For the purposes of this report, those countries who have consented to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the States Parties Section.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bahamas, Janet G. Bostwick, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and made the statement: "The Bahamas produces no antipersonnel mines, has never used or stockpiled them, or engaged in any way in their transfer. However, we are morally obligated to play a meaningful role in global efforts to rid the world of them."(1)
The Bahamas ratified the treaty on 31 July 1998, the thirtieth nation to do so. It has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. The Bahamas endorsed the Brussels declaration, but did not participate in the Oslo negotiations. It voted in favor of the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines and also supported relevant resolutions and declarations of CARICOM and the Organization of American States (OAS). The Bahamas is not mine-affected.
Barbados signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified the Treaty on 26 January 1999. At the signing ceremony Special Envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Tull, said, "The Caribbean is the world's first regional landmine-free zone, and must remain so. Barbados is committed to keeping the Caribbean area free from mines."(2) Barbados has never produced, imported, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. Barbados endorsed the Brussels declaration and attended the Oslo negotiations as a full participant. Barbados supported all of the pro-ban 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines, OAS resolutions, and the CARICOM declaration. Barbados is not mine-affected.
"We have no capacity to produce antipersonnel mines," said Lawrence Sylvester, a spokesman for the Belize Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belize City.(3) Though Belize is the only Central American country not to have been affected by landmines, Belize has nonetheless generally supported the international effort to ban them.
Belize signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 February 1998 and ratified quickly afterward. After the treaty was ratified by Belize's House of Representatives, Belize deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations in New York on 23 April 1998. Belize was the tenth nation to do so globally and the second country in the Western Hemisphere, after Canada.
Belize did not participate in the Oslo ban treaty negotiations nor in the Ottawa signing ceremony but it did attend the June 1997 Brussels conference where it endorsed the pro-ban treaty Brussels Declaration. Belize also voted in favor of the pro-ban resolutions in 1996 and 1997 in U.N. General Assembly.
Belize has never produced, imported, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines. The Belize Defense Forces possess some limited quantities of antitank mines, but have no antipersonnel landmines in their stocks.(4)
No party in Belize is known to have ever used landmines. Consequently, there has been no need for mine action programs in Belize. Belize has not contributed to international mine action programs.
Mine Ban Policy
Bolivia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Javier Murillo de la Rocha signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Bolivia ratified on 9 June 1998, becoming the first country of South America and the sixteenth globally to ratify.
Bolivia participated in all of the ban treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and took part in the Oslo negotiations. It also voted in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998, as well as the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It is also a signatory to the 14 July 1998 Declaration of the Common Southern Market (MERCOSUR); in its sixth article governments agree "to work towards being able to declare MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile zones free of antipersonnel landmines and propose to enlarge this zone to include the entire Western Hemisphere."
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Bolivia is not believed to have ever produced or transferred antipersonnel mines. Bolivia has stated that it does not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.(5) Bolivia is not known to have used antipersonnel mines.
Bolivia is not mine-affected with the exception of its border with Chile which was mined by Chile during the 1970s, particularly during a territorial dispute in 1978. On 22 September 1997, the Bolivian newspaper El Diario reported that 80,000 Chilean landmines are buried in an area of approximately 10,000 square kilometers between the towns of Todos los Santos and Salar of Ayuni.(6) El Diario reported that landmines have killed three Bolivian peasants since 1985.
In July 1998, Bolivia offered to collaborate with Chile to remove the landmines along the border, according to Bolivia's Minister of Defense Fernando Kieffer.(7) Bolivia's President, Hugo Banzer, asked Chile to demine as soon as possible.(8) Banzer said that the mines planted twenty years ago have harmed both the Bolivian and Chilean people, citing the case of three Chilean workers who were injured by an antipersonnel mine near the border. According to press reports, during the 1997 treaty negotiations, Chile asked for ten years to remove the mines but Bolivia said it considers this to be too long.(9)
At the Canada-Mexico Regional Seminar, 11-12 January 1999 in Mexico City, David Bautista Sanchez, Ministry-Advisor of the Bolivian Embassy in Mexico, made a short but passionate speech demanding that other hemispheric countries urge Chile to clear the mines buried along the frontier. Sanchez said that these mines have claimed victims and caused economic hardship for those living in the region.
In recent years Canada, joined by other countries, has shown remarkable leadership in the global effort to ban landmines. Government of Canada representatives were key to negotiating the Mine Ban Treaty and Canada was the first country to sign and to ratify it. Canada was among the first countries to begin to destroy its stockpile of AP mines. It was also one of the first countries to announce funds for mine action. Funding in the amount of CAN$100 million(10) was allocated for implementation of the Treaty, including mine clearance and provision of assistance to victims. Canada has made available financial and technical assistance to other governments, enabling them to meet their obligations under the Treaty. The government has facilitated NGO involvement in various aspects of the Mine Ban Treaty and mine action in general.
However, there remain areas of concern that should be addressed and clarified by the government of Canada. Some of these are: the addendum to Canada's Instrument of Ratification on the issue of interoperability; the status of certain antivehicle mines and Claymore mines in Canada's arsenal; differences in the definition of "antipersonnel mine" between the Mine Ban Treaty and Canada's domestic legislation; and, money from the Canadian Landmine Fund allocated to research and development on alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.
Mine Ban Policy
Canada was the first nation to sign the ban convention on 3 December 1997. This was followed immediately by the submission of its instrument of ratification to the UN Secretary General in New York.(11) Canada appended to its ratification an understanding with respect to joint operations that is discussed below.
Canada's support for a ban on AP mines was first demonstrated on 17 January 1996 during the review of the Convention on Conventional Weapons when Canadian officials announced an immediate moratorium on the production, transfer and operational use of AP mines.(12) On 2 October 1996, it was announced that the destruction of two-thirds of Canadian stockpiles of AP mines would begin immediately with the remainder of stocks to be destroyed in the context of an international ban. The Ottawa Process was launched 5 October 1996 when, during the closing plenary of the conference "Towards a Global Ban on Antipersonnel Mines," Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy invited other governments to return to Ottawa in December 1997, to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines.(13) An intensive 14-month period of demarches, bilateral and multilateral meetings and negotiations with governments and NGOs followed the announcement. In addition to offering support for various initiatives, Canadian officials provided logistical support and used several means to build broad public and political support for the mine ban. For example, Canadian funds were made available to representatives of several governments who could not otherwise have taken part in several key meetings. Additionally, a quarterly publication was launched to keep both the public and government representatives apprised of developments throughout the process.
Frequently Canadian officials helped to draft the text and worked to build support for various UN, regional, and Ottawa Process resolutions centered on AP mines. These included UNGA Resolution 51/45S, 10 December 1996, calling for an international agreement to ban AP mines, UNGA Resolution 52/38A in 1997 calling on all member states to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, the June 1997 Brussels Declaration committing nations to the December treaty signing, and the 1996 Organization of American States resolution calling for a hemispheric mine free zone. To date it is one of only six OAS member states to submit information to the OAS Register of Antipersonnel Landmines.(14) In other fora such as the G-8 and the Commonwealth, Canadian officials worked continually to place the ban issue on these and other agendas.
From a Canadian perspective, perhaps one of the most significant developments following the conclusion of the treaty was the creation of the Mine Action Team (ILX) within DFAIT and the appointment of an Ambassador for Mine Action. The creation of a new division within the Ministry, mandated specifically to work on landmines was intended not only to move the treaty process forward but also to ensure that "Canada is able to continue to provide international leadership on the landmines issue."(15)
Another initiative supported by Canada is Landmine Monitor. In a press release announcing Canadian financial support for the Landmine Monitor initiative Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy said "(m)onitoring compliance is about making sure that the Convention becomes much more than words on paper…. It is about making sure that the Convention will have concrete impact on the lives of people who must live with landmines every day."(16)
In 1998, Canada issued two policy statements that address AP mines. The LYSOEN Declaration outlines a framework for Canada and Norway to enhance foreign policy consultations and cooperation on several issues, including landmines and small arms proliferation "with a view to enhancing human security, promoting human rights, strengthening humanitarian law, preventing conflict and fostering democracy and good governance."(17) The Canada-EU Statement on Small Arms and Antipersonnel Mines,(18) although not a signed or negotiated document, is especially significant for its reference to military exports, particularly small arms. On the anniversary of the Treaty signing a report, prepared by ILX, was tabled in Parliament, giving Members of Parliament an outline of international progress on the Mine Ban Treaty, global mine action and a general description of how Canadian funds for mine action have been committed.(19)
In 1997 the Department for National Defence authorized the formation of its Antipersonnel Landmine Working Group. Policy Guidelines published in the department's Personnel Newsletter in June 1997 outlined activities prohibited to Canadian Forces personnel such as stockpiling, acquisition and use of AP mines. A more recent publication in November 1998 addresses rules of engagement, participation in combined operations, planning and command and control.(20)
Understanding on Joint Operations
Canada appended the following "understanding" to its ratification instrument:
"It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with the international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in Article 1, paragraph 1(c)."(21)
This understanding seems clearly aimed at permitting Canadian forces to fight side-by-side with the United States in a war in which U.S. forces use antipersonnel mines.
There is concern about the consistency of the Canadian understanding with the treaty's obligation under Article 1, "never under any circumstances...[t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."(22) At worst, the understanding could be interpreted to constitute a reservation to the treaty, and reservations are prohibited under Article 19. At best, the understanding goes against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all possession and use of antipersonnel mines.
Canadian officials have said that the intent of the understanding is mainly to ensure Canadian military personnel are able to participate fully in joint operations, for example with NATO allies, without fear of prosecution. According to one key official, "Canada's 'understanding' was carefully researched and worded in an attempt to clarify a situation which is a reality for Canada - that as a member of a military alliance such as NATO, or as an active participant in UN sanctioned operations, we may find ourselves engaging in military operations with an ally that is not signatory to the Convention. In short, we were simply attempting to indicate our perceptions of our obligations under the Convention under a set of specific circumstances. In this case our perception is that 'the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians' in such coalition operations would not be considered to be efforts to 'assist, encourage or induce' others to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention. We believe that this is a realistic 'perception of our obligations' which does not in any way undermine the core obligations of the Convention."(23)
The Canadian Forces (CF) and the Department of National Defense (DND) were central to the drafting of Canada's understanding.(24) They voiced concern in early 1997 about the impact of the prohibition on "assistance" on joint operations. "The question was whether or not the Canadian Forces could legally work with an ally who retained the right to use a weapon which Ottawa considered illegal," writes Major Paul W. Fredenburg, who was deeply involved in the discussions, in a recent article published in Canadian Defense Quarterly.(25) "This could jeopardize interoperability with those allies and thus compromise Canada's defense alliances." Fredenburg states that the concerns on joint operations were also recognized and discussed in the NATO and ABCA (Australia, Britain, Canada and America) fora.(26) The position taken by DND in this area was reflected in the June 1997 APL Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines where, "...the use of [AP mines] by an ally in NATO, UN or coalition operations will not preclude the deployment of the Canadian Forces nor effect interoperability with those allies."(27)
According to Fredenburg, during the treaty negotiations the concerns of the Canadian Forces were examined at great length by the Canadian delegation. "The word 'assist' was interpreted as meaning direct assistance in actually laying the mine. Normal assistance provided to the force as a whole, such as fuel and security, would not be considered to be in contravention of the treaty."(28) Indeed, the Canadian implementation legislation allows for participation in joint operations with mine users "if that participation does not amount to active assistance in that prohibited activity."(29)
Fredenburg also says, "It was generally agreed that command and control of a U.S.-led coalition would continue to create problems especially in case of joint command. The status of exchange officers serving with U.S. units with a mine-laying role would also be problematic. It was agreed that this issue will have to be resolved first in NATO and any solution or agreement will, by common practice, be extended to the ABCA."(30)
Bill C-22, An Act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction was given Royal Assent by the Parliament of Canada on 27 November 1997 and is currently listed in the Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33.(31) The Statute was approved by the Governor General 25 February 1999(32) and it entered into force on 1 March 1999. The Act will be promulgated in the Canada Gazette, the official news bulletin of the Government of Canada.
Mines Action Canada has expressed concerns about two aspects of the Bill C-22 and the Mine Ban Treaty. They are presented here in order to spur further discussion and examination. First, in Bill C-22 the terms "anti-personnel mine" and "mine" are defined by use of the phrase "designed, altered or intended."(33) In the Mine Ban Treaty the same terms are defined by use of the word "designed" only and make no reference to the phrase "altered or intended."(34) Second, Bill C-22 contains a more narrow definition of the treaty's prohibition on assistance. C-22 states that participation in operations with a State not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is allowed "if that participation does not amount to active assistance in that prohibited activity."(35) (Emphasis added).
CCW and CD
Canada signed the original Protocol II of the CCW in 1981, and ratified it in 1994. The revised Protocol II of the CCW was ratified 5 January 1998. The Declaration submitted by Canada to the CCW and its original Protocol II is available on the UN web site.(36) For amended Protocol II, "Canada reserves the right to transfer and use a small number of mines prohibited under this Protocol to be used exclusively for training and testing purposes." Canada also issued these understandings:
1. "It is understood that the provisions of Amended Protocol II shall, as the context requires, be observed at all times.
2. It is understood that the word "primarily" is included in Article 2, paragraph 3 of Amended Protocol II to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped."(37)
In 1998 Canada did not veto the appointment, in the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), of a special coordinator to explore the possibility of negotiations in the CD of a ban on APM transfers, nor did it actively support the appointment. In January 1999 Canada stated that it would not oppose the re-appointment of a coordinator. While the Canadian position appears to be one of non-interference, Canada will not support any work in the CD that will impair or hamper the effectiveness of the Mine Ban Treaty. This assumption is supported by an address made by Ambassador Mark Moher in which he states, "If such negotiations do take place, the only standards that we will accept are those of the Mine Ban Convention. Canada will not be a party to moving international law backwards."(38) In the same address the Ambassador expresses the view that the CCW is a more suitable forum than the CD for any activity outside of the Mine Ban Treaty. "In our view, it would be more appropriate to supplement this existing instrument than to create a new instrument."(39)
Canada formerly produced the "Elsie" antipersonnel mine (models: C3/C3A1/C3A2). Production of the Elsie ceased in 1992.(40) Parliamentary records show no contracts beyond those signed in 1991 for the production of 100,000 Elsie mines. The mines were produced by SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc, a subsidiary of the SNC-Lavalin group, for the Department of National Defence. DND decided that it did not need that quantity and in a settlement with SNC agreed to purchase 40,000, which were manufactured and delivered in 1992.(41) Information on the total quantities of Elsie AP mines produced in Canada has not been made available to date.
The Elsie is a plastic-bodied, cone shaped AP mine, designed to wound or kill by blast effect. It is one of the world's smallest mines. The Elsie is undetectable with conventional electro-magnetic equipment, but a detector ring can be fitted to render the mine detectable.(42) The cost of the C3A1 in 1994 was $40. These antipersonnel mines were produced by Canadian Arsenals Ltd., a crown corporation, up until 1986, when Canadian Arsenals was bought by the SNC-Lavalin group and later re-named SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc. The subsidiary company continued to produce the Elsie at its ammunition factory in Le Gardeur, Quebec.
According to the Deputy Director of the Export Controls Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada has neither licensed production of the Elsie in another country, nor transferred AP mine production technology to another country.(43) However, records show that both the U.S. and Japan have produced "a copy of the Canadian C3A1, or Elsie, anti-personnel mine," the American M25(44) and the Japanese Type 6/67.(45)
According to Colonel Normand Levert it was not necessary to decommission the ammunition factory,(46) only molds and tools related to the production of the C3 mines were destroyed.(47) The tools were "destroyed by using arc-welding/shearing/crushing and/or burning under the surveillance of a Canadian Forces Quality Assurance Representative."(48)
SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc has been awarded a contract by the Department of National Defence to assemble 18,000 modified M-18 Claymore mines (re-classified C-19, to reflect the modification).(49) The C-19s are to be assembled in command-detonate mode only from component parts that were imported from the U.S. in the summer of 1997.(50) The imported parts were screened under the Canadian moratoria and were imported under an agreement that they would not be used to produce tripwire Claymores. To ensure compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty they are being produced without the built-in tripwire capability.(51) The Canadian Forces do not consider the M18 Claymore in command-detonated mode to be a mine as defined by the treaty, and are now referring to it as an "area defense weapon."(52)
The Antipersonnel Mine Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the Canadian Forces stated that Canada's operational stock of antipersonnel mines would be replaced with "...a mix of sensors, command-detonated weapons [such as the M-18 Claymore reclassified as C19s] additional infantry, artillery, armour and air-delivered weapons."(53) According to Major Harry Burke, Canada is not currently engaged in R&D on or the production of alternatives to AP mines.(54)
However, part of the mandate of the recently created Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies (CCMAT) is to investigate alternatives to AP mines, "...to show that viable and more humane alternatives, that do not target civilians, can be developed as a way to persuade hold-out countries to sign the Convention."(55) CCMAT's Project Charter outlines this aspect of the center's mandate: "...while there is no single technology or device that provides for a one-for-one replacement for anti-personnel mines, there may be alternative approaches that can accomplish the anti-personnel landmine function within the constraints of the convention in some scenarios and for some threats. The Centre would study and document such alternative approaches and identify technologies necessary for their implementation."(56) CCMAT plans to conduct its investigation into alternatives by acquiring, modifying and/or developing computer models (see below) to assess alternatives to landmines,(57) and the development of sensor and command and control technologies as components of alternative systems.(58)
Concern has been raised by Mines Action Canada about the use of the Canadian Landmine Fund to finance research into alternatives to landmines. Despite several requests,(59) neither CCMAT nor any of the Ministers responsible for allocation of the Fund have provided Mines Action Canada with formal, written clarification of the CCMAT research component into "more humane alternatives" to antipersonnel landmines.
