ZAIRE

Human Rights Developments

Human rights in Zaire deteriorated substantially during 1993, with pervasive lawlessness and government manipulation of ethnic conflicts leading to widespread abuses against civilians. This situation was intensified by the political deadlock between two rival governments: one loyal to President Mobutu Sese Seko, who had been in power for twenty-eight years; the other to Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi and the transitional parliament, the High Council of the Republic (HCR). The potential for even greater disintegration and human rights abuses loomed large, summarized in a confidential U.S. State Department cable in February warning that Zaire could turn into "Somalia and Liberia rolled into one, with vast potential for immense refugee flows, regional destabilization and humanitarian disaster."

President Mobutu repeatedly undermined the prospects for multi-party elections, which he had promised in April 1990, and made clear his disdain for the transition process. (His term of office actually expired in December 1991.) This attitude was demonstrated in his crackdown on members of the opposition and his willingness to use force against civilians. As long as Mobutu controlled the elite army troops and the treasury, he was able to maintain power.

The economic crisis, characterized by soaring four-digit inflation and massive unemployment, produced serious starvation and malnutrition. Food shortages also resulted from the army rioting and massive looting that had taken place since 1991. Feeding centers were established around the capital by international relief organizations, and children were especially at risk.

Zaire was plagued by months of fighting between President Mobutu, Prime Minister Tshisekedi, and the HCR. On January 15, the HCR, a transitional legislative body elected by the National Conference and chaired by Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo Pasinya, claimed Mobutu was blocking "the functioning of the country's institutions at every level," and declared him guilty of high treason, for which he could face trial before the Supreme Court. Mobutu dismissed the threat on the grounds that he was not answerable to the HCR.

On January 28, government soldiers rioted when they discovered that they had been paid in new bank notes that could not be spent. Mobutu had ordered the five-million-zaire notes to be printed to keep up with inflation; Tshisekedi considered the move inflationary and called on shopkeepers to refuse to accept the banknotes. This developed into the worst unrest since unpaid soldiers rioted in September 1991, disturbances that had left at least 200 people dead and had prompted Belgium and France to send soldiers to evacuate some 20,000 foreigners.

In contrast to the 1991 riots in which the population joined the soldiers on a looting spree, the soldiers' rampage in 1993 terrorized the population. Hundreds of civilians were killed, including the French ambassador, Philippe Bernard, who was shot in an attack on the embassy, and the twenty-eight-year-old son of opposition leader Frederic Kibassa Maliba, who was killed during an attack on his father's home. Many more civilians lost their belongings in looting raids conducted by soldiers. There were numerous reports of rape by soldiers, and the Belgian government claimed that soldiers raped Belgian nuns in the Limete district of Kinshasa. Hundreds offoreigners were evacuated from Kinshasa by French troops; the Belgian troops worked to evacuate foreigners from Brazzaville in neighboring Congo to Europe, because Mobutu refused to allow them into Zaire.

Mobutu's elite troops took advantage of the chaos to attack newspapers, churches, and politicians opposed to the regime. Estimates of numbers killed range from 300 to more than 1,000, including many regular army soldiers who were killed by the presidential guard, the Special Presidential Division (DSP). Several hundred soldiers were arrested by the DSP, and there were fears that many were tortured.

Mobutu blamed Tshisekedi for the riots, and tried to dismiss him-for the second time in sixteen months, the first time being a week after he was appointed in October 1991. Tshisekedi claimed that since Mobutu did not hire him, he could not fire him.

Another showdown occurred in late February, when government troops held some 400 legislators hostage in the parliament for three days; the International Committee of the Red Cross was not allowed access to the hostages to feed them. Hundreds of other soldiers soon joined in, often with their wives and families. The soldiers demanded that the parliament approve the new banknotes as legal tender and require local merchants to accept them. They also rejected the interim constitution, approved by the National Conference. After finally releasing the legislators, on February 26 soldiers attacked the residence of Archbishop Monsengwo, who fled unharmed.

On March 29, Mobutu named Faustin Birindwa as prime minister to replace Tshisekedi, and revived the one-party National Assembly as a rival to the HCR. Birindwa was a former ally of Tshisekedi who was expelled from the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). Neither Tshisekedi nor the HCR accepted Mobutu's move, reaffirming that since the HCR elected him, only it could remove him. Western countries and the HCR continued to recognize the Tshisekedi government.

In April, authorities launched a new crackdown on members of the opposition, including politicians, unionists, independent newspapers, and human rights activists-the first wave of political detentions by the security forces since 1990. During April, some twenty members of the Sacred Union, the coalition of opposition parties, were arrested. On April 6, gendarmes blocked off the parliament building, preventing the transitional parliament from meeting. On April 13, troops were sent to search the houses of Tshisekedi and his ministers, looking for government property; they claimed to have found proof of "sedition." Meanwhile, attacks on independent journalists continued: on April 23, Mukengeshayi Kenge, of Le Phare newspaper, was arrested and later charged with "spreading false rumors;" Mulumba Kandolo, from Le Potentiel, was arrested on April 28; and Kalala Mbenga Kalao, from La Tempete des Tropiques was arrested on August 25. Several trade union leaders were arrested in May, and were still in detention in late July.

