THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community has failed to aid the transition to democracy in Zaire in an effective manner, not least by failing to press for preconditions for free and fair elections to be met. When the simmering internal political crisis finally exploded into open warfare, the international community engaged in frantic diplomatic efforts to encourage the parties to come to the negotiation table. However, in the pressure for an immediate cessation of hostilities, so that the refugees and displaced persons affected by the war could be reached and assisted, the need to hold both government and rebel forces accountable for reported large scale human rights abuses in areas under their respective control was largely ignored.

Before the outbreak of the war in the east, the Western powers were locked into a policy of support for a government of questionable legitimacy and turned a blind eye to systematic human rights abuses, pressing for elections and a speedy transition without addressing the preconditions to meet for them to have been meaningful. Given that the budget envisaged for the elections amounted to more than $250 million, which was largely to be financed by the international community, donors will have considerable leverage with whatever authorities emerge from the current crisis to ensure that clear human rights criteria are met before the release of their assistance.

The international community has played a complex role in the Zairian crisis since 1990. Except for assistance to the Rwandan refugees in the East, where vast sums, estimated at US $2.5 billion, were spent, international assistance to Zaire has been extremely limited. Nevertheless, the international community continuedto exert significant influence in all aspects of the Zairian internal debate. The declarations, and frequently the silence, of the United States, France or Belgium in the face of abuses had wide-ranging impact within the country. Many Zairians assumed that the international community was behind much of what was occurring in the country, including the survival of Mobutu as president, the Kengo government (until late in the crisis), and the war itself.

All but humanitarian assistance to Zaire was suspended in late 1991. Until mid-1994, the "Troika" of France, Belgium and the United States maintained surprising cohesion in policies intended to bring about a peaceful transition in the country. When President Mobutu intervened in the transition process initiated by the National Sovereign Conference and reinstalled the National Assembly in March 1993, his new prime minster, Faustin Birindwa, was uniformly boycotted by the Western nations. The president himself, together with his entourage, were subject to a largely effective international visa boycott. Privately, however, there were disputes within the Troika, particularly accusations about leaks and secret contacts with Mobutu. The potentially most effective action-a freeze on Mobutu's assets abroad-was never implemented.

Concerted opposition to the Mobutu regime began to fray publicly with the eruption of the crisis in Rwanda in April 1994 and further dissolved when Prime Minister Kengo was installed in July 1994. Only France took a public position enthusiastically endorsing the new prime minister. Belgium and the United States, though initially reticent, also came to support him. On April 24, 1995, on the fifth anniversary of the date marking the beginning of the transition, the Troika made a demarche to the "political leadership" of Zaire, faulting primarily the entourage of the president and the leader of the opposition, Etienne Tshisekedi.165 At that time, the United States praised Prime Minister Kengo for his "courageous effort to implement his ambitious program of political and economic reform and to move Zaire forward to free, fair and transparent elections."166

In April 1996, France resumed bilateral assistance to Zaire. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Cooperation stated that the French decision did not indicate a determination by Paris that respect for human rights had improved in Zaire.167 The French re-engagement with Mobutu had already become apparent in 1995, when he was allowed to return to France on several occasions and meet, at first discreetly, and then publicly, with high government officials.

Belgium slightly increased its aid program to Zaire, which totaled approximately $15 million in 1995, but channeled all aid through NGOs, not through the government. Belgium maintained its visa ban on Mobutu, though others in his entourage had an easier time traveling to Belgium.

The European Union

Since the suspension of E.U. aid to the Zairian government in January 1992, the European Commission allocated U.S. $309.81 million for rehabilitation and infrastructure programs in Zaire. The E.U. was prepared to contribute an estimated $35 million toward the Zairian elections, although the money was only to be released if the Zairian government took steps toward conducting fair and transparent elections and if it contributed financially toward the elections. The Zairian government said it would contribute U.S. $102 million to organize the elections, but had not yet done so. Specific human rights criteria for the release of the E.U. funding were not articulated. In addition to contributing to the special fund established by the United Nations to manage the elections' budget, E.U. assistance for the elections also provided for the establishment of a European Electoral Unit.

