Mine Ban Policy

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has yet to ratify. As the country returned to war in 1998, both government troops and UNITA forces have been using antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL has condemned both sides for use of AP mines, but is particularly appalled at the Angolan government's disregard for its international commitments. Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Angola, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty has signed the treaty." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.

The renewed use of mines flies in the face of Angola's rhetorical support for an AP mine ban. The government first publicly stated its support for a total prohibition of antipersonnel mines in 1996 at the end of the CCW review conference when Angolan Ambassador Parreira announced in the final plenary session that "the Government of Angola supports a total prohibition of all types of antipersonnel mines." Angola was active in the Ottawa Process. It endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration and participated in the Oslo negotiations. It voted for the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution in 1996, and the pro-treaty UNGA resolution in 1998.

In Ottawa during the treaty signing ceremony, Angola's then vice-Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti said:

Coming from Angola, a victim country of landmines, and being present at this important day for the signing ceremony, is not only a logical accomplishment for my government but also an opportunity to underline the expectations of the thousands of Angolan children, men and women, victims of this deadly, destructive and coward weapon.... It is mainly in the name of all these people that my government has taken a strong commitment to achieve a global ban on antipersonnel landmines... Before I conclude I wish to reiterate that the Angolan government is ready to cooperate as it has always done with the international community and all partners of this treaty who really want it to be implemented over all the Angolan territory including those areas under UNITA control, in order to achieve total peace.(327)

These words ring hollow in light of the government's continued use of antipersonnel landmines. It is clear the government is in no hurry to ratify or implement the Mine Ban Treaty. At a Red Cross meeting, Minister for Social Assistance Albino Malungo was asked by Landmine Monitor about Angolan plans for ratification. The Minister warned that article one could not be ratified, even if the rest of the Treaty might be. Quite obviously, such "ratification" would not be valid.(328)

While one Angolan minister was admitting his country had no intention to give up the use of landmines, another had just touted Angola's having signed the Mine Ban Treaty in calling for more international aid for mine clearance. In July of 1998, Angola and Zambia reached agreement to demine their common border areas. And in announcing the agreement after five days in Zambia, Foreign Affairs Minister Keli Walubita told reporters that the landmines continue to be a "major source of insecurity." The Minister added that both countries are signatories to the Treaty and "will approach donors to help them put their demining program in place."(329) Angola is a non-signatory of the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Landmine Protocol.

Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Approximately sixty types of antipersonnel mines from nineteen different countries have been identified in Angola.(330) Little is known about landmine stockpiles in Angola.(331)

On 28 November 1996 a group of Angolan NGOs formed the Angolan Campaign to Ban Landmines (CABM), which is supported by some twenty NGOs. A petition campaign gathered 60,000 signatures by December 1997, including that of Henrik Vaal Neto, the Minister of Information.

Landmine Use Since the Mine Ban Treaty

Although the Angolan government signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997 it has since been responsible for systematically laying new mines and minefields. A researcher for the Landmine Monitor has been an eyewitness to this gross disrespect of the Treaty in 1998 and has received numerous reports in 1999 of renewed landmine warfare in central and northern Angola.(332) These included: (1) seeing new minefields being prepared in Luena in August 1998, and also establishing that the provincial authorities had refused to allow mine clearance operations in these areas;(333) (2) interviewing newly-arrived refugees in Zambia who said that the Angolan National Police had protected their police station in Cazombo by putting landmines in their roof;(334) and (3) speaking with Angolan soldiers who admitted to planting landmines under orders in August 1998 during operations in Piri and in Uige.(335)

On 2 December 1998, the Jesuit Refugee Service, Mines Advisory Group, Medico International and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation published an open letter to the government and UNITA calling upon both sides to stop using landmines, noting that in Moxico province landmines had maimed or killed sixty-six persons since June 1998. The organizations wrote: "Demining is forbidden. Even to mark minefields is forbidden! This is the primary cause for many to step on mines in areas formerly safe--civilians as well as military." The letter also stated that in this period, UNITA was laying mines along roads and the government relaid a defensive mine belt around the town.(336)

The European Union, in a 28 December 1998 declaration, expressed its "grave concern" about the impasse in the peace process which has resulted in "a serious deterioration of the overall political, military, security, social and economic situation in Angola….Against this background, the EU regrets the increase in mine laying activity in Angola, a country that so far has been a major focus of the Union's demining efforts in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory of the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist so that these weapons can be removed.(337) Additionally, South Africa suspended its assistance to Angolan demining operations in January 1999 because of the new laying of mines.(338)

In 1999, each side has blamed the other for laying new mines; some twenty reports are on file with Landmine Monitor. Following are three examples: (1) Vice-Governor Simeao Dembo said on 10 December 1998 that UNITA had laid 7,000 news mines in areas of Uige province;(339) (2) UNITA reported that ten of its troops had been killed and twenty-five injured in a government minefield near Kunge (Bie) on 16 December 1998;(340) and (3) in January 1999, a Portuguese journalist was shown evidence by government soldiers of what they called new mining at Vila Nova (Huambo), which had just been retaken from UNITA rebels.(341)

Past Use(342)

Angola has been almost continuously at war since 1961. Landmines were first used in mid-1961 with the beginning of the struggle for independence from Portugal. Landmine warfare became more widespread among nationalist guerrillas beginning in 1968, reflecting growing external support for their struggle. The FNLA, UNITA and in particular the MPLA favored their use.(343) In 1970-71, the Portuguese laid some minefields along the Zambian border in an attempt to stop MPLA infiltration.(344)

Following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, the colonial government precipitously announced its withdrawal from Angola. In January 1975, the three movements that had fought for independence signed the Alvor Accord providing for a joint interim government and an integrated national army. However, as the date for military integration neared, the agreement broke down, and by mid-1975, the fronts were at war. The United States, Soviet Union and Cuba, and regional powers became involved in the conflict.(345)

Between September 1987 and March 1988, there were major battles in the Cuito Cuanavale area between some 3-5,000 South African troops and UNITA auxiliaries attempting to stop a larger joint Angolan-Cuban force advance on Mavinga and eventually UNITA's headquarters at Jamba. During these operations the South Africans laid a number of phony and real minefields along their positions. South African forces also laid antipersonnel mines behind Angolan government lines as these forces advanced in May 1987 and laid antipersonnel mines. Sometimes South African units suffered casualties from antipersonnel mines laid by the MPLA to ambush their operations.

Cuito Cuanavale marked the beginning of new diplomatic attempts to end the conflict. The following eighteen months saw simultaneously the most sustained efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war. Between April 1990 and May 1991, six rounds of peace talks took place between UNITA and the government, resulting in a peace agreement, the Bicesse Accords, which temporarily ended a conflict that had already taken between 100,000 and 350,000 lives. Under the accords the MPLA remained the legitimate government during an interim period in preparation for elections. Monitoring this interim period was a small United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II).

This peace was short-lived. UNITA rejected the results of the September 1992 elections and returned the country to war. Mine warfare also intensified in this third war, with thousands of new mines being laid by both government and UNITA forces to obstruct roads and bridges, to encircle besieged towns with mine belts up to three kilometers wide, and to despoil agricultural land. In 1993-94, the government surrounded the cities it held with large defensive minefields. UNITA then laid additional mines at the edges of the government minefields in an attempt to deny those in the besieged towns access to food, water and firewood. In March 1993 the government also used air-scatterable mines in Huambo to protect its retreating forces from UNITA advances.

Throughout 1993-94, battlefield victories and setbacks determined the pace of international mediation attempts. A series of government offensives in September 1994 pushed UNITA back from many of its territorial gains. On 20 November 1994, the two sides signed the Lusaka cease-fire protocol although it took until February 1995 for most of the fighting to stop. As late as August 1995, the FAA chief of staff, questioning whether there was true peace, stated, "We do not want peace only for Luanda, we want peace for all Angola. Twenty-five kilometers from the capital there are peasants who die. The roads are mined. There is no freedom of circulation. Ask these peasants whether this is peace."(346)

The Lusaka Protocol envisaged the deployment of over 7,000 UN troops (UNAVEM III) for a period of up to fifteen months. In late 1996, it became a UN priority to reduce UNAVEM's 7,000-strong military component, and the withdrawal, which began in earnest in February 1997, was scheduled to be complete by July. A successor UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), consisting of military observers, police observers, a political component and human rights monitors was formed in April 1997.

The ongoing, sporadic hostilities were marked by the continued use of landmines in violation of the Lusaka Protocol. Government and UNITA forces, Cabindan factions, and criminals were all responsible for new mine laying. In May 1995, Care International temporally suspended its humanitarian operations in Bie province because of newly mined roads.(347) UN Security Council Resolution 1008 of August 1995 "Urges the two parties to put an immediate and definitive end to the renewed laying of mines."(348) The UN reported in December 1995, "Recently, there had been several accidents caused by mine explosions in the provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Malange and Lunda Norte on roads that had already been in use for several months. The possibility cannot be ruled out that fresh mines are being laid in some areas, though the demining that took place prior to the opening of many access routes was not systematic."

The director of the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Ordnance (INAROEE), the official coordinating body for mine clearance, said in 1997 that "there were problems in 1996 with mines laid on roads we believed were clear, especially in government zones. There have been official investigations, but these have been inconclusive. This tendency is declining in 1997." However, incidents continued in 1997 and into 1998.

Relaying of landmines was particularly bad in the Lunda provinces were UNITA forces, government forces and criminal groups are defending their diamond interests. A number of antitank mines in 1995 and 1996 killed diamond workers. But it was not only on roads that new mines were used. At Cafunfo in Lunda Norte on 18 September 1996 twelve children between six and thirteen years of age were killed by a POMZ fragmentation mine when they were going to school from their homes in Bairro Maqueneno. This incident was not reported in the Angolan media because government forces routinely mined the center of town between 6:00 pm and 6:00 am--to provide an early warning system against UNITA or bandit incursions --and they sometimes forgot to remove all the mines.(349) In October 1998, the UN once again reported that humanitarian work was being hampered by "newly laid landmines."(350) In December, Angola plunged back into a fourth war and the UN's peacekeeping mission was not renewed in February 1999. Landmines once more feature prominently in this renewed Angolan conflict.

Landmine Problem

Long cited as one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, the early UN estimate of 10 to 15 million landmines contaminating Angolan soil is widely still cited. While no comprehensive landmine survey has been completed, estimates have been revised downward, with the 1998 U.S. State Department report stating "The source of the original baseline data remains unknown and the actual number of landmines may never be determined, although 6 million appears to be a more reasonable figure."(351) There are six to eight heavily mined provinces in Angola covering roughly 50 percent of the country. Existing records on the locations of landmines are extremely scanty. And new mine laying with the renewal of the war only complicates things further. According to statistics from the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles (INAROEE), mine types most commonly found in Angola are from Italy, China, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and Romania.(352)

As already noted, mines have been used by all parties to the various conflicts in Angola. They have been used offensively and defensively, in rural areas and cities. Provincial towns and cities were particularly affected by mine warfare when the fierce fighting resumed after the 1992 elections.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) had been contracted by the UN to conduct a nation-wide survey of the landmine problem in the northern eleven provinces, to map the existence of mines, consequences for local trade and the extent of damage. After a series of delays, work began on the survey in June 1995, but progress has been slow. Both sides have been reluctant to give real information about landmines and access has been difficult. Nevertheless by the end of 1998, NPA had completed an initial survey to identify mined or suspected mined areas in nine provinces, where about 80 percent of the population lives. Substantial progress had been achieved in five other provinces.

While, in October 1998, INAROEE reported that 2.4 square kilometers of high priority areas and 4,429 km of road had been cleared, removing 17,000 landmines, and that 6,000 minefields identified since 1995,(353) the reports of renewed mine use in the conflict present a "one step forward, two steps back" situation for mine survey, marking and clearance efforts. Additionally, renewed clashes once again force people to flee the fighting and relocate, resulting in mine accidents and changing priorities for mine action. Although mine clearance operations have encountered obstacles over the five years of unsteady peace under the Lusaka Protocol, recent developments have hindered or in some cases terminated mine action in various parts of the country. Suspensions of operations are solely dependent on security and once areas are again deemed safe for operations, most organizations plan to return to the work they left unfinished.

Mine Action Funding

As described below, attempts to address the landmine problem through the UNAVEM operation and the creation of the UN's Central Mine Action Office (CMAO) and the separate Angolan national body to coordinate clearance, INAROEE, did not begin until 1994/1995. Through its 1994 Consolidated Appeal, issued by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, $584,000 was raised for mine action by the beginning of 1995-- slightly more than the requested amount.(354)

A report for the United Nations notes "Funding for mine action was cobbled together from assessed budgets through UNAVEM III, voluntary contributions through the UNDHA-administered trust fund, the Government of Angola and direct bilateral contributions to specific projects or NGOs. In the absence of central coordination, comprehensive figures are not available. The year 1995 is indicative; the interagency humanitarian appeal included $12.4 for mine action. UNAVEM III's budget request for mine action in 1995 included $8.25 million from the assessed contributions of member states." The report also indicated that Angola had pledged $1.5 million for INAROEE at the end of 1995, but it was unclear if the pledge was ever made available. In mid-1995, the U.S. pledged $7.5 million for mine action as in-kind and cash support to NGOs and the UN.(355)

A compilation of donor support for Angola through the end of 1998 shows the following contributions: Australia, $7,687,506; Belgium, $1,126,959; Denmark, $3,989,312; the EU, $6,851,162; Finland, $500,000; Ireland, $252,791; Luxembourg, $143,000; the Netherlands, $3,883,531; Norway, $1,425,000; Sweden, $3,762,500; and the U.S., $23,344,000. These contributions total $50,943,011, and while helpful as an overview, the compilation does not indicate the years corresponding to various contributions or other "measurable" parameters.(356) Countries which have also contributed to mine action projects in Angola in 1994-1996, but did not appear in this compilation include Canada, South Africa, Switzerland and the UK.

Mine Clearance

During the period of relative peace prior to the elections in September 1992, there was a remarkable contrast between the recognition of the serious threat landmines present to Angola, and the actual response to the challenge of eradicating the mines. A UN report notes, "While there was a general understanding at the time of the Bicesse Accords that mines had been used extensively, there was no specific reference to the way in which they were likely to impact on the peace process nor how the problem would be addressed. Bicesse clauses concerned with cease-fire modalities stipulated that observance of the cease-fire would entail the cessation of 'the planting of new mines and action aimed at impeding activities to deactivate mines.'"(357) Before mid-1994, there had been no systematic assessment of the extent of the landmine problem, nor any real attempt to coordinate or plan eradication in an organized fashion. Since the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol, there have been efforts to seriously confront the landmine problem.

Several separate initiatives were underway prior to the resumption of hostilities in 1992. FAPLA/FALA teams consisted of soldiers from both armies and during the pre-election period, they were working throughout the country with varying success. The teams were using manual clearance methods, partly because of the lack of heavy equipment, and partly because they considered it the most effective. The priorities were to demine the major roads and railways, and the interiors of towns and villages.(358) However, it was questionable as to how systematically the major roads were cleared. This demining effort had a limited impact, largely due to lack of organization, resources, and support. These problems persisted despite the involvement of British military teams in assisting FAPLA/FALA efforts and by mid-1992 most mine-clearance had stopped.

The South African Defense Forces also provided technical assistance and training to the FAPLA/FALA teams in the south of the country up to mid-1992. These operations cleared some 300,000 mines. In mid-1992, most sources agreed that the South African contribution was a well-motivated project based on a good knowledge of the general problems and the specific devices, many of which had been laid by the SADF itself.(359) All the Angolan parties responded positively to the South African initiative. South Africa has since provided training for Angolans in mine clearance in South Africa and two courses took place in 1998. However, in January 1999, this assistance was suspended because of the new laying of mines.(360)

UN and Angolan Mine Action Offices

In March of 1994, the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) began plans to set up a Central Mine Action Office (CMAO. Its mine action plan called for an integrated, prioritized approach, with UCAH/CMAO as the focal point. There were problems in 1995 in obtaining funding for this project because of overall UNAVEM control and CMAO found itself in a lengthy battles for the release of funds. Although CMAO submitted its first procurement package to UNAVEM in May 1995, it was not until November that equipment was made available.

UNAVEM III itself was also engaged in mine-clearance. In May 1995, an engineering company of 206 Indian troops arrived in Angola as part of 1,200 men joining UNAVEM III. The Indian engineers engaged in mine clearing and the repair of bridges and roads, among other tasks. An advance party of British engineers which arrived in April also cleared priority roads and cantonment areas for demobilizing troops. Namibia and Brazil also provided 200 troops with mine clearing experience.

Because of the infighting, in November 1995 a senior Department of Humanitarian Affairs New York staff member visited Angola in an effort to resolve the delays. The visit produced a new document which redefined the roles and responsibilities of the key players.(361) The entire senior staff left CMAO and a new team took over in early 1996 but there remained a lack of continuity and a paucity of Lusophone speakers in the CMAO. By March 1997, the top six posts were all empty.(362) After the termination of UNAVEM III in 1997, responsibility for UN demining activities was transferred to the UNDP and CMAO became the UN Demining Program-Angola (UNDPA).(363)

In 1995, the Angolan government established its own mine action office, INAROEE, and by the end of the year the government pledged to fund the office with US$1.5 million. Essentially CMAO and Angola's INAROEE were to work side-by-side in a joint operations center in Luanda. There was little initial co-ordination with the UN although INAROEE was to be the national body to take over CMAO mine action work once the UN mandate expired.(364) INAROEE was made up of an integrated UNITA and FAA team with forty staff members provided by CMAO, and in its original plan, was to be headquartered in Luanda and have one brigade in each of the eighteen provinces. In 1998, INAROEE was operating with seven demining brigades; the remainder had not been formed due to a lack of funds.

Also, in late 1995, there were plans to establish a joint government-UN funded institute, CMATS, to train and equip Angolan demining teams.(365) Its plan to train 500 Angolan deminers by the end of 1996 failed because of "internecine control disputes among UN entities, lost time and resources and the exclusion of certain prospective students because of factional differences between UNITA and FAA."(366) By December 1996, 350 Angolan nationals had been trained and six brigades had been deployed to four of the country's eighteen provinces; only three of the brigades are fully operational in Cuando Cubango, Uige, and Moxico provinces. CMATS was handed over to INAROEE in February 1997, but it continues to receive support from UNDP, notably technical advisors.

There is no shortage of criticism about INAROEE's work regarding poor safety standards, and that its brigades are not working, and there has been a strike of deminers over lack of pay.(367) Co-ordination with INAROEE has not always been good, and remains a problem among various mine clearance programs in the country. Some NGO programs had been operational prior to INAROEE, and are not willing to change their priorities. Some problems have resulted from the multiplicity of actors, others were because of priorities. One provincial governor wanted a motor-cross track demined as a high priority--before the scheduled clearance of a water point in a city which had no other access to water.(368)

But criticism is not restricted to the Angolan government and INAROEE. A multi-country study for the UN noted that the UN and Angolan government initiatives were "doomed" from the beginning. The report cites complete lack of communication and cooperation, byzantine bureaucratic procedures slowing down or blocking almost completely mine action, a lack of professionalism within the UN itself and infighting over control over the program in Angola among the many problems. Its assessment states that the "utter failure of the UN and Government to cooperate effectively through their respectively chosen instruments, CMAO and INAROEE, discouraged donors in general." The study concluded that since it is a relatively "young" mine action program,

In theory, it was in a strong position to benefit from the experiences of other programs. In reality, the Angolan program has proved the most problematical of the four [countries in the study]. Some of the difficulties can be attributed to the political environment and the many obstacles which have slowed the peace process. Also, since Angola is a country rich with diamonds and oil which produce a high annual revenue, donors and others wanted to see the government make a strong commitment to tackle the problem of mines before soliciting support from the international community….Angola is a text-book case of how not to initiate a mine action program.(369)

Commercial Demining

Because of the lack of capacity to clear mines quickly in this period, the UN contracted out for demining operations, awarding the South African firm, Mechem, $6.5 million in June 1995 to clear mines along more than 7,000 kilometers of priority roads and to offer quality assessment of other road clearance operations. Thirteen priority roads in the north, center and south of country had been drawn up for clearance. Although scheduled to start in September 1995, a mixture of bureaucratic delays, Mechem's refusal to pay bribes and suspicion of Mechem by military officials resulted in a delay in off-loading its equipment in Luanda harbor.(370) (In June 1994 the director of Mechem had boasted that, "There are some mines in Angola which no one will be able to find without our help."(371)) Although the government gave Mechem permission in early December to become operational, the project only got underway on 11 January 1996. The German government has also provided a couple of quality assessment officials for this project.

