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Summary

It is only in recent years that the U.N., through a number of its agencies, has begun to improve its capacity to provide humanitarian assistance, protection and reintegration¹ support to the escalating numbers of internally displaced worldwide.  The plight of the internally displaced within their country has gone largely unaddressed by the international community because primary responsibility for their safety and assistance needs lies with their own government.   The absence of an internationally recognized legal status, the assertion of sovereignty by national governments, and the lack of any clear mechanism for international assistance have further contributed to a lower level of international protection than comparably situated refugees who have crossed an international border.  However, the international community is increasingly recognizing that it is legally entitled to provide such assistance where governments are unable or unwilling to fulfill their commitments under international law.   Since there is no one agency within the U.N. with overall responsibility for the internally displaced, a number of different U.N. agencies have been designated on an ad hoc basis by the secretary-general to administer these programs, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNDP among others. 

This development, while commendable and long overdue, has not been without the inevitable growing pains that occur as an institution evolves to address new areas.  An examination of the current approach reveals an uneven, limited, and, in many cases, unsatisfactory international response that is dependent on the institution selected to deal with the issue.  A major impediment to the effective implementation of international programs—by the variety of U.N. agencies with widely differing mandates—is that this expansion has not been accompanied by the requisite capacity-building, within and between these agencies, to best meet the needs of the internally displaced.  This has particular relevance in the areas of human rights and protection, which are a dimension of internal displacement.   

In the face of a changing world, most U.N. agencies administering programs to the displaced are treading on difficult, and often unknown, territory.  Human Rights Watch/Africa does not underestimate the logistical and political difficulties that will often be faced in such a situation.  The needs of the internally displaced span a wide range from the immediate requirements of food, shelter and protection from violence, to longer-term considerations that can resolve underlying tensions and restore them to their homes and livelihoods.  International programs for the internally displaced inevitably must include emergency relief assistance, protection, prevention and development components.

Human rights concerns are integral to all the components of a program to assist the internally displaced.  Often, human rights violations cause the displacement and, not surprisingly, human rights and justice issues are at the core of finding lasting solutions that can allow the internally displaced to return to their land or be reintegrated elsewhere.  Protection encompasses both security of person and property, as well as guarantees of legal protection and redress for rights abuses.  Accordingly, human rights promotion and protection work must be a central component of international programs for the internally displaced.   The cost of ignoring human rights and protection concerns will be the resulting failure to reach lasting solutions.

Under the U.N. Charter, the duty to promote and protect human rights is within the mandate of all U.N. agencies.  Human Rights Watch/Africa recognizes that ultimate responsibility for providing these assurances to the internally displaced lies with the government.  We are not advocating that U.N. agencies replace governments nor that they transform themselves into policing or investigative bodies.  Rather, in situations of reintegration where abuses are systematic, it is incumbent on the implementing U.N. agency to be prepared to assume active responsibility for being a protector and advocate for the displaced.  Among other things, this includes a willingness to vigorously and publicly protest abuses against the displaced, and to put into place minimum conditions for operation that ensure fundamental human rights and protection considerations are met.

In accepting that human rights is part of the U.N.’s mandate, it is not enough for U.N. agencies to make oblique or weak policy references as to the importance of incorporating human rights into emergency-type programs.  U.N. agencies also cannot relinquish all responsibility for human rights to the U.N.’s Centre for Human Rights.  What is required are tangible operating procedures, guidelines, and training to ensure that all staff have the necessary expertise and institutional support to take on the tasks of confronting abusive or uncooperative authorities and creating the secure environment required for reintegration to occur.  Human rights and protection issues must be up front and central to the administration of programs for the internally displaced, not peripheral or expendable.  It is not enough to include human rights marginally, and it is unacceptable to compromise human rights concerns when necessary to secure other operational goals. 

