For the purposes of this report, those countries who have consented to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the States Parties Section.
Mine Ban Policy
Benin's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Murillo de la Rocha, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Benin ratified on 25 September 1998, the forty-fourth nation to do so. Benin voted in favor of the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines. According to Ogoudjobi Sikirou, Minister Counselor at Benin's Brussels Embassy, Benin is working for a total ban on mines.(1) Though no implementation legislation has been enacted, national laws banning the possession of certain categories of weapons could be adapted to cover both antipersonnel and antitank mines. Benin is a party to the CCW, but not to the original or amended Protocol II on landmines.
There is no public or private production of antipersonnel mines on Beninese territory. Transfer of antipersonnel mines is not allowed. The national army possesses no stocks of mines, other than those used to train military personnel in line with article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Benin wants to have deminers in order to deploy a comprehensive range of skills in its armed forces. Because of structural adjustment agreements with the World Bank, the Army is occupying an increasingly development-oriented role.
Antipersonnel mines, including Claymores, have never used by the Army or by any other actors inside the country or on its borders. During the 1974-91 period of military-Marxist rule under Brigadier-General Mathieu Kérékou, Benin imported many weapons from the former Soviet Union but antipersonnel mines were not believed to be among them. The relative absence of security threat from neighboring countries obviated the need for landmines.
Benin is not mine-affected and there are no landmine casualties. Benin's army has demining capacity and declares itself prepared to take part in regional cooperation, if one day Nigeria needs clearance assistance, under the policy of "social, economic and political management of the borders," advanced with Nigeria.
Mine Ban Policy
Although Burkina Faso is not and has never been mine-affected, it has played a vocal role in international efforts to ban antipersonnel landmines. Since October 1996, the Burkinabè government has been actively involved in the Ottawa Process. Burkina Faso attended all the major meetings including the October 1996 strategy conference in Ottawa where the process was launched, the Maputo Fourth International NGO Conference where the government delivered a statement, the Brussels Meeting where it signed the declaration and the Oslo treaty negotiations, taking the firm stand for a total ban on landmines all the way through.
There is no ambiguity in the position of the Burkinabè government regarding antipersonnel mines. Burkina Faso first called for a comprehensive ban on landmines at the 50th UN General Assembly in October 1995.(2) Indeed, in all regional and international fora (OAU, UN, Franco-African Summit of heads of state) Burkinabè representatives supported resolutions calling for a global ban on antipersonnel mines. Burkina Faso voted in favour of all the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. At the Inter-African NGO Seminar on Landmines parallel to the OAU summit in Ouagadougou in June 1998, Mahahama Savadogo, representing Burkina's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ablassé Ouédraogo, spelled out clearly the government's reasoning: "To forestall the devastating effects of the antipersonnel mine disaster, there is an urgent need to intensify the campaign for the immediate coming into force of the Convention."(3)
On 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Burkina Faso's Foreign Minister Ouedrago signed the Mine Ban Treaty and declared that "Burkina Faso confirms its commitment to the participation in the eradication of landmines at all levels. Within the framework of this participation, Burkina Faso will assume all the responsibilities of a member state."(4)
Under the law number 035/98/AN, dated 29 July 1998, the Burkinabè national assembly authorised the government to ratify the Convention; and under Act No. 24/DGAPJC/AJC/STAI of 15 September 1998, President Blaise Compaoré, ratified it. The instruments of ratification were deposited on 16 September 1998 at the United Nations, making Burkina Faso the fortieth ratification and thus allowing the Mine Ban Treaty to enter into force on 1 March 1999, in accordance with article 17.
Although the ratification instruments are in compliance with the Burkinabè constitution in both content and form, the law merely authorises ratification. The government has not yet adopted any national implementation measures as required by Article 9 of the ban treaty. According to sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such implementation legislation is not necessary because Burkina Faso has never produced, stockpiled, or used landmines.(5) Burkina Faso is also not yet a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor its amended Protocol.
After participating in the October 1996 Ottawa Conference, the UIDH (Inter-African Union of Human Rights) pursued a vigorous plan of sensibilisation and mobilisation in Burkina Faso and throughout the African continent, in collaboration with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Among other things, this joint effort resulted in the Inter-African Conference of NGOs, held in Ouagadougou on 3-5 June 1998. Bringing together over 100 participants, including representatives from eighteen African and eight international NGOs, the conference culminated in a final declaration which clearly articulated a comprehensive plan of action for the African continent in the efforts to implement the ban on antipersonnel mines.
The birth of the Burkinabé National Campaign on 23 May 1998, was a direct result of the program undertaken by UIDH and MBDHP (Mouvement Burkinabé des droits de l'Homme et de peuple) at local level. It encompassing a diverse range of NGOs including trade unions, women's organisations, human rights organisations, and lawyer's associations.(6)
Burkina Faso is not known to have ever produced or exported AP mines. At a meeting of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Defence Commission in July 1998, Defence Minister Albert Millogo, in response to questions asked by deputies, stated unequivocally that Burkina Faso had never used or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.(7) According to the Minister, Burkina Faso's armed forces possess only inactive mines for military training purposes but their number and types are unavailable at this time.
Despite two border disputes with Mali (in 1974 and 1985), no mine incidents have been recorded in the country and it seems that no antipersonnel mines were laid at that time. Interviews with various members of the army and with Commander Haarouna Ouedraogo, a Defence cabinet member, corroborate the Defence Minister's statements, and reveal also that the army has never laid mines beyond its borders.(8)
Djibouti lies at the southern entrance to the Red Sea at the strategic Bab-el-Mendab, which commands the passageway to the Suez Canal for vessels to and from the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean. Djibouti, which obtained independence from France on 27 June 1977, is home to the largest overseas French military base. Approximately 3,200 soldiers, including contingents from the French Air Force and Foreign Legion, are stationed in Djibouti. It has borders with Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, three countries that have undergone upheavals in the recent past.
Mine Ban Policy
Djibouti signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 May 1998. On 5 June 1998, the United Nations Secretariat informed Djibouti's Foreign Ministry that Djibouti's MBT ratification instruments were received and duly registered. Djibouti did not participate in any of the meetings of the Ottawa process; however, its quick action on the MBT is largely due to the active involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the concern shown by a number of Djibouti government officials, particularly at the foreign ministry and within the diplomatic corps of Djibouti. Between 1996 and the early period of 1998, ICRC international and regional staff held seminars and visited government officials on several occasions to discuss the global landmine crisis and the importance of the MBT.
Djibouti voted in favor of the 1996, 1997, and 1998 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions. Djibouti has signed and adheres to the 1980 U.N. Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol II on mines. It has not yet ratified the amended Protocol II (1996). Djibouti has not introduced domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Djibouti is not a known landmine producer or exporter. It appears to have obtained mines in the past from France and Italy. Djibouti is the most important seaport on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden. It is the major port for all materials to Ethiopia. Ethiopia has signed, but not ratified, the MBT. Neighboring Eritrea has not signed the MBT. The transit of landmines through Djibouti territory is, therefore, a concern. Indeed, Djibouti opposition groups claim that at least one shipment of landmines was imported by Ethiopia through the port of Djibouti.(9)
Djibouti officials strongly reaffirm Djibouti's intention to fully comply with the MBT. With the help of technicians from the French Foreign Legion stationed in Djibouti, the Djibouti military destroyed 350 kg of landmines and UXO material in 1998.(10) It is believed that additional stocks of AP mines remain, but no information is available whether any other stocks are planned for destruction. The French military indicates that it does not use mines in Djibouti(11).
Djibouti has a small landmine problem; the legacy of a three-year internal war (1991-1994). Landmines were used in this war by the rebel force of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and by government troops loyal to President Hassan Gouled Abtidon.(12) The two sides reconciled on 26 December 1994. Mines left behind by this war claimed victims as recently as November 1998. A splinter group of the FRUD still maintains an armed opposition in some northern zones. Djibouti military officers claim that the opposition militia is now laying landmines near the border between Eritrea and Djibouti, but this claim has not been substantiated.(13)
In 1998, there were a number of landmine incidents. Most of the known incidents were due to old landmines, but at least one incident involved new landmines. In early November, an army truck ran over an anti-tank landmine near Asageila. Four soldiers were killed and nine others were wounded. Fourteen antipersonnel landmines were found in the vicinity of the anti-tank mine that exploded. A month earlier, a soldier was killed by a landmine explosion. He was with an army mine clearance team near the provincial town of Obock.
On 18 March 1998, an opposition militia mined a section of the road the leads south from Ali Sabih town to the Somaliland/Ethiopian/Djibouti border. A driver for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and three soldiers were killed in two separate incidents.(14)
In 1991, a long simmering dispute between the FRUD and the government of Djibouti escalated into a full-scale war. Both sides used landmines. Government military officers interviewed recently claim that the army used landmines according to military doctrine and had properly marked minefields. They indicate, however, that often the markings were lost. In general, landmines were used around military camps and on access roads. There is no indication of any large-scale use of landmines against the civilian population by either party.
Landmines were most heavily used in the northern district of Obock. In Obock town, the Djibouti army systematically laid mines to protect the army camp and key installations and FRUD forces are said to have mined access roads out of Obock and near the village of Andoli. A number of dry-river beds and camel caravan routes were also mined near the district town of Tadjoura west of Obock. The Djibouti military used French and Italian mines, while FRUD forces employed Italian and Russian mines.
Although no reliable data are available on the extent of mine contamination. Certain zones in the Afar highlands are, considered to face a higher landmine threat than other areas.(15) There has been no systematic survey of mined areas in Djibouti, but some of the known mined areas are where recent landmine incidents occurred. The southern district of Dikhil may contain some landmines.(16) In Obock town, mines have been found in the palm groves, which are now not tended because of landmine threat. Access roads and riverbeds north of Tadjoura are also avoided.
The government recently appointed a mine action taskforce composed of representatives from the military, Ministry of Health, the ICRC and the World Health Organization (WHO). Representatives of the taskforce attended the 1998 Kampala conference and have begun formulating an action plan. The plan calls for a mine action program that includes surveys of mine-affected zones, mine awareness and victim assistance.(17) No funds have been allocated to the taskforce action plan, but some donor countries and international organization are said to be reviewing it for funding purposes.
In 1998, the French army completed the training of a contingent of thirty military deminers. The newly trained deminers started limited demining exercise in the district of Obock, one of the districts most severely affected by landmines.(18) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is funding mine awareness and mine clearance projects in Djibouti.(19)
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Djibouti's northern plateau, the area most heavily contested during the civil war, and which contains most of the suspected minefields or mined routes, is mostly rough mountainous terrain that contains few easily accessible roads. Civilian victims face major difficulties in calling for or reaching help. Military mine victims are almost always evacuated by helicopter.
The District hospital of Obock, closest to areas with the greatest landmine threat, was completely destroyed during the 1991-1994 civil war. There are now only two hospitals in Djibouti capable of assisting victims of landmines. Both are in Djibouti City. Civilian victims are treated at the public Peltier Group Hospital. Although capable of major surgery, Peltier Hospital had gone through a number of years of deterioration. All military victims of landmines are treated at the French Military hospital of Bouffard, which has adequate but small surgery and intensive care facilities. Civilians are not normally treated at this hospital.
Post-operative care is not available for mine victims in Djibouti. Peltier Hospital, Peltier has a small rehabilitation center for amputees and other handicapped persons. It is not equipped to provide prosthetics. No job training or psychological rehabilitation facilities exist in Djibouti.
The local office of the ICRC has been active in providing some assistance to mine victims. The ICRC, which has a rehabilitation facility in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, imports prosthetics for landmine amputees or sends patients to Addis Ababa to be fitted with artificial limbs. During the 1994 and 1997 period, the ICRC has assisted a total of nineteen landmine victims with prosthetic devices. Seventeen of the victims were from the army and two were from the FRUD. The useful life-span of the prosthetics made at the ICRC center in Addis Ababa is about 18-24 months, and nine of the victims were re-fitted with new devices in 1997.(20)
Equatorial Guinea was not an active participant in the Ottawa Process leading to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty and did not attend the Ottawa signing ceremony in December 1997. But Equatorial Guinea acceded to the ban treaty on 16 September 1998. Accession is a one step process of consent to be bound, in essence combining signature and ratification. Pressure upon the government from U.N. agencies resulted in its accession. Equatorial Guinea has shown its support for an international mine ban by voting in favor of the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
Equatorial Guinea has not produced or exported landmines. Its armed forces are not thought to possess landmine stocks. The army is poorly trained and often lacking in even personal weapons. The small Moroccan detachment which assures the personal security of the president, Brigadier-General Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, is also not thought to exercise landmine capability.(21) Diplomatic and U.N. sources in the capitol, Malabo, are unaware of any mine action or injuries resulting from landmines on Equato-Guinean territory.(22)
Guinea signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. In a statement to the Signing Ceremony, Guinea made an appeal to the international community to implement the relevant articles of the treaty relating to assistance in mine clearance and victim assistance.(23) Guinea ratified the treaty on 8 October 1998, the forty-seventh country to do so.
Guinea participated in African efforts to support the Ottawa Process including the OAU meeting on landmines in Kempton Park in May 1997. It endorsed the Brussels Declaration and attended key prepatory meetings of the Ottawa Process including the October 1996 International Strategy meeting in Ottawa. Guinea was a full participant to the Oslo treaty negotiations where it spoke out against U.S. proposals which, if accepted, would have seriously weakened the treaty. Guinea has supported all relevant UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a total ban on antipersonnel mines.
Guinea is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. It is not known if Guinea has imported AP mines or holds AP mines in stockpile. Mines have not been used in Guinea. There are some mines in border areas, owing to conflict in the neighboring countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia.(24)
Guinean troops have been involved in the recent conflict in neighboring Guinea-Bissau, intervening--along with Senegal--to support the President of the country when the military rebelled after the President sacked the Army Chief of Staff. In the fighting, landmines were reportedly used by the government of Guinea-Bissau and Senegalese forces, and by the rebels. However, there have been no confirmed reports of mine use by Guinean troops during the conflict. (See Landmine Monitor report on Guinea-Bissau.) There are currently no mine action operations in Guinea and there is currently no existing data on mine victims in Guinea.
The Kingdom of Lesotho signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified nearly one year later, on 2 December 1998. Lesotho endorsed the Brussels Declaration and made a statement to the Brussels Conference affirming its commitment to a total ban on antipersonnel landmines before the end of 1997.(25) Lesotho was a full participant to the Oslo treaty negotiations. It also supported the June 1997 OAU resolution, based on the OAU Kempton Park meeting's "Plan of Action." Lesotho voted for the key 1996 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines but was absent from the 1997 resolution.
Lesotho maintains a small armed force, ostensibly in order to protect the royal family and the preserve national security. Throughout the Cold War period, Lesotho had to contend with frequent cross-border raids by South Africa acting against rebels of the African National Congress (ANC). Controversy surrounding the May 1998 general elections led to chaos and a state of ungovernability in the country,(26) and ultimately the South African-led SADC intervention on the 22 September 1998.
Lesotho is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Lesotho states that it does not maintain a stockpile of landmines. However, during the recent problems, rebel soldiers of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) claimed that they had a large quantity of arms in safe houses around the capital of Maseru and in surrounding villages, including 2000 AK-47 rifles, limpet mines and landmines.(27) There were no allegations of use of mines during this time.
Despite its conflict ridden past, this tiny mountain Kingdom is believed to be one of only two countries in Southern Africa unaffected by mines (the other being Mauritius) and is listed as such by the United Nations. There are no reports of uncleared mines.
Mine Ban Policy
Malawi did not actively participate in international efforts to ban antipersonnel landmine before 1997, although it did co-sponsor the 1996 UN General Assembly resolution urging states to vigorously pursue an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines. It was at the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo in February 1997, during the government statements session, that General O.B. Binauli, High Commissioner of Malawi to Mozambique, stated that Malawi "condemn(s) the manufacture, export, import, use and stockpiling of any type of mines."(28) In April 1997, the Malawi Campaign to Ban Landmines (MCBL) was formed by NGOs which had participated in the Maputo conference and coordinated by Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation.(29) Since then, the Government of Malawi has worked closely with MCBL toward the global ban of landmines which eventually led to Malawi signing of the Mine Ban Treaty. Malawi attended the Bonn and Brussels treaty preparatory meetings but did not participate in the Oslo treaty negotiation. It endorsed the Brussels Declaration and has supported subsequent UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
Malawi's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mapopa Chipeta, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, and in a statement to the signing ceremony, he said that Malawi "unconditionally and unreservedly subscribes" to the ban treaty.(30) He also made a call for removal of mines: "We believe that the spirit of cooperation and collaboration so far demonstrated should continue as we enter the crucial phase of implementation. The huge number of mines planted all over the world calls for considerable resources in order to successfully carry out the demining exercise."(31)
On 26 July 1998, the President of Malawi signed the instrument of ratification and this was deposited on 13 August 1998, making Malawi the thirty-first country to ratify and the second SADC country to ratify. Malawi has not passed implementation legislation. The government claims that the implementation legislation is awaiting recommendations from the Law Commissioner who is still studying the ratification instrument. Malawi has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its amended Protocol on landmines.(32)
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
Malawi does not produce landmines and this has been confirmed by the Foreign Minister.(33) Malawi is not believed to have exported antipersonnel mines. Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, as well as the Malawi Army, were reluctant to provide information on stockpiling and use of landmines when Landmine Monitor inquired. It is an open secret that the United States supplied Malawi with antipersonnel landmines, as part of a broader military assistance packages to the Malawi Defence Force.(34) The US also supplied mine detention equipment to Malawi. This support was primarily provided to facilitate the continued use of rail traffic along the Nacala Corridor.(35) According to a 1993 U.S. Army intelligence report, antipersonnel mines in Malawi include:
- M 14 plastic-bodied blast mine (U.S.)
- M 16 A1 bounding fragmentation mine (U.S.)
- M 18 A1 directed fragmentation mine (U.S.)(36)
The Landmine Problem
Malawi has never been at war and does not have a big landmine problem, but there have been a few mine incidents. Most mines on Malawi soil have spilled across the country's long border with Mozambique where Frelimo or Renamo laid them. There have also been a few reported incidents where landmines have been brought from Mozambique and used in criminal activities.(37)
Malawi is yet to map known sites within the country where minefields have been placed or mines encountered. Well-known sites include the border areas where refugees from Mozambique were camped, in the border districts of Mangochi, Dedza, Ntcheu, Mulanje and Nsanje. During the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Council of Ministries' Conference held in Blantyre, Malawi in September 1998, SADC Executive Secretary Kaire Mbuende disclosed at the press briefing that over 1,000 kilometres of Malawi territory bordering Mozambique is infected with antipersonnel landmines.(38)
One army official has said that the Malawi Army has the skill and manpower to probe and demine infested areas.(39) Colonel Henry Odillo said that "while the Malawi Army has been receiving reports from the police of exploded 'landmines' that have either maimed or killed Malawians, there has not been any request for a possible demining or investigation of any possibly infested areas on the Malawi side."(40) However, Army spokesperson Colonel MacLloyd Chidzalo said "the Malawi army neither has statistics nor information on explosives (landmines) under her soils, the desire for a probe is ruled out." He further stated, "It requires the Commander-in-Chief to say so. It is meanwhile not necessary to investigate as Malawi has neither bought nor used landmines before. We have no area that has been mined in the country. It takes quite some expertise and it is expensive to carry out such an exercise (demining)."(41) He, however, admitted that it is possible that warring factions in Mozambique may have, at one point or another, trekked into Malawi and planted landmines behind them to keep their enemy at bay. Despite ratifying the treaty, Malawi is still reluctant to give out reliable data on landmines.
There have been several landmine incidents on Malawi soil. Some landmine incidents occurred in the refugee camps when Malawi was hosting refugees from Mozambique. For instance, Edmund Chimaliro of the Malawi Red Cross who works as a project co-ordinator in Dzaleka refugee camp told Amnesty International in November 1996 that:
Landmines are not really a problem in Malawi, but there have been several incidents on Malawi soil. In Chikwawa at Changambika refugee's camps, Mozambicans planted landmines for killing each other. During my time in these camps we had three incidents. In one incident, they had hung up a poster on a tree to attract people to read what it said. The landmine was placed under the poster and a person was blown up for his curiosity to read what was on the poster. In Nsanje, another person was blown up by a landmine planted outside the bathroom."
Landmine incidents still occur. In 1998, three incidents were reported in the media, in which two people were killed in two separate incidents. Other incidents may have occurred without being reported in the media. All three incidents occurred along the border with Mozambique.
Case 1. On 27 October 1998, Esther Pulapato, a thirteen year old girl died suddenly after stepping on an antipersonnel landmine. Pulapato, a resident of Namwera village in Mulanje district, stepped on the mine when she was digging for fish bait on the Mozambique shores of the Muloza River. The incident was reported to Mulanje Police Station. The officer-in-charge of the police station together with the doctor of Mulanje District Hospital visited the scene of the accident and the doctor conducted a post-mortem at the site, which indicated that the death was due to landmine explosion.(42)
Case 2. Daudi Sinosi, a boy aged eight years, stepped on an antipersonnel mine in May 1998 while playing catching grasshoppers together with three other children of the same family in their village compound. All four children were injured but Sinosi was seriously injured as he stepped on the mine. The incident was reported to the Namwera police and the victims were evacuated to Mangochi Hospital. Sinosi was later transferred to Zomba Hospital where he died a few days later.(43)
Case 3. Saize is a carpenter from Makanijra in Mangochi district, which borders with Mozambique. In March 1998, he went with his assistants into the forest to saw and collect timber for his business. While in the forest looking for suitable trees, he came across on a beautiful and glittering object. He is already knew about landmines and hand grenades, so he suspected that the object was either one of the two. He reported the matter to Makanjira police who collected the object and sent it to Lilongwe police headquarters for identification. It is believed that the returning Mozambican refugees left the object, which was a landmine, in the forest. It was not planted in the soil but left lying on the bare ground.(44)
Some Malawian soldiers fell victim to landmines during the Mozambique civil war. This happened mostly along the Nacala Corridor where they were deployed to guard the Nacala railway line, which economically benefits Malawi. Lt. Colonel Chidzalo, Malawi Army spokesperson gave an estimated number of fifty landmine victims during the Nacala Corridor Campaign. Of the fifty landmine casualties, thirty died and the rest were injured. Of the injured, two continue to serve in the army while the others have since retired from the army. He also disclosed that victims were provided with medical assistance and that they were compensated in monetary terms.(45)
Mine Ban Policy
Mali's Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa. In accordance with Law 98-019 (9 March 1998) and Ordinance 98-009/P-RM (3 April 1998), President Konaré ratified on 10 April 1998. Mali deposited the instruments of ratification on 2 June 1998, the fourteenth country to do so and the first from West Africa. But the government has yet to adopt national implementation measures, as required by Article 9 of the ban treaty. Nor has it begun to draft its report as required by Article 7. According to a government spokesperson, Mali intends to take these measures within the time stipulated by the Treaty.(46) Mali is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor its amended Protocol on landmines.