Mechem's operations were based upon twenty-five air-sensing, armor-plated Caspir vehicles working in tandem with dog demining teams and other manual methods. Mechem deployed two teams, one in the north and the other in the south of Angola. The teams of seventy-five deminers included sub-contracted personnel of other demining companies, such as Ronco, Gurkha Security Guards and Mine-Tech. Eleven Angolan deminers also worked with the Ronco team. Mechem completed its clearance contract in the southern sector in August, and by December 1996 had cleared over 4,000 kilometers of roads. UNITA never allowed it to clear the Malange-Andulo-Kuito route.

Other commercial firms are clearing mines around the Soyo oil installations, employed by FINA and SONANGOL. The Executive Outcomes-linked firm Saracen worked in Soyo, replacing the French firm Cofras, and its successor CIDEV. The South African firm Shibata Security and the British firm, Defence Systems Limited, have also engaged in small-scale demining exercises in the Soyo area. CIDEV has distributed a proposal for a mechanized demining operation of Huila province but has failed to attract funding to date.(372) The Italian firm Apalte Bonificação e Construção (ABC) employed four brigades of twenty deminers on a demining exercise along the Benguela railway from early 1998.(373) With renewed conflict it is unclear what happened to this project.

NGO Mine Action Initiatives

Kap Anamur: The Kap Anamur Committee is a German humanitarian NGO founded in 1979. Kap Anamur set up a mine clearance project in Angola in May 1992 and clearance began in August. Through agreement with the Angolan government the town of Xangongo (Cunene province) was chosen as a starting point for the operation. The German government loaned gratis former East German military equipment, including a number of T-55 tanks with KMT-5 rollers and off-road trucks.(374) FAPLA and FALA sent a group of well trained sappers to work jointly on the project, but the FALA members left after the 1992 elections. In 1993 the operation had five Germans, twenty-five local sappers from FAA and twenty mechanics attached to the project at a running cost of $20,000 a month. Between mid 1992 and 1994 Kap Anamur cleared minefields and mine clusters in Cunene province and claims to have removed 50,626 AT mines and 25,338 AP mines.

In early 1995, Kap Anamur attempted to move its operations from Cunene to Benguela province with fatal consequences. On 1 March 1995, five people, including one German attached to the project were killed by unidentified gunmen at Solo, 100km from Benguela. The attack appears to have been aimed at keeping the road closed because the clearance team had received several indirect warnings about work in the area prior to the incident. Cap Anamur was also involved in controversy because one of its expatriate staff was arrested in 1995 for his involvement in the illegal export of munitions to Namibia. Kap Anamur ceased operating in Angola in 1996.(375)

Mines Advisory Group: MAG's presence in Angola dates back to mid-1992 with the start of a mine awareness poster campaign in cooperation with UNHCR. Following a specialist mission by MAG to Angola in November 1993, MAG began operations in April 1994 setting up a base in Luena, Moxico Province. Luena was chosen because of its critical location for returning refugees following a cease-fire. Additionally there is a shortage of land both for the communities and for agricultural projects of relief agencies because of mines.(376)

By October 1994 the construction of its demining school was finished and within two years, 134 deminers were operational and thirty more had just been trained. Nine minefields had been prioritized for initial clearance operations. Several UN officials criticized MAG's focus of resources on this one area as being extravagant and that MAG should be working on clearing priority routes in the short term. Mine-clearance operations in Moxico province were suspended in mid-January 1995 until late March because of a dispute with the Governor although none of the minefields prioritized for clearance served a military role. This problem was eventually resolved with the intervention of the Minister of Social Assistance, Albino Malungo. In October 1996, MAG also expanded its clearance operations to Lumeje, UNITA's "capital" in Moxico province.

By 1998, MAG had expanded operations beyond Lumege to Luau, which has a severe mine problem and will be a focal point for repatriation from Zaire.(377) MAG employs over 200 deminers and seven MATs, which are mine awareness staff and minefield survey personnel who work together in gathering information and marking mined sites in order to assess what are the local priorities for clearance.(378) However, MAG has been the most affected by the deteriorating situation in Angola, closing operations there in mid-1998 due to the worsening tension in the area. MAG operations in Luau were hit by mortar fire during a clash between government and UNITA troops.(379) The staff had to evacuate and the project's equipment in Luau was lost. Other areas in MAG's area of operation were subsequently the scene of battles and new mine laying, which led to its decision to leave Moxico.(380)

MAG maintained an administrative presence in Luanda while it assessed the situation in Angola. It decided not to return to Moxico province, but did recommenced activities in Angola at the end of 1998 in Cunene province in the south of the country.(381) MAG is working south and west of Ondjiva and continues exclusively with its MAT format from Luena, which consists of small mixed teams of survey, clearance, mine awareness and community liaison personnel.(382) Two MATs are being formed, with two more to be trained by the end of the year. In Luena, Medico International restarted the mine awareness component of MAG's Luena program with some assistance from other mine action NGOs in November 1998, and its work is directed at the some 36,000 internally displaced people who have settled in Luena due to the increased clashes in surrounding areas.(383) Since March 1999, the mine awareness program has been run exclusively by Medico.

Halo Trust: The British NGO Halo Trust began operating in Kuito in late 1994. In January 1995, the government through the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Cooperation issued a permit to the Halo Trust for demining operations in Kuito, Benguela and Huambo provinces. Britain's ODA has provided funds for mine clearance in Benguela. Halo Trust's initial work was in the city of Kuito itself with a team of twenty-six Angolans and twelve expatriates.

Between November 1994 and February 1995, Halo destroyed 1,200 mines in central Kuito, but in May 1995 Halo Trust faced a crisis over its operations, following a dispute with the Governor of Kuito, who indicated that he wanted the team removed from Bie province. The Halo Trust Manager in Luanda said that the government's confidence in them has improved, but that UNITA is still distrustful, and refuses to share information about where UNITA mines are located. Halo claimed to have cleared 3,000 mines in 1995.(384) Operating from a base in Huambo, with another field office in Kuito, Halo has also conducted limited local surveys in Benguela and Huambo and began clearing mines in Huambo in January 1996. In early 1998, Halo received its first mechanical equipment, an armored front loader.

Although Halo operated a team of de-miners who were former UNITA combatants, the organization had been plagued with access problems. While they were able to demine certain UNITA areas easily, they have been stopped from clearing other areas and have had cleared areas re-mined repeatedly.(385) Despite the changing security situation, Halo continues to maintain its bases in Kuito and Huambo.(386) Halo considers the security situation in the area to be not much different from when it originally began its program there in 1994 and 1995 shortly after the Lusaka peace agreement. The increased security threat from military activities in the two provinces has turned Halo's focus to clearance of areas closer to the two centers where there is still considerable debris to be cleared.(387) The concentration on areas close to the two towns also coincides with priorities to assist internally displaced people who have relocated nearer to both Kuito and Huambo. In addition to mine clearance, Halo continues to perform survey and UXO clearance tasks and monitors the location of antitank mines on routes around its areas of operation to inform aid agencies to avoid accidents when delivery of humanitarian aid is again a priority.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): The demining operation of NPA is the largest in Angola. Like Halo Trust, NPA in January 1995 obtained a government permit to clear mines in Malanje province. In early 1995, NPA found starting up difficult, indeed witnessing in some instances government forces continuing to plant mines and blocking NPA's attempt to become fully operational. In February 1995, NPA began to deploy its first team of deminer graduates in platoons in two locations along the Malanje-Luanda corridor as part of an agreement with the World Food Program and SwedRelief. In 1996, NPA gradually starting clearing land around Malanje.(388) And, on 3 October 1996, NPA announced the start of its clearance operations in Cuanza Norte province.(389)

In 1997, NPA received its first two mechanical de-mining machines, Scottish Aradvarks. In 1998, NPA acquired two Danish Hydrema flails. It also introduced dogs in 1996, although initially these suffered from sickness. According to NPA figures in 1998 it employed 650 people in Angola, including 350 manual de-miners and over thirty dogs and handlers. NPA had operations in Luanda, Lobito, Malanje and Ndalatando.(390) The organization continues to conduct survey, marking and clearance using dogs, machines and manual methods in Angola as well as providing technical assistance to the national demining organ INAROEE. On 24 February 1998, NPA announced that 1,800 areas had been identified as suspected of being mined in Zaire, Uige, Luanda, Malanje, Namibe and Cunene provinces.(391)

NPA has called for mine action to continue now in the face of deteriorating security in certain areas of the country when it is most needed to assist dislocated civilians.(392) However, its operations in Malange province were stopped in January after military clashes escalated. Mine verification and road clearance in Cuando Cubango province were also curtailed in December when military actions increased in the province. Operations in other areas were also affected to some extent, but NPA was able to re-deploy teams to areas where security was not a problem and priorities for operations identified. Another factor that hampered operations was the limitations on air transport and cargo, since almost all NGOs working in the interior of Angola depend on air transport and after the shooting down of two UN airplanes the frequency of flights has declined.(393)

Save the Children Fund (USA): Save the Children Fund (USA) won a mine clearance contract from USAID in 1995. SCF initially funded expanded NPA teams to clear mines in Cuanza Sul and Bengo and Moxico provinces to make agricultural land accessible to the internally displaced, refugees, demobilized soldiers and residents. SCF-USA has established a demining school near Sumbe and commenced in January 1996 to train 170 deminers through NPA. A total of 250 deminers were trained and SCF took over management of the operations from NPA. However, in late 1996, SCF's clearance operation ran into problems following a serious accident and its mine clearance operations were suspended pending a review. When one of its teams was clearing a pylon in Cunene province, a group of deminers was at the site of a recently uncovered mine, when it exploded injuring several of them. The medical evacuation was described by UN official as a "comedy of errors" with the vehicle carrying the injured crashing and no senior supervisory staff on location at the time of accident.(394)

Care International (USA): Care International (USA) is funding Greenfield Consultants, a new commercial firm based in the UK and run by the former Halo Trust manager in Mozambique. Greenfield signed a twelve month contract with Care which calls for two clearance teams operating in Cuando Cubango province, plus mine awareness programs in Bie, Cunene, Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces. The clearance teams were deployed in December 1995,(395) and cleared mines in Huambo in late 1996. CARE/Greenfields Inc. was also working in Bie province but terminated mine-related work and evacuated its staff from the province in mid-March due to the increased conflict between the government and UNITA.(396) Up until its departure, the CARE program was performing demining and UXO clearance.(397) The staff is in Luanda and hopes to return to work in Kuito as early as May 1999 depending on improvements in the security situation.(398)

Menschen gegn Minen (MgM): MGM is a German based NGO which is run by former members of Kap Anamur who left that organization because of increasing controversy over its safety and ethical record. MgM, funded mainly by the German government, was awarded a contract from the World Food Program in August 1996 to clear roads for the internally displaced in Caxito, Bengo province. The first clearance operations commenced in November around Dange bridge and quickly progressed.(399) MgM, continued to clear mines on roads and bridges in Bengo province in December and January 1999.(400) The clearance facilitated the resettlement of 7,000 internally displaced people from the "Boa Esperança" camp near Caxito, and the camp has now been officially closed. Currently MgM is training mechanics, operators and dog handlers for its integrated clearance method at the INAROEE training center in Viana outside Luanda. In May, MgM plans to begin demining in Caxito in an area where Save the Children formerly had attempted mine clearance.

Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara is also a German based mine clearance organization, run by Gerhart Bornman. Like MGM, Santa Barbara became operational in Angola in late 1996, is funded by the German government, and has been awarded a contract by the WFP to clear routes that will be used by internally displaced persons resettling in Benguela province. It reports that the increased tension has not affected its mine clearance operations to date.(401)

HMD: HMD, a British organization, was to begin operations in Saurimo in Lunda Sul Province in 1998, but to date, they are not known to have begun operations.

Mine Awareness

Coordinated by the CMAO, a national mine awareness program was started in 1994 by UNICEF and Angolan NGOs, using media and messages printed on bags and clothing. At the same time, UNHCR began plans with other humanitarian organizations to start a repatriation program. The campaign was led by NPA in co-ordination with Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Norwegian Refugee Council.(402) It was originally planned to train 390 local mine awareness instructors in eleven cities in nine provinces between 1 May 1995 and 1 May 1996, but this was extended to September 1996 and a further 240 local mine awareness instructors were trained. According to the CMAO by September 1996 an estimated 920,000 people have received mine awareness training and eighty-two supervisors and more than 620 instructors had been trained in thirteen provinces. MAG discontinued mine awareness programs in refugee camps in Zambia and in the Congo as their was no repatriation, due to increased hostilities.

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Angolan Red Cross also supported mine awareness training for their national staff and districts in 1997 and 1998.. UNHCR and UNICEF supported mine awareness campaigns by MAG, Handicap International and NPA. The Catholic Relief Services and World Vision International also engaged in mine awareness work.(403)

Like with the mine clearance itself, there have been problems of co-ordination in mine awareness operations. MAG criticized NPA efforts in Luena and NPA has complained about CARE International efforts in Menongue which they allege duplicate existing services; they also say that CARE pays three times NPA wages, destroying local salary structures and undermining confidence and momentum in the NPA program.(404)

Landmine Casualties

Angola has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it has many thousands of amputees, the great majority of them injured by landmines. The government claims that there are 100,000 amputees in the country although the more widely used figure is 70,000. However in general an estimated one in every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury, and the proportion of child casualties ranged from 41 percent to 76 percent in the heavily mined provinces of Moxico, Huila, Bie and Huambo.

The government has produced figures only for mine fatalities among FAPLA soldiers in the "Second War:" between 1975 and 1991, 6,728 were killed by mine explosions.(405) In reality, however, there are no reliable estimates for the total number of people killed by landmines. Because of the scarcity of medical care for the civilian population, the true figure probably is very high. Lack of a national-level victim database hampers casualty estimation, but the ICRC and UNICEF believe that there are at least 120 new landmine victims per month in Angola.(406)

It appears that the provinces of Bie and Huambo have suffered a disproportionate share of landmine injuries. However, the landmine problem is also very severe in the south and east, particularly in Moxico Province. The great majority of victims are young men, a fact which has contributed to the militancy of many amputees in demanding their rights.

Among the civilians, men and women of all ages are affected. Children are an important minority of those affected by landmines. A needs assessment by UNICEF in December 1997 concluded that over a two year period in Bie there was a 70 percent decline of mine-related accidents and a 82 percent decrease in Huambo. This was due to mine awareness campaigns, on-going demining operations and knowledge acquired by IDPs.(407)

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Care and rehabilitation for FAPLA, and later FAA, soldiers is the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Medica-Militar (SAMM) of FAA. It functions well, in part because the government and military attract good people by offering benefits and access to goods. In its Jamba headquarters, UNITA's Special Department for War Wounded was set up in 1989. Up to 1992 it had at least three units caring for was amputees. One of these produced twenty artificial legs per month. The center collapsed in late 1994 due to a lack of resources.(408) For soldiers, assistance was usually more rapid, with immediate evacuation often by helicopter or vehicle. The first-aid provided was usually extremely rudimentary, consisting of no more than bandaging the wound and providing comfort and perhaps some painkilling drugs.

For most civilians injured by landmines, transport to the nearest first-aid post usually involved being carried manually or by cart; onward transport to a hospital was usually by car or sometimes by airplane. Civilians had to wait on average for about thirty-six hours before arriving at a hospital. One man interviewed for this report believed that it had been six days before he received hospital treatment. Adequate treatment is scarce. Drugs are often in short supply, and the staff are less qualified and motivated than in government- run hospitals. The variable quality of medical care means that hospitals can be dangerous for amputees. Wounds may become affected and secondary or even tertiary amputations often are needed. There has also been a high incidence of osteomyelitides, a bone-wasting disease, which may set in after a poorly-done amputation.

Civilian victim assistance in Angola consists mostly of physical rehabilitation provided by several international NGOs, but the provision of rehabilitation services outside Luanda has also been significantly affected by the recent increase in conflict in Angola. The existing facilities for landmine victims are grossly inadequate. A prosthesis can only be expected to last two to three years, and children require new ones at least every year, as they outgrow the one they have. This means that a total of over 5,000 new prostheses is required every year, merely to cope with the existing number of amputees. This is more than twice the number currently being manufactured.

The ICRC ran a center at Bombo Alto, near Huambofrom 1980 to 1992. It included eleven technicians working solely on the manufacture of artificial limbs and seventy-eight workers in all. In 1996, with a fragile peace restored, the ICRC reopened a renovated Bombo Alto orthopedic center in Huambo and also opened a new center in Kuito. An agreement was also signed with the Ministry of Health regarding the provision of orthopedic services. The center in Kuito was closed for two weeks in December due to clashes between the government and UNITA, and Huambo was also closed for a lesser period of time in December around Christmas. Patients who would usually come from some distance and stay in the centers' dormitories were reluctant to leave their homes and ICRC was likewise reluctant to have patients from outside the urban centers housed in its dormitories during periods of shelling. Since the re-opening of the centers, ICRC reports that operations and patient numbers have almost completely returned to levels prior to the latest round of fighting. ICRC has recently expanded operations in Luanda to take full responsibility of the prosthetics workshop and components production at the Neves Bendinha.(409)

The Swedish Red Cross had run an orthopedic center at Neves Bendinha. The orthopedic components unit was completely refurbished in 1995. The ICRC and the Swedish Red Cross had also signed a cooperation agreement for the center. The Dutch Red Cross also has a center at Viana, Luanda Province.

Handicap International (HI) visited Angola in February 1995 to assess possible participation in mine action programs. HI already has a rehabilitation program for disabled persons in Benguela including an orthopaedic workshop, physical rehabilitation and an information campaign on the prevention of disabilities. By late 1998, it was operating four clinics outside Luanda in Benguela, Lobito, Negage and Bailundo, but closed the center in Bailundo, the headquarters of UNITA, in September 1998, due to increased military clashes in the area. The center in Negage in Uige province was scheduled to be turned over to the Ministry of Health later this year, but the increased breakdown in security, hastened the turn over and HI left Negage in November 1998. The center continues to function to some extent. The two centers in Benguela and Lobito have not directly been affected, but have experienced a deficit in patients of some ten to twenty a month due to the inability of patients to safely reach the workshops.(410) HI plans to start general social reintegration projects related to both workshops, but limit its activities to the urban centers until the security situation improves in surrounding areas. HI continues to work at the Viana Center outside Luanda producing feet for all the physical rehabilitation programs in Angola.

Medico International and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, under the name Veterans International, continue to provide physical and social rehabilitation to mine victims in Luena in Moxico Province. Tensions in the region coincided with the end of year holidays and leave time for expatriate staff, which caused the center and social programs to stop from the second week in December until the beginning of February. Since restarting, the program has been limited to working with mine victims within a five to eight kilometer radius of the city of Luena. All registered below the knee amputees have been fitted in Luena and the workshop is now concentrating on above the knee amputees and any recent mine victims. The social teams that had been working with a variety of groups in surrounding areas are now concentrating on specific areas of the city and the recent displaced population that has settled in Luena. (411)

Angola remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities are available for the physically disabled. Most amputees are reluctant to leave the relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their future will consist of being cared for by their families, or attempting to earn a living in one of the few occupations open to them, such as the street trading or--for those with education--secretarial work. The majority who come from farming backgrounds are likely to remain a burden on their families for the foreseeable future. Many have been reduced to begging; amputee beggars are already a common sight in Angolan towns. Angola will have to live with the human cost of the landmine wars for many years to come.


