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In September 1993 the United Nations Security Council declared an arms embargo against UNITA. Members of the observing Troika in the peace process -the United States, Russia and Portugal-subsequently announced that they were lifting their national prohibitions on military sales to the government. Thereby legitimizing the unilateral opting out by the government of the "Triple Zero" (arms embargo) clause in the May 1991 Bicesse peace accords. This clause required the "[c]essation of accepting lethal equipment, whatever its origin."224

While remaining part of the observing Troika, Russia and Portugal continued to supply military supplies to the Angolan government.225 Sir David Hannay, who as the British permanent representative to the U.N. and the U.K. representative on the Security Council in 1993 was actively involved on this issue, stated that: "We made a mistake. We probably should not have allowed the weapons floodgates to have been opened but have concentrated [instead] on making sure the embargo was better implemented."226

Continued Weapons Flows to the Government

Despite the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, both the government and UNITA continued to acquire additional weapons and military hardware. The Lusaka Protocol itself did not prohibit the importing of weapons, although the resupplying of military forces with "any lethal or similar military equipment, "was prohibited under the terms of the Bilateral Cease-Fire Modalities Timetable which accompanies the Lusaka Protocol.227

Moreover, international prohibitions on arms supplies to Angola was neither comprehensive nor enforced. Whereas U.N. Security Council Resolution 864 of September 1993 clearly prohibits the sale and supply of any military or petroleumproducts to UNITA, paragraph 19 allows the Angolan government to import arms and petroleum products, so long as they come in "through named points of entry on a list supplied by the Government of Angola to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify the Member States of the United Nations." If U.N. officials wished to investigate new shipments to either party, they were required to give forty-eight hours' notice. The inherent weakness in this stipulation was that once notice was given any evidence could simply be removed. Moreover, while the government informed the U.N. in advance of the delivery of some weapons shipments, such notification was not normal practice. Finally, the U.N. did not impose quotas on the amount or types of military goods that the Angolan government could import.

In a clear exhortation on the issue, U.N. Security Council Resolution 976 of February 1995 "Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993), and calls upon the Government of Angola and UNITA during UNAVEM III's presence in Angola to cease any acquisition of arms and war material, as agreed upon in the `Acordos de Paz,' (Peace Accords) and to devote their resources instead to priority humanitarian and social needs."

Venâncio de Moura, the Angolan foreign affairs minister, at the time of the Security Council debate on Resolution 976 in early 1995, declared that paragraph 12, advocating an arms embargo on the government "amounted to a violation of Angola's sovereignty."228 The U.S. and U.K. attempted to push for a new total ban on weapons imports but found that Russia opposed this in the Security Council.229 Brazil also lobbied hard for the government's position.

In 1999 the government's armed forces numbered about 110,000, thereby constituting the largest standing army in Africa. Its equipment includes T-55 tanks and several T-62 tanks for elite units; BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored personnel carriers; BM-21 MRL multiple rocket launchers; and SA-7 and SA-14 surface-to-air missiles. Artillery consists mainly of D-30 122mm howitzers, M-46 130mm howitzers, and M-1942 (ZIS-3) 76mm howitzers. A large assortment of other Warsaw Pact weapons systems and light weapons are also in the arsenal. 230

UNITA has alleged that between October 1994 and October 1996 the government's purchases included 300 T-62 tanks, 450 BMP-1 and BMP-2 assault vehicles, an unknown number of ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, 1,500 RPG-7s, 120,000 AKM assault rifles, and forty-five aircraft, includingtwenty-five Mi-24 helicopters.231 In 1999 UNITA claimed to have captured from the government T-55 and T-62 tanks, 122mm D-30 artillery and 122mm BM-21 and BM-24 multiple rocket launcher systems, as well as 75mm232 and 76mm field guns, 82mm and 120mm mortars, ZU-23 mm antiaircraft guns and fuel and ammunition.233

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the government's military expenditure at U.S.$400 million in 1995 and $450 million in 1996. It has been unable to make an estimate for 1997 and 1998.234 The Stockholm-based SIPRI was unable to provide an estimate for 1996, but estimated that Angolan military expenditure in 1997 was $400 million235 and in 1998 estimated spending at $840 million.236

From an official budget of U.S.$2.6 billion for 1997-98, the government has claimed it was going to spend more than $302 million on defense.237 This represents 11.1 per cent of the total budget-an increase of 8 percent from 1996-97. The true figure is unknown, however, because the budget is not transparent on payments for arms. The government on March 26, 1999 approved its latest provisional budget, which included some frank admissions that Angola's access to external financing "is almost at the limit," and that "commercial lines of credit are over-saturated." Defence spending is the priority in the new budget.238 On May 6, the National Bank's governor Aguinaldo Jaime told parliament that the country was facing one of its "worst ever crises." He reported that the "reserves are on the verge of exhaustion and the state has neither money nor foreign exchange." The largest slice of the $5.1 billion 1999 budget went to the Defense Ministry.239

The Angolan government has faced a serious problem with its payments for weapons purchases, having suffered a significant shortfall in budget funds following the collapse of international oil prices in 1998. The government is also faced with the reality that its output of 768,000 barrels per day of oil produces little in the way of current revenue.240 Angola has borrowed heavily in the past, using future oil production as collateral. Past oil-backed loans have been arranged in many shapes and forms including four previous Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) facilities and others arranged by Paribas, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), and the Bankers' Trust for advances of around U.S.$300 million with repayment terms of three years or less and at high interest rates.241 Warburg Dillon Read (WDR), UBS's investment banking arm, was trying in late 1998 and 1999 to put together a syndicated loan of US$500 million but reportedly ran into problems doing so.242 The last big loan was in early in 1998, when the Angolan government reached a deal with the Swiss oil trader Glencore to mortgage virtually the last barrel of the government's own oil production in exchange for up-front payments of some U.S.$900 million. The deal, which was routed through Sonangol, the state oil company and the Presidency rather than the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank did not meet the basic standards of accountability that the IMF was seeking. Its terms guaranteed Glencore some 75,000 barrels per day of the government's allocation. The remainder was tied up in pre-financing deals with Britains Lloyds Bank, BP-Amoco, Chevron, and Elf-Aquitaine.243 On May 18, the state oil company Sonangol announced the signing of a $575 million loan agreement in London underwritten through the Union Bank of Switzerland. The funds will be available in July and a substantial portion of it will be used to re-finance previous loans.244 Only some $35 million was new cash.245 The latest loan effectively stretched out the repayment terms for Angola over a longer period, lightening its short-term repayment obligations.

Since 1996 the Angolan government has been trying to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund over rescheduling its U.S.$11.5 billion debt to foreign creditors. The sticking points in the negotiations with IMF officials have been the lack of accountability in the oil sector and the ad hoc oil mortgage deals the government has entered into. The hiding of significant arms payments from the budget, including the paying off of older loans, defied the transparency requirement for an Angolan agreement with the IMF. The government had hoped in 1998 that some sort of standby agreement could be reached with the IMF, but the Fund insisted that, at the very minimum, Sonangol would need to allow a proper audit of its payment channels. In February 1999 the newly-appointed finance minister Joaquim David, said that the Angolan government was now prepared to reach a "shadow agreement" - an audit of the oil and diamond industry to ensure that revenues were not used for covert arms purchases and loan repayments - with the IMF. Initial talks would begin on March 10.246 An IMF delegation visited Luanda from March 12 and agreed that negotiations would start with the IMF on a monitored economic program in the second half of 1999.247 A deal with the IMF would increase Angola's credibility with creditors.

According to the World Bank's latest review of the external debt position of developing countries, Global Development Finance, Angola's total external debt stock stood at $10.16 billion at the end of 1997. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit this debt will rise to $10.7 billion for 1998.248 The government's relationship with the World Bank was strained in 1999. The World Bank in May announced that it would stop further lending to Angola unless economic reforms were implemented, including controlling corruption and transparency in the oil and diamond accounts, key features in negotiations between the government and the World Bank for several years. Revenue from oil has been the source of huge speculation as its use has been shrouded in secrecy. The World Bank and IMF have insisted that the oil account be audited before they agree to any new projects.

Meanwhile the government hopes to make up much of its current cash deficit through the cash "signatory bonus operating payments" that are to be made by international oil companies in exchange for being permitted to operate in the deep water (at water depths of over 2,000 meters) off-shore blocks thirty-one, thirty-two and thirty-three.249 Oil industry experts say that these were worth around $870 million to the Angolan government based upon estimated oil reserves in the blocksand payment of the Angolan state oil company Sonangol's percentage.250 The breakdown of these one-off non-recoverable cash down payments was reportedly $350 million for block thirty-one, $200 million for block thirty-two and $370 million for block thirty-three.251

On April 13 Sonangol announced the partnership stakes for the three hotly-contested deep water blocks.252 For block thirty-one, the operator, BP-Amoco, along with Statoil, will hold 40 percent; Exxon will hold 25 per cent; Sonangol will hold 20 percent shareholding and the Houston-based Marathon Oil ten percent.253

On block thirty-two Elf will be the operator, with a 30 percent share; Sonangol will hold 20 percent; Exxon and the Portuguese national oil company Petrogal will each hold 15 percent and a Switzerland-based financial company, Prodev will also hold 15 percent. On block thirty-three, Exxon will be the operator with a 45 percent share, Sonangol will hold 20 percent, Elf will have a 15 percent share, U.S. - based Falcon Oil and Gas Co. will hold 10 per cent and the Israel-based energy company Naphta and Petrogal will each have five per cent.254

The oil companies BP-Amoco, Elf, and Exxon made the initial signatory bonus payments; with funds released on June 1 after the formal exploration agreements were signed at the end of May.255 According to the Angolan foreign minister, these funds are earmarked for the "war effort."0

Three small companies that have been awarded concessions in the same three deep water blocks have a track record beyond oil exploration and production. Swiss-based Pro-Dev (in block thirty-three) is owned largely by a businessman who has mediated in substantial arms deals between British Aerospace and several Middle Eastern governments. Pro-Dev according to Africa Confidential has been offering its arms procurement expertise in Angola.1 Naphta (also in block thirty-three) is owned by Houston-based Isramco, and is linked to a Israeli private security firm. Another, Falcon Oil and Gas (block thirty-three) is U.S. based andlinked to businessmen that have been arranging an oil-based pre-financing deal on behalf of Luanda.2

The finance minister, Joaquim David announced on July 29 that the budget would be reviewed as the price of crude had risen to more than $18 a barrel compared with the earlier budget estimate of just $9.0 a barrel, a realistic figure at the start of the year. He said that additional funds would allow increased spending in social projects.3 However, the military seems bullish about its capacity to use such resources for weapons: "We always take losses, then recover," a general was quoted as telling a diplomat, adding that "If we lose a tank, we pick up the phone and order another one. If UNITA loses one, it is more difficult."4

The late U.N. envoy to Angola Alioune Blondin Beye claimed in 1996 that both the government and UNITA were importing unknown numbers and types of weapons as an "insurance policy." "It is simply a symptom of the mistrust that still exists between the two parties," he was quoted as saying.5 What the U.N. failed to address was that these uninterrupted arms imports greatly contributed to the lack of confidence on the ground. José Chipenda, the Angolan secretary general of the All-Africa Conference of Churches, in 1996 supported a call by Human Rights Watch for an arms embargo on both the government and UNITA, saying:

To have peace in Angola you need to build up confidence. How can allowing weapons to flow into Angola help secure peace? Angola needs reconstruction, not more weapons.6

Troika Members

The Lusaka peace process had an observing Troika consisting of the former colonial power Portugal and the cold war protagonists Russia and the United States. This composition was designed to promote, and theoretically should have resulted in, evenhandedness during the peace process. As we shall see, both Portugal andRussia have repeatedly entered into military agreements with the Angolan government, upsetting the delicate balance.


Portugal never saw its entering into military agreements with the Angolan government as an impediment to its role as a Troika member. The Portuguese state General Aviation Equipment Plant (OGMA), which refits and services the Portuguese Air Force, agreed to engage in a joint venture with the Angolan government in March 1996.7 This was followed with an announcement by Portuguese defense minister Viega Simão on a visit to Luanda in 1998 that Portugal would assist in training Angolan military officers and would develop its military relationship further by carrying out multiple cooperation projects in Angola.8 On January 20, 1999, after the war flared up again, the defense minister said that Portugal would continue its "technical military cooperation" with the government despite the renewed war.9

Russian Federation

While being a Troika member in the Angolan peace process, Russia is also a longstanding supplier of weapons to Angola. Angola has a $6 billion debt to Russia, mostly for weapons supplied in the 1980s. In the 1990s, Russia has continued to enjoy the same distinction as the former Soviet Union of the largest arms supplier to Angola. There appears to have been no let-up in Russia's eagerness to sell weapons to Angola, although unlike in the 1980s new deals are no longer done on a credit basis and there have been long delays between purchase and delivery because of payment difficulties. The Russian government appears to have continued its predecessor's dual strategy of the late 1980s of urging peace when possible while at the same time seeking to supply weapons to a longstanding client.10

Angola continued to receive weapons from Russia after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. For example, in March 1995, T-55 tanks and M-46 130mm artillery pieces passed through Luanda's Quatro de Fevereiro airport from Russia.These shipments appeared to represent purchases made since the Lusaka Protocol rather than deliveries on earlier deals.11

In January 1996 Boris Kolokolov, the Russian vice-minister for foreign affairs, visited Lisbon to explain that Russian weapons deliveries to Angola were of a purely commercial nature. According to the Lisbon daily O Independente, Angola spent U.S.$40 million in 1995 on Russian weapons, including Mi-35 attack helicopters (the export version of the Mi-24v).12 In March 1996 the government also arranged for a $75 million credit deal with Russia for six MiG-23s fighters and six MiG-24s fighters, as well as 360 Uzal lorries.13 The government also placed an order with Russia for two Su-24 fighter-bomber aircraft, and there were unconfirmed reports that the financing for this $230 million arms deal went through a French bank.14

December 1997 saw the first signs that Russia would further increase its arms sales to Luanda. On December 4, three senior Angolan military officials left Moscow after a week of talks on updating their equipment. The discussions included the purchase of reconditioned second-hand MiG-23s, spare parts, and ammunition, as only two out of an original force of fifty-five Angolan MiG-23s were operational.15 The delegation visited a storage facility near Kursk to inspect the available "goods." On January 30, 1998 Angola and the Russian Federation signed a military cooperation agreement which provided for technical assistance and the modernization of Angolan military equipment in Russia.16

The December 1997 trip was followed by a visit to Moscow in April 1998 by Angolan foreign minister Venâncio de Moura during which a deal for sixty-fiveBMP-2 armored personnel vehicles was paid for.17 The vehicles arrived in Luanda in mid-April, just after a senior UNITA delegation had also arrived in the capital and was being accommodated in the Meridian Hotel near the port. UNITA claims to have seen in subsequent days a total of sixty-five T-55 tanks and BMP-2s being unloaded from a ship in the port and transported through its main gates.18 Human Rights Watch was able to establish that military vehicles indeed disembarked at that time and included the Russian BMP-2s from the April deal and that the Angolan government had informed the U.N. of the delivery prior to its arrival in Luanda.19 A docker involved in the unloading said that he and his colleagues had been ordered not to place covers over the vehicles-contrary to standard practice-and speculated that this was intended to ensure that the senior UNITA delegation would notice these new additions to the government's arsenal.20

In June 1998 President dos Santos went to Russia with a shopping list worth millions of dollars which included twelve Mi-25 attack helicopters (the export version of the Mi-24D), four Ilyushin-76s, and six Antonov-12 planes.21 The Angolan government also reached an agreement for its MiG-23s to be reconditioned.22 In the following two months three shiploads of Russian light weapons and ammunition were delivered to Luanda port.23 In August a Russian delegation headed by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev visited Luanda for three days and signed an agreement on the repair, servicing, and modernization of a number of weapons systems. The agreement included a five-year plan to build an arms factory in Angola which would act as a workshop for the whole region to upgrade and repair Russian-manufactured military equipment.24 Because of Angola's outstanding $6 billion debt to Russia (for past arms purchases), the deal wasexpected to be funded mainly through diamond joint-venture arrangements, but also through some oil and mining concessions and fishing rights.25

