For the purposes of this report, those countries who have consented to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the States Parties Section.
Mine Ban Policy
Australian Foreign Minister, the Honorable Alexander Downer, signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. One year later, on 10 December 1998, the Australian Parliament passed national ratification and implementation legislation titled the "Antipersonnel Mines Convention Bill 1998." Australia was the fifty-ninth country to deposit its instrument of ratification at the United Nations in New York on 14 January 1999.
Australia's non-governmental movement calling for a ban on antipersonnel landmines was initiated in 1991 and is one of the oldest in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. In 1995 they were told by then-Foreign Minister Gareth Evans that their call for a ban was "hopelessly utopian."(1) In late 1995, during a national election campaign, the Labor Government declared that Australia was committed to "the elimination of all antipersonnel landmines as an ultimate goal."
In April 1996, one of the first policy announcements of the new Coalition was a joint statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense pledging Australia's support for a global ban on production, stockpiling, use and transfer of antipersonnel landmines.(2) The ministers announced a suspension of the operational use of antipersonnel landmines, with an exception "in the case of a substantial deterioration in our strategic circumstances, in which Australia's security was under threat ...."(3)
Australia attended the October 1996 pro-ban governments meeting which launched the Ottawa Process, but after the US decision in January 1997 to attempt to negotiate a ban through the Conference on Disarmament, Australia began increasing its support for this option as opposed to the Ottawa Process. Australia's Ambassador to the CD, John Campbell, was appointed by the body as a Special Coordinator in 1997 to examine the possibility of negotiating a comprehensive ban on AP mines in the CD, and again in 1998 to look at the possibilities of an export ban. To date, he has been unable to get a consensus on the issue.
During 1997, Australia attended all of the Ottawa Process diplomatic meetings, but without embracing the treaty. When asked about its attitude toward the Ottawa Process and the goal of a comprehensive ban treaty by December 1997, a senior adviser to the Minister for Defense wrote in mid-June that Australia favored the CD because of its "proven track record in developing significant international legal agreements such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention," because "it facilitates genuinely multilateral negotiation" and because "a rapidly negotiated ban treaty which does not attract the support of the major antipersonnel landmine producing, exporting and using states will do little in practical terms to relieve the humanitarian crisis."(4)
At the Brussels Conference in late June, the ICBL was compelled to release a media statement questioning Australia's promotion of the CD.(5) Australia left the meeting without joining ninety-seven other governments in endorsing the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration. At the Sydney Colloquium, "Towards Ottawa and Beyond" in July 1997, Australian government representatives disturbed campaigners by their continued insistence that an effective ban could be better negotiated through the CD.(6)
Australia came nonetheless, like the United States, as a full participant to the Oslo negotiations of the ban treaty with its CD Ambassador John Campbell as Head of Delegation. Australia's sincerity was questioned by concerned campaigners as it threw its support behind U.S. proposals that, if accepted, would have seriously weakened the treaty including an exception for continued use of mines in Korea, a delay of nine years for entry into force, and a withdrawal in times of war clause. Australia's Foreign Affairs Minister defended against the criticisms arguing, "Australia played an active and constructive role in the Oslo negotiations and succeeded in securing a number of improvements to make the final document even stronger" including in areas such as definitions and verification.(7)
In the aftermath of the treaty negotiations, Australia reassessed its position and announced on 17 November the "difficult" decision that it would sign the ban treaty in Ottawa. Earlier that week at the UN, Australia had voted in the First Committee for a UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the ban treaty. The First Committee also adopted an Australian-led resolution which invited the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts on antipersonnel mines.(8)
Downer remarked: "We initially had some reservations about the Ottawa processes as distinct from the Conference on Disarmament process, because we hoped that, through a Conference on Disarmament convention, it would be possible for it to be comprehensive and that we would get everybody in it. It was clear in the end that was not going to happen, for all sorts of reasons, so the Ottawa path was the only path that could be followed."(9)
A key 1998 government document further elaborated on Australia's reluctance to sign: "the decision to sign the Convention last December held some difficulties for the Government. Antipersonnel mines represent a significant tactical capability that has had a well-established place in ADF [Australian Defense Force] plans for the conduct of military operations. Finding alternatives will involve a costly research and development effort. As alternative technology does not exist and is some years away, the ADF for this period could face an increased risk of casualties, especially if deployed overseas, and a potentially reduced capacity for coalition operations in certain circumstances."(10)
Australia continues to profess its commitment to negotiating a ban on antipersonnel mine transfers in the Conference on Disarmament.(11) In February 1999, it was one of the twenty-two CD members that jointly called, once again, for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a transfer ban.(12)
Australia is also a strong supporter of the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on landmines. Australia is a state party to the CCW and ratified amended Protocol II on 22 August 1997.
Antipersonnel Mines Convention Bill
Since May 1996, all treaties that are tabled in Australia's Parliament are accompanied by a "National Interest Analysis" that "notes the reason why Australia should become a party to the treaty."(13) The Analysis was tabled in both houses of the Australian parliament on 26 May 1998, while the legislation itself was not tabled until 11 November 1998. The Analysis proposed "National Declaration" language setting out Australia's understanding of the treaty including its effects, direct financial costs, obligations imposed, domestic implementation, consultation that has occurred and whether the treaty provides for withdrawal or denunciation. The National Declaration language contained in the National Interest Analysis and described below remained unchanged and on 15 January 1999 it was deposited along with the instrument of ratification at the United Nations in New York.(14) This Declaration describes Australia's understandings in relation to Articles 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 of the ban treaty.
In relation to Article One (General Obligations), Australia's National Declaration on use is that:
"in the context of operations, exercises or other military activity authorised by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the participation by the Australian Defence Force, or individual Australian citizens or residents, in such operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not by itself, be considered to be in violation of the Convention."
There is serious concern about the consistency of this understanding with the treaty's Article One provision that each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to "assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited" by the treaty. The National Declaration goes on to interpret the words "use," "assist," "encourage," and "induce" in a very narrow fashion, that, at the least, appears to go against the spirit of a treaty aimed at the total elimination of all possession and use of antipersonnel mines. The understandings seem clearly aimed at permitting joint operations with the United States in which U.S. forces use antipersonnel mines.
It interprets the word "use" as meaning: "... the actual physical emplacement of antipersonnel mines and does not include receiving an indirect or incidental benefit from antipersonnel mines laid by another State or person." (emphasis added).
It interprets the word "assist" to mean: "... the actual and direct physical participation in any activity prohibited by the Convention but does not include permissible indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such activities." (emphasis added).
It interprets the word "encourage" to mean "... the actual request for the commission of any activity prohibited by the Convention," and "induce" to mean "the active engagement in the offering of threats or incentives to obtain the commission of any activity prohibited by the Convention." (emphasis added).
The phrase "jurisdiction or control" is defined as meaning "within the sovereign territory of a State Party or over which it exercises legal responsibility by virtue of a United Nations mandate or arrangement with another State and the ownership or physical possession of antipersonnel mines, but does not include the temporary occupation of, or presence on, foreign territory where antipersonnel mines have been laid by other States or persons."
When the National Interest Analysis and Antipersonnel Mines Convention Bill 1998 were tabled, parliamentary debate resolved around Part 2, clause 7(3) of the Bill which read:
"Section 7(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to anything done by way of participation in operations, exercises or other military activities conducted in combination with an armed force that:
(a) is an armed force of a country that is not a party to the Convention, and
(b) engages in an activity prohibited under the Convention."
The Member of Parliament for Cowan, Graham Edwards, expressed concern that clause 7(3) could be used as a loophole to assist countries which are not signatories to this convention and where Australia is involved in joint military operations. He asked for an assurance "that Australian defense personnel will know exactly what their guidelines are in relation to their responsibilities under this legislation. I want to be assured that defense personnel acting in good faith will have sufficient safeguards when involved in or supporting international operations." (15)
The following day, Downer made a statement of clarification on the government's understanding:
"Clause 7(3) is not intended to be construed as a blanket decriminalization of the activities listed in clause 7(1). There may be circumstances in which there are military operations carried out jointly with the armed forces of a country which is not a party to the convention. In the course of those operations, the armed forces of that country might engage in an activity which would be prohibited under the convention. Clause 7(3) provides that a person to whom the act applies will not be guilty of an offence merely by reason of participation in such combined exercises. However, that subclause does not provide a defense in circumstances where such a person actually carries out one of the prohibited acts in the course of those combined operations. In the event of a charge being laid, the prosecution would be required to prove that the actions alleged constituted an offence prohibited under clause 7(1). If the accused wished to rely on the exception of clause 7(3), he or she would need to produce evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the exception applies. If the accused is able to do this, it is for the prosecution to prove otherwise if the person is to be convicted."(16)
Downer added for the parliamentary record that "the Australian Defense Force doctrinal and operation manuals will be amended to comply with the prohibitions contained in the bill, including the interpretation of clause 7(1) and (3)" and noted that "Australia's compliance with the provisions of the convention will also be subject to the transparency measures in article 7 of the convention." Downer defended the necessity for clause 7(3) and named the non-signatory country that Australia would need to conduct joint military operations with, namely its traditional defense ally the United States.(17)
Production and Transfer
Australia states that it does not produce and has never produced antipersonnel mines. The 15 April 1996 policy announcement stated that "Australia did not produce and would not export landmines."(18)
Thus, Australia's stockpile of mines are all imported. According to one U.S. government source, the U.S. shipped 38,000 antipersonnel mines to Australia in 1969, including 30,000 M16A1 bounding mines and 8,000 M18A1 Claymore mines.(19) According to another U.S. government source, the U.S. exported 8,000 AP mines to Australia between 1983 and 1992, but precise types and years are not known.(20) Details on other importations from other countries of AP mines are not available.