Mine Ban Policy

Botswana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. In 1997, Lady Ruth Khama, a former First Lady and President of the Botswana Red Cross spoke out against the use of mines in the region and called for those who planted and/or manufactured them to remove them.(412) Botswana supported the Ottawa Process by voting in favour of the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution on landmines, supporting the June 1997 OAU resolution, endoring the Brussels Declaration and attending, as a full participant, the Oslo treaty negotiations. In addition to the Red Cross, non-governmental organizations, including Ditsawanelo, the Botswana Centre for Human Rights, have been active in supporting the campaign to ban landmines.

Botswana has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In 1995, a Botswana Defence Force official told Human Rights Watch that Botswana maintains a small stockpile of AP landmines.(413) However, in June 1997, the government stated: "Botswana finally wishes to refute allegations contained in the African Topics magazine Issue no. 17 of April -May 1997 that its Defence Force maintains a stockpile of mines. Allegations that Botswana maintains a stockpile of Landmines have not been verified."'(414)

During the Rhodesian war, landmines were planted in northern Botswana, including RAP1, RAP 2 and Shrapnel No. 2 mines of Rhodesian origin.(415) However, no known incidents have occurred since 1980 and all mines have reportedly been cleared. The U.N. Database lists Botswana as mine-free, however other sources list it as being affected by landmines.(416)

In response to reports that "Caprivi Separatists," who fled from Namibia to Botswana were found in possession of small arms and antipersonnel landmines, the Namibian Campaign to Ban Landmines called on the Botswana government to destroy all mines found in the possession of the separatists.(417)


Mine Ban Policy

Burundi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has not yet ratified, due largely to a domestic atmosphere of political instability which included suspension of the National Assembly from August 1996 to August 1998. According to Burundi's Ambassador to Belgium, Jonathas Niyungeko, recent improvements in the political situation may now allow the authorities to ratify, implement and create a specific framework to deal with the landmine issue.(418)

Burundi officials state that Burundi has not used, produced, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, though no unilateral prohibitions are in place. Burundi endorsed the Brussels Declaration but apart from attending the Bonn preparatory meeting, Burundi did not participate in meetings of the Ottawa Process. It voted in favor of the 1996 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines but was absent from the 1997 vote. Burundi also agreed to the Plan of Action from the May 1997 OAU Conference on Landmines and the June 1997 OAU resolution on landmines.(419) According to Niyungeko domestic legislation forbids the transfer through Burundi of weapons including landmines.(420)

There is considerable awareness among the population regarding landmine issues, including among opposition representatives. On 21 February 1996, the opposition Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD) gathered in Bukavu (former Zaire), expressed its high concern about the AP mine use in the Bubanza region.(421)

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Burundi has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Officials claim that the mines in Burundi have been brought in by rebels or foreign armies. One official has said, "It is highly possible that among the Rwandan antipersonnel mines introduced in Burundi, some have been sent to other countries. It seems that some of the antipersonnel mines are sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo."(422)

According to the government, Burundi has never stockpiled antipersonnel mines.(423) At the same time, however, officials acknowledge that they sometimes keep mines captured from rebels, and the Ministry of Defense has said that limited stocks are kept for training purposes.(424) This raises questions as to whether Burundi may have an operational stockpile of AP mines.

At the end of 1996, thousands of Burundian rebels crossed Lake Tanganyika and the Tanzanian and Zairian borders to conduct raids in Burundi. What were described as captured rebel munitions stocks were presented to Human Rights Watch by the Burundian army, including six Egyptian AP mines, four antitank mines, Chinese hand grenades of different makes, grenade launchers, electrical detonators, explosives, TNT, and more than fifty anti-tank rockets.(425) Officially, the only landmines stockpiles in Burundi are held by rebels, but an official said that whenever these are discovered they are destroyed "or the Army keeps them."(426)


The Ministry of Defense states that no mines have ever been laid by the army,(427) but rebels have used them regularly. Before 1996, there was believed to be no landmine problem in Burundi.(428) But according to the Minister of Defense, Col. Alfred Nkurunziza, the first mine accidents reported in Burundi occurred in 1993.(429) Members of the former Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) allegedly carried with them 40,000 antipersonnel mines and 2,000 antitank mines when they fled the advance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in April-May 1994.(430)

Cibitoke was the first province to be affected by mine use, but the problem subsequently spread to Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi and Makamba. This last province is though to be the worst affected, due to its proximity to rebel groups operating out of Tanzania.(431) Since 1993, 172 AT mines and 144 AP mines have been reported found in Burundi, either by accident or through army detection operations.(432) While AP mines reportedly continue to be found regularly, no AT mines have been found or reported since May 1998.(433)

Between November 1996 and July 1998, roughly fifty AT mine and ten AP mine incidents were reported to the United Nations "Security Cell," in Burundi, including more than 12 in the capital Bujumbura.(434) Until early 1997, most incidents occurred on access roads to the capital but since then, most incidents have occurred in the provinces, especially Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza.(435) Unconfirmed information indicates widespread mine use along the border with Tanzania, especially towards the south-east.(436) According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-Belgium, AP mine use has become quite frequent to protect isolated military posts from rebel attacks at night and rebels also use AP mines to protect retreat routes.(437)

Political-ethnic conflict continues in Burundi in the aftermath of Pierre Buyoya's coup of 1996 and Burundi's involvement in the wider Hutu-Tutsi conflict in the Great Lakes region. Several outbursts of violence has been recorded since December 1998, including landmine incidents. Although Burundi has managed to avoid being completely drawn into the wider crisis centered upon the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the local struggle between Buyoya's government (locally viewed as pro-Tutsi) and Hutu extremists in the various militia on and outside the country's border, reflects the lines drawn in Rwanda and DRC since 1994. Burundian Hutu rebels are thought to have developed close links with DRC head of state Laurent Kabila's Forces armées congolaises (FAC). Conversely, anonymous local sources state that Burundian armed forces have been fighting alongside Rassemblement congolaise pour la démocratie (RCD) forces opposing Kabila's government.(438)

Landmine Problem

According to a recent assessment by the UN Mine Action Service, "the scope of the landmine problem does not appear to justify the establishing of a specific civilian clearance authority at this stage. Nor does it justify the implementation of specific victim assistance projects."(439) Still, Burundi is significantly affected by landmines. But use of mines does not seem to be geographically widespread. No in-depth country-level survey or assessment of the situation has been made to date. However, areas that were and still are conflict-free are believed to be mine-free zones.(440) There is no precise number of people affected. Burundi's landmines are of Egyptian, Italian, South African, Russian and Chinese origin, with an increasing number of plastic AP mines.(441)

There is no specialist government department and no funding for mine clearance, victim assistance, mine awareness or training.(442) The landmine issue is a low priority compared with other questions and there seems to be little political will to finance activities on mine clearance, victim assistance, mine awareness and training.

Mine Awareness and Clearance

The United Nations in Burundi continues to conduct, co-ordinate and monitor a mine awareness-training program for all UN staff in the country. According to the Ministry of Defence, mine awareness training is also being conducted for both the military and civilian populations in mine-affected areas.(443) Mine awareness materials have been distributed in Bujumbura, although no mines detected in the last year in the capital.(444) There are currently no coordinated mine clearance and training activities in Burundi. No evaluations exist of how much mine localization and clearance would cost.

Landmine Casualties

While there is a paucity of data on landmine casualties, some sources give an indication of the problem. From 1 October 1996 to 10 April 1997 the UN Security Cell in reported twenty-three "confirmed" mine incidents and ten "unconfirmed" incidents.(445) MSF-Belgium recorded 112 mine incidents between 1996 and 1998, 61 percent of which occurred in 1997.(446) During this period, there were 364 mine victims (48% wounded, 52 % dead) and forty percent were civilian.(447) Three-quarters of logged incidents were due to AT mines.(448) These figures, while helpful, probably do not fully reflect the scale of the problem in the border areas with Tanzania.

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Burundi's health care system has deterioated since 1993, largely due to the imposition of sanctions and while exemptions were granted for health products in April 1998, availability of basic medicines and health supplies has not returned to pre-sanction levels.(449) There are two main civilians hospitals in the capitol where mine victims can be treated and onemilitary hospital.(450) Through a bilateral agreement, the Government of South Africa also treats victims with important trama who cannot be treated in Burundi and has also provided prostheses, a total of 167 as of August 1998.(451)

Handicap International (HI) has set up a coordination center in Bujumbura and currently operates in the provinces of Gitega, Kirundo, Muyinga and Bujumbura.(452) In Gitega, Kanynya, Muyinga and Bujumbura, HI provides support for mine victims and the wider population through technical training and material assistance. A HI income-generating project program has been set up. About 15 HI micro-projects have been implemented. HI is mainly working in partnership with the Minister of Social Action, and hopes to strengthen its national co-ordination this year, to gain official government recognition.

During 1998, MSF-Belgium provides surgical services in Ngozi, Ruyigi and Karusi Provinces, and in Bujumbura Municipality. In addition, MSF has set up emergency sections in Bujumbura Province and in Bururi. MSF also provides drugs, medical devices and materials, and expert staff support.


Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. Cameroon is concerned by the landmine problem even though it is not directly affected by this weapon.(453) It was a key player in the Ottawa Process, participating in key meetings, including the October 1996 International Strategy meeting which launched the Ottawa Process and the Kempton Park Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting on landmines in June 1997. Cameroon endorsed the Brussels Declaration, and participated actively in the Oslo negotiations, where it worked together with Belgium to modify the deadline for entry-into-force, reducing it from the proposed one year to six months.(454) It also spoke strongly against amendments put forward by the United States that, if accepted, would have seriously weakened the treaty. Cameroon voted in support of key 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions but was absent from the 1998 resolution urging universalization and ratification of the ban treaty.

Cameroon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. According to government representatives, "Cameroon has signed the essential by signing the Ottawa Convention. There are now obligations to take concrete measures and adopt a national implementation law soon or later, the essential objective being the total ban."(455)

Cameroon does not use, produce or export AP mines but it possesses AP mine stockpiles for training purposes. According to officials, these are tightly controlled. The precise number or types of retained AP mines are unknown. Previously, military training was provided by French, American, and Chinese Academy Schools. Under domestic legislation, Cameroon does not allow mines to transit its national territory, in any direction.(456)

Cameroon is riven by socio- and ethno-political tensions, opposing North and South, Anglophone and Francophone populations and--above all--the Bamiléké of the north-west and the Béti-Bulu ethnic complex of the South but no evidence of landmine use has been found. Cameroon's Extreme Nord province--a major security concern--is a narrow corridor separating Nigeria and Chad. Neglected by the capital Yaoundé, it is logistically vital for neighboring Chad, being the transport channel between Chadian capital Ndjamena and the ports of the Cameroonian coast at Douala and Limbe. Since the early 1990s, the security situation in Extreme Nord has worsened sharply, due largely to politico-military unrest in Chad. In particular, political bandits and armed robbers from Chad, Nigeria and other parts of Cameroon have rendered the province insecure. So called "road cutters" ( coupeurs de route ) frequently use military armaments in attacks but landmines have not, as yet, figured in their arsenal.

Another potential conflict situation concerns the Nigeria-Cameroon border, particularly the Bakassi peninsula, throughout to be rich in petrocarbons.(457) Tensions broke out into low-level war in 1994, although the situation has since stabilized slightly, and the election in February 1998 of retired general Olusegun Obasanjo as Nigerian president may improve matters further.

While Cameroon is currently unable to take part in cross border financial cooperation for demining work, due to the depth of the economic crisis in the country since the mid-1980s, it is ready to work with other countries in the region on mines clearance, if demining personnel become available. Deminers may be trained in Cameroon in future, depending upon planned restructuring of the armed forces.


Cape Verde's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amilcar Spencer Lopes, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and in a statement to the signing ceremony, he said, "Cape Verde, a small country which doesn't produce, use, or import antipersonnel mines, launches an appeal to all states, particularly those who are not participating in this Conference, to rally to the objective of the Ottawa Convention, which is the total elimination of these crippling devices."(458) Cape Verde has not yet ratified. According to the government the ratification papers are at the National Assembly waiting approval.(459) Cape Verde endorsed the Brussels Declaration and attended the Oslo negotiations. Cape Verde also supported all the key UN General Assembly resolutions in support of banning landmines.

According to a government official Cape Verde maintains no stockpile of anti-personnel landmines.(460) Cape Verde is a former Portuguese colony four hundred miles off the coast of Senegal. Although many Cape Verdians took part in the armed struggle against the Portuguese, most of the fighting was in Guinea-Bissau so there are no stockpiles of landmines on the islands.


Mine Ban Policy

Chad signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 6 July 1998, but has not yet ratified. Chad endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration of June 1997, but otherwise did not participate in the Ottawa Process, including the treaty negotiations in Oslo. There is no evidence of landmine production in Chad and the country is not believed to have any production capacity. Chad is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. There is no information on Chad's stockpile of antipersonnel mines. There have been some indications of possible recent use of landmines in the Togoimi revolt in the far north region of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET), including rumors of antitank mine incidents, but no concrete information is available.

Landmine Problem

Decades of conflict and the 1973 Libyan invasion have left Chad with a severe landmine and UXO problem. Estimates of landmine numbers vary from a low of 50,000 to a high of one million.(461) There is currently no comprehensive mine database or minefield records. An assessment carried out by an UN expert deminer in June 1995 concluded that 70,000 mines were still in need of clearance.(462)

Based on comprehensive reconnaissance of the region by a French expert, it is estimated there are approximately one million mines and an unknown amount of UXO in Chad.(463) The BET is the most severely mine-infested region and there are relatively few mine incidents in the rest of the country. In May 1996, a vehicle carrying a new sub-prefect, an army officer and gendarmerie strayed off the road and hit a mine, wounding all three.(464)

During their occupation of the Aozou Strip and environs, Libyan forces laid both AT mines and AP mines. Battles with Chadian forces resulted in the spread of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous debris. Most mines are located in the BET region. Although some were laid in field patterns, most were randomly deployed, many in food-producing areas. Minefields were neither marked nor fenced, and no maps were handed over to the Chadian authorities at the end of the hostilities.(465) Further south, the presence of mines and UXO has also been reported in the provinces of Biltine, Ouaddai, Salamat and Moyen Chari, but no figures are available.(466)

According to the Chadian military there are approximately 10,000 mines in Aouzou; 2,000 in Zouar; 31,000 in Wour; 10,000 in Oudi Doum; 2,000 in Fada; 5,000 in Ounianga-Kabir and 10,000 in other locations. Landmines restrict travel in parts of the country and have also restricted access to oasis in the north.(467) Minefields are generally made up of a combination of AT mines and AP mines, with approximately one-third of devices booby-trapped. To date, twenty-two different types of landmine of various origins have been identified.(468) Countries of origin include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the United States, former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia.(469)

Mine Action

In 1995, Chad approached the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) for help in launching a global national mine action program.(470) The UNDP has set up a mine action center under the authority of the Haut Commissariat National pour le Déminage (HCND). Despite efforts to increase funding, potential international donors are waiting for more detailed data on the social, economic and health impact of landmines. The United States finances a bilateral cooperation program to strengthen the Chadian armed forces' mine clearance capacity.

Under Chad's mine action program, the National Humanitarian Demining Program plans to implement both a national mine awareness campaign and to create a national database.(471) Since the departure of Libyan forces from the north in 1994, there have been a number of mine clearance efforts. A joint Chadian-Libyan initiative to clear landmines in the north in 1995 claims officially to have destroyed 529 antitank mines and 263 others. But, a U.N. official told Human Rights Watch that the Libyans gave the Chadian official responsible for verifying these efforts a Toyota Land Cruiser in return for declaring the work complete.(472)

French forces from the Chad-based Opération Epervier garrison have conducted mine clearance operations, as have Chadian forces.(473) Mine action was established as a priority by a presidential decree, which also created a national mine action center and the HCND.(474) The U.S. Department of State estimates that by 1998, 3,000 landmines have been cleared in these operations.(475)

After a conference sponsored by Chad at the U.N. in New York, the United States began a bilateral program, which resulted in the national action center's establishment, along with the training of eighty Chadian demining instructors and staff. The next phase involves the training of a further forty deminers and the establishment of a regional mine action center.(476) The US bilateral program is divided into the following phases:

- Command and control structure development, from January to September 1998;

- Infrastructure development;

- Specialised training and program assessment;

- Quality Assurance program certification.

Landmine Casualties

Despite Chad's otherwise relatively efficient collection system for epidemiological data, no data is at present available on mine victims.(477) Reasons for this vary: 'mine-victim' may not feature as a category in data collection questionnaires; equally, poor and scarce healthcare infrastructure in the north may result in an artificially low number of incidents recorded.

There is no information available on the nature and scope of disability legislation. Chad has three hospital structures capable of treating war-related injuries: Faya Largeau Hospital in the north; the National Hospital in Ndjamena and the capital's military hospital, both of which have surgery departments at their disposal. N'djamena has one functioning prosthetic rehabilitation workshop. No information is available on socio-economic reintegration or financial support initiatives for mine victims. The ICRC reports that between 1981 and 1992 it was present in Chad and manufactured over 1,300 prostheses. The program has been handed over to the Secours Catholique et Développent (SECADEV) although the ICRC provides technical visits annually.(478)


Côte d'Ivoire's Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Amara Essy signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Côte d'Ivoire has not yet ratified, but government officials expect that ratification will occur in due course (before the States Parties meeting in Maputo if possible), and state that there are no obstacles to ratification.(479) Côte d'Ivoire endorsed the Brussels Declaration and was a full participant to the Oslo negotiations. It has supported the relevant 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions.

Côte d'Ivoire has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Government officials describe the country as completely mine-free, with no stockpiles of either AP or AT mines.(480) Since independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire has been an island of relative stability in one of the world's most politically and militarily unstable regions. During the early 1990s there were fears that western areas of Côte d'Ivoire, particularly border villages adjoining Liberia, might be contaminated by landmine use in the Liberian conflict. However, the ICRC has recorded no landmine incidents on Ivoirian territory and in 1996, Côte d'Ivoire was among countries where the ICRC deployed media specialists to boost national awareness of the landmines issue.(481)

A training centre for regional peacekeepers will soon open near the political capital Yamoussoukro which will include a demining training capacity "to be put at the disposition of any African country" that requests it.(482) The government regards the issue of demining as very important, "as it is we Africans who are most affected."(483)


Prior to 1993, Ethiopia also included what is today the independent nation of Eritrea. The tremendous turmoil in Ethiopia and the region over the past few decades has left a considerable landmine problem. Over the past year, Ethiopia has been involved with Eritrea in a dispute over the border between the two countries, which was never formally delineated after Eritrean independence in 1993. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of laying mines during the conflict.

Mine Ban Policy

Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and in a statement to the signing conference, the government reaffirmed its commitment to the treaty, and as a mine-affected nation, urged the international community to adhere to the articles of the treaty dealing with assistance in mine clearance and victim assistance.(484) Ethiopia has yet to ratify the ban treaty but the Foreign Ministry recently stated that "Ethiopia has already triggered the necessary procedural mechanisms leading to the ratification of the Convention."(485)

Ethiopia participated in the meetings of the Ottawa Process, including the October 1996 meeting which launched the Process. It endorsed the Brussels Declaration and was a full participant to the Oslo treaty negotiations where it spoke out against U.S. proposals which, if accepted, would have seriously weakened the ban treaty.

At the time of the Oslo meetings, the International Committee of the Red Cross organized a conference in Addis Ababa with government, media and aid organizations, during which the government confirmed its commitment to the Ottawa process.(486) Ethiopia has also supported resolutions put forward by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)--which is headquartered in Addis Ababa--on landmines, along with the "Plan of Action" from the May 1997 OAU meeting on landmines in Kempton Park, South Africa. It has supported all relevant 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the ban on antipersonnel mines.

Ethiopia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a partial ban on landmines in this forum.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Ethiopia does not produce landmines and claims to not have imported mines since the end of the Menguistu regime in 1991.(487) Ethiopia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. The list below of mines found in Ethiopia gives an indication of the sources of supply of AP mines to the government in the past. The current size and composition of the government's mine stockpile is unknown.