Mali supported the Ottawa Process by endorsing the Brussels Declaration, participating in the Vienna and Bonn preparatory meeting, the Oslo negotiations (as a full participant) and supporting key 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions. Mali has taken exemplary measures to destroy its stockpiles. This is part of a wider approach to disarmament issues by the government and, especially, President Alpha Oumar Konaré.
Malian non-governmental organizations have played an important role in developing public awareness on the landmine issue. The Association Malienne des droits de l'Homme (AMDH), in particular, led efforts by creating a National Commission against antipersonnel mines on 13 November 1998, consisting of nine NGOs from diverse backgrounds.(47)
On 25 May 1998, President Konaré declared that "the Malian Army has never used antipersonnel mines in any of the conflicts it has been involved in."(48) A press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued the same day, confirmed this statement. In spite of the armed border dispute with Burkina Faso in 1974 and 1985, and in spite of the Tuareg insurgency which lasted several years, no mine incident has yet been recorded in Mali, although there were rumors in 1994 of mine-laying in the Malian Sahara, by both government and rebel forces. Mali has no problem with uncleared mines.
Stockpiling, Production, Transfer
Mali does not produce or export mines. Mali declared that it has possessed stockpiles of antipersonnel mines since 1974, the majority of supplied by the former Soviet Union.(49) Before the destruction program began, Mali held some 3,000 blast antipersonnel mines, 5,000 antitank mines and 1,900 traction mines.(50)
On 25 May 1998, the 35th anniversary of the OAU, Mali destroyed its first batch of stockpiled antipersonnel mines. In the presence of President Konaré and the government, the diplomatic corps and many foreign dignitaries, including former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, some 400 antitank mines, 500 antipersonnel mines and 160 traction mines were destroyed.
The government had planned to destroy all its stockpile in twenty-five other destruction sessions between 25 May and 22 September 1998, but due to logistical problems and a lack of sufficient funds this goal has not yet been achieved.(51) The total value of the mines which will be destroyed is estimated at the equivalent of $385,000.(52) The Armed Forces will retain a certain number of mines for training purposes, in accordance with the article 3 of the Treaty.(53)
Mauritius was the first African country to sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, when its Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamed Ould Maawiya, signed and at the same time deposited the instrument of ratification on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. Mauritius, Ireland and Canada all signed and ratified in this same manner. Mauritius participated in the Oslo treaty negotiations and also supported the key 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
Mauritius has never been a producer, exporter, or user of antipersonnel landmines. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has acknowledged that there is a very small stock of approximately a dozen landmines retained for training purposes under Article 3 of the ban treaty.(54) A Foreign Affairs spokesperson reported that they were in the custody of the Mauritius Police Force.
While Mauritius has not enacted specific domestic legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has announced that "there will soon be legislation to include anti-personnel landmines in the definition of explosives in the Explosives Act." A spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that no amendment is needed because the definition already tacitly includes landmines.(55)
Mauritian non-governmental organizations have been campaigning in support of the ban since February 1996 when one of its members attended the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo, Mozambique. A small group of people formed the Ban Landmines Group (Mauritius) and developed an action plan to lobby the government to sign and ratify the ban treaty.(56) Ban Landmines Group (Mauritius) started a signature campaign to support the Ottawa Process, collecting over 1,600 signatures in schools which were then remitted to the Prime Minister, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs and drew public attention through the media articles.(57)
Mine Ban Policy
On 24 October 1995, after meeting with then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, Mozambican President Chissano announced that Mozambique was prepared to play a leading role in the international effort to ban landmines. Speaking at the United Nations the following year, Mozambican Foreign Minister Leonardo Simão announced his government's support for a worldwide ban on the production, stockpiling and distribution of landmines. In December 1996, Mozambique also supported UN General Assembly resolution calling for negotiation of an international agreement banning antipersonnel mines.
On 26 February 1997, during the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines, held in Maputo, Foreign Minister Simão announced Mozambique's immediate ban on the use, production, import and export of antipersonnel mines.(58) Simão stated that "The government took its decision because of the mobilization work undertaken by the Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines (CMCM). The campaign collected 100,000 signatures from citizens who think that antipersonnel mines should be banned throughout the world. They spoke with me. The Head of State received them. They were received by other members of government. They told us what the aims of the Campaign were, and we thought we should support them."(59)
Following its decision to ban landmines at home, the Mozambican government continued to play an important role in ensuring African support for the Ottawa Process leading up to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty signing. Mozambique participated in the Organization of African Unity conference on landmines in Kempton Park, South Africa, and endorsed the "Plan of Action" and subsequent OAU resolution on landmines. Mozambique endorsed the September 1997 Declaration by the heads of state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Lilongwe, Malawi. Mozambique endorsed the Brussels Declaration and was a full participant to the Oslo treaty negotiations. It has supported the relevant UN General Assembly resolutions.
Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a statement to the signing ceremony, Foreign Minister Simão said "... there is a need to translate this commitment and resolve into concrete actions, the implementation of which will enable this important instrument to enter into force, as soon as possible, so that the monitoring mechanism which have already been agreed upon can be put in to practice, and our expected results can be achieved."(60) The instrument of ratification was signed by Foreign Minister Simão in Maputo on 21 August 1998 and deposited four days later, making Mozambique the thirty-third country to ratify.
Mozambique is not a signatory of the CCW. According to an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the government was actively considering acceding to the CCW, but this was superseded by the Mine Ban Treaty. However, the official indicated the Mozambican government's intention to participate in preparatory meetings for the upcoming CCW review conference in 2001.(61)
Production and Transfer
Mozambique is not a known producer or exporter of antipersonnel landmines. There are no reports of landmines being officially transferred in Mozambique since the 1992 General Peace Accord. However, there have been reports of mines being transferred as part illegal trade in light arms operating throughout Southern Africa.
Throughout the many conflicts in Mozambique, mines were being imported by different parties to the conflicts. Landmines produced in the following countries have been found in Mozambique: USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, China, Italy, Belgium, France, U.K., Portugal, U.S., South Africa, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Austria.(62)
While its intention to comply fully with the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty has been repeatedly confirmed by the Government of Mozambique, information on the size and content of its mine stockpiles, or plans for their destruction, has not yet been released. In response to a request for information on Treaty implementation from the Canadian Government, the Commander General of Police in Mozambique reported that 10,986 mines had been found and destroyed by police forces between 1995 and 1998.(63) An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation has indicated that further stocks will be destroyed during the May 1999 First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention in Maputo and that details on remaining stocks will be available at that time.(64)
There are few reports of new mine use since the 1992 General Peace Accord. In Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa , Human Rights Watch reports some isolated incidents of landmines being planted since 1992--mostly relating to local disputes or the activities of poachers and bandit groups.(66)
In 1964, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) began an armed struggle for independence from Portuguese colonial rule. The use of anti-vehicle mines began in October 1965 in the provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. In December 1966, the Portuguese military claimed to have captured 157 foreign manufactured mines from Frelimo which increasingly mined roads north of the Lúrio river in the late 1960s. The conflict escalated in early 1969 when Frelimo opened a new front in Tete province in an effort to bypass Portuguese attempts at containment in the north of Mozambique, and to threaten Portugal's plans to complete the Cahora-Bassa hydroelectric project. Portuguese colonial authorities boasted that the complex was surrounded by the "largest minefield in Africa," with some 80,000 landmines in it. As antipersonnel mines were not arriving from Portugal in the number sought by military commanders, additional stocks were purchased from South Africa.
The war of independence came to a close in April 1974 with the relinquishing of all Portuguese colonies following the fall of the regime in Lisbon. Frelimo formed a transitional government in September 1974 and led the country to independence in June 1975, but peace was short-lived. In 1977, the guerrilla armed resistance, the Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), was created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office in response to Mozambique's support for Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas. Rhodesian military began training Renamo combatants in landmine use for route denial and ambush by mining major roads, supply routes and rural tracks. Airstrips were also an important target of Renamo mining.
Government forces began using mines to protect border installations against Rhodesian incursion in 1977. Many of the Frelimo technicians had been trained in mine laying during the national liberation struggle by Tanzania, China and Algeria. Government forces primarily used defensive mining for the protection of key economic installations and strategic locations. Just before Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the management of Renamo was transferred to South Africa's Military Intelligence Directorate which used Renamo for destabilizing Mozambique in response to its support of the African National Congress (ANC). The transfer marked a turning point in the conflict, which soon began to escalate.
Frelimo laid large defensive minefields along the border with South Africa in the early 1980s. As well, both government and Renamo forces scattered landmines in a random fashion. Government patrols laid mines around their positions when they stopped at night and many of these mines were left. In many other cases it appears that mines were used deliberately to terrorize civilian communities and to deny them access to fields, water and fishing. Rhodesian and South African forces planted mines in cross-border raids in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Tanzanian troops laid defensive minefields around their bases in Zambezia province. Malazian troops planted mines along the Nacala railway and Zimbabwean regular forces mined the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors.
Pumped up with military supplies from South Africa, Renamo's strength increased between 1980 and 1982 from less than 1,000 to 8,000 fighters. The first combat areas were Manica and Sofala provinces, but Renamo quickly expanded its military operations throughout most of the country. Renamo's strategy involved targeting civilian infrastructure such as transportation links, health clinics and schools. Renamo's aim was the economic devastation and the isolation of government forces to garrisons and towns. Landmines were used extensively as part of this campaign.
By late 1988 it had become clear that there could be no military solution to the war. After several failed diplomatic initiatives and false starts, direct peace talks began in July 1990 and culminated in the General Peace Accord signed on 4 October 1992. Under the terms of the accord, demobilized Renamo forces and government troops were to form a joint army. A 6,400 person United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) force oversaw the two year transition period. At the end of 1994, the UN withdrew following peaceful multiparty elections in October through which Frelimo retained control of government and Renamo became the official opposition.
Under UNOMOZ, the first national plan for mine clearance was drafted in January 1993, barely two months after the signing of the General Peace Accords. At that time, the primary objective of demining efforts was to clear major roads to allow for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies and the repatriation of refugees and internally displaces persons, estimated at 1.5 and 4.2 million people respectively.(67) The security environment remained unstable during this first phase of demining, and institutional and political constraints further hampered the progress of mine clearance.
At the time of UNOMOZ's departure at the end of 1994, the UN, donor community and Mozambican authorities had still not reached agreement on institutional arrangements for national mine clearance. By then, a tacit arrangement had emerged whereby Mozambique was divided into three main demining territories: HALO Trust and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), two independent donor-funded NGOs, operated in the northern and central regions respectively, while the U.N.-supported Accelerated Demining Program (ADP) operated in the south. This arrangement has continued.
While the HALO Trust, NPA and UNDP/ADP continue to oversee the majority of humanitarian demining throughout Mozambique, there are also a number of private operators undertaking both humanitarian and commercial mine clearance. In 1995, the Government of Mozambique created the National Demining Commission which continues to experience difficulty in fulfilling its role as national coordinator of mine action in Mozambique.
Mine Action Funding(68)
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, between 1993 and the end of 1998, funding for demining in Mozambique exceeded US$116 million. Corrected CND data shows that this sum funded the clearance of 189 square kilometers working out at an average cost of sixty-two cents per square meter or $6,176 per hectare in which 54,468 mines and 455,496 UXO and small arms ammunition at a cost of $227 per item.
Table 1 Clearance of Roads, Electric pylons, Railways and areas.
|Demining||Km of||Area||Km of||Area||Km of||Area||Area||Cumulative|
|Organisation||Road||m2 (a)||Pylon||m2 (b)||Rail||m2 (c)||m2 (d)||m2(a+b+c+d)|
Source: CND, with LM editors corrections in italics
The sole Mozambican government input into demining comes from the CND into which the Mozambican government theoretically puts U.S.$500,000 per year. In reality only between a half and two thirds of this budget is ever realized.(69) Compared to donor funding for other programs, health and education for example, the funding for landmine action has been relatively high.
Table 2: Donor funding for mine action in Mozambique 1994 - 2001
DONOR FUNDING %
USA 18,215,300 19.49
Norway 12,997,000 13.91
Canada 8,504,000 9.10
EU 7,624,000 8.16
Germany 5,860,000 6.27
France 5,596,000 5.99
Denmark 5,400,000 5.78
Sweden 5,000,000 5.35
Finland 3,300,000 3.53
Austria 2,550,000 2.73
Australia 2,480,000 2.65
Switzerland 2,337,000 2.50
Mozambique 2,000,000 2.14
South Africa 2,000,000 2.14
Netherlands 1,900,000 2.03
New Zealand 1,400,0001 1.50
Ireland 1,267,000 1.36
Italy 1,200,000 1.28
Belgium 1,127,000 1.21
UNICEF 1,122,000 1.20
Japan 1,000,000 1.07
UK 574,000 0.61
Donor funding for clearance operations gives a slightly different picture.
Table 3: Donor funding for mine clearance in Mozambique 1994-2001
DONOR FUNDS %
Norway 12,000,000 18.48
USA 11,550,000 17.79
EU 7,624,000 11.74
Denmark 5,400,000 8.32
France 4,719,000 7.27
Sweden 4,000,000 6.16
Austria 2,550,000 3.93
Switzerland 2,200,000 3.39
Germany 2,100,000 3.23
South Africa 2,000,000 3.08
Netherlands 1,900,000 2.93
Canada 1,669,000 2.57
Finland 1,600,000 2.46
Ireland 1,267,000 1.95
Italy 1,200.000 1.85
Australia 1,030,000 1.59
Japan 1,000,000 1.54
UK 574,000 0.88
UNICEF 541,000 0.83
Table 4: Recipients of Mine Action Funds
IMPLEMENTOR FUNDS %
NPA 20,100,000 21.51
ADP 20,030,000 21.43
CND 10,267,000 10.99
Ronco 10,000,000 10.70
HI 5,134,000 5.49
SCS+ 4,813,000 5.15
Other 4,548,000 4.87
Mechem 4,200,000 4.49
HALO 3,791,000 4.06
CIDEV 3,158,000 3.38
Power 2,925,300 3.13
Military 1,960,000 2.10
Mine-Tech 1,952,000 2.09
MgM 1,500,000 0.54
CMCM 75,000 0.08
Table 5: Recipients of Mine Clearance Funds
IMPLEMENTOR FUNDS %
NPA 16,950,000 26.11
ADP 11,430,000 17.61
Ronco 10,000,000 15.40
Other 5,761,000 8.87
SCS + Afrovita 4,813,000 7.41
Mechem 4,200,000 6.47
HALO 3,791,000 5.84
CIDEV 3,158,000 4.86
HI 2,869,000 4.42
Mine-Tech 1,952,000 3.01
By combining the data from the CND data on clearance in Table 1 with data from Table 2, it is possible to make a broad estimate of clearance costs per area by company or NGO:
Table 6: Clearance costs per area by clearance company or NGO
Company/NGO $/m2 $/ha
Mine-Tech 0.02 173
Mechem 0.23 2,303
SCS 0.44 4,373
Ronco 0.57 5,744
HALO 0.63 6,303
NPA 1.61 16,059
ADP 3.05 30,484
CIDEV 4.81 48,133
HI 41.83 418,319
Average 5.91 59,099
Global averages show clearance costs between $15,000 and $50,000/ha or anywhere from $1/sq.m. The considerable differences in clearance costs are easy to explain:
The HI figure reflects the start-up costs of a new program which was based on training and demonstrating a new paradigm of clearance. HI never aimed to clear large areas at a competitive cost. NPA also operate more than just mine clearance: they perform complimentary long-term rural development programmes alongside the mine clearance activities. Mine-Tech, Mechem and SCS brought in ready-trained teams from Zimbabwe and South Africa with the specific aim of low-cost area clearance. Mine-Tech and Mechem use dogs and mechanically-assisted techniques to speed up work and lower costs on area clearance. Despite Ronco's employing expatriates and having significant start-up costs, Ronco used dogs to clear roads with a low intensity of mines.
Of the NGOs, ADP is expensive because of higher labor costs in Maputo province, possibly because of their relatively expensive expatriate advisors from Australasia. The high figure for CIDEV, a French company, reflects their high start-up costs with heavy reliance on mechanization, but subsequent low productivity.(70)
At the start of the UNOMOZ operation in 1992, the UN estimated that there were more than two million landmines in Mozambique. A 1994 survey conducted by HALO Trust for the UNDHA suggested that the number of landmines was likely to be significantly lower. In June 1995, the UN officially revised its estimate downward to one million.(71) Most demining operators today suggest that the figure is more likely to be in the hundreds of thousands of landmines. The National Demining Commission estimates a figure around 500,000.(72) However, it is not only the number of landmines, but their impact which determines a country's mine-affected status as the following example illustrates: For seven years until they were cleared in 1996, eight mines prevented more than 20,000 people from the entire Mahniça valley in Maputo province from returning to their villages.(73)
Minefields have been located in all provinces, but the most heavily mined regions are found along the border with Zimbabwe in the west of Manica province, in the center of the country in Zambezia and Tete provinces, and in the south in Maputo and Inhambane provinces.(74) HALO Trust's 1994 survey found that mines had been used for defensive and offensive reasons, principally around areas of strategic importance such as military headquarters, towns and villages, sources of water and power, pylon lines and dams, as well as on roads, tracks and paths and alongside bridges and railway lines. Many of the combatants' old transit routes are now indistinguishable from the bush and it was not uncommon for undetonated mines to be dug up and laid in a different location. Thus, in addition to a number of fixed defensive minefields, the situation in Mozambique is characterized by a highly dispersed mine pattern.(75)
A total of 981 mined areas were reported in the HALO Trust survey.(76) Since then, a further 780 reports have been added to the CND database for a current total of 1761 reported mine or UXO affected areas. While the 1994 HALO Trust National Mines Survey provided an overall assessment of the landmine situation in Mozambique, the constraints of that mission did not allow for detailed minefield reconnaissance reports. Original HALO survey data has been supplemented with information gained on an ad hoc basis from ongoing mine clearance operations. However, the development of a national mine clearance strategy has been limited by the lack of detailed, comprehensive minefield data. Beginning in 1999, the Canadian International Demining Center, with the support of the Canadian International Development Agency, will conduct a National Level 1 General Survey. In addition to detailed minefield location data, the Level 1 Survey will include a socio-economic impact assessment of the landmines in Mozambique. Data produced will be used to complete the CND minefield database and provided to all relevant actors to assist in the elaboration of a national mine action strategy.
In 1995, the government of Mozambique established a National Demining Commission (CND) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, to be overseen by an inter-ministerial body including, among others, the Ministers of Defense and of Interior Affairs. The CND's institutional framework is divided into political and executive levels. The political level is responsible for the definition of policies, strategies and identification of priorities as well as for directing, coordinating and supervising all current demining operations.
By most accounts, the CND has lacked the political authority, technical capacity, and funds to fulfill its mandate effectively. Development and approval of mine clearance strategies and other policies encountered serious delays at the executive level due to communication problems with the CND executive director, and at the political level, as a result of difficulty in convening the inter-ministerial committee whose approval is required on all policy decisions.(77)
With Swedish, Norwegian and Dutch funding, a UNDP technical assistance project was initiated at the CND in 1997. Its main objectives were to support the executive level of the CND by assisting in the development of medium and long-term mine clearance plans, the elaboration of quality assurance standards for mine clearance operations, the creation of a standardized national reporting system and landmine database. However, the project encountered significant obstacles. Bureaucratic delays and the government's inability to pay competitive salaries led to difficulty in recruiting and retaining competent national staff. As a result, there has been very little counterpart training or capacity building within the CND.
Nonetheless, the project has resulted in the production of a national demining database and digitized geographic information system as well as a concept of a "National Mine Clearance Strategy Approach;" quality assurance policy; standardized criteria for setting demining priorities; a guide for controlling demining organizations; Mozambican standards for humanitarian mine clearance operations, and a standardized reporting system for demining operations, incidents and accidents.(78)
National demining priorities have been divided into three categories: (1) the reactivation and development of vital socio-economic activities at the national level; (2) the reactivation and development of vital socio-economic activities at provincial, district and community levels; and (3) the rehabilitation and development of infrastructures required for the circulation of people and goods, both at national and local levels. From these three categories, a list of demining "high priorities" was developed.
In part due to the recommendations of the UNDP Assistance Project Evaluation Report, the CND has developed a proposal for institutional reform. The new institutional model proposed entails CND's replacement with a National Demining Institute (IND) and national Demining Fund (FUNAD).(79) Essentially, the proposed changes aim to increase the CND's size and autonomy (by removing it from direct ministerial control), increase its capacity to monitor demining operations, and, it is hoped, increase its access to funds. Upon presentation to the donor community in November 1998, the IND and FUNAD proposals met with varying degrees of skepticism. Principle concerns related to the possible creation of an institution of unwieldy size and lacking capacity, as well as donors' loss of control over funds marked for demining if deposited into a the proposed FUNAD under IND control. As a result, CND's capacity to operationalize the institutional transformation remains to be seen.
