Shortly after the evening Tarawih prayer on February 13, 1994 (2 Ramadan 1414), Prince Salman's aide (wakil) Shaykh Mansur al-`Anbari29 and assistant director Nasir al-Sabi`i arrived at the criminal division to take al-Naqshabandi to the prince's office, telling him he had to hand over the office (asallim al-maktab) because he was being fired.
I didn't realize what was secretly planned against me. Not more than five minutes passed after my arrival in the office when the Committee [for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice] arrived. 30
The Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (hay'at al-amr bilma`ruf wa al-nahi `an al-munkar, CPVPV), sometimes known as the morality police or al-mutawwi`un, has broad powers to arrest, investigate, and mete out summary punishments or refer to the courts individuals suspected of violating religious or moral precepts. Unlike the regular police (al-shurta) and the General Investigations police (al-mubahith al-`amma), which report to the Ministry of Interior, the CPVPV reports only to the Council of Ministers. The CPVPV has been widely criticized inside Saudi Arabia for being overzealous in pursuing its ill-defined mandate, and in many cases has been reported to have ill-treated or tortured individuals in its custody.31
Al-Naqshabandi alleges that Prince Salman's director of relations was an expert (khabir) in amulets who frequently had amulets and spells made for himself, while the prince's aide, Shaykh Mansur al-`Anbari, coveted al-Naqshabandi's job and used his connections in Riyadh's Suwidi district CPVPV to ensure that al-Naqshabandi would be arrested:
The Suwidi Committee [for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice] in particular was chosen because of the relationship between al-`Anbari and this Committee, and knowing that the [prince's] office is in the al-Nasiriyya district . . . . and there are a number of Committees closer than the Suwidi, those being al-Nasiriyya, al-Khazan, and al-Marraba`.32
Al-Naqshabandi also calls upon the judge to check police records to verify that "the difference between my exit from the criminal [division] and my arrest by the Committee is less than one hour."33
After searching al-Naqshabandi's office the CPVPV officers took him into custody, apparently on the basis of testimony from Prince Salman and Shaykh al-`Anbari and the "evidence" they found. Al-Naqshabandi's testimony refers to pictures of naked women, amulets, phone numbers, and "the picture of the man who writes horoscopes for one of the magazines," all of which he denies belongs to him and some of which he identifies as property of a Sudanese telephone company worker who was given a visa to leave Saudi Arabia only days after al-Naqshabandi's arrest.34 Al-Naqshabandi also goes to great length to argue that Prince Salman has a long history of improper religious, financial, and sexual behavior that preceded al-Naqshabandi's employment,35 apparently as a rebuttal to a charge that al-Naqshabandi had used witchcraft to harm the prince "in his religion, soul, money and rationality."36
Al-Naqshabandi alleges that while in the CPVPV's custody he was subject to physical abuse, threats, and other improprieties in the conduct of the investigation, and that as a result of this abuse he signed a false confession. His interrogation took place while Prince Salman and his director of general relations were in the next room, listening, and was conducted by one person only, although others signed that they had witnessed the interrogation. The interrogator refused to listen to or record al-Naqshabandi's testimony,37 and instead cursed him and threatened to have him strung up and beaten. After the interrogation al-Naqshabandi spent the night "tied like an animal . . . on the edge of the swimming pool."38 "And so, what could I do but give in and sign [the confession] in order to save myself? So I signed in hope that I would find in the police station someone who would listen to the truth."39
Such hopes turned out to be misplaced. In the police station al-Naqshabandi "was surprised by even harsher treatment when I tried to explain some matters to the officer."40 Al-Naqshabandi alleges that the police officer, acting at the Prince Salman's behest, was extremely abusive, beating him, placing his shoe in al-Naqshabandi's mouth, holding him in solitary confinement, and prohibiting visits. The officer also threatened to "work miracles on you" if al-Naqshabandi retracted his confession in court, and on the basis of that threat al-Naqshabandi verified the false confession.41
Al-Naqshabandi's treatment improved later, when he was transferred to al-Malaz prison in Riyadh, where he remained until his execution in December 1996. At al-Malaz a sympathetic prison official allowed al-Naqshabandi to receive visitors and even telephone calls from Syria.42 After more than two years in detention al-Naqshabandi wrote a letter to the prison warden asking how much longer he would be held; according to al-Naqshabandi's family the warden wrote back telling him not to worry, the case was a simple one and he would be released soon.43
29 The use of the term "shaykh" is not clear here, but seems to imply that al-`Anbari had religious training. See footnote 22. 30 Submission 2, p. 4. 31 See, for example, Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia: Religious intolerance. 32 Submission 2, p. 4. 33 Ibid. 34 Submission 3, pp. 3, 6. The Saudi government has failed to respond to Human Rights Watch's inquiries about the evidence used to convict al-Naqshabandi. 35 See, for example, Submission 2, pp. 5-8. 36 "The Killing of a `Sorcerer and Magician' . . ." Al-jazira. 37 Article 27 of the CPVPV regulations require that the statement taken during an interrogation must include "the words of the accused in detail, as they issued forth from him in the very phrases that he repeated, as well as the documentation of all aspects of his defense, and the accused is able at all times to present his defense, and to contradict prosecution witnesses, and ask for defense witnesses to be heard in support of [of his testimony], or to take any action of the investigation procedures, and all his requests must be recorded in the investigation statement." Quoted in Hilaly `Abdullah Ahmad, Huquq al-difa` fi marhala ma qabl al-mahakima bayn al-namat al-mithali wa al-namat al-waqa`i (Rights of Defense in the Pretrial Stage: Between the Ideal Type and the Actual Type) (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-Arabiyya, 1995) p. 172. 38 Submission 3, p. 5. The CPVPV sometimes hold suspects in irregular places of detention; this appears to have been the case here. 39 Submission 3, p. 6. 40 Ibid. 41 Submission 3, p. 6. Al-Naqshabandi writes that this treatment was especially distressing because it took place in the first few days of Ramadan, the Islamic month of dawn to dusk fasting, which is a time for spending one's time in prayer and in the company of one's family. 42 Human Rights Watch/Middle East telephone interview, a close relative, name withheld, Syria, June 25, 1997. This individual says that when he heard that al-Naqshabandi had been executed he immediately called this official to ask if the report was true. According to the relative, the official began to cry and then hung up without answering. 43 Ibid.