In the past, the Australian campaign voiced concerns about production and export by Australian Defense Industries (ADI) of a "Booby Trap Switch," the F1, a combination switch designed to be used in "booby trapping" that can be operated as a pull switch, pressure switch, pressure release, tension release and trip. The F1 is a switch, not a munition, and must be fitted with a detonator.(21)
In its National Interest Analysis, Australia raised concern over a "costly research and development effort" to find alternatives to antipersonnel landmine but the actual cost and the extent of these efforts are unknown at present.
Australia has an estimated 60,000 stockpiled antipersonnel landmines although the Government has never made public the number or types of stockpiled mines.(22) The National Interest Analysis which examines the cost to Australia of implementing the treaty notes that "final destruction and exact quantities for retention are still to be determined," but then goes on to state that initial indicative costs for destruction of the stockpile are 4.l million Australian dollars, of which stock write-offs total 3.9 million Australian dollars.(23) This appears to mean that the actual costs for destruction of Australia's AP mines is approximately 200,000 Australian dollars or approximately U.S.$127,380.
The Australian campaign has asked for, but not yet received, the release of more details on the cost of destruction, exact number, types, origins, and destruction schedule by the Australian Defense Forces. Such details have previously been regarded as classified information. The Department of the Parliamentary Library has also attempted to gain information in this area, but with no success--only replies that the information is either not available or classified. Stockpile destruction typically costs about one U.S. dollar per mine while dismantling the mine is slightly more expensive at U.S.$1.50 per mine.(24)
No timetable for destruction of the stockpile has been announced, however Australia intends to destroy its stockpile "consistent with the provisions of the Ottawa Treaty."(25)
Australia halted operational use of antipersonnel landmines on 15 April 1996. It has not used antipersonnel mines operationally since the Vietnam War. Australia retains the right to retain and use command detonated munitions (Claymore type mines) which under the terms of the National Declaration are not defined as antipersonnel mines.
Australia is not mine-affected.
Mine Action Funding
Australia's international development agency, AusAID, Australia has contributed almost A$36 million (approximately U.S.$ 22.9 million) in funding to humanitarian mine action programs since 1994 including contributions from both the head office and from in-country posts. Australia has committed to spending A$100 million by the year 2005.(26)
Some of these funds include in-kind contributions in personnel costs. For example, in 1997-98 an Australian Defense Adviser to CMAC Cambodia cost A$240,000 (approximately U.S. $ 153,000) while in 1996-97 technical advisers to UNDP Trust Fund in Laos cost A$500,000 (approximately U.S.$318,000). Australian technical advisors are sent overseas to country Mine Action Centers as well as United Nations Head Quarters usually through a cost sharing arrangement between AusAID and the Department of Defense.
The funds have also paid for equipment. For example, in 1997 the Australian government provided A$l million (approximately U.S. $637,000) to CMAC for the purchase of mine detectors from the Australian company Minelab, which initially provided 325 detectors.
Funding has been provided to governments (for example, UXO Lao and the National Rehabilitation Center); to the military (Australian Defense Force has supplied personnel on a "full cost recovery" basis, reimbursed by AusAID); to NGOs including Austcare, Australian Red Cross, Handicap International, ICRC, World Vision Cambodia, World Vision Australia, and numerous local NGOs in Cambodia; to the UN Trust Fund; to UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, UNOCHA, UNDHA) and also to the various national, regional and international activities of the Australian Network of the ICBL.
According to AusAID it is not possible to provide information on how much money was received by the recipient country or organization or how much was spent in the field, for all mine action projects that they have undertaken. "A good deal of the funds have been provided to UNDP Trust Funds, particularly for Cambodia, Laos and Mozambique and more recently Sri Lanka. Because these are multilateral funds, Australia's contribution cannot be distinguished from all others. Even on victim assistance we would not be able to give you a clear picture since much of our contributions in that category have gone to the International Committee for Red Cross for global appeals. As with UNDP contributions, this goes into a pool and Australian funds cannot be distinguished from others."(27)
A Government initiative using funds from the Princess Diana Trust Fund is called the "Destroy a Minefield" program, under which individuals, schools, community groups, businesses and associations raise funds to clear an adopted minefield and help to return the land to local populations for productive use. These funds are then be subsidized with monies from the Trust Funds on the basis of one for every two dollars raised.(28)
The government-funded Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization will spend A$4 million over the next five years on "further research into mine detection and neutralization."(29)
Demining assistance focuses on four countries -- Cambodia, Laos, Angola and Mozambique -- and includes support for surveys and clearance using detectors, sniffer dogs and, to a limited degree, mechanical clearance devices. The ultimate goal of Australia's demining assistance is to build local capacity in affected countries to implement and sustain demining programs.
According to the Australian Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, "Australia continues to address some of the broader problems exacerbated by the presence of landmines. For instance, Cambodia is a major recipient of Australian food aid--food that is required partly as a result of arable land being heavily mined."(30)
Australia provide a core contribution to the UN Mine Action Service to support its key role of coordination and is concerned that "donor activities are properly coordinated and matched with the priority needs of communities."(31)
In March 1998, Australia appointed a Special Representative on Demining, the Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Kathy Sullivan. Sullivan plays a key role in ensuring Australia's demining efforts are coordinated to maximize their impact in the field. She also works "to encourage the most effective global coordination of international donor resources to demining, victim assistance projects and landmine awareness education."(32)
There are Australian military, and peacekeeping casualties from landmines but no detailed data is available. A cursory examination of records held by the Australian War Memorial reveals that approximately fifty percent of Australia's casualties in Vietnam were the result of landmines; of the 504 personnel killed and 3,000 or more who were injured, approximately half were casualties of mines which had been removed from minefields that Australia had laid.(33)
Australian landmine survivors are cared for under the nation's health care system. Comprehensive national disability laws exist including the Disability Discrimination Act 1992.
Fiji signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and was the eighteenth country to ratify on 10 June 1998. Fiji has not enacted domestic implementing legislation. Although it did not attend most of the treaty preparatory meetings, or the formal treaty negotiations, Fiji endorsed the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997. It also voted for the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Fiji is neither a member of the Conference on Disarmament nor a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Unlike most Pacific Islands states, Fiji has its own military and has made major contributions to conflicts such as World War II, and to peace-keeping in situations including Lebanon and the Sinai.(34)
Fiji is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, or stockpiled antipersonnel landmines. No evidence has been found to suggest the use of landmines in Fiji. Fijian forces may have been involved in their use in other areas in earlier conflicts such as World War Two.
In the absence of specific comment from the Fijian Government there are some aspects that remain unanswered in connection with Fiji's role in international peacekeeping. These include joint operations with the military forces of governments who may not have signed the Treaty, and whether or not Fijian military are or have been trained in mine laying or mine clearing.
Fiji does not provide funding for mine action programs.
Mine Ban Policy
Japan signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa. In his address to the Signing Conference, then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi announced his government's intention to contribute ten billion Japanese yen for mine clearance and victim assistance projects for five years beginning in 1998.(35) Japan ratified the treaty on 30 September 1998, becoming the forty-fifth country to do so. Japan has already passed implementing legislation.
The real commitment by the government of Japan on the landmine issue began when then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced that Japan would host an international conference on antipersonnel landmines. At the Lyon Summit in 1996, he stated Japan's intention to host "an international conference for the purpose of strengthening international support for the efforts by the United Nations to remove mines.... I also mentioned that we have decided recently to actively support efforts for a total international ban of antipersonnel mines."(36) Subsequently, the government hosted "Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines" in March 1997.
Japan also reiterated its position in support of a global ban of antipersonnel mines during UN General Assembly meetings in 1996 and a 1996 UN resolution urging governments to pursue vigorously an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines.(37) Despite its public position, Japan did not express its support for the Mine Ban Treaty until September 1997, with its decision to participate in the Oslo negotiations.
The government was reluctant to take a part in the Ottawa Process. Given the reluctance, the government participated in the Brussels Conference as an observer and did not sign the Brussels Declaration until its decision on 28 August 1997 to go to Oslo -- after the U.S. government announced that it would participate in the Oslo Conference. With this linkage, it was not surprising that the Japanese delegation was an active supporter of the various proposals the U.S. government put forward which would have seriously undercut the treaty. It was clear that the government had taken part in the negotiations without shifting its fundamental policy. It had made no formal statement concerning a total ban, and the government continued to favor negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over the Ottawa Process until the very last minute.
