official that in the late 1980s or early 1990s, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) contracted a local manufacturer to produce landmines similar to claymore mines as part of the AFP's Self-Reliance Program. According to the official, the contract was not renewed.(278)
The Philippines is not known to produce or conduct research and development on any munitions which might function like an antipersonnel mine and pose danger to civilians (such as antitank mines with anti-handling devices, certain submunitions/cluster bombs). Neither is the AFP engaged in research and development on or production of alternatives to antipersonnel landmines, except for the use of flares and the clustering of grenades as substitutes for preventing unauthorized entry in military camps.
The AFP claims that communist and Muslim rebels produce or manufacture "homemade" or "improvised" mines, as evidenced by landmine incidents and capture of enemy armories. These "improvised" landmines are allegedly made using commercially available substances and materials. A 1996 AFP report describes the procedure as follows:
"A good example is the 'ammonium nitrate and fuel-oil' (ANFO) mixture, which uses locally available fertilizers and diesel fuel as explosive compound. Commercially available dynamite which is used for quarrying and (mineral) mining is also utilized, as is TNT of composition B taken from 105mm Howitzer or mortar shells recovered from AFP units during firefights. Gunpowder from bullets is also used. For shrapnel, just about anything is used (rusty nails, broken glass, metal strips, steel balls and sometimes, specially formed galvanized iron). Blasting caps are commercially available. However, if unavailable the rebels have found indigenous materials to make blasting caps, like matches and umbrella parts. Sardine cans, paint cans, biscuit containers or specially formed galvanized iron are used to hold the explosives and shrapnel. These mines are either command detonated (electrically, using dry cells contained in enclosed lighter fluid containers) or they are fitted with detonating cords. Recently however, there have been reports that the NPA now use improvised pressure release mechanisms."(279)
The report claimed that in 1994, the Philippine Army raided a New People's Army (NPA) landmine factory in Conner, Kalinga Apayao (Northern Luzon) and recovered some 1,000 blasting caps, ammonium nitrate and C4. The report likewise alleged that the two Muslim rebel groups--Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)--have not used landmines in their recent operations but are reportedly manufacturing and field testing improvised landmines for future use. The report also claims that Muslim secessionist groups sent men for training and experience in mine production, handling and deployment in foreign countries like Afghanistan.
Independent reports and inquiries made with rebels and former rebels affirm the production and use of improvised landmines by rebel groups using commercially available materials. In 1995, the PCBL noted, "Some Moro liberation fighters … have had battle training in Afghanistan, which happens to be the most landmine-affected country. It is not inconceivable that landmines were among the recent arms landings in Muslim Mindanao."(280)
In recent interviews, the MILF acknowledged that they do assemble mines when there arises "a necessity and for immediate use only," and that their homemade mines are command-detonated by pulling a string attached to a detonator.(281) They make use of ready-made bombs (6mm bombs) from abroad, but local materials are used for detonators. The danger in making these mines is seen as less compared to making mines using pressure as the triggering mechanism.(282) Foreigners have also been allegedly involved in giving training in the use and manufacture of landmines.(283) The MNLF also reportedly used the services of foreign-trained engineers in such production.(284) A study on the MNLF claims that ammonium nitrate for landmine production was purchased by the Muslim rebel group in Sabah.(285)
In 1997, a suspected supply officer of the MILF was arrested in a raid by agents of the First Mobile Force Command and the Philippine Navy. The raiders recovered inside the vessel ML/BB Baker five sacks of ammonium nitrate, a chemical used in making landmines, and 200 pieces of blasting caps.(286)
There are no reports or evidence to indicate that the Philippines previously or currently exports APMs.
In 1977, the U.S. exported 7,992 M18A1 Claymore mines to the Philippines.(287) Most of these mines were apparently used in AFP counter-insurgency operations against the various rebel groups.(288)
On 15 August 1995, the AFP reported it had in its inventory 2,460 M18A1 Claymore mines.(289) In December 1995 President Fidel V. Ramos ordered the AFP to stop acquisition of landmines and to dispose of the Claymore mines in its inventory.(290)
At present, there are no reports of transfers from another country to the Philippines, and the ban remains in place.(291) An AFP Position Paper on Protocol II of the Prohibition or Restriction on Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices stated that the AFP will exclude any equipment and other similar devices in the list of equipment to be acquired under the AFP Modernization Program.(292) This position is corroborated by former AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Acedera, who stated that APMs are not on the list of strategic or tactical weapons systems for acquisition under the AFP's 15-year Modernization Program.(293)
In an interview, the MILF said it acquired around 1,000 antipersonnel mines from an unnamed source abroad in 1974.(294) He declined to give any description of these purchased landmines, stating that these are "known only as antipersonnel mines and no longer available in our armory."(295)
An AFP report claimed that in the 1970s and early 1980s, the MNLF used U.S.-made M14 antipersonnel landmines.(296) It is not known how they were acquired.