CCMAT is currently developing an operational research study in computer modeling, to provide fact as opposed to opinion on the limited military utility of APM use. The aim of the initiative is to run model simulations to see the extent to which AP mines are of use in the field. This is an initiative supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, anticipating the study can be used as proof of the minimal military utility of AP mines, when in dialogue with non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty. The initiative was launched on 23 November 1998; the rudimentary basics of the initiative should be in place by fall 1999.(60)
The Government of Canada states that AP mines have not been exported from Canada since 1987.(61) This is substantiated by SNC-Lavalin who claim that when their take-over of Canadian Arsenals was made, Canadian Arsenals had received a government contract for the manufacture of several tens of thousands of type C3A1 mines, for sale to the Government of Kuwait.(62) Under SNC's ownership this contract was completed and the mines exported at the end of 1987.(63) Robert Racine, then Vice-President of Public Affairs, stated that this sale, "...to our knowledge, [was] the one and only order exported by our subsidiary [SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc.]."(64)
At the time of the final Canadian export order of C3A1s, Kuwait was allied with Iraq in the war against Iran.(65) Kuwait was later invaded and occupied by Iraq in August 1990, precipitating the Gulf War of January-February 1991.(66) Following the Gulf War, investigations of Iraqi arsenals found twenty-three different types of AP mine from at least ten nations, among them C3A1s produced by SNC-Industrial Technologies Inc.(67) In a 1995 letter former minister of defense David Collenette said these mines were either legitimately transferred from Kuwait to Iraq or Kuwaiti stockpiles were plundered during the war.(68) It is known the C3A1 was also supplied to the British Armed Forces. Canadian-manufactured AP mines are reported to have been used by U.S. and Japan.(69) Information on exports to these and other countries is not available at this time.
On 17 January 1996 the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs jointly announced a unilateral moratorium on the export of AP mines.(70) With entry-into-force of the MBT and Bill C-22 the ban on exports will no longer be at ministerial discretion but law. The ban on exports applies to all AP mines as defined by the treaty except those exempted by Article 3 for training purposes.
The Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies is currently arranging the import of PMN2 mines from Georgia for use in testing and challenging detection and neutralization equipment and techniques. The Centre uses live mines for this and in mid-December 1998 was offered the mines by visiting Georgian officials.(71) According to an official in DND, the department is not required to obtain import permits for this purpose, "DND does not request permission to import foreign anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction technique, as authorized by Art. 3 of the Convention and Bill C-22. The quantities are minimal and DND ensures that the total number of anti-personnel mines in its inventory remains well below 2,000."(72)
While there is no official or stated policy on another country moving AP mines through Canadian territory, a written response to queries made on behalf of Landmine Monitor notes transfer (import/export) of AP mines is prohibited under the Convention and that it does not address transit of mines. "Transit is the movement from one part of a state's territory to another part of the territory of the same state. Canada has no legal obligation to prohibit the transit of mines through our territory by other states. However, Canada discourages this."(73) Sections of the NATO survey circulated in March 1998 addressed questions around "storage, transit and transfer"(74) of AP mines. The results of the survey are unknown. In discussions with a DND official who worked very closely on the issue, it was said that Canada would not ask if landmines are part of NATO or allied shipments through its territory. The distinction between transfer and transit is presumably to leave undisturbed the right of "innocent passage," under cover of which the U.S., for example, might well move mines through Canada. The official said it was unlikely the U.S. would transfer its mines by road and the logistics of checking compliance with a prohibition on air and sea transfer are problematic.(75)
Canada announced that it had destroyed the last of its approximately 90,000 AP mines in November 1997. A special ceremony was held in Ottawa 3 November 1997, attended by both the Coordinator and the Chairperson of Mines Action Canada, Jody Williams of the ICBL, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Minister Lloyd Axworthy, Defence Minister Art Eggleton, and other officials, to blow up the remaining AP mines. Recently, the Department of National Defence (DND) reports that tilt rod fuses were separated from all M21 anti-vehicle mines in stock and destroyed in compliance with the treaty. The 20,000 stripped M21s are scheduled for destruction in the coming year. (76)
Canada destroyed 63,351 C3A1s and 104 M16A1/2s in 1996. It destroyed a further 18,004 C3A2s and 11,292 M16A1/2s in 1997.(77) The destruction took place between October 1996 and November 1997.(78) In 1996, DND considered these mines to be an obsolete technology and was planning to replace them with a remote-delivered, self-neutralising/self-destruct system (SN/SD). The treaty process accelerated the destruction of the AP mines and brought an end to the SN/SD plans.(79)
The destruction (including that of the tilt rods) was carried out at a base in Dundurn, Saskatchewan. Three or four CF personnel put alternating layers of a small number of the mines and expired explosive material into a pit. The mixture was blown up and the process repeated. The cost was calculated by the CF to be approximately $4 per mine in 1997; a total of $403,672.35 for the close to 90,000 mines.(80)
Other Mines and Munitions
Canada has retained its Claymore mines. The 5,400 presently in stock are American M18A1 Claymores. After conducting an inquiry, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) is satisfied that the M18s now in stock do not have a built-in tripwire capability.(81) To Mines Action Canada, there was lack of clarity within DND on whether the reclassification involved modification, removal or if the tripwire capability was ever present. An additional 18,000 C19 Claymores have been ordered without a built-in tripwire capability and are in production at SNC-IT in Canada.
The CF also stocks the "universal booby-trap device" F1A1. In the CF mine database, the F1A1 is listed as one of a number of devices which, operating together, would enable the M18 to function in a tripwire mode. Booby-trapping the C19s in this manner would now be illegal under the Canadian interpretation of the treaty. CF also reports stocking an "anti-lift device" based on the F1A1 switch; this device is reported to be able to function in a pressure mode while "not in AT mine anti-lift role."(82)
In addition, Canada has FFV 028 self-neutralising anti-vehicle mines.(83) It is listed as possessing these mines in its 1996 mine database, and is reported to have bought an additional 12,000 from the Dutch via Bofors in a process begun in 1996 and concluded in October 1997.(84) According to reports, the Dutch Ministry of Defence believed the magnetic influence mine would not be in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty because of the highly sensitive nature of its sensor.(85) Indeed, the CF 1996 database notes that "disturbance of the mine body will cause actuation." In addition, both the CF 1996 and 1998 mine databases warn that the mine may be set off by the metal components in a mine detector. DND confirms that the mines are controversial and reports that its tests remain "inconclusive." DND reports that it plans to modify the mine, replacing the current fuse with a safer one.(86) The DM21, a German anti-vehicle mine also held in significant quantities in Canadian stockpiles, is considered by DND to fall outside the treaty prohibition.(87)
The Canadian Air Force reports that it has no AP mines that would be prohibited by the treaty. According to the Air Force, the munition closest to the treaty definition in its possession is the Mark 20 Rock Eye Cluster Bomb, designed to destroy tanks.(88) NDHQ has no information on the failure rates of these munitions.(89) DND's "Anti-personnel Mine Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the Canadian Forces", 27 June 1997, provides for, inter alia, "air-delivered weapons" to replace AP mines prohibited by the treaty. (90)
APMs for Training
According to public statements of Minister of Defence Eggleton and Minister of Foreign Affairs Axworthy, Canada has elected to keep a maximum of 2,000 AP mines under the treaty exception for training purposes. This is not codified in Canadian law, but appears to have taken the form of a ministerial directive. (91) At time of printing, there were about 1,800 AP mines retained for training. These are broken down as follows: 1,000 C3A2s (Canadian); 493 M16A1/2s (American "Bouncing Betties"); 49 PMA1s (former Yugoslavia); 45 PMA2s (former Yugoslavia); 57 PMA3s (former Yugoslavia); 100 PPMI-No.1s (Czechoslovakia); 21 VS50s (Italy); 10 VAL M69s (Italy); and 8 VS MK2s (Italy).(92) These numbers will change over time as the C3A2s and M16s are used (at a projected rate of 50 per year), and more foreign mines are imported. Mines will be obtained in this way from Ukraine, as it destroys its stocks with Canadian assistance, and others will be imported from Georgia. The retained mines will be used to test countermine equipment and to teach mine-awareness to soldiers. They are stored at the Defence Research Establishment in Suffield, Alberta; probably also at the base near Dundurn, Saskatchewan and another Defence Research Establishment at Valcartier, near Montréal, Québec.(93)
There has been no evidence of the use of AP mines in Canada (other than for officially sanctioned purposes of military training and research and development). However, concerns were expressed when on 11 September 1995, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) used a remote-detonated munition concealed below the surface of a gravel road to disable a moving vehicle.(94) These actions by the RCMP occurred during the Gustafsen Lake standoff, a tense 31-day dispute over the occupation of land near Gustafsen Lake, British Columbia, by the First Nations' indigenous people, the Shuswap. Critics of the RCMP's tactic described the remote-detonated munition as an "improvised landmine."(95)
Mine Action Funding(96)
Canada began funding mine awareness training in 1989-90 when the Canadian Forces provided training for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.(97) The Department of National Defence has been funding mine clearance programs since 1992 (Iraq & Kuwait).(98) The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the agency responsible for delivering Canada's official development assistance program has supported mine clearance since 1993 when it disbursed more than $2 million to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Laos and El Salvador.(99)
Until 1998 Canadian support for mine action programs was largely channelled through either CIDA or the DND as follows:(100)
Year DND CIDA
1989 2,500,000 --
1993 900,000 2,455,344
1994 700,000 3,690,149
1995 700,000 1,490,235
1996 712,000 5,276,161
1997 715,000 3,860,363
Totals 6,227,000 12,772,252
CIDA has provided funding to United Nation agencies, the Red Cross and Canadian NGOs.(101) Other countries receiving mine action funding from Canada have included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia.
Canadian Landmine Fund
A significant increase in Canadian funding for mine action has evolved with Canada's change of policy and subsequent support for the global anti-landmine movement. On 3 December 1997 at the MBT signing in Ottawa, Prime Minister Chrétien announced the establishment of a $100 million fund to implement the treaty. "This means bringing it to life; making it truly global; clearing the mines; helping the victims. Both with immediate medical care and long-term help rebuilding their lives."(102)
The announced fund evolved into the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF) involving four Canadian federal government departments each mandated with different responsibilities. The Canadian International Development Agency is responsible for mine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is responsible for overall coordination, treaty universalization, ratification, monitoring, sustainability and Canadian public awareness. DFAIT and the Department of National Defence jointly are responsible for stockpile destruction. DND and Industry Canada jointly manage the newly created Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies. Within CCMAT, Defence has the responsibility for technology research and development, and Industry Canada the responsibility for the commercialization and marketing of any new technology.
Government strategy has been to maximize its contributions through partnerships with other governments (for example, Norway, Israel, Jordan, and Mexico) as well as with the private sector (for example, Canadian AutoWorkers Union - Social Justice Fund). The Canadian government's approach has also included NGO partnerships with particular involvement of Mines Action Canada (MAC). MAC is working jointly with the Canadian Red Cross and DFAIT on an outreach and sustainability program focused on Canadian students and youth. The Youth Mine Action Ambassadors Programme (YMAA) involves five youth interns working within host NGOs (UNICEF, Red Cross, MAC and MAG Canada) to raise public awareness, to build public support for mine action and to raise funds. These goals are met through organized events in schools, colleges and universities, as well as, various activities with the general public. In 1998 MAC and DFAIT created the Canadian Landmine Action Fund as another mechanism through which Canadians can financially contribute. Joint fundraising initiatives such as this are rare in Canada and are an attempt by both partners to develop additional and sustainable long term funding for NGO victim assistance and mine clearance programs.
The traditional funding agency for overseas assistance has been CIDA. In the latter part of 1998 CIDA created the Tapping Creativity Fund, to be accessed by Canadian NGOs working in the areas of mine awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance. The fund represents a very small portion of funds designated to CIDA for mine action. Although the fund has a much quicker review and approval process than normal, each project is limited to only a $200,000 contribution. Currently the fund is limited to $2 million for fiscal year 1998-99 only. As of 1 March 1999 almost $1.8 million of this fund had been allocated to 11 NGOs (included in the list below) for awareness, clearance and victim assistance programs in nine different countries.
Two representatives of Mines Action Canada are members of the Project Review Committee and provide NGO perspective and analysis to the decision-making process. MAC has been informed verbally that the fund has been extended and that multi-year funding will also be made available through it. It is hoped that both the sizes of the fund and the project limit will be raised significantly. NGOs are also able to compete with commercial firms and other organizations for tendered projects or through normal CIDA channels, which may not be as flexible or accessible.
MAC has also been invited to participate in the CCMAT. For the moment MAC participates as an observer in order to bring NGO expertise, perspectives and concerns to the Centre's work. MAC is waiting clarification on the exact nature of the research into the alternatives component of the CCMAT charter before officially joining the governance of the CCMAT.(103)
Since the announcement of the Canadian Landmine Fund allocations have been made to a wide variety of actors including multilateral agencies such as PAHO and OAS (Central America); UNMAS (Kosovo, Yemen), UN Mine Action Centres (Croatia, Chad); and UNDP (Mozambique). Through bilateral programs it has funded mine action in Bosnia, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, Thailand, and Ukraine.
DFAIT has contributed significantly to the ICBL, its Landmine Monitor initiative, and to Mines Action Canada, the Canadian component of the ICBL. Among the other NGOs receiving Canadian government funding are UNICEF/Canada, COCAMO, Sierra Club of B.C, World Vision Canada, Council of Canadians with Disabilities, Disabled People's International, Canadian Network for International Surgery, ADRA Canada, Alternatives, Handicap International, MAG Canada, C.I.D.C., and Queen's University.(104)
Funding can be broken into two components: domestic and foreign. In the first year, domestic expenditures include:(105)
CCMAT R&D of mine action technologies $1,445,000 (106)
MAC domestic outreach, domestic & international advocacy $300,000(107)
YMAA domestic outreach and sustainability $300,000
Other public awareness, sustainability, fundraising $571,000
Not all of the funding listed above will be spent solely in Canada. CCMAT will undertake field testing and international co-operation activities. MAC's funding will support several international activities. However, for the purposes of this report they are being reported under domestic funding. The proportion of the CLF set aside for research and development of new appropriate mine action technologies by the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies is currently the largest single allocation from the CLF, a fact that is unlikely to change.
Canadian funds destined for use outside of Canada include those given to Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, El Salvador, Honduras, Iraq, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Mexico (international conference), Mozambique, Southern Africa Region, Uganda, Yemen and Zimbabwe.(108)
Total funds committed from the Canadian Landmine Fund for clearance, surveying, awareness and victim assistance thus far are $28.16 million. Three major programs to be implemented over five years, 1998 through 2002, have been funded in:
Bosnia & Herzegovina -- clearance & victim assistance -- $10,000,000 [$2,470,000 ('98); $2,870,000 ('99); $2,000,000 (2000); $1,510,000 ('01); $ 1,150,000 ('02)]
Mozambique -- clearance, surveys & co-ordination -- $10,460,000 [$425,000 ('98); $2,500,000 ('99); $3,000,000 (2000); $3,500,000 ('01); $1,035,000 ('02)]
Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua) -- victim rehabilitation -- $3,500,000 [$500,000 ('98); $750,000 ('99); $750,000 (2000); $750,000 (01); $750,000 (02)]
Other programs funded include:
Afghanistan awareness; clearance; victim assistance $ 200,000
Cambodia awareness; victim rehabilitation; clearance 300,000
Chad survey equipment 100,000
Croatia clearance 100,000
Guatemala victim rehabilitation 100,000
Jordan clearance 300,000
Kosovo clearance surveys 950,000
Nicaragua(109) clearance 1,000,000
Peru/Ecuador(110) clearance 100,000
Yemen surveys 1,050,000
Additional funds were given to support international coordination (UNMAS, multilateral coordination, $500,000); universalization (advocacy, outreach and experts meetings, $245,000 for events held in Burkina Faso, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Georgia, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine); advocacy (ICBL, international NGO activities, $300,000); and monitoring, compliance and evaluation for a total of $580,000 (Landmine Monitor, research, monitoring and reporting, $450,000; Handicap International, technical magazine on best practices, $10,000; IDRC, tools to monitor mine action progress, $120,000).