UNDP, the U.N.’s development arm, is increasingly administering reintegration programs for the internally displaced.  Like other U.N. agencies, UNDP is grappling with the difficult task of how best to design and implement programs that can find lasting solutions for internally displaced people to return home.  UNDP has a broadly defined mandate to promote sustainable development.  Its work has been traditionally limited to non-emergency situations in which the agency works closely with the government to implement development programs.  Gradually, UNDP is shifting from its traditional approach to contribute in conflict situations where it can “bridge relief with development.”  UNDP’s resident representatives based in the field are increasingly being designated to coordinate and lead programs for the internally displaced.  With its expansion into emergency-type programs, including reintegration programs for the internally displaced, UNDP is being challenged to stretch its traditional capacity to address the operational challenges posed by such situations. 

UNDP’s recent policy documents recognize and acknowledge that human rights falls within the ambit of its development mandate and is critical to the success of emergency programs.  This fact was reinforced in a statement by the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan shortly after taking office in which he affirmed that human rights issues constituted a part of development work.²   Although human rights functions have not been an established feature of its traditional work, UNDP has formally acknowledged that its mandate and its programs for the internally displaced must incorporate the issues of governance, social justice, human rights and land tenure.  In fact, a reintegration program that UNDP implemented in Central America between 1989 and 1995 was considered a success in large part because UNDP made human rights a central component of that program. 

However, UNDP has remained ambivalent about its recognition that human rights and protection are essential to the success of its emergency programs.  UNDP has yet to take the next step to fully incorporate these components in tangible and consistent ways into its own operating procedures.  The lessons and expertise of the Central American reintegration program were not translated into UNDP’s Kenyan program.  UNDP also appears unwilling or unprepared to fully address the difficulties that must accompany the task of defending and helping internally displaced persons find lasting solutions, even in the face of hostile or uncooperative governments.  If UNDP is to administer programs for the internally displaced, it must be willing to strengthen its capacity to provide human rights protection as well as be willing to adopt a vigorous advocacy approach against government actions that undermine reintegration.  Reintegration and sustainable development cannot succeed in a context of insecurity, abuse and fear.

Human Rights Watch/Africa acknowledges at the outset the difficult role UNDP is called on to play in internally displaced situations, particularly in the face of complex political and social environments.  We do not seek to downplay the challenges that U.N. staff face in the field, nor do we overlook the fact that such programs cannot be conducted effectively without the active involvement of the government or controlling authority.  Presented with these real constraints, programs for the internally displaced often have to be conducted in politically-charged environments where human rights standards have been eroded.  As a result, adequate preparation and training to tackle the human rights and protection issues remains all the more important.  The correct approach to, and inclusion of, strong human rights and protection components in UNDP’s internally displaced programs are vital to successful long-term reintegration. 

In this context, it is particularly valuable to examine closely the UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya which was administered between 1993 to 1995 in order to reintegrate an estimated 300,000 persons displaced by “ethnic” violence.  Human Rights Watch/Africa has taken the trouble to revisit this program several years later because it contains some valuable lessons for UNDP that, if acted upon by UNDP, can improve its implementation of programs for the internally displaced.  As far as internally displaced situations go, the Kenyan situation posed the sorts of challenges frequently encountered in these situations. Violence and rights abuses instigated by the government had caused the displacement, and, during the program, UNDP faced predictable constraints in its operations because of government actions hostile to genuine assistance and protection efforts. 

The UNDP program in Kenya had tremendous potential which was never fulfilled.  The general consensus about the UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya—among local and international NGOs, international medical and relief groups, diplomats and even some UNDP employees who worked on the program—is that UNDP’s record fell far short of what it could, and should, have been.  Certain aspects of the program could have been handled better.  As a result, thousands still remained displaced when the program ended, and the key issues underlying the displacement went unaddressed.

Amid the mixed results, there were a number of missed opportunities where UNDP could have made significant contributions.  In assessing this program, Human Rights Watch/Africa in no way seeks to minimize the achievements of this program that facilitated the return of thousands.  These figures are not insignificant, given the lack of real political change in Kenya.  UNDP deserves full credit where it enabled and facilitated return.  However, using figures of the reintegrated alone as a measure of success overlooks fundamental questions that must be an integral part of any assessment of a reintegration program: Have the conditions that created this displacement been addressed?  Have the injustices and hostility caused by the violence and displacement been redressed?  Is this society better able to prevent a recurrence of the problems that caused the displacement?  If UNDP’s aim was only to provide relief assistance to the displaced until some could go home and nothing more, then the agency can view this program as a success.  If, however, the aim was, as stated, “the reintegration of displaced populations into local communities, prevention of renewed tensions and promotion of the process of reconciliation,” then UNDP did not reach its own goals in fundamental ways.

