LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Saudi Arabia has three types of courts, those handling minor offenses, major offenses, and appeals, respectively. The rulings of the first, the Court of Urgent Affairs (mahkamat al- `umur al-musta`jala), are final unless found to contravene the Shari`a. Major offenses are tried before a Greater Court (al-mahkama al-kubra), and in theory may be appealed before the Court of Appeal (mahkamat al-tamiz). Sentences of death or amputation must be reviewed by the Higher Judicial Council (majlis al-qada' al- `ala) and then must be ratified by the king. The king appoints and removes all judges, as well as the minister of justice.

In both the Court of Urgent Affairs and the Greater Court, hearings take place before a presiding judge who questions the defendant and any witnesses whom the judge may choose to call. Suspects have no right to legal counsel during pretrial interrogation or trial, although a defendant who is able to pay for a lawyer may sometimes be allowed to confer with him prior to a court session. Convictions can and often are based solely on confessions obtained during pretrial interrogations, a practice that encourages the use of lengthy pretrial detentions and physical and psychological abuse to obtain a confession. Confessions must be certified by an investigating judge, who is not the judge who will eventually preside over the trial. The investigating judge has no power to order the release of a suspect, and Human Rights Watch has received reports of detainees who attempted to withdraw coerced confessions, only to be told by the investigating judge that if the confession was not certified the detainee would be returned to custody for further interrogation. While some judges have thrown out confessions obtained through torture, these cases appear to be rare. The absence of laws limiting pretrial detention and requiring notification of the detainee's next of kin and embassy of his or her arrest further increase the potential for abuse.44

Al-Naqshabandi states that while in detention he made five complaints to the Court of Urgent Affairs asking for his release; the CPVPV attended the fourth hearing, and Prince Salman himself attended the fifth hearing. At that point the prince asked to have the case transferred to the Greater Court of Riyadh, where al-Naqshabandi appears to have had at least four sessions before Judge Sulayman al-Samhan. It is difficult to determine the precise number of sessions because the trials were not public and at no point was al-Naqshabandi allowed to consult with a lawyer. According to the family, the hearings stopped after al-Naqshabandi challenged Prince Salman in court, although al-Naqshabandi remained in prison for almost two more years before his execution.45 It was during this period that al-Naqshabandi wrote the three letters to Judge Sulayman al-Samhan, asking him to review the facts of the case because al-Naqshabandi felt he had been unable to present them properly during the short trial sessions.

In addition to the outline of events cited above, al-Naqshabandi's letters attempt to present logical contradictions in the CPVPV's charges, and offer evidence to support al-Naqshabandi's claim of collusion between the prince and the CPVPV. However, without access to a lawyer to advise him on the formal steps needed to petition for the admission of evidence, for calling witnesses, or even for filing a complaint alleging abuse, al-Naqshabandi had to depend on the willingness of the presiding judge to investigate these allegations. Of course, a judge whose tenure in office is determined by the king has little incentive to investigate allegations of abuse by the king's nephew.46 Thus, even though the letters to Judge Sulayman al-Samhan provide the names of seventeen individuals- many of them current or former employees of Prince Salman's who could be called as witnesses to verify al-Naqshabandi's account of the prince's behavior - none of these witnesses were ever called to give testimony. Nor did the judge question any of the six other employees whom al-Naqshabandi alleges also suffered serious abuse by the prince, or call any other defense witnesses at all.47

Al-Naqshabandi also alleges that Shaykh `Adil Muqbil, who testified against him on behalf of the CPVPV, was not in fact the shaykh who conducted the interrogation, but rather had been seated in the next room with Prince Salman, and that he spoke on behalf of the prince and not as an independent investigator.48

In theory these alleged irregularities and abuses, as well as the abuses in sentencing and execution detailed below, should have been investigated by the Committee for General Investigations and Prosecutions (hay'at al-tahqiq wa al-iddi`a' al-`amm, CGIP), although it does not appear that any such investigation ever took place. Created by the Council of Ministers in 1993 after eight years of deliberations, the CGIP's responsibilities, according to its president, include

the investigation of crimes and bringing of cases or declining to prosecute in accordance with what is set out in the regulations, prosecution before judicial agencies, asking for the review of [lower court] cases, supervision of the execution of sentences, monitoring and searching prisons, detention centers, and places where sentences are carried out, hearing complaints from prisoners and detainees, investigation of the legality of their imprisonment or detention and the legality of their remaining in prison or detention centers after the end of their sentences, and taking the necessary measures for their release from illegal imprisonment or detention, and instituting measures required by law against those responsible.49

The CGIP's ability to fulfill these responsibilities are necessarily undermined by its structural position: the committee reports directly to the Minister of Interior- Prince Naif bin `Abd al-`Aziz, who is also an uncle of Prince Salman. According to Article 27 of the Committee's governing regulations, the minister is responsible for "supervising the Committee and the taking of procedures and arrangements or the presentation to the specialized agencies his suggestions or projects."50 Although the CGIP is supposed to report every six months on the conditions of prisoners and detainees, when the president of the committee was asked in January 1997 to explain the role of the CGIP with regard to frequently reported excesses like "insults and blows that prisoners are [said to be] subject to," he denied that any such abuse had or could take place:

[i]f this kind of arbitrary practices were found then the Committee would apply the system of regulations and instructions that absolutely forbid these kinds of practices, but nothing like that happened and it won't happen, God willing, because all those specializing in dealing with prisoners believe in God and in the right of the person and his God given dignity . . . and based on what I know and have seen by way of reports there is nothing that proves the existence of what you refer to.51

44 See Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia: Religious Intolerance, pp. 24-28, for an English translation and critique of the Statute of Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and Preventative Detention (issued November 11, 1983). 45 Human Rights Watch/Middle East telephone interview, a close relative, name withheld, Syria, July 10, 1997. 46 The U.S. Department of State points out that "[i]n general, members of the royal family, and other powerful families, are not subject to the same rule of law as ordinary citizens. For example, judges do not have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal family." The report also notes that "[p]rovincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and reduce a judge's sentence. In some instances, governors have reportedly threatened and even detained judges over disagreements on their decisions." This last point is especially important, given that al-Naqshabandi's employer is nephew to theGovernor of Riyadh, Prince Salman bin `Abd al-`Aziz al-Sa`ud, and his trial and execution took place in Riyadh. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p. 1369. 47 The abuses al-Naqshabandi alleges the other employees suffered at the prince's hands are all quite severe, and, if true, support al-Naqshabandi's claim that "I am not his first victim, or his last." They include two successful and one unsuccessful attempt to have individuals imprisoned on spurious charges; three cases where he threatened individuals with guns, once in a police station; and one case where he extorted money from an individual and then had him flogged on spurious charges. Submission 2, pp. 7-8. 48 Submission 3, p. 6. 49 Committee President Mohammed bin Sulayman al-Mahrus, quoted in Hasin al-Baniyan, "Tahqiq ma` ra'is hay'at al-tahqiq wa al-iddi`a' al-`amm fi al-sa`udiyya: Lan nasamah bitawqif ay shakhs aw idkhalihi al-sijn dun adilla maqna`a" (Interview with the President of the Committee for Investigation and General Prosecution in Saudi Arabia: `We Won't Allow Any Person to be Detained or Sent to Prison Without Sufficient Evidence,' al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), January 27, 1997. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.