Clearance and Casualties
Canada is not a mine-affected nation in the conventional sense, but it does have areas of mine/UXO-contaminated land. These areas tend to be former or active Canadian Force Bases, used as practice or training ranges. The decommissioning of military land has generated extensive range clearance work for demining/UXO clearance companies in Canada. The following companies are the main ones conducting survey/clearance work in Canada: Notra Environmental Services Inc, SNC-Lavalin and Wolf's Flat Ordnance Disposal Corporation.
The decontamination work that SNC-Lavalin has carried out so far has been at the ammunition disposal site, and other redundant sites. Le Gardeur, an ammunition facility outside of Québec City belonging to SNC-Lavalin, was closed down 3-4 years ago and is now in the initial stages of being decommissioned, with preliminary decontamination work (mainly on contaminated soils) being carried out by SNC-Lavalin.(111)
The majority of Canadians injured or killed by landmines are members of the Canadian Forces active in peacekeeping duties. Between December 1992 and December 1995 more than 44 incidents involving either antipersonnel or antitank mines were recorded in the Defense Department's Mine Clearance Operations Evaluation study. The study was completed in January 1996 and covers only operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and in Somalia. In total 32 injuries and 2 fatalities were recorded.(112) Twenty-four of the incidents recorded did not result in any injuries at all.(113) At the time of this writing the total number of deaths and injuries to Canadian Forces personnel attributable to landmines is not known. Benefits guaranteed by law to persons with disabilities include health and medical care, training, rehabilitation and counseling, employment and participation in decisions affecting themselves.(114)
Mine Ban Policy
Costa Rica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, and ratified on 17 March 1999, becoming the sixty-eighth nation to do so. As an active participant in the Ottawa Process, Costa Rica attended all preparatory meetings, endorsed the Brussels Declaration and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations. It voted in favor of the key 1996 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines but was absent for the 1997 UNGA resolution vote.
As a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Costa Rican government supported resolution AG/RES. 1568 (XXVIII-0/98) adopted in June 1998, calling for renewed efforts in supporting mine-clearing operations in Central America and reiterating the commitment for Central America to become an antipersonnel mine free zone by the year 2000.(115)
In San Jose, Costa Rica on 28-29 November 1996, the foreign ministers of Central America, including Costa Rican Foreign Minister Fernando Naranjo Villalobos, and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) "reaffirmed their decision to make the necessary efforts, with the assistance of national, regional and international institutions, to make Central America and the Caribbean, a zone free of antipersonnel mines by the year 2000. (They) also supported the Ottawa Process, including the immediate launch of negotiations and the signing in Canada in December 1997 of a legally binding international agreement to ban this type of weapon."(116)
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Costa Rica is not believed to have ever produced, imported, stockpiled or used antipersonnel landmines, though the government has not made a definitive statement. Costa Rica does not have a standing military, but the Ministry of Security performs the functions of ground security, law enforcement, counter-narcotics and national security.(117) According to the OAS, landmines are not used in Costa Rica.(118)
Although Costa Rica was largely unaffected by the Central American military conflicts of the 1980s, landmines were placed along the northern border by forces involved in the Nicaraguan conflict.(119) Colonel Jose Fabio Pizarro, head of the Costa Rican Ministry of Security's mine clearing program stated, "There are an estimated 5,000 mines planted along our border with Nicaragua."(120) Official estimates of the number of buried landmines in Costa Rica range from one to two thousand to a maximum of five thousand.(121)
All of the landmines are believed to be within one kilometer or less of the Nicaraguan border. The affected area stretches approximately from the Pan-American Highway in the west to the point where the Rio San Juan begins to flow along the border in the east. The total amount of land affected is limited to some 20 to 25 areas dispersed intermittently along the border. These areas range from about 100 by 200 square meters to 200 by 500 square meters.(122) Most of the mines found to date have been located just north of the village of Los Chiles.(123)
Current demining efforts are expected to clear all remaining mines by the end of the year 2000.
Mine Action Funding
The OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) are responsible for demining operations in Costa Rica. Assistance in the form of technical support for demining and funding have come from OAS member states including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Peru, the United States, Venezuela and Uruguay and OAS observer nations including Germany, Great Britain, Spain, France, Holland, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland.(124)
According to the IADB, the estimated cost of completing the demining operations in Costa Rica is U.S.$900,000 to $1.2 million over a 12 to 18 month period. Additional costs for providing a helicopter for medical evacuation of deminers are estimated at $700,000.(125)
In 1992, Costa Rica submitted a request to the OAS for assistance in demining its northern border areas. The OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy has primary responsibility for the program with the IADB providing technical support and planning assistance. Currently 35 Costa Rican Security Forces members are assigned to the demining unit along with three IADB supervisors. Four mine detection dogs are also available for demining operations.
Clearance operations have been suspended since March 1998, pending the acquisition of a medical evacuation helicopter.(126) According to Colonel Carl Case of the IABD, "funding is now in place to lease a UH-1H (helicopter) from a U.S. commercial contractor for a six-month period, followed by a buy-out using primarily Costa Rican Funds."(127) Colonel Pizarro of the Costa Rican Ministry of Security stated, "We believe that once we resolve this problem, mine clearance could take us a year and a half."(128)
According to the OAS, as of 21 August 1998, 57 mines have been destroyed, 703 metallic objects detected and 41,034 square meters of land cleared.(129) The U.S. Department of State estimates that a total of 300 to 1,200 mines have already been cleared.(130) The most common landmine found is the Czech PP-MI-SR bounding mine used primarily by the Sandinista forces in the 1980s.(131)
As part of a mine awareness program, DC Comics along with officers of a U.S. Southern Command Mine Awareness Team and UNICEF produced a special edition comic book in Spanish to teach children about the dangers of landmines.(132) Approximately 560,000 comic books were to be distributed mainly to Miskito Indians along the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua and Costa Rica.(133)
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
Data concerning landmine victims is mainly anecdotal. No casualties have been reported from the OAS demining activities. According to the demining protocols, paramedics are on continuous standby on-site during all operations, and surgical trauma care is provided at a Costa Rican government-supported hospital in the capital, San Jose.(134) The United States Department of State reported seven casualties in Costa Rica in the 1998 Hidden Killers report, though no specific details were available.(135) Colonel Case reported that several accidents had occurred when local inhabitants crossed the border to fish or gather food. He stated, "The presence of mines, if not always a deterrent, certainly discourages the free movement of people in these areas, in Costa Rica and the other countries (of Central America)."(136)
Exact figures concerning economic loss resulting from landmines are not available, although the fields where the mines are planted are fertile and are not cultivated because their owners are afraid to work them.(137) According to Colonel Case of the IADB, "Most of the areas where mines have been found so far are definitely useful for agriculture. In fact, some of the mines were discovered by farmers who were injured while preparing their land for cultivation. The terrain in these and most affected areas along the border is relatively flat and close to large areas already under cultivation."(138)
In May 1996, the Costa Rican Congress enacted the "Equal Opportunities Law for People with Disabilities." This law is based on the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities of Disabled People, the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, and the United Nations Children's Convention. Its provisions prohibit discrimination, provide for health care services, and mandate access to buildings for persons with disabilities.(139) Unfortunately, the effective implementation and monitoring of the law has been difficult to achieve and many buildings remain inaccessible to persons with disabilities. Nonetheless, a number of public and private institutions have made individual efforts to improve access.
Dominica, a member of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. (See Grenada report for Statement on behalf of OECS). Dominica ratified on 26 March 1999. Dominica endorsed the Brussels declaration but did not participate in the Oslo negotiations, where its was represented by regional bodies. It voted in favor of the key 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly pro-ban resolutions on landmines but was absent from the vote on the 1998 resolution. Dominica has never produced, stockpiled, transferred or used antipersonnel mines. It is not mine-affected.
"There are no mines now in El Salvador," said Mauricio Granillo Barrera, El Salvador's Ambassador to the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.(140) Though over 20,000 antipersonnel landmines still threatened the country after its twelve-year civil war ended in 1992, El Salvador, today, exemplifies a successful mine clearing program, as the country's terrain is, by all accounts, mine free.
Mine Ban Policy
El Salvador signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. It deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations in New York on 27 January 1999. El Salvador has not yet passed any domestic legislation implementing the ban treaty.
After clearing its own terrain of mines, El Salvador has played an active role in backing the international effort to ban landmines. In September 1996, El Salvador joined with other Central American nations in declaring the region a mine free zone in a joint statement signed by each nation's foreign minister, committing to no production, trade or use of antipersonnel mines. During the Ottawa Process, El Salvador endorsed the pro-ban treaty June 1997 Brussels Declaration, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September. El Salvador also voted in favor of all three pro-ban U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998, as well as the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). It is one of the few hemispheric countries that has reported to the Landmine Register of the OAS.
El Salvador is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Though the government of El Salvador extensively used U.S.-provided landmines during its 12-year-war against leftist guerrillas, it never produced its own landmines. The guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) made significant numbers of homemade antipersonnel landmines throughout the war. Most were made of homemade or store-bought materials including plastic construction tubing, potassium nitrate and sulphur (to make gunpowder) and flashlight batteries. Though some of the FMLN's devices such as minas abanicos or "fan mines" operated similar to Claymore mines and were detonated by remote control in ambushes, other devices such as minas de chuchitos or clothespin mines along with minas de pateos or "foot removers" were detonated indiscriminately either by a trip wire or by the pressure of a foot.(141)
The Salvadoran military imported from the United States about 37,000 antipersonnel mines including M18A1 Claymore mines and M14 blast mines during the conflict.(142) El Salvador has never exported antipersonnel mines. Most of the FMLN's mines were homemade, but they may have received mines from other sources as well.
El Salvador apparently has no antipersonnel mines. From March 1993 though January 1994, El Salvador's Division of Arms and Explosives of the Civil National Police destroyed the remaining antipersonnel landmines that were in the stocks of the Salvadoran armed forces. El Salvador reported the destruction of these mines to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States in April 1997.(143) It is not certain if Claymore mines were included in the destruction.
Throughout the conflict, both the Salvadoran military and the guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front used landmines, though the FMLN used them far more. The Salvadoran military used antipersonnel landmines for perimeter defense of military bases. Military units also sometimes used landmines to protect temporary field positions and encampments. But the FMLN made much more widespread use of antipersonnel landmines. While the FMLN used landmines not long after the beginning of the civil war in 1980, the guerrillas greatly escalated their use of landmines in the mid-1980s and continued to make use of them until the end of the war in 1992. The FMLN first changed tactics in the mid-1980s to heavily rely on landmines in order to deter massive counterinsurgency sweeps involving thousands of Salvadoran military troops at a time through guerrilla-dominated terrain.
Today, El Salvador is mine free. There is still a slight danger from unexploded ordnance in some remote areas of the country. When El Salvador's twelve-year irregular war finally ended in December 1992, an estimated 20,000 landmines were still in the ground. The FMLN used mines in over two-thirds of the country, mainly on volcanos, in the provinces of Chalatenango, Morazan, Usulutan, San Miguel, San Vicente, Cabanas, Cuscatlan and San Salvador and Santa Ana. The most densely mined areas included the Guazapa volcano and the San Miguel volcano. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs identified 19 specific mined areas comprising 425 minefields and covering 436 square kilometers of land.(144)
Mine Clearance and Mine Awareness
In May 1992, before the civil war even ended, representatives of the Salvadoran military and the FMLN agreed under the auspices of the United Nations to establish a joint committee to begin a demining and mine awareness projects. UNICEF spent U.S.$287,000 on an extensive mine action campaign involving posters, advertisements and other forms of outreach as well as training. Fourteen UNICEF educators trained over 3,600 teachers, health care personnel and community leaders to reach an estimated 300,000 people or about 44 percent of the population at greatest risk of landmines.(145)
In 1993, the government of El Salvador hired a private Belgian firm, International Danger and Disaster Assistance. At a cost of $4.8 million provided by foreign donors, the firm, in coordination with the United Nations, trained a joint team of 210 deminers comprised of former FMLN combatants and Salvadoran military engineers.(146) The firm handed over its mine detection gear to the Salvadoran military upon fulfillment of its contract. A total of 1,240 Salvadoran military engineers and 240 former FMLN combatants executed the demining.(147) Many former combatants identified mines that they had each previously planted. By January 1994, the joint effort had cleared 9,511 mines from 425 different minefields.
No accidents involving landmines have been reported since 1994, though some accidents from unexploded ordnance have occurred. From January 1994 through mid-1995, 271 people including 42 children were injured from unexploded ordnance.(148)
There are to date no comprehensive estimates of the number of landmines casualties from El Salvador's civil war, though at least 75,000 people were killed during the war. According to one estimate, over 300,000 young children and adolescents were left disabled.(149) Landmines began to take a serious toll on combatants and civilians alike by the mid-1980s. In just the first of 1986, for example, the Salvadoran military suffered between 64 and 125 casualties each month from landmines, while civilians casualties were running slightly lower at between 19 and 25 victims a month.(150) During the final year of the war at least 576 people were injured from either landmines or unexploded ordnance in 107 separate incidents.(151) Most soldiers and civilians alike were injured by mines planted by the FMLN.(152)
El Salvador has only recently requested assistance from outside donors as well as from multilateral organizations to develop a comprehensive landmine victims' assistance program. On 11 January 1999 in Mexico City, representatives of Canada, Mexico and the Pan-American Health Organization signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Joint Program for the Rehabilitation of Mine Victims in Central America.(153) The initiative includes a comprehensive effort by the Pan-American Health Organization, which is being financed by an initial grant of 3.5 million Canadian dollars, to assess the needs of war victims and to begin to address them in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. According to Hernan Rosenberg of the Pan-American Health Organization, the program will unfold in each country in four stages: assessing the number of victims; assessing individual's specific prosthetics and rehabilitation needs; providing for treatment and rehabilitation; and promoting victims reincorporation back into the workforce.(154)
A number of private groups have long attempted to address these concerns. They include the Association of Mine Victims and the General Secretary of the Family. In 1992, a German non-governmental organization, Medico International, and the Los Angeles-based Medical Aid to El Salvador founded Promoter of the Organization of Disabled Persons in El Salvador (PODES) "to provide job training and rehabilitation to those disabled during the war."(155) A U.S.-based NGO, the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, also supports PODES with technical support, training and funding.(156) PODES currently serves more than 900 patients, produces approximately 200 orthopaedic devices each year and services a similar number. PODES employs 23 people, 19 of whom are disabled.
One small craft shop that began while the civil war was still being waged in the late 1980s was founded by David Wiesenfeld, a former firefighter from California. The shop employed, at first, wounded soldiers, nearly all of whom were landmine victims, to make commemorative plaques for retail sale primarily to embassies. In 1992, shortly before the war ended, Wiesenfeld was among the first to reach out to the FMLN. Soon his shop was the one of the first anywhere in El Salvador to begin integrating ex-guerrillas with ex-soldiers. Within a year, more than a dozen war victims from both sides were fully employed at the shop. Unfortunately, while the work of the shop went on, its founder, David Wiesenfeld, was later murdered in a car-jacking in San Salvador. This tragic event only underscores the post-war problem which persists in El Salvador even after its successful mine clearance and awareness campaign: the proliferation of small arms.(157)
Grenada signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and was the thirty-second country to ratify the ban treaty, on 19 August 1998. It has not enacted domestic implementation legislation.
At the signing ceremony, Grenada's High Commissioner to Canada, Mr. George R.E. Bullen, made a statement on behalf of the six members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). He said that the OECS countries "wish to use this unique opportunity to affirm to the world their unstinting support for a global ban on the production, stockpiling, and use of antipersonnel landmines" Noting that "The OECS Region is one area of the world which is totally "landmines-free," he said OECS members "have undertaken to sign and ratify the Convention with the sincere hope that this process will lead, in the not-too-distant future, to the orderly eradication of this man-made scourge from our planet."(158)
Grenada participated in the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels Declaration, by voting in favor of the key 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines, supporting the CARICOM/CENTAM declaration and statements and resolutions by the Organization of American States.