Accelerated Demining Program (ADP)
The first National plan for Mine Clearance ended with the expiration of the UNOMOZ mandate in 1994. Prior to the end of UNOMOZ, and in response to criticism over delays in operationalizing mine clearance, UNOHAC took steps to launch what became known as the Accelerated Demining Program. The primary objectives given to the ADP upon its creation were (1) to accelerate the process of humanitarian demining, and (2) to serve as the embryo for the development of a national demining commission.(80) The ADP continues to operate under the shared direction of the UNDP and the government of Mozambique in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane.
Since 1996, several hundred deminers have been trained at the ADP-run Mine Clearance Training Center in Moamba. Deminers and supervisors of Handicap International and Norwegian People's Aid mine clearance projects have also received training at the Moamba Center. In 1996, the Khron mechanical system was integrated into ADP demining operations and recently, trained dogs have also been used to assist in mine detection. However, it is important to note that these constitute assistance to mine clearance which still requires manual detection. In a minefield near Boane, an ADP demining operation cleared thirty-three mines and 1900 metal pieces.(81) As well, dense bush and scrub throughout many regions of Mozambique add considerable difficulty to demining efforts as these have to be cleared before demining activities can begin.
Today, ADP has 500 Mozambican deminers divided into ten platoons. There are an additional five foreign experts providing technical assistance to the Program's headquarters. It is anticipated that the Program will be transferred to full national control in 2000--the anticipated UNDP project end date. For the years 1998-2000, ADP is receiving funding and technical assistance from Australia, Austria, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UNDP.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): The Norwegian People's Aid is a donor-funded NGO with a mandate to respond to humanitarian demining needs in Mozambique. Training of NPA deminers began in July 1993. Mine clearance projects were subsequently complete in Tete, Sofala and Maputo provinces. Since 1996, operations have been focused in Tete, Sofala and Manica provinces where priorities for demining are established through consultation with local communities and provincial authorities. The program's long-term development objective is the sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political/democratic living conditions and reduction of human suffering from land mine accidents of the targeted populations. NPA has also undertaken limited community development activities such as improved water supply, primary health care, literacy, minor rehabilitation of health and education infrastructures, vocational skills training and provision of micro-credits implemented.
Since beginning operations, NPA demining teams have not come across stockpiles of mines or UXOs. However, piles of explosive devices left behind by the warring parties during the wars fought in Mozambique have been found. As of the end January 1999, NPA had recorded five mine accidents and four incidents.(82)
The NPA mine clearance program is now running with over 500 Mozambican deminers, twenty-five mine detection dogs, a Mozambican director and five expatriate staff. Funding is received from the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. (aid-in-kind). Through ongoing reduction of expatriate staff levels (mostly in administration), and transfer of responsibilities to national staff, the NPA intends to leave its programs under the direction of a fully Mozambican NGO as its successor organization.
HALO Trust: The HALO Trust, a London-based non-profit mine clearance consultancy was contracted by the UN to conduct a nationwide assessment of the landmines situation in Mozambique. As discussed above, the 1994 survey provided information on mined areas, but did not give exact coordinates of mine locations. HALO Trust has since undertaken demining projects in Niassa, Nampula, Cabo Delgado, and Zambezia provinces, with funding from American, British, Dutch, Irish, and Swiss development aid programs. As of February 1999, HALO employs 276 Mozambican deminers, supervisors and surveyors, and four expatriates working in management.(83)
After conducting technical surveys of possible areas for mine clearance, HALO assesses the sites' development potential. This information is discussed with provincial authorities and together, provincial priorities for demining are determined. HALO's attention then shifts to the district level. Here district authorities are consulted to determine which of the identified sites are to be given priority for mine clearance. HALO Trust now estimates that there remain between 250,000 and 300,000 mines in Mozambique. HALO further suggests that at this point in time, a Level 1 Survey may be unnecessary and proposes instead a country-wide sampling survey to assess the accuracy of existing data.(84)
HALO Trust anticipates that demining of all priority areas in the north will be completed by mid-2001 at which point, it will be pulling out its major operations. In a model to be tested shortly in Zambezia province, HALO plans to set up a small provincial "demining fire brigades" to ensure the capacity for demining of remaining lower priority areas after its departure.
Handicap International (HI): In addition to its activities in mine awareness education and provision of assistance to landmine survivors, HI has set up community-focused "Proximity Demining" operations in Inhambane province. Aside from the well-known strategic defensive minefields, most of the mining in Inhambane was not related to military tactical operations, but sought to control civilian populations by targeting sites of local social and economic importance. This type of site presents a number of technical difficulties for mine clearance: the sites are too small for efficient utilization of large (30-40 person) operational mine clearance units; they are widely dispersed in the province, requiring a high input of logistic and communication capacity; and, while HI investigators found that these sites could be considered socially or economically important to the local population, most fall into the lower categories of the national priority scale. Even where there are few or no mine victims, economic and social recovery of rural areas are affected by their existence.
Proximity demining targets local areas which larger platoon-size formations find impractical. Costs associated with proximity demining are higher, but apparently, so is the value of land cleared to local populations; HI makes efforts to ensure that areas chosen for clearance are those of maximum utility to local populations. HI proximity demining operations began in 1998 and receive funding from the European Union, the Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden. The program uses thirty-six deminers who are divided into four teams. By May 1999, the entire project staff will be Mozambican. There have not been any accidents reported during HI Proximity Demining operations.(85)
Mine-Tech: Mine-Tech is a Zimbabwe-based mine clearance firm founded in 1992.(86) Mine clearance is delivered by demobilized Zimbabwean soldiers under the direction of Col. Lionel Dyck, a former Rhodesian army officer who later commanded and elite Zimbabwean paratroop unit which operated in Mozambique against Renamo. In 1993, Mine-Tech conducted a survey for GTZ in the Gorongosa region of Sofala province. In 1994 and 1995, Mine-Tech was involved in clearing roads throughout Manica province for GTZ in support of UNHCR. Also in 1995, the company was awarded a multi-million dollar contract to clear the Cahora-Bassa powerline running from the Songa substation in Mozambique to the Apollo substation in South Africa.(87) In 1998, Mine-Tech was engaged in demining projects in Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala and Manica provinces, and is scheduled to begin work in Gaza province as well. Mine-Tech now has a training school in Chimoio for training and upgrading of Mozambican staff. (88)
Special Clearance Services (SCS): SCS is another Zimbabwe-based mine clearance company which employs mostly Zimbabwean deminers. In 1996, SCS won a UNICEF contract for demining of village areas. In 1998, SCS completed mine clearance operations for the EU-funded emergency road opening in Sofala and Zambezia provinces.(89) In 1997-1998, the company did a variety of commercial road clearance work in Zambezia, Tete, and Sofala provinces.(90) SCS is scheduled to begin a World Bank-funded project in early 1999. As of the end of December 1998, it reports zero mine accidents. By mid-1999, SCS hopes to have created a Mozambican subsidiary company with at least 80 percent Mozambican staff.(91)
RONCO: RONCO Consulting Corporation was founded in 1974 and works in partnership with the Global Training Academy of San Antonio, Texas. In September 1993, RONCO was awarded a USAID contract for demining of roads designated as a priority for ICRC and World Food Program relief efforts in Sofala and Zambezia provinces. In late December 1993, RONCO began hiring Renamo and Frelimo ex-combatants and established a Demining Training and Operations Facility outside Beira. Using twelve demining teams of seven deminers and thirty-two dogs each, RONCO completed its contract in June 1995 at which time trained deminers, dogs and equipment were transferred to the Norwegian's People's Aid demining program.(92)
Mechem: Mechem is a South African-based company which first cleared mines in Mozambique in July 1991 through a front company named Minerva. In 1994, Mechem undertook road clearance for Murray and Roberts road construction, and for Basil Read Mining. In partnership with LONRHO, Mechem conducted mine clearance for Project Caminho completed in December 1994. In May-June 1996, the company completed road clearance south of Espungabera in Manica province. The South African-funded Terra Limpa project in Maputo province was completed by Mechem in March 1998.(93) In 1999, it will be undertaking the demining of the Massingir dam in Gaza - a two million dollar project jointly funded by the U.S. and Japan.
Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias de Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda. (CGTVA): CGTVA was founded in Portugal 1993. Operating in Mozambique since 1997, CGTVA has mainly performed quality assurance (QA) services for the National Demining Commission. It has also assisted the CND in the elaboration of a National Quality Assurance Policy. With three teams in operation, CGTVA has assessed demining operations at the Cahora-Bassa dam, the Massingir dam, the powerline from Xai-Xai to Inhambane, and HALO Trust operations in Cabo Delgado. Types of problems that CGTVA has encountered include the absence of a medic onsite, insufficient guarding of mines awaiting disposal, improper marking of minefields, short-cutting safety distances, and the misuse of equipment. However, in general, CGTVA reports a high standard of demining exercises throughout Mozambique. Responding to CND's desire to have a QA team available in every province, CGTVA will be increasing its operations in Mozambique.(94)
CIDEV: L'Agence Française pour le Développement funded the French demining company CIDEV to undertake mine clearance along the Maputo-South Africa powerline beginning June 1998. For operations in Mozambique, CIDEV employed twelve French expatriates and 193 Mozambicans. The use of a mechanical detachment with one bulldozer and two Aardvark flail machines allowed for the destruction of some 70 percent of mines before areas were manually cleared and controlled. At an average of 330 mines per pylon, the numbers of mines found far exceeded original estimates and many were detected and removed from an area significantly wider than the original project-specified target area. CIDEV abandoned the work site in December 1998 having registered three fatal accidents and FF 4,475,000 in losses.(95) Only fifty-three pylons of the two hundred were cleared although CIDEV claims that it cleared 12,000 mines in the six months it operated. Its operational license was withdrawn in February 1999.
Afrovita: Afrovita is a Mozambican-based demining operator, member of CMCM and registered as a non-profit private corporation.(96) Afrovita has been contracted to do mine clearance for EU-funded road construction projects in Sofala and Zambezia provinces.(97) Concerns about quality standards of Afrovita operations have been raised by project donors.
Necochaminas: Nechominas is a demining NGO established by former Mozambican Special Armed Forces personnel and has not as yet undertaken any mine clearance operations.
Reconstruction and Development of Cleared Areas
Humanitarian demining, whether undertaken by NGO or commercial operators, is by definition aimed at allowing for the reconstruction and development of mine-affected communities. However, there has been little official coordination of demining activities with reconstruction and development planning. It is anticipated that a national socio-economic impact assessment which will be undertaken as a part of the Level 1 Survey being completed by the Canadian Demining Center, will allow for better assessment and planing of reconstruction and development of cleared areas in Mozambique.
Mine Awareness Education
Mine awareness campaigns for returning refugees and rural populations living in risk areas began after the 1992 Peace Agreement was signed. The UNHCR invited Handicap International (HI) to take responsibility for delivery of the first rural mine awareness campaign in Tete province, which was later expanded to Inhambane and Zambezia provinces. Upon the UNHCR's pullout from Mozambique in 1994, HI took over coordination of mine awareness throughout Mozambique and created the National Coordination Program of Education Activities to Prevent Mines and UXO Accidents (PEPAM).
PEPAM is a HI project run in collaboration with the Mozambican Red Cross and the Ministry of Education, as well as over eighty-six national, provincial, and local partners. Under PEPAM, Mine Awareness Committees have been established at the district level with the participation of traditional leaders, the police and district representatives of the Ministries of Education, Health, Social Welfare, and Agriculture, who, along with NGO partners, deliver mine awareness training and collect information about suspected mined areas and mine accident reports from the local communities. In each province, there is an HI coordinator who identifies and provides technical support to local partners, including materials and training for mine awareness education. Provincial coordinators report to the national PEPAM coordinator in Maputo.
Under PEPAM, and in a collaborative project with Radio Moçambique which began in 1996, mine awareness radio programs are being transmitted in eighteen of the national languages.(98) Additionally, various theater groups are working under PEPAM to present mine awareness through dramatization. PEPAM is also coordinating a project to integrate mine awareness into the curriculum of the national education system. To this end, HI has developed education materials for the project and a network of teaching technicians have been hired to assist in the program's implementation through the Ministry of Education.
PEPAM's first phase ran from July 1995 to June 1996 covering the provinces of Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambezia with the support of the UNHRC, UNICEF, EU and the US Dept. of Defense. Coverage was extended to Gaza and Nampula provinces during the program's second phase from July 1996 to December 1997 with support from UNHRC, UNICEF, UNDP, US Dept. of Defense, as well as Swiss, Norwegian and Swedish development aid programs. PEPAM's final phase runs from January 1998 to December 1999 and covers all ten provinces with a total of US$2.5 million in support from UNICEF, Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, American, French, Swiss, and Australian missions in Mozambique.
Data on mine accidents is now collected under the National Coordination Program of Education Activities to Prevent Mines and UXO Accidents (PEPAM) coordinated by HI which collects, verifies and analyses accident report forms. These include the following information: location of accident with sketch of the scene of the accident, description of accident, date of accident, circumstances in which the accident took place, number of victims, type of device that caused the accident, consequences of accident, sex and age of victims. Interviews are conducted with the victims or their representatives by a trained PEPAM local partner.(99)
In 1995, Handicap International had estimated fifty to sixty mine accident victims per month. In 1996, PEPAM's first year of operation covering six provinces, there were an average of seventeen reported landmine victims per month.(100) In 1997, covering seven provinces, the number of reported accidents fell by almost 50 percent (from a total of 126 in 1996 to sixty-nine in 1997). In 1998 PEPAM operated in all provinces and reported a total of eighty-three mine accidents.
In 1996 and 1997, 57 percent of reported mine victims were men, with children making up the second largest group of victims at 26 per cent and women representing another 17 percent. In 1998, the same trend continued with men constituting the greatest number of reported victims at 46 percent, children representing 42 percent, while women represented only 12 percent of reported victims. In a survey of the circumstances under which accidents occurred, 59 percent of victims were neither residents nor familiar with areas in which accidents occurred. Throughout 1996, 1997, and 1998, the largest number of accidents occurred while victims were working on their farms. Another significant number of accidents occurred during the felling of trees for construction. The need to enlarge farming land and resettle to former residential areas would appear to be leading people to enter unfamiliar areas which thereby increases the risk of mine accidents. (However, some donors and development program officials have suggested that land shortage in not a serious issue in Mozambique.)
Landmne Survivor Assistance
As of January 1999, there are a total of nine orthopedic centers run by the Ministry of Health with technical assistance from HI and POWER, providing services throughout Mozambique. In 1997, 29 per cent of 3,636 total persons who received orthopedic assistance in these centers had been victims of landmines,(101) while during the period January-June 1998, 18 per cent of persons treated were landmine survivors.(102) There are plans to close operations at the Vilanculos center, as there is another orthopedic center operating in Inhambane province. The Ministry of Health, in consultation with HI plans to open centers in Gaza and Manica provinces so there will be orthopedic services available in every province of Mozambique.(103) There are currently five rehabilitation centers run by the Ministry of Health and its Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Section manages the thirty existing physiotherapy centers and plans to open an additional twenty-six centers in 1999.(104)
With technical assistance from HI, the Ministry for the Coordination of Social Action is responsible for running the transit centers which serve patients of orthopedic centers. (There are plans to relocated the Vilanculos transit center, along with its orthopedic counterpart, to Gaza province.) However, the Ministry, and therefore the centers, suffers from a lack of funds and additional funding would be needed to assist in the transportation of persons to and from the centers. In 1996, the transit centers were running at 26 percent capacity; by end 1998, they operated at over 50 percent capacity. On average, 70 percent of transit center users are victims of landmines.(105)
Handicap International (HI)
In 1986, the France-based NGO HI came to Mozambique at the request of the government to establish two orthopedics centers in Inhambane province. By 1992, HI had also established two transit centers where patients could stay while being treated at the orthopedic centers. In total, six orthopedic centers had been established by HI in the cities of Vilanculos, Inhambane, Lichinga, Tete, Pemba and Nampula by the time these were integrated into the National Health System in 1995.
In 1992, Handicap International built the Malhangalene Children's Rehabilitation Center in one of the poorer areas surrounding Maputo City. At any one time, the Center serves over 100 disabled children delivering physiotherapy both at the Center and at home. In 1998 the Center was formally transferred to the Maputo City Health Department.
POWER is a UK-based NGO established in 1994 to help provide high quality artificial limbs to mine victims and victims of conflict. In 1980, the ICRC had established an orthopedic center in Maputo Central Hospital--the sole facility operating in Mozambique through the worst years of war. By the time it pulled out of Mozambique in 1994, the ICRC had established four orthopedic centers at Maputo City, Beira, Nampula, and Quelimane, which were taken over by POWER and subsequently integrated into the National Health System in 1998.
Primarily funded by USAID, POWER oversees the production of polypropylene orthopedic components at in the Maputo orthopedic center where it hopes to begin producing wheelchair as well. In 1997, POWER manufactured 703 prostheses representing about 80 per cent of national production.(106) With approximately nine to twelve thousand amputees in Mozambique, and given that the life span of a prosthesis is about three years (in developed counties amputees have access to more frequent replacements), POWER estimates that there is a need to produce at least 3,000 prosthetics per year. Current production levels, combining HI and POWER-type limbs, are less than 1,000 per year.(107) Preliminary analysis of a 1997 survey in Inhambane and Maputo provinces by researchers from Dalhousie University, Canada, suggests that only 20.7 per cent of amputees were using a prosthetic without difficulty, while 36.4 per cent of respondents had not received any rehabilitation treatment at all.(108)
POWER plans to establish non-profit private orthopedic centers in the two provinces presently lacking orthopedic services at Chimoio and Xai-Xai. This project is being developed in partnership with ADEMO (Mozambican Association of Disabled Persons) which would likely undertake a significant management role at the proposed centers.
Jaipur Limb Campaign
This UK-based NGO campaigns for the use of appropriate technology in prosthetics provided in developing countries. With British funding and in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, the Mozambican Red Cross (CVM) will be delivering a Jaipur rural orthopedic project in Gaza province which does not currently have an orthopedic facility.
National Disability Laws and Policy
In Mozambique, ex-military personnel with disabilities enjoy special legal status and state pensions which are not available to the rest of the disabled population. Rules and regulations recognizing the rights of persons with disabilities have existed for many years in a range of national legislation covering the education, labor, financial, transportation, military and health sectors. However, national disability organizations (which, in 1998, created a national forum to coordinate advocacy on disability rights), suggest that these rights and services exist more on paper than in practice.
The national coordinating agency for assistance to persons with disability is the Ministry of Coordination for Social Action (MICAS). With funding from Coopération Française, HI established Institutional Support Program (PAI) to provide technical assistance to MICAS on disability matters in 1996. Three projects have been supported by PAI including the SIRT program now operating in all provinces to provide information, referrals and transportation of disabled persons to health facilities and transit centers. Under a second PAI initiative, MICAS has proposed the creation of a national disability card, which is intended to help persons with disabilities access government services.
In 1991, a national disability policy was developed by MICAS, but for political reasons, failed to gain government approval. Through PAI's third project, the policy has since been redrafted and it is expected that in 1999, Parliament will approved a national disability law establishing fundamental rights and principles relating to persons with physical and mental disabilities. Again, transforming policy into practice is likely to be difficult. Part of the proposed legislation foresees the creation of a National Council on Disabilities which would act as an advisory body to government and include the participation of representatives of the disabled community.(109)
Mine Ban Policy
Namibia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Theo Ben Gurirab, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a statement to the signing ceremony, he said Namibia "will after signing the Convention expedite its speedy ratification by our Parliament. This we will do fortified in the knowledge that Article 1 of the Convention is sacrosanct and stands complete in all respects. Namibia does not produce, use or transfer landmines."(110) On 21 July 1998, the Namibian Parliament unanimously approved ratification of the ban treaty and on 21 September 1998 Namibia deposited its instrument of ratification, the forty-first country to do so. The country has not adopted national implementation legislation.