In the government's first official pronouncement on landmines dated 18 December 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos not only expressed support to an international ban, he also ordered the destruction of all stockpiles in the Philippine armory.(297) This was followed by several orders/memoranda from the AFP chain of command implementing the instruction.
In December 1995, President Ramos called upon the AFP Chief of Staff, who likewise directed the Logistics Command and the three Major Services (Army, Air Force and Navy) to "disarm and safely dispose of some 2,460 Claymore mines still in the inventory of the AFP without delay."(298)
All Claymore mines were reportedly surrendered to AFP Military Supply Points (MSPs) located throughout the country, where the disposal and destruction of the mines took place. As of 7 February 1997, the AFP Logistics Command reported the disposal of all 2,460 Claymore mines in its inventory.(299) A breakdown of the APMs disposed in the different MSPs and AFP units was provided in the 18 July 1997 report of the AFP Logistics Command to the AFP Chief of Staff.(300) The reported disposal was confirmed recently by Deputy for Operations (J3) Brig. Gen. Rodolfo Garcia in an interview,(301) and by the Defense Secretary during the February 1999 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee public hearing.(302)
However, in a news report, Armed Forces spokesperson Major General Victor Garcia admitted that certain units of the armed forces, such as the Army's Scout Ranger and Special Forces Regiment are still keeping and using landmines (apparently Claymores).(303) Many soldiers also allegedly kept some of these Claymore mines in their personal possession, either as souvenirs or as a weapon in case of emergency.(304) During inspection of MSPs, some mines were allegedly found put up on display for decorative purposes.(305) Under the Mine Ban Treaty, use of Claymore mines in command-detonated mode is permitted, but use with tripwires is prohibited.
Most of the mines purchased by the MILF in 1974 allegedly "self-destroyed" since they were not used and protected from damage, while others were detonated.(306) A MILF top official claimed that detonation of its stock of purchased landmines was done in 1978 while homemade mines were no longer available at that time.(307)
The government officially claims that the deployment of landmines is not and has never been part of the Philippines' defense policy,(308) and that the Claymore mines in its inventory were used by AFP troops for training purposes, and not in counter-insurgency operations.(309) Other reports, including from the government, say otherwise. Many of the AFP officials interviewed have pointed out that use of Claymore mines in a command detonated mode is not a violation of the treaty, while acknowledging these mines can be operated by tripwire. General Arnulfo G. Acedera, former AFP Chief of Staff, has said that use of mines has not been extensive by either side because, "Whatever will be the case, for both warring sides (the government and the insurgents), the common denominator in winning the war is winning the same people's hearts and minds.... To objectively and deliberately immerse these non-combatants and innocent civilians into the avoidable circumstances of the conflict would end in alienating their sympathy, thus opening the road to our defeat. This is the reason why the issue of the landmine problem in the Philippines is far from alarming compared to that in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Laos and Mozambique."(310)
One AFP report stated that before the directive of the Chief of Staff to ban the use of landmines, the AFP did use Claymore mines for defense purposes such as to protect a detachment or patrol base. Use was discriminate, temporary and never for offensive operations. The report said that minefields are not part of the AFP's counter-insurgency doctrine. Nor does the AFP possess the mechanical means for mine-laying or the capability for remote delivery of mines through artillery, rocket or aircraft.(311)
The MILF claims that there have been civilian victims of landmines placed by the AFP, but also notes that the number of such cases has been minimal.(312) MILF Vice-Chair for Military Affairs Al Haj Murad also claims that in a few cases, the MILF was able to seize (anti-tank) landmines from the AFP: "There were only about ten pieces of anti-tank mines we captured from the AFP and we used them during the height of the fighting in 1978."(313)
The AFP reports that both communist and Muslim rebels have made extensive use of "homemade" or "improvised" mines. Use of landmines by communist rebels allegedly began in 1985 when the various fronts sent students for demolition training to Samar island. The NPA landmine factory in Conner, Kalinga Apayao (Northern Luzon) in 1994 was allegedly protected by hundreds of mines that extended as far as 700 meters from the camp. In 1995, there were 21 landmine-related incidents involving improvised landmines used by the NPA. The NPA used landmines not only to harass or ambush military and police personnel, but also to secure and defend their strongholds and production bases.(314)
In another document, the AFP reported 239 landmining incidents from 1986-1995, 228 of which were allegedly perpetuated by the CPP/NPA and 11 by the MNLF/MILF.(315)