The real shift in the government's position came after then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi decided to review Japanese policy, on the day he became Foreign Minister. Obuchi noted that "it would not make sense for Japan to oppose the Treaty while cooperating in demining activities in Cambodia."(38) After internal discussions among relevant Ministries, the government announced its decision to sign the treaty on 27 November and the Foreign Minister himself flew to Ottawa to take part in the signing ceremony on 3 December 1997.
The government's decision was, for the most part, the result of external pressures, such as the momentum created by the Ottawa Process, the tragic death of Princess Diana and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the ICBL, and had less to do with the role civil society played in Japan. The pressure from outside Japan forced the government to take heed of international opinion.
After this policy change, however, there was little movement to rapidly ratify the Convention. In fact, in meetings with members of the Japanese Diet during an ICBL trip to Japan, the parliamentarians expressed their belief that ratification would not happen in 1998.(39) One important reason for delay of ratification was the nuclear test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Because the same section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of both landmines and nuclear arms control, most of time between May to August had been intensely focused on nuclear non-proliferation efforts.(40)
The Defense Agency had already undertaken research to develop alternatives for antipersonnel landmines. At a symposium organized by the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL) in cooperation with the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo on 15 June 1998, a government official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the biggest question for ratification was how to deal with antipersonnel landmines possessed by U.S. forces in Japan. More specifically: 1) Would it be necessary to remove APMs at U.S. bases in Japan? 2) Would U.S. forces in Japan be allowed to use these mines in its military activities in Japan? 3) Would Japanese personnel be allowed to transport mines from U.S. bases in Japan to, say, the Korean Peninsula? The government official went on to say that the government was looking into the possibility of introducing a bill for ratification in the next Ordinary Diet Session which was scheduled to begin in early 1999.
After becoming Prime Minister on July 1998, Mr. Obuchi again took hold of Japan's landmine policy. He announced in his general-policy speech delivered at the opening of the Extraordinary Diet Session that: "We will put every effort to ratify at the earliest possible date so that the Treaty enters into force soon."(41) Mr. Obuchi apparently pushed somewhat reluctant government officials to ratify the treaty in time to be one of the first forty countries to make the treaty enter into force.(42)
The new administration decided to introduce the legislation in the Extraordinary Session convened in the summer of 1998, instead of waiting until the Ordinary Session of 1999 as had initially been intended. Members of the JCBL met the Prime Minister to discuss the ratification issue on 11 September 1998, during which time 200,000 signatures calling for a ban were handed over to Mr. Obuchi to demonstrate growing public concern over the landmine crisis.
The Diet passed A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on 30 September 1998 to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, and deposited the instrument to the United Nations on the same day.
Role of NGOs
Unlike in other countries, there was no partnership forged between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the Japanese government nor did the government seriously seek to discuss the issue with NGOs. Obuchi himself admitted that "there was a widely recognized impression in Japan that the NGOs are not Non-Governmental Organizations but Anti-Governmental Organizations" and admitted that NGOs were not in the position to influence the policy-making process. (43)
Nevertheless, NGOs did play an important role in raising public awareness. The Association to Aid Refugees (AAR), one of the forerunners in the landmine campaign in Japan, held a parallel NGO-sponsored landmine conference at the time of the government conference on demining technology in Tokyo in March 1997. The NGO conference - the first of its type in Japan -- depicted the suffering of mine victims and helped to reinforce the need to eradicate landmines; it received intensive media coverage. AAR also published a picture book titled Not Mines, But Flowers, which sold over 400,000 copies. AAR's commitment to the issue contributed greatly in raising public awareness in Japan. AAR also invited Chris Moon to run as a flame-bearer during the Nagano Winter Olympics in February 1998, which helped raise public awareness on the landmine issue not only in Japan, but also in the world, through live coverage of the Opening Ceremony.
The JCBL, made up of nearly 40 NGOs, also organized lecture series and charity events on landmines throughout Japan in collaboration with many of its member organizations. It worked on petitions and gathered more than 50,000 signatures in a limited period of time. This petition was handed directly to the Foreign Minister Obuchi by Tun Channareth, landmine survivor and one of the founders of the Cambodia Campaign, who had been visiting Japan at that time at the invitation of the JCBL.
CCW and CD
Japan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981 and ratified it on 9 June 1982. It ratified revised Protocol II on 10 June 1997.
Japan has been a prominent supporter of efforts to address landmines in the CD, including efforts aimed at a complete ban in 1997 and at a transfer ban in 1998 and 1999. Then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi stated during the signing conference in Ottawa on 3 December 1997 that: "if we are to aim at a universal and effective banning for landmines, treaty negotiation should be started as early as possible at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Serious consideration should be given to an approach to begin such a negotiation taking up banning of export of landmines as a first step."(44)
Obuchi, as a Prime Minister, reiterated this position during hearings held before the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty.(45) In February 1999, Japan was one of the twenty-two CD members that jointly called, once again, for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a transfer ban.(46)
The Diet passed A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession on 30 September 1998. The bill had been presented on 24 September to three Committees of the House of Representatives for hearings (Foreign Affairs Committee, National Security Affairs Committee, Commerce and Industry Committee). The upper house passed the bill on 29 September immediately after which it was presented to the House of Councilors for an approval. There had been only a week for entire ratification process, which inevitably left fundamental questions unclear and sometimes unresolved. It was rushed through the Diet in an effort for Japan to be among the first 40 ratifications needed for the treaty to enter into force.
In its analysis of the bill, the Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines has raised a number of concerns. The purpose of the bill is described, in part, to "regulate possession" of AP mines.(47) The term "regulate" contrasts sharply with the term used in ratifying the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapon Convention. In both cases, the purpose of the domestic bill is clearly to "prohibit the development, production and stockpiling"(48) of either weapon. The term "possession" also creates a further problem in that one can argue that production is prohibited only under the current domestic law and other activities are only "regulated." During one of the hearing sessions an official from Ministry of International Trade and Industry was asked to clarify this point and stated that: "The use is prohibited under Explosive Control Act and others. The production and development are banned under current bill. The acquisition, stockpiling and retention are regulated under 'possession' of this bill and transfer is regulated under this bill as well as under Foreign Exchange and the Foreign Trade Law."(49) The government emphasizes that there is no loophole in the domestic law regarding a total ban.(50)
In one instance, the domestic bill appears more comprehensive than the Mine Ban Treaty. The domestic bill has no mention of an exception for antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. This point was discussed during the Diet hearings, and the government responded that any mine equipped with an antihandling device will be considered illegal.(51) As in the treaty, however, any command detonated mine will not be considered an antipersonnel landmine. Thus, the government's interpretation of the Claymore mine is that it is considered an antipersonnel landmine when it explodes by the presence of a person (i.e., when used with a tripwire), but not when it explodes by remotely controlled detonation through sight recognition.(52)
The bill does not address the issue of retention of mines for training purposes, as allowed under the Mine Ban Treaty. It also does not address how, when, and who will destroy landmines under possession by the Self-Defense Forces, and contains no provisions regarding international cooperation and assistance.
U.S. Mines in Japan
Regarding landmines stockpiled on U.S. bases in Japan, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: "Under the treaty, the obligation as the state party is to undertake measures within the framework of its jurisdictional authority to cease or deter activities prohibited under the treaty…thus it continues to be feasible for the U.S. forces to retain any antipersonnel landmines withheld and stockpiled in the U.S. bases in Japan." He also stated that "on the other hand, apart from treaty obligations, the policy of Japan is to terminate the use of landmines for defense purposes, and therefore, the government requested the U.S. not to use, develop or produce landmines within Japanese territory."(53)
With regard to the transportation of landmines by US forces stationed in Japan, it was stated that "in relation to antipersonnel landmines withheld and stockpiled in the U.S. bases, no Japanese national, whether civilian or Self-Defense Force, will be allowed to be engaged in transporting such mines under the treaty."(54)
Regarding U.S.-Japan joint military exercises, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that "it will not be acceptable for the Defense Force to engage in training which purpose is to use antipersonnel landmines, whether it be a joint exercise or not."(55)
The issue of transit through Japanese territorial waters or land by the US forces equipped with antipersonnel landmines was also repeatedly raised in the Diet session. The Vice Minister stated that "because we approve the possession of landmines by the US forces stationed in Japan, it would not be necessary to request a prior notification, and thus the government has no intention of doing so."(56)
The Defense Agency continued to purchase antipersonnel landmines until FY 1996 (procurement budget: 600 million yen). The Agency had also sought 680 million yen for purchasing AP mines for FY1997 but it was canceled once Japan signed the Ottawa Treaty. This budget line item has instead been allocated for purchasing "directional-multiple-shots."(57)
It is a widely known fact that a single private company, Ishikawa Seisakusho, assembled all AP mines. Several other companies are also known to have produced landmine components, but details are not available. The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of AP mine production facilities is not clear.