The E.U. was prepared to contribute approximately U.S. $18 million in materials and basic items necessary for the conduct of the census. At the time of writing, it was not clear when such a census might take place. The remaining $18 million would not be allocated at least until the Zairian government contributed to the elections, but probably also until the situation was deemed to be more ripe for elections and other donors made commitments to contribute as well.168

On February 17, 1997, the Dutch presidency of the European Union issued a statement about the situation in Zaire, condemning the military buildup and calling for the withdrawal of all outside and mercenary forces and the negotiation of an immediate cease-fire. The statement also called for a political solution to the crisis based on five principles: 1) respect of the territorial integrity of Zaire; 2) respect for the rights of citizens; 3) voluntary repatriation of refugees, without intimidation or risk to their safety; 4) non-aggression between states, including preventing illegal activity by opposition groups based in neighboring countries; and, 5) democratization of all countries in the region and continuation of the transition to democracy and the holding of free and fair elections in Zaire.169

The E.U. foreign ministers continued to call for an international conference on the Great Lakes, while also urging a cease-fire, negotiations, and access to refugees by humanitarian agencies. In late March, the E.U. foreign ministers again stressed the importance that democratic elections would have for the peace process.170

The United States

The United States sent an ambassador to Zaire in November 1995, after a hiatus of more than two years, intended to show U.S. displeasure with President Mobutu, the decision was a further vote of support for Prime Minister Kengo. The new ambassador, Daniel Simpson, was an outspoken advocate of elections, but less than a forceful advocate of the measures required to make them meaningful. In public and private statements before the elections were postponed, the ambassador stood firmly for elections to go ahead according to the existing timetable, even in the absence of promised reforms. Statutory prohibitions continued to restrict any direct U.S. assistance or development funding to Zaire, including election assistance, except through NGOs.171

With the outbreak of war, there was widespread suspicion in Zaire that the United States was backing the rebels, which set off a wave of anti-American sentiment in November and December 1996. The United States subsequently took a public position critical of the rebels by denouncing alleged abuses of human rights by them. On December 3, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns pointed to "allegations of human rights abuses in Eastern Zaire by elements of the rebel alliance," and called for the rebel leaders to investigate all such reports and punish those responsible. In addition, the American ambassador made frequent public declarations supporting the Zairian government's position that the country was effectively invaded by Rwanda and Uganda. On January 9, Ambassador Simpson was interviewed on Zairian state television and stated that "We understand perfectly that Zaire has beenattacked by Rwanda and Uganda. This poses problems on both the political and the humanitarian front."172 On March 14, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns addressed the problem of humanitarian access, noting that Kabila had offered guarantees of access and security and that "we expect him to keep his promises." He said the U.S. would continue to press both sides on the issue.

However, the U.S. was initially reluctant to pressure Kabila on human rights grounds, either directly in its contacts with him or indirectly via Rwanda and Uganda. The U.S. denied that it had significant leverage on Kabila, although U.S. influence was clearly greater than U.S. officials claim. The U.S. government finally raised human rights concerns in a demarche to Kabila at the end of March or the beginning of April, which reportedly focused on stopping abuses and taking action against those responsible for them, allowing access for human rights investigators, and permitting aid to the refugees. A similar demarche was reportedly delivered to the ADFL foreign minister in Kigali.

In February and March, the U.S. became more actively involved in trying to secure a political settlement, starting with a cessation of the hostilities. The U.S. supported the U.N.'s five-point plan (see below), and was actively involved in the negotiations hosted by South Africa in late February. At the time of writing, however, all discussion of elections was overshadowed by the momentum of the rebel forces and the efforts to negotiate a political settlement. On March 3, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated that the continued fighting was undermining chances for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and called on all parties to cease hostilities and initiate a dialogue. On March 21, Secretary of State Madeline Albright wrote to Mobutu to urge immediate and direct negotiations with the ADFL. She also expressed U.S. support for U.N. special envoy Mohamed Sahnoun's efforts regarding a cease-fire and negotiations.

