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Statement by the Cluster Munition Coalition, Opening Plenary of the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions

Delivered by Steve Goose, Human Rights Watch for the Cluster Munition Coalition

Dublin, Ireland 

Mr. President, Delegates, Colleagues, 

We believe that the stakes for the next two weeks are very high. 

Government delegates should be entering these negotiations with a great sense of excitement at the prospect of what you may be about to accomplish, and a great sense of responsibility. 

If you are successful in concluding a strong treaty banning cluster munitions, this will be hailed as one of the most important measures that governments have ever taken to protect civilians from the ravages of war, both during and after armed conflict. 

But if you do not succeed, it will be more than a missed opportunity, it will be a failure that will be measured in lives lost, limbs lost, and economic loss. 

The fundamental basis of the Oslo Process has been that it is self-selecting: only those who choose to pursue urgently a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians take part. Thus, we are confident that all of us assembled here in Dublin-governments, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC)-have a common purpose and common desire: to achieve the best possible outcome that will best protect civilians. 

There is no reason why the treaty cannot get stronger over the next two weeks, rather than weaker. That is what happened during the negotiations in Oslo of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. But it was only possible because governments stayed focused on the humanitarian objective, and did not subvert the greater humanitarian good to narrow, short-term military or political considerations. 

There will of course be any number of tough negotiating issues. That is to be expected. The CMC has produced a booklet with a series of position papers on many of these, which is available to delegates. We have also produced a document giving our observations on the draft treaty text, article by article. 

We view the following as the key issues: 

First, the definition: it is absolutely critical to the success of the treaty that it remains structured so that it prohibits all cluster munitions, as defined. The definition must in turn capture all cluster munitions that have the objectionable effects that have led to this Oslo Process to ban them, that is, all weapons that have indiscriminate wide-area effect and that leave a large amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO). There should be no exceptions for cluster munitions with submunitions with self-destruct devices, or for submunitions with a certain reliability rate, or for so-called "direct fire" submunitions, or for cluster munitions with less than 10 submunitions. All of these approaches have been proposed, yet the convincing preponderance of evidence and analysis indicates that such cluster munitions do in fact cause unacceptable harm to civilians. 

Similarly, an exception based solely on point target acquisition capability (such as "sensor-fuzing") is not supportable. At the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, a number of states spoke of a possible exclusion from the definition of cluster munitions for weapons with a series of cumulative characteristics, such as point target acquisition, self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms, and a very small number of submunitions. In theory, such weapons may not have the same deleterious effects as cluster munitions, in terms of indiscrimination and UXO. But the burden of proof must be on governments to demonstrate that this is so. There is danger in putting too much faith in technologies about which little is known, and virtually all cluster munitions in the past have failed to live up to the claims of producers and users. 

Second, a transition period: the very notion of a state reserving the right to continue using cluster munitions that the state agrees must be banned eventually because they cause unacceptable harm to civilians is anathema. In essence, agreement on a transition period would be agreement to undermine the object and purpose of the convention - if only for a certain period of time. It would clearly subvert humanitarian objectives in favor of questionable perceptions of military needs. 

Third, "interoperability": states must not delete or undercut the prohibition on assisting non-signatories with the use of cluster munitions. This is a core prohibition that is essential to the strength of the treaty and to the promotion of the norm against the weapon. We understand that states want to ensure legal protections to their soldiers for any unintentional assistance that could occur during joint military operations. But, we do not understand why the concerns cannot be addressed as they were for the Mine Ban Treaty, which contains identical language, through national declarations and implementation laws. It is crucial that in dealing with this issue, negotiating states make it clear that they object to any use of cluster munitions by any armed force. 

Fourth, victim assistance: we are pleased that there is a firm legal obligation to provide victim assistance, and that victim assistance has a separate article in the draft text. We also strongly support the definition of cluster munition victims (though the qualifier "substantial" should be removed). But additional treaty text is needed in order to make a real difference in the lives of the victims. Most importantly, Article 5 should be reinforced with requirements to create national plans with priorities and timelines for implementation, and Article 7 should require reporting on the status of the national plans. Inclusion of victims in planning, implementation, and monitoring is essential. 

Fifth, stockpile destruction deadline and extension: it is still not clear why the proposed stockpile destruction deadline of six years is appropriate, as opposed to a shorter period. Moreover, the CMC believes that the provision allowing for a ten-year extension of the deadline is a mistake, as it will encourage states that do not need extra time to utilize it nevertheless. 

Sixth, retention: the CMC opposes proposals to add a new provision that would allow the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for training, development, and military counter-measures. We do not believe any of these three purposes are essential so as to justify an exception to the prohibition on stockpiling. To our knowledge, no clearance organization accredited to the UN uses live submunitions for training. Adequate technologies already exist to detect unexploded submunitions. The need for live submunitions for counter-measures is not established; if it were a vital requirement, states would already have samples in their possession. 

Seventh, user responsibility: this provision in Article 4, sometimes referred to as "retroactivity," requires states that used cluster munitions prior to entry into force of the Cluster Munitions Convention to assist with the clearance of the unexploded submunitions they left behind. In addition to the moral responsibility that a user should act upon, this provision is needed on practical grounds, as the user often has technical information to aid in clearance. There is ample legal precedent for the provision, which is a logical extension of obligations under Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. 

Eighth, entry into force: the trigger for entry into force should remain 20 ratifications as in the draft text. That is a standard number for a humanitarian treaty, including the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is imperative that the treaty become international law as quickly as possible, so that implementation may begin of its life-saving provisions, such as clearance, victim assistance, risk education, and stockpile destruction, and so that the stigmatization effect of the treaty, inhibiting use by all armed forces, is enhanced. It is likely no coincidence that those calling for a higher number of ratifications are mostly those who have promoted a transition period, seeking a delay in key obligations. 

No doubt other issues will arise in the course of the negotiations, but resolution of the ones highlighted here will determine the effectiveness of the treaty. 

We firmly believe that a strong treaty banning cluster munitions will have an impact far beyond those who sign and ratify in the near term. The Oslo Process has already started building a new international norm against any use or possession of the weapon. Just as the Mine Ban Treaty has helped end the use of antipersonnel mines by nearly every country of the world - the pariah state of Burma being the main exception - so too will the future cluster munitions convention help deter use by those who have not formally joined. 

Indeed, the Oslo Process and the new treaty are also having an impact even beyond cluster munitions. This partnership between governments, NGOs, the ICRC and UN agencies is demonstrating that a new diplomacy can work, one built on common interests, which puts the protection of civilians first and foremost. 

Mr. President, 

This has been a remarkable process that has yielded remarkable results. Governments deserve high praise for the vision and determination they have shown in engaging in such innovative diplomacy and in developing such a powerful and comprehensive treaty, combining disarmament and humanitarian law while also requiring concrete humanitarian actions on the ground. 

In closing, we repeat our challenge, our fervent plea, one that we have made throughout this Oslo Process. Continue to be bold, continue to be creative, continue to dare to be different, continue to care deeply. Stay focused on the humanitarian objectives. Do not compromise away the integrity of the treaty just so that you can congratulate yourselves on having reached agreement, any agreement. Be able in the end to look the cluster munition survivors in the eye and say that you are pleased with what you have done - and expect them to be able to say that they too are pleased. Together, you will have saved lives and livelihoods for generations to come. 

Thank you. 

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