Over the last thirty years, landmines have been used in Ethiopia during various armed conflicts both internally and with neighboring countries. Landmine problems stem from several conflicts. One was the long struggle for independence by Eritrea and Tigre, which left contamination in the northern region of Ethiopia.(488) After the unsuccessful incursion of Somali forces to take the disputed Ogaden region in 1977 and 1978, the Menguistu regime constructed a mine barrier along the border between the two countries.(489) The fighting in the late 1980's to unseat the Menguistu regime, which ended in 1991, also caused mine contamination. Another area of concern stems from the mining of the southern Sudanese border.(490)

The regions most affected by these various conflicts include Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Somali, Gamela, Oromya and Beni-Shangul.(491) The areas known to be contaminated consist of "Gondar and Dessie, the northern Shewar region, along the road between Djibouti and Awash, the Ogaden region, along the Somalia border and in the Western area around Welega and West Arosa."(492) The estimated number of mines varies greatly from 500,000 mines, of which 400,000 are thought to be antipersonnel mines, to 1.5 million mines, to as many as four million mines.(493) More than twenty types of mines have been identified from seven countries.(494)

Antipersonnel mines in Ethiopia include:

Antitank mines in Ethiopia include:

There were also mines of German, Italian, Cuban, Czechoslovakian origin which could not be identified by the U.S. Department of State in its 1993 Hidden Killers report.(497)

Since the overthrow of Menguistu in 1991, Ethiopia has continued to experience internal conflicts and disputes with neighboring countries. Tensions have been felt in the National Regional States of Oramia and Somali.(498) Ethiopian forces are also reported to have entered Somalia to go after Islamic bases that have supposedly carried out attacks inside Ethiopia.(499)

The most publicized border conflict has been with Eritrea. The conflict over the delineation of the border, which was never officially marked after Eritrean independence in 1993, has centered on the Badme region and been equated to the trench warfare of World War One.(500) While the Ethiopian government and press accuse Eritrea of using mines during the conflict, as many as 50,000 in the Badme region alone, the government maintains that in this border conflict "Ethiopian defense forces have never used anti-personnel landmines."(501) There is no evidence to the contrary.

Mine Clearance

The threat of mines in Ethiopia is considered a problem though not an emergency situation.(502) The government says that demining is one of its priorities to further sustainable peace and development and the national capacity has developed considerably since 1993 when it was deemed "extremely limited."(503) Currently the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense-operated Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP), with U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining assistance, is the only capacity in country. The main headquarters in Addis Ababa consists of management, a public awareness team and an historical research team. The Project has three headquarters in the east, south and west regions of the country each with a demining company of one hundred deminers.(504)

Funding to the EDP from the U.S. government has totaled U.S. $8.2 million since 1993, with another $1.3 million projected for 1999.(505) The Handicap International project in the refugee camps has totaled U.S. $338,510, of which U.S. $270,281 was provided by the EU, with another U.S. $83,842 requested for the current year.

As of June 1998, the EDP had cleared 17,000 sq. km of land.(506) The number of mines cleared by the end of 1997 was reportedly 74,850.(507) Injuries to deminers have been limited with sixteen injuries and four deaths over a two and one-half year period.(508) Prioritization for clearance is determined by the EDP headquarters in Addis from requests by various ministries and local authorities.(509) While the Project seems reactive in its choice of areas to clear and there are questions about the prioritization mechanisms, the results appear to be entirely humanitarian in their effect.(510)

The Ethiopian program has yet to undertake a nation-wide survey to determine the full range and extent of mine contamination and victim assistance needs. Ethiopia has been identified by the UN Mine Action Service as needing a such a survey to support the existing program.(511) The German NGO, Santa Barbara, reached an agreement with the Ethiopian government to conduct a level 1 survey in 1998, however due to a lack of funding, the survey was postponed.(512) One hundred mine sites have already been identified by the EDP with additional sites being added regularly.(513) None are marked, as signs previously placed around mined areas were taken by local inhabitants.(514)

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness is carried out by the EDP and NGOs although there has been little coordination to date. The EDP program uses newspapers, radio, TV and fliers to convey messages about the danger of mines.(515) The UN assessment mission found problems in the military style of training used by the EDP and its lack of involvement with the community. In 1996, the ICRC expanded its affiliation with Circus of Ethiopia, a local NGO made up of street children to include messages about identification and the dangers of mines.(516)

Since September 1997, Handicap International has operated a mine awareness program in four Somali refugee camps located in Ethiopia.(517) As of 1998, more than 58,000 refugees had received training to prevent accidents in and around the camps and during and after repatriation. The project is staffed by one expatriate and people from the four camps.(518)

Landmine Casualties

A general estimate of amputees in Ethiopia is 21,000-23,000 of which twenty percent, 4,200-4,600, are thought to be mine victims.(519) A 1994 estimate put the number of accidents at five to ten per week.(520) However, more recent investigations say the number of mine accidents in Ethiopia is relatively low.(521) The lack of a comprehensive level 1 survey or of an established system for reporting accidents makes a more exact estimate of casualties impossible. In addition to Ethiopian casualties, a "sizable number" mine victims from Somaliland have been transported over the border to the refugee camps in Ethiopia.(522) Estimated costs for treating mine victims in Ethiopia is U.S. $60,000.(523)

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Ethiopia has three functioning physical rehabilitation centers; the Prosthetics-Orthotics Center in Addis Ababa indigenously established in 1961, the Mekele center in the Tigray region, which was established by the ICRC in 1992, and the Harar center in the Hararegay region established by ICRC in 1982.(524) A fourth center, Debre Zeit in the Wollo region is no longer functional. The Prosthetics-Orthotics center in Addis is the main center, and one of the premier centers in Africa with eighty-two staff members of which fifty-three are technicians.(525)

In addition to the 380 prosthetics produced by the center in 1998, which account for almost sixty-five percent of all production in Ethiopia, the Addis Center produces orthotic devices, wheel chairs and crutches, as well as components that supply other centers across Africa.(526) It also provides technical consulting services and has trained technicians from other centers across the world including technicians from mine-affected nations like Angola, Lebanon, Chad and Somalia.(527) Twenty-five technicians received training at the Addis center in 1998. The center is an autonomous welfare organization independently operated under the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The center is supported by its own income generation and support from organizations and individuals.

The Mekele center is administered by the Tigraye Disabled Fighters Association, a local NGO. The center produced 116 prosthetics in 1998.(528) The Harar center is administered by the regional branch of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The center produced ninety-five prosthetics in 1998.(529) ICRC scaled down its involvement at the Mekele center in 1994.(530) ICRC provided assistance to the Addis, Harar and now defunct Debre Zeit centers through 1995 with funds from its Special Fund for the Disabled through 1996.(531)


Gabon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. There is not thought to be any specific reason for this beyond the normal time for tabling the relevant legislation.(532) Diplomats see Gabon as favoring the treaty as a means of "portraying itself as a Central African island of stability" in an otherwise highly destabilized region.(533) Gabon is not mine-affected.(534) It supported the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels Declaration, attending key meetings including the Oslo negotiations and by supporting the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions. Gabon is not known to be a producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines. Gabon is believed to be in the process of destroying some of its AP mine stockpile.(535)


The Gambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. So far, it has not ratified the legislation although ratification is in process, according to government officials.(536) Gambia participated in just one of the meetings of the Ottawa Process, did not endorse the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and did not attend the treaty negotiations. However, it voted in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution calling for an international agreement banning AP mines. Gambia is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The government states that the Gambia possesses no stockpile of landmines, and objects to media reports in the Senegalese press stating otherwise. (537)

Gambia is one of the Africa's smallest states, and except for the Atlantic on the west is surrounded by Senegal. In 1982, Gambia merged with Senegal to form a confederation, Senegambia, but relations deteriorated and Senegambia was dissolved in 1989. No landmine incidents have been recorded on Gambian territory but Gambia's security situation has almost certainly been occasionally compromised by its proximity to Senegal's southern province of Casamance, where conflict between separatists and the Senegalese armed forces has led to the widespread use of AP and AT mines (see Senegal report).(538)

Senegalese diplomats suspected that Gambian territory was being used as a rearbase by rebel elements in 1992, shortly before landmines made their appearance in Casamance.(539) However, more recently, Gambian offers to mediate in the conflict have been welcomed by Senegalese representatives, suggesting a decrease in Senegalese anxiety on this point.(540)


Ghana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify it. A top Ghanaian Army officer who was involved in the Oslo treaty negotiations has explained that there was no political reason for holding up ratification and he believes that parliamentary time will be allocated for ratification before the end of 1999.(541)

Ghana supported the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels declaration, attending the Oslo treaty negotiations as a full participant and by supporting key resolutions on landmines in both the UN General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity. The All African Students Union and the non-governmental Green Earth Organisation lobbied the government on landmine issues and participate in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Ghana has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Ghanaian Armed Forces do not stockpile AP mines.(542) Ghana serves in ECOMOG, whose forces have used mines in the past; the implications of this for a treaty signatory need to be explored.



Since the opening for signing of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, there have been several cases of new or renewed mine use in the world. Guinea-Bissau is one case of new use. The conflict erupted on 7 June 1998 when Guinea-Bissau President João Bernardo Viera sacked then Army Chief-of-Staff Ansumane Mane for supposedly covertly supplying arms to separatist rebels in the Cassamance region of southern Senegal. News reports claim that landmines, which have been used in the Cassamance conflict, were included in the suspected arms shipments.(543) Mane quickly rallied almost the entire Guinea-Bissau army into a self-proclaimed Military Junta and called for President Viera's removal on charges of corruption and mismanagement. With almost no forces to defend his regime, Viera called on the neighboring countries of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry to send troops to hold off the advancing Junta, which both countries quickly did.

The conflict then involved not just one signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, but three: Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. Evidence indicates that landmines were used by the government, by Senegalese forces and by the Junta since fighting broke out. Use of antipersonnel mines has been reported by the United Nations, the commander of ECOMOG forces, the chief of staff of Guinean forces in Guinea-Bissau, and by the media and other on-the-ground observers of the conflict.

In the midst of the conflict, two of the countries--Senegal, on 24 September 1998, and Guinea-Conakry, on 8 October 1998--ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Though the Mine Ban Treaty had not entered into force for Senegal or Guinea-Bissau (which has still not ratified), the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty has signed the treaty." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997, although it had been absent through most of the Ottawa Process. The government participated as an observer in the Brussels Conference in June 1997 but it did not endorse the Brussels Declaration. It also supported United Nations General Assembly Resolutions calling for a ban on landmines in 1996 and 1997, but was absent for the vote on a similar resolution in 1998. Guinea-Bissau has yet to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

A Human Rights Watch fact sheet notes that PAIGC, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, has acknowledged producing PMD-6 box mines during their struggle for independence from Portugal, but abandoned production after independence.(544) It appears that Guinea-Bissau has obtained mines from Portugal and France. There is little information on stocks of mines in Guinea-Bissau. On 7 February 1998, the government destroyed between 2,000-2,300 landmines from its stocks, in front of foreign diplomats, media and officials from the Senegalese army.(545)


The first instances of mine use in Guinea-Bissau date back to the decade-long struggle for independence against the Portuguese. Portuguese strategy involved the mining of strategic positions and bridges to prevent PAIGC from destroying them. However, owing to the difficult terrain, which experienced flooding half of the year making mines difficult to locate, Portuguese soldiers would often create "dummy minefields" with barbed wire and "danger- mines" signs, but containing no mines to thwart the PAIGC and satisfy their commanders.(546)

In 1974, PAIGC won its almost decade-long struggle against the Portuguese. In 1980, President Luis Cabral, the brother of slain Guinean independence leader Amilcar Cabral was overthrown by General João Bernardo Viera in an almost bloodless coup, which also terminated political ties between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. President Viera won the first multi-party election in Guinea-Bissau in 1994.

The conflict that broke out in June 1998 marks a new chapter in landmine use in Guinea-Bissau. The conflict centered on the capital, Bissau, where government troops reinforced by Senegalese troops defended the center of the city south of the airport. Conflict in other parts of the country included fighting in the south as well as Guinea-Conakry troops defending the interior cities of Bafata and Gabu in the east. However, the rebel Junta eventually consolidated its hold on the interior and forced the withdrawal of the foreign troops, turning the focus of fighting to the city of Bissau. Reports also put Cassamance rebels fighting on the side of the Junta.

The initial period of conflict lasted from 7 June until 26 August when a cease-fire, facilitated by the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) and regional diplomats, was declared. Fighting broke out again between 26 October and 1 November, when the Abuja Accord was signed by the government and the Military Junta. The Accord, and a subsequent agreement in December, hammered out under ECOMOG provided a structure for a transitional government and elections in early 1999 along with a West African intervention force to oversee the peace accord and replace Senegalese and Guinea-Conakry troops. Delays in the formation of the transitional government and the replacement of foreign troops with members of the ECOMOG force led to another outbreak of fighting in early February. On 20 February 1999 the Government of National Unity was sworn in to oversee the transition period until elections can be organized sometime this year.

According to a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment, the use of mines by both sides in the battle for Bissau in 1998 left an estimated 2,000-3,000 mines--"[I]n any case, 8,000 mines seem to be a maximum."(547) It has been reported that the Togolese commander of ECOMOG forces, Colonel Gnakoude Berena, said that about 3,000 mines had been placed by loyalist and rebel soldiers in the eight-month rebellion. He further commented that all soldiers would have to remove mines laid around the capital before returning to barracks.(548) Combatants used mines principally in five locations: around the Bissau airport, along the demarcation line within Bissau, along the border with Senegal, around the psychiatric hospital in Bissau, and along main routes in the south of the country. The mines in Bissau seem to have been used in a manner consistent with military doctrine of recording minefields. The UNMAS assessment notes that "it is reported that Junta and government forces as well as the Senegalese contingent have established records of the different minefields."(549)

As Junta troops advanced on Senegalese and Government positions, they often encountered landmines and began removing mines from lands they captured. Mines were of Portuguese as well as French origin.(550) An informed military source who was present on the ground contends that the vast majority of mines were planted by the government and Senegalese forces in their defense of the city against the advancing Junta forces.(551) That mines were used by government and Senegalese troops was reported on Portuguese television: "RTP [Lisbon RTP International Television] has confirmed the existence of antipersonnel mines in Guinnea-Bissau, where the conflict's front line used to be. They were laid by government and Senegalese troops. The Bishop of Bissau had warned of mines before."(552)

In addition to the mining in and around Bissau, the UNMAS assessment notes the existence of mines in the north of the country along the border with Senegal, but offers no details. The report also mentions some mines, notably antitank mines, in the south of the country. A Junta spokesperson was quoted recently as saying the use of mines in the conflict is a lamentable situation since Guinea-Bissau is one of the signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty.(553) It should be noted that the most recent outbreak of violence in February 1999 occurred after the UNMAS assessment, which could increase the estimates of mines around Bissau where government and Senegalese forces reinforced their defensive barriers against the Junta.

Landmine Problem

The 1994 edition of Hidden Killers report by the U.S. Department of State listed Guinea-Bissau as "heavily mined" due to contamination during the independence struggle.(554) However, in the 1998 edition of Hidden Killers , which sought to recalculate what were perceived as gross overestimates of number of mines in affected countries, Guinea-Bissau was removed from the list of mine-effected countries.(555) Twenty years after the independence war, many areas in the interior of the country were still treated as suspect and occasional accidents involving mines and UXO were reported (see below).

As noted above, the UNMAS assessment of the extent of the current problem, after discussions with different sources, is that between 2-3,000 mines were laid in the fighting in 1998. Minefields were reported mapped. Additional mines may have been laid in fighting in 1999.

Mine Clearance

The extent of the problem and the fact that maps exist for the vast majority of minefields should limit the need for any large-scale mine action program. However, Guinea-Bissau has no structured mine action capacity at present. Skills training of the armed forces for mine clearance is not known, but adequate equipment is definitely lacking for mine action operations.(556)

In its evaluation that the mine situation is not a "significant threat" to the community nor does it hinder the provision of humanitarian assistance, UNMAS assessed that a level one survey was not essential given the scale of mine use and the fact that there are records, that it was "not relevant to create a too big mine capacity" and that the problem could be handled with a brigade of 200 deminers who could survey, mark and clear the minefields. Such a program could be 1) under the auspices of the international community and/or the UN, 2) a national autonomous program, or 3) created under the auspices of a national program with expert assistance and funding through UNDP.(557)

In assessing the clearance capabilities in Guinea-Bissau, UNMAS noted that currently the military does not clear mines according to international standards and would need training. There was a strong recommendation that deminers be recruited from the military and "preferably those having already participated in the mining operations." In concluding the report, UNMAS noted that "marking should be initiated as quick as possible by Junta and the Senegalese contingent before their departure under the control of the Good Will Commission."(558)

As of December the Junta had reportedly removed 800 mines with two fatalities associated with clearance.(559) The Portuguese Embassy in Guinea Bissau had reported that a group of young retired officers had started to create a local mine clearance company but suspended their activities with the outbreak of fighting.(560)

In March 1999, the chief of staff of Guinean forces in Guinea-Bissau, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu Bony, confirmed that Guinea had now left Guinea-Bissau.(561) He added that a demining commission involving mine specialists from both sides of in the conflict had been set up and would be supervising the removal of approximately 5,000 landmines.(562)

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness, and more specifically UXO awareness is seen as an immediate need in Bissau itself. UNICEF has prepared a program for Guinea-Bissau, but implementation has been delayed because of the continued outbreaks of violence.(563)

Landmine Casualties

As noted above, there remains some threat from mines planted during the war for independence. "Since 1990 there have been a number of reported incidents, involving Russian or Portuguese antipersonnel mines. Osvaldo Semedo, the government delegate at the May 1997 OAU meeting on landmines in South Africa, reported that in 1997, two civilians in a town in the east of the country fell victim to landmines, demonstrating that landmines continue to pose a threat, twenty-three years after independence."(564)

There have been several reports of mine accidents as a result of the recent fighting involving civilians.(565) While there have been some reports, it appears that the civilian exposure is low. However, the threat from UXO which litters the city of Bissau after the numerous rounds of shelling does pose an immediate danger to the civilian population. (566)

The infrastructure of the country has been decimated by the conflict and health services have been heavily damaged. The main hospital in Bissau was hit during the last round of violence in February and heavily damaged. The government reported that it had opened three orthopedic centers after independence to help the war injured, including mine victims, but that by 1997 none were functioning because of a lack of resources.(567)


Mine Ban Policy

Kenya signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. Although it participated only in the first treaty preparatory meeting in February 1997 in Vienna, Kenya attended the Oslo negotiations as full participant. It also voted in favor of the key pro-ban 1996, 1997, and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines. Kenya has not yet ratified the ban treaty but according to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official "the government is studying the instrument of ratification and preparing a bill to be tabled in parliament."(568) No legislative process has been put in place. The country's domestic law prohibits the possession of arms and ammunition unless licensed by the government.(569) The Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, formed in June 1995, comprises eighteen non-governmental organizations. It lobbied for Kenya to sign the ban treaty and continues to campaign for ratification and implementation of the ban treaty.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Kenya is not believed to have produced or exported AP mines. AP mines may have been imported by colonial authorities during World War II and during the Mau Mau insurgency.(570) The current size and composition of Kenya's stockpile of antipersonnel mines is unknown as government officials are tight-lipped on military issues which are not open to public scrutiny.


Although Kenya has no real landmine problem it has a limited UXO problem dating back to World War I and WWII, as well as the Mau Mau insurgency in the years running up to independence. More recently, army maneuvers involving the Kenyan, U.S., and U.K. armed forces have led to a slight increase in the UXO problem in these training ranges. Kenya also borders with nations currently or recently in conflict where landmines have been used (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and receives refugees from these nations. Kenyan security forces allege that AP mines were used in the past along the Somali border in North Eastern Province, especially by Shifta bandits in the 1960s.(571)

Survivor Assistance

There are a number of casualties from UXO, including among scrap metal dealers, children, military personnel and shepherds, but none from landmines. Almost every village and every town in Kenya has a health unit with first aid facilities and there are regional and national hospitals which include prosthetics services. The Jaipur Foot Project in Nairobi provides prosthetics free of charge. There are national disability laws.

Since 1985, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has run a surgical facility at Lokichokio, near the border with Sudan, which cares for Sudanese refugees. In 1996 1,725 landmine patients were admitted and 3,874 operations performed.(572) Other humanitarian agencies active in Lokichokio and Kakuma include the Lutheran World Federation, Don Bosco, Radda Barnen, Jesuit Refugee Services, UNICEF, UNHCR, and the World Food Programme. Services provided include services for the disabled.


