External pressures are essential to force police administrators to improve accountability, but police brutality will only subside once higher-ranking police officials judge their subordinates - and are judged themselves - on their efforts to provide sufficient and consistent oversight.104 As the Christopher Commissionstated, "The problem of excessive force in the LAPD is fundamentally a problem of supervision, management and leadership."105 Absent constant vigilance, clear departmental policies, consistent enforcement of those policies, and a "zero tolerance" approach to both abuse and the code of silence that surrounds it, police brutality will continue to undermine police-community relations.

Unfortunately, in every city we examined, police leadership on this issue is lacking. Most high-ranking police officials, whether at the level of commissioner, chief, superintendent, or direct superiors, seem uninterested in vigorously pursuing high standards for treatment of persons in custody. When reasonably high standards are set, superior officers are often unwilling to require that their subordinates consistently meet them.

The heads of police departments set a tone, whether openly hostile toward victims of abuse, such as during the eras of Frank Rizzo in Philadelphia (who served as police commissioner and then mayor and who reportedly vowed to "make Attila the Hun look like a faggot"106) and Police Chief Daryl Gates in Los Angeles, or a positive tone, such as that set by reformers Patrick Murphy, the New York City police commissioner during the 1970s, or Joseph McNamara, the former police chief in San Jose, California from 1976 to 1991. Tone-setting is particularly important following police corruption or brutality scandals. Willie Williams, for example, became Los Angeles police chief in the aftermath of the King beating, and most observers credited him with injecting a sense of professionalism in the department. Currently, Richard Pennington, the police superintendent in New Orleans since October 1994, is attempting to "clean house" and implement reforms in an exceptionally troubled department; Chief Robert Olson in Minneapolis appears dedicated to instilling a culture of accountability, and the new LAPD chief, Bernard Parks, has a reputation as a strict disciplinarian in misconduct cases. Unfortunately, even when good chiefs attempt to improve accountability for misconduct, progressfalters once the individual leader leaves the department. In other cases, police chiefs or commissioners have made good-faith efforts to reform, only to be faced with overwhelming resistance among deputies or others on the force.

104 For example, the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, calls for accountability for superior officers: "Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held responsible if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command areresorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress or report such use. Principle 24. UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).

105 Christopher Commission report, p. 32.

106 Indeed, during Rizzo's tenure as mayor, Philadelphia police officers made no more arrests than New York City officers, but were thirty-seven times more likely to shoot unarmed citizens nonviolent crimes. Michael Kramer, "How cops go bad," Time Magazine, December 15, 1997, citing James J. Fyfe, "Philadelphia police shootings, 1975-78: a system model analysis," a report for the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, March 1980.