Intimidation and Dismissal of Journalists and Editors
Ahmadjon Meliboev, chief editor of the Uzbek-language literary weekly Adabiat va San"at (Literature and Art) and co-chairman of the new Foundation for Support and Democratization of the Media, which is nominally independent but government financed, issued a resounding call for freedom of the press when he addressed an OSCE seminar on human rights on September 13, 1996. "No one in Uzbekistan is satisfied with the state of the press," he said. "Officials react adversely to any criticism." It should be said that this was a rare outburst by a figure who enjoys a measure of immunity because of his authority as a literary figure; it also came during a forum whose content was not greatly publicized inside Uzbekistan .
Constraints on press freedom can take different forms, from verbal reprimands from state officials to closure of a publication. On August 15, 1996, the weekly Uzbek-language newspaper Vatan (Fatherland, a publication of Vatan Taraqqioti, one of the official pro-government political parties) published an editorial criticizing the state of the press in Uzbekistan, while citing President Karimov's stated desire for improvements in this realm. The editorial stated that Uzbekistan's newspapers were still lacking in diversity and continued to publish old news. Although the editorial had been approved by the censor prior to publication, shortly after it appeared in print, Vatan's acting editor-in-chief, Tursunali Akbarov, was reportedly called into the presidential administration and criticized.19 The newspaper then began appearing irregularly, reportedly due to a shortage of newsprint paper (which is distributed by Goskompechat'). A few weeks later Mr. Akbarov was replaced as chief editor. He later resigned from Vatan, which has now begun to appear again regularly.
Sobit Madaliev, editor of the literary journal Zvezda Vostoka, suffered a similar fate. Zvezda Vostoka published a mix of new fiction by local authors, essays on Central Asian and other themes, and translations of foreign poetry and prose. The content of this Russian-language periodical was intellectual and apolitical, a tone apparently set by Madaliev. Madaliev was dismissed in the spring of 1996, reportedly after speaking out against censorship at a government-sponsored media seminar.20 His departure roughly coincided with a vicious, xenophobic attack against the journal and its foreign "avantgardism" in the government newspaper Narodnoye Slovo.21
In early January 1997, a new Uzbek-language weekly appeared, Hurriyat (Freedom), which was set up with the help of the recently-formed Foundation for Support and Democratization of the Media, and which described itself as an "independent newspaper." Hurriyat did show signs of independence. Because the venture was understood to have the support of President Karimov himself, the newspaper's editors were uniquely able to get away with not being censored by the State Control Inspectorate (located in the same press building only a few doors from their own offices), and it omitted to carry the official reports from the Uzbekistan Information Agency that most other daily and weekly papers cannot avoid publishing. Most importantly, Hurriyat carried openly critical material, in the first instance taking the state television company to task for what it described as its unimaginative news coverage andoverall poor quality.22 Other controversial pieces included an open attack on censorship and its effects on journalism. "As long as capriciousness and censorship continue to dog journalists, they will never be able to freely express themselves on any subject," journalist Malik Mansur wrote in this piece. (He nevertheless avoided direct reference to the State Control Inspectorate.)23
The decision to take such liberties rested with Hurriyat's editor-in-chief, Karim Bahriev. Apparently offended by the criticism, the state television company's managers hit back immediately after the first issue came out by using contacts both in the government and Foundation for Support and Democratization of the Media to pressure Mr. Bahriev to recant. Hurriyat readers were kept abreast of the conflict with the publication of an aggressive letter from the acting head of state television, and Mr. Bahriev's unrepentant response. Mr. Bahriev had a number of conversations with senior government officials, including a deputy prime minister, during which he was encouraged to back down. After he was criticized at a high-level meeting attended by ministers and senior media officials, which he himself did not attend, he was finally given to understand that from its next, sixth issue, Hurriyat must pass through the censor's hands. He refused to accept this and in consequence had no option but to resign. Issue 6 of the newspaper appeared on February 12 without Mr. Bahriev's imprimatur; it had been censored. Hurriyat continues in print, but no longer carries the same kind of hard-hitting material.24
Bans and Illegal Closure of the Press
The Uzbek authorities ban newspapers that give space to opinions they do not wish publicized, even when formally registered by the government. The following newspapers were closed in 1992-93, some by parliamentary decree: Erk (Strength/Will), the newspaper of the opposition Erk party; the Uzbek-language Mustaqil Haftalik and its Russian version Nezavisimyi Ezhenedel'nik (Independent Weekly), published by the opposition Birlik movement; Dostlik Toi (Flag of Friendship), a Kazak-language daily newspaper published in the name of Uzbekistan's Kazak minority; Istiqlol (Independence), whose focus is unknown; Tarjima (Translation), a news digest; weekly newspapers Tadbirkor and its Russian version Predprinimatel' (Entrepreneur); Rokodrom (Rockodrome), a weekly Russian-language entertainment publication; and Muloqot and Dialog, differing Uzbek- and Russian-language versions of a monthly magazine devoted to political debate. Although Tadbirkor and Muloqot are again available, the rest never reopened.