Madagascar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but it has not yet ratified. However, the Minister of the Armed Forces is preparing to place the legislation necessary for ratification before the national assembly.(573) While Madagascar did not participate at all in the Ottawa Process, including the treaty negotiations, it did support the pro-ban 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolution on landmines.

Madagascar is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Minister of the Armed Forces confirmed by letter to the U.N. that Madagascar had not imported any landmines since as far back as 1970.(574) The size and composition of Madagascar's current stockpile of AP mines is not known.

Madagascar, the largest of the Indian Ocean island states, has had a turbulent post-colonial history, including periods of military, social unrest and widespread strike action. It is also affected by some of Africa's most pressing economic, social and environmental problems. However, the political system has never descended into the generalized combat that has favored the spread of landmine use elsewhere in the continent.(575) According to the U.S. State Department, the only known use of mines in Madagascar was in 1991 as a deterrent to opposition marches in the immediate vicinity of the Presidential Palace.(576) Madagascar is not considered mine-affected.


Mauritania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. Ratification is expected soon, as the country's Senate has already approved the treaty. The process now merely awaits the signature of the country's president.(577) Mauritania endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration in June 1997 and attended the Oslo negotiations as a full participant. It voted in favor of the pro-treaty UN General Assembly resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Mauritania has signed the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but it has not ratified the amended Protocol II on landmines (1996).

Mauritania has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. But Mauritania has imported landmines from Italy, France, the former Yugoslavia, Great Britain, Argentina, Greece, Singapore and Egypt.(578) Mauritania still holds an unknown quantity of landmines in its stocks.

Mauritania has some landmines on its territory dating from World War II and from its war in Western Sahara. The US State Department has estimated there are 10,000 mines planted in Mauritania, of Spanish, French, Soviet and German origin.(579) The area around the military outpost of Bir Mogrein is mined, as is the region between the port city of Noudhinhou and Zouerate and between Zouerate and Bir Mogrein.(580)

The Mauritanian army has removed some landmines, though its efforts have only occurred in a haphazard fashion. The U.S. State Department indicates a total of 7,000 mines and 5,000 UXOs have been destroyed.(581) The country has never implemented a mine awareness program. No reliable assessment of the number of landmine casualties in Mauritania exists.(582) No medical programs geared toward landmine victims are available.


Mine Ban Policy

Rwanda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. Rwanda attended, as an observer, the international strategy meeting in October 1996 which launched the Ottawa Process. It also participated in the Bonn preparatory meeting and endorsed the Brussels Declaration, but it did not attend the Oslo treaty negotiations. Rwanda supported the pro-ban 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.

Rwanda military forces have been supporting opposition forces fighting against the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). (See country report on DRC). The Namibian Defense Ministry, among others, has accused Rwanda of laying mines in the conflict. When two Namibian soldiers (fighting in support of Kabila) were killed by a landmine in November 1998, the Defense Ministry said that it and its allies "hold Rwanda and Uganda responsible for using antipersonnel landmines, weapons which the international community has banned."(583) However, there is no conclusive evidence that Rwandan forces have used AP mines.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Rwanda is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In the early 1990s, thousands of Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) allegedly defected en masse to the Rwandan Patriotic Front, bringing weapons with them, including antipersonnel mines.(584) Rwanda has also imported mines in the past through the former government of the late President Habyarimana, via the FAR.(585) Rwanda received two thousand MAT-79 antipersonnel mines from Egypt.(586) These plastic blast mines are copies of the Italian VS-50. Belgian antipersonnel mines are also believed to have been supplied to Rwanda.(587) The United Nations records thirty-nine types of mines being found in Rwanda from Belgium, China, former Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Italy, Pakistan, former Soviet Union, and the U.S. Italian and Russian mines are the most common.(588) Details on the size and composition of Rwanda's current stockpile of AP mines are not available.


The most populous ethnic groups in Rwanda are the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi. In 1990 exiled Tutsi rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), launched an insurgency war against the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government. The RPF closed in on the capital Kigali in 1993 but a cease-fire for arranged through international mediation efforts. The presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were set to sign a peace settlement when their aircraft was shot down on 6 April 1994, allegedly by Hutu hard liners. The assassinations marked the start of a genocide in Rwanda in which at least half a million minority Tutsi were killed and thousands of Hutu moderates were slaughtered by Hutu extremists. The RPF meanwhile moved into Kigali on 4 July 1994 ousting the new Hutu leadership and an estimated 1 million Hutu fled the Tutsi take-over to neighboring states.

At the onset of the RPF incursion from Uganda, in September 1990, landmines were placed by the former government forces of Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) especially within the RPF entry areas from Uganda, around Ruhengeri and Byumba. Minefields were laid in the north of the country along the border with Uganda. The heaviest concentration of known landmines is in north and northeastern portion of the country in the rural farmlands where government soldiers mined roads, footpaths and fields to impeded the advance of the RPF forces. Tea plantations north of Kigali and parts of the Kagera National Park were also mined.(589)

Because of the fierce battle for the control of Kigali in 1994 which lasted about three months, "areas near infrastructures like schools, hospitals, factories, military barracks were heavily mined" reported the Head of the National Demining Office, Maj. Joshua Mbaraga.(590) For example, four children were killed and nine other people injured in a mine blast in Gikondo suburb of Kigali in October 1995. The explosion occurred when a group of children were playing.(591) The FAR forces laid mines in several towns during their retreat in 1994. All the main military barracks were also heavily mined in 1994 by the FAR to prevent rebel (RPF) attack.

In 1995 and 1996, the Rwandan government fought a growing threat from soldiers (ex-FAR) and militia of the former government, who had been leading incursions from refugee camps in Zaire. The infiltrators, part of the force that carried out a genocide, remained committed to returning Rwanda by force and to completing the extermination of the Tutsi.(592) At first the infiltrators used bombs and mines to target electricity pylons, vehicles, and buildings and increasingly witnesses to the genocide and local officials.(593) In April 1996, U.N. human rights observers were unable to secure first hand accounts of killings during a gun battle which took place in Rutsiro village of the lakeside town of Kibuye because the village was off-limits due to landmines.(594) A patrolling Rwandan army officer complained in May that "the infiltrators are around us. Its dangerous here. They lay mines, they fire at us. We don't see them."(595) Due to the rebel and government military operations in these areas there is a high level of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees, normal agricultural and pastoral activities are severely curtailed, some due to landmines.

Landmine Problem

According to the U.N. and U.S. data bases there are between 100,000 and 250,000 mines in Rwanda.(596) Rwanda's National Demining Office estimated in December 1997 the figure to be 100,000.

Mine Action Funding

In January and February 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) sent a team to Kigali to undertake a site assessment to determine the parameters, scope and extent of a humanitarian demining program. This was followed in July and August when thirty-five U.S. military personnel helped to establish a National Demining Office (NDO) and train 120 Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) personnel for the NDO at a cost of US$1.2 million. In support of this program the U.S DoD provided demining equipment, medical supplies and communications equipment. The U.S. Department of Defense also funded the operations of a U.S. contractor, RONCO, for a demining dog training program including equipment and services at a cost of $1.4 million.(597)

Some military maps exist of the mined areas. In September 1995, the Rwandan government opened its National Office of Demining. The office keeps a data base and a country map on mined areas and updates this data base every month, including the casualty incidences.

Between September and October 1996, twelve U.S. military conducted a refresher demining training course for seventy-two RPA personnel at a cost of US$160,000. This training focused on mine clearance, minefield survey techniques, mine marking and medical training. This training team also assisted in integrating the eighteen RONCO-trained demining dogs into the Rwandan demining operations. Nine other U.S. military personnel conducted specialized training for the National Demining Office in mine awareness and an assessment of earlier humanitarian demining training at a cost of $38,000.(598) Follow-up training occurred between March and May 1997 when ten U.S. military personnel conducted a train-the-trainer course in the NDO. The team also established a computer training program in the NDO, revitalizing the NDO's data collection center. Between May and July a second team of eleven U.S. personnel conducted training on humanitarian demining for ninety-three RPA deminers and EOD personnel at the NDO in Kigali and at the Rebero training site in eastern Rwanda.(599) Canada also provided demining experts after the 1994 genocide within the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) forces that came to Rwanda. UNAMIR withdrew in March 1996.

Destruction of the cleared mines is through explosions against a wall of sand bags. The British and U.S. governments assisted with this.(600) According to Paul Brown of RONCO,'clearing of mines is concentrated on former defensive positions of the former government, including terraces and areas surrounding defensive positions.' Brown further stated that the major problem in demining was that many mines were ' indiscriminately laid.'(601)

The humanitarian demining/mine clearance by the military is said to be very effective, at ninety to ninety five percent success level. According to the government sources the total area cleared is 75 percent, comprising of 65 per cent clearance of agricultural/grazing land; 95 per cent transportation areas; 100 per cent of infrastructure area; 95 per cent of population area; and 35 per cent in others (national parks). Most of the clearance has been in the Mutara, Byumba and Kigali prefectures. According to the government the national priorities for demining are: one, socio-economic areas; two, schools and hospitals; and three, resettlement areas. The records of areas cleared are accessible and maintained at the NDO.(602)

Mine Awareness

The need for mine awareness education was long recognized by the Rwandese government, and the NDO is charged with mine awareness education and indeed runs an aggressive mine awareness program which comprises radio programs, TV adverts, t-shirts and banners. According to the NDO, twelve people have been trained as mine awareness educators(603).

UNESCO and UNICEF working with teachers and health authorities, launched a campaign to sensitize people on the presence of mines and other UXOs. More than 2000 teachers have been trained. The campaign has its own song, which is played on national radio. In November 1994, 500,000 posters and booklets in Kinyarwanda were distributed to school teachers. Mine awareness materials were linked to UNESCO-Program for Education for Emergencies and Reconstruction (UNESCO-PEER) school in a box, which aims to teach children about the dangers of landmines, while at the same time providing basic literacy and numeracy.(604)

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Incidences of casualties of AT mines as well as AP mines still continue to rise due to insurgency and counter insurgency operations in Rwanda. Up to last year (1998) 500 people were recorded by the NDO has having been killed by mines. The death rate has been reduced to an average of one per month. Both civilians and military personnel are affected. Most of the civilian casualties are women and children.

Rwanda's health infrastructure is being steadily rebuilt but regaining former levels of health cover is proving difficult. The NPA started its relief efforts in Rwanda after the genocide that took place in 1994. NPA is engaged in rehabilitation and running of two regional hospitals in Nyagatare and Cyangugu.(605) There are several centers for prosthetics run by the ICRC South of Kigali. The ICRC opened a hospital in Kigali in 1994 and from 1995 to 1997 seconded Swiss and German Red Cross teams to Kibue Hospital. This has now become an ICRC-run project. The ICRC has run a rehabilitation program in Gatagara since 1996.(606)


São Tomé and Principe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 April 1998, the 125th country to sign. According to a government official, the late signature was due to bureaucratic problems.(607) The same official said that parliament had already approved the ban treaty and the president was about to ratify it.(608) São Tomé was absent from votes on key UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines and did not attend any meetings of the Ottawa Process. São Tomé and Principe is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. According to Luís Maria from the Office of the Chief-of-Staff of the São Tomean Armed Forces, there are no stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines in the country.(609)


Seychelles signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. Seychelles endorsed the Brussels Declaration and was a full participant to the Oslo negotiations, where it was a vocal critic of US proposals to weaken the treaty text. Seychelles supported the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution against landmines but was absent form the votes on UNGA resolutions in 1997 and 1998.

Seychelles has not yet ratified the treaty. This is in part due to normal legislative timing considerations. However, according to one foreign ministry official, some worry that if Seychelles ratifies, it will then be pressured into contributing to demining and related activities in Africa and possibly elsewhere, to solve a problem to which the government regards itself as not having contributed.(610)

Landmines are not a problem in Seychelles. It is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Seychellois armed forces are not thought to hold any stocks. Highly placed officials comment that the existence of mines would "be a disaster" in this tourism-driven Indian Ocean island economy.(611)

There is some evidence that Seychelles was used as a staging post for weapons deliveries to the Forces armées rwandaises during their campaign against the Rwandan Patriotic Front, during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Zaire provided end-user certificates.(612) Weapons transported included antitank mines and fragmentation grenades. It cannot be ruled out that landmines were transported; other supply flights to the FAR did include such weapons.(613) Seychellois officials deplore the incident, stressing that such affairs run directly counter to the country's national interest.(614)



Sierra Leone has been in crisis for nearly a decade. Discontent during the one party rule from 1978 to 1992 led to instability which was fueled by the civil war in neighboring Liberia. The military took power in April 1992 and initiated a transitional program which was derailed by another military coup. In 1996 President Tejan Kabbah came to power following the first multiparty elections in nearly two decades. However, another military coup was staged in May 1997 which led to the introduction of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces into the country in February 1998; the West African force ejected the military government and its allies. This civil war has been characterized by very high levels of violence. In the early part of 1999, the rebel forces returned to Freetown, the capital, and unleashed untold violence on the population.

Mine Ban Policy

Sierra Leone signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 1998. Sierra Leone was not an active participant in the Ottawa Process, it did not endorse the Brussels Declaration or attend the Oslo negotiations. But Sierra Leone did vote for the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions in support of a mine ban.. In September 1997, Foreign Minister Shirley Gbujuma told Human Rights Watch that the government in exile would sign the Mine Ban Treaty.(615) In 1997, President Kabbah told Human Rights Watch that his government would sign in Ottawa, and once returned to power, would quickly legislate.(616) After President Kabbah was restored to power in 1998, he did ensure that his country signed the Treaty. However, Sierra Leone has still to ratify. On 6 May 1997, a local NGO Sierra Leone Campaign to Ban Landmines was launched, but it lasted only a few weeks because of the coup.


Sierra Leone is not known to produce or export antipersonnel mines. It maintains landmine stockpiles, but will not disclose how many and what types.(617) A number of minefields were planted by a private army of fifteen Lebanese mercenaries hired by De Beers in the mid-1950s to stop diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone.(618)

Rebel forces in the east and south used a small number of landmines along roads in the early 1990s. Of the thirty-seven landmine deaths in 1993, three were civilians. According to the U.S. Department of State there was an average of three to four landmine incidents in 1993 and these mines were discouraging relief efforts.(619)

In 1997, following the coup, the Nigerian ECOMOG forces were responsible for laying some new minefields, resulting in some civilian casualties. There is evidence that ECOMOG forces used landmines to protect the area around Lungi airport and the Kossoh town area. The Military Junta claimed that the Nigerian forces used landmines much more widely, sometimes suffering injuries while laying them, and then blaming the Junta.(620)

The Nigerian press also reported, in September 1997, that eleven Nigerian soldiers serving with ECOMOG "were killed by landmines planted by the military Junta, particularly on the passage routes used by ECOMOG and there had been civilian casualties.(621) Several villages have also suffered from the Junta forces laying landmines according to President Kabbah.(622) There has also been an unconfirmed report that the Junta had used landmines along certain roads with a heavy concentration in Kailahun District in the East and in the Kangain Hills in the North.(623)

A number of mercenary forces have also operated in Sierra Leone. Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) denied that it conducted any training in 1995 involving landmine warfare and claimed to have spent "half an hour with the Army Chief of Staff in Sierra Leone talking him out of his wish to lay landmines in order to protect their borders and vital installations. While I could not get his agreement to destroy their landmine stockpile; he agreed not to permit any to be laid."(624)

After capturing the Kono diamond area in August 1995, the South African mercenary force Executive Outcomes allegedly secured this area by ringing the mining complex with landmines.(625) Rebel leader Foday Sankoh in August 1996 alleged in an interview to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that EO was using antipersonnel mines against his forces.(626)

Merlin, a medical NGO active in Sierra Leone reported that it had not heard or dealt with any landmine victims in over eighteen months in Sierra Leone. However, its BO clinic in late March received a patient whose injuries might have been due to a landmine.(627)


Mine Ban Policy

Sudan is mine-affected but humanitarian mine action efforts are severely handicapped by the country's continuing 16-year old civil war. Despite the unnerving situation, efforts are on-going both to remove landmines and to spread mine awareness among the civilian population. The main rebel group is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose armed forces are known as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Both the SPLM/A, which controls an area as large as France in southern and eastern Sudan, and the Government of Sudan (GOS), based in Khartoum, have asked for international assistance in the clearance of landmines. The SPLM/A has gone one step further to invite non-governmental organizations into the areas it controls to begin mine clearance.(628) But only a tiny fraction of the Sudan--the largest nation in Africa--has been cleared.

Sudan's Minister of External Relations, Ali Othman Mohamed Taha, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, and, in a statement to the signing ceremony, he said that "Sudan, like many African countries, suffered from the scourge of landmines. While landmines have been planted in the North Western corner of our country during the Second World War, Southern Sudan experienced them during the prolonged civil war since independence. They threaten the civilians and impede economic development and prosperity."(629)

The Sudan government participated in the Ottawa Process, attending the Vienna and Bonn preparatory meetings, endorsing the Brussels Declaration and attending the Oslo negotiations as a full participant. The GOS also voted in favor of the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines. Sudan government has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Two recent reports have shed light on Sudan's landmine problem: an assessment report by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs Mine Clearance and Policy Unit dated August 1997 and an August 1998 report by the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Conflict .(630)

The Sudanese government and the SPLA have never been known to manufacture antipersonnel landmines. But both sides have considerable knowledge in improvisation techniques.(631) Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) may be assembled using cheap components such as "two wooden blades with a hinge, set over a detonator and explosive."(632) IEDs are also prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

The GOS and the SPLA have obtained antipersonnel mines from a variety of different sources. The following information on mines found in Sudan gives an indication of the various suppliers. The UN assessment team listed nineteen types of antipersonnel mines found in Sudan:

- PRB M409 plastic-bodied blast mine (Belgium);

- Type 69 bounding fragmentation mine (China);

- Type 58, a copy of the Soviet PMN blast mine (China);

- Type 72 plastic blast mine (China);

- T/79, a copy of the Italian scatterable or hand emplaced mine (Egypt);

- No 4 blast mine (Israel);

- MAUS (Italy);

- Valmara 69 bounding fragmentation mine (Italy);

- VS-Mk2 plastic scatterable or hand emplaced mine (Italy);

- VS-T Illumination alarm mine (Italy);

- M14 plastic-bodied blast mine (U.S.);

- M16 (U.S.);

- OZM-3 bounding fragmentation mine (USSR);

- OZM-4 bounding mine (USSR);

- PMD-6M wooden box or "shu" mine (USSR);

- PMD-7 wooden box mine (USSR);

- PMN blast mine (USSR);

- POMZ-2 fragmentation stake mine (USSR);

- POMZ-2M fragmentation stake mine (USSR).(633)

Human Rights Watch identified ten types of antipersonnel mines allegedly captured by the SPLA from the Sudan government. They include the mines already identified by the UN assessment plus the TS-50, a small, round, plastic antipersonnel mine with rubber pressure cap manufactured by Italy.(634)

The current size and composition of the AP mine stockpiles of the GOS and the SPLM/A are not known. It is unknown if the GOS has started destroying stockpiled antipersonnel landmines as required by the treaty. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan), the SPLA/M's mine action NGO, notes that "both [sides] have stockpiles and there is no way to ascertain figures even though it is important to note that the quantity of landmines in the Sudan can provide conflict in Africa for the coming decade."(635)

The GOS has provided rebel groups fighting many of its neighboring governments with antipersonnel landmines as well as antitank mines. These have included the Eritrean rebel group, Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which has used antitank mines on civilian roads, and the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army.(636) (See Eritrea country report for details on supply to EIJ). It is unclear if any transfers have taken place since the GOS signed the ban treaty in December 1997.