The Japanese Defense Agency is currently developing an alternative weapon system to antipersonnel landmines. The "Antipersonnel Obstacle System" combines sensor and remote control, and is detonated by manual command so that civilians are not targeted indiscriminately.(58) The Agency has been seeking budget allocations for this development since FY 1997, including 20 million yen for development in FY 1997, 20 million yen for development in FY 1998 and 600 million yen in FY 1999 for purchasing test models. During the Diet hearing session, the government stated, "We have asked for funding since FY 1997 and have been considering this. The budget we have asked for FY 1999 is for purchasing samples to examine in the coming two years if they actually function after assembling."(59)
Until a new alternative system is developed, the Defense Agency will use directional-multiple-shots as an alternative weapon. The government stated that "it will take some time for this (new system) to be completed and thus meanwhile, we will...make sure [the directional-multiple-shot-mine] detonates only by manual command. Until we develop an alternative system, we will purchase a small amount of directional-multiple-shots."(60)
The Agency has already converted all directional-multiple-shot-mines it possessed to directional-multiple-shots in FY 1998, and it also has sought budget allocations for new procurement in FY 1998 (1.4 billion yen) and FY 1999 (400 million yen). However, the number of munitions are not disclosed.(61)
Japan has never exported or imported antipersonnel landmines. This is forbidden under the Law on Three Principles on Arms Export. The export of components of landmines, such as fuses and blasting powder are forbidden under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.(62)
The total number of antipersonnel landmines possessed by the Self-Defense Force is 1,000,401 (as of the end of 1998).(63) The Defense Agency stated during the Diet hearings that it possessed 999,496 landmines,(64) but later changed the number to 1,000,401. According to the Agency, this change was due to simple miscalculation.(65) The type and number of antipersonnel landmines the Self-Defense Force possesses are:
1) Type-M3 49,974
2) Type-63 28,947
3) Type-67 586,530
4) Type-80 326,514
5) Type-87 scatterable landmines with self-destruct mechanisms 8,436
During the Diet session, an official from the Defense Agency stated that the government will determine the exact number of antipersonnel landmines to be retained for development and training purposes during the 180 day period for reporting to the Secretary General of the UN. However, this official also said, "We expect to require approximately 15,000 landmines for this exception in the next ten years."(67) The Defense Agency reinforced that "at this point in time, the statement made during the Diet Session last September is still valid, and we will come up with the exact figure before 180 days are over."(68)
To date, the government has not officially disclosed the contractor or schedule for destruction of its stockpiled landmines. However, in a response to a Diet member's inquiry, the Defense Agency presented the type and cost of initial destruction as follows:
1) Type M3 16,000
2) Type 63 9,000
3) Type 67 107,000
4) Type 80 87,000
5) Type 87 3,000
Total number: 222,000
The total cost for destroying these 222,000 antipersonnel landmines is 420 million yen, plus 27 million yen for transportation for a total cost of 447 million yen.(69) Thus, the average cost for destroying one landmine will approximately be 2,014 yen. In total, Japanese government is expected to spend 2 billion yen to dismantle all the stockpiled mines. These figures were also confirmed during the Diet hearing session.(70)
It must be noted that the government uses the word "haiki" as the translation of the word "destruction." "Haiki" means "discard" rather than "destroy." This point attracted much attention during the Diet hearing sessions and one Diet member sought to clarify government's position, and the response was: "Basically, we would ask the dealers to dismantle it rather than discard it. Not just removing the fuse but also blasting powder to deprive its function as a landmine."(71) It appears the government's interpretation of "discard" is the same as "dismantle" or "disassemble." When asked why explosion or incineration could not be considered as possible options, the government responded that it did not possess a training field where massive explosions can take place, and that fragments can disperse which could be harmful and dangerous.(72)
Actual destruction (or dismantling) may not begin during FY 1999 (April 1999 to March 2000). The only obligation for the Defense Agency in FY 1999 is to start logistical procedures and conclude contracts with firm(s) to undertake destruction.(73) The Agency has not prepared a complete dismantling plan since it believes that the official format will be discussed during the first conference of state parties in May 1999.(74)
Japan has not used antipersonnel landmines since the establishment of Defense Force in 1954. However, the government for a long time took the stance that landmines are an indispensable means in protecting its long coast lines. Landmines were considered as purely defensive weapons, appropriate for Japan's official "Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy."(75)
Mine Action Funding
The Japanese government contributed nearly US$30 million to mine action programs before the end of 1997. The most significant contributions for mine clearance operations were:
* Afghanistan (UNOCHA), $17 million
* Cambodia (CMAC), $5 million
* Former Yugoslavia, $3 million
* UN Trust Fund, $4 million
* OAS, $2 million
Mine victim assistance programs included support for the establishment of protheses facilities in Cambodia in 1992, and the establishment of a rehabilitation center in Cambodia in 1993, as well as assistance through the NGO Association to Aid Refugees-Japan for vocational training (1994, 1995, 1996).(76)
The government launched a new program to promote further assistance after signing the Mine Ban Treaty. On 3 December 1997, Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, having attended and signed the Ottawa Treaty, announced the "Zero Victim Programs," a plan to provide 10 billion yen over a five-year period starting January 1998 for landmine removal and support of mine victim projects.
In March 1998, the Japanese government held the "Tokyo Conference on Land Mine Issues." At this meeting, landmines were positioned as "not only a human rights issue but a barrier to the maintenance of peace and stability and reconstruction" and guidelines were defined for the following three areas: activities concerning landmine removal, development of technology for landmine removal and support for landmine victims. Furthermore, reducing the number of landmine victims to zero was declared the ultimate objective of the international community's efforts on the landmine issue.
The following the guiding principles were also outlined at this conference: 1) Regarding landmine removal activities, support should be given with an emphasis on the ownership of the mine-affected country and the partnership of donor countries, international organizations and NGOs; 2)Pursuit of "even cheaper, safer and efficient technology" in view of the real needs of humanitarian mine clearance; and 3) Regarding support for mine victims, the mine-affected country should determine a comprehensive program that includes medical service and prosthetics provision service and medical rehabilitation as well as vocational training, and promote the development of program management and implementation skills.
The 10 billion yen, five year program is to include the following elements:
* keeping in mind long term reconstruction, supplies such as mine detecting and removing equipment, vehicles, grass cutters, wireless transmitters and batteries are to be donated to the mine affected country, in addition to enforcing the coordination function of the UN and creating of a technology registration system with the donations.
* in order for the affected country to acquire the skills to plan and implement a comprehensive program for the support of landmine victims, technology cooperation and construction of and provision of equipment for medical and rehabilitation facilities should be made in the area of artificial limb production and mental and physical rehabilitation of victims.
* in consideration of the importance of a humanitarian support for landmine removal activities, the option of providing mine detectors and removal equipment from other countries should be opened up.
* full support to grassroots NGOs should be provided in the area of artificial limb production and rehabilitation of victims.(77)
In 1998 under this new program the Japanese government disbursed 106.16 million yen (US$8.65 million) to landmine-related assistance projects through multilateral agencies and NGOs.(78) The government has also been engaging in a survey to formulate bilateral demining and victim assistance projects in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The results have not been made available and the projects have not been initiated yet, but are expected to begin soon. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)(79) and the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS)(80) have undertaken the survey. Both agencies are governmental organizations that provide grants and technical assistance to developing countries, but for Bosnia-Herzegovina project, AAR participated in the local study mission to formulate the project.
Support to the United Nations and other multilateral organizations has included: UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance ($2.12 million); OAS Special Fund for mine clearance, victim assistance, rehabilitation and local mine awareness education in Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica ($45,000 ); and support for ICRC "Special Appeal for Victim Assistance 1998" medical treatment and rehabilitation projects including production of prosthesis ($1.47 million).
Japan has supported mine action in the following countries:
* Assistance to CMAC's mine clearance activities ($0.9 million)
* Financial contribution in holding Phnom Penh Forum in October 1998, including travel expenses for participants and logistical expenditures in holding conference ($0.3 million)
* Victim assistance vocational training through AAR ($0.119 million)(81)
* Medical assistance and rehabilitation assistance through AMDA (Association for Medical Development in Asia, a Japanese NGO) ($80,000)
* Provision of vehicles to Cambodia Trust ($50,000)(82)
* Provision of tractors for grass cutting to Halo Trust ($98,600)
* Assistance for establishing Bosnia Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) ($1 million)
* Assistance to mine awareness program through UNICEF, spent to purchase educational materials and to distribute them ($0.28)
* Assistance to Slovenia Fund through UNDP for mine clearance and victim assistance ($1 million)
* Assistance to demining project in Masinjiru area through UNDP ($1 million)(83)
* Small scale grant assistance for construction of Kigari rehabilitation center through Japanese NGO ($67,000)
* Small scale grant assistance to Nicaragua Red Cross, for purchasing one emergency vehicle and construction of local point for the emergency medical team to stand by ($84,000)
* Small scale grant assistance to mine victim support plan; spent on purchasing wheel chairs, prosthesis and rehabilitation equipment ($47,000)
To summarize, out of U.S.$8.65 million the government disbursed in 1998, 94% went to multinational organizations, and 6% to NGOs. Although five states received country-specific grants, the means for disbursement were nearly all through multilateral organizations. Financial contributions on landmine-related projects by the Japanese government have been heavily dependent on the role of international/multinational organizations. The government has provided little bilateral assistance or project oriented grants.