In late 1997, the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) in the Caraga Region (Southeastern Mindanao) condemned the continued use of landmines allegedly planted by the New Peoples Army in Agusan and Surigao provinces. The ABC cited the recovery of landmines in places frequented by village folk: the 67th Infantry Battalion retrieved ten antitank mines and six antipersonnel mine planted on the road in Barangay Hubo, Tago, Surigao del Sur; two Claymore mines were discovered planted on a trail in Sitio Tahos, Barangay San Pedro, Marihatag, Surigao del Sur; five antipersonnel landmines were found in Sitio Lahi, Barangay Mahawan, Tandag town; and in Agusan del Sur, the 36th Infantry Battalion recovered five antipersonnel landmines in Sitio La Fortuna, Barangay Aurora, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.(316)
Occasional newspaper reports corroborate landmine use by communist forces. In 1996, army soldiers reportedly raided a communist rebel safehouse in Sitio Hugno, Barangay Nagbinlod, Santa Catalina town, Negros Oriental, and three improvised Claymore mines were recovered.(317) A March 1997 report on the recovery of an NPA arms cache by army troops in Amulung, Cagayan Valley listed an antipersonnel mine among items seized.(318) In the same year, Army soldiers recovered in a sitio in San Mariano, Isabela 1,000 adaptors, 200 meters of detonating cord, six Claymore mines, eight pipes, 250 blasting caps and 15 pressure release firing devices.(319)
In an interview, an NPA cadre claims use of landmines both for offensive and defensive purposes. He cited one incident in which an NPA platoon successfully eluded the attack of an undersized AFP battalion by hastily planting mines in possible enemy advance routes and detonating those mines when the targets were within range.(320) In his 29 March 1997 Message to the NPA urging intensification of guerilla warfare, CPP Chair Armando Liwanag identified mine laying, along with sniping and grenade throwing, as among the forms of "small unit harassment operations" which the NPA can wage against government forces.(321)
In 1976, the MILF allegedly banned the use of landmines in their operation on the basis of a research conclusion that landmine use -- because it involves death through harsh methods -- contradicts the teachings of Islam.(322) Despite the claimed ban on landmine use by the MILF, actual use of landmines by Muslim rebel groups is acknowledged in rebel publications. In an account of the Battle of Wato on 16 March 1996 between the government troops and the MILF, where the AFP allegedly sent two helicopter gunships and two bomber planes which dropped 26 bombs, the MILF said it "fought back with mortar (81mm and 60m), anti-tank weapons and mined the fields."(323)
In the Battle of Mal-Mar on April 11, 1996: "Hostilities resumed at about 5:00 a.m. in Sitio Sambayangan, Tupig, Carmen. AFP threw in action three OV-10 planes and two Huey gunships. Also used 105 howitzers, 81mm and 60mm mortars. The Mujahideen retaliated with 81mm, 60mm, 50mm and RPG anti-tank weapons and also mined the area."(324)
On the whole, according to an AFP report, use of landmines by Muslim secessionists has been minimal, directed only at government soldiers and not civilians.(325) The MILF, for its part, claimed that the mines used in the aforementioned battles as well as in other battlefields were homemade self-controlled detonating mines for tanks and armored vehicles.(326) It claims mines not used in an aborted ambush are retrieved and no mines are left behind.(327)
Other than rebel groups, there was also one reported case of landmine use by a political warlord or private army. In May 1995, the marines reportedly took over the camp of political clan leader Khan Tulawie in Bilaan, Talipao, Sulu where they found minefields stretching about 500 meters along the main road.(328)
To date, the Monitoring Committee of the 1997 cease-fire agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF has not reported any violation of the provision against landmining.
Recent reports of seizures of landmines and materials used for manufacturing landmines from communist rebels reveal a continuing intent to use, if not actual use of these weapons. A December 1998 report claims that in a brief clash with the communist rebels, government troops from the 58th Infantry Battalion recovered five landmines from two rebels who surrendered.(329)
In mid-1998, Quezon Province police seized a cache of explosives that included 235 sticks of dynamite and other bomb components. The explosives were hidden at the foot of Mount Banahaw, which the NPA communist guerrillas reportedly intend to use for bombing runs on government and civilian targets, and for the manufacturing of landmines. Quezon Police Director Superintendent Jaime Caringal said the seizure derailed the rebels' plan to avenge the death of their comrades during a chance encounter with a composite police-military team in Barangay Jonagdong I in Sariaya town on 19 June 1998.(330)
Since use of landmines has on the whole been temporary and minimal, the Philippines cannot be considered mine affected in any significant way. Nonetheless, there have been reported deaths due to landmines up to 1997, though most of these may have been caused by command-detonated APMs.