Namibia only became "unequivocally committed" to the Treaty after it was on several occasions accused by NGOs of adopting an ambivalent attitude.(111) Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been supportive of the Convention, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) initially urged the Government not to rush into endorsing the treaty.(112) The Namibian Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) and Namibian Red Cross has been active in lobbying for the government to sign, ratify and implement the ban treaty. Namibia participated in the Ottawa Process, speaking in the government session of the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in February 1997 in Maputo, and it also attending the May 1997 OAU Meeting in South Africa and the Vienna, Bonn and Brussels meetings. Namibia endorsed the Brussels Declaration, but it was absent from the Oslo treaty negotiations. It supported the key 196, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Namibia does not currently produce antipersonnel mines, has never exported AP mines, and has completed destruction of all AP mines except those retained for training, as allowed under the Mine Ban Treaty. Namibia officials refute a U.S. Department of Defense claim that the country produced PMD-6 AP mines in the past.(113) Told of the denial, a U.S. expert involved in compilation of the landmines data base insisted on the veracity of the information, which he stated was based on visual identification of the weapon.(114)
According to Human Rights Watch twenty-five types of AP mines have been reported in Namibia, originating from: Portugal, former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, former Czechoslovakia, former East Germany, Belgium, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia.(115)
Since 1993, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has been described by local media as maintaining a huge stockpile of AP mines, various types of projectiles and bombs at the Grootfontein Military Base. In 1993, a military explosive expert was dismissed by Namibian President Sam Nujoma after the latter accused him of leaking "confidential" documents on the poor maintenance of an assortment of unstable and hazardous mines and projectiles said to be weighing 800 tons at the base. Human Rights Watch has obtained two confidential documents, which state that it is unstable and very hazardous. The stores include antitank mines, Claymore mines, POMZ-2 mines, and "obviously suspect wooden PMD-6 mines that had previously been soaked by constant exposure and wet." According to both of these reports, the condition of the arsenal is so unstable that even moving the weapons could be a problem.(116)
The MOD independently transported and exploded 50 tons of AP mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) from the stores in May 1998.(117) What was destroyed could not be independently confirmed, neither by the NCBL nor by the media but the Explosives Unit of the Namibian Police were apparently invited to witness the event. On 12 January 1999 the MOD explained to the NCBL that journalists and other observers were for reasons of safety not allowed in the close proximity of the destruction site near or at Oshivelo Military Base. No environmental standards were observed at the time of the demolition. Nor have costs for exploding these munitions been made public. A "small number" of AP mines have been retained "for military training purposes."'(118) No further information is available on the retained mines as the MOD declined to divulge the number, the types and location of such devices.(119)
Namibia became independent in 1990 from South Africa, which had administered Namibia under a League of Nations mandate from 1920 to 1966, and illegally since 1966 on a de facto basis. A low level guerrilla war, in which landmines were frequently used, was fought from 1966 until independence. The war typically involved hit and run attacks by the South West Africa People's Organization's (SWAPO) military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and counterinsurgency sweeps against the guerrillas by South African forces. The first landmine was planted in May 1971, when an antitank mine exploded under a police vehicle near Katima in the Caprivi strip.(120) By the late 1970s landmine warfare was becoming a serious concern for the South African forces. In December 1977 Major-General Wally Blad, the South West Africa Defence Force (SAWDF) Director General reported that South African casualties had increased during the past year following a "significant" rise in the use of landmines. He noted that sixteen soldiers had been killed by landmines.(121) By February 1979, there had been 324 confirmed landmine incidents. SWAPO forces mainly used POMZ antipersonnel mines and TMA-3 anti-vehicle mines. Antipersonnel mines were often laid alongside antitank mines to hamper mine clearance. Interviewed in 1986, PLAN's deputy chief of engineering and demolition justified SWAPO's dependence on landmine warfare by saying that mines are "designed to cope with the situation in which the enemy is infinitely superior in relation to every conventional factor of warfare."(122)
Civilians were the most frequent victims as the South Africans with their sophisticated mine-proofed vehicles, usually escaped heavy casualties. In 1980, 220 Ovambos were killed and another 256 injured in mine related incidents.(123) Landmine warfare continued until the end of the war although by the late 1980s, the war had reached a stalemate. The South Africans succeeded in preventing serious cross-border attacks, while guerrilla activities were sufficient to tie down large numbers of South African troops. Between 1974 to 1989 the South African Engineer Corps reported having lifted and disarmed a total of 1,743 landmines in northern Namibia.(124)
The South African Defence Forces in the 1980s also laid a series of minefields in northern Namibia around military encampments and installations. Maintenance of these minefields proved difficult and contributed to the SADF abandoning plans in 1988 to construct a thirty kilometer barrier minefield along a stretch of the Namibian border with Angola. It was also dropped because the SADF's engineering staff convinced the command that it would be too costly and ineffective.(125)
A number of landmines have been planted in Namibia since independence. In 1996 there were a few reports of newly laid landmines, some of them almost certainly by poachers.(126) In November 1998 the Government accused the alleged Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM) of plotting to secede by armed force Caprivi from the rest of the country. Alleged members of the CLM had fled to Botswana were said to have been found in possession of APMs. (127)
There has been no nation-wide survey or in-depth assessment to date and there are no reliable statistics on the prevalence of AP mines in the country. Namibian officials have said there are no more than 4,000 uncleared AP mines in the eleven known minefields in the northern areas of the country.(128) The United Nations estimated that some 50,000 mines are scattered in Namibia.(129)
Mine clearance has been under way in Namibia since 1989 when the first demining operation started in the country. According to statistics from the Police's Explosives Unit, eleven minefields with a combined area of 353,510 square meters had 44,594 mines.(130) Of these, 40,779 were neutralized by the South African Defense Force (SADF) and the United Nations Transition Group (UNTAG) forces during the transition period leading to Namibian independence from South Africa in 1990. If these figures were anything to go by, then 3, 815 APMs remained to be cleared as of 12 January 1999. The MOD, however, maintained that there were only nine known minefields all of which have been "successfully cleared" as of 14 May 1998.(131)
The SADF left no detailed records of where the mines were laid in the minefields, although there are records of the number planted. PLAN did not keep accurate records of where it laid mines. Generally, fences and warning signboards were erected around minefield perimeters. These minefields were all in the far north, around former army and police bases, water towers and electricity pylons.
In late 1989, before the South Africans withdrew from Namibia they made limited efforts to clear the main minefields around their bases by hurriedly driving Olifant tanks, and other heavy vehicles back and forth repeatedly over the minefields. Although this detonated many mines, it was clearly not up to humanitarian standards, under which civilians could safely return.
Landmine clearance was not part of the mandate of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which oversaw the transition period between January 1989 and independence in March 1990. Landmines were the responsibility of an Australian engineer unit which cleared some of the minefields in Ondangwa. They also put up some new fences sand repaired fences around ten minefields. A publicity campaign followed asking local residents to leave the fences, parts of which were stolen, intact.(132) A year later most of these fences were gone.
In March 1991, a controversial twelve month R3.4 million contract was awarded to Namibian Blasting Agents, a Windhoek based firm to clear the minefields around the SWAWEK powerlines.(133) The mines turned out to be more numerous than expected: 8,122 R2M2 and 1,086 No.69 South African-manufactured antipersonnel mines were reportedly found and destroyed. The Namibian Blasting Agents used a bulldozer and roller method to clear many of the mines. Two deminers were lost limbs during these operations and live mines were found afterwards.
The Namibian Police had the responsibility for destroying any ordnance (including landmines) not associated with an active military base or activity since independence. Limited resources and personnel have precluded systematic mine clearance by its Explosive Disposal Unit, but despite such limitations Nampol reported having cleared 167 antitank mines and 531 APMs between 1989 and 1998.(134) As of June 1998 the Explosives Unit had a backlog of over 600 UXO reports throughout the northern parts of the country.(135) The Explosives Unit as of September 1998 had not received all the twelve 4 x 4 vehicles promised them by the U.S. embassy in order to help tackle the pervasive UXO problem.(136)
The U.S. also assisted in 1995 in the setting up of a National Demining Liaison Committee to coordinate the national program, collect data, set priorities, and monitor all mine related issues. The Liaison Committee has one Police Liaison Coordinator and one NDF Liaison Coordinator attached to it. However, at the outset the emphasis of this Committee was media relations rather than clearance priorities.
In 1994, the Namibian government invited a U.S. Department of Defense Demining Assessment Team to visit Namibia and provide it with mine clearance training assistance. A Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. government and the Namibian government over mine clearance training was subsequently signed in February 1995.(137)
In March 1995, a team of U.S. military explosive experts from the Army Special Forces arrived in Oshakati to start an eight week mine clearance training project. The U.S. team withdrew in September 1995, leaving behind a small evaluation team. The primary objective of the project was to encourage the NDF to professionally engage in national mine clearance programs rather than leave it to Nampol. (138)
According to the U.S. Department of State, the program started with a donation of $1.2 million in equipment and training assistance to the Namibian government, and since 1995 has included the provision of military specialists as part of a train-the-trainer program. By mid-1997, 135 deminers, twenty EOD personnel and twenty medical personnel in mine/UXO clearance and emergency medical treatment had been trained.(139) The U.S. has provided US$7.2 million for mine clearance equipment, training of military de-mining personnel as well as mine awareness material since the program began in 1995; another $1.5 million is projected for 1999.(140)
This program was not without controversy. At Ruacana township the NDF cleared 102 mines (fifty-five by bulldozer, forty-eight by hand) at Hurricane base 192 mines (ninety-nine by bulldozer and ninety-three by hand). But South African data indicated that 648 mines were unaccounted for at Ruacana and 209 at Hurricane base.(141) Still, in December 1995, the NDF announced Ruacana was safe and the protective fence around it was removed. Tragedy struck soon afterwards when a twelve year old boy lost his leg, walking across this so-called 'cleared' area. Accidents continued in so-called "cleared" fields in 1996. In March 1996, the NDF suspended its operations because of accidents.
Since late 1995, 2, 383 APMs and 1,107 unexploded ordnance (UXOs) have been cleared from the nine known minefields around former SADF military bases in the northwestern areas of the country. If these figures are accurate, 1, 432 mines are still unaccounted for and may be in these so-called 'cleared' minefields.
The U.S.-sponsored mine clearance operations attracted further controversy in its second phase, clearing the burns and minefields around the 409 power pylons. In March 1998, the U.S. government sent a prototype machine, a Berm processor, to assist with the demining of the berms around the pylons. In theory, the vehicle mechanically scoops up dirt and shakes out the landmines, leaving them exposed on the ground for deminers to clear.(142) In fact, these operations have been hampered by the lack of appropriate tools and equipment.(143) Speaking on the occasion of the US-sponsored mine awareness campaign on 18 September 1998, Lt. Col. Martin Nashandi, commander of the mine clearing engineering regiment, admitted: "We thought that we can go quickly and smooth as we have done with the open minefield. To our surprise and disbelief the tools and equipment we had were so much inferior."(144)
However, in a phone interview with the NCBL, a spokeswoman of the U.S. Information Service in Windhoek stated in December 1998 that the "berm processor" was working "perfectly well."(145) A U.S. concept brief on the processor was not so upbeat about it, saying that this machine can only be used with other mechanical clearance equipment, such as wheel loader and a bulldozer--with only some 60 percent success rate.(146)
The sole recipient of this U.S. funding has been the Namibian Government and the bulk of the money has been spent in the U.S. on the manufacturing of de-mining equipment, procurement of computers and related software as well as printing of T-shirts and other APMs risk education material. The exact amount of the money spent locally is not known.
In 1990, the Explosives Unit of the Namibian Police launched a radio and television campaign in order to warn residents about the dangers of UXOs in the northern areas of the country. This campaign succeeded in reducing the number of casualties in the contaminated areas. In 1995, the government launched a second campaign, which included the distribution of T-shirts and pamphlets warning the public about the dangers of explosives. The campaign was supported by $1.5 million from the U.S.
On 18 September 1998, the Ministries of Information and Broadcasting and Defense, with US financial, technical and material support, re-launched the mine awareness campaign featuring the distribution of 120,000 pieces of promotional material, including pens, rulers, T-shirts and hats and numerous other similar items.(147) Those items were, however, mainly distributed in modern schools in some of the contaminated northern parts of the country. Whereas a large number of Namibian children attend schools in the inaccessible parts of the contaminated areas of the country were not taught about the dangers.
This promotional material, worth some US$140,000, was only available in the English language, a language very few people read in the affected areas.(148) The slogan Don't Touch It, Report It which was written on many mine awareness campaign items was not entirely effective. A large number of UXO casualties and or injuries occurred not when victims 'touched' UXOs but rather when they struck or threw stones at those explosives and or by setting them on fire.
The U.S. Government has also donated over U.S.$250,000 worth of computers and graphic software as well as providing professional training to Government employees. U.S. Ambassador George Ward, Jr. said that altogether some US$200,000 would be spent on the 1998-1999 mine awareness campaign in the country.(149)
In addition to livestock and other property, AP mines and UXOs constitute also a serious threat to human life. There are, nevertheless, no reliable statistics on the actual number of survivors in the country. However, according to the MOD 105 people have so far been killed and 246 others injured in mines and UXO explosions between June 1989 and September 1998.(150) This means that, on average, Thirty-five people a year, three people a month are killed or injured in mine or UXO explosions, in a population of some 1.5 million. Since 1991, casualty rates have dropped by 90 per cent from a post war high of twenty-three deaths and forty-one injured in 1991 to two deaths and ten injured in 1997. In 1998, the number of dead and injured rose.(151) Over 86 percent of all the casualties was caused by UXOs.
Namibians have also become landmine victims abroad. On 26 November 1998, the Ministry of Defence, in a press release, announced that two members of the NDF were injured in the DRC after one of them detonated an antipersonnel mine. In the same statement the Ministry accused Uganda and Rwanda of using APMs in violation of international law.(152)
Landmine Survivor Assistance
There are over 2,000 war disabled including civilians. For people in need of prostheses, there is a modern hospital and workshop in Windhoek. The workshop runs and outreach program to three northern centers. Few resources have been spent on mine survivor assistance in the country. According to the director of social services in the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MOHSS), Batseba Katjiuongua, senior citizens and persons with disabilities, regardless of whether they are mine survivors or not, receive on a monthly basis a disability and/or pension grant equivalent to some US$28.(153)
At the same time, Katjiuongua also informed the NCBL that children with disabilities under the age of 16 are left to be cared for by their parents. Whereas children under especially difficult circumstances are cared for by the MOHSS in accordance with the provisions of the country's Children's Act. The Government has not yet adopted a national legislation on persons with disability.
Landmine victims find it particularly difficult to survive in an economy with 45 percent unemployment. Despite training programs, as little as 5 percent of war disabled have found employment, often because employers discriminate against their disability.(154)
Niger signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. Niger participated in few meetings of the Ottawa Process and did not endorse the Brussels Declaration. It did support the 1996, 1997 and 1998 UN General Assembly resolutions. On 29 November 1998, the National Assembly passed a law authorizing the government to ratify the ban and, on 23 March 1999, Niger ratified. There is no domestic implementation legislation as yet. Niger is a party to the CCW and ratified the original Protocol II on landmines on 10 November 1992. It has yet to ratify amended Protocol II.
Niger is not believed to be involved in the production or export of antipersonnel mines. It can be assumed that the Nigérien armed forces hold stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, though government officials have been evasive on this topic.(155) Sporadic military activity by Tuareg and other rebel groups and a prevailing state of near-war in much of the north and east, have tended to reinforce military secrecy as far as the army's arsenal is concerned. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to estimate the quantity, origins and characteristics of the army's weaponry .
There are persistent allegations that the Army used antipersonnel mines in the far north of Niger during the Tuareg insurgency of 1990-96.(156) Non-state actors were also involved in the laying of AP mines until both warring parties signed the peace agreements.(157) Rebel activity against the Army persists in the far north and the east, near Diffa.(158)
Niger has a problem with uncleared landmines in the far north of the country--the legacy of mine-laying activity during the World War II.(159) Nigérien sources claim these mines were originally placed on Libyan soil during WWII, near the frontier with Niger, but shifted over the border due to the slow movement of sand dunes over the decades.(160) Lack of statistics makes it difficult to be certain of the scale of this. Few civilians are affected: the Aïr and Ténéré areas are very sparsely populated.
The exact number of mine victims is unknown. Nevertheless, according to investigations by the Association nigérienne de défense des droits de l'Homme (ANDDH) it has been documented that during the government-Tuareg conflict three mine victims died in the region of Agadez-Tanout and another person died in the area of Tchiro. According to a 1998 US State Department report, Hidden Killers , eleven landmine casualties were reported in Niger in 1997.(161) Due to the information blackout on the issue and the relative isolation of the mined areas, these figures are probably far from exhaustive.(162) Niger is not involved in mine clearance, survey and assessment work, or mine awareness education. Neither is Niger involved in landmine victim or survivor assistance.
It appears certain that Senegalese troops used antipersonnel landmines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, supporting the government in fighting that erupted in that country in June. (See country report on Guinea-Bissau). In the midst of the conflict, Senegal ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 September 1998. Though the Mine Ban Treaty had not entered into force for Senegal, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "a state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.
Senegal has a severe landmine problem in its southern enclave province of Casamance where fighting has intensified between the Senegalese army and the separatist Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) since August of 1997. The conflict, which began in 1982, has had disastrous results for the civilian population. The situation has been aggravated by the recent proliferation of antipersonnel and antitank mines in the region, laid in large numbers by the rebels. Civilians--the main victims of landmines--have been severely affected and the agrarian base of the Casamançais economy destroyed.
The consequences--for public health, the regional economy, and the environment--are alarming. Rural activities in the entire region south of the Casamance River are heavily affected. Investments totaling several billions CFA francs in rural development projects have been shelved or canceled. Technical assistance to farmers and breeders is paralyzed in 60-80 percent of cases: agriculture is virtually at a standstill. Vaccination campaigns and public health activities have slowed down considerably. Tourism, relatively unaffected until recently, has been hit by the fear that the indiscriminate nature of AP mines has sown in the region.
Mine Ban Policy
Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998. Senegal participated fully in the Ottawa Process; it attended the treaty preparatory meetings and the Oslo treaty negotiations, endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration, and supported the key 1996, 1997 and 1998 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
The Dakar-based NGO, Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (Raddho) played an active role in lobbying the government to sign the ban treaty. It also co-hosted with African Topics magazine a media workshop that drew domestic and international attention to Senegal's landmine problem, in Dakar on 3 November 1997.(163) In 1997 Raddho also met with the head of the separatist MFDC Senghor and urged him to use his influence in stopping the MFDC from using landmines.(164)
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Senegal is not a known producer of landmines. Members of the Senegalese engineering corps assert that the army has only mines of Warsaw Pact origin,(165) although the U.S. may have also supplied Claymores.(166) There is no further information on Senegalese stockpiles. The government claims that MFDC mines are of Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian and Chinese origin.(167) Recorded incidents confirm that both AP and ATMs have been used by rebels. A number of these are apparently undetectable with the army's current detection equipment. Photographic and pathological evidence suggest that blast-effect mines have been used by the MFDC.(168) The loss of one lower limb, but not the other suggests the characteristic effects of blast mines.
An important source of mines used by the rebels is apparently the black market in Guinea- Bissau, where mines are reportedly obtainable for as little as 1,500 CFA francs (less than $3) for AP mines and 2,500 CFA francs for AT mines.(169) It has also been reported that rebel elements of the Guinea-Bissau military provided mines to the Casamance separatists - one of the factors that lead to the fighting in that country. (See country report on Guinea Bissau). Gambia has also been named as a source for the MFDC rebels.(170)
Mines traceable to the MFDC conflict began causing damage in 1991. But it was around the Senegalese presidential and legislative elections in February 1993 that the MFDC stepped up military pressure by using mines to prevent the people from going to the polls to vote in Casamance. In January 1993, an ICRC vehicle exploded as it went over an antitank mine, killing and mutilating several people. Large-scale laying of mines by the MFDC began in August 1997.
According to well-informed sources in contact with the MFDC, the use of mines is due to a number of factors,(171) including increased pressure on MDFC rear bases in the Guinea-Bissau border area as a result of improving diplomatic relations between the Senegalese and Guinea-Bissau governments. The pressure weakened the MFDC's logistical support of food and funds, forcing it to rely more heavily on food resources in Casamance itself. Where previously the MFDC had levied informal taxes on the population, it now took full control of areas rich in natural resources to satisfy its own needs and market the surplus. The decision was made to construct security perimeters and expel the local populations. Landmines were a useful means of terror. At the same time, the MFDC separatists are split on their use of landmines. Its hardliners wanted to step up the fight at any cost, while its political leader, Father Augustine Diamacoune Senghor, currently under house arrest in Zinguinchor, is said to have been shocked by the rebels' use of antipersonnel mines.(172)
MFDC forces inside the country admitted to using mines in November 1997 but promised not to do so any more. This was contradicted by the French branch of the MFDC, which issued a statement in early February 1998, claiming that the landmines, the "instruments of death," had been laid by the government. Landmines continued to be laid in 1998.(173) To complicate things further the MFDC has now split into two antagonistic fronts, a "Front Sud" under Senghor and a "Front Nord" led by Sidy Badji, the MFDC's first guerrilla chief of staff.
The MFDC was almost certainly still laying mines in August 1998. Two incidents involving antitank mines took place on dirt roads in the Ziguinchor area that month. On 10 August, an accident occurred with a minibus in the Bignona department in the Sindian zone, killing thirteen people and injuring ten. On 13 August, three children died and another was seriously injured when their cart hit a mine 3 -4 km from Ziguinchor, on the road to Soukouta. This road is used constantly so there is no doubt that the mines were recent. This mine may have been intended for an expected military convoy.(174) The wide-spread laying of mines also contributed to economic chaos which the MFDC wished to instigate to force the Senegalese authorities to negotiate.
According to the Senegalese military not all mines planted in Casamance are by rebels. Mines are also used to sort out local vendettas and have been used by bandits and highwaymen to cover their tracks and frighten locals.(175) A number of merchants in Ziguinchor have been arrested for possession of landmines.(176)
Senegal Army Use
The first landmines are thought to have been laid in Casamance in 1968-73, when the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) began the fight for independence against Portuguese colonialism in Guinea-Bissau, which Casamance adjoins. PAIGC enjoyed the backing of the OAU, Senegal and people along the Casamance border, many of whom had family and ethnic links with PAIGC activists.
After independence, Senegalese armed forces have laid mines to protect the border with Guinea-Bissau where, as noted above, the MFDC has had rear bases, and to protect military perimeters and infrastructure.(177) The army has stuck to conventional mining doctrine, with a clear laying pattern. This is less dangerous for civilians and less problematic for future mine clearance operations than MFDC practices. Some sources have reported a few examples of "terrorist" mining, aimed at civilians in high-risk areas. But these are apparently isolated cases, which do not seem to correspond to orders from the military hierarchy.(178) The U.S. Department of State's report Hidden Killers noted in 1993 that two Senegalese members of ECOMOG were killed in Liberia while laying landmines.(179) It is not clear if Senegalese forces have laid mines inside Senegal since it signed the ban treaty in December 1997. The official line is, "It is not the Senegalese army's vocation to lay mines."(180)
Use by Senegalese forces in Guinea-Bissau
It appears certain that Senegalese forces used antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, in support of government troops. The conflict erupted on 7 June 1998 when Guinea-Bissau President João Bernardo Viera sacked then Army Chief-of-Staff Ansumane Mane for supposedly covertly supplying arms to the MFDC. News reports claim that landmines, which have been used in the Cassamance conflict, were included in the suspected arms shipments.(181) Mane quickly rallied almost the entire Guinea-Bissau army into a self-proclaimed Military Junta and called for President Viera's removal on charges of corruption and mismanagement. With almost no forces to defend his regime, Viera called on the neighboring countries of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry to send troops to hold off the advancing Junta, which both countries quickly did.
Fighting centered on the capital, Bissau, where government troops reinforced by Senegalese troops defended the center of the city south of the airport. The Junta eventually consolidated its hold on the interior and forced the withdrawal of the foreign troops, turning the focus of fighting to the city of Bissau. Reports also put Cassamance rebels fighting on the side of the Junta. On 1 November, the Abuja Accord was signed by the government and the Military Junta and on 20 February 1999 the Government of National Unity was sworn in to oversee the transition period until elections can be organized sometime this year. (See country report on Guinea-Bissau.)