Grenada has never produced, used, transferred or stockpiled antipersonnel mines. It is not believed to be mine-affected.
Mine Ban Policy
Guatemala signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. The Guatemalan Congress ratified the treaty less than three weeks later in a vote that was published in Guatemala's official register on 23 December 1998. On 22 February 1999, Guatemala's Ambassador, Alfonso Quinones, said "We are finalizing the [ratification] process now."(159) Guatemalan non-governmental organizations affiliated to the ICBL urged the government to ratify quickly.(160) On 26 March 1999, Guatemala deposited its instrument of ratification.
Guatemala was an early supporter of a mine ban. In September 1996, it joined with other Central American nations in declaring the region a mine free zone in a joint statement signed by each nation's foreign minister, committing to no production, trade, or use of antipersonnel mines. During the Ottawa Process, Guatemala endorsed the pro-ban treaty June 1997 Brussels Declaration, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September. Guatemala also voted in favor of the pro-ban U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1996 and 1997, as well as the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS).
Guatemala also passed domestic legislation to ban landmines as early as 1996 with Decree Number 106-97 prohibiting the production, purchase, sale, importation, exportation, transit, use or possession of antipersonnel landmines or of explosive artifacts or of their composite parts. It is believed that this law now serves as the implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty.
Guatemala is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on landmines, though it has not yet ratified the 1996 amended Protocol II. Guatemala is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
The government of Guatemala states that it did not use landmines during its long-running internal war, and there is no concrete evidence to the contrary. Some local military commanders, however, did occasionally deploy improvised explosive devices, often involving hand grenades set to trip wires, for perimeter defense around their bases.(161) The government also states that it has not produced or imported antipersonnel mines, and has no stockpile.(162)
The guerrillas of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) made relatively limited use of crude, homemade mines and improvised explosive devices during the war. The guerrillas used them for perimeter defense of their main base camps. One of the areas most heavily-mined areas by the URNG was the Tajamulco volcano in San Marcos, as it was the site of the rebels' clandestine radio station. In these areas, the URNG produced their own landmines out of locally available materials, including plastic tubing, potassium nitrate and sulphur (to make gunpowder) and flashlight batteries. Most of these mines were detonated by the pressure from above, though some were set as booby-traps. The URNG also occasionally booby-trapped hand grenades. The URNG also frequently used homemade directional mines, which function similar to Claymore mines, as a close-range offensive weapon against Guatemalan army troops.(163)
No one in Guatemala is known to have either made or used mines since the war ended in 1996.
Estimates vary as to the extent of both the antipersonnel landmines and unexploded ordnance that still threaten Guatemala. Before the war ended in 1996, the Guatemalan military claimed that the URNG guerrillas had deployed 35,000 landmines.(164) Today, Guatemalan Army General Otto Perez Molina, who represented the Guatemalan military in the peace negotiations with the guerrillas that ended the war, admits that figure was grossly exaggerated.(165) General Perez, who now represents the Guatemalan military on the Inter-American Defense Board of the Organization of American States, says that today probably only hundreds, not thousands, of landmines still pose a threat in Guatemala. Indeed the UNHCR and the ICRC both estimate that before the end of the war, in the mid-1990s, there were no more than 1,500 landmines in Guatemala.(166)
The mines were laid in many regions including the Playa Grande region of Alta Verapaz province along with the bordering region of Ixcan in Quiche province.(167) Other mined areas include the northern Peten province along Guatemala's border with Mexico, the Tajamulco volcano in San Marcos province as well as on the Atitlan volancos in Solola province. Mines were also used near San Mateo in Huehuetenango province, as well as in mountainous regions of Quetzaltenango, Chimaltenango and Escuintla provinces.(168)
Unexploded ordnance remains a far greater problem than landmines have ever been in Guatemala. The government's Executive Coordinating Unit estimates that there are between 5,000 and 8,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance in Guatemala,(169) in the same regions as above. An unknown amount of land remains affected by unexploded ordnance.
Mine Awareness and Clearance
Guatemala began to try and address its landmines problem as early as 1992, when the Demining Committee of the Inter-American Defense Board chief of staff visited Guatemala. Plans were drawn for a mine clearance process to be carried out in three stages by the Guatemalan military over a two-year period at an estimated cost of U.S.$4.2 million. But the plan was never implemented due to the ongoing civil war.(170)
Even before Guatemala began mine clearance, it initiated a program of mine and unexploded ordnance education. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was facilitating the repatriation of war refugees from Mexico back to Guatemala, embarked on a landmine and unexploded ordnance awareness program modeled partly upon the highly successful campaign led by another U.N. organization, UNICEF, shortly before in El Salvador. The program trained Guatemalan civilians among the repatriating community in mine detection and awareness. The UNHCR was assisted by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the German Project Coordination for Reparation of War Damages, in a program financed first by the European Union and then by Switzerland. The program spent U.S.$700,000 to assess the initial problem and to train a team of 18 selected refugees as landmine detection awareness leaders for the repatriating community.(171)
The trained team was later integrated into the Volunteer Firefighter Corps. The Volunteer Firefighter Corps has since proven essential to the country's demining and unexploded ordnance clearing process, as the Corps enjoys widespread confidence among Guatemala's civilian population. Their role in Guatemala stands as a model for civil society involvement in demining in other nations.
In 1995, Decree Number 60-95 established a national demining coordinating commission which included the President of the Commission of Legislative Studies for Peace, an agency of the Guatemalan congress. The commission was also comprised of representatives of the Volunteer Fireman's Corps, the National Commission for the Attention of Repatriation, Refugees and Displaced Persons, along with a private German firm, Project Coordinator for Overcoming War Damages. The law also provided $200,000 to support the ongoing work of the Volunteer Firefighter Corps.(172)
Guatemala's three-decade long civil war finally ended in December 1996. As part of its obligations under the peace accord, URNG transferred its largest minefield to the United Nations Mission for Guatemala, which monitored the implementation of the peace accords. The area was cleared by a U.N. military contingent in April 1997. Soon Guatemala also passed Decree 46-97, which established the Executive Coordinating Unit. In November 1997, the unit prepared a "National Plan for Demining and the Destruction of Unexploded Ordnance." It is under the auspices of the above legislation and plan, that the Inter-American Defense Board is now assisting Guatemala with its demining and unexploded ordnance clearing efforts.
The Inter-American Defense Board is helping with demining and related efforts in Guatemala as well as in Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The effort is being supported by donor nations including Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, while military personnel are being provided by member states of the Organization of American States including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, the United States and Venezuela. The progam was expanded from working only in Honduras in 1995 to working as well in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Costa Rica by 1998. Fifteen demining platoons, each comprised of approximately 25 deminers, are involved in the regional operation, whose total annual budget in 1998 was U.S.$3 million.(173)
The Inter-American Defense Board only began training Guatemalan personnel in demining efforts in June 1998 and actual clearance operations in Guatemala only began in December 1998. Hurricane Mitch, which swept Central America's Atlantic Coast in November 1998, has not delayed demining and related activities in Guatemala.(174) In the first month of operation, the IADB's demining team detected and destroyed ten antipersonnel landmines, clearing twenty-four square meters of land.(175)
Guatemala has yet to make any comprehensive effort to treat war wounded. Though the number of casualties from landmines and other war-related artefacts are far lower in Guatemala than, for example, in neighboring El Salvador, the total number of wounded from Guatemala's civil war remains unknown. It appears that little or no treatment is currently available in Guatemala for prosthetics fitting, rehabilitation and workplace reincorporation. Partly because the overall need for such programs is considered to be far less in Guatemala than in other Central American nations, the Pan-American Health Organization is not undertaking such efforts in Guatemala.
"We have many problems, and we have to grapple with several things at the same time," the President of Honduras, Carlos Flores, told a delegation of the Organization of American States and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, including the Nobel Laureate Jody Williams, in Tegucigalpa on 8 January 1999. While thousands of landmines still threaten Honduras, the country also suffered the worst damage of any Central America nation last fall from Hurricane Mitch.
The delegation saw Mitch's devastating impact first hand across the Honduran border in Nicaragaua along the Rio Coco at the site of the Anastasio Somoza bridge. While the river's flow had since been reduced to a trickle, Mitch's flood line was still marked near tree tops by hanging, dried straw. Mitch caused a devastating U.S.$2.1 billion worth of damage to Honduras which, before the storm, had a Gross National Product of about U.S.$10 billion.(176)
Only the vertical steel girders of the Anastasio Somoza bridge remained. Three months later, in January, a helmeted Nicaraguan soldier stood near one of the girders not far from a sitting Weimaraner dog. On command, the dog walked alone on a path between yellow markers, while sniffing in the sand. The dog and the soldier were searching for mines and unexploded ordnance that might have been deposited there by Mitch. The soldier and the dog had been trained together by the Inter-American Defense Board at its regional demining base in Danli, Honduras.(177)
While Mitch set back all of Honduras for years, it only set back the Inter-American Defense Board's demining efforts there by about three months, its experts say.(178) (In Nicaragua, the same experts expect Mitch to set back its demining efforts a full year.)
Mine Ban Policy
Honduras signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. It deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations in New York on 24 September 1998. Honduras has not yet passed domestic legislation implementing the ban treaty.
Knowing too well the tragedies of mines, Honduras has fully supported efforts to ban the weapon. Honduras first endorsed an immediate, comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines in April 1996.(179) In September 1996, Honduras joined with other Central American nations in declaring the region a mine free zone in a joint statement signed by each nation's foreign minister, committing to no production, trade or use of antipersonnel mines. During the Ottawa Process, Honduras endorsed the pro-ban treaty June 1997 Brussels Declaration, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September. Honduras also voted in favor of the pro-ban U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1996 and 1997, as well as the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS).
Honduras is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and it is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
The government of Honduras has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It has imported a very small number of antipersonnel and antitank mines from the United States, but it is not known if it has purchased AP mines from other sources as well.(180) In response to a questionnaire from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in April 1996, the Honduran government stated that it had imported, stockpiled and used antipersonnel mines only in "very limited quantities for military training purposes only."(181) Since the end of Nicaraguan war in 1990 and of the El Salvador war in 1992, there is no evidence that any party of any nationality in Honduras has used landmines.
On 8 January 1999, the ICBL delegation asked President Flores whether his country still possessed antipersonnel mines. The President frankly told the delegation that he did not know, but that he would find out. Landmine Monitor, on 24 February 1999, asked Honduras' military attache in Washington, D.C. the same question.(182) No response has been received to date.
The irony of Honduras' present landmine dilemma, as Honduran officials today are quick to point out, is that the mines that still affect the country were not planted by Hondurans.(183) Instead most of the country's mines were planted by foreign combatants fighting over Nicaragua in the 1980s. After the fall of the dictator Anastasio Somoza in July 1979, Sandinista revolutionaries took power. By the mid-1980s, anti-Sandinista rebels known as the Contras established military bases in southern Honduras.
Both the Contras and the Sandinistas relied exclusively on Eastern bloc landmines, including Soviet-made PMN blast mines and Czechoslovakian-made PP-MI-Sr-11 "Jack-in-the-box" mines. Other mines discovered in Honduras include the Czechoslovakian-made PP-MI-1 antipersonnel mine along with the Soviet-made PMN-2 blast mine and the Soviet-made PMD-6 antipersonnel mine.(184)
Throughout the conflict, both the Contras and the Sandinistas mined either side of the Honduran/Nicaraguan border. While the bulk of mines still lay in Nicaragua, up to 20,000 landmines were once believed to threaten Honduras. This initial estimate, however, appears to have been grossly exaggerated. Today, Inter-American Defense Board experts say that there are probably only about 3,000 landmines which still pose a threat in Honduras.(185)
FMLN guerrillas, based in El Salvador, laid several thousand landmines in Honduras. But unlike the factory-made, long-lasting mines widely deployed by both the Contras and the Sandinistas, the FMLN used only homemade devices dependent upon flashlight batteries, which rapidly deteriorate in tropical climates.(186)
The most heavily mined area of Honduras is the El Paraiso province along the Nicaraguan border. Choluteca province, to the southwest of El Paraiso and contiguous to it, is also heavily mined. Within them, the Honduran military identified potentially mined areas including 95 square kilometers in the Las Trojes region, 76 square kilometers in the Las Limas region, 63 square kilometers in the Las Difficultades region, 38 square kilometers in the El Portillo del Gobernador region, 29 square kilometers in the Cerro de Jesus region, 24 square kilometers in the Bocay region, 12 square kilometers in the Tierra Colorado region, 7 square kilometers in the Palo Verde region, 5 square kilometers in the Mojon Amatillo region and 200 square kilometers in the Las Vegas Salient region.(187)
In Honduras along its border with El Salvador, the FMLN planted homemade landmines mines in both the La Paz and the Lempira departments. The Hondurans identified 52 square kilometers of potentially mined territory in the La Virtud region and 120 square kilometers of terrain in the Naguateria region.(188)
Mine Clearance and Clearance
Honduras and the Organization of American States began negotiations over how to jointly address the country's landmine problem back in June 1992. In July 1993, Honduras requested assistance in mine clearing from the Organization of American States to carried out by the Inter-American Defense Board. Six U.S. Army Special Forces officers or non-commissioned officers led the training. They initially trained nine military personnel from Brazil, four military personnel from Colombia and five military personnel from Honduras in demining techniques.(189) These instructors then trained four platoons with 17 Honduran deminers each from October 1994 through June 1995. Along with support personnel, the total number of Honduran trainees was 130 men. They marked areas for demining in mid-1995. On 18 September 1995, they began mine clearing operations.(190)
The Inter-American Defense Board's efforts in Honduras now includes the presence of helicopters near the mine clearing sites in case of accidents. Before, wounded deminers were transported by whatever means were available. From 9 March 1996 through 10 January 1997, three Honduran soldiers and two officers were injured during mine clearing operations.(191)
The Inter-American Defense Board program also provided for limited rehabilitation and fitting of prostheses for war victims, fitting approximately 200 civilian amputees. The Inter-American Defense Board program included some efforts of mine awareness through radio and television ads as well as posters.(192)
One consistent criticism of the Inter-American Defense Board's efforts in Honduras as well as in other Central American countries is that it has made little effective effort to incorporate civil society groups into its mine clearance and awareness campaigns. In Tegucigalpa, President Flores admitted this shortcoming to Williams and other delegation members and he said that his government is seeking to find better ways for civil society groups to participate in the process.
Nonetheless, the Inter-American Defense Board's demining activities go on in Honduras. The Board's regional efforts began in Honduras in 1995 before they were expanded to other Central American countries in 1998. Fifteen demining platoons, each comprised of approximately 25 deminers, are involved in the regional operation, whose total annual budget in 1998 was $3 million.(193)
The Inter-American Defense Board's regional operation is being carried out under the auspices of the Organization of American States' Working Group on the Demining Problem in Central America, Document No. GT/PDCA-7/97 rev. 1, "The Organization of American States Demining Assistance Program in Central America: Responsibilities of Participants," 15 September 1997. The operation is also responsive to the Inter-American Defense Board's own guidelines as stipulated in Document No. C-2964, "Directive of the Inter-American Defense Board to the Program of Assistance for Demining in Central America," 19 February 1998. The operation is being assisted by a private consulting firm, RONCO, which has previously assisted in demining efforts in Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovenia and Croatia. The center of operations or "The Mission of Assistance for the Removal of Mines," known as MARMINCA, is currently based in Danli, Honduras, though by next year the base is expected to be moved to Managua, Nicaragua.
