The codification and application of the statute's complementarity principle, governing the relationship between national jurisdictions and the Court, is key to the functioning of the International Criminal Court. On the one hand, the Court is not intended to be a supranational institution with the power to substitute itself for national legal systems. Rather, one by-product of an effective and independent Court should be to encourage national authorities themselves to investigate the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and the consequent strengthening of national judicial systems. At the same time, the statute must ensure that, when national systems do not do so, the ICC is able to investigate and prosecute. It must be borne in mind that the impetus for the establishment of the ICC is the stark failure of national court systems to hold the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes accountable under law.
Considerable time and effort was dedicated at the August 1997 Preparatory Committee session to the careful negotiation of the standard on which the Court will decide on the admissibility of cases before it. Delegates achieved agreement on the largely unbracketed text for Article 15 which provides extremely strong assurances that national authorities will remain the first line of investigation and prosecution. At the December Preparatory session, developments were made on the procedural aspects of admissibility challenges, in Article 17 of the statute. At the March-April 1998 Preparatory Committee session, one delegation proposed an Article 16[11 bis] which provides for the application of the complementarity principle at an earlier phase of the process, prior to the commencement of an investigation.168
This section of the commentary offers recommendations and comments on Articles 15, 17, and 16[11 bis].
THE COMPLEMENTARITY TEST
· Recommendation: A case should be inadmissible before the ICC where it is being or has been investigated or prosecuted by a state. The exception to this rule should be where the national proceedings are "ineffective" or "unavailable," rather than where the state is "unwilling" or "unable."
Comment: Article 15, which deals with the substantive content of admissibility challenges, is the cornerstone of the complementarity principle. It is appropriate that complementarity be enshrined in clear terms in the statute to ensure that the ICC does not supplant the role of national authorities in the administration of criminal justice. However, the current text of Article 15 goes beyond ensuring that the ICC be able to investigate or prosecute only where national authorities do not in fact do so. It sets an unduly high threshold which may prevent ICC jurisdiction even in cases where there is no effective investigation and prosecution at the national level.
In the text of Article 15, a case is inadmissible where it is being or has been investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction, unless there is "inability" or "unwillingness" on the part of that state to genuinely carry out such an investigation or prosecution. What constitutes "unwillingness" or "inability" in this context is set out in an exhaustive list of criteria.
In each case the burden rests with the Court to demonstrate that no such proceedings exist and, if there is any question as to the existence of a national investigation or prosecution, to determine the inability or unwillingness of the state. In order to determine "inability" the Court must consider whether, due to "a total or partial collapse" or "unavailability" of its national judicial system, the state has been unable to carry out its proceedings. Further, in order to establish "unwillingness," the Court must demonstrate the underlying intent of the national authorities.169 One concern, on a practical level, is the difficulty for the Court to gain access to information regarding a criterion as subjective as the intent of state authorities. In addition, this standard means that the Court would have to investigate and make subjective assessments as to the willingness of stateauthorities to bring to justice the perpetrators of serious violations. Ironically, the desire to avoid creating an ICC which sits in judgment of national authorities was the justification given by certain states for seeking a strong provision on complementarity.
The present draft significantly raises the threshold for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC from the standard contained in the original ILC Draft Statute,170 as reflected in the wording in the current draft preamble which provides that the ICC will be "complementary to national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be ineffective."171 Unavailability and ineffectiveness are established standards used by human rights bodies to monitor whether domestic remedies have been exhausted as required for the exercise of jurisdiction of these bodies.172 The criterion of "ineffectiveness" and "unavailability" provide not only an established but also an objective standard by which to assess the investigation or prosecution, rather than the more subjective criterion of "unwillingness" or "inability."
The text of Article 15 was achieved as a result of arduous negotiations during the August 1997 Preparatory Committee session. The extremely high standard for establishing admissibility provides ample assurance to states that their interests will not be infringed upon by the ICC and that the ICC will operate only in exceptional circumstances. In the light of these factors, it may be unlikely that states will want to reopen the language of Article 15. Should they do so, however, effectivenessand availability should provide the relevant criterion by which the admissibility of cases before the ICC are judged.