Mine Action Funding
In a statement, former President Ramos said that the Philippines contributed through the U.N. Development Program to mine clearing activities in Cambodia.(331) Inquiries made at the Department of Foreign Affairs yielded no information as to the nature and value of the contribution.
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
No sustained mine clearance operations have been necessary. Except for the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and its member organizations, no other agency in the Philippines has engaged in a mine education program. In 1996 and 1997, the PCBL organized several symposia in Metro Manila that aimed to popularize the landmine issue and commit the government and rebel groups to a mine ban.
In landmine incidents involving the New People's Army, the AFP reported that from 1991-1995, 17 civilians were killed and 31 injured. Most of these incidents took place in Northeastern Luzon, particularly in Cagayan and Isabela. In 1995, there were 21 landmine incidents nationwide. Two died and 29 soldiers and policemen were wounded. Four civilians were killed and another four were wounded. In incidents involving Muslim secessionists, 11 landmine incidents with two injuries took place from 1986-1995.(332) The last case of a soldier falling victim to a mine was in 1997, according to an army doctor, but the victim's whereabouts are unknown.(333)
No subsequent report has been issued by any government agency on landmine victims. It is not clear if the injuries/deaths may be directly attributable to APMs covered under the treaty as these mines may have been command-detonated, or may have been antivehicle/antitank mines.(334)
There are no specialized services available to landmine victims. Civilian and military victims ordinarily would go to regular private, public or AFP hospitals for emergency assistance.
Soldier victims are covered by several medical and insurance plans, for example, by the Government Service Insurance System and various AFP benefit programs. The benefits depend on the severity of injuries, resulting incapacity, and the type of work one can still perform. For those who were amputated, prosthetics are provided by the AFPMC, which is the oldest producer of prosthetics in the country.(335)
Wounded rebels are normally treated in rebel camps or hideouts for fear of being arrested if brought to regular hospitals. Wounded rebels who are captured by the AFP are provided with medical assistance in regular hospitals or AFP camps.(336)
Vanuatu's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, Vital Soksok, signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa, Canada on 4 December 1997, but Vanuatu has not yet ratified. Vanuatu did not participate in the treaty preparatory meetings or the formal negotiations, and it did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration. Vanuatu voted in favour of the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the elimiation of antipersonnel landmines but was absent from the 1998 vote endorsing the ban treaty. Vanuatu is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or exported antipersonnel landmines and is not believed to be mine-affected although there are still major dumps of military equipment left over from World War Two.
127. Personal communication from Col. Veerasak Raksasab.
128. Interview with Thai military official in Mae Sot, Tak province, January 1999.
129. Interview with displaced ethnic migrants housed in camps along the Thai-Burma border, Mae Sot, Tak province, January 1999
130. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document given to Humanitarian Demining Team Leaders on 18 August, 1998, #1.3 p.1 and also Thailand Mine Action Center, A Brief Account of TMAC, January 1999, p. 2.
131. Ibid, #1.2 .
132. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. A-2
133. Thailand Mine Action Center, Directorate of Joint Communication, Supreme Command Headquarters, 183 Songprapa Street, Tung Si Gun, Don Muang, Bangkok 10120 Thailand, Tel (66-2) 565-5199, 565-5200.
134. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document given to Humanitarian Demining Team Leaders on 18 August, 1998.
135. Statement by Ambassador Asda Jayanama before the Plenary of the 53rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 17 November 1998.
138. Dipankar Banerjee, Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, "South Asian Regional Survey," prepared for Landmine Monitor, p. 24. Banerjee based this on observations from the South Asian Regional Landmines Workshop, held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 7-8 December 1998, attended by senior Bangladesh government officials including two serving Brigadiers.
139. Ibid, pp. 10-12.
140. Interview with Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Dato Mohd Alimin Abdul Wahab at the Bolkiah Garrison, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 11 February 1999. To quote: "There were initial reservations … (But) (I)t was His Majesty himself who said that we should subscribe (to the MBT)."
141. Ibid. He said, "We have to see our situation as not exclusive to the fact that our neighbors have got a similar position on landmines because then we feel more comfortable …not just purely as an ASEAN thing but an ASEAN spirit…taking stock of how we project our own survival in the years to come."