Immediately following his visit to Angola, Sergeyev told Russian TV that "a joint commission set up by the governments of Angola and Russia" was to decide whether Russia would receive hard currency or diamonds in exchange for the weapons.26 A further meeting in November attempted to iron out problems of payment.27

Some of the financing problems appeared to have been resolved, because at the end of November, the state-owned Russian Military Transport Aviation began deliveries of MiG-23s to Angola. According to the terms of the contract, the MiGs, which had been in storage on Russian military bases, were to be delivered by the end of December, assembled, test-flown, and handed over to the Angolan Air Force. Moreover, Russian technicians were contracted to repair the MiG-23s and MiG-22s purchased earlier. Weapons for the aircraft and spare parts were also delivered. The total Russian contract was estimated by the Russian press to be worth U.S.$1 billion, although Western military intelligence analysts put the figures at "several hundred thousand million U.S. dollars."28 In December 1998 the Angolan government reportedly also arranged through Promexport, a Russian state-owned company which deals in second-hand military equipment, a $125 million deal to provide MiG-23s to Angola.29 However, there was a delay in delivery of much of this equipment because of renewed problems in reaching agreement on payment.30

In his first foreign trip, Angola's new foreign minister, João Bernardo de Miranda, visited Moscow from the end of February to March 1, 1999 to discuss "the modernization of the Angolan armed forces, including the training of specialists and the acquisition of equipment."31 Human Rights Watch had been told that the meetings de Miranda had with his counterpart Igor Ivanov, defense minister Igor Sergeyev, and first deputy prime minister Yuriy Maslyukov, who isin charge of Russia's foreign trade and war industry, concerned the method of payment for these contracts.32

These meetings seem to have resolved some of the Russian worries over payment. On March 30, the Luanda-based newspaper Actual reported that there were biweekly flights into Luanda by a Russian Antonov-132 delivering assorted weaponry, including T-72 tanks.33 A researcher from the Economist Intelligence Unit saw an Antonov unloading five Russian tanks in mid-April at Luanda's airport.34 Large quantities of Russian weapons have also been unloaded from ships in Benguela port in mid-April.35 The Portuguese paper Diário de Notícias also reported in mid-April that the Angolan government had purchased SU-24 fighter-bombers, and that Angolan pilots had trained in Russia to fly these and would shortly arrive in Angola.36

United States

The U.S. is the only Troika member not to have tried to push its military services directly on the Angolan government, although in 1996 it pressed hard for the Angolan government to use the U.S. private military company Military Professional Resources Inc., MPRI, to train the newly formed joint army, instead of MPRI's competitor, the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO). Although EO pulled out of Angola officially in early 1996, MPRI failed to reach agreement with the Angolan government and the training program never took off.37 Later, a U.S. firm attempted to sell six reconditioned C-130 Hercules aircraft to Angola for U.S.$72 million, but the deal was blocked by the U.S. Congress in 1997. 38

Non-Troika Members


Belarus has sold military equipment to the Angolan government on a number of occasions. It supplied twenty-one BMP-1 armored personnel carriers in 1993, a further seven BMP-1s to Angola in 1998. The Belarussian company that reportedly sold the vehicles, Beltekheksport, chartered a Ukrainian Air ForceAntonov transport plane to fly the cargo from the Machulische airfield.39 Using the same route in February 1999, Belarus delivered three Grad BM-21 multiple-rocket launcher systems, 1,000 122mm artillery shells for D-30 guns, 2,000 AKM assault rifles, and 10,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition to Angola. These goods were delivered at Catumbela airport on February 16.40 This contract cost Angola $1.4 million.41 The Portuguese press also reported in April that the Angola government had purchased T-72 tanks and long range artillery from Belarus which had been delivered to Luanda in the last few days.42


Brazil has sold weapons to the Angolan government for a number of years. Two ships containing Brazilian weapons docked in Lobito in January 1993, suggesting the Brazil was providing weapons to the Angolan government in violation of the Triple Zero embargo under the Bicesse Accords.43 Further transfers followed in 1994.44 When Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso visited Angola in August 1995, his delegation reached an agreement on an arms deal involving an Avibras Industria Multiple-Rocket Launch System (SS-06), which was paid for in October with U.S.$2.5 million.45 The system was delivered in mid-January 1996 but, according to a Western intelligence source, the ammunition accompanying it had the manufacturer's brand taken off.46 Following a private visit by Angolan President dos Santos to Brazil in August 1998, the Angolan government purchased six EMB-312 Tucano training planes in October at a total cost of around U.S.$15 million, according to news reports in Brazil.47 In 1999Brazil has been supplying nonlethal military aid to Luanda including uniforms, ration kits, and vehicles, such as trucks.48


Bulgaria supplied weapons to Angola in 1993 and 1994.49 In February 1996 acting Angolan defense minister Pedro Sebastião visited Sofia, the first visit by an African defense minister in five years. During the visit Sebastião signed a bilateral military agreement with Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov, at which both countries restored "military-economic relations."50 In practice this meant the purchase of light weapons and ammunition (AK-47s and 60mm mortars), which were transported on a series of flights by an Air Sofia An-124 from Burgas and Sofia in April 1996 to Catumbela in Angola.51


Angola, China's second largest trading partner in Africa after South Africa, made a number of arms purchases during the Lusaka peace process. For example, in October 1997, Yang Wesheng, Chinese deputy minister of economy, trade and cooperation, announced while visiting Angola that trade had been increasing significantly over the previous six months. Part of this trade involved small arms.52 In October 1998, President dos Santos also visited China, seeking to "expand bilateral economic ties" in meetings with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and other officials.53


Poland exported weapons to Angola in the 1992 to 1994 conflict. For example, the irregularities over the sale of armored BWP-2 transporters to Angola in 1996 resulted in the dismissal of Henryk Mika, head of the Polish General Staff's military armaments and equipment department, and Deputy Minister of National Defense Jan Kuriata. This equipment had been commissioned by Angola in1994.54 In August and September 1997 weapons on Polish- and Danish-registered vessels were reportedly delivered at Luanda port.55 According to the Polish news agency PAP, Angola remained one of Poland's main weapons markets in November 1998.56

South Africa

According to South Africa's National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), South Africa exported to Angola in 1998 a total of R8,945,000 (U.S.$1,461,357) in weapons, of which R3,151,000 (U.S.$514,783) was for weapons classified as Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE)57 and R5,794,000 (U.S.$846,574 ) was for Sensitive Significant Equipment (SSE).58 In 1997 no information on transfers to Angola was recorded by the NCACC and in 1996 only the sale of R43,000 (U.S.$7,024) in nonlethal equipment was entered in the NCACC register.59

Other Countries

Human Rights Watch has also seen reports of arms sales by the following countries but has not been able to verify whether these transfers occurred:

Czech Republic: The delivery of Czech-made L-39 ground attack aircraft to Angola in 1998.60

India: A sale of unspecified military equipment to Angola in 1996.61

Israel: The sending of MiG fighter aircraft to Israel for reconditioning in late 1996.62

Kazakstan: The purchase of two Mi-35 attack helicopters (the export version of the Mi-24v) and three Su-22 from Kazakstan in December 1996.63

Slovakia: Oil-for-Slovak-helicopter deal in March 1996 through the Russian state SIMPORTEX and a unnamed Franco-Russian consortium.64

Ukraine: The delivery in September 1995 of six Mi-17 helicopters from the Ukraine. According to media and diplomatic reports the government also purchased ammunition and weapons in 1998 and 1999 from the Ukraine.65 According to the Angolan media, Ukrainian experts have also provided technical assistance to various branches of the Angolan Army on how to use these weapons systems.66

Zimbabwe: The supply of ammunition and uniforms in late 1998 by Zimbabwe Defence Industries.67

Transparency in Arms Transfers

Human Rights Watch believes that states should be willing to provide details about their weapons transfers and other military assistance they provide to other countries. As a rule, if a country believes it is in its national interest to make a particular arms sale, it should be willing to divulge the details of the sale and provide justification. This is particularly necessary in the case of arms transfers to human rights violators, when the possibility of misuse of weaponry is high.

Recognition of the need for disclosure, or "transparency" as it is called in the international security community, led to the establishment of the United Nations Conventional Arms Register in December 1991 to promote "transparency so as to encourage prudent restraint by states in the arms export and import policies and to reduce the risks of misunderstanding, suspicion or tension resulting from a lack of information."68 States are requested to voluntarily submit data on their arms imports and exports, but only for seven categories of major weapons systems: tanks, armored vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

Angola has yet to submit an entry to the register. In the 1994 register (covering the arms trade in 1993) only Russia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic reported arms deliveries to the Angolan government. In the 1995 register (covering the arms trade in 1994), Poland listed the delivery of fifty BWP-2 armored vehicles to Angola, and Slovakia listed the delivery of nine OT-64 armored vehicles and forty 122mm artillery pieces. Despite the evidence documented above of continued exports of weapons systems that fall into the register's seven categories, there has been not one further entry in the 1996, 1997 and 1998 registers by any state concerning arms transfers to the government of Angola.

UNITA Procurement

The Angolan government claimed in December 1998 that it had been surprised to find how well prepared UNITA forces were at the start of a new round of fighting in the civil war, and that these forces were using new weapon systems that included tanks for the first time, a claim that has been repeated in the media a number of times since.69 This claim is not entirely correct. In the 1980s and in the 1993-1994 war UNITA was able to field several armored and mechanized unitswith T-54/55 tanks it had captured from the government.70 However most of UNITA's forces were light infantry backed up by artillery, air defense, and antitank units. UNITA also has used captured 122mm D-30 artillery and 122mm BM-21 multiple-rocket launcher systems widely, as well as 75mm71 and 76mm field guns, and 82mm and 120mm mortars. 72

U.S.-made 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on four-wheel-drive vehicles have been popular with UNITA. Shoulder-fired light antitank weapons (LAWs), as well as RPG-7 rocket launchers have provided additional firepower. UNITA has also utilized captured air defense artillery and shoulder-fired surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs), including SA-7s.73

The Angolan government claims to have captured the following new weapons from UNITA in the fighting since December 1998: BMP-2s, 122mm D-30 artillery, T-64s, BM-21 (MRLs), Zu-23 anti-aircraft guns, and Russian Sam-16s.74 It also has claimed that UNITA has BM-21 truck-mounted rocket launchers and BNP-1 armored vehicles.75 Moreover, the government has reported that in addition to 122mm D-30 artillery, UNITA has G5 155mm howitzers and 106mm field guns, U.S.-made M-60 grenade launchers, RPG-7 rocket launchers, PKM machine guns, AKM rifles, and German G3 rifles.76 Defence Minister Kundi Paihama briefed the National Assembly on May 7, 1999 and said that UNITA had BMP-2 combat vehicles, T-62 and T-64 tanks, Orkan surface-to-surface multiple rocket launcher systems, SAM-8s, Crotale surface-to-air missiles and 122mm self-propelled artillery pieces.77

Richard Cornwall of the Pretoria-based Institute of Security Studies has made more dramatic claims. He claims that UNITA recently obtained six Russian-made MiG-23 fighter aircraft, six MI-25 combat helicopters, fifty tanks and seventy armored troop carriers. He said the weaponry came mainly via Ukrainian suppliers.78 Cornwall has also claimed that the rebels have recently obtained more than twenty Russian-built unguided ground-to-ground mini-scud missiles, knownas FROGs, from North Korea and three Fox 7 surface to air missiles.79 To date Human Rights Watch has not independently confirmed this information.80 There have also been reports that UNITA has generally purchased its weapons from dealers in Bulgaria and Romania.81

A number of diplomats have also told Human Rights Watch that military equipment has been purchased from the Ukraine.82 Ambassador Fowler of the U.N. Sanctions Committee visited Kiev in July to discuss these allegations and reported that he received "categorical assurances from senior Ukranian officials that such allegations of violations of Council-imposed sanctions by Ukraine were without foundation and that Ukraine was fully in compliance with international laws and norms relating to the enforcement of such sanctions," and that the officials were "confident that export control provisions were such that no authorization had ever been given for arms exports which might have resulted in the delivery of arms to UNITA."83

The deputy foreign minister of Ukraine visited Angola in June 1999 to investigate these allegations and the Ukraine is considering participating in the E.U. Code of Conduct on arms exports and de-registering those aircraft of Ukrainian origin that are no longer under the control of the Ukranian authorities.84 The Ukrainian government issued on August 3 a further denial that it was assisting UNITA and claimed that the Angolan government had accepted this denial.85

What is not in doubt is that UNITA was well prepared for the new round of fighting: it had carefully maintained stockpiles of weapons from the 1993-1994 war, and it had brought in new weapons on sanctions-busting operations. UNITA also was able to restore to fighting order a number of weapon systems it had captured from the government, and had trained in their use during the peace process when its forces were supposed to be undergoing complete demilitarization. A senior UNITA official interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 1998 explained:

We don't need to bring in too much. We are busy making sure our weapons caches are in good order and we are training. If the government attacks us, they are in for a big surprise. One thing we know well is how to fight. We won't let these people destroy us.86

The Angolan government has claimed that mercenaries are working with UNITA on the maintenance of these weapon systems, mainly from Israel, Serbia, South Africa, and Ukraine.87


Despite an arms and oil embargo imposed on UNITA in 1993, there has been a steady flow of supplies into territories controlled by this armed force. Diplomats and U.N. officials have known about this but habitually claimed there was little that could be done. Paul Hare, the U.S. special envoy to the Angolan peace process, told Human Rights Watch in September 1998 that:

Without military force to back up the arms embargo, the two-way flow of diamonds and arms between UNITA territory and neighboring Zaire was impossible to stop. But the sanctions did have political and psychological effects; they have increased UNITA's international isolation.88

UNITA's procurement pattern initially did not change following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. Arms and oil flowed unabated through Zaire. According to a Human Rights Watch source on the afternoon of March 7, 1995 a plane belonging to the cargo company ATO, loaded with weapons for UNITA, was seen taking off from Kinshasa's N'Djili international airport bound for Angola.89 UNITA's use of ATO was not new. ATO flew three loads of rifles and pistols to UNITA directly from Pretoria in 1994.90 In early 1995 ATO carried senior UNITA military commanders to Burkina Faso and Côte D'Ivoire.91 ATO owns shares in a Britannia aircraft and also operates DC-4s, DC-6s, and an Ilyushin transport aircraft.92

Flights to UNITA in this period did not only carry weapons. They supplied the movement with fuel, food, beer, and medical equipment, and also carried passengers. Because of the sensitivity of such operations, Human Rights Watch was informed that as a matter of practice these cargo companies would file false flight plans.93 In the second six months of 1995 the number of flights out of Kinshasa to UNITA zones declined. However, the crash of a Trans-Service Airlift flight carrying UNITA personnel just after take-off from Jamba's airport on December 18, 1995 showed the continued use of Kinshasa-based companies.94 Companies operating out of Kinshasa that have flown into UNITA zones in 1995 were:95

* Trans-Service Airlift (TSA)

* Trans-Air Cargo (TAC)

* Guila Air

* Express City Cargo

* Skydeck

* Fil Air

* Walt Air

Subsequently, questions were raised regarding the destination and cargo of an aircraft that departed Kinshasa's Ndolo airport on January 8, 1996, and then suddenly crashed into Simbazikita market in Kinshasa, killing some 350 people in one of the worst air disasters in history. Diplomatic sources told Human Rights Watch that they believed the aircraft was bound for a UNITA zone in Angola, and that while it was not carrying weapons, it was carrying petroleum products-in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 864 of September 1993.96 Le Monde reported that the AN-32 transport plane belonged to a company named African Airways, which operated in then Zaire under license from Scibe-Zaire, a company owned by Congolese businessman Bemba-Salona.97

In June 1996 yet another plane crashed at N'Djili airport in Kinshasa, this one a Russian cargo plane reportedly carrying a shipment of weapons from Bulgaria destined for UNITA. A press account quoted a witness to the crash, a foreign pilot working for a Zaire-based company, as stating: "This particular load of arms came from Bulgaria. It was bound for Luzamba, in Angola, but weapons come in here all the time and they go everywhere."98