The internal displacement that led to the creation of the UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya began in 1991 after the Kenyan government was forced to concede to a multiparty system.  In response, President Daniel arap Moi and his inner circle adopted a calculated policy against ethnic groups associated with the political opposition.  In spite of Moi’s pronouncements, the violence was not a spontaneous reaction to the reintroduction of multiparty politics.  The government unleashed terror, provoked displacement, and expelled certain ethnic groups en masse from their long-time homes and communities in Nyanza, Western and Rift Valley Provinces for political and economic gain.  This was particularly true for the Rift Valley Province which hosts the largest number of parliamentary seats and some of the most fertile land in the country.  The government capitalized on unaddressed and competing land ownership issues dating from the colonial period between those pastoral groups, such as the Kalenjin and Maasai, who were ousted from land by British settlers and the agricultural laborers who subsequently settled on the land after independence.  Many of these farms were at the center of the ethnic clashes, as they came to be known.

By 1993, Human Rights Watch/Africa estimated that 1,500 people had died in the clashes, and that some 300,000 were internally displaced.  Of those displaced, an estimated 75 percent were children.  The clashes pitted members of President Moi’s small Kalenjin group and the Maasai, against the larger Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo ethnic groups.  Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo-owned farms were attacked by organized groups of Kalenjin or Maasai “warriors” armed with traditional weapons such as bows and arrows.  It was subsequently found that ruling party officials had paid some attackers a fee for each house burned and person killed, and that government vehicles had been used to transport the attackers.  Security forces often stood by in the course of an attack, and appeals for protection went unheeded.  By contrast, counter attacks against the Kalenjin or Maasai were usually more disorganized in character, and not as effective in driving people off their land.  The great majority of those displaced were members of the Kikuyu Luhya and Luo ethnic groups from the Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza Provinces.  Following a 1992 election win by President Moi and his ruling party the frequency of the attacks diminished steadily, but periodic incidents continued.  Meanwhile, those displaced by the attacks fled to nearby churches, market centers, or abandoned buildings.  Largely ignored by the government, they congregated in squalid conditions, receiving assistance largely from the churches and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

In 1993, UNDP took commendable initiative to create a reconciliation and reintegration program for those displaced from the “ethnic” clashes.  The stated objective of the proposed U.S.$20 million Programme for Displaced Persons was “the reintegration of displaced populations into local communities, prevention of renewed tensions and promotion of the process of reconciliation.”  The program was implemented jointly with the government.  The program plan was based largely on two reports, known as the Rogge Reports, after the author.  The first Rogge report, written in 1993, identified three groups of the displaced: those who had returned and were in the process of rehabilitating their homes and farms; those who were commuting to their farms to cultivate, but were not able or willing to return because of the perception or experience of continued insecurity; and those who would probably never be able to return because the remaining residents were emphatic about never allowing members of any other ethnic group to reclaim their land or because they were squatters with no legal claim to return.

The first Rogge report provided a sound and well-conceived proposal for action that included short-term relief assistance needs; medium-term needs for general development initiatives including the rehabilitation of destroyed institutions, reconciliation seminars, employment training, and regularization of the land tenure system; and long-term protection and security issues which, the report stressed, were paramount to the program’s success. 

By the time the UNDP program began, levels of violence had diminished significantly, and reintegration had begun to occur in some areas, particularly Nyanza and Western Province.  However, at the same time, the government steadily undermined reintegration through active obstruction of reintegration efforts on some fronts and inaction on others.  During the UNDP program, and since, there was no government commitment to reverse the damage that had been caused, and to restore the displaced to their lost land and livelihood without regard for ethnicity.