Though the demining efforts in Honduras began in 1994 with the participation of military officers from Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and the United States, military officers from El Salvador and Venezuela were incorporated into the program by 1996. In January 1999, Argentinian military officers joined the effort.(194) Today, a total of 28 military personnel from six Latin American countries are participating in demining efforts in Honduras as well as elsewhere in Centeral America. The United States is continuing to provide additional training and logistical support for the regional effort. Moreover, in late 1998, the Board increased the number of Mine Detection Dogs available for deployment to 12. The dogs along with their Honduran handlers have been trained by RONCO at MARMINCA, and they will be deployed in Honduras as well as in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.(195)
By August 1998, before Hurricane Mitch, the Inter-American Defense Boards efforts had detected and 2,100 mines in Honduras, sifting them from 39,583 metal objects which the joint human/canine demining teams had found. By August 1998, 234,542 square meters of Honduran land was cleared.(196) Since Hurricane Mitch, by the end of 1998, the Boards efforts had detected and destroyed two more landmines out of 39,867 metal objects detected, clearing 248,202 square meters of land.(197) The Inter-American Defense Board estimates that the clearing of over 240,000 square meters of Honduran land has opened up a total of 5.54 million square meters of land for planting or other purposes.(198)
The Inter-American Defense Board's mine and unexploded ordnance clearance programs in Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Costa Rica are being financed by nations including Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Honduran officials estimate that over 200 civilians have been killed in landmine accidents since 1990.(199) However, Honduras, like most other Central American countries, has yet to conduct a comprehensive assessment of its casualties resulting from mines or other artefacts of war. From September 1994 through August 1995, the Inter-American Defense Board recorded six mine accidents, some involving children, in Honduras near the Nicaraguan border.(200) From March 1996 through September 1997, the Inter-American Defense Board recorded five mine accidents involving civilians in Honduras.(201)
Honduras, like most other Central American countries, has only made minimal efforts in either addressing the needs of its war wounded or providing them with adequate treatment. Honduras has yet to even assess the total number of Hondurans who have been injured from landmines. Now, however, the Pan-American Health Organization is helping Honduras deal with both problems. On 11 January 1999 in Mexico City, representatives of Canada, Mexico and the Pan-American Health Organization signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Joint Program for the Rehabilitation of Mine Victims in Central America.(202) The initiative includes a comprehensive effort by the Pan-American Health Organization, which is being financed by an initial grant of 3.5 million Canadian dollars, to assess the needs of war victims and to begin to address them in Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. According to Hernan Rosenberg of the Pan-American Health Organization, the program will unfold in each country in four stages: assessing the number of victims; assessing individual's specific prosthetics and rehabilitation needs; providing for treatment and rehabilitation; and promoting victims reincorporation back into the workforce.(203)
Jamaica's Minister of Legal Affairs and Attorney General, A. J. Nicholson, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December. Jamaica ratified the treaty on 17 July 1998, making it the twenty-fifth to ratify. Jamaica has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. In an April 1996 reply to an ICBL questionnaire, Jamaica first stated its support for an immediate ban on antipersonnel landmines. It also stated that it had never produced, stockpiled, used or imported antipersonnel mines.(204) Jamaica supported the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels Declaration, supporting key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UNGA resolutions, the CARICOM/CENTAM declaration on landmines and key OAS resolutions. Jamaica is not mine-affected.
Mine Ban Policy
Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Angel Gurría, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. As noted by the Foreign Relations Secretariat (SRE) Director General for the United Nations Minister Luis Alfonso De Alba, "Mexico has been one of the main promoters, along with Canada and other nations, of the Ottawa Convention."(205) Mexico was a member of the Core Group of nations which led the Ottawa Process. It was one of the first nations in the world to call for a total ban on antipersonnel landmines and has been a diplomatic leader on the landmine issue since the negotiations for the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Mexico ratified the ban treaty on 9 June 1998, the seventeenth country to do so. During the Mexican Senate's debate on ratification, Senator Jorge Alfonso Calderón Salazar said the government "shall undertake vigorous diplomatic actions to...promote the implementation of this instrument, its ratification by legislatures and further realizations of positive actions."(206)
Mexico has not enacted implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty. But, it is important to note that once the Mine Ban Treaty was promulgated and published in the Official Federal Gazette (Diaro Oficial de la Federación) on 21 August 1998, it became a part of domestic law.(207)
The Mexican Permanent Mission to the Organization of American States (OAS), on 7 February 1997, issued a "Declaration of Principles of the Government of Mexico on the Production, Exportation and Use of Antipersonnel Landmines," which detailed the steps taken by Mexico in regional and multilateral fora toward banning antipersonnel mines and which declared the use of antipersonnel mines a violation of international humanitarian law.(208) Mexico has played a leading role on this issue globally and in the Western Hemisphere. It has supported, by consensus, key resolutions of the Organization of American States on landmines. Mexico is one of the few OAS members that has submitted data to the OAS Antipersonnel Landmines Registry. In January 1999, Mexico and Canada, with the support of the OAS and the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), convened the first Regional Seminar on Antipersonnel Landmines in Mexico City on 11-12 January 1999.
While Mexico ratified the CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines in 1982, it has not yet ratified the 1996 amended Protocol II. According to a Foreign Ministry official, Mexico does not expect to ratify amended Protocol II as it views it as being surpassed by the Mine Ban Treaty and too limited in comparison with the ban treaty.(209)
Mexico is a member of the Conference on Disarmament but does not support, and in some instances has blocked, any effort to launch negotiations on a transfer ban in this forum.(210) Mexican officials have stated their opposition to any measures that might undermine the comprehensive ban embodied in the Mine Ban Treaty.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
The government states that it does not use, produce, stockpile or transfer antipersonnel landmines, and has never possessed mines. The February 1997 Declaration of Principles stated that "the Government of Mexico neither manufactures nor imports antipersonnel landmines and maintains a strict and constant vigilance over the enterprises of Mexican corporations that utilize explosive materials and does not grant any permissions for the manufacture of antipersonnel landmines." The Declaration of Principles also explicitly stated that there is no production, nor licensing for production, of antipersonnel mines in Mexico and no import.(211)
Additionally, a Press Bulletin issued by the SRE states that "Mexico was the first country in Latin America to declare that it does not produce or import antipersonnel landmines. In 1997, the OAS recognized Mexico as a landmine-free territory."(212)
There is no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in Mexico. During the Antipersonnel Landmines Regional Seminar, hosted in Mexico City on 11-12 January 1999, Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Rosario Green Macias declared that Mexico had never used landmines and that Mexico would not do so in the future, not in the State of Chiapas nor elsewhere in the country. If others have done so, "We would find them and expose them," Green Macias said.(213)
In the past, a U.S. State Department report and a few media articles alleged mine use by rebel forces in Chiapas, and mine use by drug traffickers in Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Sonora.(214) In response to questions on this matter, Foreign Relations Secretary Rosario Green Macías stated in an interview that "there is no evidence to prove an opinion of that nature, I assure you that the Mexican government is not involved at all." Green stated that if there were individuals responsible for the use of landmines in Mexico, "we would exhibit them because Mexico repudiates and opposes this type of devices."(215) Also on this matter, Mexico's Permanent Representative to the OAS, Ambassador Claude Heller said, "We also know that there has not been any incidents in Chiapas resulting from a landmine explosion."(216)
Allegations of mine use in Chiapas appeared on 11 October 1994 in the El Norte newspaper, in a letter to the editor signed by Daniel Pensamiento, which said "...the Zapatista Army for National Liberation [EZLN] determined to break the dialogue with the Mexican Government and proceeded to mine all terrestrial accesses...on the rebel territory."(217) Another letter from Pensamiento, dated 10 February 1995, stated that "EZLN First Captain Lucio, informed that the armed group decreed a state of alert and initiated the works for reinstalling mines on the accesses to the jungle to avoid a possible night incursion of the Mexican army."(218)
In a telephone interview, Head of Correspondents for the Proceso magazine, Mr. Salvador Corro, said that the letters "may have been a figurative declaration" and added that "there is no evidence of any antipersonnel mine incidents or antipersonnel mine-related casualties in Chiapas."(219)
While Mexico is not mine-affected, and there are no known mine casualties in Mexico, according Minister Luis Alfonso De Alba, "Mexico was the main promoter of the initiative which ended with the signature of the 'Memorandum of Understanding on a Joint-Program for Rehabilitation of Victims of Landmines in Central America,' between Mexico, Canada and the Pan-American Health Organization" at the Regional Seminar on Antipersonnel Landmines in January 1999.(220)
Mexico has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, and is not known to have contributed bilaterally to mine clearance operations in affected nations.
Mine Ban Policy
Nicaragua's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Edmundo Castillo Salazar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. Nicaragua deposited its instrument of ratification on 30 November 1998, the fifty-fourth nation to do so. On the one year anniversary of the treaty signing, 4 December 1998, President Arnoldo Aleman stated, "We Nicaraguans have been witnesses of the devastating effects of antipersonnel landmines planted during the previous decade and that have caused severe and irreparable damage to many persons, in the majority civilians and sometimes children, that did not know the field of battle but that have been mutilated by this mortal artifact. The same has happened in other countries. That is why its use, stockpiling and production has been prohibited by the Ottawa Treaty, that Nicaragua has signed and ratified."(221)
Nicaragua was one of the early backers of a mine ban, first announcing its support for an immediate, comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines at a United Nations conference on mine clearance in July 1995 in Geneva, Switzerland. In September 1996, it joined with other Central American nations in declaring the region a mine free zone in a joint statement signed by each nation's foreign minister, with each pledging to no production, trade or use of antipersonnel mines. Nicaragua attended all of the treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-ban treaty June 1997 Brussels Declaration, and was a full participant in the Oslo negotiations in September 1977. Nicaragua also voted in favor of the pro-ban U.N. General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998, and supported the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS).
Domestic implementation legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty is currently under consideration, through a commission of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Relations. It will be reviewed by the recently created National Demining Commission, referred to the Presidency for approval, and subsequently to the legislature.
Nicaragua is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Nicaragua's Ejercito Popular Sandinista (Sandinista People's Army - EPS) has been identified as a past producer of the TAP-4 directional fragmentation antipersonnel mine.(222) In an interview, Lt. Col. Cesar Delgadillo, Army Chief of Operations, confirmed that around 1985, the Sandinista Army produced a very primitive version of the TAP-4, but he said the mine was never exported and production ceased before the end of the war.(223) A November 1993 U.S. Army document stated that "Nicaragua only produced minimal numbers of TAP-4 mines, strictly for internal use. They are no longer produced and no exports are envisioned."(224)
The Sandinista Army acquired its mines from the Soviet bloc and the Army will not specify the type or quantity of mines exported to Nicaragua. The contras acquired Claymore antipersonnel mines and perhaps others from the United States. It has also been reported that the contras used a Brazilian-made antipersonnel mine nicknamed "quitadedos" or "removes toes."(225) Other sources of contra mines are unknown.
According to a number of reports, the following antipersonnel mines have been found in Nicaragua:
- Soviet Union: OZM-4, PMD-6 and -6M, PDM-1M, MON-50, MON-100, PMN, PMN-2, POMZ, POMZ-2;
- East Germany: POMZ-2, PMFM-1;
- Czechoslovakia: PP MI SR II;
- Egypt: PMFC-1, PMFH-1, PMM-1.(226)
Nicaragua has not exported antipersonnel mines.
According to the Minister of Defense Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Nicaragua has a stockpile of approximately 100,000 antipersonnel mines.(227) The Army began destruction of stockpiles in April 1993 with the explosion of 2,858 mines by a specialized Army platoon.(228) As of November 1998, the Army had destroyed 18,672 antipersonnel mines including PP MI SR II, PMD-6, and PMN mines.(229)
When the ICBL and 1997 Nobel Co-Laureate Jody Williams visited Nicaragua in January 1999, the government announced its decision to destroy its remaining stockpile of about 100,000 mines by the end of March 1999. On 19 February 1999, Nicaragua's Foreign Minister Eduardo Montealegre stated that the first destruction of the stockpile would take place in mid-April 1999 during the visit by Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chrètien, Secretary General of the OAS Cesar Gaviria, and Foreign Ministers of the region.(230) This will be the first publicly-monitored destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in Nicaragua. The Foreign Minister indicated that no precise timetable had been set for the destruction of the remaining stock.(231)
In January 1999, Nicaragua's Defense Minister had said that destruction would take place in March 1999. "I'll be frank with you," he said, "we want to be the first to comply, to set an example, because we need donations to clean the country of mines. And the time to get donations is when there's a lot of attention on the process, a lot of sympathy."(232) The Minister confirmed in an interview that "an important quantity of mines" will be destroyed in the April destruction ceremony and admitted that as yet there is no time-line in place for the destruction of the remaining stockpile.(233)
Some in the Nicaraguan Army have indicated that it may require the maximum four years allowed to complete destruction of the stockpile. A study for the donor community is being undertaken to examine the social and ecological impact of the destruction process, to calculate the costs of destruction and to set forth a timetable for destruction.(234)
Nicaragua's stockpiled APMs are located in army warehouses. They are destroyed by being exploded on site. To date no public figures have been released of the cost of destruction. Nicaragua receives technical support from the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) through the OAS for the destruction of stockpiled mines.
It is not known if or how many mines are being retained for training purposes, as allowed under Article 3 of the treaty. It is not known if Claymore-type mines (MON-50, MON-100) are included in Nicaragua's stockpile destruction plan.
There are no allegations of recent use of antipersonnel mines in Nicaragua. According to Nicaraguan Army sources, the Operational Division of the Army registered the laying of about 120,000 antipersonnel mines during the 1980s conflict.(235) Massive emplacement occurred in 1984 when the conflict intensified. According to non-Army sources, in addition to the Operational Division of the Army, there were at least three other operational levels that were authorized to use mines; sometimes the Reserve Battalions or Fixed Brigades were also equipped with mines, as were some militia units.(236) Mines were used mainly for protection of strategic installations, economically important locations, and lines of communication.
The contras also employed mines extensively, mainly to disrupt economic life and destabilize the government. According to a December 1996 report by Americas Watch, mining by the contras "caused the great majority of civilian casualties.... The contras made no effort to warn the civilian population of the placement of mines."(237)
A systematic survey of the mine problem in Nicaragua has never been undertaken, though an initial United Nations assessment mission was recently completed.(238) Estimates of the number of mines planted in the ground during the war range from 91,000 to 135,000.(239) The most common recent estimates of the number of mines currently in the ground range from 70,000 to 75,000,(240) though some official estimates are as high as 85,000-90,000.(241) According to one source, at least 600,000 Nicaraguans, or one out of every seven, are affected by the presence or suspected presence of mined areas.(242)
Mines are mostly located in the border areas in the north and south of the country, with perhaps two-thirds along the Honduran border. Mine-affected land is found around electricity towers and power stations, settlements and cooperatives, bridges, communications towers, and warehouses. Heavily mined is the Dipilto cordillera from Las Manos to the joining of the river Poteca with the river Coco. Additional minefields are near Wamblan, Bocay and Waslala. According to the UN, the most affected Departments are Esteli, Jinotega, Madriz, Matagalpa, and Nueva Sergovia, which contain one-quarter of the Nicaraguan population and form the breadbasket of the nation.(243)
Mine Action Funding
Mine clearance in Nicaragua is carried out as part of the regional Organization of American States / Inter-American Defense Board Demining Program in Central America. Total costs in 1993 and 1996-1998 have been about US$6 million. Operations were suspended in 1994 and 1995 due to lack of funding. The OAS has calculated that about $9 million will be required to complete the demining process in Nicaragua, a figure which takes into account the impact of Hurricane Mitch on the demining program.(244) An Army spokesperson, Lt. Col. Spyro Bassi has estimated $10 million is needed to complete the demining task.(245)
The annual budget has been approximately $1.5 million per year. International donors have included Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US.(246) Denmark has contributed $1.8 million on a bilateral basis, Sweden has contributed $1.6 million though the OAS program, and Norway has contributed $800,000 through the OAS.(247)
Some 250 military (and ex-military) personnel have participated in the OAS/IADB demining program, from countries of the region as well as from the United States.(248) Nations that have provided military specialists to assist in the clearance effort include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In November 1998 there were twenty-three trainers and advisors engaged in field operations, from Brazil (nine), Colombia (seven), US (four) and Venezuela (three).
The Nicaraguan Army, with support from the Inter-American Defense Board and the Organization of American States, is currently undertaking mine clearance and training operations in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas begin demining on their own in 1990, and claim that almost 11,000 antipersonnel mines were removed from 131 locations in the first year.(249) In August 1991, Nicaragua requested assistance in mine clearance from the OAS. After a study was conducted by the IADB of the problem, the OAS and IADB began demining in cooperation with the Nicaraguan Army. They put together a team of 15 military specialists from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and Uruguay. The team targeted the Sebaco area. But the program was suspended in December that same year due to the lack of funding. By then an estimated 2,538 mines had been eradicated.
The Nicaraguan Army continued on its own, with some bilateral support, until May 1996 when new funding was allocated to reinitiate the IADB/OAS program. Mine clearance operations recommenced in April 1997, this time under the responsibility of the OAS's Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. The OAS also set up its regional base for the clearance effort in Central America in Danli, Honduras called MARMINCA (Mision Asistencia Para la Remocion de Minas en Centro America).
