Human Rights Developments

Defending Human Rights

The Role of the International Community

United Nations

In December 1999, Human Rights Watch called on the Security Council to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate violations of the laws of war in Chechnya. The Security Council, however, never formally discussed Chechnya.

In late March, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson travelled to the area after an earlier refusal of her request for a visit sparked an international outcry. Robinson became the first senior international official to acknowledge receiving evidence of summary executions, torture, and rape. Although Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at the end of the trip told Robinson she was welcome to visit Chechnya again in a few months, a formal invitation had not yet been extended at the time of writing.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution criticizing Russia for violations of human rights in Chechnya-the first time a resolution was adopted regarding a permanent member of the Security Council. The resolution, among other things, called on the Russian government to establish "according to recognized international standards" a national commission of inquiry and mandated five special mechanisms of the Human Rights Commission to visit Chechnya and report to the commission and the General Assembly. At the time of the General Assembly session in the fall, none of the special mechanisms had been able to visit. The Russian failure to implement the resolution was raised at a one-day commission session in September but no public record of the discussion was issued.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

At the November 1999 Istanbul summit, OSCE member states, including Russia, confirmed the mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya. The Russian government, however, subsequently refused to allow the Assistance Group to function in Ingushetia and created administrative obstacles to its return to Chechnya. As a result, the Assistance Group was unable to fulfill its functions in a meaningful way.

In other OSCE developments, its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) provided ad hoc technical and training assistance to the staff of Kalamanov's office. The office did not respond to evidence of widespread fraud during the March presidential elections, other than to characterize the elections as "a benchmark in the ongoing evolution of the Russian Federation's emergence as a representative democracy."

Council of Europe

A number of Council of Europe delegations visited the North Caucasus to assess the situation, including the European commissioner for human rights, members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.

Chechnya figured prominently on the agenda of all Parliamentary Assembly sessions in 2000. After its January recommendations went unheeded, a majority of parliamentarians voted in April to strip Russia's parliamentary delegation of its voting rights. The assembly also recommended that member states file an interstate complaint against Russia with the European Court of Human Rights and that the Committee of Ministers start proceedings to exclude Russia from the Council of Europe.

The Committee of Ministers brushed aside all of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly without serious discussion and said that Russia's response to international pressure was satisfactory.

The secretary general of the Council of Europe invoked a seldom used mechanism to require Russia to explain the application of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to the conflict. When Russia's response was unsatisfactory, the secretary general deferred further action to the Committee of Ministers, which remained silent.

The Council of Europe sent three experts to the office of Vladimir Kalamanov starting in June. Although the presence of these experts no doubt contributed to the efficiency of the office, the experts were not in a position to make a meaningful contribution to the accountability process.

European Union

In the early months of the war, the European Union (E.U.) under the Finnish presidency took a fairly tough stance on Russia, consistently criticizing its military operation and abuses and freezing some technical assistance funds. After Boris Yeltsin resigned as president and it became apparent that Vladimir Putin would become Russia's next president, the E.U. toned down its criticism and backed away from any tougher action.

To its credit, the E.U. introduced the resolution on Chechnya at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. However, the E.U. itself undermined the importance of this step. As Russia openly defied all international criticism and refused to recognize or implement the resolution, the E.U. and its member states started a series of bilateral and multilateral summit talks to establish good relations with Russia's new president.

E.U. member states refused to take Russia to the European Court of Human Rights over abuses in Chechnya. In response to an appeal from more than thirty leading human rights and humanitarian NGOs, the E.U. claimed that such a step was unnecessary as Russia was makingprogress toward accountability. The E.U. also refused to use political and economic levers, such as suspending the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or support for international lending, to convince Russia to change its conduct in Chechnya.

In sharp contrast to its conduct in Kosovo in 1999, the E.U. failed to gather information independently on abuses in Chechnya. No E.U. diplomats visited Chechnya or even Ingushetia independently to interview victims of human rights abuses, although a December 1999 declaration of the E.U. foreign ministers requested that they do so.

United States

The United States limited itself to a rhetorical response to the violations in Chechnya. It criticised Russia consistently over its actions in Chechnya but was unwilling to use any stronger political or economic levers. The United States was unwilling to suspend its support for international lending to Russia or to use bilateral economic assistance to convince Russia to change its conduct. It actively pursued good relations with Putin despite the war. At times, even the rhetoric was flawed. Testifying before Congress in May, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott went to great lengths to avoid using the words "war crimes" to describe the serious violations of humanitarian law that Russian forces have committed in Chechnya.

The United States also failed to collect first hand information independently on abuses by regularly sending diplomats to the region.

Financial Institutions

The World Bank did not condition disbursement of loans to Russia on its actions in Chechnya, releasing U.S. $450 million in structural adjustment loan payments to Russia since the outbreak of the conflict in 1999. Linked to various industrial reforms, these payments went directly to the Russian government for unfettered general budgetary spending. Bank officials stated that they would monitor the impact of the conflict but this scrutiny was apparently limited to economic concerns.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) financing for Russia remained frozen, officially because of the slow pace of economic reforms, but Russian officials claimed the IMF decision was linked to the Chechnya conflict.

Relevant Human Rights Watch

Reports:

Civilian Killings in Staropromyslovski District of Grozny, 2/00

February 5: A Day of Slaughter in Novye Aldi, 6/00

"No Happiness Remains:" Civilian Killings, Pillage, and Rape in Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya, 4/00

"Welcome to Hell:" Arbitrary Detention in Chechnya, 10/00