Use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict by Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Junta forces has been reported by the United Nations, the commander of ECOMOG forces, the chief of staff of Guinean forces in Guinea-Bissau, and by the media and other on-the-ground observers of the conflict. According to a U.N. Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment, the use of mines by both sides left 2,000-3,000 mines, and "it is reported that Junta and government forces as well as the Senegalese contingent have established records of the different minefields."(182) An informed military source who was present on the ground contends that the vast majority of mines were planted by the government and Senegalese forces in their defense of the city against the advancing Junta forces.(183) That mines were used by government and Senegalese troops was reported on Portuguese television: "RTP [Lisbon RTP International Television] has confirmed the existence of antipersonnel mines in Guinnea-Bissau, where the conflict's front line used to be. They were laid by government and Senegalese troops. The Bishop of Bissau had warned of mines before."(184)
Mine Action Funding
So far, almost no financial resources have been dedicated to the support of technical surveys, mine clearance, mine awareness or victim assistance, for two main reasons: 1) The proliferation of landmines in Casamance is a relatively new phenomenon and, as such, has taken the international community by surprise, and 2) Peace has not yet been restored. This prevents large operations, particularly in sensitive fields like technical survey, marking and mine clearance. Although the army has engaged in demining operations, it has received no specialist assistance. The Senegalese authorities report that several of their deminers have been shot at by MFDC while trying to clear landmines.(185)
Little has been done in the field of landmine awareness. At the end of 1998, no specific programs have implemented for mine victim assistance. However, growing international awareness of the problem may change this situation in months to come. In March 1999 Handicap International initiated a two-year program, with funding from the EU and the French cooperation secretariat, to strengthen local capacity for victim assistance and landmine awareness.
The army claims to have destroyed 786 antitank mines and 1,947 antipersonnel mines, and lifted fifty-nine antitank mines and 106 antipersonnel mines between 24 October 1995 and 30 May 1998. It is unclear exactly which areas have been cleared. The current situation does not allow large-scale mine clearance programs that could be supported by specialist international agencies; additionally, the authorities are opposed to such interventions while fighting continues. It is difficult to ascertain the MFDC's position on mine clearance activities. Sources close to the movement feel its military leadership would be hostile to such an idea, fearing a loss of tactical advantage. In addition, mines are still being laid, rendering clearance pointless at present.
Future clearance operations will be expensive. The low density of mining in some areas, the terrain and the lack of plans or maps will increase the level of logistical difficulty. It is as yet impossible to make an in-depth assessment of the location, number and socio-economic impact of landmines in Casamance. Existing information, although carefully sourced, should be treated as indicative. Whereas the army appears to have laid mines according to conventional doctrine, the MFDC appears to have mined indiscriminately, compounding surveying problems.
Most mine-laying has occurred in the southern strip of land between the Casamance River and the Guinea-Bissau border, in Ziguinchor and Oussouye departments and in part of the Sédhiou department in the south-west of the Kolda region. The Ziguinchor region has a population of about 492,000 people, about 176,000 of them in Ziguinchor itself. The strip of land south of the river, severely affected by the fighting, previously had a population of roughly 300,000 people. An estimated 60,000 people have now moved to other parts of country, mostly to large towns. 5,000-60,000 (depending on the source) have fled to Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia.
Some prevention mechanisms already exist. The army prevents civilian access to some mined areas, while others are marked. The Senegalese Red Cross has carried out basic mine risk awareness education, as has the army. Reportedly, the army has been teaching civilians to detect mines, providing them with a three-pronged fork with a long handle for probing.(186) Once the mines have been found, the civilians contact the military so that they can be neutralized.
Landmine Survivor Assistance
In late 1998, Handicap International recorded forty-six villages (plus Ziguinchor itself) where mine incidents had taken place. Of these, forty-three are located south of the Casamance River. Forty-three were in the Ziguinchor region and four in the Kolda region. Eighty percent of these sites were cross-confirmed. The fact that accidents took place in these villages does not mean that they still contain mines. In some cases the army has carried out demining operations, although there are doubts about their exhaustiveness. In other cases few mines appear to have been laid and all may now have been detonated.
According to a survey of mine victims by the NGO Radho, 32 percent of surviving landmine victims are in Ziguinchor itself, 23 percent in Oussouye, 16 percent in Oussouye and six per cent from Bignona. The other 32 per cent of survivors are from various locations. Thirty-five percent of victims are women, but the most surprising statistic is the victims' youth: 58 percent one and 17 years of age. And another 13 percent are 18 to 30.(187)
Senegalese military records indicate that, between 24 October 1995 and 15 June 1998, 226 mines were detonated by people or vehicles in the Ziguinchor region. These accidents are said to have resulted in 153 victims, all civilians, including forty-five dead and 108 injured.(188) This suggests an average of about thirteen victims per month.
Between 2 August 1997 and 10 August 1998, 193 civilian mine victims were treated at Ziguinchor regional hospital, an average of sixteen victims per month. At the present the hospital is treating two to three victims a week. However, not all cases are recorded as mine victims, while people killed instantly are not registered. According to the authorities, between 1 July and 31 December 1997, fifty-six soldiers were mine victims, eleven died. Extrapolating from these figures, it is safe to assume a "real" figure of 500 mine victims. Taking into account the surface area concerned (7,339 sq. km), total population (492,000) and the fact that an estimated 90 per cent of the mines are located in an area of no more than 2,500 sq. km, the annual ratio (1.5 victims per 1,000 people) is extremely high.
As noted above, the statistics for victims should be treated with care, but it is clear that women and children are heavily affected. Local sources claim that the army death toll is higher than officially declared. The director of Ziguinchor regional hospital hopes to build a dedicated mine victim unit, in part because of mine cases' psychological impact on other patients. For military victims, generally evacuated to Dakar, medical care does not pose any particular problem.(189) Treatment of mine victims today represents 40 per cent of the workload of the hospital's orthopedic center. A shortage of raw materials is beginning to be felt. There is only one physiotherapist for the two regions of Kolda and Ziguinchor (one million inhabitants), based at Ziguinchor regional hospital. Ongoing care and the follow-up to the fitting of prostheses are inadequate.
Broader Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Use
Obsessive fear of landmines has developed since the beginning of massive laying in 1997. The people are shocked by the suffering of the victims and their families and by the terrible increase in the number of disabled, and by the disastrous effects of the proliferation of mines on the economy. In the wider climate of terror which currently reigns in Casamance, it is difficult to discern what is the result of mines and what stems from the fighting, surprise attacks by the MFDC and repression of the civilian population by the two warring parties. Many activities relating to health, agriculture, and rural life in general, are at a complete standstill and many parts of the region are now no-go areas.
Vaccination, prenatal visits and medical assistance in general have been badly disrupted. Health workers note an increase in endemic diseases and home births. The army is now frequently used to carry out vaccination campaigns. A heavy food deficit has built up, resulting in malnutrition and even famine according to some people, although some reports may be exaggerated.
Ziguinchor's regional agricultural service estimates an 80 per cent reduction in agricultural activity south of the Casamance River, in what used to be the region's richest agricultural zone. Fruit is rotting on the trees, while rice fields are no longer cultivated.(190)
Agricultural extension services are paralyzed, as are regional agricultural inventory and stock breeding programs. Vulnerable fresh-water systems are becoming salinated for lack of dam maintenance. Most of the food consumed now comes from Dakar. On average, food prices have doubled, partly due to the greatly increased difficulty in distributing supplies.
Before August 1997, tourism was not direct target for the MFDC, although four French tourists disappeared in 1994. In principle, tourism is still not a direct target today, but unlike the rebels, mines do not choose their victims. Since August 1997, the massive appearance of landmines has frightened off potential holiday makers. All reservations during the last November 1997-March 1998 season were canceled leading to significant loss of earnings. The mining of roads, including arteries such as the road between Kolda and Ziguinchor, has frightened off a large number of tourism promoters. Alternative solutions have been found, including direct flights between Paris and Cape Skirring, but these are at best a partial solution. It has been estimated that up to 70 per cent of the region's 16,000 tourism-related jobs are at risk.
Mine Ban Policy
South Africa was the third country to sign the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In his address to the signing ceremony, Foreign Affairs Minister, A.B. Nzo, noted that the ban treaty "represents some of the best news in the field of disarmament as it abolishes an entire range of conventional weapons. Early Entry Into Force of the Convention must be a top priority to make our new international norm against anti-personnel mines legally binding."(191) The National Assembly ratified the ban treaty on 5 May 1998, and on 26 June 1998 South Africa deposited its instrument of ratification, the twenty-first country to do so and the fifth from Africa.
South Africa has been one of the most active African nations in the global process to ban antipersonnel mines. On 20 February 1997, just days before the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo, Mozambique, South Africa announced, effective immediately, a comprehensive ban on use, production, and trade of antipersonnel mines, as well as its intention to destroy existing stocks.
In June 1995, a number of South Africa NGO representatives attended the third International Conference to Ban Landmines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and, on their return, the Ceasefire Campaign launched a coordinated campaign against antipersonnel landmines. In early 1996, the campaign was restructured as the South African Campaign To Ban Landmines (SACBL).(192)
In May 1996, at the conclusion of the negotiations on the Landmine Protocol of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, South Africa announced that it was suspending use of antipersonnel mines, pending an evaluation of the military utility of the weapon. However, it continued at that time to advocate "smart" mines as the solution to the global mine crisis. Over the course of 1996 and early 1997 South Africa's policy shifted to one of full support for a comprehensive ban, leading to the 20 February 1997 unilateral ban announcement.
South Africa played a prominent role in the Ottawa Process. It was a member of the "core group" of governments that took responsibility for developing and promoting the Mine Ban Treaty. At the first treaty preparatory meeting held in Vienna in February 1997, South Africa was the first nation to speak, making a particularly strong statement in support of the Ottawa Process. South Africa hosted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference on landmines in Kempton Park in May 1997, a key meeting in building support among African states for the ban treaty. South Africa's Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Jacob Selebi, skillfully steered the ban treaty negotiations toward their successful conclusion in September 1997 in Oslo, Norway. South Africa has also supported or co-sponsored all key UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines.
The roads to the ban was never completely smooth, however. A South African Defense Department document dated 20 May 1997, described the possibility of a global ban as "a tall order" and went on challenge "anyone doubting the effectiveness of such an anti-personnel minefield, should try it sometime."(193) South Africa ratified the CCW on 13 October 1995, and its amended Protocol II on 26 June 1998. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been supportive of efforts to negotiate landmine restrictions in that forum.
Production and Transfer
South Africa has in the past produced and exported landmines, but the government, manufacturers and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) have been tight-lipped about how many mines were made, where they were exported to, and when exactly the manufacture ceased.(194) Some claim that in the past South Africa was the largest African producer and exporter of landmines.(195) South Africa's mines have been found in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe and exported further afield to Cambodia, Rwanda and Somalia.(196) The U.S. Department of Defense has identified South Africa as manufacturing six antipersonnel mines: the R2M2; the R2M1; the Mini-MS 803; Shrapnel No. 2; the Type 72, a direct copy of the Chinese Type 72; and the No. 69 Mk1, a direct copy of the Italian Valmara 69.(197)
South Africa also produced the "Ambush" mine which can be used against "personnel, vehicles of low-flying helicopters," and the DEVA M8926A1 anti-handling device equipped with a self-destruct of self-neutralization option.(198) It produced the Demi, also known as M8943A1, a mine initiator or add-on fuse designed to be "conventional pressure-activated anti-tank mines providing an add-on magnetic sensing capability."(199) South Africa also produced the following antitank mines: the "intelligent horizontal mine;" the No. 8 and the Type 72 antitank mine.(200) More recently, Ruetech Defence Industries has developed the Superstop Area Denial Boom System (ADBS 145) for the South African armed forces. It was introduced to the defense industry at IDEX 97 in Abu Dhabi.(201)
In March 1994, the De Klerk government announced an indefinite moratorium on the export of all landmines (both AP and AT mines). This was superseded by the 20 February 1997 announcement of a unilateral comprehensive ban on use, production, and trade of antipersonnel mines.
The Minister of Defense in reply to a question in Parliament on 15 May 1996 said that the SANDF has "a total of 311,179 landmines in stock. Of these 261, 423 are anti-personnel types and 49, 756 anti-tank." In May 1997 the South African Department of Defense listed South Africa's stockpile as consisting of: R2M2 "blast" type anti-personnel landmines, J69 "Shrapnel" type jumping anti-personnel landmines and number 8 HE anti-tank mines.(202) It stated that all of the standard South African landmines are "dumb" (non-self-destructing) landmines. There were 186,408 AP mines (HE), 13,038 practice AP mines, 48,484 J69 Jumping mines; 2,059 practice Jumping mines; and 11,434 foreign mines making a total of 261,423 mines.(203)
A significant number of these mines were destroyed in a "big bang" ceremony on the 21 May 1997. The remaining stockpiled antipersonnel landmines were destroyed over a period of five months in 211 detonations which culminated in the destruction of the last thousand on 30 October 1997. By then, the total destroyed was 243,423.(204) It was estimated that R1,18 million (U.S. $19 million) would be required to destroy the AP mines but the actual cost is not known. An environmental study was conducted before and after the destruction to ensure that as little cost to the environment as possible would be done. South Africa prides itself on not only having destroyed its stockpiles way ahead of the four year period provided for in the Convention, but also for the fact that it was the first country to have involved the media and NGOs as witnesses in various phases of the destruction.
When South Africa announced its ban policy in February 1997, it also stated that it would retain "a very limited and verifiable number solely for training specific military personnel in de-mining techniques and for research into assisting the de-mining process."(205) Since then it has indicated that 5,000 high explosive AP mines have been retained for research and development and 13,000 AP mines for demining training.(206) South Africa also vowed that demining training and research will be carried out under the strictest government supervision and control.
Mines have been used in South Africa, though not extensively. According to one source, South African security forces sometimes placed AP mines on suspected ANC infiltration routes in northern and eastern Transvaal.(207) Recently, various sources including from the ANC's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have revealed new information regarding mine use in South Africa.(208)
After its June 1985 National Consultative Conference in Kabwe, Zambia, the African National Congress (ANC) conducted a low intensity guerrilla campaign and opened up a new front in rural areas by laying a number of landmines on roads and farm tracks. In response, the South African government repeatedly warned the neighboring governments against allowing their territories to be used as bases from which the ANC could operate and subsequently South African Defence Forces personnel carried out "cross-border" raids into Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
In a submission to the TRC in June 1996, retired senior members of the South African Police argued that the decision by the ANC to engage in a landmine campaign was a flagrant violation of Protocol 1 of 1977 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 which the ANC had signed in 1980. "In their struggle to overthrow the South African government, the ANC alliance resorted to one of the most frightening and intimidatory, if not cowardly, forms of violence, namely the use of landmines."(209)
Research by the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria has revealed that ninety percent of the ANC's landmine use occurred in rural areas.(210) According to the South Africa Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), in 1986, 1,298 people were killed in political violence, of whom forty-two were killed by landmines and other explosives.(211) The then-Minister of Law and Order claimed that between 1 January and 14 September 1986, seventeen landmine attacks were carried out by the ANC. The South African government also claimed at the time that eleven people were killed in fourteen landmine incidents in the Eastern Transvaal alone from April to November 1986.
Other sources list fifty-seven landmine incidents between November 1985 and February 1991, of which thirty-nine landmines were actually detonated, fourteen were detected and de-activated and another four destroyed by controlled explosions. In this period, twenty-five people were killed and seventy-six injured. It should be noted that it is often unclear in the sources whether "landmines" refer to antitank and/or antipersonnel landmines.
According to South Africa police figures between 1991 and 1994, twenty-six landmines were seized in South Africa in operations aimed to stem the illegal weapons trade in Southern Africa and in particular the flow of illegal weapons into South Africa.(212) In 1994, the press reported that on 6 December an arms cache was seized in the Ingwavuma district of Kwa-Zulu Natal containing among other weapons four TM7 landmines and thirty-four PMN mines.(213) In April 1995, police seized what was believed to the biggest and most sophisticated arms cache of its kind found in the country, on a farm near Pretoria. The cache included 15 Valsella antipersonnel landmines and one Claymore mine.(214) In the same month another large cache of weapons allegedly stolen from the South African Police training center in November 1994 was recovered. Twenty-six Claymore mines and two practice mines were amongst the arms found.(215)
The number of landmines seized by police in 1995 showed an increase of one over 1994.(216) In March 1996, a cache unearthed near Bloemfontien included landmines and antipersonnel bombs. In November 1996, an advertisement was placed in a daily newspaper's "classified" section by a Cape Town-based man who described himself as a commodities dealer. Under the R200 columns, the man advertised M-18 Claymore, SPM, PMN and PMD-2 mines. He claimed that more than 200 had been bought.(217) As late as February 1998, police raided and arrested exiled Albanian King Leka for the possession of a large arsenal of weapons and explosives, including landmines.(218)
South Africa is emerging as a leader in the field of mine clearance equipment and believes that it possesses leading demining technology and expertise as well as medical capability and experience to assist mine victims. Mechem, a specialized engineering division/subsidiary of South Africa's state-owned arms giant Denel has since 1991 been contracted by both U.N. and private electrical or road-building companies to demine in Mozambique. In 1997, it was estimated that Mechem mine-clearance contracts in Mozambique and Angola have brought in up to U.S. $5 million a year.(219) In August 1997, the South African government signed a R12 million deal with Mechem to clear landmines along the Maputo Corridor.(220)
In October 1997, it was reported that the United States was to order twenty Chubby mobile mine-detection systems developed by the South African company, Dorbyl Ltd (RSD Division).(221) The same article said that the Chubby is being used by the French, British and Rwandan forces as well as by IFOR in Bosnia.
South Africa's involvement in demining has not been without controversy. Besides the issue of "double-dipping", which the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines defines broadly to include demining profits being earmarked for general arms production, Mechem's Terra Limpa (clean land) project in Mozambique recently received media attention because of alleged bad labor practices. In addition, the SACBL has called on Mechem staff to come clean on their apartheid past. A former member of Koevoet and the Civil Co-operation Bureau units who is regularly employed by Mechem appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation to ask for amnesty for his role in the killing of anti-apartheid activists in 1985. Mechem's property was also allegedly used to store large caches of weaponry earmarked for the Inkatha Freedom Party to be used before the first democratic general elections in 1994.(222)
A list of landmine incidents in South Africa is available.(223)
The Kingdom of Swaziland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on the 23 December 1998, the fifty-eighth country to do so. Swaziland voted in support of the pro-ban 1996 UN General Assembly resolution on landmines. During the government statements session of the February 1997 Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo, Mozambique, a Swazi government official, J.M. Dube, High Commissioner to Mozambique, called for a ban "with immediate effect."(224) During the May 1997 OAU Meeting in Kempton Park, Dr Timothy L. Dlamini, Principle Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed Swaziland's full support for the Ottawa Process stating that the government "is convinced that the use, development, production and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines should be banned with immediate effect."(225)
Swaziland supported the landmines resolution by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in June 1997 which was based on the Kempton Park "Plan of Action." At the Brussels meeting later that month, Swaziland endorsed the Brussels declaration and Captain M. Fakudze affirmed that Swaziland's support for "the total ban on manufacture, use, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines" and announced its intent to sign the ban treaty in December 1997.(226) Swaziland attended the Oslo treaty negotiations as a full participant and spoke against proposals to weaken the treaty text. Swaziland non-governmental organizations have been active in the campaign to ban landmines including the Red Cross and the Swazi affiliate of the Southern African Churches in Ministry with Uprooted People.
Swaziland has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Contrary to a report in African Topics , the government has denied that the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force maintains a stock of antipersonnel landmines.(227) The government has stated that Swaziland "does not use, buy or manufacture landmines."(228) However, the Swaziland government has failed to disclose what happened to weapon caches left by African National Congress (ANC) cadres en-route to South Africa from Mozambique, some of which may have contained landmines. Two landmines were recovered in 1993, and three in 1995 in arms caches.(229)
Although Swaziland has not been listed as mine affected by various sources, it does in fact have a landmine problem, albeit very limited.(230) Several Swazi citizens have been killed or maimed by mines along the Mozambique border, including army officers patrolling the border and Ministry of Agriculture officials rehabilitating the fence, which controls foot-and-mouth disease.(231)
In addition, a small minefield exists near the border town of Mananga. In 1988, Swazi authorities blamed Renamo rebels for the mines, but in the 1990s the Mozambican government has been accused of planting them. Another explanation given is that the minefield is simply the result of an error by the Mozambique authorities presuming the area to be South African land. The minefield is well known, fenced and marked posing little or no threat to the local population. The field is 100 meters wide and 10 kilometers long and contains an estimated ten uncleared mines.(232) The extent of spillover from Mozambique border minefields however also needs to be thoroughly investigated.
The United States of America has a direct, bilateral Humanitarian Demining Program with Swaziland to the value of US$210 000. The funds are earmarked to enable Swaziland to develop an indigenous self-sustaining humanitarian demining program by training defense force personnel in demining techniques.
Mine Ban Policy
Uganda's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Honorable Martin Aliker, signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and made a statement to the signing ceremony that:
"Those who have already been maimed and disabled are closely watching to see whether their plight has moved us enough to append our signatures to this very important convention. Uganda has signed the treaty and pending the finalization of our constitutional process shall fully abide by it."(233) Uganda ratified the ban treaty on 5 November 1998. The instrument of ratification was handed over to the UNICEF Country Representative in Uganda for onward transmission to the U.N. Secretary-General and deposited on 25 February 1999. Uganda has not yet enacted domestic implementing legislation.
Uganda played an active role during the Ottawa Process. It endorsed the Brussels Declaration, was a full participant to the Oslo treaty negotiations, supported statements and resolutions taken on landmines by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and and voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions on landmines in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
The Government has stated that it has never laid mines. It also states that the locations of the mines laid by rebel groups are not marked and the government does not have accurate information on them. Uganda has made a statement that the Uganda Armed Forces will not engage in the use, production, storage or transfer of APMs; a military directive was issued to that effect.(234)
Ugandan military forces have been supporting opposition forces fighting against the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). (See country report on DRC). The Namibian Defense Ministry has accused Uganda of laying mines in the conflict. When two Namibian soldiers (fighting in support of Kabila) were killed by a landmine in November 1998, the Defense Ministry said that it and its allies "hold Rwanda and Uganda responsible for using antipersonnel landmines, weapons which the international community has banned."(235) However, there is no conclusive evidence that Ugandan forces have used AP mines.