142. Telephone interview with Mr. Yahya Idris, Acting Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 11 February 1999.
143. Interview with MINDEF Permanent Secretary, 11 February 1999.
145. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. (no page number)
146. Interview with MINDEF Permanent Secretary, 11 February 1999.
147. Royal Kingdom of Cambodia, Constitution, 1993.
148. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Chairman, His Excellency Ieng Mouly, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1999.
149. Norodom Sihanouk, Declaration of King of Cambodia, Siem Reap Peace March, 14 August 1998.
150. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Director General, His Excellency Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.
151. Norodom Sihanouk, Declaration of King of Cambodia, Beijing, 2 October, 1994.
152. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Director General Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.
153. Human Rights Watch, Cambodia at War (New York: Human Rights Watch, March 1995), p. 100.
154. " "Mouly Reveals Plans to Outlaw Mines," Phnom Penh Post, August 26-September 8, 1994.
155. International Committee of the Red Cross, "States and International Organizations Supporting A Total Prohibition of Antipersonnel Landmines," 18 April 1996.
156. Chea Sim, High Representative of His Majesty the King, Speech made to the International Landmine Conference on the Human and Socio-economic Impact of Landmines, Phnom Penh, 1995.
157. Tea Banh, Co-Minister of Defense, Speech made to International Landmine Conference on the Human and Socio-economic Impact of Landmines, Phnom Penh, 1995.
158. Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, Welcoming Speech to the International Forum on De-mining and Victim Assistance, Phnom Penh, 26-28 October 1998.
159. Ieng Mouly, CMAC Chairman, Statement to the International Forum on De-mining and Victim Assistance, Phnom Penh, 26-28 October 1998.
160. International Committee Red Cross, 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), 8 January 1998.
161. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Chairman Ieng Mouly, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1999.
162. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Chairman Ieng Mouly, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1999.
163. U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Program, Mine Facts CD Rom, version 1.2.
164. Reuters, "Hunters using landmines to kill Cambodian tigers," 27 January 1999 and Compton, J., " Action promised to Save tigers from Poachers mines," South China Morning Post, 10 February 1999.
165. Interview, 24 February 1999, Source Confidential.
166. NGO Forum Letter to UNHCR, 1998.
167. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables.
168. Declaration of Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, Beijing, 2 October 1994.
169. Landmine Monitor Interview with Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun, Phnom Penh, 17 February 1999.
170. Market Survey conducted by Kim Phirum, February 1999.
171. Landmine Monitor Interview with Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun, Phnom Penh, 17 February 1999.
172. Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, Report about de-mining in Cambodia, 15 February 1999.
174. See for example, Human Rights Watch, Cambodia at War, 1995, p. 100.
175. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Chairman Ieng Mouly, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1999.
176. Landmine Monitor Interview with Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun, Phnom Penh, 17 February 1999.
177. Interview, 17 February 1999, Source Confidential.
178. Handicap International, Cambodian Red Cross, United Nations Children's Fund, Mines Advisory Group, Cambodia Mine Incident Report, Mine Incident Database Project, December 1998.
179. Landmine Monitor Interview with Lt. Gen. Pol Saroeun, 17 February 1999.
180. Moser-Puangsuwan, "Non-State/Quasi State Armed Forces in Cambodia using, holding or producing landmines," Nonviolence International SE Asia Office, 1 September 1998.
181. UNHCR Report, Phnom Penh, 28 May 1998.
182. Moser-Puangsuwan, opcit., 1 September 1998.
183. Speech of H.E. Mr. Ung Huot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Antipersonnel Mine Convention Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, Canada, 2-4 December 1997, p. 4.
184. United Nations Center for Human Rights - Confidential Source
185. "Hunters using landmines to kill Cambodian tigers," Reuters Phnom Penh, 27 January 1999 and Compton, J., "Action promised to save tigers from poachers' mines," South China Morning Post, 10 February 1999.
186. U.S. Department of Defense, Mine Facts CD Rom, version 1.2.
187. Handicap International, Cambodian Red Cross, United Nations Children's Fund, Mines Advisory Group, Cambodia Mine Incident Report, Mine Incident Database Project, December 1998.
188. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. 64.
189. CMAC, Response to the Landmines Monitor Questions, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
191. CMAC, Response to the Landmines Monitor Questions, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
192. CMAC, Letter to Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines, Phnom Penh, 25 August 1998 and CMAC, Memorandum - Questionnaire for Monitoring Treaty, Phnom Penh, 14 August 1998.
193. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Director General Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.
195. P. Mathews, UNDP Letter to Landmine Monitor, 18 February 1999.
197. CMAC, Response to the Landmines Monitor Questions, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
198. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Director General Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.
199. CMAC , Memorandum - Questionnaire for Monitoring Treaty, 14 August 1998.
200. Landmine Monitor, Interview with CMAC Director General Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.
201. CMAC, Response to the Landmines Monitor Questions, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
202. CMAC, Memorandum - Questionnaire for Monitoring Treaty, Phnom Penh, 14 August 1998.
203. CMAC, Response to the Landmines Monitor Questions, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
204. Archie Law, MAG Briefing Paper, received 21 February 1999.
205. Provided by Mines Advisory Group, Cambodia. A detailed chart on donations is available.
206. Halo Trust Statement to Landmine Monitor, 22 February 1999.
207. NPA Statement to Landmine Monitor, 22 February 1999.
208. CMAC, Response to the Landmines Monitor Questions, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
209. CMAC Database, All Mined Areas Cleared by CMAC, Phnom Penh, 11 December 1998.
210. Provided by Mines Advisory Group, Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 16 December 1998.
211. CMAC Database, All Mined Areas Cleared by HALO TRUST, Phnom Penh, 14 December 1998.
212. CMAC Database, Statistical Profile, Phnom Penh, 14 August 1998.
214. CMAC, Socio Economic Unit Report, December 1998.
215. The full text of the statement is available from Landmine Monitor.
216. CMAC, Socio Economic Unit Report, December 1998.
219. Handicap International, Cambodian Red Cross, United Nations Children's Fund, Mines Advisory Group, Cambodia Mine Incident Report, Mine Incident Database Project, December 1998.
222. Information in this section was provided by the named organizations for the purposes of the Landmine Monitor.
223. Cooperation Committee Cambodia, NGO Forum, Medicam Joint Statement to Donors Consultative Group, Tokyo, 24 February 1999.
224. P. Barrs, Report of Draft Law to Protect the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, March 1998.
225. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Henry, KBE, Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, Statement to the Signing Ceremony for the Landmines Convention, Ottawa, 2-4 December 1997.
226. Statement by H.E. Mr. Edi Sudradjat, Minister for Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997.
227. Landmine Monitor interview with Major General Ferry Tinggogoy, Jakarta, 23 February 1999.
230. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. (no page number).
231. Landmine Monitor interview with Major General Ferry Tinggogoy, Jakarta, 23 February 1999.
234. Landmine Monitor interview with Simon, 12 February 1999.
235. Landmine Monitor interview with Mujikar, 15 February 1999.
236. Landmine Monitor, Bonar Tigor Naepospos interview with Xanana Gusmao, 17 February 1999.
237. Landmine Monitor interview with Simon, 12 February 1999.
238. Landmine Monitor interview with Ferry Tinggogoy, 23 February 1999.
239. Statement by H.E. Mr. Edi Sudradjat, Minister for Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, Ottawa, Canada, 4 December 1997; "Assistance in Mine Clearance: Report of the Secretary-General," U.N. General Assembly A/53/496, 14 October 1998, p. 29.
240. Statement by Ambassador Dato' Abdullah Zawawi B. Haji Mohamed, High Commissioner for Malaysia to Canada, at the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 2-4 December 1997.
241. E-mail message from retired Colonel G. Gopinath to the Landmine Monitor researcher, 5 March 1999.
242. Interview with an officer (who requested anonymity) in the Multilateral Political Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the MFA compound, Kuala Lumpur, 9 February 1999.
243. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Principal Assistant Secretary and Mr. Iskandar bin Dato'Mohd Kaus, Assistant Secretary, Defense Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, Defense Planning, Army Headquarters, at the Kementerian Pertahan (Ministry of Defense), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 8 February 1999.
244. Ibid. The Landmine Researcher was told that this document is not available to the public.
245. Letter of Datuk Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 1 December 1998 to country researcher for the LM.
246. Interview with retired Col. G. Gopinath who served as a military doctor in the MAF from 1969 to 1990, at the Bestotel, Kuala Lumpur, 9 February 1999. Dr. Gopinath has also been a long-time Malaysian Red Crescent volunteer.
247. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
249. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. (no page number)
250. Follow-up interview with Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, Defense Planning, Army Headquarters, Kementerian Pertahan (Ministry of Defense), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 February 1999.
251. Letter of Datuk Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 1 December 1998 to country researcher for the LM.
252. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
253. Arnold Molina Azurin, Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern Philippines and Wartorn Zones in the Global Village (Quezon City: UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippines Press, 1996), p. 251.
254. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
255. Follow-up interview with Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 9 February 1999.
256. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
257. Letter of Datuk Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 1 December 1998 to country researcher for the LM.
258. Follow-up interview with Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, Defense Planning, Army Headquarters, Kementerian Pertahan (Ministry of Defense), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 February 1999.
259. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
261. Follow-up interview with Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 9 February 1999.
262. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Zakaria Hamid, "Violence at the Periphery: a brief survey of armed communism in Malaysia" in Lim Joo-Jock with Vani S. (editors), Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), p. 58.
263. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
264. MINDEF, Malaysian Defence, Towards Defense Self-Reliance (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Defense, undated), p. 69.
265. Interview with Commander Razali bin Md. Ali, Mr. Iskandar bin Dato' Mohd Kaus and Major Abdullah bin Mustaffa, 8 February 1999.
266. Interview with retired Col. G. Gopinath, 9 February 1999.
267. E-mail message from retired Col. and Dr. G. Gopinath to the Landmine Monitor researcher, 5 March 1999.
268. Follow-up interview with Major Abdullah Mustafa, 9 February 1999.
270. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 1992, p. 214.
271. "A Victory for All Humankind," Statement of H.E. Domingo Siazon, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines at the signing ceremony of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
272. Statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos during the official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Chamcar, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1995.
273. Soliman Santos and Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Policy Brief on the Landmines Issue and the Philippines, October 1995, pp. 21-22.
274. Final Declaration of Participants to the "Anti-Personnel Landmines: What Future for Asia? Regional Seminar for Asian Military and Strategic Studies Experts," Manila, 20-23 July 1997.
275. Section 21, Article VII, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
276. "Resolution Urging the Senate of the Philippines to Concur in the Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction," Resolution No. 47, Eleventh Congress, received by the Office of the Secretary, Senate of the Philippines, 20 July 1998.
277. Letter from Kenneth Shifflett, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center to Human Rights Watch, 1 November 1993, p. 1; U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.
278. Interview with Capt. Dominador Rescate, Head of the Office of Chief Ordnance and Chemical Service, AFP, 11 November 1998, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
279. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996, for the Meeting of Experts on the Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.
280. Santos and Coronel Ferrer, p. 13.
281. "Answers to Questions from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines," signed by Al Haj Murad, faxed to the PCBL on 10 February 1999.
282. Interview with Al Haj Ibrahim Murad, MILF Vice-chair for Military Affairs, 2 December 1998, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao.
283. "Answers to Questions from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines," signed by Al Haj Murad, faxed to the PCBL on 10 February 1999.
284. Interview with a former MNLF fighter, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal, 12 December 1998.
285. Arnold Molina Azurin, Beyond the Cult of Dissidence in Southern Philippines and Wartorn Zones in the Global Village (Quezon City: UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippines Press, 1996), p. 51.
286. Hernan P. de la Cruz, "MILF man held for explosives," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 August 1997.
287. U.S. Department of the Army response to Human Rights Watch Freedom of Information Act request, letter from Don Lappin, Chief, General Law/Congressional Affairs Division, Office of Counsel, Department of the Army, to Human Rights Watch, dated 25 August 1993.
288. Interview with Maj. Gregorio Macapagal, J3, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 23 February 1999.
289. Memorandum for the Secretary of National Defense from General Arturo Enrile, AFP Chief of Staff dated 8 October 1995.
290. Statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos during the official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Chamcar, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1995.
291. Based on statements committing the AFP to a mine ban policy by President Estrada's Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado during the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee public hearing on Resolution No. 47, Philippine Senate, Manila, 25 February 1999.
292. "AFP Position Paper on Protocol II of the Prohibition or Restriction on Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices," undated.
293. "Non-Use of Anti-Personnel Mines in Internal Armed Conflict" by General Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr., then AFP Chief of Staff when he read this paper at the International Meeting of Experts on the Military Uses of Landmines in Manila, 1996.
294. Interview with Al Haj Ibrahim Murad, MILF Vice-chair for Military Affairs, 2 December 1998, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao.
295. Answers to Questions from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines," signed by Al Haj Murad, faxed to the PCBL on 10 February 1999.
296. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996 for the Meeting of Experts on the Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.
297. Statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos during the official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Chamcar, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1995
299. Letter signed by Lt. Col. Jusue A. Valdez to the AFP Chief of Staff Re Disposal of Antipersonnel Mines, 18 July 1997.
