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Introduction





Asia

Europe and Central Asia

Middle East and North Africa

Special Issues and Campaigns

United States

Arms

Children’s Rights

Women’s Human Rights

Appendix




The International Community 

The international community focused on ending the war, in part because it understood how unstable the entire region was, in part because it was determined that Burundi not suffer a genocide like that which devastated neighboring Rwanda-with a population similarly divided on ethnic lines. President Clinton's brief stop to encourage signing of the Arusha Agreement underlined the importance the U.S. gave to ending combat in the region. The U.N. Security Council followed the diplomatic process closely, twice receiving direct reports by former President Mandela. The OAU, the E.U., and various individual governments, like the United States, all provided high-level diplomatic support to the peace process throughout the year and many donors helped pay its hefty expenses.

The U.S., like others, downplayed the need for justice as potentially impeding a settlement. At the same time they hoped to keep open the option of some form of international accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To improve judicial proceedings within Burundi, the U.S. provided some U.S. $3 million to support Burundian nongovernmental organizations under the Great Lakes Justice Initiative.

Donors gave humanitarian aid, but, except for France and Belgium, they did not resume the development aid that had been cut when an embargo was imposed after Buyoya's 1996 coup. President Mandela tried to push the immediate renewal of assistance, but donors refused at a September meeting because a cease-fire had not taken effect. The government faced bankruptcy early in the year, but the World Bank gave $35 million to stabilize the economy.

Most international actors, including the U.S., condemned the regroupment camps and demanded their closure. After several months, however, the Belgians implicitly accepted the camps and stressed merely the need to improve conditions for residents. When President Buyoyasuggested that some regroupment camps might be transformed into "villages," the European Commission delegate immediately warned that no E.U. aid would be given without evidence that affected people favored this move.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights began the year with a strong statement condemning the human rights violations inherent in the regroupment policy, a position that was reiterated by the special rapporteur for Burundi, Marie-Therese A. Keita Boucoum, in her report to the commission in February. The special rapporteur, named in 1999, visited Burundi only briefly in late 1999, but spoke out clearly against killings and other abuses by both military and rebels.

The field office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights reduced its staff in late 1999 due to a security alert and did not substantially increase its personnel in 2000 after the security situation improved. Handicapped also by budget cuts, the office worked largely for improvements in the judicial system. It did not publicize any abuses that it documented, although it did address some of them with the authorities. Although the field office at one time circulated reports confidentially among the diplomatic community, it apparently stopped doing so in mid-1999.

Relevant Human Rights Watch Reports:

Emptying the Hills: Regroupment in Burundi, 7/00

Neglecting Justice in Making Peace, 4/00

Human Rights Watch World Report 2000

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