Clearance has proceeded in several phases or "modules." The first module involved a sweep of the perimeter of a hydroelectric plant near Jintega to check and certify the results of demining carried out previously by the Nicaraguan army. In the second module, 1,656 mines were removed from thirty-eight electricity towers in the Juigalpa area. The third module which began in October 1997 involves clearance of 17 highway bridges.
At the end of October 1998, the Nicaraguan program included 14 mine clearance platoons with about 380 personnel, working on three fronts.(250) Each special clearance unit is composed of half military experts, and half specially-contracted civilians. They work under the technical supervision of Nicaraguan military officers and those from other countries. There have been approximately ninety casualties among the deminers, including twelve fatalities. But recently there has been a steady reduction in the accident rate.(251)
As of 23 September 1998, under the OAS program, 4,805 mines had been destroyed,(252) and more than 141,000 square meters of land had been cleared.(253) These numbers represent clearance under OAS auspices only; total area cleared is estimated at 819,000 square meters, and some 26,000 mines destroyed, according to the Army.(254) A UN report indicates that a total of 43,000 mines have been destroyed, and from 1996-1998, about 13 hecares of minefields have been cleared.(255)
Cleared areas are located primarily along the northern and southern border areas, in particular the departments of Esteem, Jinotega and Matagalpa. There are no figures on the number of people who have benefited from mine clearance efforts. To date cattle ranchers have benefited along with farmers seeking to cultivate fields previously denied access by the presence or suspected presence of mines.
The demining program is now taking place in four different areas and there are plans to begin clearance in a fifth area and to add an additional 200 men in order to clear all mines by the year 2004.(256) The initial goal for completion of mine clearance region-wide had been the year 2000. While it still appears the other mine-affected countries (Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala) can meet that goal, it became apparent in 1998 that Nicaragua would not. Even prior to Hurrican Mitch, Nicaragua had shifted the date to 2002.(257) After Hurricane Mitch, OAS Secretary General, Cesar Gaviria, "insisted on the reformulation of the demining program in order to define a more realistic completion date and to incorporate the support of the international community in a greater dimension in tasks of prevention, and victim attention so that Nicaragua can get out of this problem."(258) President Aleman commented that "it would be unrealistic to say that we will eliminate 70,000 mines in 1999 or 2000."(259)
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, priorities needed to be reestablished on account of the displacement of thousands of mines. A Ministry of Defense mission traveled to Washington to meet with OAS and US government officials to procure more specialized equipment and lay the basis for a new four year plan. Following a request from President Aleman to the United Nations UnderSecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, an assessment mission was deployed to Nicaragua. Part of the mission's mandate was to examine damage caused by Hurricane Mitch and to suggest recommendations for mine action in the short and longer term.(260)
On 4 December 1998, President Aleman announced the creation of the National Demining Commission. He said that "implementing the commitment acquired under the Ottawa Convention requires the creation of the National Commission on Demining so that it will be the principal instrument of the National Program of Demining. This will be inter-institutional with the sole purpose of ensuring that the National Program of Demining be implemented without further delay." He also stated, "The government that I preside considers the coordinated and efficient execution of the Demining Program as a national priority actively involving all sectors of Nicaraguan society."(261) Executive Decree No. 84-9,8 signed on 27 November 1998 and published in La Gaceta, Diario Oficial No. 236 on 5 December 1998, established the National Demining Commission.
Some elements of Nicaraguan civil society have noted that while there is some community participation in mine action in Nicaragua, the OAS/IADB program is largely military and dominated by expatriates. There is little involvement by government agencies or ministries other than the Army. While citizen security and economic development are the officially established demining priorities, in practice it appears that the Army determines the criteria and priorities for demining. The commitment of the Army to rapid humanitarian clearance has been questioned. Clearance of agricultural land in particular has proceeded slowly.(262)
Communities are not always satisfied with the clearance of their land and in some areas campesinos are still refusing to go back to claim their land. Ranchers and farmers have joined with community residents in complaining about the continued incidence of mine-related accidents, restrictions on communication and travel due to the presence or suspected presence of mines and both have called for demining efforts to be redoubled.(263)
A large-scale mine accident prevention campaign was initiated in 1996 by the Red Cross in conjunction with the Army. About 150 workshops were set up, educating 1,500 youth. In 1998, with support from UNICEF, the campaign was extended to the Departments of Jinotega, Matagalpa, Nueva Segovia, Madriz and Rivas.(264)
Nicaragua's representative at the United Nations has said that the "Child to Child" program has taught some 23,000 children about the dangers of mines.(265)
International military supervisors that work with the Army periodically visit local schools to "inform, conscientize and to warn children as to the dangers of mines, distributing materials, posters, comics."(266) Items including calendars, shopping bags and school supplies with mine warnings and instructions have been produced and disseminated.(267) Superman and Wonder Woman comic books produced by D.C. Comics, UNICEF and the U.S. Department of Defense have also been distributed.
Heavy reliance on the military and external multilateral support has resulted in less than adequate community involvement. In 1999, the OAS/IADB mine awareness component of the demining program will increase its efforts to work with national and community-based non-governmental organizations.
Two Nicaraguan NGOs, the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) and Centro de Estudios Estratégicos (CEEN), are involved in mine awareness education in Nicaragua, working with local communities in north-central part of the country. CEI also has peace promoters involved in mine action in central Nicaragua and has trained 23 persons in mine awareness education. There is a need for more involvement and support from community-based organizations in mine awareness education.
There are no exact figures on the number of people killed or injured by landmines as there is no national registry of mine-related injuries and deaths and not all cases are reported. The OAS is making an effort to set up a Central American database on landmines and mine victims. The United Nations has estimated that roughly 1,500 people in Nicaragua have been injured by mines, not including fatalities. According to the UN, an average of 10 to 20 mine incidents per year are currently reported, and it is believed that many more occur and are not reported.(268)
More than 500 landmine casualties have been reported by just two hospitals in Managua (Davila Bolanos and Aldo Chavarria) and the national Red Cross. According to the Nicaraguan Red Cross, there have been a total of 553 accidents, with 423 civilian and 76 military injured; 46 civilian and 7 military dead.(269)
Mine accidents seemed to occur when individuals were going about their daily work, usually agricultural activities such as herding cattle or harvesting crops. Military casualties to landmines are now usually the result of demining accidents. There is no available data on the types of injuries suffered. There are several cases where victims have died before reaching hospital due to distance, bad roads and inadequate transport.
Through a technical collaboration program between Nicaragua and the OAS, 120 injured mine victims with no means to pay for medical care have received assistance. The program is paid for with a Swedish contribution of US$200,000, and is allocated for about 200 cases. In addition, since 1997 the OAS has had a program of "Care for Civilian Amputees in Mine Related Accidents," which includes prevention and rehabilitation as well as public awareness and education.(270)
Access to medical, surgical or rehabilitation services is difficult if the victim has no money, unless they are a member of the Army. There are prosthetics services and some rehabilitation and vocational training available in Nicaragua such as the Centro Nacional de Producción de Ayudas Técnicas y Elementos Ortoprotésicos (CENAPRORTO) run by the Ministry of Health. Its capacity to deliver services is sometimes limited by demand. There are also some small-scale prosthetics manufacturing and repair services, often run by the disabled themselves. While there is some social security available, most victims receive support from their families.
The first mine victim in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch was a sixteen-year-old boy, Bernardo Ocampo Gonzalez, from the community of Puerto Viejo in Waslala municipality. Early on the 16 November 1998, Gonzalez decided to go swimming in a nearby river pond. When he went to dive he detonated one of thousands of antipersonnel mines displaced from their original location during Hurricane Mitch and now lodged in river bends and water holes by storm currents. While the area was unmarked, the Army warned the local population not to wade into or cross the rivers. Gonzalez suffered serious wounds in his chest and lower jaw and it took two days for him to be transported to the nearest hospital, a journey greatly slowed by poor road. He died in hospital two days later.(271)
Panama signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. On 7 October 1998 Panama was the forty-sixth nation to deposit its instrument of ratification at the United Nations.
Panama's support for a mine ban dates back to 12 September 1996, when Panama's Foreign Minister joined the other Central American foreign ministers in declaring the region a mine free zone in which production, trade, and use of antipersonnel mines was prohibited. Panama endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997, but surprisingly attended the Oslo negotiations as an observer only. It voted in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998, as well as the pro-ban Organization of American States resolutions.
Panama is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines but has not yet ratified the revised Protocol II.
Panama is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. There is uncertainty if Panama has imported mines and if it currently has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.
According to the United Nations, Panama does not have a problem with uncleared landmines.(272) But there are an estimated 5,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and landmines planted by the U.S. for training purposes in military ranges in the Canal Zone.(273) Under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, the U.S. will turn over control of the Panama Canal to Panama on 31 December 1999, and the U.S. must to clear all dangerous materials from its former sites by the year 2000.
Paraguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and was the fifty-first country to ratify on 13 November 1998.
Paraguay participated in all of the ban treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and took part in the Oslo negotiations. Paraguay also voted in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998, as well as the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). As a signatory to the 14 July 1998 Declaration of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Paraguay supports the sixth article of the Declaration, which commits signatories to move toward declaring MERCOSUR member countries zones free of antipersonnel landmines and to work to enlarge this zone to include the entire Western Hemisphere.
Paraguay is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Paraguay is not mine-affected. It is not believed to have produced or transferred antipersonnel landmines. It is unknown if Paraguay has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. There is no known use of AP mines by Paraguay.Paraguay has not contributed to international mine action programs.
Landmine Monitor sent a questionnaire to the Ministry of Defense on 18 January 1998 and its General Secretary, Victor Pappalardo Lopez, said on 10 February that it had been sent to the Armed Forces for "study and consideration" and would be returned via the Foreign Ministry's UK Embassy because that Embassy has answered similar questions in the past. As of 1 March 1999 LM had received no response to the questionnaire.
Mine Ban Policy
Peru's Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduardo Ferrero signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a statement at the signing ceremony, Ferrero said Peru "has been adjusting its conduct to the objective of this Convention [and] confirms here its will to execute in good faith the international prohibition of these artifacts."(274) Earlier in 1997, Peru told the Organization of American States (OAS) that Peru's Armed Forces do not have antipersonnel mines.(275)
On 17 June 1998, Peru became the nineteenth nation to ratify the ban treaty. Peru expressed its deep satisfaction with the agreement which it considered "the result of a long negotiation process to which Peru actively contributed."(276) Peru was among the early nations to call for an immediate, comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines, which it did in July 1995 during a United Nations International Mine Clearance conference in Geneva. Peru participated in all of the ban treaty preparatory meetings, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and took part in the Oslo negotiations. Peru also voted in favor of the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998, as well as the pro-ban resolutions of the Organization of American States (OAS). Peru is one of the few nations that has contributed to the OAS mines register.
Peru is a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and ratified its amended Protocol II on landmines on 3 July 1997. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to launch negotiations on a mine export ban in that forum.
It appears that Peru was a producer of antipersonnel mines in the past. The U.S. Department of Defense identifies Peru as the manufacturer of the MGP-30 plastic antipersonnel mine and the MGP 31 plastic antitank mine, both made by the Centros de Fabricacion de Armas of the Industrial Services of the Navy.(277) The U.S. State Department has also identified Peru as an AP mine producer.(278) It is not known when Peru ceased production.
Peru is not thought to have ever exported antipersonnel landmines, though it never instituted a formal moratorium. A 1993 U.S. State Department communication said that while Peru had not exported mines, it "may be attempting to sell [its] landmines abroad."(279)
Peru imported 10,252 M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mines from the United States (10,000 in 1978 and 252 in 1989).(280) Other suppliers of Peru's mines are unknown.
In its 1997 report to the OAS Landmine Registry, Peru stated that it had no stockpile of antipersonnel landmines.(281) The United Nations landmine database indicates that, as of 1996, Peru may have had a "small" stockpile for antiterrorist purposes.(282)
Despite allegations to the contrary, Peru denies using antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Ecuador in 1995.(283) In December 1998, Peruvian General Raul O'Connor said that "Peru has never placed landmines at the border with Ecuador."(284) Ecuador claims that the country of origin of the mines it has already cleared makes it certain that some of mines were laid by Peru.(285)
A 1993 U.S. Department of State report said that Peru "currently employs mines as part of its static defense program to protect certain installations and equipment" from terrorist threats posed by the MRTA and Sendero Luminoso organizations.(286)
Peru's principle problem with uncleared landmines is on its border with Ecuador, specifically in the foothills of the Cordillera del Condor mountain range between the two countries. The border area was a subject of dispute for 57 years and the countries went to war over this area in 1941, 1981 and most recently, in February 1995. Throughout the conflict, tens of thousands of mines were laid along the border, with the majority of them planted during the 1995 fighting.
While Ecuador acknowledges mine use, Peru denies it.
Between 1995 and 1998 there were approximately 130 casualties to landmines in Peru, most of them in the Cordillera del Condor border region.
Amazonian indigenous people, the Shuar and Achuar, live on both sides of the border and are affected by the presence or suspected presence of uncleared mines. In November 1998, the "Families Shuar and Achuar of the Frontier" issued a joint declaration to the international community, asking for the governments of both countries to demine the border.(287) On 5 December 1998, the Ecuadorian Indian Confederation of the Amazonia (COICA in Spanish) demanded the clearance of the mines along the border.
Peru also has problems with landmines along its border with Chile. Non-governmental organizations in the southern Peruvian border town of Tacna have protested against the mines planted by Chile on the border between 1975 and 1976 claiming that the mines have been responsible for at least fifteen deaths and approximately 200 injuries.(288) They warn Peruvians about the dangers of attempting to cross the border illegally to seek work in Chile, and they have asked for demining of the area.(289)
On 20 November 1998, Peruvian women's organizations launched a "Flower Crusade" to demand the eradication of antipersonnel mines and to show solidarity with landmine victims.(290) Linda Lema, president of the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom, said on that occasion that many children had suffered mutilations by mines planted around electrical towers near cities.(291)
On 26 October 1998, after three years of peace talks, the Presidents of Ecuador and Peru signed a peace agreement in Brasilia, Brazil. As part of the agreement, both nations agreed to the demining of their borders under the supervision of the Ecuador/Peru Multinational Observation Mission (MOMEP). MOMEP is made up of military representatives of the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. These four countries are the guarantors of the 1942 peace protocol, the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro.
General O'Connor, representating Peru in MOMEP, said in December 1998 that Peru has no maps to submit to MOMEP because it did not plant any mines.(292) Ecuador handed over maps, but asked MOMEP not to make them public for security reasons.(293)
Despite these problems, the mine clearance effort is both a confidence-building measure as well as an endeavor with concrete humanitarian goals. Both the Ecuadorian and Peruvian governments sent representatives to the January 1999 Mexico City Regional Seminar on Landmines and said that implementing the peace agreement, including mine clearance, is more important at present than trying to establish who placed the mines.(294) Ecuador and Peru made a joint presentation on the border demining program at the meeting. The first phase of the program is clearing the mines in order to place boundary markers. This initial clearance phase began on 28 December 1998.
Several countries, including Canada, Japan, Spain, Russia and the United States, have announced that they will support the demining operations along the Ecuador/Peru border with funding, technical expertise and equipment. Larger efforts are underway to develop the border zone's economy.
On 17 September 1998, the President of Spain, Jose Maria Aznar, said at the Congress in Lima that his country would assist in mine clearance operations on the the border with Ecuador.(295) On 28 December 1998, the Spanish Agency of International Cooperation handed the Peruvian Government more than US$730,000 for mine clearance and integration programs with Ecuador.(296) On 17 November 1998, Russia's Ambassador in Lima, Valentin Bogomazov, said Russia was ready to support demining operations with special equipment, instructors and training.(297) Japan also promised aid for the demining operations. MOMEP members Argentina, Brazil and Chile will assist in the clearance effort.(298) At the Mexico City conference in January 1999, Canada pledged $100,000 (Canadian) to the effort.
On 22 February, an official in the office of the Director of Planning and Evaluation of Programs of the Foreign Ministry in Peru said "there have been advances in the demining of electrical towers," but detailed information could not be made public for secutity reasons.(299)
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
Saint Kitts and Nevis, a member of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. (See Grenada report for Statement on behalf of OECS). Saint Kitts and Nevis ratified the treaty on 2 December 1998. It has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. Saint Kitts and Nevis supported the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels declaration, voting in favor of the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines and through key OAS General Assembly resolutions. Saint Kitts and Nevis has never produced, stockpiled, transferred or used antipersonnel landmines. It is not mine-affected.