Uganda is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the amended Protocol II on landmines. Following the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo in February 1997, a number of Ugandan NGOs, including the Ugandan Association of Medical Workers for Health and Environment and IPPNW-Uganda, formed the Uganda Campaign to Ban Landmines (UCBL). The campaign held a number of public seminars on the issue and informed the Ugandan media. In September 1998, the World Health Organization (WHO), with the support of the Ugandan Campaign, held an inter-regional workshop in Kampala on public health and antipersonnel mines.
Production and Transfer
Uganda produced AP mines until at least 1995. These mines were produced by the State-run National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) at Nakasongora. The factory was constructed between 1987 and 1992 with assistance from China's China Wabao Engineering Corporation.(236) According to Ugandan officials the plant produced two antipersonnel mines, a PMD-6 and a plastic mine.(237) The factory had a capacity of to produce 50,000 mines per year, and by one account had produced a total of 10,000 by 1997.(238) But, according to NEC's acting Managing Director, Major Fred Mwesigyi, the Nakasongola factory stopped producing AP mines in 1995 because of the worldwide campaign against mines. Mwesigyi also said that "all the mines and grenades we produced have since been kept in stores and have not been sold anywhere." He said that the factory now produces dry cell batteries instead of mines and grenades(239) Uganda states that it has never exported antipersonnel mines.(240) There is no information about importation of AP mines by Uganda.
At the treaty signing conference in Ottawa in December 1997, Uganda's Foreign Minister said, "We hold a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines which we intend to destroy as soon as possible."(241) The stockpile apparently numbers approximately 50,000.(242) According to a Foreign Ministry official, Uganda has already destroyed some mines--those that it produced itself. But, he indicated that destruction of foreign mines is awaiting acquisition of the technology to do so. He added that Uganda is in the early consultation process with Norway and Austria over acquiring destruction technology and expertise.(243)
Three rebel groups are known to have stockpiles of AP mines, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the West Nile Bank. According to the Ugandan government there is not much information on the quantities and types of these mines but the rebels are believed to be supplied from outside Uganda, mainly from Sudan.(244)
Uganda obtained independence from Britain in 1962 and from the late 1960s until the mid-1980s the country was marked by conflict and numerous human rights abuses, especially under Idi Amin (1971-78) and Milton Obote's second term (1980-85). Obote was again overthrown by his army in 1985 who formed a military government which soon ran into difficulties in its efforts to defeat Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA). After failed negotiations, the government was overthrown by Museveni who was sworn in as President of Uganda in January 1986. He has been president ever since.
In 1987, remnants of Obote's army formed a rebel group, the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) which has enjoyed support from the Sudanese government. It has been fighting the Ugandan government in the northern part of the country mainly in the districts of Gulu and Kitgum. Another group, the West Nile Bank, also supported by Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has been fighting the Uganda government in the West Nile Region. From 1997, a third rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), supported by the previous government of Mobutu and since 1998 by the current government of Kabila in the DRC, and Sudan, has been fighting the Uganda government in the western part of the country in the Mount Rwenzori area. Since 1990 these rebel groups have used antipersonnel mines.
Only a small number of mines appear to have been in used in the pre-1990s conflicts in Uganda resulting in a few mine victims. Arua hospital reports that they get occasional mine victims from the West Nile region who are injured by the mines left behind by fleeing Amin soldiers in 1979.(245) There were only a few incidents or injuries in these former conflict zones in central Uganda indicating that not many mines were used in this conflict.
The 1990s have seen the wider use of landmines. The ADF in western Uganda and the LRA in northern and north-western Uganda have used antipersonnel landmines. Two children were injured by an AP mine in Kitgum district during the first week of January 1999 for example. AP mines laid by the LRA have also been reported in Kitgum and Gulu, and by the ADF in Kasese. In Kitgum the rebels plant mines in abandoned homes, waiting for the occupants to return to check their property.(246) The rebels also plant mines along their tracks, to stop hot pursuit and keep people away from their route ways. In 1998, a teacher tried to follow the path that rebels had used to see where they had gone and was injured by an AP mine.(247)
At the UPDF garrison in Gulu in northern Uganda, Human Rights Watch saw and photographed large quantities of antipersonnel and antitank mines taken from the LRA. They were sorted by type and labeled by date and place of capture. Both the antipersonnel and antitank mines matched the types of many of those seen by Human Rights Watch in Yei and Kaya in Sudan and those seen in Eritrea.(248) During the period 1991-1998, there were a total of 328 landmine casualties.(249) The number of mine injuries is on the decline from 118 in 1996 to twenty-four in the whole of 1998. The most affected districts are Gulu and Kitgum.(250)
In a recent article in the Ugandan newspaper, The Monitor , UPDF Brigadier Katumba Wamala denied that the army had planted landmines along the Uganda-Sudan border.(251) "Do we plant landmines so that our soldiers are maimed? Do you want to talk to my landmines engineer who was hit by a mine when I sent him to detect mines at Agoro area? The UPDF has no landmine fields at the border," Katumba said while responding to a letter, "Save us from landmines."(252) The letter alleged that five civilians have so far been hit by the 5,000 landmines planted by the UPDF at Lomwaka Hills in Agoro.(253) Katumba however, acknowledged that there are more landmines around Agoro hills than anywhere else in Gulu or Kitgum and he said that demining the two districts is difficult because the said mines were planted by the LRA rebels and are scattered.(254)
There are no humanitarian mine clearing and training operations. The UPDF carries out the demining of mined roads in affected areas. In addition to manual clearance, the UPDF uses mine sweeper vehicles popularly known as 'Mambas.' More systematic clearance by the UPDF has resulted in a decline in mine incidents.(255) A special unit of the mechnised division of the UPDF is being trained in mine clearance techniques.(256)
There are no national priorities for demining. The cost of mine clearance is not known and there are no available records of cleared areas. The main obstacle to a more effective mine clearance program is that the mines used by the rebels are scattered. The lack of funds is also a constraint for demining such areas. However, recently some of the areas bordering the Sudan, which were mined by rebels, have been sealed off with barbed wire to exclude civilians from the area and that the civilians have been made aware of this.(257)
There has been some mine awareness activities, mainly through the media, in seminars and workshops and through drama and posters. There are a number of agencies working on mine awareness issues in Uganda including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); the AMHEC (IPPNW-Uganda) and the Ministry of Health. But hardly any people have been trained as mine awareness educators.
The combined number of victims from Kitgum and Gulu Districts per month for the year 1996, 1997 and 1998 were 9.8 and 4.9 respectively, a declining trend.(258) Statistics from the orthopedic center indicates also that the AP mine problem is in north and north-western Uganda, especially in Gulu and Kitgum districts.
Mine Injuries in Uganda, 1991-1998(259)
From the available results so far from four hospitals, the people mostly injured or killed by AP mines are soldiers followed by peasant farmers. Males between the age of twenty and forty are the most affected and the majority of victims were injured while traveling.
Occupation of AP Mine Victims(260)
Occupation Number (Percentage)
Soldiers 54 (67.5%)
Peasant Farmers 11 (13.8%)
Students 8 (10%)
Unknown 6 (7.5%)
Businessman 1 (1.2%)
TOTAL 80 (100%)
Activity at time of Injury(261)
Activity Number (Percentage)
Traveling by foot 28 (53.8%)
Traveling by bicycle 7 (26.9%)
Traveling by vehicle 14 (13.5%)
Farming 1 (1.9)
Grazing livestock 2 (3.9%)
TOTAL 52 (100%)
Landmine Survivor Assistance
In Gulu or Kitgum districts once the patients get to the hospitals they are quickly attended to and usually receive definitive surgical treatment, i.e. amputation would be done within about three hours of arrival, a reasonable time. The Ministry of Health regards landmines as a trauma injury. With the assistance of WHO and CIDA Canada an Injury & Trauma Control Center has been set up which is responsible for documenting traumatic injuries throughout the country. This program is in its infancy and there are no specific programs for psychological and social support services for landmine victims.(262)
There are seven orthopedic workshops in Uganda, four are regional orthopedic workshops, one is a central workshop, and there are two missionary orthopedic workshops run by the Church of Uganda. Most mine victims receive physical rehabilitation at Gulu hospital. While the workshops are well equipped there is a shortage of trained staff. For example there are only eight orthopedic technologists and eleven orthopedic technicians in the whole country and only one social worker attached to the Gulu workshop.(263)
Although the orthopedic workshops are regionally distributed and well equipped, prosthetics and orthotics are not provided free of charge to victims and their costs are prohibitive to most of the population. Even where these are subsidized by government, such as at the Mulago Central workshop in Kampala, the prices are still high and this center is far from affected areas. In Gulu victims cannot afford to pay for wheelchairs.
While the overall number of amputees fitted with prosthesis is low (27.9 percent), the percentage of mine victims fitted with prosthesis is relatively high (55.6 percent). A number of agencies have been donating funds for prosthesis for survivors in Gulu district, including AVSI, the Italian and Austrian governments, the World Relief Fund (WRF) and the Dutch embassy.
Mine Ban Policy
Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 18 June 1998. The country was one of nine African states attending the October 1996 meeting in Canada to strategize as to how to reach an international ban treaty. Attended by 50 countries as full participants and 24 observer states, along with NGOs and international agencies, that historic meeting launched what became known as the Ottawa Process and gave the world, in little over a year, the Mine Ban Treaty. Also in October 1996, a group of concerned individuals, NGO workers, academics and journalists formed the Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Zimbabwe also took pro-ban positions in international fora. On 10 December 1996, along with 155 other states, Zimbabwe voted in the UN General Assembly in favor of Resolution 51/453, which called for an international agreement to ban antipersonnel landmines. In 1997, as Chair of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Zimbabwe helped steer the Continental Resolution DOC CM/2009 (LXVI), which eventually coalesced the African position on a ban.(264) The country continued its commitment to the issue by working with like-minded states within the regional political and economic grouping of SADC.
The Defense Minister, Moven Mahachi on 15 May 1997 announced that Zimbabwe had banned antipersonnel landmines. He stated that:(265) "The Zimbabwean Armed Forces have never and will never use antipersonnel mines, be they 'smart' or 'dumb' in the future. Zimbabwe has not manufactured antipersonnel mines since 1980 and undertakes never to try and acquire the technology or capacity otherwise to do so in the future. The bulk of stocks of antipersonnel mines held presently will be destroyed within the next five years. Only a few will be retained for training purposes and public awareness campaigns, under the strict and centralized control of a specialized section of the Ministry of Defense. Zimbabwe will not allow the transfer of antipersonnel mines into, over or above its territory by any party and will itself not allow the transfer of mines within its territorial borders except for purposes of their destruction, for instructional purposes or in relation to demining operations." With this unilateral ban, and its signature and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, the country has now demonstrated singular commitment to banning APMs at every level. The ban treaty has been incorporated within Zimbabwe's domestic law, but it is unclear if that constitutes implementation legislation.
There have been allegations of use of mines by Zimbabwean forces operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, but the allegations have been vehemently denied by Zimbabwean officials, and no concrete evidence has been presented. (See below).
With South African technical assistance the Rhodesians developed their own landmine manufacturing capacity and began producing the Rhodesian RAP No.1 (nicknamed Carrot Mine) and RAP No.2 (nicknamed Adams Grenade). These Rhodesian mines were dangerous to handle and equally hazardous to produce. Carrot mines were produced by Cobrine Engineering, which was run by a United States citizen.(266) The production process was so dangerous that following a spate of accidents the Rhodesians closed the operation down and relied on supplies of landmines from South Africa in the last years of the war. The production of a Claymore type mine, the PloughShare was more successful.(267)
The PloughShare command-detonated mines continued to be produced by Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI) after independence. According to the government, production stopped sometime between 1990 and 1993(268) "when the call to ban antipersonnel mines gathered momentum."(269) Against persistent rumors that the country was continuing to produce mines, on 25 March 1997, the ZDI invited the Zimbabwe Campaign to Ban Landmines, foreign military attaches based in Harare and other diplomats for an on-site inspection at the ZDI factory in Domboshawa where they were also shown dismantled antipersonnel mines. Colonel Tshinga Dube told the visitors that ZDI had produced Claymore mines at the Toolmaking and Engineering factory in Bulawayo until 1991 but had stopped. Soon afterwards, the Minister of Defense, Moven Mahachi issued a comprehensive government position on the issue of landmines "to demonstrate support for the current international efforts and (register) revulsion towards the use of antipersonnel mines in any type of warfare."(270)
Concrete evidence of any post-independence export of Zimbabwean antipersonnel mines is scarce. The Center for Defense Studies at the University of London reported in 1996 that Zimbabwe supplied landmines to the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA).(271) Also at Zimbabwe's annual International Trade Fair in 1994 in Bulawayo, Zimbabwean manufactured landmines featured prominently among the products exhibited by the state-owned ZDI.(272) According to the U.S. Department of Defense Mines Facts CD-ROM Database, Zimbabwean PloughShare mines have been found in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia. RAP-1 mines have been found in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and RAP-2s in Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia. In addition to its mines inherited from Rhodesia and those produced domestically, Zimbabwe appears to have acquired mines from a number of other countries, including the Soviet Union, Italy, and Portugal. (See below).
The government in 1997 stated that: "Zimbabwe will not allow the transfer of antipersonnel mines into, over or above its territory by any other party and will itself not allow the transfer of mines within its territorial borders except for purposes of their destruction, for instructional purposes or in relation to demining operations."(273)
The Minister of Defense in 1997 acknowledged that Zimbabwe had inherited Rhodesian stocks of the "PMD6 World War II type mines and its related technology." He said, however, these mines had been destroyed during the sabotage at Inkomo barracks "carried out on 16 August 1981 and destroyed Z$50 million worth of weapons and ammunition."(274)
In 1997, the government committed itself to destroy what antipersonnel mines it had in stock "within the next five (5) years, with only a few retained for training and public awareness purposes" to be managed "under the strict and centralized control of a specialized section of the Ministry of Defense."(275) An Army official told Human Rights Watch (HRW) at that time that Zimbabwe had more than just PMD6 mines in its stockpile and that there were some 1,000 mines.(276) HRW was told that there were POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M from Russia, RAP No.1 and RAP No.2 left over from Rhodesia, Italian VS-50s, Portuguese M969s and Zimbabwean PloughShares (ZAPS) in the stockpile.(277)
Zimbabwe has deployed combat troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since August 1998 in support of the government of Laurent Kabila. There are a number of allegations that Zimbabwe has laid landmines in DRC around Mbuji Maya and Cabinda. No concrete evidence has been presented. A number of Zimbabwean troops have fallen victim to landmines at the warfront in the DRC.(278) Contacted by Human Rights Watch, the Defense Advisor at the Zimbabwean High Commission in London, Lieutenant-Colonel Ezekiel Zabanyana said, "We do not use landmines in the DRC. This is improper. We are signatories to the Convention and we abide by our commitment to this Convention. This is emphatic." When asked whether this meant that Zimbabwe refrained from the use of all mines, at home and abroad, the Lieutenant-Colonel replied, "No. That is correct."(279)
As early as 1969 the possibility of nationalist use of landmine warfare within Rhodesia was discussed at length within Rhodesian military circles. The first mine incident targeted against the Rhodesian security forces was actually on Mozambican soil on 27 April 1971 at Mukumbura, killing one Rhodesian soldier. In July 1971, Rhodesian police uncovered a number of crates of weapons in Salisbury, including six antipersonnel mines. The weapons were, according to one author, to have been distributed to secret caches across the country in preparation for increased nationalist operations.(280) The first incident reported on Rhodesian soil followed soon afterwards, in August 1972. From then on the number of landmine incidents steadily increased.
ZANLA guerrillas favored using Chinese-made TM57s, unmarked TM46 and TMH46s (with an anti-handling device) and wooden TMD-B mines. POMZ antipersonnel mines were also used.(281) ZANLA's strategy was to restrict mobility by liberally mining roads and protecting approaches to bases. By 1974 the Rhodesian security forces admitted that insurgent landmine warfare was exacting "a heavy toll on vehicles and lives" and that fifty-seven civilians had been killed, thirty-four of them Africans.(282)
From December 1972 until January 1980, when the war ended, there would be 2,405 incidents involving vehicles detonating nationalist planted mines, resulting in 632 dead and 4,410 injured. By 1979 landmine incidents increased dramatically by 234 per cent, a reflection of the spread of the war.(283)
In the 1983-1987 conflict in Matebeleland, ZAPU dissidents received from South African-linked sources forty-seven TM57 Russian anti-vehicle mines between April and November 1983; at least one was laid in Western Matebeleland that year. In December 1983, Zimbabwean military officials, with intelligence gleaned from ZAPU dissidents retrieved several ZAPU dissident caches hidden in Botswana including "a variety of mines."(284) For the rest of the Matebeleland crisis the dissident groups were poorly armed, mostly restricted to using AK-47s, but they did also use improvised mine-like devices in some of their operations.(285)
Incursions into Zimbabwe along the Eastern Highlands by Mozambique's Renamo rebels saw the renewed use of landmines on Zimbabwean soil. Incursions began in June 1987 and continued until December 1990. Several mine incidents in this period were probably due to Renamo action. The only one to attract international attention was the maiming and killing of British tourist, David Pearson, in 1989 while on a family holiday at the Chimanimani National Park on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Although the Zimbabwean authorities described this as a "freak accident," there were other mine incidents in the area before, including one in which one person was killed. Information about mine incidents during this period was suppressed by local residents, who were fearful of reprisals by the security forces.(286) The Zimbabwean authorities also downplayed this incident because of fear that it would discourage tourism to Zimbabwe, a lucrative source of foreign exchange.
In October 1995, police detained William Nhamakonha in connection with an alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Robert Mugabe. According to police, Nhamakonha was a member of a shadowy Zimbabwean dissident group, the "Chimwenjes" and was found to be in possession of weapons including a landmine.(287)
In addition to the recent deployment of troops in the DRC, Zimbabwe deployed combat troops, in Mozambique between 1985 and 1992. In the war against Renamo in Mozambique in the 1980s, Renamo alleges that Zimbabwean troops used landmines against it. This can not be confirmed, but research has shown that in at least one incident mines were used against orders and those responsible were disciplined.(288)
The Rhodesians boasted that by 1979 their border minefields were the "Second Largest Man-Made Obstacle in the World," after the Great Wall of China.(289) Whatever the truth of this claim, these border minefields still contain from one to three million mines and continue to take human, livestock and game victims, nineteen years after the war ended. Short of soldiers, the Rhodesians felt that a mined border would address both the manpower shortage as well as the intensifying military threat.(290)
Zimbabwe's landmines problem is well-known and documented. The government has confirmed that minefield plans were handed over by the Rhodesian military at independence in 1980.(291) Mine-Tech conducted an E.U.-financed study of the border minefields in 1994 and 1995 with the objective of defining the precise location and nature of the minefields, assessing their socio-economic impact and preparing a costed and prioritized proposal for clearance. According to the survey, Zimbabwe is host to an estimated 1.5 to 1.8 million antipersonnel mines, and some ten thousand PloughShares (PS) and Claymores littering over 8,566 sq. km. These remain from an estimated 2,528,800 APMs and 76,600 PloughShares laid between 1974 and 1980. The Mine-Tech survey also concluded that over ninety percent of the minefields' protective fencing had been removed by local people to use as materials around small patches of vegetable gardens or in the construction of cattle pens. These "open minefields" were a health hazard to those living nearby.
The EU used the results of this survey as the basis to draw up its terms of reference for the tendering to clear the Mukumbura Minefield.(292) However field work by Martin Rupiya of the ZCBL has identified an undocumented minefield tucked inside Kariba town.(293) One wonders how many more of these there are.
The first Rhodesian minefield to be laid was a hectare of 3,000 homemade PMD box mines around the Kariba Power Station. It was completed on 11 November 1963, a few weeks prior to the formal distribution of federal assets at the Victoria Falls Butler Conference in December 1963. The minefield was aimed at hindering any Zambian post-Federal efforts towards gaining control of the jointly owned installations.(294)
Only in 1973 with increasing nationalist infiltration did the Rhodesian authorities consider building new minefields. The decision was finally made in 1974 to build a minefield along the northeastern border, coupled with the creation of a "no-go" area. Several types of minefields were examined by the Rhodesians, before a down-graded Israeli system was chosen. Some Rh$10 million was approved for the minefields, which would include thousands of mostly Portuguese type M969 antipersonnel mines. The planned density of the minefield was three blast mines per meter or 5,500 per kilometer. Later other mines were put into the fields, including South African R2M1 and R2M2 and Italian VS50 antipersonnel mines. Laying mines in these fields began in May 1974 and continued to 1979.(295)
The early border minefields were constructed in the conventional manner, demarcated on both sides by security fencing with prominently displayed warning signs. Later the fence on the hostile side was taken down and maintenance and care of the minefields declined as the war progressed. Mine laying became uncontrolled and unrecorded and booby trapping flourished. They also increasingly included Claymores and PloughShares.(296) By independence in 1980, Zimbabwe had seven minefields measuring 766 km located along its borders with Zambia and Mozambique. An estimated 2. 2 million antipersonnel blast mines and 22,000 PloughShares were sowed.(297) These minefields were the Msengedzi, Mukumbura, Rushinga, Nyamapanda to Ruenya Minefield, stretching for 359 km constructed from 1974 and took two years to complete. The 50 km Sheba/Stapleford Forest to Mutare south; the 4 km Burma Valley-Junction Gate Minefield; the 72 km Junction Gate to Muzite Mission and the 61 km Malvernia (Songo) to Crooks Corner (Pafuri) Beit-ridge minefields. The last minefield to be constructed was the 220 km Kazungula, Victoria Falls, Deka to Mlibizi obstacle.(298)
Mine Action Funding
Since 1980, the Zimbabwean government has regarded landmines as both a developmental and security issue. In August 1980, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe announced in parliament that minefields covered an area of 2,500 square kilometers along 70 kilometers of Zimbabwe's border and that a group of soldiers had been assigned to remove the mines as a matter of urgency.(299)
In 1981, the minefields have been acknowledged as "devastating (culminating in) the serious breakdown in animal disease control with outbreaks of tick-bone and foot and mouth occurring in the border regions. An estimated one million cattle were affected and of this sum over thirty-per cent were from the Tribal Trust Lands."(300) In the ZIMCORD Conference on Reconstruction, Z$1.3 million, spread over the three years of 1980-83 was sought to compliment local funding for mine clearance - to provide for salaries, fuel and maintenance of equipment through the Army Engineers Corp.(301)
The extent and nature of the problem was seriously under-estimated in 1981. The Government believed that clearing of the minefields had to be done by military engineers with specialized expertise using special equipment and that it could be done in three years. In areas not scheduled for immediate clearance the government said it would replace the lost protective fencing to prevent accidents and recover for resettlement schemes when it was no longer needed.(302)
Britain provided Z$461,000 and the United States Z$850,000 for mine clearance. The then Federal Republic of Germany donated clearance equipment and by late 1982, Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) Engineers began official clearance operations. Army operations have since continued with funding from the government. By 1984, the U.S. had discontinued most of its aid due to the lack of government money for demining.(303)
Government funding has continued to be a problem. In an address to parliament on 6 May 1998, the Minister of Defense, Moven Mahachi reported that for the financial year ending in December 1998, only Z$155,000 (Z$38 for US$1) was received from a total bid of $2 million dollars for National Mine Clearance. This allocation was barely enough to meet procurement of oils and lubricants for the repair and maintenance of equipment. The National Mine Clearance Committee based on previous deployments had also quantified costs of clearance. This showed that nearly $750,000 was required to clear 20 km (twenty) at 1997 prices. Not only have the costs predictably risen in the interim but the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated by over 60 per cent against major currencies since August 1998. This has made the cost of clearance almost impossible to contemplate and make provision for from local resources. The Minister of Defense publicly called for Members of Parliament and other well wishers to solicit donor assistance to eradicate the landmines menace.