Even while progress was made in alleviating the emergency food and material assistance needs in the first year of the UNDP program and some reintegration  occurred, a climate of mistrust and insecurity persisted in many parts of the Rift Valley.  Numerous difficulties remained largely due to government resistance to full reintegration, and a lack of political will to restore security, to redress past and continuing injustices against the displaced, and to find lasting solutions particularly with regard to land reform.  The Kenyan government continued to harass and intimidate the displaced after they were driven from their land.  The government brought charges against critics of the government’s policies towards the displaced, while at the same time it allowed the instigators and perpetrators of the violence to enjoy complete impunity.  Where the displaced were congregated in groups that could attract negative attention, they were dispersed with threats or force by local government officials, often without regard for their safety and with no alternative accommodation.  Those assisting the displaced or journalists attempting to report on the plight of the displaced were sometimes denied access to certain areas, arrested for short periods or harassed.  If reintegration occurred, it was usually due to the efforts of the communities themselves or because a local government official quietly acted on personal initiative.  In the more contentious areas, where Kalenjin and Maasai residents had vowed not to permit the displaced to return, or where local or national government leaders obstructed reintegration, no steps were taken by the government to restore the rule of law.  Most importantly, the government took no action to work with UNDP to seek long-term solutions for redress and prevention, particularly in regard to the issue of land registration and tenure.     

In the face of this largely predictable resistance from government quarters, UNDP appeared unprepared and unqualified to deal with the rights and protection implications that this raised.  The manner in which the program was initially structured did not put into place safeguards to minimize government control or manipulation of the program.  Instead of addressing the key impediments to lasting change, UNDP ignored the political, human rights, and development dimensions of the displacement.  Building its approach on experience acquired previously through a drought alleviation program, UNDP proceeded as if all that was necessary was to provide relief supplies to enable people to return—while doing nothing more than acknowledging the political causes of the displacement and the attendant human rights violations that needed to be addressed.  Also, based on its usual working approach, UNDP partnered itself closely with the government.  Many of the issues that the Rogge reports identified as fundamental were disregarded in the implementation of the program.  Where UNDP encountered government resistance to addressing an issue, such as human rights violations or land law reform, the agency’s approach was to retreat rather than to press for these fundamental changes to be made.  The narrow perspective adopted by UNDP resulted in a program that ignored issues responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Kenya which were key to finding lasting solutions. 

Initially, UNDP did not secure any written commitment from the government to maintain security and to bind it to provide basic minimum conditions such as free access to the displaced, safeguards for the physical security and basic human rights of the displaced, and the free passage of humanitarian assistance.  The lack of an operating agreement allowed the Kenyan government to continue to evade its responsibilities, while at the same time it was able to use the threat of ending access to silence UNDP.  UNDP did create some successful national and local fora to bring together government officials, NGOs, community representatives and UNDP.  However, these efforts, while bringing some pressure to bear on the government, were still not a sufficient replacement for a written agreement.

UNDP sought to remedy the lack of a formal working agreement by trying to work closely with the government and to provide positive incentives for the government to cooperate.  This entailed downplaying human rights abuses as the acts of individuals in the government rather than the responsibility of the government. There were a wide variety of past and ongoing human rights abuses whose remedies were integral to finding lasting solutions.  These included the denial of basic human rights to the displaced; the harassment, intimidation and forced dispersals of the displaced; the government’s complete refusal to hold the perpetrators and inciters of the violence accountable; and the expropriation of the land owned by the displaced with a view to consolidating the new ethnic order of land distribution that had been imposed by the violence.  Yet human rights monitoring and advocacy to protect the displaced were not a part of the program.  UNDP staff tended to avoid any public denunciation of the abuses on the grounds that quiet representations would be more effective and would allow UNDP to secure various operational goals.  The lack of any formal reporting requirement on these issues by UNDP in New York further reinforced the silence on human rights violations.