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Trinidad and Tobago's High Commissioner to Canada Robert Sabga signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. At the signing ceremony, he said, "After signature, our countries are faced with the real challenge of implementation of the measures outlined in the Convention. This Conference can only be deemed successful when all countries participating in the process to this point which are engaged in the production, use and/or transfer of antipersonnel mines cease these operations and ensure no further engagement through vigorous enactment of national legislation."(300)
Trinidad and Tobago ratified the treaty on 27 April 1998, the eleventh country to do so. It has not yet enacted national implementation legislation. Trinidad and Tobago has never produced, imported, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel landmines and it is not mine-affected.(301) Trinidad and Tobago participated in the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels Declaration, voting in favor of the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions, supporting the CARICOM/CENTAM declaration and supporting, by consensus, key OAS General Assembly resolutions.
1. Statement made by the Honorable Janet G. Bostwick, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, December 1997. See also, response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire completed by the High Commission for the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, in Ottawa, 2 February 1999.
2. Statement made by the Honorable Louis Tull QC, MP, Special Envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Barbados, on the occasion of the signing of the Convention, at the Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997.
3. Statement to LM Researcher by Lawrence Sylvester, spokesman for the Belize Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Administrative Building, Belmopan, Belize, 16 February 1999.
5. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database
6. El Diario, 21 September 1997..
7. Agence France Presse, La Paz, 4 July 1998.
10. Throughout the report, figures given are in Canadian dollars.
11. Canada did not opt for formal provisional application of Article 18 of the treaty, which binds a signatory to key prohibitions even prior to entry-into-force.
12. Government of Canada, News Release No.5, 17 January 1996 on the announcement of a comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the production, export and operational use of AP mines by Canada
13. For a detailed description of Canada's role in the Ottawa Process, see M. Cameron, et al, eds., To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Toronto :Oxford University Press, 1998).
14. OAS, Register on Antipersonnel Landmines, OEA/Ser.G, CP/CSH-168-99, 11 February 1999
15. DFAIT, press release No. 129, "Axworthy Appoints Ambassador for Mine Action," 22 May 1998, Ottawa.
16. DFAIT, press release No.212, "Canada to Support International Mine Monitoring Program," 15 September 1998, Ottawa
17. Canada-Norway Partnership for Action, The LYSOEN Declaration, 11 May 1998, Bergen, Norway.
18. Canada-EU Statement on Small Arms and Antipersonnel Mines, 17 December 1998, Brussels.
19. ILX-DFAIT, "One Year Later: Is the Ottawa Convention Making A Difference? 2 December 1998, Ottawa.
20. DND, "Personnel Newsletter 11/98," pp. 4-5
21. UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,..C.N.473.1997.TREATIES-2
23. Email, Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor, ILX-DFAIT, 15 March 1999
24. Major Paul W. Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," Canadian Defense Quarterly, Winter 1997
25. Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," p.6
26. Ibid., p.7
27. DND, Antipersonnel Mine Operational Planning and Policy Guidelines for the Canadian Forces, 27 June 1997, as quoted in Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," p.7
28. Discussions, Canadian Forces Technical Advisor with Canadian Head of Delegation, 1 September 1997, as footnoted in Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," p.9
29. First Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament, 46 Elizabeth II, 1997, Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Bill C-22, Assented to 27 November 1997, section 6(3)(d)
30. Discussion, ABCANZ Military Advisors, Oslo Diplomatic Conference, attended by the author, 8-10 September 1997, as footnoted in Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," p.9
31. Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use…, www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-22/…/C-22_cover-E.htm
32. Privy Council Order No. PC 1999-295
33. First Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament, 46 Elizabeth II, 1997, Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Bill C-22, Assented to 27 November 1997, section 2
34. UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction, Concluded at Oslo 18 September 1997, C.N.473.1997.TREATIES-2, Article 1
35. Statutes of Canada, Chapter 33, An Act to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use…, section 6(3)(d)
36. UN Treaty Series, vol. 1342, p.137, depositary notifications C.N.356.1981, TREATIES-7, 14 January 1982 and C.N. 320.1982 TREATIES-11, 21 June 1983.
38. Ambassador Mike Moher, statement to the CD, January 1999
40. Government news release, No.5, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the production, export and operational use of AP mines by Canada, 17 January 1996. Other sources indicate production halted in 1994. See, Mark Abley, The Gazette, Montreal, 17 November 1994; Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics, 1994-95, p 175.
41. Government news release, No.5, 17 January 1996.
42. CFSME Mine Database 96 (Canadian Forces CD-ROM);
U.S. Department of State web site: http://mineweb.org/mfacts/mfacts5/f573a.html; and SNC Industrial Technologies Inc, The Convention on Conventional Weapons: Final Report on a Study of the Technological and Cost Implications of Retrofitting Landmines with Fuses Incorporating Self Destruct or Self Neutralizing Devices, December 1994.
43. MAC/Roger Lucy (Deputy Director of Export Controls Division), telephone interview, 11 February 1999.
44. U.S. Department of State: http://mineweb.org/mfacts/mfacts7/f751a.html
45. U.S. Department of State: http://mineweb.org/mfacts/mfacts5/f534a.html
46. MAC/Col. Normand Levert, (Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), telephone interview, 23 February 1999.
47. Directorate of Arms and Proliferation Control Policy, documentary evidence of the destruction of APM tooling pieces, completed on 30 November 1998, provided to MAC by LCol. J. P. Chabot.
49. MAC/Col. Normand Levert (Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), telephone interview, 5 February 1999.
51. MAC/Col. Normand Levert (Liaison Officer to the Mine Action Team of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), telephone interview, 5 February 1999.
52. See Fredenburg, Longtin, Levert, CFSME database.
53. Major Paul W. Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine", Canadian Defense Quarterly, Winter 1997, p 7.
54. MAC/Major Harry Burke (Deputy Scientific Advisor [Land], Research and Development Branch, Department of National Defense), telephone interview, 4 February 1999.
55. Government Press Release, on the launch of CCMAT, 25 August 1999.
56. CCMAT Project Charter, October 1998.
59. MAC, letter to ministers of foreign affairs, defense, international cooperation and industry, copied to CCMAT director, 29 January 1999
60. MAC/Major Harry Burke (Deputy Scientific Advisor [Land], Research and Development Branch, Department of National Defense), telephone interview, 4 February 1999.
61. Government News Release, No. 5, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the production, export and operational use of APMs by Canada, 17 January 1996.
62. Letter from Robert Racine, then vice-president, Public Affairs, SNC-Lavalin, to Dr. Eric Notebaert and Dr. Michael Dworkind of Health Professionals for Nuclear Responsibility, 17 November 1994.
65. François Patenaud, "La belle hypocrisie de SNC-Lavalin et de son pape Guy Saint-Pierre", L'aut Journal, No. 144, 20 November - 11 December 1995.
66. Ed. Michael Howard and Wm. Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p 260.
67. U.S. Army Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, "Operation Desert Shield Special Report: Iraqi Combat Engineer Capabilities," 30 November 1990, pp. 2-16, 2-17.
68. DND, letter to MP Svend Robinson, signed by former Minister of Defense, David Collenette, March 1995.
69. CFSME Mine Database 96, CD-ROM, 1996
70. Government of Canada, News Release No.5, 17 January 1996, on the announcement of comprehensive, unilateral moratoria on the production, export and operational use of AP mines by Canada
71. ILX-DFAIT, Normand Levert, e-mail subject "ILX 1025", 8 January 1999
72. Directorate of Arms and Proliferation Control Policy, Lt.Col. J.P Chabot, Ottawa, 23 February 1999
73. Kristeva Zoe, Political and Multilateral Issues, DFAIT-ILX, facsimile, 11 February 1999
74. NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Ref. A. IMSWM-121-98 (SD2), 17 March 1998
75. Colonel Ed Fitch, Director of Military Engineering, DND, telephone interview, 5 May 1998, Ottawa
76. MAC/Col. Normand Levert, DFAIT Liaison Officer, National Defense Headquarters, telephone interviews, 5, 8 and 23 February 1999; letter from Daniel Longtin, Director of Munition Programme, National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ), 12 March 1999
77. Directorate of Arms and Proliferation Control Policy, National Defense Headquarters, faxed information, 18 Feb 1999
78. "Canada announces timetable for destruction of Landmines," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Press Release, No. 145, 10 September 1997
79. Fredenburg, "The banning …, "Canadian Defense Quarterly, p. 6.
80. MAC/Col. Levert, telephone interview, September 1998.
81. Longtin letter, 12 March 1999
82. Colonel E.S. Fitch, Director of Military Engineering, NDHQ, letter to MAC, 24 August 1998
83. Letter from Col. Fitch, August 1998
84. , 27 March 1996, p. 12; Mines Action Canada/Pax Christi, Netherlands, email correspondenc Jane's Defense Weekly, January 1998.
85. Confidential source
86. MAC/Levert, February 1999
87. Letter from Fitch, August 1998
88. MAC/Longtin, February 1999
89. Longtin letter, 12 March 1999
90. Major Paul Fredenburg, "The Banning of the Antipersonnel Landmine," Canadian Defense Quarterly, Winter 1997, p. 7.
91. MAC/Levert, Feb 1999; MAC/Lt. Col. J.P. Chabot, telephone interview, 23 Feb 99
92. Directorate of Arms and Proliferation Control Policy, National Defense Headquarters, faxed information, 18 Feb 1999
93. MAC/Major Perrin, telephone interview, April 1998; MAC/Fredenburg, Feb 1999; MAC/Levert, Feb 1999;
94. Transcript of Court Proceedings in the Gustafsen Lake Trial, questioning of RCMP officer.
95. Patrick Cain, "Feds Tarnish Anti-Mine Stance", NOW, 3 - 9 July 1997.
96. All figures in this report are in Canadian dollars. As of 25 February 1999 the exchange rate was 1C$ = .66 US$.
97. "One Year Later: Is the Ottawa Convention Making A Difference, Report submitted to the Canadian Parliament by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 2, 1998. Pg. 5
98. Ibid., Pg. 5
99. Ibid., Pg. 5
100. Information provided by DFAIT to LM questionnaire, Feb. 1999
101. Speech made by Minister of International Cooperation, Diane Marleau, Ottawa, 2 December 1997
102. Speech made by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to the Opening Plenary of the Ottawa Treaty Signing Conference, 3 December 1997
103. In a Feb. 1999 meeting government officials informed MAC that the total allocation for the 'research into humane alternatives' would be up to $1.5 million over the five year mandate of CCMAT.
104. Funding for ADRA Canada (Yemen), Alternatives (Yemen) and UNICEF Canada (Angola) were approved in 1999.
105. Government of Canada fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March.
106. This five-year initiative has a total of $17 million in funding. Notional expenditures by financial year are 1,445,000 (98/99), 5,640,000 (99/00), 4,205,000 (00/01), 3,405,000 (01/02) and 2,305,000. Government officials provided these figures in an Aug. 1998 briefing to MAC from DFAIT, DND and Industry Canada.
107. The funding to MAC supports both its domestic and international work.
108. The figures used in this report are compiled from the One Year Later report prepared by DFAIT and released on 2 December 1998. The figures are also taken from MAC files and a February 1999 response from DFAIT to a LM questionnaire.
109. Announced and funded in 1999
111. MAC/Rèmi Vèzina (Manager of SNC-Lavalin's Decontamination Department), telephone interview, 5 February 1999.
112. The incidents were categorized in the report as 16 slight injuries, 16 serious injuries and 2 fatalities.
113. "The Canadian Battle Group in Somalia operated in wheeled armored vehicles. The shape and character of these vehicles give them an inherent mine resistance. Hence no injuries," noted on report by L.Col Normand Levert, DND, copy faxed 10 February 1999.
114. Canadian submission to the United Nations global Survey on Disability Policy, 15 September 1996, www.independentliving.org/standardrules
115. Organization of America States, "Support for the Mine-Clearing Program in Central America," http://oas.org/en/prog/juridico/english/ga%2Dres98/eres1568.htm., 19 December 1998.
116. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canada, "AP Mine Ban: Progress Report" http://www/dfait-maeci/gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/mines/report1f.htm, 22 February 1999.
117. CIA Factbook, Costa Rica, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/cs.htm, 3 December 1998.
118. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, 12 January 1999.
119. International Demining Organization, 24 September 1998, Article No. 98-09-02, http://www.jid.org/MARMINCA%20CofC.html.
120. Sequeira M, Disarmament Central America, "170,000 mines still to be cleared", Inter Press Service, 4 February 1999.
121. The 1-2,000 figure comes from Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis, US Dept State, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_nxa.htm while the higher figure came from "Costa Rica to defuse 5,000 land mines", Xinhua News Agency, 19 October 1996.
122. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, 12 January 1999.
123. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, January 12, 1999. United Nations Demining Database, Country Report: Costa Rica, http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/costaric.htm., 3 December 1998.
124. Information Paper OAS/IADB Demining Program Update, Col C. Case/7568, 14 September 1998. Ministry Announces more Aid to OAS for Land Mine Removal,Tokyo Kyodo News Service in English 0705 GMT 11 December 1998. Sweden Provides $1.5 Million for CENAM Mine Clearing, Daily Washington File, http://www.usis.it/wireless/wf961115/96111519.htm. Green, E, Anti-Landmine Effort Showing Progress in Central America, Public Diplomacy Query (PDQ), http://pdq2.usia.gov/scripts/cqcge.exe, 3 December 1998.
125. Personal Correspondence: Col. Carl Case OAS/IADB, email: 12 January 1999.
126. Information Paper, OAS/IADB Demining Program Update, Col. C. Case/7568, 14 September 1998. International Demining Organization, September 24, 1998 Article No. 98-09-02, http://www.jid.org/MARMINCA%20CofC.html.
127. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, 16 February 1999.
128. Sequeira M, Disarmament Central America: "170,000 mines still to be cleared", Inter Press Service, 4 February 1999.
129. Information Paper, OAS/IADB Demining Program Update, Col. C. Case/7568, 14 September 1998.
130. Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis, US Dept of State. http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_nxa.html, 10 December 1998.
131. Hidden Killers 1994: The Global Landmine Crisis, US Dept State, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9401_demine_ch3.html.
132. Aita J, Superman, Wonder Woman Teach Youngsters about Landmines, Public Diplomacy Query (PDQ), http://pdq2.usia.gov/scripts/cqcgi.exe, 3 December 1998.
133. Beard, David, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, FL) 11 June 1998, pg. 12A.
134. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, 12 January 1999.
135. Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis, US Dept of State. http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9809_demine_nxa.html, 10 December 1998.
136. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, 16 February 1999.
137. Xinhua News Agency, 19 October 1996.
138. LM Researcher Email Correspondence with Col. Carl Case, OAS/IADB, 16 February 1999.
139. Montero F, Legislation on Disability: The Costa Rican Experience, http://www.independentliving.org/LibArt/HumanRightsConf/hr12.html, 25 February 1999.
140. Interview with Mauricio Granillo Barrera, Ambassador of El Salvador to the Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., 16 February 1999.
141. Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua: The Civilian Victims, Americas Watch, December 1986, p. 25-16.
142. Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, The Human Rights Watch Arms Project and Physicians for Human Rights, New York, October 1993, p. 185-186.
143. Seguridad Hemisferica, Cuadro Resumen: Minas Terrestres Antipersonales, Al 1 de mayo de 1998, "El Hemisferico Occidental como Zona Libre de Minas Terrestres Antipersonales," AG/RES. 1411 (XXVI-O/96) y AG/RES. 1496 (XXVII_O?97) parrafo resolutivo 4, Organizacion de los Estados Ameicanos, Washington, D.C. de los Estados Ameicanos, Washington, D.C.
144. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and post-conflict, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, January 1996, p. 13.
147. United Nations, Landmine Country Report for El Salvador, May 1995.
148. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 14.
149. United Nations, Landmine Country Report for El Salvador, May 1995.
150. Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua, p. 22.
151. "Clearing the Minefields," UNICEF, May 1995, in Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 13.
152. Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua, p. 2.
153. Carta de la Mision Permanente de Mexico y la Mision Permanente de Canada al Presidente del Consejo Permanente de la Organizacio de los Estados Ameicanos, Washington, D.C., a 3 de febrero de 1999. This letter builds upon the Organization of American States resolution, AG/RES. 1568 (XXVIII-O/98), "Support for the Mine-Clearing Program in Central America," adopted on 2 June 1998.
154. LM Researcher interview with Hernan Rosenberg, Pan-American Health Organization, Washington, D.C., 18 February 1999.
155. "VVAF and PODES: Working Together in El Salvador", VVAF Web Site, see http://www.vvaf.org/assistance/elsalvador.html
157. Based on observations by foreign journalists including Frank Smyth in San Salvador from 1988 through 1996.
158. Statement made by His Excellency George R. E. Bullen, High Commissioner. Grenada, on behalf OECS, to the Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 3-4 December 1997.