No reasons were given for most of these closures. In the case of the Kazak-language Dostlik Toi, for example, the Uzbekistan parliament simply ordered it to stop publication on February 14, 1992. The newspaper had reportedly incurred official displeasure after publishing material that unfavorably compared elections in Uzbekistan with those in the United States. It was replaced by the weekly Nurly Zhol (Path of Light), which consists mainly of translations into Kazak of reports that have already appeared in all the Uzbek- and Russian-language dailies (most Kazaks understand at least one of these languages), plus some cultural items.
After Erk and Mustaqil Haftalik were banned in 1992, as part of broader government moves against the opposition Erk party and Birlik movement, respectively, they resumed publication-only now in Moscow. The occasional copy still reaches readers in Uzbekistan via clandestine routes. Since 1992, individuals have been harassed and even imprisoned for possessing or disseminating such publications. The most recent reported arrests took place on February 13, 1996. Three scholars-Kholiknazar Ghaniev, Bakhtiar Nabii-oghli, and Nosim Bobev-were arrested in Samarqand on charges of violating article 158, part 3, of the criminal code "in connectionwith distributes (sic) of press-literature containing slander (sic) information." Under strong international pressure, the three men were released on April 13 and the case against them reportedly was closed.25
When Erkin Ashurov, a member of the outlawed opposition Erk party, went on trial in 1995 in a case involving an alleged plot to train saboteurs for attacks on the Uzbekistan government, one of the criminal accusations leveled against him was that he illegally helped distribute four stacks of the banned newspaper Erk; court documents claim the issue contained incitement to "violent seizure of power." Mr. Ashurov was convicted in March 1995 on five criminal charges26 and sentenced to ten years in prison, a term reduced by 25 percent under a presidential amnesty of August 1996. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki considers Mr. Ashurov to be a possible prisoner of conscience, as there is reason to believe he was in fact detained solely for his non-violent political activity in the exercise of his rights.
On April 5, 1997, police questioned the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki representative in Toshkent while he was visiting a friend's private home, and demanded he hand over a copy of Tsentralnaya Azia, a Russian-language journal about the Central Asian republics published in Sweden. Approximately ten policemen, several of them senior officers, took turns in scrutinizing the journal and refused to return it for over two hours. Only after the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki demanded they return the document immediately or else formally confiscate it did the head of the Sobir Rahim district police, Bakhtiyor Homidov, telephone a deputy minister of internal affairs for instructions. He then took the journal away to photocopy it. The head of Toshkent City Police Department, Major Davron Tursunnov, finally returned the publication without offering any explanation as to their interest in it, or as to why they had questioned the Human Rights Watch/Helsinki representative.
Government Tolerance of Foreign Media
Since approximately 1995, there has been a marked increase in the availability of alternative viewpoints on the airwaves in Uzbekistan thanks overwhelmingly to the increased presence of foreign broadcasters in Uzbekistan. As a rule, foreign correspondents enjoy greater freedom to investigate and publish or broadcast than Uzbeks. The notable exception is the Russian media, which has faced growing restrictions.
The Russian Media
The Uzbek authorities' policies toward the Russian-language media have been inconsistent in recent years, with a liberalization in the treatment of Moscow-based broadcasters, but a significant curtailing of media access for Russian-language media produced within Uzbekistan. The restriction on access to the Russian-language media coincides with the Uzbekistan government's growing wariness of Russia's influence in the region, and with the emigration of significant numbers of Russian-speakers from Uzbekistan since independence.
Russia's political role in Uzbekistan may be waning, but its intellectual and cultural legacies remain strong. At the most basic level, the Mayak news and music station, broadcast from Russia, still appears to enjoy great popularity among the Uzbekistan population. One Moscow-based specialist on Central Asia, Arkadii Dubnov, formerly a pariah in some circles in Uzbekistan for his critical reporting of events there, has been granted personal interviews with President Karimov and returns frequently and without impediment. Likewise, in February 1996, theUzbekistan government brought a team of leading Russian journalists to Uzbekistan, including Mr. Dubnov, allowing them carefully tailored interviews and escorted trips within the country in the hope that this would generate more favorable publicity for Uzbekistan in Russia. The results were mixed.