The Washington Post has also described the N'Djili airport as an arms trafficking hub and highlighted the inflow of weapons from Bulgaria. It reported in 1997 that then-Zaire facilitated large-scale weapons supplies from Bulgaria to UNITA forces in 1996, with more than 450 tons of Bulgarian weapons smuggled to UNITA in October and November that year. The paper also alleged that cargo flights from Bulgaria arrived at the N'Djili airport several times a week for several weeks in mid-to-late 1996, delivering weapons and ammunition. According to a diplomatic source quoted by the paper, the shipments included AK-47s and 60mm and 120mm mortars, as well as rocket-propelled grenades and launchers. Another diplomatic source quoted in the paper stated that the cargo was repackaged on-flight to go to UNITA-held areas of Angola.99

Following the ouster of Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997, UNITA was no longer able to rely on Zaire, which became the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to facilitate its arms purchases. Initially it made a switch to the neighboring Republic of Congo (also known as Congo-Brazzaville), which from May to around September 7, 1997 served as a major sanctions-busting hub for UNITA. Becauseof militia fighting in Brazzaville over control of the Maya Maya International Airport in June and July, the brunt of UNITA's operations then moved to Pointe Noire's airport, which began receiving daily flights of weapons and military supplies for UNITA.100 Although this information was known to Western intelligence agencies and the U.N., nothing was done to denounce or expose this flood of weapons.101 Carriers landing at Pointe Noire in September and early October 1997 include:102

* a Boeing 707 of Air Atlantic Cargo;103

* two Trans-Service Airlift (TSA) planes: Electra L188 (9Q-CCV), and Viscount V744 (9Q-CVF);104

* a Trans-Air Cargo (TAC) plane: Britannia-31 BR31 (9Q-CJH);105

* a Fil Air flight.106

Defecting UNITA officials have added details about arms flights into UNITA-held areas in 1997. Maj. Florentino Sawimbo told Angolan television in August 1997 that "in February, March and April it came from Zaire. For instance, we saw material unloaded in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Provinces. Recently, we have thought that the flights were coming from South Africa."107 Colonel Sawimbo also claimed that weapons had arrived in Lusamba and Katodi airstrip on the border with Zaire, where war material had been unloaded since 1995.108 In October 1998 another defecting UNITA official, Capt. Damba Zau, alleged that Yugoslav-manufactured AK-47 rifles were flown to Andulo, Bailundo, and Maquela do Zombo via South Africa and Morocco in 1998.109

A UNITA officer captured by the government in December 1998, Col. Boaventura Vito Cangundo, reportedly described sanctions-busting during questioning:

From late 1996 we began to receive from Zaire weapons such as AKs, RPGs, PKMs, AG-17s, and 82mm mortars. The weapons were packed as if they were second-hand clothing. BMP-2s began to arrive on July 1 1997 from a country that I did not identify...The supply lines are domestic but in 1997 there were a number of imports from South Africa to Andulo in particular [words indistinct], particularly to purchase SAMIL 100 lorries and tinned food for soldiers.110

Colonel Cangundo provided further details to Jornal de Angola. When asked where the arms and ammunition came from, he replied: "From what I could read on the boxes of munitions and arms, one could see that they came from Bulgaria and were transported by an IL-76 that landed in Andulo."111 According to the Portuguese weekly Expresso, a Western intelligence document seen by the paper in Washington D.C. reported that UNITA in 1998 had obtained weapons and ammunition from some ten countries "via land routes from Mozambique, Tanzaniaand Zambia and by air, directly to the UNITA bases at Jamba, Cazombo, Andulo and Lusamba."112

Southern Africa

Southern Africa has played an important role as a transit point for supplies to UNITA for many years. Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia were important supply routes in the 1993-94 war but less so in 1995 as security was tightened and the transition to majority rule in South Africa made South Africa more hostile to sanctions-busting. By 1997, most of UNITA's arms supplies arrived through Kinshasa and Pointe Noire. In 1998 and 1999, however, with both Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo off-limits to major sanctions-busting operations for UNITA, southern African supply routes, especially through Zambia and Tanzania, once again became important.

South Africa

The chair of the U.N. Sanctions Committee on Angola, Njuguna Mahungo of Kenya, announced on April 22, 1998 that there had been as many as 186 sanctions-busting flights in December 1997 but that this number had dropped to forty in the January-February 1998 period. "There will be much less in the future," he predicted.113 Many of these flights originated in South Africa. According to a South African police report in March 1998, there may have been as many as fifty flights going to UNITA-held territory every month from various South African airports in 1997.114 The number of sanctions-busting flights out of South Africa has fluctuated during the Lusaka process, from a top figure of fifty a month to at times just a handful.115

The fluctuation in sanctions-busting flights has been dependent both on the demand and on the actions by the South African authorities to tighten up their border controls. One problem has been that until 1997 South Africa had thirty-six airports classified as "international," whereas most of these lacked both air traffic control and regular police, customs, or immigration checks. The South African authorities decided in 1997 to reduce the number of "international" airports toeight. This improved control and helped save costs.116 They also began deploying mobile X-ray units at land borders and airports that lacked such facilities in order to increase the risk of detection for smugglers. 117

In June 1998 the local monitoring of air traffic also improved after the South African Air Force deployed an early-warning radar system covering a distance of 1,900 nautical miles and operated at the towns of Mafeking, Uppington, Ellisras, and Marriepskop. This permitted the government to monitor flights over Botswana, Namibia, southern Zambia, and southern Angola. Smaller aircraft, such as the DC-3, can still evade detection. The radar system is backed up with Tactical Mobile Units (mobile radar units) which can cover more space.

Despite the tightening up of border controls, sanctions-busting activities have continued. Pilots file false destinations or say they are ferrying mining equipment, food, or clothes.118 They also know how to take advantage of gaps in the radar system or a lack of adequate telephone communications, and how to change their routes to run arms without getting caught. They also started exhibiting a preference for less-monitored airports like Mmabatho and Gateway in Pietersburg after Gauteng's airports, including Lanseria, imposed stiffer controls.

On January 20, 1998 a sanctions-busting Dakota DC-4 cargo plane (registration EL-WS) was intercepted by the Angolan Air Force over Menongue in southeastern Angola and forced to land at Cuando Cubango airport. The plane was found to be carrying an eight-ton cargo of mining equipment and food stuffs, and had eight people on board. It had been chartered by a South African businessman, Johannes (aka Johnny) Porfiro Parreira of Interstate Airways, from Argo Express in Brazzaville.119 The flight had originated from Maun, Botswana, but had filed a false flight plan stating that it was from Pietersburg and that Maun was its final destination. Its illegal flight had been scheduled to visit Kananga, Andulo, and Jamba in UNITA-held areas of Angola. The plane's crew-pilot Peter Britzke, flight engineer Antoine Steenberg "Shukker," and co-pilot MarkJeffries-were detained by the Angolan authorities and released on March 2, 1998. The other five passengers, Johnny Parreira and four others, were tried on charges of unlawful entry and contravention of an international arms embargo, convicted, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in October. (Johnny Parreira, who escaped from Menongue prison on September 2, was tried in absentia).120

In a statement to Angolan authorities Britzke reportedly confessed to flying more than 300 covert flights into Angola to supply arms and other equipment to UNITA, most frequently to Luzamba, Luremo, and Cuango in the northeast, and to the main UNITA-held areas of Bailundo, Andulo, and Jamba in the southeast. He told the press after his arrest that he was being paid $2,500 for the trip, and added: "I am just a freelance pilot, and my business is flying. If I don't fly, another pilot will take the job. That's what our work is like."121

According to statements made by the crew to Angolan officials, but not independently confirmed, another passenger on the flight, Marnix van der Eecken, also a South African pilot, had worked on previous sanctions-busting flights with Britzke, including twenty-five flights with DC-4 and DC-6 aircraft (registration ZA-NJR and EL-WNH) which delivered one hundred SAMIL trucks and other "lethal materials" to UNITA intended to "destabilise the country."122 According to South African press reports, Parreira's Interstate Airways had flown mining equipment and other logistical supplies to UNITA in late 1997 and early 1998, including a fleet of SAMIL all-terrain trucks thought to be part of a R32 million order for logistical and related equipment.123

South Africa's Gateway International airport in Pietersburg has played a prominent role in sanctions-busting activities. South African Civil Aviation authorities visited AirPass, an air freight company based at the airport, in April 1998 and after assessing its documentation issued 200 charges for violations of the Civil Aviation Act, including operating without a foreign operators permit.124 Inaddition, three Antonov aircraft were found not to be airworthy; another two which landed while the investigation was underway were impounded.

Detective Service spokesman Superintendent Faizal Kader claimed that the Russians had been operating illegally and that their case details were being forwarded to the office of the senior public prosecutor for a decision. AirPass had been transporting "fuel tanks, tow trucks, boots, ponchos, food and mining equipment" to UNITA-held areas without permission from the U.N. Security Council.125 Fuel to UNITA has been embargoed since 1993. AirPass is a subsidiary of Air Cess, run by Russians Andrei Kossalopov and Victor Budd.126

Following the event, South African television interviewed a representative of Gateway International airport and an owner-pilot about sanctions busting:

Representative of Gateway International: "If a person wants to fly to Angola and he calls up to the tower, he may do so. The tower has no control over an individual's aircraft wherever it wishes to go. He is just there to facilitate the arrival and departure of aircraft."

Tom Robbertse (one of the operators at Pietersburg): "The typical flight with 40 tons of cargo from here to Angola would cost you anywhere from 50,000 to 60,000 dollars with a margin of, I would say, ten to fifteen thousand dollars on top."

Cook: "How soon would you make a profit?"

Tom Robbertse: "Well, it's about a four-hour flight to Angola. As long as there are diamonds, there is payment and as long as there's paymentand as long as there are people who need supplies, flights will take place."127

Shortly thereafter AirPass moved its operations to Swaziland, where it began flying out of Manzini airport with its sister company Air Cess.128 After a clamp down at Mazini over the liberal issuing of operating licenses and after a freight company was found to be transporting military equipment in June, AirPass decided to move its operations headquarters completely from southern Africa, making Bangui in the Central African Republic its base. A couple of AirPass planes were reregistered with CAR numbers and have since returned to operate once again out of South Africa.129

According to the South African police, the authorities are powerless to tackle the problem of foreign-owned airlines.130 There were no arrests or confiscations in the Pietersburg case. A primary reason that individuals who are involved in sanctions-busting operations via South Africa use foreign-registered companies is that as such they can not be easily touched as these fall outside South Africa's legal jurisdiction.


In February 1996 the Namibian authorities grounded a Russian-registered Antonov-12 in Grootfontein pending an investigation by police. The planebelonged to Yurand Air, a company owned by a Russian national, Yuri Siderov, which was suspected of flying ten illegal flights from Grootfontein to Saurimo and Lobito in Angola, Kinshasa in then-Zaire, and Gaborone in Botswana between February 15 and February 19, carrying thousands of liters of fuel as cargo.131 Siderov was fined NR40,000 ( U.S.$6,534 ) on two main charges of flying without an air service license and failure to file flight plans. Police suspected that the flights had made detours into UNITA-held areas to deliver fuel contrary to U.N. sanctions.132 The Namibian police told Human Rights Watch that Yurand Air had bought R750,000 (U.S.$122,528) worth of fuel from British Petroleum in Namibia and had never provided proof that the fuel was sold to legitimate customers in Angola, leading police to believe it went to UNITA.133 According to Jane's International Defense Review, Yurand Air flies An-32s and An-12s, operates out of South Africa, and is responsible for weapons deliveries to UNITA.134


Angola accused Malawi in March 1999 of allowing UNITA rebels to use its airspace to fly weapons to territories under its control. The Malawi defense minister Joseph Kubalo has denied these allegations through the Southern African Development Community.135


A South African arms trade researcher has claimed that in November 1996 he saw small arms and ammunition being loaded onto light aircraft, similar to onesseen flying into UNITA-held areas in Angola, at a Mozambican airfield in Nampula province, near Nacala.136 He claimed that he believes private South Africa-based individuals and companies had arranged the weapons shipments through Mozambique and that while he could not confirm that the shipments he had witnessed were delivered to UNITA-held areas in Angola, he was sure UNITA was the intended recipient because these individuals were known to have had a long history with UNITA.137 The Mozambican government subsequently denied charges that weapons for UNITA were being transshipped through its territory.138 However, the Mozambican foreign minister, Leonardo Simão, told Human Rights Watch that certain individuals might have been trafficking arms through Nacala, but that they were no longer doing so.139 In July 1999 Gen, Cirilo de Sa "Ita," chief of the Angolan Armed Forces' intelligence services visited Mozambique to find out more about fresh allegations that lethal equipment was reaching UNITA through Beira port and then onto Zambia.140


Zambia has for many years had an ambivalent relationship with Angola, having in the past shown sympathy to both the Angolan government and to UNITA. Zambia hosts the oldest continuous refugee camp in Africa,Muykwayukwa, opened in 1966 for Angolan refugees. Three wars later, 63,000 refugees still reside in Zambia and new ones have been arriving every day. Those connections continued for years, and during the 1992-1994 war both the government and UNITA used Zambia as a weapons conduit, especially through Ndola's airport and across its lengthy land border.141

Allegations of sanctions-busting by UNITA through Zambia have increased since the fall of President Mobutu in May 1997, and as a result the Angolan government began watching Zambia much more carefully, regarding it as the weakest link in its efforts to isolate UNITA. Threats delivered through diplomatic channels led the Zambian government to ground two aircraft belonging to the South African firm Metex International on July 25, 1997. Metex International had established an operational base at Ndola airport in March, and had been using two Sierra-Leone-registered Hawker-Sidney 748 aircraft142 to airlift "unnamed cargo" from Ndola airport into Angola in operations that violated U.N. Resolution 864.143

Metex International and its personnel were fined $8,000 and thrown out of Zambia.144 Defense Minister Chitalu Sampa stated that there was evidence that Metex was involved in gun running from South Africa to Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo via Ndola.145 Metex International's operations director countered by claiming that the Kitwe-based firm Chani Enterprises Limited had been using a C-130 for sanctions-busting work into Angola and that he had been unfairly scapegoated.146 Chani Enterprises, owned by Kitwe businessman Moses Katumi, denied these allegations, saying that Metex were the gun runners.147

Two senior officials working for the National Airport Corporation at Ndola and two workers of British Petroleum lost their jobs for their failure to log the departures to and arrivals from Angola of the Metex planes, and for not logging new fuel intake.148

Human Rights Watch was able to ascertain that while Metex International was flying mainly logistical supplies into UNITA-held zones, at least two of its flights carried weapons. One official at Ndola airport said he had seen six crates of weapons being put on board a Metex plane "sometime in June 1997." The crates had Russian written on them.149 Following Angolan pressure the government announced that it would tighten border controls on the movement of cargo transported by road and ban all unauthorized overflights and landings by unscheduled aircraft.150

After a coup attempt against President Chiluba in October 1997, Zambia's fear of Angolan reprisals for Zambian support for UNITA reached fever pitch. Soldiers have testified in court that they were dispatched to Lusaka International airport to defend it against an expected invasion from Angola.151 The government imposed a curfew on night flying in Zambian airspace-lifting it only in February 1998.152

On March 5, 1998 Angolan ambassador to Lusaka Manuel Augusto issued a blunt threat to the Zambian government, saying "We don't want to reach the stage of Congo-Brazzaville." Augusto claimed that the Zambian government was aware that companies were using Ndola airport to traffic arms and had failed to stop them. He also charged that UNITA soldiers were using Maheba camp in Zambia, having replaced refugees who had gone back to Angola.153 In response to these allegations, the chair of the U.N. sanctions committee on Angola, Njuguna Mahugu, visited Maheba refugee camp and the Chavuma border post in April, concluding that there was no evidence to support the Angolan allegations.154

On January 15, 1999 the Angolan government wrote a detailed letter to President Chiluba, once again accusing Zambia of supporting UNITA.155 A numberof the allegations subsequently appeared in the Angolan and Zambian press, along with additional details, triggering a torrent of claims and counterclaims, few of which could be substantiated.156 The Zambian government denied the allegations, claimed to have launched an investigation,157 and invited the secretary-generals of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, as well as the heads of state of South Africa and Zimbabwe, to send missions to Zambia to "establish the veracity of these allegations."158

On March 21, the Information and Broadcasting Minister Newstead Zimba announced that the Zambian government had replied to the Angolan memorandum and that the Angolan allegations lack specificity and that the "Zambian government categorically denies any dealings whatsoever with UNITA."159 He said that the government's investigations had not provided any hard evidence of gun running by current or former government officials.160 Zimba also asked the Angolangovernment to furnish Zambia with more information on a list of individuals it had claimed were sanctions-busting: "Mulyata of Solwezi, a Transit Allen, Miro Gonçalves and Harriet Sikazwe as the government did not have proof of the existence of such people." Zimba also said two other individuals, Paul Manneplavin and Bapista, were investigated and found to have engaged in cross border trade involving foodstuffs bypassing immigration and customs regulations and they were deported to India and South Africa respectively.161 Zimba also cleared Chani Enterprises of allegations of transporting arms and ammunition for UNITA.162 There was no mention of Aero Zambia, a private airline that the Angolan government alleged had been gun running and which was subsequently grounded by Zambia.163 Aero Zambia has strongly denied these charges and has challenged the Angolan government and the Zambian press to provide proof.