The most visible illustration of the government's manipulation of the ethnic and regional conflict took place in Shaba, Zaire's mineral-rich province. A government-inspired campaign of terror had caused more than 100,000 residents with origins in the neighboring region of Kasai to be displaced from their homes since November 1991, and most since August 1992. Under the guise of promoting the interest of Shaban natives, or "Katangese," Mobutu's regional representatives attacked the substantial Kasaien community, which had been in place since well before independence, and raised a youth militia to reclaim the wealth of the region for its "original" inhabitants. As many as 90,000 were displaced by mob violence in March 1993.

Although there were historical roots to the animosity between the two communities, the explosion of violence in 1993 was largely explained by Mobutu's struggle to retain power: the violence erupted at the moment when Mobutu was forced to accept the appointment of Tshisekedi, who is himself Kasaien, as prime minister.

The attacks on Kasaiens and the promotion of Katangan interests took the form of a campaign, spearheaded by Gov. Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza and Deputy Prime Minister Nguza Karl-I-Bond, for "regional purity" throughout Shaba. The governor turned the youth wing of Nguza's UFERI party into a security and intelligence apparatus, which was implicated in the attacks. The pattern of attacks had begun in Likasi in August 1992; by year's end, an estimated 68,000 Kasaiens had been forced out of their homes. There was no effort to investigate or prosecute those responsible for the violence. The same tensions exploded in the mining city of Kolwezi in March 1993. But while it had taken six weeks to convince the Kasaiens of Likasi to leave their homes, the same process took only two weeks in Kolwezi. The facts surrounding theinitial violence in Kolwezi are vague, but by March 22, Katangese youth carrying knives and machetes attacked Kasaiens-looting, burning homes and conducting house-to-house expulsions of Kasaiens. Again, the attacks were carried out with total impunity.

In an even more deadly explosion of regional violence linked to the political stand-off, ethnic fighting broke out in North Kivu in March 1993. The conflict in North Kivu, which borders Rwanda, pitted the Nyanga and Hunde ethnic groups against Hutu and Tutsi of Rwandan origin (Banyarwanda). Reports from international relief organizations indicated that at least 7,000 people, mainly Banyarwanda, might have been killed, and over 200,000 more displaced. Some Banyarwanda reportedly staged counter-attacks, killing and wounding members of other ethnic groups. As in the case of Shaba, the fighting appeared to be instigated by the local authorities, and the central government did nothing to protect civilians.

In April, Tshisekedi asked the U.N. to send peacekeeping troops to Zaire to help stop the ethnic and political violence.

U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed a special envoy to Zaire in July-Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister. Brahimi visited Zaire in August to investigate the political crisis. In early October, U.N.-brokered negotiations were reporting some progress. However, there was nothing to indicate that President Mobutu was willing to make any real concessions. By November, Mobutu's intransigence seemed to be paying off. His international image was enhanced after participating in the Francophone summit held from October 16 to 18 in Mauritius, where he was granted an audience with French President Francios Mitterrand. Although the two sides were nearing agreement on moving the country toward elections, they remained deadlocked on issues such as the role of the President and the selection of the interim Prime Minister.

The Right to Monitor

Several independent human rights organizations began functioning in Zaire. These monitors operated under difficult conditions, and were frequent targets of harassment by the Mobutu regime. Nevertheless, they became an important source of information about human rights abuses in Zaire, and collaborated with various international organizations including Africa Watch.

In 1992, a coalition of human rights organizations joined together to form Human Rights, Now (Droits de l'Homme, Maintenant). The participating groups included: The League for Human Rights (Zaire); the Voice of the Voiceless for Human Rights (VSV); the Zairian Association of Human Rights (AZADHO); the Committee for Democracy and Human Rights in Zaire; the Group Amos; the Black Robes. Human Rights Now served as a forum to coordinate their activities and to resolve disagreements. Another human rights group was the Committee for Democracy and Human Rights. The groups in Human Rights, Now differed slightly in focuses; for example:

· VSV, the oldest of the human rights groups, worked on educating Zairians about their rights, providing assistance to victims, conducting investigations, and producing reports.

· The League for Human Rights, founded in 1990, published periodic reports on human rights and waged campaigns in the press. It tried to work on a national and international level, and has branches in Shaba, Kasai, North Kivu, Maniema and Equateur, as well as a representative in Belgium.

· AZADHO, created in 1991, published reports on various human rights topics as well as a bi-monthly journal on human rights.

· The group Amos was not a regular nongovernmental organization but, rather, an independent group within the Catholic Church. Amos was engaged in a range of activities involving education and sensitization on human rights, and played a major role in organizing within local churches, especially in Kinshasa.

· The Black Robes was an association of young lawyers and magistrates active in human rights. Individual members played a significant role in several human rights-related cases in the courts and prisons.