Contributions by Country and by Sector(84)
1) Cambodia $1.53 million (18.0%)
2) Bosnia Herzegovina $2.28million (25.3%)
3) Croatia $0.2 million (2.4%)
4) Mozambique $1 million (11.7%)
5) Rwanda $0.075 million (0.8%)
6) Nicaragua $0.13 million (1.5%)
7) Multilateral agencies $3.43 million (40.3%)
1) Mine clearance $5.86 million (68.7%)
2) Victim assistance $2.3 million (26.9%)
3) Vocational training $0.14 million (1.4%)
4) Mine awareness $0.3 million (3.0%)
Mine Ban Policy
New Zealand's Minister of Youth Affairs and Associate Minister of Women's Affairs, the Honourable Deborah Morris, signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa, Canada on 3 December 1997. In a statement to the signing conference, she noted,"In a sense landmines is not just a matter of foreign policy or defense: it is a youth issue and a women's issue."(85)
One year after New Zealand signed the ban treaty, its ratification and implementing legislation --the "Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Bill"-- completed its progress through Parliament. The legislation (referred to hereafter as the Act) was given the Royal Assent on 8 December 1998 and came into force the following day. New Zealand deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations in New York on 27 January 1999, the sixty-fourth nation to do so.
New Zealand first spoke in support of a total and immediate ban on antipersonnel landmines during the September 1995 Vienna session of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Review Conference. On 22 April 1996, at the Geneva opening of the final session of the CCW Review, New Zealand unilaterally renounced the operational use of antipersonnel mines through a joint statement by the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control.(86) This decision to renounce antipersonnel landmines came after three years of campaigning by non-governmental organizations under the umbrella of the New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines (CALM). Upon ratifying the ban treaty New Zealand's Disarmament and Arms Control Minister, Don McKinnon, acknowledged the role of NGOs in making the ban a reality: "This has been a unique international movement. New Zealanders have played a significant role internationally in efforts to negotiate a ban on antipersonnel mines. They have been supported back home by the New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines (CALM) and many other groups."(87)
During the parliamentary debate on the ratification and implementation legislation, McKinnon explained the policy change this way: "New Zealand has already declared that we do not need antipersonnel landmines. Our forces have not used them since the Korean War, and we hold no stocks of these weapons. In 1996 the Government announced a moratorium on the use of landmines, which resulted in our Defence Force unilaterally renouncing the use of landmines as a weapon of war. By signing the Ottawa treaty, the Government made it clear that we will explore all avenues for achieving a complete global ban, and that is what this Bill seeks to do."(88)
New Zealand attended the early meetings of pro-ban governments during the close of the CCW Review in 1996 and from then on participated in the Core Group of countries driving the Ottawa Process. It signed the Brussels Declaration, actively supported the key General Assembly resolutions and in the lead-up to the December signing ceremonies, New Zealand encouraged as many countries as possible to sign the ban treaty.(89)
New Zealand is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and ratified the amended Landmines Protocol on 8 January 1998. It is also one of the more recent members of the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand's strong preference is to promote the Mine Ban Treaty, not lesser measures through the CD because "New Zealand believes that the best way to push forward is to continue to extend the Ottawa membership, not to develop new instruments that run the risk of diluting support for all mine control and elimination measures."(90)
Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Act
The prohibitions in the domestic ban bill apply anywhere in New Zealand territory and in Tokelau, a dependent territory administered by New Zealand.(91) Engaging in prohibited activity is made an offense at domestic law, punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or a fine not exceeding N.Z.$500,000 (approximately U.S.$250,000). Antitank mines, antihandling devices and Claymore mines are not covered. Claymore mines are considered to be command-detonated devices and hence excluded from the Act. The rigging of Claymores so as to detonate by tripwire is a technique no longer taught or practiced by the New Zealand Defence Force.(92)
The Act contains a provision which allows a member of the armed forces "in the course of his or her duties, to participate in operations, exercises, or other military activities with armed forces of a state not a party to the Convention that engage in conduct prohibited by Section 7 (1), if that participation does not amount to active assistance in the prohibited conduct."(93)
The Act does not contain provisions with regard to international cooperation and assistance in areas such as demining, assisting mine victims, developing mine awareness programmes and sharing information on the means and technologies of mine clearance. They are considered as executive or administrative matters and not necessary to be included in legislation.(94)
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
New Zealand has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines.(95) In the past, New Zealand imported mines. U.S. Army records show that New Zealand imported 5,634 M18A1 Claymore mines from the United States from 1969-1988, with the most recent shipments of 3,096 mines in 1983 and 852 mines in 1988.(96) Another official U.S. government source indicates that the U.S. shipped 6,486 antipersonnel mines to New Zealand, including 4,800 mines in the period 1983-1992 but there is no breakdown of each year or mine type.(97) Under the new Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Act, antipersonnel mines are prohibited outright in New Zealand and will fall within the ambit of the Customs and Excise Act 1996, allowing the New Zealand Customs Service to exercise import and export controls from the time antipersonnel mines enter New Zealand territorial waters.(98)
Rather than sell or transfer, New Zealand destroyed its small stockpile of antipersonnel and antitank landmines when the "de facto" ban was declared in 1996 and now there are no antipersonnel or antitank landmines belonging to the Army.(99) New Zealand retains a small stockpile of command-detonated Claymore mines.
New Zealand's military has a history of mine use in conflicts dating from World War Two to Korea, but since 1996, operational use of antipersonnel mines has been banned. The Prohibition Act allows the presence and use of antipersonnel mines only as per the conditions of the Mine Ban Treaty regarding training and specifies that the Minister in charge may authorize use antipersonnel mines for this purpose. The Minister must specify, by notice in the official legislation journal (The Gazette), the number of antipersonnel mines determined to be the number absolutely necessary for the allowed purposes.(100) According to the government, however, the New Zealand Army does even not hold live mines for training purposes at the moment: "No live APMs are retained for operational or training purposes.... All mines being retained are either practice or inert and contain no explosives."(101)
Mine Action Funding
New Zealand's involvement in humanitarian mine action dates back to the end of the Cold War when it sent military personnel to assist the United Nations in establishing an indigenous mine action program in Afghanistan. Since then, New Zealand has assisted the United Nations in mine action in countries including Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Laos, Mozambique and Namibia, and for the last few years has seconded two personnel to UN Headquarters in New York to assist in the management of these mine action programs.(102) The assistance provided by New Zealand Defence Force personnel has included training, mine clearance and destruction, logistics support, planning demining operations and survey operations. New Zealand's contribution to mine action is a matter of considerable pride for the government and its citizens.
New Zealand's in-kind commitments are supplemented by funding which, since 1992, totals N.Z. $2,793,000 (approximately U.S. $1,710,000).(103) Recipients include governmental programs such as the Angolan National Demining Program (INAROE) and the Lao UXO program; the UN Trust Fund for Mine Clearance; UN agencies and headquarters; the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC); and schools conducting training and research into demining, prosthetics, rehabilitation and mine detection. For example, the New Zealand branch of the Cambodia Trust (Aotearoa-New Zealand) has received N.Z.$200,000 over a four year period (approximately U.S. $120,000) which has gone toward supporting the Cambodia School of Prosthetics and Orthotics. The New Zealand Embassy in Bangkok has made two small grants to the School for the purchase of equipment. Rehab Craft Cambodia, a rehabilitation programme for disabled in Cambodia, has been assisted in part by Government subsidies.
New Zealand is completely clear of minefields and unexploded ordnance. There have been New Zealand civilian, military and peacekeeping casualties from landmines but no detailed data is available on these individuals. One recent case involved a New Zealand nurse, Maggie Bryson, who was injured when the vehicle she was traveling in hit an antitank mine in Kosovo, killing an ICRC doctor and injuring two others.(104)
Although it was not a participant during the Ottawa Process, Niue signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. Niue was the nineth country to ratify on 15 April 1998 and was thus the first nation of the Asia-Pacific region to ratify. Niue has never produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. It has no military force as its defense is the responsibility of New Zealand.