Protection of the physical safety of the internally displaced was as crucial to reintegration as relief assistance.  Protection issues with the displaced in Kenya came up both with regard to ensuring physical security from threats of coercion and violence and the longer-term issue of defending legal rights that were violated by those responsible for the displacement.  Although the provision of security is ultimately the responsibility of the government, UNDP had a major role to play in making protection concerns a priority with the Kenyan government.  However, UNDP viewed this role as being too “political.”  While there was talk by UNDP of the need to create an enabling environment, no effort was made to promulgate articulated standards for the government or to protest government abuse effectively.  UNDP never worked with the security forces and local administration to provide training on rights and legal responsibilities, nor did it seek to protect the legal rights of the displaced.

As a result of this approach, public statements by UNDP continually put forward positions that only reflected or exaggerated the positive developments, and ignored or downplayed government abuses against the displaced and other measures designed to perpetuate the new ethnic alignment in the regions from which the displaced were driven.  The second Rogge report, published at the mid-point of the program in 1994, contributed to the impression that reintegration was largely proceeding with government cooperation, as did a 1994 visit to Kenya by Administrator Gustave Speth who publicly praised the Moi government for “moving to reconcile tribal differences.”  Mr. Speth made no mention of the continued threats or actual violence against the displaced, forced dispersals, the destruction of camp sites by administration police, or government harassment of those assisting the displaced.  UNDP continually deflected international and local criticism of the government’s human rights record toward the displaced.  Based on UNDP’s public gloss of the program, the Kenyan government was able to reassure donors and investors that it was taking steps to reintegrate the displaced.  This, in turn, led to a widespread NGO suspicion that UNDP was hand-in-glove with the government.

UNDP also decided not to address the issue of accountability for past abuses—and government policies—which had caused the displacement, on the rationale that societies have to come to terms with their tragic pasts in their own way.  UNDP continually downplayed the need for accountability, portraying the problem as one without victims and aggressors, but only communities that needed to be reconciled.  However, in a situation where people had lost their families and homes, accountability and an acknowledgment of the wrong done to them, was a critical stepping stone to lasting reconciliation.  

Throughout the program, the government was able to evade its responsibility to reintegrate by forcibly dispersing identifiable groups of displaced people.  Since UNDP never prioritized data collection, UNDP was helpless to remedy the situation because it had not done a count or registered names.  Additionally, at the mid-point of the program, NGOs working with the displaced accused UNDP of using the lack of data to inflate the estimates of the reintegrated in order to put the best face on its program. 

The lack of any mechanisms within the program structure to prevent government abuse and manipulation, and UNDP’s unwillingness to publicly raise concerns about these issues, alienated two strong allies: the international donor community and the local NGO community.  Both groups have been a powerful force in calling for an end to human rights violations in Kenya.  As a result of their efforts, significant improvements have occurred in the past decade.  Yet, there was not a close partnership by UNDP with these sectors.  As the program progressed, donors became more wary of committing funding to a program they saw to be increasingly compromised by UNDP’s perceived acquiescence to government abuses.  Eventually, some donors even withheld funding they had previously pledged. 

This unfortunate situation was further aggravated by generally poorly managed NGO relations.  UNDP did not support the work of other agencies or serve as a vigorous advocate to end the harassment of NGO staff.  In Western Province, UNDP inadvertently undermined NGO efforts through its efforts to direct a regional committee to such an extent that when UNDP ended the program, the local initiatives were weaker than they had been before.  An assessment report of Western Province, commissioned by UNDP itself, concluded that UNDP had “hijacked” the process, and “[i]n the end, their [UNDP’s] whole participation was judged as a failure by all the actors on the ground.”     

Fraudulent land transfers or pressured land sales continued throughout the UNDP program, further disenfranchising Kikuyus, Luos, and Luhyas, particularly in the Rift Valley Province.  This aspect of reintegration was ironically the one UNDP was best suited to deal with—long-term development.  Finding lasting solutions to the problem of internal displacement requires attention to the root causes.  In Kenya, these were the unresolved land tenure issues arising from the colonial period which was manipulated by Kenya’s government for political ends.  The “ethnic” violence had furthered this process.  Yet, UNDP did not prioritize this politically thorny issue in order to push the Kenyan government toward a land law reform program.  As a result, land continues to be fraudulently transferred, illegally occupied, and sold or exchanged unfairly, further disempowering the internally displaced and contributing to the removal of certain ethnic groups from the Rift Valley Province up to today.