There were also specialized groups, including an association of prisonprofessionals involving civilian prison employees in reporting on human rights and prison conditions.

The U.S. Role

As of early 1992, the Western governments that formerly supported Mobutu-the U.S., France and Belgium-collaborated to support the transition process headed by the National Conference and then the Tshisekedi government. All U.S. military aid was ended by Congress in November 1990, and most economic aid ended the following year, long after such measures had been urged by the U.S. Congress and human rights groups in Zaire and the United States.

On February 11, 1993, the State Department revealed possible steps that the U.S. and its allies might take regarding Zaire, including: freezing Mobutu's bank accounts in the U.S. and Europe; seizing his personal assets; denying visas to Zairians closely associated with Mobutu; suspending Zaire from the International Monetary Fund; and seeking an arms embargo and a ban on exports from Zaire. However, the U.S., France and Belgium were slow to take any further measures, except for restrictions on visas to President Mobutu and his close advisors.

The Clinton administration decided not to appoint a new ambassador to Zaire to replace Amb. Melissa Wells, who left in March 1993. The intention was to send a clear signal to Mobutu that the U.S. would not conduct normal relations with Zaire until the transition process was back on track. Nevertheless, many Zairians saw this as a sign that the U.S. was pulling away from the forceful position represented by Ambassador Wells.

The Clinton administration took a more forceful public line toward Zaire than its predecessor. In several public statements, senior U.S. officials distanced themselves from Mobutu and criticized the human rights abuses. In February 5 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen said, "Mobutu must effectively give up power so that a transition to a fair election can take place." In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 9, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose put it more firmly: "There is no doubt about the cause of the problem. It is President Mobutu's stubborn refusal to honor his promise to permit a democratic transition process to proceed." He went on to note a "a pernicious pattern of government-provoked or -tolerated violence against minority ethnic groups," and a "sharp escalation of human rights abuse."

Assistant Secretary Moose described how the U.S. was working with the French and Belgian governments to increase political and economic pressure, using measures such as visa restrictions and prohibition of arms exports. In April, the U.S. did impose a ban on arms sales to Zaire.

On June 21, the State Department's spokesperson announced that President Clinton had banned entry to the U.S. to Zairians "who formulate or implement policies impeding a transition to democracy in Zaire or who benefit from such policies and the immediate families of such persons." This policy was to remain in effect for so long Secretary of State Warren Christopher considered it necessary. The State Department explained the move as "a sign that the administration will not conduct normal business with President Mobutu so long as he thwarts a transition to democracy."

On July 19 and 21, Assistant Secretary Moose held meetings in Washington with Mobutu's envoy and notorious security official, Ngbanda Nzambo-ko-Atumba. The purpose of the meeting was for Mr. Ngbanda to deliver Mobutu's response to a letter from Secretary of State Christopher; not surprisingly, Mobutu blamed the opposition for Zaire's problems. According to the State Department, Moose informed Ngbanda that this response was "totally inadequate."

After the meetings, the State Department's spokesperson gave a strongly worded statement, holding Mobutu responsible for a situation that "puts at risk the lives and welfare of millions of his countrymen and the stability of an entire region."

On October 26, Assistant Secretary Moose testified again on Zaire, denouncing Mobutu's intransigence and stating that the U.S. was exerting "mounting pressure" on the regime. It was unclear, however, what concrete steps the U.S. was taking to pressure Mobutu, other than threatening economic sanctions.

As of July, the U.S. had obligated $1.5 million in fiscal year 1993 to assist displaced persons in several parts of Zaire, including the victims of civil strife in Kinshasa and the displaced in Shaba and North Kivu.

The Work of Africa Watch

In March and April, Africa Watch sent a mission to Zaire to investigate both prison conditions and the ethnic conflict in Shaba province.

The results of the study of prisons and police detention in Zaire first appeared in June as part of a larger report by Human Rights Watch's Prison Project, The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Prisons, and were issued in November as a separate report titled Prison Conditions in Zaire. Among our findings: that prisons in Zaire had become private enterprises and prisoners were slave laborers, with extremely high rates of death and disease. The prisons themselves were in an advanced state of decay, most of them dating from the period prior to independence in 1960. In addition to extreme overcrowding, inmates suffer from very limited drinking water and sanitary facilities that are, at best, semi-functional.

Also in June, Africa Watch published "Inciting Hatred: Violence Against Kasaiens in Shaba." The report documented the government-inspired campaign of terror threatening the lives and livelihoods of tens of thousands of Zairians who have their roots in Kasai. The violence was found to be the result of a cynical and politically expedient effort to shift popular grievances away from the failed Mobutu regime and onto one group of Zairians closely identified with the opposition. The events in Shaba were highlighted as an example of the suspicious re-emergence of regional violence linked to the political stand-off.

Africa Watch engaged in various forms of advocacy regarding Zaire, focused on informing members of Congress and the administration about the deteriorating human rights situation and the Mobutu regime's role in the violence. Africa Watch also conducted numerous press interviews about human rights in Zaire.