The European Union, in January 1996, agreed to fund an ECU 10 million program to clear the Mukumbura minefield, the Cahorra-Bassa to Twenya river minefield, a length of 335 kilometers. Mukumbura has been made a priority by the Zimbabwean government because of the need of the local population to gain access to water resources and reclaim land in the area, but also because the Rhodesian minefield did not follow the border, making a new de facto border. There is also illegal gold prospecting in the area.(304)
A German firm KOCH MINE-SAFE registered under the Company CLAMA Enterprises won the tender in 1998. KOCH-MUNITIOSBERGUNGS claims it can complete the contract in eighteen months. GESELLSCHAFE (UXO) Ordnance Mine Clearance Company is in partnership with the ex-combatants offering them technical assistance and the Zimbabwean based firm Rom-Tec is also involved.(305) A 500,000 ECU Quality Assessor contract was awarded to a British based firm BACTEC International Limited.
In July 1998, the U.S. military, under the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program, started a U.S.$2 million project providing several advisors and equipment for ZNA mine clearance at Victoria Falls. In March 1999, a team of U.S. Army officers arrived to train the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) in mine clearance, and the team made a donation of U.S. $756,000 to purchase clearance equipment for the ZNA.(306)
Little has been done to warn border communities about the dangers of landmines. To prevent continued mine accidents in the interim, some police and Defense officials claim to be carrying out local mine awareness campaigns in their border regions. There is need of a sustained mine awareness program.
A National Mine Clearance Committee was formed in 1981 to coordinate and manage mine clearing operations, with representatives from interested ministries and chaired by the Commander of Engineers. Its duty was to prioritize projects and administer funds allocated to the program. But no policy document was ever drawn up and the committee ceased to operate in December 1985. From then on the Zimbabwean army decided on priorities for mine clearance.(307) Between 1980 and 1995 the ZNA cleared sixteen areas of landmines.(308)
These initial mine clearance priorities were primarily areas of economic and infrastructural interest. The border minefields have generally not been a government priority due to scarce resources and political commitments elsewhere, the conflict in Matebeleland, and later the ZNA's involvement in Mozambique. The Mozambican border minefields were also seen until 1992 as a useful barrier against Renamo rebel incursions, although they had been easily breached during Zimbabwe's nationalist struggle.
Although attempts began in 1983 to clear the ninety-seven kilometer minefield beginning at Victoria Falls and proceeding eastward along Zimbabwe's border with Zambia, this is still far from completion. Since 1983, the Army's National Army Corp of Engineers has cleared only some 10 per cent of Zimbabwe's minefields. They have destroyed only about 12,643 mines.(309) During initial mine clearing efforts in 1983 Zimbabwe converted British commercial tractors and bulldozers for the mechanized clearance of the minefields. Although Zimbabwe produces a mine detector, the NMD-78, most of its equipment dates from pre-independence. Hand-held clearance techniques have also been used by the army.
By the early 1990s, only "economic priority zones" were being cleared, with financial assistance from the U.S. government. Much of the heavy mine clearing equipment given to Zimbabwe shortly after independence was no longer working because of a lack of spare parts and maintenance problems. In 1996 the U.S. military provided a grant of US$500,000 for the training of Zimbabwe National Army personnel in mine clearance techniques and for the rehabilitation of some mechanical clearance equipment.(310)
As a result of the EU survey, the EU announced in January 1996 that it would donate approximately US$10 million for mine-clearance in north-eastern Zimbabwe.(311) In February 1996, the government announced that they expected the EU de-mining contract to begin operations in 1997. After inaction for one year, government officials said in January 1997 that tenders would be accepted soon. In February, it was announced that work would begin in mid-1997, although tendering had not yet been done. In October 1997, the government's tendering process was about to begin and would last ab out four months. Only then would the decision-making process commence, and work should begin some time in 1998.
In April 1998, a Zimbabwean government official announced that the contract had been awarded to a German firm - one of the few eligible bids.(312) It was only two months later that the award was officially announced. In December 1998, KOCH MINE-SAFE had just begun deploying its trained members onto the Mukumbura Minefield. This follows a three-month training period for deminers. Six teams were trained, each comprising fifty men, to begin operations from three sites at Chidodo, Musengezi and Nyamapanda.(313)
In addition to the EU program, the United States in 1998 began assisting mine clearance at Victoria Falls under the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Operations. The U.S. provided two advisors, equipment and funding assistance. According to the Zimbabwean government US$2 million has been allocated to the Victoria Falls project.(314) Between July and October 1998 the program claims to have cleared 166,000 sq. meters.(315) The project began in an area where clearance had been attempted three times since independence, by army shooting at the mines, by burning the undergrowth and by bulldozing. Bulldozers and a tractor turned into a bulldozer have been used in this project which by December 1998 had found only two inoperable M 972 mines, mistakenly identified as R2M2s.
The use of these bulldozers has been slowly made worse by unusually heavy rains In early 1999 the area around Victoria Falls was declared clear and the teams set to move out to the rural areas of Deka, Dete, Mlibizi and Binga. The quality and standards of this clearance operation have been questioned in an independent inspection. In a confidential report on "Demining incidents in southern Africa" for the U.S. government's CECC M NVESD, the report concludes that "while it may be true that those required by humanitarian demining this effort is in peace time clearance by personnel supposedly trained by the U.S. I have never personally seen such a poorly organized apparently random clearance undertaken in such a careless and unprofessional manner." (316) The U.S. trainers are not allowed into the minefield although it is the training ground and those inspecting the program found deminers not using protective gear, cutting safety procedures and using techniques that are not up to humanitarian standards. As this is a military to military program there is no outside independent quality assessment.
With the 359-km Mukumbura and the 220-km Victoria Falls Minefields having found sponsor, this has left five minefields measuring 187-km still waiting urgent attention.(317) The government hopes that international donors will funds clearance operations in the remaining five minefields.
Zimbabwean Mine Clearance Firms
Founded in 1992, Mine-Tech is a division of Stongman Engineering Ltd, based in Harare. The company is directed by Col. (Rtd) Lionel Dyck, a former commander of Zimbabwe Special Forces who retired from the army in 1990, and employs demobilized ZNA military personnel. Mine-Tech conducted the E.U.-financed study of the border minefields in 1994 and 1995 with the objective of defining the precise location and nature of the minefields. In 1995 and 1996 Mine-Tech engaged in several mine clearance contracts for local commercial firms. Mine-Tech also conducted mine survey, awareness and clearance in Mozambique, Somaliland and Bosnia. The company has not been without controversy, blamed for "double-dipping" because its management are former Rhodesian soldiers, and also accused of racism in its staff management.(318) It also protested at not being awarded the border minefield contract, having been disqualified because it had conducted the original survey.(319)
This is a small Harare-based firm. It has been trying to develop a mine resistant vehicle, the Pookie and claims to have developed a detector for non-metallic mines. It has been sub-contracted by Koch-Mine Safe. It has tried to undermine Special Clearance Services in Mozambique.(320)
Special Clearance Services
Special Clearance Services is run by Benrie Auditorie out of Harare. It has conducted a number of small commercial clearance contracts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique.(321)
This firm, based at Msasa, Harare, has since 1997 manufactured humanitarian demining equipment, particularly an early design of AVS/NVESD apron and visor and genital protection. This production has been assisted by a charitable grant aimed at getting humanitarian demining equipment to be manufactured near to the place of use. The U.S. Army is one of the customers, issuing visors, aprons and genital protectors to the ZNA clearing mines at Victoria Falls. They also purchased visors and aprons for the Namibian training program. Mine-Tech, MgM in Angola and HI in Mozambique also use the visors.
Reconstruction & development of cleared areas
The resettlement of people into areas that have been cleared of landmines or from areas that are contaminated have been marked by official and unofficial complacency, a lack of planned action or a chaotic settlement strategy. Above Pafuri, in the southeast of the country, the Dumisa and Chinotera communities were moved in the war and mines were planted around the areas vacated. This included the single watering point for both humans and animals in the normally parched zone. At independence, the communities returned to their traditional land now infested with mines. They have since become squatters on the grazing fields of the Mphahle, a situation that has evolved into constant and bitter fights amongst the community.
The current United States Army and Zimbabwe Engineer Corps initiative in clearing the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield will benefit the resort town of Victoria Falls. Owing to increasing tourism, at least two major hotels are planned to be opened in the next few years. This has created employment downstream in the services and banking sectors with most of the workers residing in the Chinotimba African Township. The administrative council has so far failed to expand housing units and other facilities at the edges of the Town because of the minefield. Some houses built are barely seven yards from the edge of the minefield. The sewerage works had also been hemmed in with little prospect of expansion until the mines had been lifted.
The oldest minefield in the country, around the Kariba Power Station, has also restricted plans to expand working space. On at least two occasions, the Company, CAPCO has had to call in the Army Engineers to clear certain patches in order to add further buildings in order to cope with the increase in hydro-electric output.
Since independence in 1980 nearly 13,000 landmine incidents had been recorded countrywide. However, the independent survey by Mine-Tech and our own fieldwork has revealed that the national statistics are understated by as much as forty percent. Police Stations and major hospitals are on average one hundred kilometers from most of the border areas.
Simply reporting landmine incidents to the authorities was until recently problematic for people living in border areas. Ernest Katoma from Dendera village, a few hundred meters from the Mozambican border, told a Zimbabwean magazine in 1994:(322) People are afraid they will be locked up if they report a landmine incident to the Police. During the war in Mozambique, villagers would be interrogated by the Zimbabwean security forces if such incidents were reported to them because they were afraid people were collaborating with Renamo.
Since the war ended in Mozambique in October 1992, villagers living on the border remain ambivalent about reporting landmine incidents. They fear that the police will suspect them of being, or helping, border jumpers from Mozambique, BJs as they are commonly known.
From the government's statistics, Mine-Tech Survey and our own fieldwork, it is estimated that 70 people have been killed while over 400 have been maimed by the landmines. Some of the victims residing near the more active minefields have had several near escapes. Others had not been so lucky.(323) These incidents are far from urban areas and as they do not impact on the elite community are rarely captured in the news.(324) Zimbabweans continue to be landmine victims. On 29 January 1999, two children walking on a path to school in the Chimoyi area adjacent to the Mukumbura minefield --one stepped on a mine which injured the child and the one following behind.(325)
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Although social service support for anyone seeking medical assistance is available subject to passing a stringent and some would say humiliating means testing, no special funds have been set aside for landmine victims. The state provides up to fifteen per cent of medical costs to victims of mines. The individual meets the rest of the cost. An artificial arm is retailed at Z$15,000 while a foot is Z$ 8,000. The ICRC ran a rehabilitation program in Zimbabwe from 1985 to 1990 during which 1,400 new prostheses were manufactured. This program was then handed over to the Ministry of Health.(326)
Researchers have found numerous cases of victims using sticks as limping aids or simply hobbling about without artificial limbs because the price of them is beyond their reach. Local production of limbs is either through a government prosthetics center or out-contracted to the major private company in Bulawayo. The period from fitting to delivery was shortened by a donor funded program which catered for Mozambican refugees in the Mazoe River Bridge and Chambuta designated locations but this ended in 1993 after the general repatriation of Mozambican refugees.
Human beings are not the only victims. Over 15,000 cattle have also perished, especially in the Chisumbanje, Mwenezi area, a major cattle rearing zone in the country. In the socio-economic environment of southern Africa, cattle represent a value that cannot be easily quantified. Not only are these family assets to be passed down from generation to generation but they are also viewed as a bank, of ceremonial value used to bind marriages, funerals, celebrating births, graduations or appeasing spirits. In the day-to-day use, these provide draught power facilitating the movement of heavy loads and other household materials as well as readily available manure.
In the "open minefields" adjacent Game Parks, unaccountable numbers of game have also detonated antipersonnel mines. Some of the wounded beasts then wandered with half-destroyed feet around the villages until put down by wardens from the National Parks and Wild Life. Tourist groups have witnessed landmine wounded animals, as most of these incidents are common around the Hwange National Park near Victoria Falls and the Gona Re Zhou northeast of Beit-Bridge. The mines in and around the Game Parks pose a serious threat to the tourist industry.
Commercial acreage of timber has also not been able to be harvested after maturing in the Eastern Highlands due to landmines. Zimbabwe has losing in excess of Z$5 million a year in lost earnings from the timber located inside the minefield.
Economic activity between communities residing on both sides of the borders of Mozambique and Zimbabwe have also been impacted by landmines. The only permanent solution is to clear the mines and allow the emergence of healthy and mutually reinforcing social and economic relations on the borders between Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
The Zimbabwean minefields are known breeding grounds of Tse-Tse fly which carries Trypanosomiasis (better known as sleeping sickness). They also provide sanctuary for large numbers of grain ravaging quela birds and ravenous locusts. Since the establishment of the landmine obstacle in 1974, Rhodesia abandoned all pretense of paying attention to regional disease control. After independence in 1980 the resumption of these efforts has been difficult because of the threat these mines posed to the teams. Temporary and inadequate measures have been instituted in the form of opening access corridors but this has not been enough to contain the hazard. The result has been an unquantifiable economic loss of cattle, outbreaks of Newcastle disease affecting fowl and Foot and Mouth disease in sheep, goats and cattle. Requiring the northeastern regions of Zimbabwe to be placed under quarantine have occurred with disturbing frequency. Zimbabwe has experienced a number of export bans lasting several months to export meat to the lucrative European market. In all instances of outbreaks, the time and effort spent in regaining lost ground before production and exports are resumed can only be permanently eliminated if the minefields are all cleared.
1. 0LM Researcher interview with Ogoudjobi A. Sikirou, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Benin in Brussels, Belgium, 16 February 1999. This is the source for information throughout this report.
2. UN General Assembly resolution 50/74, 12 December 1995.
3. Speech delivered at the Inter-African Seminar on APM, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 3 June 1998.
4. His Excellency Ablassé Ouédraogo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Statement to Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
5. Name withheld at the request of the interviewed official.
6. The Burkinabè Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights (MBDHP), the Survey and Research Group on Democracy and Economic and Social development (GERDDES), the Aimé Nikkiema Foundation for Human Rights (FANIDHO), the Coalition of Women's Associations in Burkina Faso (COA/FEB), the Free Trade Union of Magistrates in Burkina Faso (SAMAB), the Association for the Promotion of Disabled Women (APFH), the BurkinabèTrade Union Confederation (CSB), and others.
7. Parliamentary debate, 29 July 1998.
8. LM Researcher interview, 20 January 1999.
9. "Addis Readies for War in the Air," Indian Ocean newsletter (ION 842), pp. 8-9.
10. Nation , 28 March 1998; French military sources.
11. French military sources.
12. Interview with Gen. Zakaria of the Djibouti Armed Forces.
13. On a number of occasions, spokesmen for opposition militia have claimed responsibility for some incidents in which landmines were reportedly used. This was the case on 18-19 March when rebels claimed a successful assault on a military post south of Ali Sabih.
14. "Program Summary - Radio France Internationale," Paris Radio France Internationale , 21 March 1998.
15. Information on mined zones and the types of mines used was obtained from Djibouti military sources and members of the Task Force on Landmines.
16. Interview with Djibouti military officers, 14 January 1999.
17. Landmine Monitor interview with Dr. Mohamed Said Madian, Chief Medical Officer.
18. Nation , (Djibouti), 18 November 1998.
19. "ICRC, UN Applaud Implementation of Landmine Ban," Agence France-Press , 1 March 1999.
20. Mustafa Mohamed Barkat, ICRC Office Manager in Djibouti.
21. LM Researcher telephone interview, regional security analyst Antony Goldman, Economist Intelligence Unit, 25 March 1999.
22. LM Researcher telephone interviews, Malabo, 24-25 March 1999.
23. Declaration of the delegation of the Republic of Guinea to the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.
24. Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "The Mine Ban Treaty and Africa," May 1998.
25. 0Statement by the Lesotho Delegation to the Brussels Conference, June 1997.
26. 0Stephen Rule, The Lesotho Election, May 1998. (EISA: Johannesburg, 1998)
27. 0 Weekly Mail and Guardian , (Johannesburg), 2 October 1998.
28. "Malawi Government Position on Landmines," presented by H.E. General O.B. Binauli, High Commissioner of Malawi to Mozambique, to the Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines, Maputo, Mozambique, 27 February 1997.
29. MCBL includes: the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR), the Malawi Centre for Research, Advice and Education on Rights (Malawi CARER), and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Malawi.
30. Honorable Mapopa Chipeta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, statement to signing ceremony, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.
32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Malawi Ratifies Chemical Weapons and Landmines Conventions," Media Release, 13 August 1998.
33. "Malawi does not produce landmines but is constantly exposed to the dangers long after the war in neighboring Mozambique ended," in Honorable Mapopa Chipeta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, statement to signing ceremony, Ottawa, 4 December 1997.
34. U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Centre Intelligence Report, "Landmine warfare - Mines and Engineer Munitions in Southern Africa (U)."
37. See Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), pp.60-61.
38. Thom Khanje, "Ban Landmines" Sadc Ministers," The Nation, (Lilongwe), 5 September 1998.
39. Gabriel Kamlomo, "Army Ready If Ordered," The Binoculars , (Lilongwe), vol.1, no.23, 8-14 February, 1999.
42. Horace Nyaka, "Landmine Kills Girl," UDF News, vol.5, no.70, November 20-23, 1998.
43. Gabriel Kamlomo, "Landmines Trouble Malawi," The Binoculars, (Lilongwe), vol.1, no.10, November 9-15, 1998.
44. LM Researcher Interview with B. Saize, Makanjira, Mangochi, October 3, 1998.
45. LM Researcher Interview with Lt. Colonel Chidzalo, Lilongwe, 21 January 1999.
46. Interview, Mohamed Touré, Directeur des affaires juridiques at the Ministère des affaires étrangères, 15 January 1999.
47. Association pour le progrès et la défense des femmes au Mali (APDF), Comité d'action de défense des droits et l'enfant et de la femme (CADEF), Convention pour la vulgarisation du droit au Mali (CVDM), Fédération de l'éducation nationale (FEN), Syndicat autonome des greffiers (SAG), Syndicat national de la police (SNP), Réseau des journalistes pour la promotion des droits de l'homme (RJPRODH), Association malienne des droits de l'homme (AMDH).
48. "ATout sera detruit d'ici septembre", L'Essor , Bamako, 27 May 1998.
49. Anonymous Malian sources. From independence in 1960, Mali maintained close links with the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc military powers.
50. Numbers suppled by Colonel Béguéle Sioro, head of Direction du matériel, des hydrocarbures et du transport des armées (DHMTA) du Mali. This agency was in charge of the destruction of the first part of the Malian stockpiles.
51. Information provided by the AMDH, a member of the National Commission to Ban Landmines. The funding and logistics problems are the result of the need to move the destruction site. At present, the site is too close to the city (only 10km away from residential areas) and thus poses a security problem.
52. "Tout sera detruit", 27 May 1998.
53. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Data Base indicates that approximately 1,000 mines will be kept.
54. 'Landmines in Mauritius, "As Dead as the Dodo?", Interview with Rajikeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs,' African Topics , issue 22, January-March 1998.
55. Ban Landmines Group meeting with official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Port Louis, 11 March 1999, in Report of Ban Landmines Group (Mauritius), prepared for presentation at the Southern African Regional Landmines Campaign Meeting , Johannesburg, South Africa, 15-16 March 1999.
56. Meeting with Hon Paul Berenger, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Port Louis, 23 April 1997.
57. L'Express , (Port Louis) and Le Mauricien , (Port Louis), 14 August 1997.
58. CND website: http://www.tropical.co.mz/~plans/, 12 February 1999.
59. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), p. 101.
60. His Excellency Dr. Leonardo Simão, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mozambique, Statement to Signing Ceremony, 3 December 1997.
61. Interview with Sr. Eugenio Come, MINEC, 6 January 1999.
62. HRW, Still Killing , pp. 74-75.
63. Letter shown to Landmine Monitor researcher by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MINEC), Maputo, 11 February 1999.