301. Interview with Deputy for Operations (J3) Brig. Gen. Rodolfo Garcia, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 20 November 1998.
302. Based on statements made by President Estrada's Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado during the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee public hearing on Resolution No. 47, Philippine Senate, Manila, 25 February 1999.
303. Gemma T. Cuadro, "Military is still stockpiling landmines despite UN ban," The Manila Times, 18 July 1997.
304. Interview with an officer of the Army's Scout Ranger, Quezon City, 7 November 1998.
305. Eyewitness account of an AFP middle-level official during an interview in Quezon City, 11 November 1998.
306. Interview with Al Haj Ibrahim Murad, MILF Vice-chair for Military Affairs, Camp Abubakar Siddique, Maguindanao, 2 December 1998.
307. "Answers to Questions from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines," signed by Al Haj Murad, faxed to the PCBL on 10 February 1999.
308. Statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Republic of the Philippines during the official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Chamcar, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1995.
309. Memorandum for the Secretary of National Defense from General Arturo Enrile, AFP Chief of Staff dated 8 October 1995.
310. "Non-Use of Anti-Personnel Mines in Internal Armed Conflict" by General Arnulfo G. Acedera, Jr., then AFP Chief of Staff when he read this paper at the "Anti-Personnel Landmines: What Future for Asia?," Asian Regional Seminar for Military and Political Experts in Manila, 20-23 July 1997.
311. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996 for the Meeting of Experts on the Military utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.
312. Interview with Al Haj Ibrahim Murad, MILF Vice-chair for Military Affairs, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao, 2 December 1998.
313. "Answers to Questions from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines," signed by Al Haj Murad, faxed to the PCBL on 10 February 1999.
314. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996 for the Meeting of Experts on the Military utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.
315. Memorandum to the Secretary of National Defense from AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Arturo Enrile, Subject: Landmine Production Issues, dated 3 October 1995.
316. Mike U. Crismundo, "Use of land mines by rebels condemned," Manila Bulletin, 3 December 1997.
317. Carla P. Gomez, "Explosives, weapons seized in a raid,'' Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 October 1996.
318. Gladie Cabanizas, "NPA arms cache found," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 March 1997.
319. Gladie Cabanizas, "Explosives found," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 May 1997.
320. Unofficial interview with a high-level NPA cadre in mid-1995 by Atty. Soliman Santos Jr., PCBL Co-coordinator, documented in an undated paper titled "Landmines."
321. "Intensify Guerilla Warfare According to Capabilities," Message to the NPA of Armando Liwanag, Chair, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines on the founding anniversary of the NPA, 29 March 1997.
322. Interview with Al Haj Ibrahim Murad, MILF Vice-chair for Military Affairs, 2 December 1998, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao.
323. MHDI Research and Documentation Desk, "The War in Mindanao," Homeland, Vol.5 No.2 March-April 1998, Cotabato City, Mindanao.
324. MHDI Research and Documentation Desk, "The War in Mindanao," Homeland. Vol.5 No.2 March-April 1998.
325. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996 for the Meeting of Experts on the Military utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.
326. "Answers to Questions from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines," signed by Al Haj Murad, faxed to the PCBL on 10 February 1999.
327. Interview with Al Haj Ibrahim Murad, MILF Vice-chair for Military Affairs, Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao, 2 December 1998.
328. "Tulawie faction flees - Marines find virtual war camp in Sulu town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 May 1995, p.17.
329. Alvin Tarroza, "3 rebs killed in firefight," The Philippine Star, 14 December1998.
330. Jaime Laude, "Rebs' explosives seized at the foot of Mount Banahaw," The Philippine Star, 5 August, 1998.
331. Statement of H.E. Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Republic of the Philippines during the official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, Chamcar, Phnom Penh, 18 December 1995.
332. Report prepared by the Strategic Studies Division, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 7 February 1996 for the Meeting of Experts on the Military utility of Anti-Personnel Mines 12-13 February 1996, Geneva.
333. Interview with Lt. Col. Adrien R. Quidlat, M.D., FPCS, FPOA, Chief of Orthopedic Surgery Services and of Clinics, Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center (AFPMC), and Maj. Benedicto Jovellanos, Assistant Chief and Administration Officer, AFPMC, Quezon City, 10 March 1999.
336. Based on knowledge acquired in previous field researches/interviews in rebel areas.
337. Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998.
338. Human Rights Watch Arms Project Fact Sheets, "Nations Calling for a Comprehensive Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines," April 1996 and January 1996.
339. Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998.