The UN assessment described the conflict in southern Sudan as "a classic guerrilla war in which the government holds towns and cities and the insurgent forces control the countryside."(637) In this type of warfare, the August 1997 UN report stated "the government uses landmines to protect its garrison towns, and to interdict the movement of insurgent supplies and forces. On the other side, the guerrillas use landmines to fix government forces in the towns, and to interdict their supply lines. Both sides also reportedly continue to use landmines to terrorize local populations in order to diminish their support for the opposite side."(638)

In early 1995, there was an NGO conference with senior SPLA officers in New Cush where they discussed landmines and considered whether they were of any strategic or practical importance.(639) In 1996, the SPLA "declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines provided that there is a significant reciprocation on the side of GOS."(640) The SPLA considered this initiative to be "pro-ban" and also created Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan) in part to address the issue of landmines and UXO in the areas under their control.(641)

In March 1999, the GOS and the SPLM/A pledged not to use mines, although details on this agreement secured by Olara Otunnu, the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, are not available.(642) It is unclear if Sudan has used antipersonnel mines since it signed the ban treaty in December 1997. The August 1997 UN report stated, "Both sides also reportedly continue to use landmines...." In February 1999, at a major regional conference on landmines, a representative of the government of Sudan's armed forces described how "GOS forces plant mine fields in accordance to accepted rules such as sketch maps and registration of mined areas."(643)

Landmine Problem

The true extent of Sudan's landmine problem remains unknown as there has been no in-depth, country-wide survey of the problem. Several attempts have been made, however, to assess the problem. On 25 January 1997, the GOS submitted a formal request to the United Nations, following discussions held in New York, with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), for assistance in dealing with its landmine problem.(644) The UN assessment team analyzed several previous assessments of Sudan's landmine problem before concluding that the most credible estimate of the number of landmines in Sudan is "in the range of 500,000 to 2 million landmines, with the vast majority of those located in southern Sudan."(645) The Sudanese government states that two to three million landmines and UXO cover some 800,000 quare kilometers or 32 percent of the country.(646) It claims there are 42 types of mines and explosive ordnance from 14 countries.(647)

According to the U.S. Department of State, the desert of northern Sudan was mined during World War Two and more "recently in new conflicts along the northwestern border with Libya and eastern border with Eritrea."(648) Mines in the sparsely populated northwest occasionally affect livestock and smugglers.(649)

The southern regions of Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal, and Upper Nile, the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan in central Sudan, and the eastern region, where there has been fighting since 1995, are all mine-affected. Most roads in the southern region are mined, and areas around towns such as Yei, Juba, Torit, Kapoeta and the Ugandan border town of Kaya, are reported mined.(650) Earlier in the conflict, antitank mine use was more prevalent than antipersonnel mine use and when roads were mined, the solution was not to clear them but to "open new roads."(651) Mined roads have inhibited and increased the cost of delivery of humanitarian aid as it must be delivered by air.(652)

While both sides to the conflict told UN Representative Otunnu that they "mapped" areas where they planted mines, it seems highly unlikely that comprehensive maps or records have been kept by either side.(653) OSIL-Sudan has a few maps of minefields from both sides but most were not drawn to scale.(654) Very, very few mined areas are marked and fenced.

Mine Clearance

The UN assessment team recommended that, "... until there is peace and stability, large scale mine clearance should not be undertaken" in Sudan but it did outline a number of interim measures that could be taken including mine awareness training, safety training courses for all UN and NGO staff working in the south, rehabilitation of the medical system in southern Sudan, preparations and preparatory planning for a survey as soon as a cease fire of peace agreement is signed, designated mine action liaison officers in the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit in Khartoum and in UNICEF - OLS Southern Sector in Nairobi/Lokichoggio, and finally, stigmatization of the continuing use of landmines in Sudan.(655)

Mine action efforts in government-controlled areas are carried out by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and the Sudanese army is responsible for mine clearance. A mine action programme plan has been drawn up but implementation is hindered by lack of resources and funding.(656)

On the SPLA side, humanitarian affairs are the responsibility of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), which created Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) to deal with the landmine problem, as outlined in its mine action programme planning.(657)

While many international and UN agencies and local NGOs provide humanitarian relief and limited development assistance in southern Sudan under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), mine action assistance is scarce and relatively recent. Mine action efforts by OSIL-Sudan in SPLA-controlled areas started in September 1997, supported by a consortium of international and non-governmental organizations including UNICEF/Operation Lifeline Sudan, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Christian Church Aid, DanChurch Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, Catholic Relief Services, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches, and the All African Conference of Churches.(658) It received start-up funding from UNICEF/OLS, Christian Aid, DanChurch Aid and the ICRC, in the amounts of U.S. $149,000 for mine clearance and U.S. $150,000 for mine awareness.(659)

Christian Aid took up the challenge of providing mine action in southern Sudan when it concluded that "international bodies were unwilling to address the problem due to the ongoing conflict," according to Dan Collison, its programme officer for the Horn of Africa.(660) Collison described Christian Aid's contribution as "a worthwhile investment."(661)

Since 15 September 1997, OSIL-Sudan's mine clearance programme claims to have located and destroyed: 216 antitank mines on 236 miles of roads; 1,963 antipersonnel mines around SPLM/A-controlled towns and villages; 1,219 cluster bombs around Yei town and surrounding villages; and 19,521 pieces of other UXOs.(662) OSIL-Sudan has cleared or declared mine free many areas of agricultural land in Yei and Kajo Keji county.(663) OSIL-Sudan mine clearance of the Mvolo-Rumbek road is expected to facilitate land-delivered World Food Programme relief services to Bahr El Ghazal.(664)

OSIL-Sudan's mine action programme has its operational headquarters in Yei, and an office in Nairobi, Kenya. The programme includes both mine clearance, mine clearance training and mine awareness education. The mine clearance component is carried out by demobilized SPLA military personnel in two demining teams consisting of twelve personnel grouped. The mine awareness team numbers ten, five of whom are women, with women comprising most of the leadership. OSIL-Sudan mine action programme personnel received training from two Mines Advisory Group (MAG) consultants, using funds from Christian Church Aid and DanChurch Aid.(665)

OSIL-Sudan's director, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, is proud that the OSIL clearance program is cheap compared to other country demining efforts. OSIL clearance costs an estimated U.S. $9 per mine, according to Aleu.(666) OSIL's workers are not insured and the program does not use highly paid expatriates.(667) Aleu is concerned, however, that more funding be given to the program: "I laid landmines myself. I am proud that I am now clearing them. Why should they [donors] wait for peace? The mines will remain in the ground."(668)

Mine Awareness

The need for mine awareness education in Sudan is imperative due to the severity of the landmine problem. Mine awareness programs in government-controlled areas are the responsibility of the Humanitarian Aid Commission. The Sudanese Red Crescent and Sudanese NGOs in Khartoum grouped under the umbrella of the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) are also active in the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL) and in more general mine awareness activities. The GOS also established the Disaster Management and Refugees Studies Institute (DIMARSI) to train trainers on mine awareness in conflict zones in Sudan.(669) UNICEF supports OSIL-Sudan's mine risk education activities in rebel areas by providing training, equipment and technical support. The OSIL program focuses on children and returning refugees and targets an estimated 300,000 people.(670)

Landmine casualties

No one knows how many casualties there have been due to landmines in Sudan. The government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission estimates that Sudan has 700,000 amputees resulting from mine accidents but to date this number has not been verified.(671) The International Committee of the Red Cross reported only 5,000 amputees registered in their hospitals, according to OSIL-Sudan.(672) The UN assessment team claimed it "was struck by the small number of landmine casualties reported, and the even smaller number receiving assistance at the prosthetic centres in Khartoum, Juba, and Lokichoggio."(673) The assessment concluded that "very few landmine victims survive to make it to hospital" due to the facts that "travel in the area is so difficult, and mechanized transportation so scarce, that non-military victims generally tend to have to walk as much as a hundred miles to the nearest hospital."(674)

Landmine Survivor Assistance

While the government of Sudan provides its military personnel with medical care, civilian medical facilities and hospitals in government-controlled areas usually lack basic equipment, staff and resources. A former-ICRC prosthetic clinic in Khartoum now run by the GOS produces 700 to 800 ICRC standard prosthetics per year, and 400 orthotics.(675) Satellite workshops in southern Sudan government towns of Juba and Wau assemble the ICRC standard prosthetic devices, fit them and provide physical therapy. Basic infrastructure and public services in southern Sudan are practically non-existent. Some examples of the few medical facilities follow but this list is not comprehensive.

Norwegian People's Aid operates four hospitals in SPLA-held locations of Yei, Chukum, Labone and Nimule in rebel-held southern Sudan. The hospital in Yei, which treats landmine victims, has been deliberately targeted by GOS planes which bombed it twelve times in 1998 and to date, five times in 1999, inflicting substantial damage and resulting in many injured and dead. On 4 March 1999, GOS bombing damaged the operating theater and maternity ward and forced the hospital to close temporarily.(676) NPA also runs emergency mobile medical units and it offers vocational skills training and small community-based programs in Chukum and Yei. NPA provides combined food relief and agriculture assistance in southern Sudan (Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Bahr El-Gazhal).(677)

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) operates a hospital in Kajo Keiji on the Sudanese side of the border with Uganda in Equatoria, southern Sudan which treats landmine victims. On 13 January 1999, the GOS dropped five bombs on the hospital, destroying the immunization block and extensively damaging the surgical and outpatient departments.(678) In Juba, the International Committee of the Red Cross has resumed activities at the Juba Teaching Hospital in August 1998 after a period of absence.(679) The ICRC also treats patients, including many mine victims, at the hospital in Lokichokio, Kenya. The Sudan Evangelical Mission (SEM) has attempted to provide prosthetic support by bring technicians from the Nairobi-based Jaipur Foot Project to southern Sudan to assess the needs of amputees.(680) The Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) assists in rehabilitation efforts in southern Sudan focusing on self-sufficiency to improve the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people.(681)

Psychological and social support facilities for mine victims are inadequate, if available at all in southern Sudan. Some counseling and social support services are available at the ICRC facilities at Lokichogio and at the UNHCR refugee camp at Kakuma, Kenya, managed by the Lutheran World Federation and the International Rescue Committee.


Tanzania's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Jakaya M. Kikwete, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and stated, "It is the expectation of my delegation that at the end of this conference, we shall have come up with a credible plan of action. Firstly the quick ratification of the treaty by those of us signing today. Secondly, to have a concrete plan to clear the minefields and expeditiously assist the affected countries and persons. And, thirdly, to have a clear strategy which will ensure the actual elimination of production and use of landmines."(682)

Tanzania has not yet ratified the ban treaty. When Foreign Minister Kikwete tabled his ministry's budget for 1998/1999 in parliament, he told the National Assembly that a "Bill on the Abolition and Accumulation of Land Mines" (most likely the ratification legislation) would be tabled shortly.(683) Tanzanian non-governmental organizations working to ban landmines are actively lobbying for swift ratification of the ban treaty, in addition to mine awareness activities.(684)

In November 1996, Tanzania issued its first statement in support of a ban, which was later presented during the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines held in Maputo in February 1997.(685)

Tanzania attended the 1997 Bonn, Brussels, and Oslo meetings of the Ottawa Process, endorsed the Brussels Declaration and supported key 1996, 1997, and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.

Tanzania does not manufacture landmines and is not believed to transfer them. It is not known whether Tanzania maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Tanzanian Armed Forces used landmines in Uganda in 1979 and in Mozambique in 1986-1988.(686) Tanzania experienced a limited number of landmine incidents on its soil in the 1960s. In April 1966, a woman and man in the village of Kilambo, about five miles from Mahuranga, stepped on a landmine, and security forces subsequently found and destroyed another mine. In November 1966, four Tanzanians died from mine explosions in the village of Mahuranga, about thirty miles from the post of Mtwara. Six mines had been laid according to the police.(687) The OAU Standing Committee on Defense condemned these landmine incidents and blamed the Portuguese.(688) A Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson in Lisbon denied that their forces were responsible, claiming in 1967, "It is not one of our methods to place mines on trails used by peaceful populations, and even less so in a foreign country. In Mozambique we are fighting foreign-backed rebels."(689)

According to Major-General John Walden of the Tanzanian army, there have been no other landmine incidents since the 1960s, although UXOs at former nationalist bases remained a problem.(690) There was, however, an incident in 1996 in which a child was killed by a mine in a forest near Ngara.(691) The mine was reported to have been dropped by refugees fleeing Rwanda.

Tanzania's main link to the landmines problem is the refugee population in the Kigoma area, in the western part of the country. The Kigoma area accommodates several refugee camps which host refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. Unconfirmed reports from Tanzania say that Burundi is reported to be planting landmines inside Tanzania along its borders to prevent Hutu rebels from crossing back into Burundi. (The Burundian government denies using AP mines-- see Burundi country report). Tanzanian diplomats say that there have been a handful of cases in which booby traps or improvised devices have been used, but no antipersonnel landmines.(692)

Forty-five Burundian males aged between seventeen and thirty-nine were registered at Kibirizi Port in Kigoma as landmine casualties between 1 January and 31 December, 1998. They have been treated at Kigoma regional hospital.(693)


Togo signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. Togo voted in favor of the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines and endorsed the Brussels Declaration. Togo is also a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original, but not amended, Protocol II on landmines. There is currently national legislation on arms ownership and use which prohibits individuals from bearing arms without official authorization and given this law, legislation specific to antipersonnel mines is thought to be unnecessary.(694)

Togo has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has no weapons-production capacity.(695) There were rumours of mine importation at the time of the alleged attempted coup and mercenary invasion in 1977, but no substantive proof has been found. It is not known if Togo possesses a stockpile of AP mines. Togo is not mine-affected.(696)

French Togoland became independent in 1960 as the current Togo. It remains a member of the French-backed African Franc Zone. Tensions with Ghana have existed, especially since the accession of Jerry Rawlings as Ghanaian head of state in 1981. Rawlings relies heavily on the support of predominantly Ewé-speakers in the east and south-east. These have close links with Togo's southern and coastal Ewé-speaking populations, who in turn have a mutually antagonistic relationship with Togo's veteran northern military head of state, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma, in power since 1967.(697)


Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964, and Kenneth Kaunda became Zambia's first president. Soon after independence Zambia began supporting independence guerrilla groups from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa. This support increasingly made Zambia a target for counter-subversion. Violent incidents, including the use of landmines, occurred in Western Province border areas and along the Rhodesian and Mozambique frontiers. Only in late December 1979 following a lasting cease-fire in Zimbabwe did the situation improve.

Mine Ban Policy

Zambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty in New York on 12 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. Zambia endorsed the Brussels Declaration and participated in the Oslo negotiations. Zambia voted for the UN General Assembly resolutions in support of banning landmines. Zambian Foreign Minister Keli Walubita was asked in May 1998 by the Landmine Monitor when his country would ratify the ban treaty and replied, "Soon. This is a priority for my government. I represent a constituency that suffers from landmines. I am therefore determined to see this enacted into Zambian law quickly."(698)

In September 1996, a group of students and staff at Lusaka's University Training Hospital launched the Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines in an effort to lobby the government and raise public awareness of Zambia's and southern Africa's landmine problem. Members of the campaign included the Zambian Red Cross Society, medical students and various NGOs. The ZCBL played an important role in raising public awareness of Zambia's landmine legacy, reflected by increased media coverage of incidents.

In February 1999, the Zambia Campaign to Ban Landmines interviewed the Foreign Minister. He said that "We are very committed to the complete eradication of landmines and Zambia has always supported the ban. Zambia is a peaceful country and we have always campaigned for peace. We will certainly ratify the treaty. My colleagues at the Defense ministry are working on a Cabinet memorandum and we should ratify before the first half of the year."(699) Zambia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its amended Protocol on landmines.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Zambia is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. The Zambian Defense Forces maintains stocks of antipersonnel landmines, many of them provided to ZIPRA in 1979 by the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. After Zimbabwean independence the Zambian government assumed control of the mines. Nearly thirty types of antipersonnel mines from ten nations have been found in Zambia.(700) If the Defense Forces have begun planning for the eventual destruction of their mine stocks, that information has not been made available.


A number of antipersonnel landmines appear to have been planted in Zambia in 1999 for criminal or political reasons. In late January several antipersonnel mines were planted by a shop owned by businessman Hugo Batista. An 18-year-old youth died and another sustained injuries when they stepped on these mines.(701) Local residents have reported that the area between Zambezi Boma and Chinyingi is particularly dangerous for landmines. They claim that Angola's UNITA rebels are responsible for laying them.(702)

Due to military operations in the 1970s and 1980s, Zambia has a limited landmine problem in Western and Eastern Provinces although there have also been incidents near Lusaka. The part of Western Province most affected by South African military actions was around Sesheke, close to the Namibian border, stretching northwest to the Senanga sector. This had been an area of tension since the start of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) nationalist activity in Namibia in the early 1970s.

The first documented landmine incident on Zambian soil occurred on 12 November 1970, when a Zambian Government vehicle detonated a landmine in Western Province. The driver survived but had to have his leg amputated. A Zambian police investigation identified the mine as being of British origin.(703) In 1971 there followed a number of mine incidents, all antitank mines probably laid by the South Africans during cross border operations against SWAPO rebels.(704)

South African forces also planted mines near the Angolan border in the 1970s, as did the Portuguese forces in an attempt to curtail MPLA infiltration. A number of antipersonnel mines were laid in these operations.(705) The conflict escalated seriously in 1978 and 1979, with the South Africans stepping up their clandestine operations. This resulted in the widespread mining of roads especially in the Imusho to Sesheke area. In 1980 the Zambian army laid minefields along the Caprivi border in anticipation of further South African cross-border raids. Even today villagers still regard some of these areas as "no go" zones, fearing the continued presence of landmines. (706)

The Zambian Defense Forces (ZDF) may have laid a few small minefields along the Angolan border in the mid-1980s in an apparent attempt to show solidarity with the Angolan government (Zambia had in the mid-1970s supported the UNITA rebels).(707) However, the ex-defense chiefs deny that their forces laid any landmines on Zambian soil.

The flow of weapons from Angola into western Zambia continued to be a concern to the Zambian police in the 1990s. In February 1995 police seized weapons, including antiaircraft guns and landmines, during a sweep along the border, where members of the Lozi ethnic group were demanding self-rule. Police estimated that at least 500 weapons, including landmines, could be in the hands of pro-secession villages.(708)

Rhodesian forces were responsible for the covert laying of a small number of mines on Zambian soil in Eastern Province in the early 1970s.(709) Rhodesian laying of mines in Zambian border areas to disrupt nationalist infiltration routes became more regular in the mid-1970s and peaked in 1979.(710) The Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) reportedly lost eleven men laying mines in such operations.(711) In June 1979 Rhodesian forces claimed to have destroyed more than 500 antitank and antipersonnel mines in a raid against a ZIPRA supply depot near Lusaka. ZIPRA used landmines to protect its bases from attack. In October 1979 two Rhodesian SAS soldiers were injured by shrapnel from two POMZ-2 fragmentation antipersonnel mines attached to either side of a trip wire during an operation against a ZIPRA camp.(712) Because of the Rhodesian incursions President Kaunda declared a nation-wide military mobilization in 1979. Some minefields were laid along what is now the Zimbabwe border, as well as around key bridges.

Landmine Problem

In 1994, Zambia defense spokesperson, Major Jack Mubanga, said. "There are a lot of landmines in Southern and Western provinces, but it is too costly for the government to embark on an exercise to have them removed. It is very expensive to carry out such an assignment."(713)

There are areas in Western Province along the Namibian border that are mine affected. In the early 1980s the Zambian Defense Force (ZDF), with multinational assistance, conducted mine clearing operations in the southern region of Western Province, near the Caprivi strip. The U.S. military has reported that in 1990 Zambia and Namibia conducted a joint mine-clearance exercise in the Katima Mulilo border area, although local Namibian and Zambian officials have told the Landmine Monitor the exercise never occurred.(714) Whatever the case, this area is still not considered safe by local residents. Former Zambian military officials also reported that in the early 1980s they spent significant resources on clearing landmines along the Angolan and Mozambican borders and at former nationalist bases.(715)

The Zambia Red Cross also reports that the clearing of the road to Shangombo in Western Province in 1996 was done by a commercial firm, using a bulldozer and grader. There had been no mine clearance on the road, and the bulldozer simply pushed the mines to the verges. A past employee of the Zambia Red Cross and founding member of the Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines almost stepped on one of these "cleared mines." (716)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) visited one former base, the Matondo farm in Lusaka West, and found there had been continued landmine incidents there. The Sri Lankan farm manger told HRW that although the army had cleared the area, he had mines explode on three occasions in 1993 when burning undergrowth. Although the explosions produced lots of shrapnel, nobody was injured.(717)

Public awareness of Zambia's landmine legacy is growing. In March 1997, member of parliament Jerry Muloji asked when the Ministry of Defense would send military experts to clear landmines along the border areas with Angola in his district. Deputy Defense Minister Mike Mulomgoti told parliament, "It's impossible to clear all landmines at the moment. They will only be cleared on an 'as is found' basis."(718)

Landmine Casualties

Former Zambian military officials reported that there was a high number of landmine casualties amongst Zambia National Army soldiers in the 1970s because of South African and Rhodesian incursions. The government responded by conducting a nation-wide mine awareness campaign in areas along the Namibian, Angolan and Mozambican borders and within its armed forces resulting in a decline in landmine incidents.(719) However, Zambians continue fall victim to mines laid over fifteen years ago.

