July 1997 Vol. 9, No. 7, (D)

UZBEKISTAN

VIOLATIONS OF MEDIA FREEDOM

Journalism and Censorship in Uzbekistan

INTRODUCTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS 4

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 5

MEDIA OVERVIEW 7

Ownership 8

Censorship 9

Media as a Propaganda Tool 9

VIOLATIONS OF MEDIA FREEDOM 11

Intimidation and Dismissal of Journalists and Editors 11

Bans and Illegal Closure of the Press 12

Government Tolerance of Foreign Media 13

The Russian Media 13

Western Media 15

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 16

APPENDIX 17

INTRODUCTION

Despite the government of Uzbekistan's professed commitment to freedom of the press-made both explicitly and publicly over the past two years-state censorship of the media remains pervasive and intimidation of journalists is rampant. The tone and subject matter of articles published in Uzbekistan is strictly controlled by the government. Moreover, many journalists do not dare to challenge the parameters of the state's media policy, fearful of the possible professional repercussions should they guess incorrectly about the limits of the state's tolerance for critical expression. The Uzbek government's public calls for greater press freedom lie in stark contrast to its complete failure to give force to laws that guarantee freedom of expression, as well as to the impunity granted to those who beat and harass journalists.

During the period of perestroika (restructuring), from approximately 1985-91, and democratization in the Soviet Union the media came to realize its own potential and became a true venue for political debate. The media was at the same time the catalyst and the yardstick of political reform. Except for a slight liberalization of the media in the late 1980s and early 1990s, during which some opposition newspapers and Islamic periodicals were published independently, media in the successor state of the Republic of Uzbekistan have largely remained the moribund organs they were during the times of heaviest Soviet control and continue to be employed primarily as a tool of the government, in violation of international and, in some cases, domestic human rights law. Today there exists a tension between official government policy toward free speech, which allows the principle of free media, and the stark reality for journalists and media consumers who cannot enjoy the practice of free media because of government harassment. The independent media will continue to suffer until the Uzbek government of President Islam Karimov musters the political will to observe laws protecting free speech.

Every news story currently released to the public by the local media has been scrutinized and approved by an apparatus of strict state censorship. Journalists who deviate or attempt to deviate from the unwritten but universally understood limits of "acceptable" topics and tone (a positive, uplifting ideology) have been expelled from the country, fired from their jobs or threatened with dismissal, and on occasion beaten or threatened with violence to them or their families by the security services. Opposition newspapers are banned without legal justification (as are all but the four government-financed, "pocket opposition" parties), and individuals implicated in their possession or distribution within the country are detained and arrested. Careful daily monitoring of the major media in Uzbekistan, in Uzbek and Russian languages, from June 1996 to March 1997, revealed little substantive critical analysis of domestic affairs and no criticism of government policy, common indicators of free speech. The only criticism that is allowed is of low- or mid-level officials, such as of the managers of a factory which is not working efficiently, or of mismanagement in the urban transport system. There is no domestic expression of political views that differ from the government's. As a result, the tone is reminiscent of the latter days of the Soviet media, according to which the country seemed to enjoy only prosperity, although some mild criticism of low-level corruption or inefficiency was nevertheless encouraged.

Over the last two years, the government has adopted an explicitly pro-free speech attitude. Since 1995, leading foreign news radio stations such as Radio Liberty, Voice of America and the BBC (British Broadcasting Company) have not suffered the relentless vilification in the press and jamming of their broadcasts that characterized earlier periods; since approximately 1995, they have been granted significant privileges, such as government accreditation, and their correspondents no longer suffer regular interrogation and harassment from security forces.1 However, print and broadcast media emanating from the Russian Federation or filed for the Russian media have beenparticularly hard hit during this same period, with reductions in rebroadcasting of Russian programs and in the accessibility of Russian newspapers.

Messages of government support for a free media are often ambiguous at best, and at worst hypocritical. Exhortations for reform emanate from the pages of the leading dailies and from the president himself, but journalists so far have failed to respond to the call because of skepticism about their newly "given" rights and fear of retribution. In one typically mixed recent statement in the government daily newspaper Narodnoye Slovo (Word of the People), a journalist noted that "Given that the media represent a powerful means of influencing the masses, and taking into account the peculiarities of the transitional period, it was deemed advisable to maintain state control over the work of the media in Uzbekistan."2 In a December 1996 issue of another government daily, Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East), an authority on journalism called for the rejection of censorship and the strengthening of legal protections for journalists and media; at the same time, he urged that "laws governing the media should take into account... the gradual nature of reform and Uzbekistan's history and culture"-a restriction fundamentally at odds with free expression principles.3