PROVISION FOR AMNESTY LAWS
One disturbing issue contained in Article 15, which remains unresolved, is the question of whether the Court should take into account national amnesty laws or pardons in determining admissibility of a case. One delegation raised the issue at the August 1997 Preparatory Committee session,173 and circulated a paper on the issue. The new draft of Article 15 does not deal with the issue in the text of the article, but the provision does contain a footnote recognizing that certain issues, including "possibly also amnesties and pardons," should be revisited at an unspecified future stage.
· Recommendation: Domestic legislation granting impunity for these heinous crimes should not be a basis for determining that a case before the ICC is inadmissible.
Comment: There can be no recognition of legislation granting impunity for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. There can be no "legitimate" amnesty for these crimes; rather, the application of an amnesty law to these offenses would be a clear contravention of established principles of international law.
There is a duty incumbent upon states to investigate and prosecute serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, this duty is explicit. Article 18 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance states that persons responsible for acts of enforced disappearance "shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measure that might have the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings or sanction."174 On several occasions, the U.N. HumanRights Committee175 and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights176 have made clear that the application of amnesty laws to serious human rights abuses is inconsistent with these international obligations. A special rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities also opposed the application of amnesties to serious violations of human rights.177
In light of the above, the inclusion in the statute of any deference to the application of amnesty laws to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court would be unacceptable. It would undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the Court--a body charged with upholding international law--if its statute were to allow a state to limit the Court's jurisdiction by taking measures which were themselves violations of international law.
National legislation granting impunity, far from rendering inadmissible the case before the International Criminal Court, may instead provide clear evidence of the inability or unwillingness of the national system to prosecute the crime.
A broad range of amnesty mechanisms have been adopted by states attempting to account for past violations, including those procedures more carefully crafted than blanket amnesties. However, given the exceptional nature of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, these national efforts at exoneration should not affect the case's admissibility before the ICC.
CHALLENGES TO ADMISSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 17
Article 17 deals with the procedure for challenging admissibility on the basis that the state is investigating or prosecuting pursuant to Article 15. In this context, the procedural questions surrounding complementarity include who can challenge admissibility and when; what the interim consequences of a challenge should be; and who makes the ultimate decision on admissibility.178 The task for delegates is to establish a statutory framework capable of ensuring that legitimate challenges to the exercise of jurisdiction can be made, without holding the functioning of the Court hostage to dilatory tactics and obstructionism.
Who can challenge
· Recommendation 1: The right of a suspect to challenge admissibility should be removed. Only accused persons or interested states should be able to challenge.
Comment: Article 17 contains an option which would allow an accused person or a suspect to challenge admissibility on grounds of complementarity. This option would open the door unnecessarily widely, and could lead to delays in the investigative phase. An individual who has been arrested clearly should, however, enjoy the right to challenge.
· Recommendation 2: Only states whose interests are directly affected by the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court should be able to challenge admissibility. An interested state should be defined as a state which is carrying out the investigation or prosecution, by virtue of which admissibility is challenged.
Comment: States directly interested or affected by the Court exercising its jurisdiction in the case should be able to challenge that exercise of jurisdiction onthe basis of complementarity.179 In this respect Article 17 should reflect Article 16[11 bis]. The legitimate interest which complementarity seeks to address is the interest of the state in investigating or prosecuting the case; states that are doing so should therefore be able to challenge under Article 17. On the other hand, states that are neither seeking nor intending to institute proceedings should not be able to delay ICC proceedings by challenging admissibility. Accordingly, the reference in Article 17(2)(b) granting the right to challenge to a state "which has received a request for cooperation" would allow states without a direct interest to challenge and should be deleted. It is states involved in any investigation or prosecution under Article 11 that would have access to the information concerning the domestic proceedings which would be necessary for the purposes of such a challenge, and challenge should be limited to such states.
Burden of proof
· Recommendation: The burden of proof as to admissibility should lie with the state making the challenge. It must be for the state investigating or prosecuting, or which has done so, to furnish the Court with sufficient information as to the steps taken in such an investigation or prosecution to satisfy the Court that the exceptions as to the unwillingness or inability of the state do not apply.
Comment: It is inappropriate, in a challenge based on the sufficiency of national proceedings, for the burden of proof to be on the ICC prosecutor to demonstrate their insufficiency. As most, if not all, of the relevant information about national proceedings would be in the hands of national authorities, not the ICC prosecutor, the burden of proof should be placed on the party best able to produce the relevant information - the state. On a practical level, for the ICC to ascertain what investigative or prosecutorial measures have been taken, and whether the state was willing and able to satisfy the Article 15 test, would impose a prohibitively onerous burden on the Court. Moreover, to give the ICC such a role would involvethe ICC in a considerable amount of investigation into national legal systems, which is not the intended remit of the Court.