Samoa's Minister of Transport, Hans Joachim Keil, signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. In a statement to the signing ceremony, Keil said that Samoa does not "use, produce, import or stockpile anti-personnel mines. However, we share the abhorrence of the indiscriminate devastation and suffering caused by these horrific weapons and have consistently maintained our support for international efforts to ban this terrible scourge."(105) Keil said "[i]t is our earnest hope that early ratification by all signatories will lead to early entry into force at the earliest possible time" and on 23 July 1998 Samoa became the third Asia-Pacific nation to deposit its instrument of ratification after Niue and Fiji, and the twenty-eighth in total.(106) Samoa, formerly known as Western Samoa, did not actively participate in the Ottawa Process meetings but it supported the 1996 and 1997 landmine resolutions by the UN General Assembly.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Solomon Islands, the Honorable Patterson Oti, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. In a statement to the signing ceremony, Oti said: "Some may wonder why Solomon Islands, with a population of less that four hundred thousand people living on hundreds of islands arrayed over 1,600 kilometers of ocean, has a particular interest in an enforceable ban on landmines. In 1942 and much of 1943, the Solomon Islands was the site of brutal land and sea warfare. Thousands of combatants and civilians were killed and the delicate forest and marine environments severely damaged. Left behind on land and the seabed, fifty-five years later, are unexploded ordnance including artillery shells, bombs and other dangerous devices."(107)
Oti said that Solomon Islands "followed with interest the extraordinary international effort that ... brought us to this treaty ceremony. If our resources had permitted, our representatives would have participated in the conferences that were so important as part of the Ottawa process."(108) While the Solomon Islands did not actively participate in meetings of the Ottawa Process or endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, it supported the key pro-ban 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
On 26 January 1999, the Solomon Islands deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations in New York
Solomon Islands has no defense force and is not believed to have ever produced, transferred, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. With the assistance of the United Nations Development Program, a feasibility study to determine the size of the UXO problem and the cost of dealing with it will begin soon.(109)
Mine Ban Treaty
On 3 December 1997 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra signed the Mine Ban Treaty on behalf of the Kingdom of Thailand. On 27 November 1998 Thailand deposited its instrument of ratification at the United Nations, making Thailand the fifty-third nation, and first in Southeast Asia, to ratify the MBT.
A representative from the Foreign Ministry, in a report prepared for the ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Group on Confidence Building Measures held in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, from 4-6 November 1998 stated, "Thailand is determined to fulfill the obligations specified in the Convention, including the destruction of mine stockpiles and mines buried in the ground."(110)
The new laws necessary to implement the treaty have been drafted and proposed to the Cabinet.(111) They must have Royal signature and proclamation in the Royal Gazette to make them functional. There was already domestic law, prior to the MBT, making it illegal for civilians to possess landmines.(112)
Thailand had been somewhat reluctant to embrace the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not actively participate in the preparatory meetings throughout 1997, did not endorse the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, and came to the Oslo negotiations in September 1997 only as an observer. However, Thailand did vote for the pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolutions in 1996 and 1997. It also supported the more recent 1998 UNGA resolution A/C.1/153/L.33 welcoming the addition of new states to the MBT, urging its full realization and inviting state parties to the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique.
A number of different sources have identified Thailand as a past producer of antipersonnel landmines, including the U.S. Army and the U.S. Department of State.(113) A U.S. Department of Defense data base released in July 1995 indicates that Thailand produced three types of antipersonnel mines. Model 123 Claymore-type mine; U/I TH (AP.1) blast mine; and U/I TH (AP.2) blast mine. The data base, available on CD-ROM, contains photographs and descriptions of the technical characteristics of the mines.(114)
In November 1998, a Thai Army officer stated that Thailand in the past produced only for training and research purposes, but has never produced landmines for operational use in battle.(115) The Thai military has stated Thailand is not producing APMs.(116) In 1998, the Thai U.N. ambassador said, "While being neither a producer nor exporter of landmines, Thailand nevertheless suffers acutely from the problem."(117)
It is not believed that Thailand has exported landmines. A 1993 U.S. State Department communication said that while Thailand had not exported mines, it "may be attempting to sell [its] landmines abroad."(118)
Thailand has imported antipersonnel mines from the United States, and perhaps other nations. According to U.S. Army documents, the U.S. shipped 437,166 antipersonnel mines to Thailand from 1969-1992. These were mostly M-18A1 Claymore mines which are not banned under the treaty when used in a command-detonated mode, but also included M-14 and M-16 antipersonnel mines, which are banned.(119)
Stockpiling and Destruction
According to a Thai military officer, mines are kept in six storage centers in the military armory department and eight storage facilities under the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Engineering Department.(120) Most of the stockpile of mines is held at Fort Bhanurangsri in Ratchaburi province. The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) also hold stockpiles of mines.(121)
The current stockpile apparently numbers approximately 400,000.(122) Details on mine types are not available.
The RTA, the RTN and the RTAF and the Ministry of Interior have prepared a plan to destroy stockpiled APMs within four to five years after authorization to destroy has been made.(123) The timing and quantity of mines to be destroyed has been considered. Some mines will be kept for training and research. Requests by the Thai Campaign to Ban Landmines to see the plan, as well as other documents, have been denied.
Disturbingly, the Thai military have told the Thai Campaign that they insist on the condition that should neighboring countries act against the treaty, they would reconsider this policy of destroying antipersonnel mines.(124)
In the past, Thai soldiers laid defensive minefields along the Thai-Cambodian border to prevent infiltration by Vietnamese troops. Vietnamese forces established a heavily mined perimeter (K-5), and Cambodian and Khmer Rouge forces are believed to have laid mines on what is now territory claimed by Thailand.(125) The most common mines used in Thailand were Soviet PMN-2, POMZ-1, and POMZ-2 mines, as well as Chinese Type 72 and U.S. M-18A1.(126) The Royal Thai Army states that most, but not all, of its mines were documented, and that when it found mines laid by others, the area would be marked with warning signs.(127) Military sources have said that some refugees entering Thailand laid mines for self-defense and protection from external armies.(128)
Mines were also used on the Thai borders with Burma/Myanmar, Laos, and Malaysia. While the Thai military no longer uses antipersonnel mines, along the northwestern Thai-Myanmar border it appears new mines are being laid by non-state actors, including refugees from the Karen and Karenni states of Burma/Myanmar now seeking shelter in Thailand.(129)
A survey conducted by the RTA and the RTN in 1998 shows that in all border areas 796 square kilometers are mined.(130) Of these mined areas, 532 square kilometers are on the Thai-Cambodian border, 124 square kilometers are on the Thai-Lao border, 53 square kilometers on the Thai-Myanmar border, and 87 square kilometers on the Thai-Malaysian border. The seventeen provinces in the northern, northeastern, southern and western parts of Thailand affected by landmines are Sa Kaeo, Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, Ubon Ratchathani, Chanthaburi, Trat, Tak, Mae Hong Son, Chiang Rai, Phayao, Nan, Uttaradit, Phitsanulok, Songkla, Yala and Chumphon.
A 1992 military survey of the Thai-Cambodian border indicated mines in approximately 440 square kilometres the five provinces of Ubon Ratchathani, Sisaket, Surin, Buriram and Sa Kaeo provinces, and on 250 kilometres of roads in two provinces, namely Chanthaburi and Trat.(131)
A 1998 report by the U.S. State Department estimates the number of mines in Thailand at 100,000.(132)
An inter-agency national committee on mine problems was initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in mid-1998. Committee members come from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior.
A new Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) was established on 18 January 1999, located in Thung Si Gun (Don Muang) area, north of Bangkok.(133) It is under the Prime Minister's Office with the Thai Military in charge of overall operations. It is headed by director-general Lt. Gen. Dr. Vasu Chanarat. TMAC will serve as a focal point of contact to deal with all matters concerning antipersonnel landmines, including demining training, area demining, mine awareness and victim assistance and coordination of domestic and international assistance on landmine management.
Both United Nations organizations and individual governments have been approached to provide financial assistance for mine action programs in Thailand. The Foreign Ministry has prepared a funding request for financial assistance which was forwarded to Humanitarian Demining Team Leaders on 18 August 1998. The project is titled: "Thai-XYZ (unidentified nations and one UN funding agency) Cooperation Project in Humanitarian Demining".(134)
The Royal Thai Army has been able to remove about 2,500-3,000 mines per year along the border, but intends to accelerate that pace greatly in order to remove all mines within ten years, as required by the treaty.(135)
The new TMAC is primarily responsible for the demining and destruction of APMs in Thai territory. A team of experts on demining training from the United States will help train demining personnel in Thailand in April 1999.
Thailand has estimated that the cost of demining and stockpile destruction will be over 1 billion baht, or U.S.$4 27.4 million, for the Thai military authorities and police combined. It will require four battalions and three companies of army and marine engineers.(136)
Thailand has also assisted others with mine clearance, notably Cambodia. According to Thai U.N. Ambassador Asda Jayanama, "We are pleased to have provided active assistance in demining efforts in Cambodia, bilaterally as well as multilaterally…. During 1992-1993, we dispatched two Thai engineering battalions into Cambodia to clear landmines on route No. 5 from Poi Pet to Battambang, providing the safe return home for hundreds of thousands of Cambodians."(137)
Mine Awareness Education
The government has done little in terms of mine awareness education. The new TMAC will be in charge of the public information on danger of antipersonnel mines, as part of its responsibilities.
The Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines, a group of NGOs, has organized and coorganized numerous programs on Mine Awareness Education during 1997-1998.
The numbers of people killed or injured by antipersonnel landmines are not available from any sources. There have been no records kept in the village administration, health-care units, hospitals, or public health and social welfare offices. Only one hospital on Thai-Myanmar border can provide their annual statistics on landmine survivors, Thai and non-Thai, patients for the past three years. Handicap International, now working on the Thai-Myanmar border, keeps statistics of Karen and Karenni survivors benefiting from their prosthetic and rehabilitation services.
Colonel Veerasak Raksasab, an RTA personnel who has been assigned to the TMAC operation unit, indicated that part of TMAC's task is to set up a database on landmine casualties; he admitted that it is going to take a long time.
The Thai Campaign has interviewed fifty-four survivors in fifteen sample villages in six of the seventeen provinces known to be mined areas. Two landmine survivors, who work in district hospitals as technicians in the Prosthetic Unit, were a great help in the interview process of two provinces along the Thai-Cambodian border. Both military personnel and civilians have been injured; including both males and females, with a majority being males. The ages of survivors and deaths range from children who can walk (1.5 years) to over-90-year-old villagers.
On 3 December 1998, representatives from Thai Campaign called on the Deputy Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the first anniversary of Thailand's signing of the Ottawa Convention and presented a letter signed by 1,823 supporters demanding the government begin to implement immediate assistance to mine victims.
Medical and rehabilitation services in Thailand are available in both state and privately owned hospitals and health care units, functioning at the provincial, district, and community levels. While facilities offering first aid are offered at all district and village levels, patients who have sever injuries and are in need of surgical care are referred to a higher level and to a better equipped institution. Psychological and social support are normally not provided. The mine victims are mainly supported by their own families and communities. Regarding rehabilitation facilities, mainly provincial hospitals with adequate equipment, personnel, and space, would provide this service since there are a number of patients with paralytic and/or diabetic problems as well.
Several border provincial hospitals have prosthetic and assistance devices available. There are also some government provisions for vocational or skills training for landmine survivors but most of the interviewees, especially those with family members dependent on them, refuse to take up the training. Projects for financial support are under the responsibility of the social welfare department, but most of the survivors have not been able to make use of them due to the budget constraints of the county.
Centers supporting medical rehabilitation include:
A national disability law, titled "Laws on Rehabilitation of Thai Disabled Persons, 1991" has been proclaimed in Thailand, and has been implemented since 1994. Landmine survivors are included in the description of handicapped persons as given in this law. Due to the economic downturn and the tight budget many conditions of this law have not yet been realized. Implementation has been inconsistent among provinces, districts and tambons.
1. Senator Gareth Evans, Questions without Notice, Australian Senate, l June 1995.
2. "Australia Pledges Support for Global Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines; unilaterally suspends use," Press Release by Downer and MacLachlan, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 15 April 1996.
4. Peter Jennings, Senior Adviser in the Office of Minister for Defense, Letter to Dr. Ian Buckley, 13 June 1997.
5. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Australian Duplicity At Landmines Conference," Media Release, 25 June 1997.
6. Australian Network ICBL, "Australian Ambivalence, South Pacific Commitment at Landmine Colloquium," Media Release, June 1997.
7. "Australia Shows Mine Ban Doubts," West Australian, 19 September 1997.
8. First Committee Adopts APMs Resolution, WKGR 8995, UNGA 52, United Nations.
9. The Honorable Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Speech on Antipersonnel Mines Bill, House of Representatives Hansard, p. 623, 26 November 1998.
10. DFAT, Conventional and Nuclear Disarmament Section, International Security Division, "National Interest Analysis: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction," tabled on 26 May 1998, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/nia/1998/1998019n.html
11. For example see: Member of Parliament Kathy Sullivan , "Landmines: Australia's Policies & Programs," Speech to Soroptimist International meeting, Melbourne, 30 October 1998; and Downer, Speech on Landmines Bill, House of Representatives, 26 November 1998.
12. Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.
13. "Australia and International Treaty Making: Questions and Answers," http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/infokit.html#3.
14. DFAT, "National Interest Analysis," tabled on 26 May 1998. See also: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Declarations: Austrailia. www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xxvi_boo/xxvi_5.html.
15. Graham Edwards MP, Speech to the Australian House of Representatives (page 558 Hansard), 25 November 1998.
16. The Honorable Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Speech to the Australian House of Representatives (pp. 624-625 Hansard), 26 November 1998.
18. "Australia Pledges Support for Global Ban on Antipersonnel Landmines; unilaterally suspends use," Press Release by Downer and MacLachlan, DFAT, 15 April 1996.
19. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables.
20. Letter from Valerie Belon, Demining Action Officer, US Dept. of State, to Human Rights Watch, 29 March 1994, and attached table from the Defense Security Assistance Agency, "US Landmine Sales by Country."
21. Bill van Ree and Patricia Garcia, Austcare, email correspondence to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch, 22 March 1999.
22. Two sources citing 60,000 AP mines are: Gervase Greene, "Australia to Sign Landmine Treaty," The Age, November 1997; and MAPW (Australia), "Australia Joins the World at Ottawa," MAPW National Newsletter, Summer 1997-98.
23. DFAT, "National Interest Analysis," tabled on 26 May 1998.
24. Thomas Hajnoczi, Government of Austria, Panel Presentation "Toward a Ban: The Ottawa Treaty, An Overview," in ICBL Report: Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, Hungary, 26-28 March 1998, p. 51.
25. "Australia to Sign Landmines Ban Treaty and Destroy Stockpile," Joint Media Release by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defense, 17 November 1997.
26. Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Penny Wensley, Statement on Assistance in Mine Clearance, UN General Assembly 53, Item 42, 17 November 1998.
27. Humanitarian Emergencies Section, AusAID, Letter to LM Researcher, 19 January 1998.
28. Australia and Landmines. http://www.dfat.gov.au/landmines/
29. The Honorable Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, "Statement to the Ministerial Treaty Signing Conference for the Convention on the Prohibitions of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and on their Destruction," Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
30. Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Penny Wensley, Statement on Assistance in Mine Clearance, UN General Assembly 53, Item 42, 17 November 1998.
32. Australia and Landmines: Demining. http://www.dfat.gov.au/landmines/
33. Bruce Grey, Submission, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament House, Canberra, 19 June 1998. See also, The Shadow of Vietnam, Television Documentary screened on TV3, New Zealand, 26 April 1995; Chris Gannon, "You'll Be Back for Breakfast," in Kenneth Maddock (ed.), Memories of Vietnam (Sydney: Random House, 1991), pp. 70-71.
34. Captain M. Donoghue, New Zealand Defence Department, Personal communication with LM Researcher.
35. Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, Address to the Signing Conference of the Ottawa Convention, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
36. Press Conference by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, 29 June 1996.
37. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution, (New York: United Nations, 1996), A/51/4.
38. Asahi Shimbun, 28 September 1997. (All documents, including official hearing records, journals and interviews utilized in this report are in Japanese, responsibility for any error in translating into English is that of the JBCL.)
39. Meeting with over twenty members of various political parties of the Diet and ICBL representatives, Tokyo, January/February 1998.
40. Statement by Nobuyasu Abe, Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 November 1998, p.36 of the conference report.
41. Asahi Shimbun, 8 August 1998.
42. On "Zero Victim Programs,": International Development Journal, August 1998. Statement by Tsuneo Nishida, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Tokyo Guideline and International Cooperation Towards Zero Victim, at the occasion of signing the Ottawa Treaty, 4 December 1997.
43. Interview with Jody Williams, Asahi Shimbun, 7 February 1998.
44. Statement by Keizo Obuchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997.
45. Statement by Keizo Obuchi, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p.3.
46. Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999.
47. A Law Concerning the Prohibition of the Production of Antipersonnel Landmines and the Regulation of their Possession, Article 1, Section 1.
48. Refers to domestic law passed in ratifying the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their destruction, and the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction.
49. Statement by Masatada Hirose, Bureau Chief, Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 6.
50. Interview with Yasunori Morino, Deputy Director, the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 December 1998.
51. Statement by Masatada Hirose, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, p. 2.
53. Statement by Akio Suda, Deputy Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 2.
55. Statement by Nobutaka Machimura, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 9.
57. It is not clear what type of munition the "directional-multiple-shots" are. The Agency does not confirm it is a Claymore type munition, but differentiates it from non-command detonated mines.
58. Statement by Hiroshi Kondo, Director of Planning and Programming Division, National Defense Agency, during 3rd NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, 28 November 1998, p. 51 of the conference report.
59. Statement by Yasunori Ito, Director General for Facilities, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, p. 3.
61. Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.
62. Yukio Kitazume, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of International Trade and Industry also confirmed on this point during committee hearings, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No.5, 25 September 1998, p. 10.