Allegations of weapons going through Zambia to UNITA continue. Opposition politicians have made a string of claims.164 As mentioned above the South African media has also reported that in 1999 six MiG 23 fighters piloted by Ukranians were grounded in transit to UNITA at Ndola airport.165 Meanwhile theAngolan government has also continued to allege that Zambia supports UNITA, although in April it agreed to have talks with Zambia over its concerns.166 On May 10 five days of talks between Angola and Zambia opened in Swaziland but ended with no major breakthrough. On June 10 Angolan and Zambian representatives signed an agreement that the two countries would forget all past disputes between them. The agreement followed a thirteen-hour meeting in Swaziland, which facilitated the talks.167

On February 28, seven bombs rocked Lusaka. Six targeted electricity and water supplies and one exploded within the Angolan Embassy. The bomb at the embassy was on the second floor behind a sealed door, resulting in one death. The U.S. and Netherlands sent investigative teams to Lusaka. The U.S. and Dutch investigations concluded that the Angolan government was responsible for the bombings.168 Three weeks later, in late March, U.S. and French intelligence purportedly uncovered information that the Angolan government might use its commandos to strike at the Ndola oil refinery, which was suspected of supplying UNITA fuel. Through diplomatic channels, Luanda was told such action would seriously damage its international standing.169

While further UNITA arms procurement via Zambia in 1999 could not be verified, a small UNITA delegation traveled to Bulgaria in 1998 and again inJanuary 1999 via Lusaka and London, purportedly for "sightseeing" purposes,170 but in all probability to arrange arms deals.

Other African Transit Routes

Entebbe airport in Uganda appears increasingly to have become a conduit for arms trafficking and Angolan officials and the media have often cited Uganda as the main transit point for military equipment to UNITA.171 The Ugandan government has strongly denied these allegations saying in a press statement that "Angola has accused Uganda of supporting and assisting UNITA. At no time has Mr. Jonas Savimbi come to Uganda. Uganda has always supported all efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the U.N. to bring an end to the Angolan civil war. Uganda stands by and strongly supports the Lusaka peace accords of 1994."172 A number of pilots involved in the arms business have told Human Rights Watch that they freight equipment through Entebbe, although none of them admitted to flying to UNITA-held areas in Angola, saying that such an admission would be evidence of violating the U.N. embargo.173

The speaker of the Angolan Parliament, Roberto de Almeida, on May 20 told a meeting that weapons that went through Dar-es-Salaam port destined for Ugandawere then diverted to UNITA by the Ugandans, attributing this information to the Tanzanian foreign minister.174 A U.S. military intelligence analyst told Human Rights Watch that, "we know what's being delivered in the Tanzanian ports, but then we lose track of some of it. Some of this may be turning up in Angola for UNITA."175

Weapons destined for UNITA have sometimes been transported by rail from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, from where they were ferried by boat to Kalemie in Zaire and from there by plane to UNITA forces in Angola.176 A slightly different route involves weapons cargos being transported from Dar Es Salaam south through Mbala and then by road to Angola or to Ndola in Zambia, where it was placed on planes for distribution inside Angola. According to Zambian intelligence sources, a number of Russian businessmen in Dar es Salaam have been involved in brokering this trade.177

Burkina Faso, Côte D'Ivoire, and Togo178 have for a number of years been named as transit points for arms to UNITA in Angola.179 Côte D'Ivoire has also been an important supporter of UNITA in the past, issuing passports to a number of its officials. However, in recent years UNITA's relationship with Côte D'Ivoire appears to have soured, and although UNITA maintains a foothold in Abidjan, it has not been able to act with the freedom it once enjoyed. In February 1999 Côte D'Ivoire annulled the passports it had issued to UNITA officials.180 On his fateful last flight on June 27, 1998, U.N. Special Representative Blondin Beye was on a last-ditch trip to West Africa to get support from countries like Togo and Burkina Faso for the Angolan peace process through a more rigorous enforcement of the embargoes.181

Pilots and staff at Ouagadougou's international airport in Burkina Faso told Human Rights Watch in June 1998 that flights carrying arms or fuel regularly arrived from central Africa to refuel in Ouagadougou, though they were not sure about the exact destination. "It can be one of a number of locations: Kinshasa,Brazzaville, UNITA. We don't ask questions. They get their fuel and off they go," said one official at the airport.182 A pilot interviewed by Human Rights Watch in South Africa spoke of colleagues flying from Togo into UNITA-held areas with weapons bought in Albania, but he declined to reveal which firms were involved.183

Morocco trained several hundred UNITA officers in logistics and communications in 1998 according to a UNITA official.184 There are also unconfirmed reports of the presence of Moroccan soldiers in UNITA-held areas in Angola.185 On April 2, the Angolan media reported that Mohammed Messari, Morocco's communications minister, had announced that Morocco had ended its support of UNITA in compliance with U.N. sanctions.186

Fuel to UNITA

Fuel features conspicuously in UNITA's sanctions-busting efforts. In 1997 and 1998 fuel, food, and mining equipment made up probably the bulk of the cargos brought into Angola. Fuel in particular has been essential to UNITA's military efforts; without it, the rebels' ability to operate on several fronts at the same time and maintain a semi-conventional military fighting option would have been much more limited. For example, UNITA's counteroffensive against the government and its siege on Kuito in early January 1999 ended because its forces ran out of fuel.187

Although much of UNITA's fuel has come from outside the region, Human Rights Watch believes that in 1998 senior Angolan government officials also assisted UNITA in its procurement of fuel, thereby breaking the U.N. embargo. A number of truck drivers told Human Rights Watch that on the orders of Governor Flavio Fernandes of Malanje, Sonangol fuel trucks were driven past Malanje city to Quela, where their contents were siphoned off by UNITA.188 Reportedly, this went on for many months, and diplomats in Luanda told Human Rights Watch that they had raised this with the government, which did nothing.189 Only in December1998, after Malanje came under UNITA siege, was the city's police Sub-Comisssário Paka arrested on charges of facilitating the sale of fuel to UNITA.190

In May 1999 further details of the diversion of fuel with the knowledge of some government officials to UNITA came to light. According to O Independente, fuel has been purchased on behalf of UNITA from the Sonangol storage facilities at the port of Lobito and is transported through various intermediaries.191 Angolan officials have admitted to Human Rights Watch that several hundred people have been arrested, including some army officers.192 According to the Angolan media, UNITA has also been acquiring fuel in 1999 from northern Namibia.193

UNITA's Weapons Exports

According to some sources, the longtime supply of arms and training to UNITA via Zaire was reciprocated in 1995 and onwards as UNITA provided arms and training to Mobutu's Rwandan and Burundian allies. Diplomats, businessmen, and weapons traffickers told Human Rights Watch that in 1995, weapons from UNITA-held areas in Angola were transported across the Zairean border to Luau-Dilolo and loaded onto trains which took them via Kolwezi to Lubumbashi and Kamina. From there, the weapons were either flown directly to Goma and Bukavu or transported by rail to Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika on a track operated by Spoornet, the South African national railways. The weapons were then ferried by boat to Burundian Hutu rebels in Tanzania and eastern Zaire.194 Cargo operators and diplomatic sources said that Hutu rebels based in eastern Zaire had obtained arms and training from UNITA until they were ousted from those bases in late 1996.195

In 1996 and 1997, UNITA forces in southern Angola were reported to have sold weapons to South African arms traffickers based in northern Namibia, especially via Rundu.196 There was also evidence of a limited trade into Zambia in the same period.197

The Trade and Embargo of Diamonds

Angola is an important diamond-producing country. Diamonds are the second main export, after oil, but production has oscillated sharply because of armed conflict and in recent years has never come close to its peak of 2.4m carats in 1971, when Angola was the world's fourth largest producer (by value). Ninety percent or more of Angola's diamonds are of gem or near-gem quality. To date, diamond mining has been restricted to alluvial and eluvial deposits in Lunda Norte.198 Spectacular river diversion methods, involving the building of dikes and canals, have been employed to drain rivers and permit the mining of rich diamond-bearing gravel in the river beds. Much of the mining has been done by garimpeiros199 in poor and difficult conditions. Many garimpeiros operate as semi-bonded labor and often have to work under sharing agreements with whoever controls the land they work on. Angola also has several kimberlite pipes, but these have yet to be exploited commercially.

UNITA and the Sale of Diamonds

Diamonds have in recent years been UNITA's primary source of revenue. Between 1992 and 1994 UNITA controlled up to 90 percent of diamond production but this declined in 1995.200 During 1996 and 1997 UNITA produced about two-thirds of Angola's output, with a peak value of U.S.$730 million in 1996.201 The majority of these diamonds were bought up through the De Beers Central Selling Organization.202 UNITA's former chief of staff Gen. Arlindo Pena "Ben Ben" told Human Rights Watch in 1998 that "Diamonds are UNITA's life blood. Without them UNITA wouldn't be able to maintain its options. We needed to have choices, and as you see what the government is doing now, UNITA needed to maintain military reserves so that the government doesn't destroy us. This is the reality."203

Diamonds and access to diamonds were a central part of the Lusaka peace process.204 The Lusaka Protocol provided UNITA with the ministerial position of Mines and Geology, but failed to address the diamond issue. Whereas UNITA technically was obligated under the Lusaka Protocol to withdrawal from the diamond areas it occupied, the government and observing Troika accepted that this would be unrealistic, and therefore attempted direct talks. The view was that the Lunda provinces were a fault-line zone, and that if war erupted there, it would spread and threaten the peace process. It was also argued by U.N. officials anddiplomats that for UNITA to play an effective role in an Angolan multiparty system it would need an independent funding base. Several years followed of intermittent negotiations between the government and UNITA about the distribution of diamond resources. In November 1996, the government and UNITA signed a memorandum of understanding, giving UNITA, through a legally recognized holding company, the right to control or explore certain diamond areas.205

Talks between the government and UNITA finally ended in mid-May 1997, when the government's military launched an offensive against UNITA-held diamond areas in Lunda Norte province along the northeastern border.

One of the richest alluvial mining areas UNITA occupied was the Cuango valley. A watershed event in the Lusaka peace process occurred in early January 1998, when UNITA forces withdrew from the Cuango valley and allowed state administration to be restored there. UNITA had given up Cuango town itself in late January 1997, but had refused to hand over the rich diamond fields. That UNITA handed back some of its diamond assets to government control was significant, although diamond industry sources said that all the easy mining had been done during UNITA's occupation of the region.206 In 1998, UNITA only raised some U.S.$200 million from diamond sales due partly to the collapse in world prices forrough diamonds and partly because it had exhausted its most lucrative mines.207 De Beers expect sales to be roughly the same level in 1999.208

In 1998 the level of violence in Lunda Norte increased, with many human rights abuses also reported. The killing of at least 105 civilians by an unidentified group and the wounding of numerous others in the mining settlement of Bula on July 21 constituted the most dramatic such abuse (see above). UNITA also increased its attacks on traffic to the diamond mines by laying landmines and carrying out ambushes. In a November 1998 attack on the Yetwane mine, UNITA forces killed eleven workers and abducted four others.209 In a second attack in January 1999 UNITA killed a British miner and three other people in an ambush four miles from their base in Luzamba.210 In mid-April UNITA rebels made six attacks on foreign companies working in the diamond-rich north-east in one week.211 Since then the number of attacks have declined and a number of journalists have speculated that a number of diamond companies have reached accommodations with the rebels and the government.212

Diamonds For Weapons and Petroleum

The wealth of diamonds mined in UNITA-held areas has provided the rebels with the resources to rearm and prepare for renewed conflict during the Lusaka process. The diamonds have left the country through the same pipelines through which sanctions-busting oil and weapons have entered Angola. UNITA's exports of diamonds during the Lusaka process netted the rebels some U.S.$1.72 billion, much of which it invested in military supplies, petroleum products, food, and medicines.

Large numbers of diamonds mined in UNITA-held areas have passed through the buying offices in Mbuji-Mayi and Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite the DRC government's hostility to UNITA, Kinshasa still remains one of the main departure points of diamonds for Europe.213 Until October 1997,Brazzaville and Pointe Noire in the Republic of Congo were also important departure points for UNITA diamonds.214 Other transit countries for diamonds from UNITA-held areas in 1998 are Zambia,215 Namibia, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Togo, Côte D'Ivoire, and the Central African Republic, and Rwanda.216 The Zambian press reported in March 1999 that the town of Mongu was busy with illegal trading in Angolan diamonds.217 A pilot who used to work for Fil Air described flying for UNITA to Cafunfo out of Kinshasa's N'djili airport in 1996:

I flew some ten times into Angola, to Cafunfo. We used a DC-6 and had no problems. I was paid cash for the trip and usually carried fuel, beer, and toilet paper. The return flight was always with diamonds, which were then taken to the buying outfits in town, I was told. The dealers always had an armed escort. Those were the boom times. By 1997 I gave up on Angola.218

A U.S. official confirmed this two-way traffic of diamonds leaving Angola through Bujumbura to Antwerp in exchange for arms in 1996. He helped shed light on the traffickers' motives in employing such tortuous paths as follows: "They want it to come via Bujumbura rather than Kinshasa, which would involve a wholly different pay system."219

Given how important diamonds were for UNITA and how they provided for UNITA's rearming, it is remarkable that only in July 1998 did the United Nations impose an embargo on the diamond trade. By then, UNITA had been able to buy significant amounts of weapons and petroleum. It was a critical mistake in the Lusaka peace process not to have imposed an embargo on UNITA's diamond sales much earlier.

The Embargo on Diamonds

On July 1, 1998, a Security Council-imposed embargo on the diamond trade with UNITA entered into force. Resolution 1173 called on states:

(b) to prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of GURN.

(c) to prohibit, upon notification by the Chairman of the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) to all Member States of guidelines approved by that Committee, the sale or supply to persons or entities of Angola to which State administration has not been extended by their nationals or from their territory, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of equipment used in mining or mining services.220

On July 8 the European Union announced that it had formally adopted the new sanctions, thus binding its fifteen members. Both Belgium and Israel, both important diamond-trading centers, had enacted legislation to implement the U.N. sanctions by August 1998. Switzerland, which is also active in the diamond trade (but not a member of the U.N.), enacted domestic law to enforce the embargo on November 25, 1998.221

The Belgian government in March called for coordinated European Union action to stop diamond sales being used to fund arms purchases in Angola. Belgian Foreign Minister Erik Derycke said that most of the diamonds arrived in Brussels from South Africa via London.222 In the ACP-EU Joint Assembly meeting in Strasbourg on April 1, 1999 a resolution on Angola included "Calls for a thorough and urgent investigation by the Commission into the conduct of the diamond trade with a view to eliminating smuggling by Mr. Savimbi to fund his war effort."223 The De Beers company, which through its Central Selling Organization (CSO) controls around 80 percent of world sales of diamonds,224 has yet to say how itintends to deal with the embargo, but declared in a press statement on December 15, 1998 that "De Beers' buyers do not buy rough diamonds without an Angolan Government certificate of origin and whose provenance is uncertain. De Beers' buyers have refused (and will continue to do so) diamonds without certificates."225 In January 1999 De Beers wrote to the U.N. offering its expertise in helping to implement the embargo.226 Asked why it took so long to write to the U.N., De Beers has said that it wrote to the Angolan government first, seeking clarification on what it should do.227 In May, two senior De Beers officials met with Ambassador Fowler of the U.N. Sanctions Committee twice, in Angola and then in South Africa. De Beers, however, has not been forthcoming with information to the nongovernmental organisation Global Witness (which published a widely publicized report on the diamond trade and Angola in 1998) and has been seeking information on how De beers plans to assist implementation of the embargo.228

A key to the implementation of the diamond embargo on UNITA is the identification of the rough diamonds coming out of Angola. De Beers has told Human Rights Watch that "you cannot tell the difference if, say, Angolan roughs are mixed with some from gem-quality alluvials in Sierra Leone."229 De Beers wrote to the U.N. in January 1999 saying: "It is difficult to be confident of the origin of a diamond once it has left the place where it has been extracted. When a rough diamond has been polished, then the difficulty of identification becomes an impossibility." De Beers' advice to the U.N. in this letter was that the international trade should be regulated with trading only by recognized firms and a tightening of border controls around Angola, as the identification of illegal diamonds is muchmore difficult once they had left the country.230 De Beers produced a document on the "sources of rough diamond production and their individual characteristics, " in June 1999. According to De Beers:

It is difficult to be certain of the origin of a rough diamond once it has left the place where it has been extracted.