64. Interview with Sr. Fernando Conselho, MINEC, 11 February 1999.
65. The following section was compiled from Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, pp.63-71; Alex Vines and João Paulo Borges Coelho, "Trinta Anos de Guerras e Minas em Moçambique," in, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Mocambique: Desminagem e Desenvolvimento (Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 1995), pp.11-49.
66. HRW, Still Killing , p. 73.
67. UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Mozambique: The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities , undated, p. 9.
68. The following section and tables was provided by Henry Thompson who analyzed CND's 28 March data and Landmine Monitor data.
69. Laurie Boulden and Martin Edmonds, The Politics of De-Mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp.79-112.
70. Some areas may have been logged as "cleared" when they were described as minefields by the Level 1 Survey but were greatly reduced by dogs or manual passes in a Level 2 Survey. Clearance rates also depend on terrain, vegetation and technical threat.
71. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis , (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998), p.32.
72. CND, The National Mine Clearance Strategy Approach , November 1998 Draft, p. 7.
73. Interview with Jacky D'Almeida, ADP Director, Maputo, 13 January 1999.
74. U.S. Dept. of State, Hidden Killers , p. 32.
75. HALO Trust/UNOHAC National Mines Survey Report, 25 May 1994.
76. Ibid., p. 7.
77. Patrick Channer, Laurie H. Boulden, Teodoro Waty, Report of the Evaluation Mission of UNDP Support to the Executive Directorate of the National Mine Clearance Commission, Moz/95/B01/A/7B/99, December 1997, p. 7.
78. A weakness in the Standard Operating Practice requirements is that it does not require operators to take insurance policies out on their work force.
79. See Draft Proposal of a New Institutional Model for the National Demining Commission , distributed by CND at the International Seminar on Institutional Reform of the Demining Sector, Maputo, 11-12 November 1998.
80. UNDP, Project Document, "Consolidation of the Accelerated Demining Program," Maputo, 24 February 1997, p. 11.
81. Account given at interview with Jacky D'Almeida, ADP Director, Maputo, 13 January 1999.
82. Information contained in email correspondence from Filipe Muzima, NPA Program Director, 12 February 1999.
83. Interview with Nick Bateman, Halo Trust Country Manager, Maputo, 10 February 1999.
85. Interview with Mike Wilson, HI Proximity Demining Director, Inhambane, 25 January 1999.
86. Interview with Chris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Harare, Zimbabwe, 29 December 1998.
87. HRW, Still Killing , p. 92.
88. CND, Bulletin no. 7 , Maputo, September 1998, pp. 22-23 & appendix 'Planed Future Demining Tasks'.
89. EU factsheet: Cost of Landmine Removal - Emergency Opening of Roads in Sofala and Zambezia Provinces , January 1999.
90. HRW, Still Killing , p. 94.
91. Interview with Bernie Auditore, SCS Director, Harare, 28 December 1998.
92. HRW, Still Killing , pp. 90-91.
93. CND, Bulletin no. 7, Summary of Recorded Mine Clearance in Mozambique, Maputo, September 1998.
94. Interview with Bobby DeBeers, CGTVA Field Manager-Mozambique, Maputo, 2 February 1999.
95. CND, Bulletin no. 7, pp. 17-18; "Demining contract blows up," Indian Ocean Newsletter , 13 February 1999.
96. Response to CMCM-administered Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 1 February 1999, on file with author.
97. EU factsheet: Cost of Landmine Removal - Emergency Opening of Roads in Sofala and Zambezia Provinces , January 1999.
98. Portuguese, Tsonga, Xitswa, Bitonga, Mandau, Xissena, Ximanica, Xitewa, Kyanja, Xinhungwé, Loruwé, Chuabo, Emacua, Macua, Swahili, Maconde, Nyanja, Jyao.
99. Handicap International, Accidents from Landmines in Mozambique in 1996 and 1997.
100. Handicap International, Coordination nationale des activités d'éducation pour la prévention des accidents par mines terrestres et autres engins explosifs: Phase Final , Maputo, Mozambique, October 1997, p. 5. Handicap International suggests that mine accidents in 1995 were underreported and that actual numbers of incidents could be as much as three times higher.
101. Fransisco Baptista, Estatisticas da Secção da Medicina Fisica e Reabilitação Para o Ano de 1997 , Maputo, June 1998.
102. Interview with Christina Vera Sage, Coordinator of Health and Social Projects, HI Mozambique, Maputo, 8 January 1999.
104. Baptista, p.2.
105. Telephone interview with Pascal Torres, HI Technical Assistant, Ministry for the Coordination of Social Action, Maputo.
106. POWER Mozambique project pamphlet, undated.
107. Interview with Max Deneu, POWER Country Manager, Maputo, 20 January 1999.
108. Findings reproduced in POWER Mozambique project pamphlet, undated.
109. Interview with Pascal Torres, PAI Project Coordinator, MINEC, Maputo, 12 January 1999.
110. Speech by the Honorable Theo Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 2-4 December 1997.
111. "Government accused of 'ambivalence' on key issue," The Namibian , 16 October 1997, p. 1-2.
112. See Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo Ben Gurirab, letter to Phil ya Nangoloh, National Society for Human Rights, 10 March 1997; and "No rush to sign landmine treaty ... ," The Namibian , 9 April 1997.
113. U.S. Department of Defense, "Mine Facts" CD Rom.
114. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.112; Vernon Joynt, director of Mechem, claimed that South Africa produced PMD-6 mines in the past and assembled them in South West Africa. The MUV fuzes were produced in South Africa.
116. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.113 - citing PROC GEN/EOD/93/4. Confidential Report on Inspection of Ammunition and General Visit, Grootfontein Military Base, by Col D.W.J Radmore, 17-18 March 1993.
117. "Nam edges closer to being proclaimed landmine-free," The Namibian , (Windhoek), 31 August 1998.
119. The Honorable Erkki Nghimtina, Minister of Defence during meeting with NCBL, Windhoek, 12 January 1999.
120. Guardian , (London), 25 May 1971.
121. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.105.
122. The Combatant , July 1986.
123. Paul Moorcraft, African Nemisis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (London: Brassey's, 1990), p.227.
124. Jannie Geldenhuys, A Generals Story: from an era of war and peace (Johannesburg: Johnathan Ball Publishers, 1995) pp.184-85.
125. International Committee of the Red Cross, Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? a study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines (Geneva: ICRC: 1996), pp.31-32.
126. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.123.
127. Namibian , (Windhoek), 5 November 1998.
128. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.116.
129. UNDHA, Landmine Database, Country Report: Namibia , March 1997,
130. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.115.
131. Speech on Mines Awareness, by Lt Col MK Nashandi, Co Engr Regt, Oshikango, 18 September 1998.
132. Namibian , (Windhoek), 9 March 1990.
133. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , pp.113-114.
134. Namibian Police Explosives Unit,' Destruction of Unexploded Ammunition, Antipersonnel and Antitank Mines, 1989 to 1998,' Windhoek, Nampol, 1998.
135. Mines Advisory Group, Namibia , (Cockermouth: MAG, 1998) p.5.
136. "Remarks by U.S. Ambassador F. Ward, Jr., Re-launch of the Mine Awareness Campaign," Oshikango, 18 September, 1998.
137. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.119.
139. U.S. Department of State, Landmine Database, Comprehensive Report: Namibia , 26 August 1997, p.4.
140. U.S. Department of State, "Demining Program Financing History," 11 January 1999.
142. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers , pp.41-42.
143. 'Mine Awareness Campaign,' Lt. Col. MK Nashandi, Co. Engr. Reg., Oshikango, 18 September 1998.
145. NCBL telephone interview with USIS spokesperson, 8 December 1998.
146. Mines Advisory Group, Namibia , (Cockermouth: MAG, 1998) p.11.
147. "Remarks by U.S. Ambassador George F. Ward Jr. Re-Launch of the Mine Awareness Campaign," Oshikango, 18 September 1998.
148. "Statement by Hon. Ben Amathila, Minister of Information and Broadcasting at the Re-launch of the Mine Awareness Campaign," Oshikango, 18 September 1998.
149. Namibian , (Windhoek), 3 March 1998.
150. "Re-launch of the Mines/Unexploded Ordnance Campaign, 1998," Information Campaign on Mines & UXOs , Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 23 September 1998.
151. Namibian Police Explosives Unit,' Destruction of Unexploded Ammunition, Antipersonnel and Antitank Mines, 1989 to 1998,' Windhoek, Nampol, 1998.
152. 'NDF members wounded in the DRC,' Press Release, Ministry of Defence, Windhoek, 26 November 1998.
153. Batseba Katjiuongua in a telephone interview with Mr P. ya Nangoloh, 14 December 1998.
154. Pam Zinkin, "The War, disability, and rehabilitation in Namibia," in Rosemary Preston (ed.), The Effects of War in Namibia (Windhoek: Namibian Institute for Economic and Social Research, 1993), pp.7-1 to 7-29.
155. LM Researcher interviews with Nigérien military and diplomatic personnel, Niamey and Paris, February and March 1999.
156. This observation is based upon discussions with the Association nigérienne pour la défense des droits de l'homme (ANDDH) and certain ex-members of the Organisation de resistance armée (ORA), the Tuareg-led umbrella group of insurgent groups during the later phase of the rebellion. In addition, UK-based Franco-phone Africa specialist journalist Andrew Manley met on several occasions in mid-1994 with Nigérien Tuareg insurgents who had been evacuated to Paris by French sympathisers, for corrective surgery and aftercare for landmine-related injuries. They testified that these had been inflicted by unmarked minefields in combat zones in the Nigérien north, and that the mines had been laid by the Nigérien armed forces.
158. "Tension in Central Sahara," U.N. Integrated Regional Information Network, 18 March 1999.
159. Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (Raddho) and African Topics , Media Workshop, Dakar, Senegal, 3 November 1997; and Union Interafrican des droits de l'Homme and International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Inter-African NGO Seminar on Landmines, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 3-5 June 1998.
160. LM Researcher interviews with Nigérien military personnel, Niamey and Paris, February and March 1999.
161. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1998) p. A-4.
162. See footnote 2.
163. Kwasi Gyan-Apenteng, "Media Workshop Proclaimed A Success," African Topics , no. 21, November-December 1997.
164. Alioune Tine, "Landmines in Casamance Against the March of History," African Topics , no's 23-24, May-July 1998.
165. Handicap International, "The Impact of Landmines in Casemance/Senegal", Exploratory Mission Report , August 1998. To protect sources, this is a confidential document.
166. Barbarcar Ndiaye and Alex Vines, "Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars," African Topics , no. 22, January-March 1998.
167. West Africa, (London) , 9-15 February 1998.
168. HI, Exploratory Mission Report .
169. Africa Confidential , vol 39, no.2, 23 January 1998.
170. Alioune Tine, "Landmines in Casamance."
171. Africa Confidential , vol.39, no.2, 23 January 1998.
172. Barbarcar Ndiaye and Alex Vines, "Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars."
173. West Africa Magazine , 9-15 February 1998.
174. HI, Exploratory Mission Report .
175. Barbarcar Diagne and Alex Vines, "Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars."
176. Alioune Tine, "Landmines in Casamance."
177. Africa Confidential vol.39, no.2, 23 January 1998.
178. HI, Exploratory Mission Report .
179. U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers , (Washington DC: US Department of State, 1993), p. 150.
180. Barbarcar Ndiaye and Alex Vines, "Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars."
181. Alex Duval Smith, "Just a Little War among the Crocodile Swamps," Guardian News Service. Johannesburg . 24 June 1998; West Africa , (London), 26 January - 1 February 1998.
182. Major Herve Petetin, "Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau," United Nations Mine Action Service, December 1998, p. 1.
183. HI, Exploratory Mission Report .
184. "Guinea-Bissau: Mines Discovered on Both Sides of Front," Lisbon RTP Television , 9 November 1998.
185. 'Barbarcar Ndiaye and Alex Vines, "Senegal: Old Mines, New Wars."
186. HI, Exploratory Mission Report .
187. Alioune Tine, "Landmines in Casamance."
188. HI, Exploratory Mission Report .
191. Address to the Signing Ceremony by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, A.B. Nzo, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.
192. SACBL members include OXFAM, the Group for Environmental Monitoring (GEM), the Anglican Church, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and more than 100 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations, religious groups and student movements.
193. Department of Defense, Landmines in the Department of Defense. (SANDF, Logistical Division 20 May 1997).
194. Weekly Mail and Guardian , (Johannesburg), 10 May 1996.
195. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), p. 125.
196. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.129.
197. U.S. Department of Defence, "Mine Facts CD Rom."
201. World of Reunert , 5 (3), April 1997.
202. Department of Defense, Landmines in the Department of Defense. (SANDF, Logistical Division 20 May 1997).
203. Department of Defense, Landmines in the Department of Defense. (SANDF, Logistical Division 20 May 1997).
205. Press Statement by the Minister of Defence, the Hon. Mr. J. Modise, Parliament, 20 February 1997.
206. Department of Defense, Landmines in the Department of Defense (SANDF, Logistical Division, 20 May 1997).
207. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p. 125.
208. Political Conflict in South Africa: Data Trends 1984 - 1988 . (Durban: Indicator SA, 1998); Various Press reports; the South African Institute for Race Relations' Race Relations Survey.
209. Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by the Foundation for Equality Before the Law, June 1996.
210. Star, (Johannesburg), 19 September 1996.
211. Race Relations Survey 1986, Part 2, pp. 517-518.
212. In 1991, nine landmines were found; in 1992 - eleven; 1993 - none; 1994 - six. Chris Smith and Alex Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa , London Defence Studies 42, (London: Brassey's and Centre for Defence Studies, 1997), p.30.
213. Natal Witness, (Durban), 27 December 1994.
214. 1995/96 Survey. South African Institute of Race Relations.
216. 1996/97 Survey. South African Institute of Race Relations.
217. Star , (Johannesburg), 5 November 1996.
218. Saturday Star , (Johannesburg), 6 February 1999.
219. Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 23 May 1997.
220. Star , (Johannesburg), 4 August 1997.
221. Star, (Johannesburg), 1 October 1997.
222. Weekly Mail and Guardian, (Johannesburg), 21 November 1997.
223. 'Political Conflict in South Africa: Data Trends 1984 - 1988.' (Durban: Indicator SA, 1998); Various Press reports.
224. J.M. Dube, "Swaziland's Policy Position on Anti-personnel Landmines," Statement to Fourth International NGO Conference on Landmines in Maputo Mozambique, 27 February 1997.
225. T. Dlamini, "Swaziland Government's Position. Statement to the OAU Conference," Kempton Park, South Africa, 19-21 May 1997.
226. "Declaration by the Kingdom of Swaziland," Brussels Conference, 24-27 June 1997.
227. T. Dlamini, "Swaziland Government's Position. Statement to the OAU Conference," Kempton Park, South Africa, 19-21 May 1997. See also: African Topics , issue 17, 1997
229. G. Oosthnysen, Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa . (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 68.
230. According to the United Nations Country Database, Swaziland is not mine-affected. See: www.un.org/depts/landmine/country/swazilan.htm. In 1993, the United States Department of State stated that Swaziland "has no landmine problem" but in 1998, it revised this to "affected". See U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1993), p. 159 and U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers 1998: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington: United States Department of State, 1998), p. A-2.
231. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), p.138.
232. 0T. Dlamini, 'Statement to the OAU Conference on the Legacy of Anti-personnel Landmines,' 19 - 21 May 1997.
233. Honorable Martin Aliker, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Statement to Signing Ceremony, 3 December 1997.
234. Interview with Issac Sebulime, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Kampala, 29 January 1999.
235. Namibian Ministry of Defense Media Release, "NDF members wounded in the DRC," 26 November 1998.
236. New Vision , (Kampala), 1997.
237. Interview with Major S Muruli, Uganda People's Defence Force, Kempton Park, South Africa, 20 May 1997.
238. New Vision , (Kampala), 1997.
240. Military official, UPDF, Kampala, 25 February 1999.
241. Honorable Martin Aliker, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Statement to Signing Ceremony, 3 December 1997.
242. Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Data Base.
243. Isaac Sebulime, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kampala, 29 January 1999.
244. Military official, UPDF, Kampala, 25 February 1999.
245. Interview with Mr. Mwambu, Surgeon at Arua Hospital, May 1998.
246. Acting General of Health Services, Kitgum, December 1998.
248. Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact. Arms Transfers to all sides in the Civil War in Sudan , vol.10, no.4(A), August 1998, p.43.
249. Hospital records (1991-1998)
251. John Muto Ono P'Lajur, "UPDF Didn't Plant Mines - Katumba," The Monitor , (Kampala), 23 March 1999.
255. Military official, UPDF, Kampala, 25 February 1999.
256. Interview with Luc Deneys, ICRC delegate, Kampala,25 February 1999.
257. Interviews with inhabitants of the Agoro border area who asked to be unnamed, Agoro, Uganda, 20 January 1999.
258. The following section is a brief summary, detailed information is on file with the Mine Monitor and with the Ugandan Campaign to Ban Landmines.
259. AVSI, Hospital Records (1991-1998)
260. Hospital records (1991-1998)
261. Hospital records (1991-1998)
264. "Brief by Minister of Defense to the House on the Convention Prohibiting the Production, Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction and Recommending Ratification," Debates in Parliament, March 1998.
265. Press Statement on Zimbabwe Government Policy on Antipersonnel Landmines, 15 May 1997.
266. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), p. 158.
267. Col. T.J. Dube, "4th International NGO Conference on Landmines: Toward a Mine Free Southern Africa," Maputo, 26 February 1997; see also, . Martin Rupiah, "A Review of Mine-Warfare during Zimbabwe's War of Independence: November 1963 - April 1980," ICRC/OAU Regional Seminar, "Antipersonnel Land-Mines: What Future for Southern Africa," Harare, 20 to 23 April 1997, p. 9.
268. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p.165.
269. Press Statement Zimbabwean Government Policy on Antipersonnel Landmines, Defense Headquarters Conference Room, 4 May 1997.
271. Chris Smith (Ed.), The Military Utility of Landmines...? (London: Center for Defense Studies, King's College, #University of London, 1996), p.13.
272. Fernando Gonçalves, "Landmines: Seeds of Death," Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly , Harare, February 1996.
273. Government Press Statement, 4 May 1997.
274. Paul Moorcraft, African Nemesis War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (London: Brassey's, 1994), p.302.
275. Government Press Statement, 4 May 1997.
276. Col. Nyikayaramba of the ZNA, Harare, 23 April 1997.
277. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p.166.
278. Herald , Harare, 21 December 1998.
279. Telephone interview, London, 19 March, 1999.
280. Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa (Cape Town: Jeremy Spence, 1974) p.52.
281. The Zimbabwe News, vol.10, no.5, Sep-Oct 1978, (Maputo: Department of Information and Publicity, ZANU Headquarters) pp.15-17.
282. Peter Swift, Taming the Landmine, (Alberton: Galago Books, 1986), pp.46-47.
283. Ibid, p.84.
284. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, "Zimbabwe: Apartheid's Dilemma," in P. Johnson and D. Martin (eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), pp.58-60.
285. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, p.162.
286. Daily Telegraph, (London), 10 May 1995. Pearson died after an eighteen hour delay in treating him; the Zimbabwean authorities refused to send a helicopter, fearing the presence of other antipersonnel mines.
287. AIM, (Maputo), 9 October 1995.
288. Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Landmines in Mozambique (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).
289. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing, pp.152-176.
290. Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, Salisbury, 23 to 27 March 1981 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1981) p.31, para.50; Jakkie Cilliers, Counter Insurgency in Rhodesia (London: Croom-Helm, 1985, pp.104-105, 115.
291. Herald, (Harare), 7 October 1984 citing comments by the commander of ZNA Engineers Squadron.
292. Project No.7 ACP ZIM 068 EDF VII (ZIM 7004/000) Minefield Clearance in N.E. Zimbabwe Financing Agreement between The Commission of the European Communities and the Republic of Zimbabwe, December 1995.
293. Martin Rupiya, Landmines in Zimbabwe: a deadly legacy (Harare: SAPES, 1998).
294. Martin Rupiah "A Historical Study of Land-Mines in Zimbabwe, 1963-1995," in, Zambezia , vol .XXII, no1 (1995), pp 45-55.
296. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.159.
297. Col. T.J. Dube, "National Implementation: De-mining in Zimbabwe," paper presented at Towards Cost Effective De-Mining: An Evaluation of Experiences and Technique conference, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 22-23 April 1998.
298. Martin Rupiah, "A historical Study," pp.45-55.
299. ZNBC, 'This Week in Parliament.' 0410 gmt, August 16, 1980.
300. ZIMCORD., p.10.
301. Ibid., p.21.
302. Ibid., p.32.
303. U.S. Department of State. Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis (Washington DC: US Department of State, 1994) p.17.
304. Human Rights Watch, Still Killing , p.173.
305. Telephone interview with Makova, one of the directors running operations and a German representative, Harare, November 1998.
306. SAPA News agency , 31 March 1999.
307. Col. TJ Dube, "National Implementation: De-mining in Zimbabwe."
311. Laurie Boulden and Martin Edmonds, The Politics of De-Mining: Mine Clearance in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999) p. 123.
313. Interviews conducted with Managing Director Makova, Harare, 23 and 25 November 1998.
314. Debates in Parliament, Fourth Session of the Fourth Parliament, 6 May 1998 , Minister of Defense response to Baloyi, MP Chiredzi South.
315. All Africa News Agency, 20 October 1998.
316. CECCM NVESD, 'Demining Incidents in Southern Africa,' January 1999.
317. Herald , (Harare), 4 November 1992.
318. Zimbabwe Mirror , (Harare), 5-11 June, 1998.
319. Financial Gazette , (Harare), 8 October , 1998.
320. Laurie Boulden and Martin Edmonds, The Politics of De-mining, p.90.
321. Ibid for details about its work in Mozambique.
322. George Mangwiro, "The Killing Fields of Mudzi," Horizon, August 1994.
324. Casualties have continued to be experienced by Zimbabwean forces stepping on landmines while deployed on Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia, Angola and recently during military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
325. Police Chief report quoted as Radio One news item at 11.00 gmt, 1 February 1999.
326. International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Landmines in Africa,' ICRC, May 1997.