 

Ultimately, the manner in which the program was administered resulted in the greatest attention being placed on that part of the program that was relatively the easiest and least politically controversial to administer—the relief part—and a neglect of protection, human rights, and long-term needs, which would have required UNDP to adopt a more critical advocacy role in relation to the Kenyan government.  In the end, UNDP was immobilized.  UNDP was neither able to address the long-term developmental issues for reintegration which it had the expertise to do, nor was it able to channel sufficient pressure on the government where needed because it lacked the experience and political will. 

The final blow to the flagging program was the forced expulsion of some 2,000 Kikuyu from Maela camp, who were trucked out of the camp after a police raid in the middle of the night on December 24, 1994, without the knowledge of UNDP, and dumped at three sites in their “ancestral” home of Central Province.  A few days later, many of the same people were subjected to a second round of police raids, as the government tried to disperse them as quickly as possible.  For the first time, UNDP became an outspoken advocate of the displaced, calling on the government and the world to stop these abuses.  By that time, however, UNDP’s position was so compromised, it was in no position to mobilize donor and NGO support.  Despite assurances from UNDP that it would protect those who had been displaced from Maela, UNDP never returned them to Maela, nor did the agency succeed in pressuring the government to punish the responsible officials.  At one point, UNDP’s resident representative to Kenya characterized the forced dispersal as a “temporary hiccup” in the program, in a bid to urge donors and others not to allow this incident to detract from the positive contributions of the program.  Moreover, because UNDP had such poor NGO relations and a record of praising the government, UNDP became a target of blame for the Maela camp incident, irreparably damaging its image and credibility in Kenya.  The Maela incident brought the UNDP Displaced Persons Program in Kenya to a halt.  It was formally ended in November 1995.

To date, the Kenyan government has condoned the illegal occupation of land by its political supporters and the continued displacement of thousands of its citizens from ethnic groups that are perceived to support the political opposition.  The government has taken the minimum steps necessary to allay public criticism of its policies of ethnic persecution and discrimination.  Although some of its actions have promoted reintegration, the Kenyan government has never sought to redress fully the destruction and loss it instigated, nor has it addressed the political grievances that created the conditions for such violence.  As a result, a significant number of people are still not back on their land today, and will probably never be.  In some areas, the effect has been to reduce significantly the numbers of  Kikuyu, Luhya, or Luo residents, in keeping with the calls by some high-ranking government officials for the expulsion of these ethnic groups from certain areas of the country.  More importantly, the grievances that allowed for the manipulation and explosion of ethnic tension can as easily be fanned today as they were in the early 1990s. 

As the Kenyan experience illustrates, UNDP is lacking expertise, capacity, and experience in certain areas critical to the success of programs for the internally displaced.  Without taking further steps to improve its capacity, UNDP will be unable to fulfill the challenges presented by the expanded responsibilities that arise in situations with human rights and protection implications.  The conclusions and recommendations of this report offer to UNDP suggestions of institutional steps that it can take to address the issues identified as impediments to reintegration.  Such an examination is particularly valuable in light of UNDP’s growing involvement in this area.

Human Rights Watch/Africa is calling on UNDP to ensure that human rights and protection components are a central part of its responsibilities in programs it administers for the internally displaced.  Without doing so, its ability to successfully reintegrate the displaced, as evidenced from its own comparative experiences in Central America and Kenya, will not be as successful.  Human Rights Watch/Africa believes that it is within UNDP’s political mandate and capability to do better.  UNDP needs to build on the encouraging efforts to interpret its mandate broadly and flexibly, and take the next step to ensure that its policy positions on governance, social justice, human rights, land tenure and protection are consistently and centrally translated into its program application.  Human Rights Watch/Africa is calling on the U.N. Secretary-General to ensure that the basic principles of human rights protection are made integral to any U.N. operation aimed at internally displaced populations.

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