Experts from De Beers and elsewhere can be reasonably sure of the origin of diamonds from a primary source or a broad alluvial area if they see a parcel of original "run-of-mine" goods or a decent sized parcel (say several hundred carats) of specific types of rough gem diamonds.

In the case of alluvial diamonds, the situation is complicated by the fact that some diamondiferous rivers cross national borders. For example, diamonds that have their origins in Angola have been transported by ancient alluvial flood plains or river courses into what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo, so the same types of diamonds can be found on both sides of the border.

There are cases where an expert could be reasonably sure of the geographical origins of quite small parcels of diamonds, even individual diamonds, for example with some kinds of Russian crystals, some of the characteristic Australian goods, or the "frosted" gems from Angola/Congo.

However, in general it will be much more difficult to tell the origin of rough gem diamonds when they are not run-of-mine, when there are only individual stones or small parcels available, or when diamonds from different sources have been mixed together.

It is generally accepted that a single rough diamond cannot be identified with certainty as having come from a particular source, certainly not to the standard of evidence required for a court of law. There are occasional exceptions, i.e. some large and famous polished and rough stones with a known history.

When a rough diamond has been polished, identification becomes impossible. During the polishing process, diamonds lose the natural features by which they could be identified.231

It is believed that 80 percent of transactions in rough diamonds take place in the Belgian city of Antwerp. Jan de Kesel, general director of the Antwerp-based Diamond High Council, which defends the industry's interests, has claimed that the Belgian authorities are rigorously respecting the U.N. sanctions.232 Diamond traders in Antwerp told Human Rights Watch that the origin of mixed packets could easily be identified, though distinguishing gems from northern Angola from those from Congo could be difficult.233 The diamond industry has not, however, specified the established criteria to assist governments and the U.N. in the implementation of the embargo, a transparency that is needed. There are other obstacles. At present only Angolan diamonds require an official Certificate of Origin, whereas diamonds from other countries require only a customs declaration and some supporting paperwork. This makes it easy to put Angolan gems in mixed packets or to claim they have another origin.234 The introduction of a global certification scheme would assist the monitoring process.

Antwerp certainly appears to have tightened up on its purchasing of uncertified or contentious roughs. In 1998 only 14,593 carats were exported from Zambia to Belgium according to the Diamond High Council, a fraction of the estimated UNITA sale of US$220 million.235

Israel's diamond trade, which has a strong demand for Angolan-type stones, buys these on the open market and appears much less questioning. Several Angolan diamond traders who had visited Tel Aviv in January 1999 to sell packets of Angolan diamonds told Human Rights Watch that they had faced no problems in selling their stones, which were a mixture of diamonds from both government and UNITA-held areas of Angola. The areas are so close as to make it difficult for anyone to tell the precise points of origin.236

Despite Tel Aviv becoming a more favored location for UNITA's diamonds, Belgium remains an important destination for Angolan diamonds, which are likely to end up in one of four diamond bourses in Antwerp, where much of the diamond trading is carried out.237 Shortly after the new U.N. embargo entered into force Antwerp Confidential reported that:

Dealers in Antwerp told Diamantaire that the UN move, designed to cut UNITA's economic lifeline, would not make the slightest difference to supplies of Angolan rough, coming into Belgium, which is the main market...One dealer, who wished to remain anonymous, said when buyers smuggle the rough out of Angola and land them in Belgium, they declare the origin of the goods as Congolese or South African and the Customs cannot tell where they are from.238

When Human Rights Watch visited Antwerp in October 1998, it found that a number of dealers were equally philosophical about where their Angolan diamonds originated.239 A journalist a few months later found the situation hadn't changed: "one confidential Antwerp diamond dealer revealed to the New African that he personally knows of at least one Antwerp-based dealer who are still buying and selling illegal rough Angolan diamonds, including those from UNITA."240 Western diplomats have told Human Rights Watch that they believe that $20 million a month of illicit Angolan diamonds pass through Antwerp, a small figure for this trade.241 In its report on the Angolan diamond trade, the British-based NGO Global Witness concluded that:

Angolan diamonds, which are being imported into Belgium, are being misdescribed as originating from other countries. The experts who work on behalf of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to check parcels are failing to spot the misdescribed parcels. It would seem this is because they are generalists and cannot identify Angolan gems. The Belgiangovernment needs to take immediate action to train experts, or find others who can assist in implementing the UN embargo.242

UNITA's representative in Brussels has also admitted to the press that UNITA is still trading diamonds in spite of U.N. sanctions. "Yes we do mine diamonds...we have to survive economically," Azevedo d'Oliveira Kanganje said in 1999.243

Human Rights Watch has also been told that the Ukraine and India have become a market for packages of poorer quality diamonds from UNITA. These reports too merit further investigation. The chairman of the U.N. Sanctions Committee on Angola visited Kiev in July and discussed with officials the Ukraine's industrial capacity for the cutting and polishing of diamonds, which employs some 3,000 individuals, and the legal framework relating to diamond imports and exports. According to Ambassador Fowler Ukranian officials said that purchasing diamonds from UNITA is specifically prohibited and individuals importing rough diamonds in the Ukraine without the necessary documentation risked prosecution and the confiscation of the diamonds. They also "stated categorically that import and export control provisions made the bartering of diamonds for weapons impossible."244

The Angolan government appears to have been reluctant to tighten up its system of Certificates of Origin. This may be because a number of senior government officials have played a significant role in unofficial diamond production in Angola, and this trade would be threatened by more rigorous controls.245 Moreover, diamonds from UNITA-held areas have also been traded to government officials in significant quantities. In the period 1995-1998, Angolan government officials regularly engaged in deals with UNITA, arranging local transactions while claiming in Luanda that the diamonds were obtained from mines in government areas. An employee of a senior Luanda-based government official admitted in August 1998 that he had engaged in sanctions-busting for his boss:

I fly up to the Lundas on behalf of my boss to look after his diamond trade. I deal with a couple of UNITA officials and we make business. No problem. When business is good, there is no war and I've never had problems. But I think war will return soon because UNITA needs to get more diamond areas. They are producing fewer diamonds this year and can't afford to share with the generals.246

In 1999 Human Rights Watch obtained reports that official Certificates of Origin are for sale in Luanda. This needs to be verified.247 Ambassador Robert Fowler of the U.N.'s sanctions committee also highlighted in his July 29 report the "importance of working with the Government of Angola to tighten controls on the buying and selling of diamonds within Angola and diamond exports, including through the redesign of government-issued certificates of origin."248

Diamonds mined from UNITA areas are not the only problem. An increasing number of diamonds from the Democratic Republic of Congo pass through Angola for onward sale. This is a result of attempts by President Kabila to control the diamond industry. In September 1998 the DRC government banned the use of U.S. dollars in economic transactions and announced in January 1999 that a national precious materials exchange had been created. The insistence that sellers accept only Congolese francs has resulted in a sharp decline in officially registered sales-$16 million in February compared with $35 million in December 1998.249 Many diamonds have entered the black market and Human Rights Watch has spoken to traders that have used Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda as outlets for these stones.250 Stones enter Angola, including through UNITA areas, for resale. This makes it even more difficult to distinguish between diamonds originating in UNITA areas and other stones.

In October 1998, Actual Fax reported that the government was seeking a moratorium on diamond mining and smuggling of diamonds by government generals and officials as part of a Diamond Sector Stabilization plan.251 In early1999 President dos Santos ordered a complete audit of Endiama, Angola's national diamond parastatal.252 The audit was aimed at placating requests by the International Monetary Fund for transparency in Endiama's accounts, but the company is reportedly also looking into the possibility of becoming involved in direct mining again-perhaps to the benefit of the De Beers company in a direct joint venture and at the expense of the small operators that mushroomed during the Lusaka peace.253

In May, Chairman and Managing Director of Endiama Paulino Neto was sacked after allegations that he had been diverting diamond revenue and diamonds.254 An investigation is now underway to find out what happened. A new board has been appointed, with General Agostinho Dias as its chairman. The governor of the Angolan National Bank, Aguinaldo Jaime has also required diamond companies to deposit the funds from diamond sales in national banks.255

These policy changes will not provide the government with a sharp increase in diamond revenue, but these gestures have been welcomed by the IMF. The international market for diamonds has strengthened in 1999. Although De Beers reported in April that the global sales of rough diamonds in 1998 had reached an eleven-year low, it welcomed the fact that supplies of roughs from Angola had been "contained," courtesy of renewed war.0 In June 1999, De Beers was more upbeat about the global market, reporting a 44 percent increase in sales to $2.45 billion in the first half of 1999 of uncut stones compared with the previous year. Improving retail demand in the U.S. and Europe have helped this recovery. The war in Angola was again credited for helping to stem the number of Angolan rough stones on the open market.1

De Beers' dominant position in the diamond market makes it an essential part of the implementation of the embargoes regime against UNITA. In assessing the implementation of the embargo, the Sanctions Committee should ask De Beers and its Central Selling Organisation to describe and document the measures taken byits buying offices with respect of the embargo. What steps are they taking to avert buying up illegal diamonds? The De Beers' Overseas Purchasing Department should be requested to make its records of purchases available for inspection by the U.N. Sanctions Committee; as well as records of suspect packages turned down by its buyers. Similarly De Beers should be asked to lend its technical expertise in the identification of the provenance of its rough diamonds to the Sanctions Committee.

The International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA), which is comprised of ten member organizations which collectively employ 800,000 diamond cutters worldwide on July 5 issued a statement in support of Angola sanctions at its meeting in Moscow on July 5. It "urges all members of the diamond industry to refrain from purchasing any diamond originating from Angola without a certificate of origin issued by the government of Angola."2 The IDMA also invited the Chairman of the U.N.'s Sanctions Committee to address the World Diamond Congress 2000, to be held in Antwerp in July 2000.3

Other Embargoes

Information on the progress of freezing UNITA bank accounts and the blocking of foreign travel by their officials (Security Council Resolution 1135, October 29, 1997) has been sketchy. Part of the problem has been the lack of quality information provided to the U.N. by Luanda. Human Rights Watch has seen a 1998 list, which records names of UNITA officials like "General Tarzan," with no further details, such as age, passport details, and so forth. Such flimsy lists will not help the better implementation of sanctions.

On January 27, 1998 Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree banning UNITA representatives and their adult relatives from entering Russia. The ban also included flights by UNITA aircraft or the leasing of Russian aircraft to UNITA.4 In February 1999 Côte D'Ivoire declared the Ivorian passports held by senior UNITA officials, such as Lukamba Gato and Isaias Samakuva, null and void.5 Much progress has also been made in the closing of UNITA's offices abroad (Security Council Resolution 1135, October 29, 1997). In 1997 and 1998 UNITA's offices in Lisbon, London, Brussels, Stockholm, Washington, DC, and New York ceased to function, and the French government stopped UNITA official IsaiasSamakuva from making public statements in Paris by telling him on February 23, 1999 that he would be expelled. In May France said the expulsion was still under consideration.6 The additional package of restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of "unofficial" Angolan diamonds, defined as those not accompanied by a Certificate of Origin by the Angolan government (Resolution 1173, July 1, 1998) remains, as we have seen above, an area of frequent violation.

U.N. Monitoring

The U.N. monitoring of the embargoes on UNITA has not been very systematic. MONUA did draw up a list of sanctions-busting planes and their identification marks where observed. One U.N. official working in UNITA's Lumege quartering area described how a DC-4 landed on the airstrip there in September 1997 and unloaded crates:

This old plane landed and we saw lots of crates being unloaded. It could have been guns, but UNITA did not invite us to look inside the crates. All we could do was record that a plane landed and unloaded cargo.7

MONUA denied Human Rights Watch access to its register of sanctions-busting flights at MONUA headquarters.8 A senior MONUA official told Human Rights Watch that only a rough list existed, saying "we don't even know if the names are true."9 A senior MONUA military commander stationed in eastern Zambia explained the methodology in documenting sanctions busters in August 1998:

We see these planes at great distance and UNITA never allows us to get close. Our figures are based on overflights also, even high-altitude ones. If we do not expect a flight, we put it down as a sanctions-busting sighting.10

MONUA has complained that the Angolan government has habitually failed to provide details of sanctions-busting firms or airstrips. It often spoke in generalterms and never provided a list of planes with permits to operate in Angola.11 Only in 1999, as the war with UNITA was reignited, did the Angolan government become more specific in its allegations of sanctions-busting, especially with regard to Zambia.

Human Rights Watch has recorded one plane on a U.N. list having been impounded in Luanda. An Antonov-26 (registration number UR-26016), a Ukrainian-owned plane of Motor-Sich Airways, had reportedly carried out flights into UNITA-controlled areas after the imposition of U.N. sanctions. It was detained at Luanda airport upon its arrival from South Africa. According to Motor-Sich Airways manager Valentyn Shyrochkin, the AN-26 had been chartered by the South African SG Corporation for flights in Africa since October 1997.12

The U.N. has also been powerless to deal with arms flows on the government side that have not been declared. It could only complain about them in the Joint Commission, the U.N.-chaired mechanism for the discussion of complaints in the peace process. The U.S., which has the technology and intelligence assets to greatly improve monitoring, has used its resources sparingly, and has used its information on an erratic basis. This did result in UNITA and government procurement patterns changing to avoid continued detection, but it never stopped the flows.13 Issa Diallo, the U.N. special envoy for Angola on July 6, 1999 concluded the U.N.'s embargo implementation failed because:14

There is a lack of political will. The financial assistance was there. The general way was there. But the political way was not there. And you can multiply the financial contribution made by ten. You will not be successful if the political will is missing.

Sanctions Committee

As we have seen above, one of the major causes of the new crisis in Angola has been the failure to implement the U.N. embargo packages on Angola. The current chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Robert Fowler ofCanada, described the embargoes on UNITA as, "like traffic rules. But nobody enforced them, people drove where they wanted and parked all over the place. It was a complete disaster."15

There are three packages of sanctions on the UNITA rebels: the ban on military equipment and petroleum products (Resolution 864, 1993); the blocking of foreign travel by its officials, and closing of its offices abroad (Resolution 1127 of 1997); and restrictions on air and sea travel to UNITA zones, the freezing of UNITA bank accounts, and the prohibition of direct and indirect export of unofficial Angolan diamonds (Resolution 1173 of 1998).

When it imposed its 1993 arms and oil embargo, the Security Council established a sanctions committee to examine reports countries were asked to submit regarding their obligations under the embargo, and to consider information it received concerning violations. The committee also had a mandate to promulgate guidelines to implement the embargo. In practice, the committee remained passive and only at its fourth meeting, held on November 12, 1993, decided to take the very timid step of sending a "special appeal" to the countries neighboring Angola and several others in the region "that might have the ability to monitor air and sea traffic in the region, for information on reported or suspected violations of the mandatory sanctions with respect to UNITA." Letters were sent to Botswana, Congo, Namibia, South Africa, Zaire, and Zambia, and by mid-1994 replies had been received from all except Zaire.16 Precious little action ensued, and the Security Council continued to refrain from acting against governments suspected of violating the embargo.