Timing of challenges and right of appeal
· Recommendation: Retain the provision allowing for states, unlike the accused, to challenge admissibility only prior to or at the commencement of trial, and only once. Similarly, retain the right of either party to appeal decisions on admissibility to the Appeals Chamber.
Comment: Article 17(3) limits the opportunity for state challenges to admissibility to prior to or at the commencement of trial, and provides that challenges by states should, in general, be allowed only once. The provision correctly gives the Court discretion to allow a challenge to be brought more than once, or after the trial has begun, in exceptional circumstances. Such discretion is an important guarantee of flexibility for the Court on an essential issue relating to the implementation of the complementarity principle. Article 17 provides for the right of appeal by either party to the Appeals Chamber. These provisions should be retained, and the provisions of Article 16[11 bis] be brought into line in respect of each of these points.180
Review in the light of new facts
· Recommendation: The ability of the prosecutor to submit a subsequent request for a review of the decision on admissibility, in the light of new facts, should be retained.
Comment: Delegates are urged to support the provision in bracketed paragraph 5, allowing the prosecutor to submit a request for review of the decision on the grounds that the conditions which rendered the case inadmissible no longer exist or that new facts have arisen.
· Recommendation: The statute should provide for the power of the prosecutor to take provisional measures, such as the preservation of evidence, pending resolution of the admissibility challenge.
Comment: One bracketed provision of the current draft statute states that the prosecutor "shall not initiate an investigation where submission of the case is challenged under Article 15...until the final ruling of the Court."181 This could have serious implications if not coupled with the prosecutor's right to take such provisional measures as may be necessary to ensure that evidence is not lost or destroyed, pending resolution of a challenge to the admissibility of a case. Preservation may be essential if a subsequent prosecution is to be possible, in the event that the Court finds the case admissible. A challenge to admissibility must not be capable of paralyzing the Court and rendering impossible subsequent prosecutions where the challenge turns out to be unfounded. The inclusion of an express provision to this effect is necessary to clarify this important power.182
TRANSFER OF SUSPECTS FROM THE ICC UPON A FINDING OF INADMISSIBILITY BASED ON COMPLEMENTARITY
· Recommendation: The statute should contain appropriate safeguards to ensure that, where the ICC decides to transfer a suspect to a state, following a determination of inadmissibility, it does so subject to the continued satisfaction of the complementarity test. The Court must be able to regain custody in the event of a subsequent determination that the conditions for inadmissibility no longer exist. The statute should make specific provisions in this regard for non-state parties, specifying that the transfer of a suspect to a non-state party should be contingent upon the state's recognition of the competence of the Court over the particular case, and its assumption of the obligation to transfer the suspect back to the Court upon a determination of admissibility.
Comment: If the Court determines that a case is inadmissible, on the basis of complementarity, it may transfer a suspect in its custody to either a state party or a non-state party. However, safeguards must be taken to ensure that the Court could regain custody over the suspect if new circumstances rendered the caseadmissible before the Court and permitted the Court to assert jurisdiction over the suspect.
The obligation of states parties to transfer persons to the Court, upon a request from the Court, are clearly set out in Part 9 of the statute. For non-state parties, however, there are no obligations vis à vis the Court. It is essential that if the Court relinquishes custody over a suspect upon the expectation, the requesting state will proceed with an investigation and prosecution; and if the state fails to do so, the Court must be able to regain custody over the suspect. Transfer should therefore be conditional upon acceptance by the non-state party of the obligation to return the suspect if the Court makes a subsequent determination that a case has been rendered admissible by the state's failure, inability, or unwillingness to investigate or prosecute.
During the earliest stages of the investigation, the Court may not yet have made a determination under Article 17 but, if proposed Article 16[11 bis] is retained, may have deferred to the state investigation. Transfer would at that stage be premature. The ICC should, however, make the suspect available for questioning.