Nevertheless, independent reporting by Russian journalists from Uzbekistan has been curtailed. In October 1996, the Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper) reported that four Russian correspondents working in Uzbekistan had been refused renewal of their accreditation.27 (It is virtually impossible for a journalist to work in Uzbekistan without being officially accredited by the Foreign Ministry.) As of March 1997, the authorities still showed no signs of renewing the accreditation of two of the correspondents concerned, who worked for Pravda (Truth) and the Itar-Tass news agency. The obstacles to accreditation reported by Nezavisimaya Gazeta followed a concerted campaign in the Uzbek media against allegedly biased coverage of the republic by the Moscow press. Even President Karimov joined in this criticism in an interview published in the main daily, Narodnoye Slovo (People's Word).28
In January 1996, Goskompechat' froze publication of the Russian Cultural Center's newspaper Vestnik Kul'tury (Cultural Herald), just after the first issue had appeared. Since early 1995, the Uzbekistan authorities have allowed only about five hours per day of Russian-language broadcasts to be rebroadcast from the Russian national television company ORT. In Toshkent, a selection of ORT programming is now transmitted on Uzbek TV Channel 3 for a few hours each day. A cable company in the capital offers a package including several Russian Television stations, but the cost is beyond the means of most ordinary people. As one foreign journalist in Toshkent commented, "these cuts are important because they restrict people's access to unbiased information."29
Vestnik Kul'tury existed for just one month, between December 1995 and January 1996, before being closed by the government. Following the release of the first issue, the State Committee for the Press decreed that the editors had violated a parliamentary resolution by using funds provided by Russia.30 The resolution bans "political parties and mass movements which pursue political goals" from funding publications with foreign money. Yet Vestnik Kul'tury was founded by Uzbekistan's Russian Cultural Center, an organization with a cultural agenda. Local observers allege that Vestnik Kul'tury fell from grace because its first issue displayed insufficient overt loyalty to the Uzbekistan regime. Others say its basic aim-to provide a cultural information service for Russian speakers-was viewed as inherently suspect and a threat to the government.
Only two Russian Federation newspapers are now regularly available on the newsstands: Trud (Labor) and Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) are reprinted and sold in Uzbekistan. The government, which controls the reprinting and sale of these papers, has explained the cutbacks in reprinting other major Russian Federation newspapers by citing the expense of foreign newspapers for most citizens, but the limited coverage of Uzbekistan provided by these two newspapers surely also plays a role. Izvestia (News), which does report on Central Asia, is no longer printed in Toshkent. There is no legislation banning Russian Federation newspapers in general or in particular, but they are sometimes confiscated from arriving travelers by Uzbekistan border officials, and have also been confiscated during police searches of people's homes. The absence of Russian newspapers and the reduced broadcasts of Russian television is felt particularly by the local Russian population, many of whom complain that their access not just to Moscow but to the outside world in general is gradually being closed off. Even President Karimov's Institute of Strategic Studies reports that fully 40 percent of the Russian-speaking population thatemigrated from Uzbekistan in the first seven months of 1996 did so because of what it called "an information blockade" in the country.31
Perhaps most sinister are the threats of dismissal, threats of violence to family members, death threats, and beatings reportedly suffered by some leading Russian-language journalists in Uzbekistan in recent years. (They requested that their names be withheld for fear of retribution.) Their fears were fueled by the February 1996 death of a colleague, correspondent Sergei Grebeniuk in Toshkent. Mr. Grebeniuk had worked for Interfax, perhaps the most outspoken of the Russian Federation news agencies reporting out of Uzbekistan. The circumstances of his death-by drowning, officials said-were unclear, and the details of a police investigation raised some concern that it could have been homicide. Uzbekistan's deputy interior minister, Kutbutdin Burkhanov, insisted that Mr. Grebeniuk's death was in no way connected with his journalistic concerns.32 Nevertheless, the fact that the police investigation did not answer the questions posed about the circumstances of the death sent a chilling message to journalists, particularly Russians, in Uzbekistan. Several Russian-media journalists who reportedly had been harassed or threatened in the past emigrated from Uzbekistan recently, citing government pressure, inability to work freely as journalists, and fear for their safety and that of their families. Their departure further erodes the base of experienced journalistic professionals reporting and writing on Uzbekistan for the Russian Federation media, boding poorly for the future of the medium.