During a visit to Angola in March 1998, the Sanctions Committee's president, Njungana Mahugu, stated that his presence in the country was to demonstrate the continued activity of the committee and the U.N.'s determination to implement the sanctions fully.17 He also said that "if the situation merits it, the sanctions will be lifted. But be quite clear, that if this is not the case, the Security Council is ready to take further measures against UNITA."18 After the Angola visit Mahugu visited Zambia in April, concluding that there was no evidence of Angolan allegations of sanctions-busting there.19 In mid-April he visited Côte D'Ivoire toask the government to tighten up on its issuing of travel documents to UNITA's leadership.20

By February 1999 the Sanctions Committee had received replies from fifty-seven states in regard to the implementation of resolution 1127 (1997) and thirty-three states on the implementation of resolution 1173 (1998). A reminder was sent out to all states on January 27, 1999 stressing the importance of their taking legislative action to implement the measures imposed on UNITA and requesting those states that had not yet replied to do so as soon as possible. 21

In January 1999 a new president of the Angola sanctions committee was appointed, Robert Fowler, Canada's permanent representative to the U.N. and one of the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council in 1999. On January 20 the committee held its first meeting after having been briefed by the NGO Global Witness and others on sanctions busting. The committee also commissioned a report on the progress of the sanctions regimes. This report was approved by the Security Council on February 18.22 In its recommendations the committee called for:

* A list of all registered aircraft in Angola from the Angolan government.

* Additional information on senior officials of UNITA, including UNITA representatives abroad, and adult members of their immediate families from the Angolan government.

* Copies of authorized stamps and signatures for diamond Certificates of Origin from the Angolan government.

* Governments of countries with companies that are major traders in the diamond industry and have expert monitoring facilities to notify the committee and relevant enforcement agencies of any trader or company that offers them illegal Angolan diamonds, as well as diamonds originating from states neighboring Angola.

* Member states to provide information on illegal arms flows, the illicit trade in diamonds, and the supply of petrol and petroleum products to UNITA.

* The commissioning of expert studies to help the committee obtain better information on embargo violations.

Given the ineffectiveness of the Angola sanctions committee in the past, this was a positive start. On May 7 the U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of two panels of experts to investigate violations of the sanctions imposed on UNITA. On the request of the chairman of the committee, the investigations are mandated for six months. One panel will investigate violations of the arms embargo and the other violations related to the supply of petroleum, the export of diamonds, and the movement of the rebel movement's funds. Fowler also recommended that the team investigating sources of revenue, funding, and petroleum supplies have six members, while the arms violation team have four, all chosen on the basis of expertise. An interim report on the panel's work will be due by July 31.23 The work of the committee is to be funded by a trust fund established for the purpose, although Ambassador Fowler told Human Rights Watch that the U.N. had allocated U.S.$1 million from internal funds for its work.24 The ten-person composition of the two expert panels was announced at the end of July. 25

Between May 10 and 28 Ambassador Fowler visited Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This Southern Africa trip was to add impetus to the initiative. Following his return, on June 4, a detailed report of recommendations was presented by Ambassador Fowler to the president of the Security Council.26 His report includes fourteen recommendations to strengthen the sanctions regime against UNITA. The key recommendation is sending sanctions monitors to the region-customs administration experts-as well as border monitoring experts, who would travel widely to discuss with police, citizens, airport managers and others about what is happening along the roads and at airports and airstrips. Recommended also were increased air surveillance, improved interdiction of flights, and a variety of recommendations relating to the diamond trade, including ways to improve diamond business management.27

A second report by Ambassador Fowler was presented to the Security Council on July 29. This report contained five further recommendations: that donor states provide financial and material assistance to the Southern African Development Community to assist its efforts to implement the sanctions; that the E.U. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should ensure that compliance with the sanctions is among the criteria for accession by new members; that the World Customs Organization should be invited to collaborate with the committee's expert panels; that Interpol should be invited to set up an informal working group; and that interested states should work to harmonize procedures and documentation for the import and export of rough diamonds, possibly through the World Customs Organization.28

Many of Ambassador Fowler's recommendations are useful. To be successful, however, they will need to be sharpened. The success of Fowler's recommendations will depend in large part on the quality of the appointments to the expert investigative panels he has proposed. These panels need to include people who understand how to work with NGOs and will be accessible to those who want to provide information (by phone, fax and e-mail). The U.N. monitors working with them need to be mobile and not tied down by bureaucracy and diplomatic protocol. If their efforts are blocked by any government or organization this should be made public. As much of the weapons and illicit diamond trade is centered on Europe, these monitors need also to visit the Ukraine and Bulgaria and to have the assistance of Interpol in Europe. Finally, just as Fowler recommends a call upon the diamond trade to assist in the enforcement of the embargo on UNITA's diamond sales, multinational oil companies should be approached to assist in providing information on any suspicious bulk sales of petroleum. This should include monitoring supplies to oil refineries in East Africa, particularly Kenya and Tanzania.

On July 6 Fowler visited Britain at the start of a European fact-finding tour at the diamond exchanges in London and Antwerp, with a view to further recommendations to the Security Council. Fowler told Human Rights Watch that he has won over the diamond companies such as De Beers. "The pitch was very simple," Fowler said of his meetings with De Beers chairman, Nicky Oppenheimer, and its Angola managing director, Ollie Oliveira: "Does the diamond industry want to be part of the problem or part of the solution in this business? And I'm happy tosay we received unanimous commitment to support sanctions."29 Fowler said that while "[i]t is impossible to stop a small bag of diamonds finding a market....what we might be able to do is make it more expensive for Savimbi to sell them and thus lower his revenue, and by lowering revenues reduce his arms purchases."30

Fowler also attended the Organisation of African Unity Heads of Government summit in Algiers to explain his recommendations to the OAU members. Fowler urged African leaders to enact legislation making sanctions violations a criminal offense. He also visited the Ukraine to seek data from officials about what he called anecdotal evidence of UNITA arms sources there.

Fowler expects the entire sanctions committee to study his recommendations and by the end of the year to adapt a plan of action reflecting them. Canada has played an important role already as a proponent of small-arms restrictions at the U.N. and this experience should help its efforts to more systematically enforce U.N. embargoes.

224 Article II (7) of the Bicesse accords cited in Ministério Da Justiça, Angola: Livro Branco Sobre O Processo de Paz, Volume 1, 31 de Maio de 1991 - 31 de Maio 1993 (Luanda: Ministério Da Justiça, 1995), p.51

225 U.S. and British diplomats, New York, June 1994.

226 Presentation by Sir David Hannay at the conference "Transitions from War to Peace in the Post-Cold War Era," Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, September 28, 1998.

227 "IV Timing of the Modalities For the Bilateral Cease-Fire , Phase One," cited in Protocolo de Lusaka (Amsterdam: AWEPA, 1997), p.19

228 "Angola: Between War and Peace. Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the Lusaka Protocol," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 8, no. 1(A), February 1996.

229 Ibid.

230 This assessment is made from press reports and interviews with defence analysts.

231 "Compra de Armas Pelo MPLG," December 10, 1996. Statement sent to Human Rights Watch.

232 This is probably a 75mm recoilless rifle, the M20, technically an infantry weapon and not a field gun.

233 See UNITA's web site:

234 IISS-Military Data on Angola, March 5, 1998.


236 SIPRI Arms Transfers Project, updated June 18, 1999, Expenditure on weapons does not necessarily mean delivery of equipment. There have been press reports of at least $200 million as "commissions" to senior military officers - and allegations that those paid off had accepted inflated prices and equipment that was not necessary for the war effort. Guardian (London), July 1, 1999.

237 Information provided by Ministry of Defense, Luanda, August 1998.

238 Televisão Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1930 gmt, March 26, 1999.

239 Reuters, May 6, 1999.

240 The oil industry is forecast to grow by 25 per cent a year over the next decade, with Angola to become Africa's largest oil producer within a decade. See, Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Angola: 2nd quarter 1999 (London: EIU, 1999) pp.23-28.

241 Banco Nacional de Angola official, Luanda, August 1998.

242 Nick Shaxson, Economist Intelligence Unit author, April 13, 1999.

243 Human Rights Watch has seen a copy of the confidential memoranda between Glencore staff and officials of Sonangol. See also, Africa Confidential, vol.39, no.14, July 10, 1998.

244 Reuters, May 21, 1999.

245 Oil industry source, London, May 21, 1999.

246 Dow Jones Energy Service, February 26, 1999.

247 Televisão Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1930 gmt, March 19, 1999.

248 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Angola: 2nd quarter 1999, p.28.

249 These blocks are operating concession areas for oil companies.

250 Human Rights Watch interview with Nick Shaxson, Economist Intelligence Unit, March 1, 1999.

251 Dow Jones Energy Service, April 13, 1999. Not surprisingly the government is down-playing these bonus figures in its budget, which will come under IMF scrutiny during negotiations. In its draft budget the government claims it expects only $400 million.

252 Thirty-eight companies bid for a stake in these three blocks.

253 Dow Jones Energy Service, April 13, 1999.

254 Ibid.

255 Communication from BP-Amoco, May 21, 1999.

0 Human Rights Watch interview with Foreign Minister Venâncio de Moura, Luanda, December 9, 1998.

1 Africa Confidential (London), vol.40, no.10 May 14, 1999.

2 Ibid. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Falcon Oil has no experience of ultra deep oil exploration but has "complex links with the financial interests of President, José Eduardo dos Santos." Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Angola: 2nd quarter 1999, p.26.

3 Reuters, July 30, 1999.

4 Financial Times (London), January 19, 1999.

5 SouthScan (London), vol. 11, no. 11, March 15, 1996.

6 José Chipenda, "Rebuilding Angola," conference organized by the Angola-Netzwerk and Gustav-Stresemann-Institute, Bonn, March 27, 1996.

7 SouthScan (London), vol. 11, no. 12, March 22, 1996.

8 Xinhua news agency, April 9, 1998.

9 Lusa (Macão), in English, January 21, 1999.

10 Keith Sommerville, Southern Africa and the Soviet Union: From Communist International to Commonwealth of Independent States (London: MacMillan Press, 1993), p. 122.

11 "Angola: Between War and Peace. Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the Lusaka Protocol," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 8, no. 1(A), February 1996.

12 O Independente (Lisbon), February 2, 1996. The same article claims that MiG-29s were sold as well, but Human Rights Watch has been unable to find evidence of this.

13 Human Rights Watch interviews with a U.S. military source, Washington, DC, July 1996, and a Russian diplomat, New York, July 1996.

14 Ibid.

15 Russkiy Telegraf (Moscow), December 5, 1997, cited by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 7, 1997; and Human Rights Watch interview with a Russian diplomat, Luanda, August 1998.

16 The agreement was signed in Luanda by Gen. Roberto Leal Ngongo, the Angolan deputy minister of defense, and Gen. Vladimir Pakhomov, the Russian deputy minister of foreign economic relations. Rádio Nacional de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1900 gmt, January 30, 1998.

17 Segodnya (Moscow), August 18, 1998, cited by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 20, 1998.

18 Human Rights Watch interview with Isaias Samakuva, head of UNITA's delegation at the Joint Commission, Luanda, August 21, 1998.

19 Human Rights Watch interview with a U.S. diplomat, Luanda, August 22, 1998.

20 Human Rights Watch interview with a docker, Luanda, August 23, 1998.

21 Human Rights Watch interviews with Angolan Air Force staff, Luanda, August 25, 1998.

22 Africa Confidential (London), vol. 39, no. 16, August 7, 1998, claimed that Angola also wanted MIG-29s. However, there have been no sightings of these planes.

23 Human Rights Watch confirmed this by interviewing workers in the port, Luanda, August 1998.

24 Reuters, August 19, 1998.

25 Defense & Security (London), November 11, 1998.

26 Russian Public TV, in Russian, August 20, 1998. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 22, 1998.

27 Russian diplomatic source, London, December 1998.

28 Izvestia (Moscow), December 4, 1998, cited in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 6, 1998 and Human Rights Watch interviews with military intelligence analysts in London, Paris, and Washington, D.C., January 1999.

29 Kommersant-Vlast (Moscow), no. 3, January 26, 1999, copy in Human Rights Watch possession.

30 Military intelligence official, London, March 15, 1999.

31 Jornal de Angola (Luanda), March 3, 1999.

32 Angolan diplomatic source, London, April 1999.

33 Actual (Luanda), March 30, 1999.

34 Marcus Scheuemaier, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, April 26, 1999.

35 Expresso (Lisbon), April 20, 1999.

36 Diário de Notícias (Luanda), April 12, 1999.

37 U.S. diplomat, Luanda, August 1998.

38 Agence France Press, August 22, 1997.

39 Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta (Minsk), December 23, 1998, cited by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 17, 1999.

40 Human Rights Watch interview with pilot, Minsk, February 15, 1999.

41 Ibid.

42 Diário de Notícias (Lisbon), April 12, 1999.

43 Human Rights Watch, Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994) p.41.

44 Ibid., pp.41-42.

45 Human Rights Watch interviews with Angolan military sources, Luanda, April 1996.

46 Human Rights Watch interviews with a Western military intelligence source, Washington DC, April 1996.

47 Gazeta Mercantil (São Paulo), November 23, 1998.

48 Information provided by U.S. and Portuguese diplomats, London and Washington D.C., April 1999.

49 See, Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade, p.45.

50 BTA news agency, Sofia, in English, February 21, 1996.

51 Human Rights Watch interview with an Angolan military source, Luanda, November 1996.

52 Chinese diplomat, Luanda, August 1998.

53 Xinhua news agency, October 13, 1998; and Human Rights Watch interview with an Angolan military source, Luanda, August 1998.

54 Human Rights Watch confirmed these shipments in interviewswith government officials in Warsaw, July 1996.

55 Angolan military sources, Luanda, 1997.

56 PAP news agency (Warsaw), in English, November 29, 1998.

57 This category comprises conventional implements of war such as explosives, large caliber arms and automatic weapons, guns, missiles, bombs, grenades, tanks, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, and naval vessels that could cause severe casualties and/or major damage and destruction.

58 This category comprises all types of infantry hand-held and portable assault weapons, and associated ammunition of a caliber smaller than 12.7mm.

59 See:

60 Sydney Herald, December 29, 1998.

61 O Independente (Lisbon), February 2, 1996.

62 Israeli diplomatic source, Luanda, February 1997.

63 Actual Fax (Luanda), December 7, 1996.

64 A contract, reportedly signed between the Angolan military procurement agency and a Franco-Russian consortium in late July 1994, envisioned the supply of four shipments of weapons, including Mi-17 helicopters and armored personnel carriers. Expresso (Lisbon), July 30, 1994.

65 Independent (London), April 24, 1999 reported that the government used newly acquired tanks from the Ukraine in its December 1998 offensive against UNITA rebels. Público (Lisbon), May 18, 1999 also reported that tanks and heavy artillery were being delivered and sent to Kuito. When the U.N.'s Sanctions Committee visited Kiev in July 1999, Ukrainian officials told its Chairman that the reports of authorized Ukrainian weapons going to UNITA were untrue, spread by jealous competitors attempting to undermine the Ukraine's lucrative weapons deals with the Angolan government.

66 Folha 8 (Luanda), August 5, 1999.

67 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with diplomatic sources, Harare, March 8, 1999.

68 U.N., Report of the Secretary-General, "Study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms," U.N. Document A/46/301, September 9, 1991, p. 11.

69 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), January 15, 1999.

70 See John Turner, Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa to the Present (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1998), p. 113.

71 This is likely to be the 75mm RCL M20.

72 FAA military sources, Luanda, January 1999.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Televisão Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1930gmt, May 7, 1999.

78 "Angola: IRIN background report on UNITA," April 2, 1999

79 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), March 19, 1999; Hart's Daily Petroleum Monitor, March 31, 1999. Human Rights Watch also discussed these allegations with Richard Cornwall, London, April 27, 1999.

80 Sean Cleary, Director of Strategic Concepts Ltd in South Africa, claims that he possesses evidence of one shipment of FROG rockets to UNITA from North Korea via Benin. He also claimed that UNITA may have obtained a couple of Alouette helicopters and two Mi-8 helicopters but that he did not believe the reports that UNITA had MiG-23s. Human Rights Watch interview , London, April 13, 1999.