PRE-INVESTIGATION DETERMINATION OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND ADMISSIBILITY
Article 16[11 bis]
Proposed Article 16[11 bis]183 is intended to apply at a preliminary stage, once the ICC prosecutor has determined that sufficient basis exists to launch an investigation. The procedures in Article 16[11 bis] would enable a state to delay an ICC investigation unless the prosecutor determines -- and the Pre-Trial Chamber agrees -- that there has been a total or partial collapse of the state's legal system or that the state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out an investigation and prosecution. The decision to defer to a state investigation would not be able to be re-examined until six months or one year after the date of deferral.
Existing provisions safeguarding complementarity
Provisions ensuring the rigorous protection of the principle of complementarity are already incorporated into the statute. As stated above, a very high threshold for admissibility is codified in Article 11. Prior to initiating an investigation the prosecutor must "determine whether... the case is or would be admissible under Article 15...."184 If the prosecutor so determines and the investigation does proceed, states that are genuinely investigating or prosecuting may challenge admissibility prior to or at the commencement of a trial, under Article 17. Article 17 further obliges the Court to satisfy itself as to the admissibility of a case at all stages of the proceedings, on its own motion.
The legitimate scope of article 16 [11 bis]
In the light of these existing statutory protections of the complementarity principle, there is limited scope for further provisions to protect this principle. Human Rights Watch sees the legitimate scope of Article 11 bis as covering only the very preliminary stage at which it may be premature for the prosector or chamber of the Court to make any determination as to admissibility. At the moment when a matter is first referred to the Court, for example--such as shortly after the alleged commission of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction--even a state that is willing and able to investigate may not have taken sufficient investigative steps to satisfy the Court that it meets the complementarity test. There may therefore be some scope for the statute to provide for a conditional deferral, until such time as the Court is able to make a determination as to complementarity under Article 17. The current text of Article 16[11 bis] is too broadly formulated, inconsistent with other provisions of the statute and, most importantly, renders the Court susceptible to the obstruction of justice.
Certain of the following recommendations on Article 16[11 bis] reflect those made in the context of Article 17, concerning the right to appeal and the appropriate burden of proof, while others reiterate the need for consistency between the two articles. The majority relate to specific concerns which would have to be addressed if delegates agree to some legitimate scope for Article 16[11 bis].
· Recommendation: Limit pre-investigative notification to state parties, deleting the obligation of the prosecutor to make a public announcement prior to initiating an investigation.
Comment: Paragraph 1 of proposed Article 16[11 bis] obliges the prosecutor to make a "public announcement" of his or her plans to initiate an investigation as well as notifying all states parties to the ICC statute.185 As such, it goes beyond earlier proposals that state parties should be notified. A public announcement would involve notification not simply to states but also to suspects, which would entail certain obvious dangers. While we recognize that the announcement will provide information as to a "matter" and not specify which individuals are the subject of an investigation, it will often be clear from the facts given, and signal an opportunity for flight of suspects, tampering with evidence, or intimidation of witnesses.
Scope of article 16 [11 bis]
· Recommendation: Article 16[11 bis] should be brought into line with Article 17. It should be clarified that Article 16[11 bis] does not supersede Article 17, but rather operates only at a stage where a determination as to admissibility under that article is not appropriate.
Comment: In situations where a state challenges admissibility claiming to be genuinely investigating or prosecuting a case, and that the case is inadmissible under Article 15, the procedure in Article 17 applies and the case will be deemed admissible or inadmissible. If Article 16[11 bis] is retained, it should be clarified that it is intended to apply in those circumstances not covered by the scope of Article 17. The scope of Article 16[11 bis], as identified in the introduction, should cover only the very preliminary stage at which a determination of admissibility is impossible or would be premature and therefore inappropriate.
Time restrictions on deferral
· Recommendation: If the prosecutor defers investigation under Article 16[11 bis], he or she should be entitled to reopen the question of admissibility "at any time" if new facts indicate that the state is not satisfying the complementarity requirements set out in Article 15.
Comment: Under the current text of the proposal, if the Court decides to defer to an investigation by the state and the prosecutor is unsuccessful in challenging this decision, the prosecutor may not seek to review this decision until a period of six months or a year has lapsed. By freezing the prosecutor's ability to act for six months or one year after the date of deferral, Article 16[11 bis] provides ample opportunity to destroy evidence and otherwise obstruct justice. This arbitrary time restriction should be deleted in favor of a provision that-consistent with Article 17-allows a prosecutor who has deferred investigation to reopen the question of admissibility "at any time" if new facts indicate that the state is not satisfying the complementarity requirements set out in Article 15. It would be anomalous to allow the ICC to reconsider the admissibility of a case at any time, where a deferral under Article 17 has been made, and impose a higher standard where the Court has deferred under Article 16[11 bis], in the absence of any prior determination that complementarity had in fact been met.