President Islam Karimov, who has personally led the new government campaign, continues to send mixed messages regarding journalists' ability to work freely. On the one hand, he calls for a more critical local press corps and urges the adoption of legislation that protects free speech, including draft laws "On access to information" and "On the free press," and adopting revisions to the law "On the media." (See "Legal Obligations") Furthermore, in December 1995, President Karimov complained that local journalists were "toothless."4 In perhaps his strongest remarks to date, he told parliament on August 30, 1996:

the press and television carry no profound analysis or serious political, economic or international reviews; there is no debate.... Many journalists are still bound up in the old ways of thinking... We must fundamentally alter our attitude to criticism in the press... The reaction should not take the form of administrative pressure on a journalist or editorial boards, as sometimes happens. On the contrary, we must do everything to encourage those who help us rid ourselves of our shortcomings... You should know that if there is criticism in the press and you [officials] come down on it the next day, then you won't keep your job for long.5

On the other hand, the president and, correspondingly, the rest of the government, continue to deny the very existence of state censors. The government provides work space and pays salaries to the censors, who play arguably the most devastating role in repressing free speech in the mass media in Uzbekistan. Also, despite new verbal instructions to journalists, the government has not yet taken significant action to create conditions for a free press, such as enforcing extant free speech legislation, or arresting and prosecuting individuals who beat and harass local journalists. Thus, the persistent violations of freedom of free speech and the media by the Uzbekistan government, that are in part documented in this report, including by President Karimov himself, belie the otherwise heartening government appeals for a free media.6

While free speech obligations are woefully unenforced in Uzbekistan, prior censorship and intimidation of the media do not fully account for the low quality of media reporting. One explanation cited by local observers for the generally poor professional quality-the limited use of sources and weak analysis, for example-is that journalistic standards have declined as experienced writers and broadcasters are forced to leave their poorly-paid jobs for economic reasons and are not replaced by people of the same caliber. Training for journalists has also suffered as many teachers have left the country. Some journalists now have access to foreign training programs, but this is still relatively uncommon. Almost all of the journalists who spoke to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki agreed that even within the limits of what was allowed by state censors, few broadcasters or writers were currently producing stimulating material. One hopeful sign in this regard is the appearance on Uzbek television of a number of light-entertainment youth programmes fronted by young presenters in a lively, popular format and Biznes-Vestnik Vostoka (Business Herald of the East), a weekly newspaper that makes a serious effort to write in an informative, interesting and sensible way about economic developments in Uzbekistan, albeit within the same political limits as the rest of the press.

But the government of the Republic of Uzbekistan bears most of the responsibility. It is directly responsible for the perpetuation of censorship, firings, harassment and intimidation of journalists, and for creating an atmosphere that is so repressive that journalists often censor themselves before their work ever reaches a formal censor. Another insidious side effect of state censorship, albeit not a human rights violation, is that many journalists feel they have no power over their final product and thus no real responsibility to the general public (as opposed to their editors and censors)-"We're not answerable for what we write," as one editor put it.7

The international community has taken increased interest in the development of the media in Uzbekistan. On October 4-5, 1996, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conducted a seminar entitled "Mass Media under Conditions of Democracy," sponsored by the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. While striving to provide a venue for dialogue on the importance of free speech principles, the seminar agenda inexplicably skirted the most glaring and obvious impediment to free speech in Uzbekistan: state censorship. Indeed, the OSCE failed to place the central issue of censorship on the agenda, thus helping the Uzbekistan government maintain its clearly false assertions that censorship has been abolished. On November 22-23, 1996, the U.S. Information Agency held a conference on "Mass Media and National Identity in Central Asia," organized by the American Council of Teachers of Russian/American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study (ACTR/ACCELS). Because this seminar was held primarily for ACTR/ACCELS alumni, it was by its very nature limited in its audience and thus its effect on journalists in general. As of this report's initial writing, there was no indication that organizers of either seminar have since raised concerns about censorship and government harassment of the independent media with the Uzbekistan authorities, diminishing the long-term value of their initial efforts.

In this period of conflicting government statements and actions with regard to free expression, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki hopes that this report on the current state of the media in Uzbekistan will help identify ongoing violations of the right to free speech and will spur the government to fulfill its pledges to protect the independence of the media and comply with its obligations to guarantee free speech.

1 Critics and human rights activists charge that the radio stations have diminished their criticism of the government to ensure the continuation of their accreditation and decreased harassment of their Uzbekistan-based correspondents. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki is unable to take a position on these allegations because it does not consistently monitor the pertinent Radio Liberty, Voice of America and BBC broadcasts.

2 Narodnoye Slovo, October 8, 1996. Cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, herinafter FBIS.

3 Feliks Nesterenko, professor of the Department of Journalism, Toshkent State University, "How to Use Freedom of Speech in a Civilized Manner," Pravda Vostoka, December 25, 1996, p. 3. FBIS, FBIS-SOV-97-003, December 25, 1996.

4 Izvestia (News) Moscow, February 28, 1996.

5 Uzbekistan Television, August 30, 1996.

6 One indication is that the last sentence of the president's statement, above, was one of several cut from the official version of this speech published in the press.

7 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview, Toshkent, September 27, 1996.