Western Media
The most notable loosening of government control in Uzbekistan since the early 1990s has been for the benefit of listeners to foreign, particularly western, broadcasters. However, access to western print media remains highly limited, for economic reasons as well as due to government control of borders and distribution.
Until about 1995 the government of Uzbekistan jammed the British government's radio broadcasts of BBC programming and that of U.S. government-funded radio stations Voice of America and Radio Liberty and lambasted their contents as the products of "enemy voices" and hostile foreign propaganda.
The government tried not only to discredit foreign programming but to curb overseas scrutiny of Uzbekistan's own domestic media. For example, on January 22, 1994, American scholar William Fierman arrived in Toshkent for a scheduled one-week stay to assess conditions for the development of independent mass media in Uzbekistan, a project he was pursuing for the Internews organization, sponsored by the USAID. Of the other U.S. citizens arriving on his flight to work on USAID projects, only Professor Fierman was denied a visa.33 He was unable to secure a written explanation for the denial; indeed, he was given patently absurd explanations for his inability to enter the county or leave the airport, including that Toshkent had been closed for quarantine. After spending two days confined to the airport, he was forced to leave Uzbekistan on the verbal promise that if he went to Frankfurt he would then be able to enter Uzbekistan, a promise which was not kept. He was therefore forced to abandon the planned media investigation and leave the country.34 In 1994, American journalist Steve LeVine was stripped of his journalist's accreditation, expelled, and denied reentry from the country after publishing a number of articles critical of Uzbekistan in the U.S. press. At the time he was also placed on a Commonwealth of Independent States blacklist,which prevented him temporarily from obtaining visas in other republics, including Russia. Since that time he has been granted access to Uzbekistan.
Such treatment of foreign journalists has largely ceased in recent years, however. On the contrary, the Uzbekistan government has assisted the BBC and Radio Liberty in registering as official foreign agencies. The BBC World Service has supplemented its English-language correspondent with a local correspondent working for the Uzbek Service, and Radio Liberty has opened an office where local correspondents similarly file stories back to its Uzbek-language service in Prague. The BBC's Uzbek Service has gained morning and evening slots on the local re-broadcasts of the popular Moscow-based radio station, Mayak. At the same time, some foreign journalists continue to report suffering limitations on their freedom of movement, routine surveillance of their homes and offices, being followed when they travel within the country, wiretapping of their phones, and other forms of government harassment.
Foreign newspapers also continue to be sold only in a small number of elite hotels, where most Uzbekistan residents do not go; a broader range has become available since 1996 but they are extremely expensive. Even then, newspapers containing information critical of repression in Uzbekistan have been known to disappear soon after arrival in hotel lobbies.
***
19 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview, Toshkent, August 16, 1996.
20 His comments were not made public. Information given to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Toshkent, August 16, 1996.
23 Hurriyat, January 29, 1997, p.4.
24 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interviews, Toshkent, February-March 1997.
25 Letter from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, May 17, 1996.
26 Articles 55-1, 60 (2), 62, 149 (2) and 172 , respectively, of the then Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, punish "plot[s] with the goal of seizing power," "public incitement to treason or to commission of a terrorist act or sabotage", "organized activity directed at preparing or committing particularly dangerous crimes against the state, at establishing an organization which aims to commit such crimes, and participation in an anticonstitutional organization," "abuse of power or professional position... causing serious consequences," and "manufacture of poor-quality, non-standard or incomplete products" . It is unclear which of these charges was based on the possession of banned newspapers.
27 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 9, 1996, p.3.
28 Narodnoye Slovo, October 17, 1996, p.1.
29 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview, Toshkent, November 2, 1996.
30 Measures to Prevent the Illegal Funding of Public Associations in the Republic of Uzbekistan, April 3, 1992.
31 Nezavisimaia Gazeta Moscow, August 22, 1996, p.3.
32 Nezavisimaia Gazeta Moscow, February 20 , 1996, p.3.
33 Although it is standard procedure to obtain a visa for Uzbekistan prior to travel, at the time of Professor Fierman's trip it was possible, in practice, to obtain, a visa at the airport.
34 Professor Fierman believes that neither the project nor his background alone was the single cause of his thwarted investigation, but has no clear explanation for being singled out for expulsion from Uzbekistan. Bill Fierman, "Quarantine on the Silk Road," Central Asia Monitor, No. 1, 1994, pp. 12-15.