This flexibility is particularly important since Article 16[11 bis] provides for deferral of a "situation" in general terms, not simply a case, a state may indeed be investigating a situation in general, but turn out not to investigate crucial aspects of it, or to pursue certain cases resulting from it.186 The statute must not bar the ICC from the proper exercise of its jurisdiction where "situations," broadly formulated, are being investigated selectively or arbitrarily on the national level. At any time after a deferral to a state investigation, the Court should be able to make a determination as to complementarity and exercise its jurisdiction.
Preservation of evidence
· Recommendation: In situations where an investigation is deferred according to Article 16[11 bis], the prosecutor must be allowed to take the steps necessary to preserve evidence, and for this purpose have access to both physical evidence and witnesses.
Comment: If an ICC investigation is to be deferred under a modified Article 16[11 bis], deferral should be subject to the ICC prosecutor's right to preserve orsafeguard evidence. For this purpose, deferral should be permitted only on the condition that the prosecutor be able to take steps as he or she deems necessary to prevent vital evidence from being compromised or lost. In some cases, when there is little reason to fear obstruction of justice, the ICC prosecutor could simply monitor national proceedings. In situations of greater risk, the ICC prosecutor would need direct access to physical evidence and the ability to conduct preliminary interviews of witnesses in order to preserve any evidence which would prove necessary for a case before the ICC should national proceedings fail.
· Recommendation 1: Allow the prosecutor to appeal any decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to defer to the state.
Comment: Contrary to Article 17(4), which provides that decisions on admissibility may be appealed by either party, paragraph 3 of proposed Article 16[11 bis] apparently does not allow the prosecutor the opportunity to appeal a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to "defer" to the state for such a period. Article 16[11 bis] should be brought into line with Article 17 in this respect.
· Recommendation 2: The text should provide for expedited appeals
Comment: The possibility of lengthy litigation before the two ICC judicial chambers could provide added opportunity to obstruct justice. In an effort to avoid this, while respecting the important interest that states and the prosecutor may have in appealing, an expedited system for appealing the decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber to defer or not to defer should be established.
· Recommendation 3: The decision on appeal should be made by a simple majority.
Comment: In addition, the proposal for a supermajority or unanimous judicial decision before the ICC prosecutor would be empowered to override national proceedings sets too high a threshold. If states are concerned that the ICC might be swayed by emotions or political pressures, the solution is to have a stringent initial selection process for the ICC judges and prosecutor to ensure that individuals of only the highest caliber are selected. Thereafter, confidence must be placed in their integrity and professionalism rather than constructing excessively high procedural hurdles that pose too great a risk of impeding the effective functioningof the Court. As indicated in the latest text of Article 82(4), appellate confirmations of judgments require, and should require, only a simple majority.
Burden of proof
· Recommendation: The state seeking deferral should bear the burden of proving that the investigation or prosecution on the national level are sufficient to justify deferral. This should apply also in the event of any appeal against the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision, by a state or the prosecutor.
Comment: The proposed Article 16[11 bis] creates a strong presumption in favor of national proceedings and suggests that, in the event of a challenge to the sufficiency of national proceedings, the burden of proof would be on the ICC prosecutor to demonstrate their insufficiency. This would impose a potentially impossible burden on the prosecutor, as most of the relevant information about national proceedings would be in the hands of national authorities, not the ICC prosecutor. Instead, the burden of proof should be placed on the party best able to produce the relevant evidence: the state party. While the ICC prosecutor could fairly be expected to make a preliminary showing that there is reason to believe that national proceedings are insufficient, the crossing of that threshold should shift the burden of proof to the state party in question to demonstrate that its investigative and prosecutorial efforts remain vigorous and genuine.
Multiple challenges to admissibility on the basis of complementarity
· Recommendation: Admissibility should be challenged by states only once. If the state challenges at this pre-investigative phase and loses, it should not, in general, be able to challenge again under Article 17. The Court should be able to make an exception to this general rule.