159. LM Researcher interview with the Guatemalan Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Alfonso Quinones, Washington, D.C., 22 February 1999.
160. In March 1999 IEPADES, a local NGO, reported that a meeting between IEPADES and the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President's General Secretariat, indicated that ratification would occur very shortly. Email Correspondence from Carmen Rosa de Leon, IEPADES, with Liz Bernstein, ICBL Co-ordinator, 22 March 1999.
161. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and post-conflict, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, January 1996, p. 18.
162. Interview with General Otto Perez Molina, the Guatemalan military's representative to the Inter-American Defense Board of the Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., 19 February 1999.
163. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and post-conflict, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, January 1996, p. 18.
165. Interview with General Otto Perez Molina, 19 February 1999.
166. UNHCR estimated that there were 1,000 to 1,500 landmines in Guatemala in the mid-1990s, according to the United Nations landmine country report on Guatemala. See http://www.un.org/Depts/landmine/country. The ICRC reported in 1996 that "the total number of inspected mines is probably under 1,500," according to Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 19.
167. United Nations landmine country report for Guatemala, 3 March 1997.
168. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 18-19.
169. Republic of Guatemala, Legislative Commission for Peace Studies, Executive Coordination Unit, "National Plan for Demining and the Destruction of Unexploded Ordnance," November 1997.
170. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 21.
172. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 22. The title of the decree is "Reducing the Risks to Inhabitants of Zones Affected by Armed Conflict through the Identification and Deactivation of Mines and other Explosive Artefacts."
173. Inter-American Defense Board, "Demining Assistance Program in Central America," August 1998.
174. Organizacion de Estados Americanos, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, "El Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamerica," 4 February 1999.
176. "A Preliminary Assessment of Damages caused by Hurricane 'Mitch,'" prepared by the United Nations Development Program and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, p. 4.
177. ICBL delegation observations at the Rio Coco in Ocotal, Nicaragua, 7 January 1999 and LM Researcher interview with an Inter-American Defense Board expert in Washington, D.C., 24 February 1999.
178. LM Researcher interviews with Inter-American Defense Board experts, Danli, Honduras, 7 January 1999, and Washington, D.C., 17 February 1999.
179. Letter from Honduran Ambassador to the U.S., Roberto Flores Bermudez, to Human Rights Watch, in response to ICBL questionnaire, 22 April 1996.
180. U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, "U.S. Landmine Sales by Country," March 1994, indicates nine AP mines and 210 AT mines were provided to Honduras.
181. Letter from Honduran Ambassador to the U.S., Roberto Flores Bermudez, to Human Rights Watch, in response to ICBL questionnaire, 22 April 1996.
182. LM Researcher fax to the Honduran military attache to the United States, Colonel Rafael Rivera, at the Honduran Embassy in Washington, D.C., 24 February 1999.
183. LM Researcher interviews with Honduran officials, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 8 January 1999.
184. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem With Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 99.
185. LM Researcher interview with Inter-American Defense Board expert, Washington, D.C., 17 February 1999.
186. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America: Conflict and post-conflict, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, January 1996, p. 15.
187. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, December 1994, p. 99.
188. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 14-15.
189. Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras: Equipo de Tarea Conjunto "Alfa", "Historia del Desminado en Honduras," compiled with information as late as September 1997.
190. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 15-16.
191. Oranizacion de los Estados Americanos, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Mision de Asistencia para Remocion de Minas en Centro America, "Cuadro Demostrativo de Los Accidentes Ocurridos al Personal Militar Participante en La Mision de Asistencia para la Remocion de Minas en Centro America," as of January 1997.
192. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 16.
193. Inter-American Defense Board of the Organization of American States, "Demining Assistance Program in Central America," August 1998.
194. Organization of American States, Inter-American Defense Board, Washington, D.C., "Demining Assistance Program in Central America," 21 August 1998.
195. Interview with Inter-American Defense Board expert at Washington, D.C., 24 February 1999.
196. Organization of American States, Inter-American Defense Board, Washington, D.C., "Demining Assistance Program in Central America," 21 August 1998.
197. Organizacion de Los Estados Americanos, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Washington, D.C., "El Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamercia," 4 February 1999.
198. Organizacion de Los Estados Americanos, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Mision de Asistencia para La Remocion de Minas en Centroamerica, "Informe Mensual de Las Operacions de Desminado en Centroamerica, Mes Enero 1999.
199. United Nations landmine country report for Honduras, September 1995.
200. Antipersonnel Mines in Central America, p. 16.
201. Organizacion de Los Estados Americanos, Junta Interamericana de Defensa, Mision de Asistencia para Remocion de Minas en Centro America, "Cuadro Demostrativo de Los Accidentes Ocurridos al Personal Civil que Vive en Las Areas Rurales de La Republica de Honduras," as of September 1997.
202. Carta de la Mision Permanente de Mexico y la Mision Permanente de Canada al Presidente del Consejo Permanente de la Organizacio de los Estados Americanos, Washington, D.C., a 3 de febrero de 1999. This letter builds upon the Organization of American States resolution, AG/RES. 1568 (XXVIII-O/98), "Support for the Mine-Clearing Program in Central America," adopted on 2 June 1998.
203. LM Researcher interview with Hernan Rosenberg, Pan-American Health Organization, Washington, D.C., 18 February 1999.
204. Letter from Dr. B. K. Bryan, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Jamaica, Washington, DC, to Human Rights Watch, 19 April 1996.
205. Letter dated 3 February 1999 from Minister Luis Alfonso De Alba, SRE´s General Director for the United Nations to Claudio Torres Nachón, Landmine Monitor researcher, Document Number: DNU-1202990, p.1.
206. Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, AÑO 1, Segundo Período Ordinario, LVII Legislatura, NUM.9, p.12.
207. Diario Oficial de la Federación, 21 August 1998, p.2-9.
208. "Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de México sobre la Producción, Exportación y Uso de Minas Terrestres Antipersonales," Misión Permante de México ante la OEA. CP02954.S, México, D.F. a 7 de Febrero de 1997.
209. Telephone Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Mexico City, Mexico, 23 March 1999.
210. See for example, Reuters (Geneva), "Mexico blocks conclave on world land-mine ban," 12 June 1997.
211. Declaration of Principles, 7 February 1997.
212. "Establecen Compromisos los Paises Americanos para Erradicar las Minas Antipersonales en la Región" (Countries from the Americas Establish Compromises to Eradicate Antipersonnel Landmines in the Region),Press Communique: B-012, Secretariat of Foreign Relations, Tlatelolco, D.F., 12 January 1999.
213. Mónica Martín, "México Nunca ha Usado ni Fabricado Minas Terrestres: Rosario Green Macías (México has Never Used or Produced Landmines: Rosario Green Macías)," Excelsior Newspaper, 13 January 1999.
214. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, December 1994, p. 23.
215. Isidro Chávez, "Acuerdan Redoblar Esfuerzos contra Minas Antipersonales (Announcement to Double Efforts against Antipersonnel Landmines)," Novedades Newspaper, 13 January 1999.
216. José Luis Ruiz, "Rechazan que haya Areas ´sembradas' con Minas Antipersonales en Chiapas (Rejection to the Version of Existing Antipersonnel Landmines Seeded Areas in Chiapas)," El Universal Newspaper, 13 January 1999.
217. Daniel Pensamiento, "Rompe EZLN Diálogo. Pone Grupo Rebelde Minas a Accesos a su Territorio y Coloca Unidades ntiaéreas," El Norte-Chiapas Newspaper, 11 October 1994.
218. Daniel Pensamiento, "Se Prepara PGR para Ejecutar Ordenes (PGR Prepares to Execute Orders)," Reforma Newspaper, 10 February 1995.
219. Telephone Interview with Salvador Corro, Head of Correspondents for PROCESO Magazine, 24 February 1999.
220. Letter from Ministro De Alba, p.3.
221. Speech, "Firma del Decreto Creador de la Comision Nacional de Desminado," 4 December 1998.
222. United States Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD Rom.
223. Lt. Col Delgadillo, Army Chief of Operations, communication with LM Researcher, Managua, 4 March 1998.
224. U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Department of Army, Letter to Human Rights Watch Arms Project, 1 November 1993, p. 4.
225. Americas Watch, Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua: The Civilian Victims, December 1985, pp. 55-56.
226. See, OAS, Desminando, No. 1, December 1998, pp. 6-7; United States Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 132; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Landmine Warfare - Trends and Projections, December 1992, DST-11608-019-92, p. 2-18.
227. Statement made to ICBL delegation, Managua, 6 January 1999.
228. LM Researcher interview with Major Sergio Ugarte, head of demining for Nicaraguan Army, Managua, 15 January 1999.
229. LM Researcher interview with Major Sergio Ugarte, head of demining for Nicaraguan Army, Managua, 15 January 1999. Also mentioned were PTMI-K and SM mines, of unknown origin to LM.
230. "Destruiran 170 mil minas del Ejercito," La Prensa, 20 February 1999.
232. "Nicaragua renews effort against mines," The Miami Herald, 11 January 1999.
233. LM interview with Defense Minister, Managua, 18 January 1999.
234. LM Interview with Defense Minister, Managua, 18 January 1999.
235. LM Researcher interview with Major Sergio Ugarte, head of demining for Nicaraguan Army, Managua, 15 January 1999.
236. Interview with Valdrack Jaentschke, Executive Director of the Centro de Estudios Estratégicos (CEEN), Managua, 14 December 1998.
237. Reprinted in Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), pp. 216-217.
238. United Nations, Nicaragua Landmine Situtation Assessment Mission Report, 15 December 1998.
239. The lower estimate is Nicaraguan Army (La Prensa, 24 February 1999), the higher estimate is US State Department, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 132, and United Nations, Nicaragua Landmine Situtation Assessment Mission Report, 15 December 1998, p. 3.
240. OEA, Programa de Asistencia de Desminado en Centroamerica PADCA, Proyecto en Nicaragua, January 1999; "La OEA y el Desminado en Nicaragua," Desminado, (PADCA-Nicaragua), No. 1, December 1998, pp. 2-3.
241. Programa OEA/JID de Desminado, "Despejando el Camino hacia el Futuro." See also, http://www.oas.org/EN/updhome.htm.
242. Figure provided by Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) .
243. UN, Nicaragua Landmine Situation Assessment Mission Report, 15 December 1998, p. 6.
244. "Destruiran 170 mil minas del Ejercito," La Prensa, 20 February 1999; Interview Major Sergio Ugarte, 15 January 1999.
245. "EN urge 5 milliones de dolares," La Prensa, 24 February 1999.
246. OAS/IADB Fact Sheet, "Facts About Demining in Nicaragua," 1998.
247. Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support, Fact Sheet, 16 November 1998, provided by government of Norway.
248. Programa OEA/JID de Desminado, "Despejando el Camino hacia el Futuro." See also http://www.oas.org/EN/updhome.htm
249. See, U.S. DIA/FSTC, pp. 218-219.
250. UN Assessment Mission, p. 9.
251. Interview with Major Sergio Ugarte, Managua, 3 December 1998.
252. OEA, Programa de Asistencia de Desminado en Centroamerica PADCA, Proyecto en Nicaragua, January 1999; "La OEA y el Desminado en Nicaragua," Desminado, (PADCA-Nicaragua), No. 1, December 1998, pp. 2-3.
253. OAS/IADB, "Information Paper: OAS/IADB Demining Program Update," 14 September 1998 cites 141,479 square meters cleared as of 21 August 1998.
254. See, "EN urge 5 millones de dolares," La Prensa, 24 February 1999, citing an Army spokesperson.
255. UN, Assessment Mission, p. 9.
256. "EN urge 5 millones de dolares," La Prensa, 24 February 1999.
257. UN, Assessment Mission, p. 9.
258. "Zapadores en busqueda de 70 mil minas," La Prensa,, 17 November 1998.
260. United Nations, Nicaragua Landmine Situation Assessment Mission Report, 15 December 1998.
261. Speech of 4 December 1998, "Frima del Decreto Creador de la Comisión Nacional de Desminado."
262. These views have been expressed by representatives of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) and Centro de Estudios Estratégicos (CEEN), and others.
263. Interview with Uriel Carazo, Joint Wounded War Veterans Commission, Somoto, 14 December 1998; interviews with Heriberto Bermudez, farm administrator, La Misión, and Fidel Rodriguez, Cattle Ranchers Commission, Matiguas, 11 December 1998.
264. UN, Assessment Mission, p. 10.
265. UN Press Release, GA/9505, 17 November 1998.
266. "La Prevencion y Concientizacion", Desminado, (PADCA-Nicaragua), No. 1, December 1998, p.4.
267. Maj. Tom McCollum, "Special Forces lead U.S. demining efforts in Central America." Army Link News, December 1997.
268. UN, Assessment Mission, p. 3.
269. Quoted by La Tribuna, 1 March 1999.
270. OEA, Un nuevo modelo de cooperacion, p.12.
271. "Mina explota y mata en Waslala," La Prensa, 23 November 1998.
272. UN Landmines Database, Country Report on Panama. http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/panama.htm
273. United States Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. A-2; "U.S. to remove explosives from Panama bases," Xinhua news service Panama City, 9 November 1998.
274. Unofficial translation of statement to Signing Ceremony by Doctor Eduardo Ferrero, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peru in Ottawa, Canada, 3-4 December 1997.
275. Letter from Ambassador Beatriz Ramaccion, Permenent Representative of Peru to the OAS, Washington DC, 1 March 1997, No. 7-5-M/073.
276. Peruvian Foreign Ministry Press Release quoted by Agence France Presse (AFP), 19 September 1998.
277. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD Rom.
278. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.
279. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram, Unclassified, Subject: landmine export moratorium demarche, 7 December 1993.
280. U.S. Army, Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (USAMCCOM), Letter to Human Rights Watch, 25 August 1993, and attached statistical tables.
281. OAS, "Summary Table: Antipersonnel Landmines, as of May 1, 1998"; Letter from Ambassador Beatriz Ramaccion, Permenent Representative of Peru to the OAS, Washington DC, 1 March 1997, No. 7-5-M/073.
282. Peru Country report, UN Database, see www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/peru.htm
283. See: Letter from Ministro Juan M. Leoro, Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the OAS to the OAS Landmine Register,14 march 1997, N.029-97 MPE-OEA; letter from Ambassador Beatriz Ramaccion, Permenent Representative of Peruto the OAS, Washington DC, 1 March 1997,7-5-M/073; and letter from Ambassador Beatriz Ramaccion, Permenent Representative of Peruto the OAS, Washington DC, 21 April 1997,Nota 7-5-M/132.
284. "Peru Denies Planted Mines Along Ecuadorian Border," FBIS Translated Text of PA 1612174398 article in Guaya El Universo, Quito, 10 December 1998, p. A4.
286. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 141.
287. The declaration was dated 19 November 1998.
288. Agence France Presse, 23 July 1998, Lima.
290. Agence France Presse, Lima, 20 Nov 1998.
292. "Peru Denies Planted Mines Along Ecuadorian Border," FBIS Translated Text of PA 1612174398 article in Guaya El Universo, Quito, 10 December 1998, p. A4.
293. Remarks at Regional Seminar on Antipersonnel Landmines, Mexico City, Mexico, 11-12 January 1999.
294. Remarks at Regional Seminar on Antipersonnel Landmines, Mexico City, Mexico, 11-12 January 1999.
295. Agence France Presse Lima, 17 September 1998.
296. Agence France Presse Lima, 17 September 1998.
298. Agence France Presse, 23 November 1998, Lima.
299. Telephone interview with Carmen Azurin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 February 1999.
300. Statement to the Signing Ceremony by His Excellency Robert Sabga, Trinidad and Tobago's High Commissioner to Canada, Ottawa, Canada, 2-4 December 1997.
301. Response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire completed by the Legal and Marine Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 26 February 1999.
302. Statement made by Ambassador Lionel Hurst of Antigua and Barbuda, Treaty Signing Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 3 December 1997.
303. Statement made by Ambassador Lionel Hurst of Antigua and Barbuda, at the Americas Regional Seminar, "Reaffirming Our Commitment", co-hosted by the Governments of Canada and Mexico, Mexico City, January 11-12 1999. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire (dated 20 January 1999), stated that the ratification process would be completed within the next three to four months.
304. Committee on Hemispheric Security, Permanent Council of the OAS, OAS Register of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines: Summary Table of Information Submitted by Member States for the Year 1997, CP/CSH-168/99 Corr. 1, February 1999.
305. Response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire completed by the office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Antigua and Barbuda, 20 January 1999.