The United Nations

The U.N.'s Electoral Assistance Division began in 1996 to provide some support to the Zairian electoral process, although that support was limited to a technical assistance office in Kinshasa as of April 1997. This office was to assist the electoral commission in building its own capacity for elections, in terms of the legal framework for elections, training, and civic education.

The U.N.'s position regarding support for the Zairian elections was spelled out in a letter from then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Zairian government, dated August 9, 1996, in which he articulated the main preconditions for U.N. assistance: namely, the timely adoption of the legal framework for elections and the government's financial contribution to the National Electoral Commission. The secretary-general also noted that "neither your government nor the United Nations can count on the political and financial support of the international community-a critical condition for the success of elections under the current circumstances in Zaire-if these preconditions are not addressed as soon as possible."173 However, the letter made no mention of specific human rights preconditions, other than to call for the elections to be transparent and in accordance with international principles.

The U.N. earmarked some $5 million for Zaire, of which approximately $2 million had been spent in hiring consultants for technical assistance and another $1 million was to be spent on a pilot census project. In addition, inearly 1997 the U.N. opened a trust fund for the Zairian elections, although the fund had received no contributions from member states as of early March 1997.174

On August 21, 1996, after more than one and a half years of negotiations, Zaire had agreed to the establishment of a two-person U.N. human rights field office in Zaire.175 An office was promptly set up with one professional staff member in the country and one more to be hired. The office was originally proposed by Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Roberto Garretón to assist him in collecting information and maintaining contact with the government of Zaire. The primary mandate of the office was to monitor human rights abuses, though some technical cooperation activities were envisaged. It was however, an extremely limited operation.

In January 1997 the United Nations named Mohammed Sahnoun as special envoy for the region jointly with the O.A.U. He expressed his position in favor of a negotiated settlement of the war, and, following extensive consultations during a tour of the region, including a visit to Zaire, drafted a five-point plan for consideration by the Security Council. The council endorsed this on February 18, 1997 in its Resolution 1097 (1997), calling for the:

* immediate cessation of hostilities;

* withdrawal of all external forces, including mercenaries;

* reaffirmation of respect for the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Zaire and other States of the Great Lakes region;

* protection and security for all refugees and displaced persons and facilitation of access to humanitarian assistance;

* rapid and peaceful settlement of the crisis through dialogue, the electoral process and the convening of an international conference on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region.

The O.A.U. and Other Regional Initiatives

President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya hosted a regional summit on the war crisis in eastern Zaire, on November 5, 1996, which was attended by the presidents of Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia and Eritrea. The secretary general of the Organization of African Unity and the prime minister of Ethiopia were also present, but Zaire declined to participate in what came to be known as Nairobi I, invoking the involvement of Uganda and Rwanda in supporting the rebellion. The African leaders urged the U.N. Security Council to deploy a "neutral force" to help repatriate refugees caught in the war zone in east Zaire and called for an immediate cease-fire in the fighting to enable diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting peace.

Another meeting by African heads of state was convened in Nairobi on December 16. Giving in to international pressures to get involved, South African President Nelson Mandela joined eight other leaders from eastern and central Africa and the secretary general of the O.A.U. to discuss the escalating crisis in the Great Lakes region in "Nairobi II."176 Zaire again was notable for its absence, despite Mobutu's assurances to President Moi thatPrime Minister Kengo would attend. At the last minute, Kengo canceled, denouncing the meeting as an "Anglo-Saxon conspiracy."177 The heads of state called for respect for the territorial integrity of the states of the Great Lakes region and an end to cross-border incursions. They also called for a peaceful settlement to the conflict in eastern Zaire. In the interim between Nairobi I and II, President Moi had complained that the initiative was largely ignored by the northern states as they planned an intervention force for the region.