81 Sean Cleary, "Angola's Unremitting Agony: Time for a rethink," paper presented at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 11, 1999, p.4.

82 Diplomatic sources, London and Washington, July 1999.

83 These discussions included Ukrainian measures against mercenaries. These include legislation providing for serious penalties for Ukrainian nationals proven to have engaged in mercenary activity or of violating Ukraine's practice of deploying military personnel abroad only in support of U.N.-mandated military operations. "Report on the Chairman's visit to Europe and Participation in the Seventieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, July 1999," S/1999/829, July 29, 1999.

84 Ibid.

85 Ukrainian news agency UNIAN, August 3, 1999.

86 Luanda, August 1998.

87 Ukraine has denied that its nationals are working with UNITA. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Kiev), January 23, 1999, cited by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 27, 1999. Ukraine, in an admission of its role in the current arms trade to the Angolan government told the U.N. Sanctions Committee when it visited Kiev in July that competitors were trying to undermine the Ukraine's good business relationship with Luanda.

88 Human Rights Watch interview, London, September 28, 1998.

89 Eyewitness reports, and Human Rights Watch interviews, Kinshasa, March 1995.

90 Human Rights Watch, "Angola: Between War and Peace," p.15.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Interviews with pilots who flew these routes for ATO, Johannesburg, January 1996.

94 "Angola: Between War and Peace," pp. 15-16.

95 Human Rights Watch interviews in Kinshasa, interview with diplomatic sources in Washington and Luanda, and information provided by Angolan officials, March 1995 and February 1996.

96 Human Rights Watch phone interviews with diplomatic sources in London and Washington, D.C., February 1, 1996.

97 Le Monde (Paris), January 10, 1996.

98 Inter Press Service, August 12, 1996. See also, De Standaard (Brussels), Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Africa, August 26, 1996.

99 Washington Post, March 21, 1997.

100 Human Rights Watch interviews with an official employed at Point Noire airport in this period, Paris, June 1998.

101 Human Rights Watch was told by U.S., French and U.N. officials that sanctions-busting was happening during this period.

102 Human Rights Watch interviews with an official employed at Point Noire airport in this period. Interview took place in Paris, June 1998.The names of these same companies were also provided independently by both a UNITA official and Western intelligence sources; Human Rights Watch interviews, Paris, London, Washington, 1997 and 1998.

103 Observer (London), January 31, 1999. According to this article Air Atlantic Cargo is a British company with offices in Kent. The planes spotted in central Africa are registered to the Lagos-based Air Atlantic Nigeria, the major shareholder in the British company. Air Atlantic Cargo was investigated in May 1998 by British Customs after it was passed an airway bill, dated February 4, 1998, purporting to show that Air Atlantic Cargo had delivered arms to President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone in contravention of an international arms embargo, though the document may well have been a fake. In August 1998 one of Air Atlantic Cargo's Boeings reportedly landed at Goma in eastern Congo for the Congolese rebels and delivered thirty-eight tons of arms from Burgas, the Bulgarian free-trade zone on the Black Sea. A week later the aircraft was spotted in Namibia, reportedly delivering twenty-one tons of arms, destined eventually for the DRC government. The plane was then said to have flown to Botswana where it unloaded armored cars, also intended for the DRC. Air Atlantic Cargo closed in 1999.

104 Human Rights Watch interviews with an official employed at Pointe Noire airport in this period. Interview took place in Paris, June 1998. The names of these companies were also provided independently by both a UNITA official and Western intelligence sources; Human Rights Watch interviews, Paris, London, Washington, 1997 and 1998.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 SouthScan (London), vol. 12, no. 32, September 5, 1997.

108 Ibid.

109 Lusa (Macão), October 15, 1998.

110 Televisão Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1930 gmt, January 28, 1999. The words of Colonel Cangundo should be treated with caution, as he was in Angolan government custody when he reportedly gave the above statement.

111 Jornal de Angola (Luanda), February 1, 1999.

112 Expresso (Lisbon), June 20, 1998.

113 SAPA-DPA, April 22, 1998.

114 South African Police Report. According to the report, most of these flights were out of Pietersburg, but it also named Lanseria near Johannesburg and five private airstrips in Gauteng. The report stated that these airports were being used to transport "suspected" illegal "military equipment" into UNITA-held areas of Angola, p.3.

115 South African Police official, Pretoria, 1 September 1998.

116 The Operational Working Team on Border Control, "Border Control. Collective Approach-Implementation Plan," unpublished report, Pretoria, April 1997.

117 South African Police official, Pretoria, 1 September 1998.

118 For example, Capt. Christopher Barratt-Jolly, flying a Boeing 707 under contract to Occidental Airlines, reportedly left RAF Manston in the U.K. in May 1998 with a cargo of military equipment that failed to reach its declared destination in South Africa. South African police fear that the equipment may have been handed to UNITA rebels. Sunday Times (London), January 10, 1999.

119 According to Angolan officials the plane is owned by a H. Sckuvie of Brazzaville. Human Rights Watch attempted to contact H. Sckuvie but was unable to reach him.

120 SAPA news agency, October 20, 1998.

121 Ibid.

122 Angolan charge sheet, July 2, 1998. Human Rights Watch has a copy on file.

123 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), May 1, 1998. The trucks reportedly were flown out of Mmabatho airport in South Africa during an eighteen-day operation in December 1997.

124 South Africa Police report. The report named two companies operating illegally out of Pietersburg-Air Pass and Air Cess. The two companies' planes were not registered in South Africa, however, but elsewhere in southern Africa, including in Swaziland. Air Cess, the parent company, is also not registered in South Africa but in the United Arab Emirates.

125 SAPA news agency, April 15, 1998.

126 AirPass is linked (through ownerships) to a series of air charter companies, including Air Cess and Norse Air. Norse Air is owned by Victor Budd and run by Andrew Smullian; it operates a DC-4 (registration EL-AWX, serial number 22192). A company profile search on AirPass by Human Rights Watch in South Africa provided a trading address in Sandton and Roodepoort in Johannesburg, indicating that the shareholders are V. BOOT (BUDD) (90 percent) and Deidre Ward (10 percent). Victor Budd is known as Victor Bout in Belgium. According to U.S. military intelligence Air Pass has also been flying in 1999 between the Central African Republic, Kisangani, and Kigali carrying weapons, timber and precious stones. Human Rights Watch interview, June 4, 1999. A 1999 U.S. intelligence assessment on diamonds in Africa seen by Human Rights Watch also mentions Victor Butt and Air Cess as being known to supply services to UNITA in exchange for diamonds.

127 SABC TV, April 23, 1998.

128 Air Cess announced in 1998 to the press (in an undated press release) that it was "setting up shop in Swaziland in a multimillion-rand investment that will create jobs for locals," and that it had opened routes from Matsapha airport to Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa and planned operations to include Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia. See, Business Day Online,, no date.

Swaziland has also figured in the arms trade. In June 1998 a cargo aircraft arriving at Manzini airport was found to carry the parts for two helicopter gunships. Janes' Defense Weekly, July 15, 1998. The Electronic Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), July 10, 1998, reports that the helicopter parts were found when the new Swaziland director of civil aviation, John Tambi, discovered that corrupt Swazi officials had issued fraudulent papers for various Russian-made aircraft. The planes were chartered to two Swaziland-registered companies, Southern Cross and AES. The registrations appeared to be a front, however, with the companies' only presence in the kingdom consisting of post office boxes. Forty-six aircraft around the world were grounded following the investigation.

129 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a South African Police officer, February 19, 1999.

130 South African Police official, Pretoria, 1 September 1998.

131 This operation was linked to Ters Ehlers, a business partner of Siderov. Ehlers had approached Dr. Klaus Dierks, Namibia's deputy minister of works, transport, and communication on February 15, 1996 to get permission to airlift fuel, food, mining equipment, and other supplies from Grootfontein to neighboring countries. Elhers is a well-known South African arms dealer who was involved in arms trafficking to the ex-FAR. See,"Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide," A Human Rights Watch Short Report,, vol.7, no.4 (A), May 1995.

132 After war broke out in the Democratic Republic of Congo in August 1998, Siderov switched sides in the Angolan conflict, associating himself with the DRC and Angola, and hiring an Antonov 24 through a U.K.-based company, Air Foyle Ltd, headquartered at Luton Airport. Air Foyle is represented in South Africa by Norse Air. Human Rights Watch interview with South African Police officer, Johannesburg, February 1999.

133 Human Rights Watch interview with Namibian Police officer, Windhoek, April 16, 1996.

134 Jane's International Defense Review, vol. 31, no. 8, August 1, 1998.

135 "Angola: Malawi accused of aiding UNITA," IRIN, March 26, 1999 [19990327].

136 Jakkie Potgieter, senior researcher with the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, described the planes as Cessna 210s and DC-3 transporters, which were being loaded with small arms and ammunition in November 1996. The planes were not registered in South Africa. Electronic Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 20, 1997, retrieved at Potgieter visited Nacala again in March 1997, when he saw a vessel with an Indian flag discharging cargo at Nacala port, including boxes of weapons, which were then stored in grain silos and at a Taiwanese prawn-processing plant near Nacala. He said that he saw Chinese and Bulgarian crates and wrappings. Human Rights Watch interview, Eskom Conference Center, Midrand, July 3, 1997.

137 Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), June 27, 1997, retrieved at wmail/970627/BUS43.html.

138 While rejecting charges that weapons flows to UNITA have transited Mozambican territory, the government stated in June 1997 that it would investigate such claims. Agence France Presse, June 26, 1997. Mozambican army chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Lagos Lidimo rejected as fabrications allegations that an arms network run by Portuguese businessmen through the Mozambican port of Nacala was linked to senior Mozambican officials. SouthScan, vol. 12, no. 25, July 4, 1997.

139 Human Rights Watch interview, London, May 16, 1998.

140 Angolense (Luanda), July 26, 1999.

141 Human Rights Watch, Angola:. Arms Trade, pp. 57-58.

142 Registration numbers 9LLBH and 9LLBF.

143 Human Rights Watch interviews airport officials, Ndola, Zambia, June 1998.

144 Zambia Today (Lusaka), August 29, 1997.

145 Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 29, no. 17, April 29, 1998.

146 Times of Zambia (Lusaka), March 12, 1998.

147 Chronicle (Lusaka), August 22, 1997; Human Rights Watch interviews in Zambia in 1998.

148 British Petroleum confirmed to Human Rights Watch that two of its staff had failed to account for fuel provided to Metex. Human Rights Watch interview, London, January 25, 1999.

149 Human Rights Watch interviews, Lusaka and Ndola, July 1998. The official could read Russian, having studied in Russia on a scholarship. He could not, however, establish whether the crates came from the Russian Federation or another of the former Soviet republics.

150 Zambia Today (Lusaka), August 29, 1997.

151 "Zambia: No Model for Democracy: Continuing Human Rights Violations," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 10, no. 2(A), May 1998.

152 Human Rights Watch visited Zambia in this period and was told by airport staff about the restrictions.

153 Times of Zambia (Lusaka), March 6, 1998.

154 ZNBC radio, Lusaka, in English 1115 gmt, April 10, 1998.

155 Copy on file with Human Rights Watch. This letter was submitted on March 9 to the Sanctions Committee of the U.N. Security Council by Angolan Ambassador and Permanent Representative Afonso Van Dunem "Mbinda." It was published by the SecurityCouncil as S/1999/267, March 11, 1999.

156 Jornal de Angola (Luanda), February 3, 1999; and Post (Lusaka), February 16, 1999. See also Post (Lusaka), January 21 and January 28, 1999; Jornal de Noticias do Porto (Oporto), February 3, 1999; and Monitor (Lusaka), February 12-25, 1999.

157 Post (Lusaka), February 12, 1999.

158 Letter to Angolan government sent by the Hon. S.K. Walubita, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lusaka, dated February 17, 1999 (on file with Human Rights Watch). Foreign Minister Walubita subsequently stated that his government had appealed to the whole "international community" to investigate Angola's allegations. Reply to Human Rights Watch question, Center for Strategic and International Studies meeting, Washington D.C., February 26, 1999.

159 Post (Lusaka), March 22, 1999.

160 Human Rights Watch investigated in May 1999 the Angolan allegations that the Zambezi Motel was used as a sanction-busting location. The Motel was leased to N.N Air Services of South Africa, co-owned by Pretoria based businessman Nicolas Acton and Chipili Member of Parliament Ntondo Chindoloma and that the company had attempted to lease the airstrip adjoining the Motel but were refused a permit. The Zambezi Motel closed down on March 16, 1999 after it main clients, people linked with trade to Angola stopped using its premises following the publicity over its alleged use as a lodging and meeting place for gun runners. Businessman Juan Baptista had opened a chain of shops near the Angolan border and traded in diamonds in exchange for military uniforms, mealie meal, fuel, salt and soap through a UNITA General Kalungulungu. A local Movement for Multiparty Democracy official and an immigration official were also reportedly involved in this border trade, but no planes are known to have landed in Zambezi and trafficked guns through the district into Angola have not been confirmed. Residents told Human Rights Watch that Zambia Army lorries were transporting building materials to Kayenge and that these might have been mistakenly thought to be arms traffickers.

Human Rights Watch established that in early December 1998 several shipments of heavy weapons passed through Zambia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, which may have also been mistaken for weapons destined to Angola. However, we also established that a cross border trade continues with UNITA and that a number of individuals close to the Zambian government, whose names were not mentioned in the Angolan accusations may be involved. Human Rights Watch interviews, Zambia, May 5 to 9, 1999.

161 Human Rights Watch interviewed Maneplavin in Mwinilunga in July 1998: he claimed that government officials were trying to blame him for their trade with UNITA. However, other sources in Mwinilunga confirmed he traded across the border, but mainly in cooking oil, salt, and soap, and some fuel.

162 Ibid.

163 Zambian officials grounded Aero Zambia on March 4, 1999 for allegedly flouting aviation laws and denied the move was connected to the alleged transport of weapons to the Angolan rebels. AP news agency, March 6, 1999.

164 Basil Kabwe of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was quoted in Johannesburg's Mail and Guardian (April 9, 1999) as claiming to have observed eight brand-new military trucks-apparently part of a much larger convoy-in procession along the Shangombo highway leading to the border with UNITA-held areas in Angola. Number plates on the trucks identified them as being Zambian registered; however, the vehicles were not the kind used by the Zambian military. Each truck was loaded with thirty soldiers-not dressed in Zambian army uniforms. However, when Human Rights Watch questioned him about this article in Lusaka on May 6, 1999 he denied these claims, saying the South African journalist had misrepresented what he had told him and that he was considering legal action.

165 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), April 9, 1999.

166 President dos Santos on April 8 reiterated that Zambia was supporting UNITA. See, Jornal de Angola (Luanda), April 9, 1999.

167 SAPA, June 10, 1999.

168 Diplomatic sources, Lusaka and the Hague, May 1999.

169 Africa Confidential (London), vol.40, no.8, April 16, 1999; Human Rights Watch also had this confirmed by a number of Western diplomats, London and Lusaka, April 1999.

170 Human Rights Watch interview, London. January 1999. Bulgaria features as an important source of weapons for UNITA. In October 1998 the Bulgarian authorities halted a suspicious arms transaction before it was completed. The deal, which involved a shipment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) which they presumed was destined for an embargoed party in Africa, was first described in the local press after an official reported it at a press conference. Several officials told Human Rights Watch that the deal was brokered by a U.S.-Ukrainian company registered in the United States, Miltex, which presented an end-user certificate showing Zambia as the final destination. An investigation showed that Zambia's Ministry of Defense was not aware of the document, so authorities inferred that the SAMs might be diverted and therefore stopped the transaction before it could be completed. Miltex's owner categorically denied his company's involvement in the deal, denied ever providing a false end-user certificate in other deals, and asserted that Miltex's deals were made on the basis of valid arms licenses. See, Human Rights Watch, "Bulgaria: Money Talks: Arms Dealing with Human Rights Abusers," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol 11, no.4 (D), April 1999, p.40.

171 Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), April 9, 1999 alleged that Ugandan troops had been seconded to fight alongside UNITA. This was denied by the Ugandan government. See, Monitor (Kampala), May 19, 1999.

172 Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statement reproduced in the Monitor (Kampala), March 7, 1999.