Comment: In the event that the ICC's Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers uphold the prosecutor's decision to proceed, proposed Article 16[11 bis] would enable the state to lodge further challenges to admissibility on the grounds of complementarity under Article 17. Paragraph 5 of proposed Article 16[11 bis] permits the state to have two opportunities to challenge admissibility, notwithstanding that this was clearly not envisioned by Article 17(3), which provides that a person or state may challenge admissibility only once.
Permitting multiple challenges to admissibility would unduly delay the prosecutor's ability to proceed with investigations and prosecutions, and potentially jeopardize the integrity of the evidence, as outlined above. While basic due process would require allowing an individual defendant to challenge admissibility post-indictment, particularly as he or she may not have had the opportunity to do so at an earlier stage, there is in general no need to give the state a second opportunity to raise the matter if it has already done so unsuccessfully at the investigative stage.
However, Article 16[11 bis] should provide--as Article 17 does--that in exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a second challenge to be brought. This would cover the situation where substantial new facts are available, or where a challenge based on the investigation of a "situation" under Article 16[11 bis] failed, but different considerations pertain in respect of the investigation of a particular "case" arising out of that situation. For example, it is conceivable that, in exceptional cases, a state may fail to satisfy the Court that it had met the relevant standard in its investigation of the situation as a whole, but be able to satisfy the Court that it has conducted genuine, thorough investigations in one particular case. The Court should be endowed with the flexibility to embrace these situations, while ensuring that multiple challenges based on the same facts cannot obstruct and delay the important work of the ICC.
169 Note that to determine "unwillingness" the Court will consider whether the proceedings had the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility, or there has been undue delay inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice, or the proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially and were conducted in a manner inconsistent with the intent to bring the person to justice.
170 Article 6.
171 See Preamble to the statute.
172 The principle of exhaustion of "available" local remedies is set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which states, Article 41(1)(c), that "all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law." This is reflected in Article 26 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention on Human Rights. Further, international bodies have determined that the general rule as to exhaustion of domestic remedies does not apply in circumstances in which domestic remedies are considered ineffective although available. See for example, the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (Ser. D) No.3, (1994), para.95-7.
173 The delegation of the United States of America.
174 General Assembly Resolution 47/133 of December 18, 1992.
175 See, in particular, the U.N. Human Rights Committee Commentary on the Report of Argentina, April 5, 1995, where the Human Rights Committee determined that the Argentine amnesty law was incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant. It did so, on the basis that, inter alia, the law promoted an atmosphere of impunity for the authors of violations of human rights and consequently undermined the protection of those rights. Comentarios al informe Argentino, 5 April 1995, UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add 46.
176 The commission has reported on the illegality of amnesty laws in several cases. See in particular Reports 28/92 and 29/92 regarding the application of amnesty laws in Uruguay and Argentina respectively.
177 Report of June 21, 1985, UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16/Rev.1.
178 Within this framework, precise details of how challenges are to be made can be set out in the Rules of Procedure.
179 The "directly affected" formulation reflects Rule 108 of the Rules and Procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia allowing states to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal where the state is "directly affected" by the decision. The Appeals Chamber, in its judgment of July 29, 1997, in the case of The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, described Rule 108, which was adopted on July 24, 1997, in the following terms: "[t]he rule was adopted to fill a perceived lacuna in the Statute and Rules, namely that a state whose interests were intimately affected by a decision of the Trial Chamber could not request the Decision be submitted to appellate review."
180 See the section on Article 17[11 bis] below.
181 See the bracketed option at Article 54(3)[47(1)ter].
182 Such provision would correspond with the power which the Pre-Trial Chamber already enjoys, in the context of an investigation, to "take measures... to assure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings...." It should be clear that this also applies where a decision on admissibility is pending.
183 Article 16[11 bis] was proposed on March 25, 1998, by the U.S. delegation. Unlike Article 15, this article was not discussed during the March/April Preparatory Committee session and does not represent the fruit of extensive negotiation and compromise.
184 See the current unbracketed text of Article 54.
185 See Article 54(2)(a)[47(1)bis(a)].
186 An example would be a case of genocide where the state decided to investigate only those immediately responsible, omitting investigation of those responsible for engineering the policy behind the acts, or the investigation of war crimes committed in a particular time or place but pursuing only crimes committed by one side and ignoring the other.
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