While six African foreign ministers were visiting Kinshasa in the third week of February 1997 to follow up on the resolutions of Nairobi II and discuss the possibility of convening a Nairobi III regional summit, South Africa hosted indirect talks between representatives of the alliance and Honore Ngbanda, President Mobutu's nephew and security advisor. This initiative differed from the Nairobi regional talks in that it involved the participation of the rebel alliance, which the Nairobi process ruled out. On the other hand, the O.A.U. said that it would convene a summit of the member states in the Togolese capital Lome within the framework of its Central Organ of the O.A.U. Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution before the end of March to examine the situation in the Great Lakes.

Converging and Diverging Initiatives

A consensus emerged around the five-point plan as the basis for settlement of the conflict in several subsequent mediation efforts. After initially labeling the U.N.'s peace plan as "timid," the Zairian government accepted it in its declaration of March 5, 1997. Bowing to international pressures, the rebel alliance declared its acceptance of the five-point plan on March 8, but only as a basis for direct negotiations with the government, short of which, the alliance said, it would reject the cease-fire.

The Organization of African Unity endorsed the plan at the fifty-sixth ordinary session of its Council of Ministers which was convened in Tripoli from 24 to 28 February. A measure of the high hopes that the South African mediation initiative raised was the presence of O.A.U./U.N. Special Representative for the Great Lakes region Mohamed Sahnoun, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and the U.S. National Security Council senior director for Africa in Cape Town to bolster the process and apparently also to reconcile international and regional initiatives. These hopes quickly receded, however, as the rebels' military campaign scored additional gains and the Zairian government distanced itself from the talks, saying that the president's envoy was not mandated to represent it.

Nairobi III was convened on March 19 in the absence of the ADFL and Rwanda and Uganda, two of its alleged backers. The six-nation summit called for an end to the conflict in Zaire through the urgent implementation of the U.N. five-point peace plan.178 The O.A.U. Lome summit of March 26 was attended by fourteen heads of state and delegates from the government of Zaire and the ADFL. While the two sides in the conflict did not meet face to face, the summit focused on how to bridge the gap between them on reaching a cease-fire and broader talks on the settlement of the crisis. The final communique from the Lome summit stated that both sides in the conflict pledged to "respect the principle of a cease-fire and the principle of negotiations."

As the Lome summit concluded, the Kenya News Agency reported that President arap Moi, in agreement with the participants in Nairobi III, had handed the chairmanship of the Nairobi initiative to the U.N. and the O.A.U. This step appeared to indicate the merger of the U.N./O.A.U. and regional diplomatic initiatives. An agreement was reached at Lome that delegations from Kinshasa and the ADFL would enter into direct talks in South Africa in early April. The Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun would take the leading role in mediating talks which were expected to set forth the preconditions for further talks and prepare for a direct meeting between the president of Zaire and the leader of the ADFL.

In a statement on March 12, the E.U. reiterated its support for the U.N. efforts to achieve peace in Zaire and called on all the parties involved to endorse the plan and implement its various provisions.179 Meeting in Paris on February 18, senior diplomats from the U.S. and six E.U. countries180 reaffirmed "their adhesion to the principles that must guide the international community in helping restore peace and stability in Zaire-the very guidelines that inspired the five-point peace plan . . . . unanimously agreed by the U.N. Security Council."181

Such unanimity was tested repeatedly as the diverging interests and agendas of members of the international community took precedence in discussions of particular initiatives. During the first quarter of 1997, France found itself alone when it persistently attempted to secure the participation of other members of the international community in enforcing a cease-fire and organizing a multinational force to "assist the refugees." It backed a call by the U.N. secretary general for such an intervention force, while the United States and Britain reportedly distanced themselves from the initiative.