According to government statistics over 200 Zambians have been killed or maimed since Zimbabwean independence in 1980, but many believe the figure to be much higher.(720) The Zambia Red Cross estimates that there are several casualties a year in addition to a higher number of incidents related to unexploded ordnance. In November 1991 Sylvia Maphosa, a twenty-seven-year-old pregnant Lusaka housewife, stepped on a ZIPRA landmine while collecting firewood on a Lusaka West farm. The explosion left Maphosa half paralyzed. She cannot walk and speaks with difficulty. She sustained severe head wounds and had her right limb shattered. The farm served as ZIPRA headquarters, dubbed "Victory Camp," during the liberation war.(721) Although the Zambian Army combed the area for mines in 1980 and 1981, Maphosa can attest that they failed to clear it of mines completely.

Fieldwork in 1998 by the ZCBL in Chiawa, 200 kilometers south of Lusaka has established that landmines and UXOs continue to be a problem. In the early 1980s antipersonnel landmines claimed 125 civilians alone and a Japanese sponsored water project had to be stopped because of the mines. People in the area have lost their livestock and as the population grows, the land area to accommodate the population is getting smaller.(722) In late January 1999 an 18-year old youth died and another sustained injuries when they stepped on a antipersonnel mine planted by a shop near Zambezi Boma in Western province.(723)

322. George Mangwiro, "The Killing Fields of Mudzi," Horizon, August 1994.

323. Ibid.

324. Casualties have continued to be experienced by Zimbabwean forces stepping on landmines while deployed on Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Angola and recently during military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

325. Police Chief report quoted as Radio One news item at 11.00 gmt, 1 February 1999.

326. International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Landmines in Africa,' ICRC, May 1997.

327. Statement Made by H.E. Vice-Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

328. Interview with Albino Malungo, London, July 1998.

329. Zambia, Angola Seal Landmines Pact," Xinhua, Lusaka, 17 June 1998.

330. Belgium: M409; China: Type 72a; Type 72b; Egypt: T78; Italy: VS-69; VS MK-2; South Africa: USK; USA: M16A1; M16A2; M14; M18A1 (also widely copied); Soviet: PMN; PMN-2; PMD-6; POMZ-2; POMZ-2M; MON-50; MON-100; Czechoslovakia: PP-MI-SR; West Germany: DM-11; DM-31; Romania: MAI 75; MAIGR 1; East Germany: PPM-2; Hungry: Gyata 64; Italy: VS-50; Spain: PS-1; South Africa: R2M1; R2M2; Shrapnel No.2 R1M1; Shrapnel No.2; MIM MS-803 (Mini-Claymore); SA Non-Metallic AP; Sweden: FFV 013; AP-12; Yugoslavia: PMA 1; PMA 1A; PMA 2; China: T69; Soviet: OZM-3; OZM-4; MON-200; OZM-72; OZM-160; PMD-7.

331. U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center(S&T) Intelligence Report, "Landmine Warfare - Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa (U)," May 1993, reports that South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) maintained training bases in Angola for many years where weapons for its military operations in South Africa were stockpiled. According to their inventories, the ANC held 19, 442 AT mines, 13,908 AP mines and 5,443 limpet mines in Angola and it is not known what happened to these stocks.

332. Landmine Monitor field work in Angola in August 1998.

333. Ibid.

334. Landmine Monitor field work in Zambia in July 1998.

335. Landmine Monitor field work in Angola in August 1998.

336. JRS, MAG, MI, VVAF, "Landmines in Moxico Kill and Maim 66 Persons since June: Open Letter to the Angolan Government and UNITA," Luena, November 1998.

337. European Union, "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Angola," Vienna, 28 December 1998. The Declaration noted that "The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the EFTA countries, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration."

338. Radio Nacional Angola, Luanda, 1900 GMT, 11 January 1999.

339. Lusa newsagency, 10 December 1998.

340. UNITA Standing Committee of Political Commission, Bailundo, 17 December 1998,

341. Jornal de Noticias , (Lisbon), 21 January 1999.

342. The following section is taken from, Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) pp.16-28.

343. FNLA is the Frente Nacional de Liberacão de Angola, UNITA is the União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, and MPLA is the Movemeto Popular de Liberacão de Angola.

344. The Portuguese themselves suffered their worst landmines casualties in 1970, when landmines accounted for half the casualties suffered by Portugal's forces in Angola: 355 dead, 2,655 missing and 1,242 injured. See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare , (1962-1976) vol.2 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), p.214.

345. The U.S. waged a covert war against Angola for many years refused to recognize the MPLA government until 1993. U.S. covert aid totaled about $250 million between 1986 and 1991, making it the second largest U.S. covert program, exceeded only by aid to the mujahidin in Afghanistan.

346. Público , (Lisbon), 4 August 1995.

347. Chris Simpson, "Of Mines, Roads and Bridges," IPS Africa , 3 May 1995.

348. United Nations Security Council S/1995/1012, "Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission," December 1995.

349. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.27.

350. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, S/1998/93, 8 October 1998,

351. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998) p.19. The report also notes that HALO Trust estimated the problem to be 500,000 in 1997.

352. Jornal de Angola , (Luanda), 8 October 1996.

353. ANGOP News, (Luanda), 9 October 1998.

354. United Nations Demining Database, "Multi-Country Mine Action Study," available at

355. Ibid.

356. "Mine Action Bilateral Donor Support," 4th Edition, 6 November 1998. Information provided by the UN Mission of Norway.

357. UN, "Multi-Country Mine Action Study."

358. In the 1980s in Cunene according to ex FAPLA deminer Albano Costa, " We used to drive cows out in front of us. If one was blown up - food for us. Excellent de-Mining equipment. Heavy enough to blow up an antitank mine, too," cited by Reuters , 28 June 1994.

359. Independent, (London), 6 June 1994. The newspaper reported that a South African mine specialist had told it that the SADF put 27,000 mines, 9,000 with anti-lift devices in one minefield alone outside the south-eastern Angolan town of Mavinga.

360. Radio Nacional Angola, Luanda, 1900 GMT, 11 January 1999.

361. CMAO documents: "Review of Mine action Plan for Angola," cable 3764 dated, 6 December, 1995; "Implementation Plan for Establishing a National Mine Clearance Capacity in Angola," Cable 3764, 6 December 1995.

362. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Angola: The Development of Indigenous Capacities , (New York: DHA, February 1998) p.22.

363. Ibid, p.24.

364. INAROEE was formed by government decree of law No.14/95 on 26 May 1995.

365. In January 1995, Chipapa meeting between the UNITA and government military both sides agreed for the first time to form Joint Mine Clearing Teams and provide the UN with all necessary assistance in terms of mine information, reconnaissance, survey and clearance. Both sides also appointed Mine Liaison officers to the Joint Commission. By April, UNAVEM had received limited information from FAA and UNITA concerning minefields, as well as confirmation that the parties will make available the necessary mine-clearance personnel. Both sides believed, however, that the UN should equip and train the personnel. The government had allocated US$3 million for the procurement of mine-clearing equipment. The UN reported in December 1995 that, "the government/UNITA mine sweeping operation is still limited, owing mainly to mistrust between the two parties."

366. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers , 1998, p.22.

367. Laurie Boulden and Martin Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs), pp.138-139.

368. Eddie Banks, "Current Mines Situation in Angola," CMAO, Luanda, September 1996.

369. UN, "Multi-Country Mine Action Study."

370. Star, (Johannesburg), 21 October 1995.

371. Ibid.

372. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.49.

373. Jornal de Angol a, (Luanda), 26 February 1998.

374. Committee Cap Anamur German Emergency Doctors, "Field Activity Report," April 1994.

375. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.51.

376. Mines Advisory Group, Annual Report 1994/95.

377. The 180,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire are fearful of returning home because of landmines. See, Berthuel Kasamwa-Tuseko, "Les Réfugiés angolais ne veulent pas rentrer sur des champs de mines," Propeace (Kigali), no.1, January 1996, pp.47-48.

378. Initial funding for these MAG clearance operations was contributed by CAFOD, OXFAM and Christian Aid. The British ODA funded a mine survey and marking project in the second half of 1994. In 1996, MAG funding came from USAID, DanChurchAID and the UN DHA Mine Clearance Trust Fund.

379. Dave Turner, Former Senior Technical Specialist, MAG Angola, email communication, 23 March 1999.

380. Ibid.

381. Telephone interview with Tim Carstairs, Communications Director, MAG, 23 March 1999.

382. Steve Priestly, Manager. MAG Angola, email communication, 22 March, 1999.

383. Telephone interview with Ulrich Tietze, Angola Program Officer, Medico International (Frankfurt), 22 March 1999.

384. Jornal de Angola , (Luanda), 11 November 1996.

385. Boulden and Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining , p.142.

386. Guy Willoughby, Director, The Halo Trust, fax communication, 23 March, 1999.

387. Ibid.

388. Norwegian People's Aid, Mines: The Silent Killers , (Oslo: NPA, 1996) p.16.

389. Noticias, (Maputo), 3 October 1996.

390. Boulden and Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining , p.143.

391. Jornal de Angola , (Luanda), 24 February 1998.

392. Norwegian People's Aid, "Angola: Security, remining and demining operations," Public statement, 1999.

393. Norwegian People's Aid. "Section 3.2 Security for NPA Staff and Implications on our Operations," NPA Angola Fourth Quarterly Report 1998, early-1999.

394. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , pp.54-55

395. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with David Hewitson of Greenfield Consultants, London, 30 January 1996.

396. CARE 1999 News Stories: March, "CARE Evacuates Staff in Wake of Fighting in Bie Province, Angola,"

397. Telephone interview with Bob MacPherson, Assistant Director of Emergency Programs for Security and Landmines, CARE, 23 March 1999.

398. Telephone interview with Cynthia Glocker, Press Officer, CARE, 23 March 1999.

399. Interview with Hendrik Ehlers, Luanda, 1 September 1998.

400. Hendrik Ehlers, MGM, email communication with Ulrich Tietze, Medico International, 18 March 1999.

401. Telephone interview with Norbert Rossa, Executive Director. Santa Barbara, telephone interview, 23 March 1999.

402. The original plan had been for the training of 300 local mine awareness instructors in cooperation with World Vision and CARE International but CARE International pulled out of this project in April 1995.

403. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers , 1998, p. 23.

404. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p. 57.

405. David Sogge, Sustainable Peace: Angola's Recovery, (Harare: Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, 1992), p. 89.

406. ICRC, Antipersonnel Mines: An Overview , 1 August 1997, p. 1.

407. Tehnaz Dastoor and Jane Mocellin, Mine Related Problems in Angola: A Needs Assessment , UNICEF Office of Emergency Programs Working Paper Series, December 1997, p. 5.

408. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p. 33.

409. Telephone interview with Patrick L'Hote, Southern Africa Desk Officer, ICRC (Geneva), 22 March1999.

410. Telephone interview with Pierra Hublet, Angola Program Officer, Handicap International (Brussels), 22 March 1999.

411. Tietze, 22 March 1999.

412. "Away with Anti-Personnel Landmines," Southern Africa Quaker News, No. 2, 1997.

413. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), p. 59.

414. Botswana Statement to 1st OAU Conference on Landmines, Ref No. HCS/16/5/C I SS 21 May 1997.

415. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.59.

416. UN Database: Country Report on Botswana, see landmine/country; and Voices , Issue 2, Spring 1995 (published by World Vision Canada).

417. Namibian Society for Human Rights, Press Release, 15 November 1998.

418. In August 1998 moderate opposition parties joined a coalition government. LM Researcher interview with His Excellency, Jonathan Niyungeko. Ambassador of Burundi in Belgium, Brussels, 12 February 1999.

419. CM/Dec. 363 (LXVI) "Rapport du Secrétaire Général sur la question des Mines anti-personnel et les efforts fais au niveau international pour parvenir à une interdiction totale" Doc. CM/2009 (LXVI), OAU Summit, Harare, June 1997.

420. Interview, Jonathas Niyungeko, 12 February 1999.

421. "Sur les Mines Antipersonnel", African Topics , Issue 17, April-May 1997, p.19.

422. Interview, Jonathas Niyungeko, 12 February 1999.

423. UNMAS, Mission Report , p. 10.

424. UNMAS, Mission Report , p. 6.

425. "The balance of forces", Africa Confidential , Vol. 37, n 22, 1 November 1996, p.3. in "Les rapports du GRIP"op.cit p. 22.

426. Interview, Jonathas Niyungeko, 12 February 1999.

427. UNMAS, Mission Report , p. 6.

428. See U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines , (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1993), p. 63; and U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis , (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1994), p. 15.

429. Pierre Hublet, "Mission Report in Burundi from the 23rd January to the 1st February 1999", Handicap International Belgique, 1998, p. 3-4.

430. Ibid.

431. Ibid.

432. Ibid.

433. Ibid.

434. UNMAS, Mission Report , p. 1.

435. Hublet, Mission Report , p. 7.

436. Hublet, Mission Report , p. 6-7.

437. Médecins Sans Frontières-Belgique, Récapitulatif des incidents par mines au Burundi, Période 1996-1998 , p. 1.

438. Pierre HUBLET, "Mission Report in Burundi from the 23rd January to the 1st February 1999", Handicap International Belgique, 1998, p. 3.

439. UNMAS, Mission Report , p. 12.

440. Interview, Jonathas Niyungeko, 12 February 1999.

441. United Nations Mine Action Service, Joint Assessment Mission Report , 27 August 1998, p. 6.

442. Interview, Jonathas Niyungeko, 12 February 1999.

443. UNMAS, Mission Report , p. 9.

444. Interview, Jonathas Niyungeko, 12 February 1999.

445. United Nations, Burundi, 6 April 1997.

446. Médecins, Sans Frontières-Belgique, Récapitulatif des incidents par mines au Burundi, Période 1996-1998 , p 1.

447. Ibid.

448. Ibid.

449. UNMAS, Mission Report, p. 9.

450. Ibid.

451. Ibid.

452. Handicap International-Belgium, "Assistance aux victimes au Burundi" Plan d'action 1998-1999, 4 pp.

453. LM Researcher interview with Iya Tidjani, Minister Counselor, Cameroon Embassy, Brussels, 24 February 1999.

454. Ibid.

455. Ibid.

456. Ibid.

457. "Document on the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute," Yaoundé, Ministry of Communication, 2nd edition, August 1998.

458. Amilcar Spencer Lopes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cape Verde, Statement to Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 4 December 1997. Unofficial translation from French by LM Researcher.

459. Telephone interview with Jorge Silva, Desk of Bilateral Accords in the Secretariat of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Praia, 25 March 1999.

460. Telephone interview, Luís Dupret, the Director of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Praia, 25 March 1999.

461. The U.S. Department of State estimated between 50,000 and 70,000 mines remain in Chad. See U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998) p. A-2.; and for the one million figure see, Déminage du B.E.T. - Soutien cartographique - Réhabilitation des pistes déminées. République du Tchad, N'djamena, 1997. Mine-clearance reconnaissance report in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region, conducted in December 1996 by General Grangeon (France) and three Chadian officers.

462. Paddy Blagden, 'Outline Proposal for the Mine Clearance of the Tibesti region of Northern Chad,' U.N. Demining Office, New York, 1995.

463. Déminage du B.E.T. - Soutien cartographique.

464. Reuters , 6 June 1996.

465. Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), vol. 1, p.70;cited in Anti-Personnel Landmines. Friend or Foe? A study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines (Geneva: ICRC, 1996), p.33.

466. Chad report, UN Country Database,

467. Alex Vines, 'The Killing Fields: Landmines in North and West and Central Africa,' African Topics , no.18, June-July 1997.

468. Republic of Chad, National Mine Action Plan 1999. 1 November - 31 December 1998. National Plan for the removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance in support to the economic and social development for Chad, (Ndjamena: Republic of Chad, 1998), p. 5.

469. Chad report, UN Country Database,; the most common antipersonnel mines are NR409 (Belgian); PPM2 (German); M14 (US); M18 (US); PMA3 (Yugoslavia); PMN (Russian).

470. Republic of Chad, National Mine Action Plan 1999. 1 November - 31 December 1998. National Plan for the removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance in support to the economic and social development for Chad, (Ndjamena: Republic of Chad, 1998), 21pp.

471. Republic of Chad, National Mine Action Plan , p.7.

472. Alex Vines, 'The Killing Fields,' African Topics , no.18, June-July 1997.

473. Between May and November 1987, French engineers removed or destroyed: 4,747 ATM, 1,073 APM, 6,735 items of UXO (rockets, mortar, grenades, etc), twenty-five plane-carried bombs, 4,490 stockpiled mines and 192,880 rounds of ammunition. See, Bilan Global des interventions réalisées par le 17 RGP entre le 28 mai et le 2 novembre 1987,'  in, Déminage du B.E.T. Soutien Cartographique .

474. Republic of Chad, National Mine Action Plan 1999 , p.5.

475. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers , 1998, p.A-4.

476. Republic of Chad, National Mine Action Plan 1999 , p. 6.

477. Ministère de la santé, Annuaire des statistiques sanitaires du Tchad. Tome A, niveau national, année 1997 , (Ndjamena: Ministère de la santé, 1998).

478. ICRC, Landmines in Africa , ICRC, May 1997.

479. 0LM Researcher telephone interview with Eric Ndri, Côte d'Ivoire mission to the UN, New York, 1 April 1999.

480. 0LM Researcher telephone interviews with officials at Côte d'Ivoire Embassies in Ottawa and Paris, 25 March 1999; telephone interview, Ndri, 1 April 1999.

481. 0ICRC website. Search "Cote d'Ivoire AND landmines."

482. 0Telephone interview, Ndri, 1 April 1999.

483. Ibid.

484. His Excellency, Dr. Fecadu Gadamu, Ambassador to Canada, Statement to Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997, p. 2.

485. Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fax to Ethiopian Consulate in The Hague, 17 March 1999, p. 2.

486. ICRC, "Ethiopia: Media poised to raise awareness about landmines," ICRC News, no. 34, 5 September 1997, see

487. Gadamu, p. 3.

488. "Ethiopia- Joint assessment mission report," UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 2.

489. U.S. Department of State, Political-Military Affairs Bureau, Office of International Security Operations, Pub. No. 10098, July 1993, p. 89; U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," March 1998, Office of East African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs,

490. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 2.

491. Ibid. Map- "The Three Most Mine Affected Areas in Ethiopia."

492. Ibid, p. 2.

493. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-1.; UN Landmine Database. "Ethiopia."; Gadamu, December 1997, p. 2; UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 2.

494. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers , 1993, p. 88.

495. Ibid. The U.S. Department of State incorrectly listed the M3 AP mine as an AT mine.

496. Ibid.

497. Ibid.

498. ICRC, "Ethiopia," Annual Report 1997 .

499. BBC World, "Ethiopians pull Out of Somalia," 4 January 1999,

500. "Ethiopia and Eritrea- Trench warfare," Economist, 13 March 1999, p. 56.

501. Ethiopian Government Spokesperson, "Total Victory for Operation Sunset," Ethiopian News Service , Addis Ababa., 28 February 1999; Professor Addis Birhan, "Mind Eritrea's Mine Fields," Walta Information Service , Addis Ababa., 6 March 1999; Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 March 1999, p. 2.

502. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 2.

503. Gadamu, p. 2; U.S. Department of State, 1993, p. 88.

504. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 2.

505. U.S. State Department, "Demining Program Financing History," 11 January 1999.

506. UNMAS, p. 3.

507. Gadamu, p. 2.

508. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 4.

509. Ibid, p. 3

510. Ibid., Executive Summary and p. 3.

511. "UNMAS Discussion Paper on the Application of Survey and the Impact of the Ottawa Treaty," UNMAS, New York, Version 1.2/98, Annex C.

512. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 3.

513. Ibid, p. 2.

514. Ibid, p. 4.

515. Ibid. p. 3.

516. ICRC, "Ethiopia," ICRC Annual Report 1994, 30 May 1995,

517. Handicap International, MAG, and Norwegian People's Aid, "Ethiopia," Portfolio of Mine-related Projects, 1998.

518. Ibid.

519. Yohannes Berhanu, Manager, Prosthetics-Orthotics Center- Addis Ababa, Fax to author, 19 March 1999, p. 2.

520. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis . (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1994), p.16.

521. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 4.

522. Ibid.

523. UNMAS, 22 June 1998, p. 6.

524. Berhanu, 19 March 1999, p. 1.

525. Ibid, p. 1-2.

526. Ibid.

527. Berhanu, p. 2; ICRC, "Ethiopia," Annual Report 1994 , 30 May 1995; ICRC, "Ethiopia," Annual Report 1995, 31 May 1996.

528. Berhanu, p. 1.

529. Ibid.

530. ICRC, "Ethiopia," Annual Report 1994 , 30 May 1995.

531. Ibid.; ICRC, "Ethiopia," Annual Report 1995 , 31 May 1996; ICRC, "Ethiopia," Annual Report 1996 , 1 June 1997.

532. 0LM Researcher, telephone interviews, Gabonese diplomats, London, Paris and Ottawa, 25 March 1999.

533. 0LM Researcher, telephone interview, U.S. embassy political officer, Libreville, 25 March 1999.

534. LM Researcher telephone interview with Mr Moungara, Gabonese Mission to the UN, New York, 1 April 1999.

535. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.

536. LM Researcher, telephone interview with Fatou Jallow, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Banjul, 30 March 1999.

537. Ibid.

538. 0Alex Vines and Barbarcar Diagne, "Senegal: old mines, new wars," African Topics , no. 22, January-March 1998, p.13; Andrew Manley, "Guinea Bissau/Senegal: war, civil war and the Casamance question," Writenet/Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, pp.14-16.

539. 0See Guinea Bissau and Senegal reports.

540. 0"Senegal: Gambia to mediate?", West Africa , (London), no. 4180, 12-18 January 1999, p. 7.

541. Interview with Adjudicator-General of the Armed Forces, Col. A.B. Donkor, Accra, 6 February 1999.

542. Ibid.

543. Alex Duval Smith, "Just a Little War among the Crocodile Swamps," Guardian News Service, Johannesburg, 24 June 1998.

544. Human Rights Watch, "The Mine Ban Treaty and Africa," May 1998, p. 8.

545. Photographs of the stockpile destruction were printed in the Senegalese media. See Le Soleil , (Dakar), 9 February 1998. See also Noel Stott, South Africa Campaign to Ban Landmines and Alex Vines, Human Rights Watch, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Global Campaign Against Anti-Personnel Landmines," researched for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and presented at the XII NAM Summit, Durban, South Africa, 29 August-3 September 1998, p. 30.

546. John Cann. (ed.), "Memories of Portugal's African Wars, 1961-1974," Proceedings of a Conference, King's College, London, 10 June 1997; Contributions to War Studies , no.1, (Quantico: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1998), p. 140; Stott and Vines, p. 30.

547. Major Herve Petetin, "Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau," United Nations Mine Action Service, December 1998, p. 1.

548. United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa, Update 404, 17 February 1999.

549. Petetin, "Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau," UNMAS, December 1998, p. 1.

550. Ricardo Mota, "Report from Bissau," RTP International Television , 9 November 1998; Pedro Rosa Mendes, "Minas antipessoal ameaçam a população de Bissau 'Nous Ecomog, Guerra Vai Acabar,'", Pol. 1239, 12 February 1999.

551. Confidential source.

552. "Guinea-Bissau: Mines Discovered on Both Sides of Front," Lisbon RTP Television , 9 November 1998.

553. Pedro Rosa Mendes, 12 February 1999.

554. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis , (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1994), p. 16.

555. Ibid., p. A-1.

556. Petetin, p. 2.

557. Ibid, pp. 3-4.

558. Ibid, pp. 2-4.

559. Ibid, p. 1.

560. Ibid, p. 2.

561. Reuters , 24 March 1999.

562. Ibid.

563. Petetin, p. 2.

564. Stott and Vines, p. 30.

565. ACEP- Associação para a Cooperação Entre os Povos, Portugal, November 1998; "Three Children Trigger Off Mines," MISNA- Missionary Service News Agency ,, 28 October 1998; Ricardo Mota, 9 November, 1998.

566. Petetin, p. 1.

567. Presentation by Mr. Osvaldo José Semedo, Guinea Bissau Delegation, at OAU meeting, Kempton Park, South Africa, 19-21 May 1997.

568. LM Researcher interview with Legal Advisor in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, 11 November 1998.

569. See Arms Act, Cap. 114.

570. LM Researcher interview with Joseph Okungu, RSM, Instructor with 3KAR (Retired), Kisumu, 2 November 1998.

571. LM Researcher interview with senior police commander, 12 November 1998.

572. International Committee of Red Cross, Landmines in Africa , May 1997.

573. LM Researcher telephone interview, Mme Elena Rajaonarivelo, Madagascar Mission to the U.N., New York, 31 March 1999.

574. Ibid.

575. For the historical background, see Africa South of the Sahara , Europa Publications (London), 1996, pp.553-557.

576. U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers , July 1993, p. 121.

577. Landmine Monitor interview with the Mauritanian Red Crescent.

578. Osservatorio sul commercio delle arme report, Italy Toscane IRES.

579. U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers , September 1998, p. A2; Hidden Killers , December 1994, p. 16.

580. United Nations, Country Report: Mauritania , at country/ mauritan.htm.

581. Hidden Killers, 1998, p. A4.

582. U.S. State Department indicates just 19 mine casualties. Ibid.

583. Namibian Ministry of Defense Media Release, "NDF members wounded in the DRC," 26 November 1998.

584. Ibid, p. 19.

585. In 1993 the South African arms manufacturer Armscor refused to issue Denel any further export permits to Rwanda and it had to dishonor an order worth US$45 million. This order included 5,000 antipersonnel mines. See, Jacklyn Cock, "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa,"in Jasjit Singh, Light Weapons and International Security (Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security International Council, 1995) footnote eight, p.123.

586. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War , Vol. 6, Issue 1, January 1994, p. 15.

587. Ibid, p. 30.

588. UNDHA, Landmine Data Base, Country Report: Rwanda : NR 409, NR 413, PRB 409, PRB M35 (Belgium); Type 72a, Type 72b (China); PP-MI-SR-II (Czech Republic); M-78, T 79 (Egypt); PPM-2 (Germany); TS 50, VS-50, Valmara 59, Valmara 69 (Italy); P2 Mk2, P4 Mk1 (Pakistan); MON-50, PMD7s, PMN, PMN-1, POMZ-2, POMZ-2M (Russia); M-14, M-2A4, M16-A2, M18A1 "Claymore", M2A1, M2A3 (U.S.).

589. UN, Landmine Database. Country Report: Rwanda ,


590. Inter Press Service , 15 May 1996.

591. Agence France Presse , 2 October 1995.

592. Human Rights Watch, 'Rwanda,' Human Rights Watch World Report 1997 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996) p.46.

593. Reuters , 5 February 1996.

594. Reuters , 11 April 1996.

595. Reuters , 24 May 1996.

596. UNDHA, Landmine Database. Country Report: Rwanda ,; and U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington DC: U.S. Department of State, 1998) p.A-2.

597. 'Summary - Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda, 1994 - August 1997,' p.1. Available at:

598. Ibid, p.2.

599. Ibid, p.5.

600. Paul Brown of RONCO talking about mine clearance in Rwanda in Kigali in 1998 on Reuters film footage by Patrick Kariuki Muiruri, Reuters cameraman, Nairobi.

601. Ibid.

602. LM Researcher interview with Patrick Kariuki Muiruri, Reuters cameraman, Nairobi, 4 January 1999.

603. Ibid.

604. UNESCO, Mine Awareness Education: a country review and curriculum for Bosnia.

605. NPA, NPA Annual Report 1996 (Oslo: NPA, 1996)

606. ICRC, 'Landmines in Africa,' I CRC Fact Sheet , May 1997.

607. LM Researcher telephone interview with Dr. Ana Paula Alvim of the Department of Multilateral Issues in the office of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, São Tomé, 26 March 1999.

608. Ibid.

609. LM Researcher telephone interview, São Tomé, 26 March 1999.

610. Telephone interview, Terry Jones, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Planning and Environment, 1 April 1999.

611. 0Telephone interview, defence analysts, Centre d'analyse et de prévision, Paris, 29 March 1999; telephone interview, Terry Jones, 1 April 1999.

612. 0Human Rights Watch, Rearming with Impunity. International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide , May 1995, p. 10.

613. 0Ibid., p.11

614. 0Telephone interview, Terry Jones.

615. Interview , London, 15 September 1997.

616. Interview with President Kabbah, 6 October 1997.

617. According to Jeremy Harding, an editor at the London Review of Books , he was told in 1995 while in Sierra Leone by a diamond industry source that the British military equipment agent, J & S Franklin Limited had procured landmines for the Sierra Leone government. Telephone interview with Jeremy Harding, London, 31 March 1999.

618. Anthony Hocking, Openheimer and Sons (London: McGraw, 1973) p.287.

619. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington DC: Department of State, 1994) pp.16-17.

620. Sierra Leone Daily Mail, (Freetown), 4 October 1997.

621. Guardian , (Lagos), 17 September 1997.

622. Interview with President Kabbah, London, 6 October 1997.

623. Olive Sawyer, 'The Mine Problem in Africa,' Special Landmine Workshop Supplement , RADDHO and African Topics, Dakar, November 1997.

624. Alex Vines, 'Gurkhas and the private security business in Africa,' in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization of Security in War-Torn African Societies (Halfway House: Institute of Security Studies and Canadian Council for Peace and Security, 1999) p.130.

625. Abdel-Fatau Musah, Research and Publications Co-ordinator, Centre for Democracy and Development, London, 27 March 1999; David Lord, Co-Director, Conciliation Resources, London, 27 March 1999; Khareen Peck, independent journalist, Johannesburg, 31 March 1999; Lucy Taylor, Trading Force Ltd, London, 30 March 1999. All the above individuals have been told by secondary sources in Sierra Leone that EO laid mines in this operation or spread the word that the areas around this diamond area were mined.

626. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Diamond Mercenaries of Africa,' Background Briefing , 4 August 1996.

627. Telephone interview with Peter Paul de Groote, Merlin, London, 31 March 1999.

628. The SPLM/A commits itself to unilateral demining effort in the areas under its control and commissions the [non-governmental organization] Operation Save Innocent Lives - Sudan (OSIL-Sudan) ... to demine the liberated areas of New Sudan and to help put an end this scourge," in Sudan People's Liberation Army, "Resolution on problem posed by proliferation of anti personnel mines in liberated parts of New Sudan," Statement signed by Commander Salva Khr Mayardit, Deputy Chair, NLC/NEC (SPLM) and SPLA Chief of Genearl Staff, New Kush-Himan, 1 November 1996.

629. Statement to the Signing Ceremony by His Excellency, Ali Othman Mohomed Taha, Minister of External Relations, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.

630. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs: Mine Clearance Policy Unit, The Landmine Situation in Sudan Assessment Mission Report, August 1997; and Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan , New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1998.

631. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan/Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), Nairobi-Kenya, "Landmine Information-Sudan," signed by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Director, OSIL-Sudan, dated 8-1-1999 (8 January 1999), p. 2.

632. LM Researcher interview with Patrick Kaiuki Muiruri, chief cameraman, Reuters Television, Nairobi, 4 January 1999.

633. "ANNEX F: Specifications of Landmines found in Sudan," in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

634. The antipersonnel mines identified by HRW were: PMD-6M (Russia); No 4 (Iran); PMN (Russia, China or Iraq); M-14 (U.S.); Type 72 (China and South Africa); Type 69 (China); POMZ -2M (Russia, China, former East Germany, North Korea); VS-T (Italy); MAUS (Italy), and the TS-50 (Italy), in HRW, Sudan : Global Trade, Local Impact , p. 18.

635. OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 3.

636. HRW, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact , August 1998, p. 39 and p. 40.

637. UN/DHA/MCPA, Sudan Assessment Mission Report, p. 7.

638. Ibid.

639. HRW interview with Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Director, Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL)-Sudan, Nairobi, 15 February 1999.

640. OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 1.

641. Ibid.

642. Otunnu was reported to have secured a ban on use of landmines in the south of the country by both parties to the conflict. See "Sudan's Warring Parties Agree to Stop Using Landmines," Reuters, Nairobi, 11 March 1999.

643. Mustafa Othman Ebeid, Sudan Defense Force presentation, in "The Situation from a Military Point of View Panel," Regional Conference on the Menace of Landmines in the Arab Countries, Beirut, Lebanon, 11 February 1999.

644. "ANNEX A: Request for Assistance dated 25 January 1997," in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

645. UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report , August 1997, p. 10.

646. The Republic of Sudan, Humanitarian Aid Commission, "Sudan: Mine Action Programme (SMAP), July 1997, p. 1. In ANNEX I: The HAC Report, Sudan Mine Action Programme, July 1997, in UN/DHA/MCPU, Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

647. Ibid.

648. "Sudan: Country Profile," in U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington D.C.:U.S. Department of State, 1998), p.52.

649. HRW interview with Aleu Ayieny Aleu, OSIL-Sudan, 15 February 1999.

650. See Annex G: Areas and Roads reported mined to the Assessment Team," in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

651. HRW interview, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, OSIL-Sudan, 15 February 1999.

652. Other factors inhibiting land-delivery of humanitarian relief in southern Sudan include inadequate roads and ambushes of overland and river transport. See, HRW, Famine in Sudan , 1998, p. 38.

653. See "Sudan's Warring Parties Agree to Stop Using Landmines," Reuters Nairobi, 11 March 1999. The UN Assessment noted that "GOS sketches of mined areas have been captured by the SPLA during the winder/spring offensive [but] it should be noted that maps or records have rarely been kept; what may exist is incomplete at best." in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report , August 1997, p. 12.

654. OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 5.

655. UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report," August 1997, pp. 2-3.

656. Annex I - HAC report, Sudan Mine Action Programme, July 1997 in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

657. Annex J - OSIL, Mine Action Projects for southern Sudan, 1997/97 in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

658. LM Researcher interview with Dan Collison, programme officer, Christian Aid, Nairobi, 18 December 1998.

659. OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 5.

660. Collison, Christian Aid, 18 December 1998.

661. Ibid.

662. This is according to OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 1. MAG has agreed to asses OSIL's mine clearance efforts to date in early 1999 according to Collinson, CA, 18 December 1998.

663. LM interview with Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Director, OSIL-Sudan, 7 October 1998.

664. Collinson, CA, 18 December 1998.

665. See "MAG, Southern Sudan," in Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian People's Aid, Portfolio of Mine-related Projects , 1998-, 4 December 1998.

666. HRW interview, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, OSIL-Sudan, 15 February 1999.

667. Ibid.

668. Ibid.

669. This is according to OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 5.

670. OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 5.

671. The Republic of Sudan, Humanitarian Aid Commission, "Sudan: Mine Action Programme (SMAP), July 1997, in ANNEX I: The HAC Report, Sudan Mine Action Programme, JULY 1997, in UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report - Annexes, August 1997.

672. OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmine Information-Sudan," p. 4.

673. UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report, p. 9.

674. Ibid.

675. UN/DHA/MCPU, Sudan Assessment Mission Report, p. 15.

676. "Sudan Air Force Bombs Southern Hospital Aid Group," Reuters Nairobi, 3 March 1999.

677. LM Researcher email correspondence from Claudio Feo, Norwegian People's Aid, 29 March 1999.

678. "Sudan Government Bombed Civilian Hospital: Aid Agency," Reuters, Nairobi, 14 January 1999.

679. See ICRC section in the Appendices.

680. LM Researcher interview with Reverend Lexson Awad, Director, Sudan Evangelical Mission, Nairobi, 8 January 1999.

681. Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) Annual Report, 1996.

682. Statement by the Honorable Jakaya M. Kikwete, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanzania, at the Landmines Signing Conference, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

683. Hubert M. Lubyama, Christian Council of Tanzania, "Tanzania Country Report," prepared for presentation at the Southern African Regional Landmines Campaign Meeting , Johannesburg, South Africa, 15-16 March 1999.

684. Tanzanian NGOs campaigning to ban landmines include the Christian Council of Tanzania.

685. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) p.140.

686. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), pp.71, 140.

687. East African Standard, (Dar-es-Salaam), 14 April, 1967.

688. Radio Dar-es-Salaam, in English, 18 April 1967.

689. East African Standard, (Dar-es-Salaam), 20 April 1967.

690. Human Rights Watch interview with Major-General Walden, London, 6 January 1997.

691. Reuters , 2 August 1996.

692. Human Rights Watch interview with N Mdoe, Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kempton Park, South Africa, 20 May 1997.

693. LM Researcher interview with Mathew M. Biggs, East African correspondent, Reuters , Nairobi 1999; LM Researcher email correspondence with Vincent Parker, liaison officer, external relations, UNHCR-Tanzania office, 5 February, 1999.

694. LM Researcher interview with Georges Anani, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Togo, Brussels, Belgium, 17 February 1999.

695. Ibid.

696. UN Country Report on Togo, see

697. See C. Toulabor, Le Togo sous Eyadéma , Paris, Karthala, 1986.

698. Interview with Foreign Minister Keli Walubita, Ouagadougou, May 1998.

699. ZCBL interview with Keli Walubita, Lusaka, 19 February 1999.

700. U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Intelligence Report, "Landmine Warfare - Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa (U)."

701. Times of Zambia , (Lusaka), January 28, 1999.

702. Monitor , (Lusaka), February 12-25, 1999.

703. Zambia Police, Annual Report , 1970, p.6.

704. Zambia Police, Annual Report , 1971, pp.4-6.

705. Zambia Daily Mail , (Lusaka), 8 December 1971.

706. Times of Zambia , (Lusaka), 12 April 1989.

707. Zambian Campaign To Ban Landmines, Landmine Workshop,, Lusaka, June 1997.

708. Monthly Review Bulletin , April 1995.

709. Zambia Police, Annual Report , 1970.

710. Barbara Cole, The Elite: The Rhodesian Special Air Service (Transkei: Three Knights, 1984), p.208.

711. Peter McAleese, No Mean Soldier: The Story of the Ultimate Professional Solider in the SAS and other Forces (London: Orion, 1994) , pp.152-153.

712. Barbara Cole, The Elite , p.392.

713. Times of Zambia , (Lusaka), 20 June, 1994.

714. U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Intelligence Report, "Landmine Warfare - Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa (U);" Namibian officials denied to Human Rights Watch in 1996 that any joint clearance operation had occurred.

715. Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines Workshop, Lusaka, June 1997.

716. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997) p.149.

717. Ibid.

718. Post , (Lusaka), 3 April, 1997.

719. Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines Workshop, June 1997.

720. Zarina Geloo/AIA, "Zambians Pay Heavy Price for Freedom of their Neighbors," Lusaka, 26 February 1997.

721. Weekly Post , (Lusaka), 29 November - 5 December 1991.

722. Muleya Mwanayanda, "Field Notes," no date, on file at Afronet, Lusaka.

723. Times of Zambia , (Lusaka), January 28, 1999.

724. Interview, M. Zounguere-Sokambi, Ambassador of the Central African Republic, in Brussels, 26 February 1999.