173 Human Rights Watch interviews Johannesburg, London, and Kampala, January 1999.

174 Roberto de Almeida at British-Angola Forum talk, London, May 20, 1999.

175 Human Rights Watch interview, June 4, 1999.

176 Human Rights Watch interviews with shipping agents, Dar es Salaam, September 17, 1996, and with an advisor to the Tanzanian Foreign Ministry, Dar es Salaam, August 27, 1997.

177 Human Rights Watch interview, Lusaka, April 1998.

178 In May 1999 the Angolan government began naming Cameroon also as a transit point for trade with UNITA.

179 Xinhua news agency, October 5, 1998.

180 Televisão Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1930 gmt, February 22, 1999.

181 U.N. official, Luanda, August 29, 1998.

182 Human Rights Watch interviews, Ouagadougou, June 1998.

183 Human Rights Watch interview, Johannesburg, December 10, 1998.

184 Human Rights Watch interview with a UNITA official, December 1998.

185 Africa Confidential, vol. 40, no. 5, March 5, 1999.

186 Televisão Publica de Angola (Luanda), in Portuguese 1930 gmt, April 2, 1999.

187 FAA official, phone interview, Kuito, February 11, 1999.

188 Human Rights Watch interviews, Luanda, August 1998.

189 Human Rights Watch interviews, Luanda, August 1998.

190 Police and NGO sources, Luanda, January 1999.

191 O Independente (Lisbon), May 8, 1999.

192 Angolan officials London, May 20, 1999; Actual, (Luanda),1999.

193 Actual (Luanda), August 7, 1999.

194 Human Rights Watch interviews with a European diplomat, Kinshasa, March 9, 1995; with a corporate security officer, Kinshasa, March 8, 1995; and with arms traffickers, Kalemie, February 9, 1995, and Kinshasa, March 7-8, 1995. Similarly, weapons arriving in Angola for the Burundian government were reportedly also transported by rail to Lubumbashi before being delivered to Kalemie.

195 Human Rights Watch interviews with a U.S. embassy official, Bujumbura, October 1, 1996, and with cargo company personnel, Brussels, August 2, 1996. A connection to UNITA also arose with respect to Zairean nationals Aziza Gulimali, General Kpama Baramoto, and Jean Bemba Saolona, who were under scrutiny by several Western embassies in the region for having provided arms, including Heckler & Koch G-3 rifles and 7.62 caliber ammunition, to FDD rebels via Angola in the summer of 1996. A European diplomattold Human Rights Watch that the three "run guns from South Africa to Zaire...Baramoto's men have been having skirmishes with local Zairean troops over the supply line." Human Rights Watch interview, October 6, 1996.

196 Alex Vines, "Small Arms Proliferation: A Major Challenge for Post-apartheid South and Southern Africa," in David Simon (ed.), South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region (London: James Currey and Ohio University Press, 1998), p. 39, citing the author's field work in Zambia.

197 Chris Smith and Alex Vines, "Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa," London Defense Studies 42 (London: Brassey's, 1997), p. 38.

198 Tony Hodges, Angola to 2000: Prospects for Recovery (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993), pp. 116-118.

199 Diamond diggers.

200 World Diamond Industry Directory & Yearbook 1996/97 (London: Diamond International, 1997).

201 Africa Energy & Mining (London), no. 235, September 9, 1998.

202 Diamond industry source, Antwerp, October 1998; UNITA officials, Angola, London, and Paris in 1997 and 1998. Ollie Oliveira, De Beer's Angola Director and director of the CSO told the British-Angola Forum on March 24, 1999 that, "What we have consistently (sic) is that De Beers has never had any direct dealings with UNITA. Up until the imposition of sanctions, in June 1998, what conceivably happened is that an intermediary (who could be connected to UNITA) would arrive at the buying centres of Antwerp and Israel with diamonds which, according to the laws of those countries, were legal. He might have been the forth, third handler of those goods. Until the imposition of sanctions, we could have conceivably indirectly purchased UNITA diamonds. We will never know." De Beers Managing Director Gary Ralfe at a press conference in Moscow on October 21, 1997 stated that "You are absolutely right to say that in fact it is UNITA that over the recent few years been responsible for most of the production in Angola. One of the essential jobs that we De Beers carry out worldwide is to ensure that diamonds coming onto the markets do not threaten the overall price structure and therefore although we know (sic) direct relationship with UNITA, there is no doubt that we buy many of the diamonds that emanate from the UNITA-held areas in Angola, second-hand on the markets of Antwerp and Tel-Aviv. And as the diamond markets were weakened recently (inaudible) buying up this Angolan production which otherwise will be threatening the overall price structure has increased." "Press Conference with Alrosa Company and De Beers Corporation, October 21, 1997," Federal Information Systems Corporation Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, October 21, 1997.

203 Human Rights Watch interview, Luanda, August 27, 1998.

204 According to a U.S. intelligence assessment of the diamond trade and Africa, Lebanese dealers have been important middlemen for UNITA in the diamond trade.

205 A rare glimpse of these negotiations were given in an interview in June 1996, when UNITA leader Savimbi was interviewed about diamonds (Lisbon Rádio Renascença, June 27, 1996, as printed in FBIS Daily report: southern Africa, July 1, 1996):
[Ribeiro] I have heard that the president of ENDIAMA (Angola's national diamond company) visited Bailundo. Is this true?

[Savimbi] It is true but he did not talk to me. He had no business talking to me. I do not enter talk about stones. I have not sunk so low as to discuss our diamond wells [as heard].

[Ribeiro] Those stones are precious to UNITA?

[Savimbi] Yes they are, but I have not sunk so low. He had talks with other UNITA officials. I still don't know what they talked about because it was not important enough for an immediate report. Yes he paid a visit. We acknowledge that there are ongoing discussions, very realistic discussions...The fact is, UNITA cannot be left without resources. It cannot. You cannot ask for everything: let us have your army! Here, have it. Let us have your weapons! Here, have them. Let us have your money! Oh come on, get real! Nobody will accept that.

206 Endiama official, Luanda, August 28, 1998.

207 Down from U.S.$500m in 1997. Estimates provided by Ollie Oliveira, executive director of the De Beers Central Selling Organization and the director responsible for De Beers Corporate Finance and Angola, London, March 24, 1999.

208 Ibid.

209 Sunday Times (London), November 15, 1998.

210 Times (London), January 8, 1999.

211 Economist (London), April 24, 1999.

212 DPA correspondent in Luanda Anna Richardson visited Saurimo in April and heard much discussion about this amongst the diamond companies. Human Rights Watch interview, London, July 3, 1999.

213 Diamond industry sources, London, January 1999.

214 Ibid.

215 There are known dealers in Zambia in Zambezi, Kalabo, and Mongu. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of any significant trade going through Mwinilunga when it visited in June 1998. But we were told that the town had been a major transit point for Zairean traders working in UNITA-held areas until mid-1997; Human Rights Watch interviews with diamond industry sources, Antwerp, October 15, 1998.

216 Confidential sources.

217 Post (Lusaka), March 30, 1999.

218 Human Rights Watch interview, Johannesburg, December 1, 1998.

219 Human Rights Watch interview with a U.S. Embassy official, Bujumbura, October 1, 1996.

220 U.N. document S/RES/1173 (1998).

221 SAPA-AP, November 25, 1998.

222 Channel Africa, "Midday Report 020399," March 2, 1999.

223 ACP-EU "Resolution on the situation in Angola," ACP-EU 2759/99 fin, dg08/document/joint/joint1_en.htm

224 De Beers, 1997 Annual Report. To maintain the value of diamonds as supplies increased, they had to be artificially scarce. De Beers has created the "single channel marketing system," which is the world's most unquestioned cartel. Through its Central Selling Organisation in London, De Beers sells up to 80 percent of the world's uncutdiamonds. To maximize control, the CSO has in the past bought up any loose stones in circulation, either from small-time traders in Angola or dealers in London or Antwerp. The aim is to bring as much trade as possible under De Beers' control. The CSO organizes ten sales a year to 160 selected dealers who each are offered a small box of uncut stones. The CSO decides what it sells at the sales, which are known as "sights." It also determines the price.

225 Reuters, December 15, 1998.

226 Letter from De Beers Managing Director Gary Ralfe to the United Nations Sanctions Committee, January 13, 1999.

227 Ollie Oliveira, Executive Director of the De Beers Central Selling Organization (CSO), London, March 24, 1999.

228 Human Rights Watch interview with Charmian Gooch, Co-Director, Global Witness, London, July 3, 1999.

229 Human Rights Watch interview with Andy Lamont, De Beers, London, December 1998.

230 Letter from De Beers Managing Director Gary Ralfe to the United Nations Sanctions Committee, January 13, 1999.

231 De Beers, Introduction to the sources of rough diamond production and their individual characteristics (London: De Beers, June 1999), p.3.

232 Business Day (Johannesburg), April 21, 1999.

233 Human Rights Watch interview, Antwerp traders, October 15, 1998.

234 Human Rights Watch interview, Antwerp, October 15, 1998.

235 According to a Canadian diplomat one packet of illicit Angolan diamonds was intercepted by customs officials in Antwerp in June 1999.

236 Human Rights Watch interview, London, February 4, 1999.

237 Eighty percent of the world's supply of rough diamonds go to Antwerp: 43 percent from the De Beers CSO; 30 percent from Africa; and 27 percent from Australia, Europe, North America, and the Near East. There are 190 Antwerp firms licensed to import rough diamonds.

238 Antwerp Confidential, August 1998.

239 Human Rights Watch interviews, Antwerp, October 15, 1998.

240 New African (London), March 1999.

241 Diplomatic source, London, April 22, 1999.

242 Global Witness, "A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict," Global Witness Report, December 1998.

243 Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), July 16, 1999.

244 "Report on the Chairman's visit to Europe and Participation in the Seventieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, July 1999," S/1999/829, July 29, 1999.

245 Endiama (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola) is the parastatal which issues diamond concessions. It is also responsible for issuing licenses to buyers, permitting them to buy unofficial production in Luanda and the provinces. It receives a 2.5 percent tax on all diamond exports.

246 Human Rights Watch interview, Luanda, August 1998.

247 An Angolan trader in July 1999 boasted to Human Rights Watch that he could for a price obtain Certificates of Origin.

248 "Report on the Chairman's visit to Europe and Participation in the Seventieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, July 1999," S/1999/829, July 29, 1999.

249 The Mining Journal, March 26, 1999.

250 Human Rights Watch interviews, London June 1999.

251 Actual Fax (Luanda), October 21, 1998.

252 According to a U.S. intelligence assessment less than 25 percent of an estimated $850 million of annual sales of Angolan diamonds are accounted for in official government revenues.

253 Africa Analysis (London), no. 316, February 19, 1999.

254 According to Endiama and local press sources, Endiamo officials had used Certificates of Origin and put false signatures and stamps on them to sell diamonds for his own benefit. Human Rights Watch interview, April 1999.

255 Africa Analysis, June 25, 1999.

0 Wall Street Journal Europe (Paris), April 10, 1999.

1 Financial Times (London), June 23, 1999.

2 IDMA, "Press Release," Moscow, July 5, 1999.

3 "Report on the Chairman's visit to Europe and Participation in the Seventieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, July 1999," S/1999/829, July 29, 1999.

4 SAPA, January 27, 1998.

5 Televisão Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese, 1930 gmt, February 22, 1999.

6 Ibid; Reuters, May 11, 1999.

7 Human Rights Watch interview with Danielle Faure, Paris, November 1, 1998.

8 MONUA official, Luanda, August 1998.

9 MONUA official, Luanda, August 1998.

10 Human Rights Watch interview, Luanda, August 1998.

11 MONUA official, Luanda, August 1998.

12 Motor-Sich is based in the town of Zaporizhya in the Ukraine. On May 18, 1998, Shyrochkin said he would seek an out-of-court settlement on the impounded AN-26. He also announced that his firm had signed an agreement on repair and maintenance for 150 aircraft engines in Angola. This appears to have been a deal to get the plane released and the charges dropped. Infobank (Kiev), May 18, 1998.

13 Human Rights Watch interviews with diplomatic sources, Luanda, August 1998.

14 Issa Diallo, File on Four. BBC Radio 4, July 6, 20:38 gmt.

15 Ambassador Robert Fowler to International Development Committee, House of Commons, London, July 6, 1999.

16 U.N. document, S/1996/37, January 17, 1996.

17 Jornal de Angola (Luanda), March 20, 1998.

18 Reuters, March 22, 1998.

19 ZNBC radio, Lusaka, in English, 1115 gmt, April 10, 1998.

20 SAPA-AP, April 16, 1998.

21 Canadian diplomat, New York, February 5, 1999.

22 U.N. document S/1999/147, January 21, 1999.

23 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1237, May 7, 1999.

24 Human Rights Watch interview with Ambassador Fowler, London, July 7, 1999.

25 Fowler told Human Rights Watch that there would be no journalists, business people, or NGOs on the panels. This is not strictly correct, Human Rights Watch knows that at least one person from a multinational oil company that was invited to join the panel.

The composition of Panel One (Sources of Revenue, Funding and Petroleum Supplies of UNITA) is: Ambassador Anders Mollander - Chairman (Sweden), a former ambassador to Angola (1992-95) and Head of Southern Africa Group, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Stanlake Samkange-Rapporteur (Zimbabwe), a former U.N. official; Hannes George McKay-diamonds (Namibia), Detective Chief Inspector, Protected Resources Unit, Ministry of Mines and Energy; Olivier Vallee-finance, an independent consultant; Robert Cowieson-petroleum (United Kingdom), Business Director and Development Manager, Reservoir Research Limited; Oleg Ivanov-travel, representation abroad (Russian Federation), Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Panel Two (Sources of Military Support to UNITA) is: Col. Otisitswe Broza Tiroyamodimo-Vice-Chairman (Botswana), Deputy Brigade Commander; formerly Deputy Regional Commander, UNOMOZ in Mozambique; Melvin E. Holt, Jr. -customs (United States), Senior Special Agent, U.S. National Central Bureau, Interpol-U.S. Department of Justice; Member, U.N. International Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda (1996 and 1998); Gilbert Barthe-customs (Switzerland), customs expert; U.N International Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda (1996-97, 1998); Control Expert, Export/Import Monitoring Group,Baghdad (1997); Benny Lombard-small arms (South Africa), Deputy Director for Arms Export Control and Regional Arms Matters, Department of Foreign Affairs. Member, U.N. Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1996-97) and the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1998-99).

In addition, several governments in the sub-region offered their technical expertise on diamonds to the panels through their diamond boards or relevant ministries. The contact person for South Africa is Victor Sibiya, Chief Executive Officer, South African Diamond Board.

26 "Letter Dated 4 June 1999 From The Chairman Of The Security Council Committee Established Pursuant To Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning The Situation In Angola Addressed To The President Of The Security Council," S/1999/644, June 4, 1999, pp.1-20.

27 These were: I) U.N. sanctions monitors with expertise in customs inspection deployed mostly in Africa, also Ukraine; II) Intelligence sharing by U.N. member states with the U.N. Security Council; III) Air surveillance/interdiction of UNITA supply flights; IV) U.N. Sanctions Committee/Southern Africa Development Community collaboration; V) Two Interpol African sub-regional bureaus working with Sanctions Committee; VI) Senior representatives of Antwerp Diamond High Council, Israeli Diamond Exchange and CSO to liaise with Sanctions Committee and expert panels; Explore measures including requirement of all diamond-producing countries to introduce standardized and credible certificates of origin; VII) Expert monitors at major diamond exchanges; VIII) Legislation in Angola and neighboring countries criminalizing violation of sanctions; IX) U.N. Secretary General/UNSC president briefing for member states on application of sanctions; X) Political profile at summits and major ministerial meetings; XI) Industry associations to sensitize members; XII) Expert panels empowered to commission research; XIII) Expert panels to identify best practice (e.g. inter-departmental committees in Botswana and Namibia); Collaboration with U.N. Commission on Human Rights over use of mercenaries.

28 "Report on the Chairman's visit to Europe and Participation in the Seventieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity, July 1999," S/1999/829, July 29, 1999.

29 Human Rights Watch interview with Ambassador Fowler, London, July 7, 1999.

30 Ibid.

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