63. Asahi Shimbun, 23 February 1999.
64. Statement by Masakazu Yamauchi, Director, Weapons and Warships Division, Bureau of Equipment, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 6, 25 September 1998, p. 6.
65. Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.
66. Information obtained from International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 12, 1999.
67. Statement by Ken Sato, Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy, Defense Agency, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 14.
68. Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 24 February 1999.
69. A response by the Defense Agency to a Diet member, Yukihisa Fujita, 23 December 1998.
70. Statement by Ken Sato, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 28 September 1998, p.6.
71. Statement by Yasunori Ito, Director General for Facilities, Defense Agency, Commerce and Industry Committee, House of Representatives Proceedings Report No. 5, 25 September 1998, p. 2.
73. Interview with Atsuo Suzuki, Principle Deputy Director, International Policy Planning Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Defense Agency, 12 March 1999.
75. Statement made by Hiroshi Kondo, Third NGO Tokyo Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, p. 50 of the conference report.
76. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Nations Administrative Division, "The Current Conditions and Challenges of Landmine Problems," 10 September 1997.
77. On "Zero Victim Programs,": International Development Journal, August 1998. Statement by Tsuneo Nishida, Economic Cooperation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Tokyo Guideline and International Cooperation Towards Zero Victim, at the occasion of signing the Ottawa Treaty, 4 December 1997.
78. Progress Report on Landmine Related Assistance, as of January 1999, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Exchange rate: 1997: 1US$=107 yen; 1998: 1US$=118 yen).
79. Contact: JICA / Project Formulation Study Department, Shinjuku Maynds Tower BLDG.10thF 1-1 Yoyogi 2, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151-8558, JAPAN, TEL: 81-3-5352-5507; FAX: 81-3-5352-5500.
80. Contact: JICS / Planning and Survey Division, Shinjuku Sanshin BLDG. 4-9 Yoyogi 2, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151-0053, JAPAN, TEL: 81-3-5352-5962; FAX: 81-3-5352-5993.
81. NGO project subsidy is a program Japanese government begun in FY 1989 to subsidize private nonprofit organizations involved in international development cooperation. The government subsidizes one half of the cost of development projects undertaken by Japanese NGOs in developing countries.
82. Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects is a scheme of assistance begun in 1989. In response to requests from local governments, research institutions, medical organizations, NGOs and other organizations working in developing countries, Japanese embassies and consulate generals take up small-scale projects for assistance (anywhere between $1,000 to $100,000).
83. It was reported in the press that the contractor of this UNDP program in Mozambique is South Africa's company, Mechem. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it financed the UNDP and not to Mechem.
84. Progress Report on Landmine Related Assistance, as of January 1999, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Exchange rate: 1997: 1US$=107 yen; 1998: 1US$=118 yen). Some disbursements include both mine clearance and victim assistance projects. For the purpose of convenience, the total amount for each project is divided between mine clearance and victim assistance. Country contributions are not bilateral assistance but rather through multilateral organizations operating in these countries.
85. Statement by the New Zealand Head of Delegation, Honourable Deborah Morris, Minister of Youth Affairs at the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
86. Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Bill, Explanatory Note, November 1998.
87. "NZ Ratifies Antipersonnel Mines Ban," Media Statement by Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control, 28 January 1999.
88. Rt Hon. Don McKinnon, Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control, Second Reading debate on the Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Bill, 30 June 1998.
89. Hon. Simon Upton, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor of CALM, 17 November 1998.
90. Grahame Morton, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Email Correspondence with LM Researcher, 16 February 1999
91. Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998.
92. Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Bill - Report from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 14 September 1998.
93. Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998.
94. Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Bill - Report from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, 14 September 1998.
95. Brigadier C W Lilley, Deputy Chief of General Staff, NZ Defence Force, Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor CALM, 23 February 1999.
96. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables.
97. Letter from Valerie Belon, Demining Action Officer, US Dept. of State, to Human Rights Watch, 29 March 1994, and attached table from the Defense Security Assistance Agency, "US Landmine Sales by Country."
98. Hon Simon Upton, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor of CALM, 17 November 1998.
99. Interview with Captain Martin Donoghue, 6 October 1998.
100. Antipersonnel Mines Prohibition Act 1998 Section 8 (a) and Section 11.
101. Brigadier C. W. Lilley, Deputy Chief of General Staff, NZ Defence Force, Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor CALM, 23 February 1999.
102. Hon Simon Upton, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor of CALM, 17 November 1998.
103. Hon Simon Upton, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor of CALM, 17 November 1998. Note: all conversions from NZ dollars to US dollars have been calculated on an average exchange rate for the year concerned (1994-1999) and NZ$1 = US$0.58 for 1992-1993. Source: Exchange rate records kept by Neil Mander.
104. "Red Cross Doctor Dies in Kosovo Blast", Reuters Pristina, 30 September 1998.
105. Statement by Hon. Hans Joachim Keil, Minister of Transport of the Independent State of Samoa at the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997.
107. Statement by Hon. Patterson Oti, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Solomon Islands, at the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, Canada, 3-4 December 1997.
110. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Thai Government, "Thailand Mine Action Center", ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures Honolulu, HI, USA, 4-6 November 1998, p.1
111. Landmine Monitor interview with Lt. Gen. Dr. Vasu Chanarat, Director General of the Thailand Mine Action Center on 16 February 1999.
113. Letter from U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center to Human Rights Watch, 1 November 1993, p.1; U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.
114. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD-ROM, first released July 1995.
115. Personal communication in Thai language dated 26 November 1998 from Col. Veerasak Raksasab, Royal Thai Army, Operation & Intelligence Division, Engineering Department, Fort Bhanurangsri, Ratchaburi.
116. The Nation, "Ridding the world of fear and destruction", 6 November 1997.
117. Statement by Ambassador Asda Jayanama before the Plenary of the 53rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 17 November 1998.
118. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.
119. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. (no page number). This document gives the exact number and type of mines shipped each year from 1969-1992. Another official document from the Defense Security Assistance Agency puts U.S. APM shipments to Thailand even higher: 499,278.
120. Personal communication from Col. Veerasak Raksasab.
121. Landmine Monitor interview with Lt. Gen. Vasu Chanarat, Director General of TMAC on 16 February 1999.
122. Rough estimate obtained from Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.
123. Personal communication from Department of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official in December 1998.
124. LM discussion with TMAC officials in January 1999 which reiterates the Royal Thai Army stand reported in The Nation, "Army shifts stand to support landmine ban", 28 August 1997.
125. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 164.
127. Personal communication from Col. Veerasak Raksasab.
128. Interview with Thai military official in Mae Sot, Tak province, January 1999.
129. Interview with displaced ethnic migrants housed in camps along the Thai-Burma border, Mae Sot, Tak province, January 1999
130. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document given to Humanitarian Demining Team Leaders on 18 August, 1998, #1.3 p.1 and also Thailand Mine Action Center, A Brief Account of TMAC, January 1999, p. 2.
131. Ibid, #1.2 .
132. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. A-2
133. Thailand Mine Action Center, Directorate of Joint Communication, Supreme Command Headquarters, 183 Songprapa Street, Tung Si Gun, Don Muang, Bangkok 10120 Thailand, Tel (66-2) 565-5199, 565-5200.
134. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document given to Humanitarian Demining Team Leaders on 18 August, 1998.
135. Statement by Ambassador Asda Jayanama before the Plenary of the 53rd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 17 November 1998.
138. Dipankar Banerjee, Co-director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, "South Asian Regional Survey," prepared for Landmine Monitor, p. 24. Banerjee based this on observations from the South Asian Regional Landmines Workshop, held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 7-8 December 1998, attended by senior Bangladesh government officials including two serving Brigadiers.
139. Ibid, pp. 10-12.
140. Interview with Ministry of Defense Permanent Secretary Dato Mohd Alimin Abdul Wahab at the Bolkiah Garrison, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 11 February 1999. To quote: "There were initial reservations … (But) (I)t was His Majesty himself who said that we should subscribe (to the MBT)."
141. Ibid. He said, "We have to see our situation as not exclusive to the fact that our neighbors have got a similar position on landmines because then we feel more comfortable …not just purely as an ASEAN thing but an ASEAN spirit…taking stock of how we project our own survival in the years to come."
142. Telephone interview with Mr. Yahya Idris, Acting Deputy Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 11 February 1999.
143. Interview with MINDEF Permanent Secretary, 11 February 1999.
145. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables, provided under the Freedom of Information Act. (no page number)
146. Interview with MINDEF Permanent Secretary, 11 February 1999.
147. Royal Kingdom of Cambodia, Constitution, 1993.
148. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Chairman, His Excellency Ieng Mouly, Phnom Penh, 1 February 1999.
149. Norodom Sihanouk, Declaration of King of Cambodia, Siem Reap Peace March, 14 August 1998.
150. Landmine Monitor Interview with CMAC Director General, His Excellency Sam Sotha, Phnom Penh, 16 February 1999.